SIR HARRY SMITH DETACHED FROM THE MAIN ARMY—HE REDUCES THE
FORTRESSES OF FUTTEYGHUR AND DHURMCOTE—COMBINES WITH
COLONEL PHILLIPS AT JUGRAON, AND AFTER CHANGING HIS ROUTE
TO LOODIANA ENCOUNTERS THE ENEMY AT BUDOWAL, AND LOSES
SOME PART OF HIS BAGGAGE—HE RELIEVES LOODIANA, AND, BEING
REINFORCED AND THE ENEMY HAVING RETREATED, OCCUPIES HIS
POSITION AT BUDOWAL.
On the 16th January the Commander-in-Chief sent for me, and told me the
Governor-General was desirous that the small fortress of Futteyghur
and the larger one of Dhurmcote, both slightly garrisoned by the
enemy, should be reduced, as under their cover he was drawing supplies
from the left bank and crossing them over. His Excellency said, “A
Brigade will be sufficient to send, the 3rd Light Cavalry and some
Irregular Horse; but who will you send?” I replied I had rather go
myself. Sir Hugh Gough was much pleased with my offering to do so,
for I subsequently ascertained it was the Governor-General’s desire I
should be ordered. The Commander-in-Chief said, “When will you march?
there is no hurry.” I said, “Soon after this time to-morrow I shall
be writing my report that I have reduced them both.” He laughed and
said, “Why, the distance to Dhurmcote is twenty-six miles from your
right.” I replied, “I know that; still, what I say shall be, provided
that the officer and the Engineers supply me in time with the powder I
want to blow in the gates in the case of necessity.” I said to myself,
“However, powder or no powder, I march.”
When I reached camp, I found that, without my knowledge, the
Commissariat had sent almost all the tent elephants and other transport
into Ferozepore for provisions; some, however, arrived in the night.
These provisions I laid hold of, and I collected every animal in camp
for the use of the troops ordered to move, and I marched two hours
before daylight. On my approach Futteyghur was abandoned, and I pushed
on to Dhurmcote, which I reached by two o’clock in the afternoon, and
found it occupied, but without any gun deserving the name of cannon. I
invested it immediately with the 3rd Light Cavalry and Irregulars (the
infantry not being yet up), and summoned the garrison to surrender.
It received my flag of truce, and the leader or _killadar_ came out
and made a variety of stipulations, which I cut short by saying, “You
may march out with your arms, ground them on the glacis, and I will
endeavour to secure all hands six weeks’ pay. Go back to the fort. I
give you 20 minutes to consider, after which I shall make no terms,
but open my cannon upon you.” I waited 25 minutes, and no communication
being made, although I rode close to the works myself and beckoned to
them, I ordered our 9-pounders and a howitzer to open a few shots. The
Sikh flag was then hauled down, and a white one hoisted. I allowed the
garrison to march out and lay down their arms as prisoners of war,
and as the Infantry arrived, I immediately occupied the fortress and
commenced improving its defences. I was thus able to report, as I had
promised, to my Commander-in-Chief.
I had orders to reconnoitre the country around to ascertain its
resources and the feeling of amity or hostility of the neighbourhood.
Near me the villages were Mussulman and well disposed. Dhurmcote itself
belonged to a Sirdar in the enemy’s camp, but the people, when the hand
of power was manifested, were civil and brought me all the supplies I
required.
Having made so long a march on the 17th and being desirous to put the
fortress in a state of defence, I had resolved to halt on the 18th,
when I received a communication to say that on the 19th I should
receive a reinforcement of two troops of Horse Artillery (viz. 12
guns), H.M.’s 16th Lancers, and the remainder of the corps of Irregular
Horse under Brigadier Cureton. Upon these reaching me, I should have
a Brigade of Cavalry, one of Infantry, and 18 guns. With this force I
was to move on to Jugraon, thence open a communication with Busseean,
the line nine miles to the interior of Jugraon, on which our enormous
battering train, stores, treasure, and ammunition, covering an extent
of ten miles of road, was marching. I was informed that I might get
hold of H.M.’s 53rd Regiment at Busseean, and if so, they were to obey
my orders. Under any circumstances, I was to open a communication
with Loodiana (distant from Jugraon, by the direct roads _viâ_ the
little fortress of Budowal, twenty-five or twenty-six miles), it being
threatened by Runjoor Singh’s army of 50 guns and 30,000 men, which had
crossed at Philour by boats and was in position at Baranhara, seven
miles from Loodiana. The force at Loodiana, under Lieutenant-Colonel
Godby, 30th Regiment N.I., consisted of one Regiment, the 5th Native
Cavalry, the 30th and 36th Sermoor and Nusseeree Battalions, and four
guns Horse Artillery.
On the 19th I marched the Infantry to Koharee, halfway to Jugraon,
which divided the distance, and I left orders at Dhurmcote for Colonel
Cureton to move on the 20th to Jugraon, where he was to join me, which
was effected accordingly. On reaching Jugraon, I received a report from
Lieutenant-Colonel Phillips, commanding H.M.’s 53rd Regiment, to whom
I had sent orders to Busseean to move on without delay to Jugraon. He
begged a day’s halt, representing that his transport was done. I had
opened a communication with Colonel Godby commanding at Loodiana. I
received the most pressing and urgent reasons for my joining him, and
I was equally urged by the Governor-General and the Commander-in-Chief
to move on to save Loodiana and drive back the invaders under Runjoor
Singh and the Rajah of Ladwa. Hence the necessity to concentrate every
soldier I could lay my hands on for the purpose. I therefore sent
Lieutenant Smith of the Engineers over from Jugraon to Busseean, with
a written order for Colonel Phillips to march immediately—provided it
were possible. He marched, and the 16th Lancers and guns had reached me.
I here annex a narrative written at the Period.
“When I reached Jugraon on the 20th January, all accounts agreed
that the enemy was still at Baranhara, thirty miles from me, between
Loodiana and Philour, a fortress of his on the right bank of the
Sutlej, under cover of which he had crossed and perfected his invasion;
but that he had also occupied with a small garrison the fortress of
Budowal, which had been abandoned by the troops of a chief in amity
with us, and that he had near it some two or three hundred Horse. He
was also known to possess a fortress called Gungrana, regarded as
very strong, to my right (that is, its parallel) about ten miles from
Budowal into our interior, where there was also Cavalry.
“I got hold of the 53rd Regiment on the evening of the 20th, the day
I arrived at Jugraon. My force therefore stood thus: eighteen guns,
one Regiment of English Cavalry (16th Lancers), one Regiment of
Native Light Cavalry, one Regiment of Irregular Horse, two Regiments
of British Infantry (H.M.’s 31st and 53rd), 250 convalescents, and
two very weak Regiments of Native Infantry (the 24th and 47th). At
Jugraon was a very tenable fortress occupied by the troops of a
Rajah considered to be friendly, but in time of war and doubtful
success friendship is precarious. I therefore occupied the fortress
(or rather its citadel) by two Companies of my Native Infantry, and
resolved as soon as the moon was up, viz. at half-past twelve, to
march on Loodiana, leaving Budowal to my right, _i.e._ by the best,
shortest, and direct road, and I ordered all baggage which consisted of
_wheel-carriage_ transport, to remain behind under the protection of
the fort of Jugraon.
“Meanwhile, every two hours I dispatched instructions of these my
intentions to the officer who commanded at Loodiana, whom I ordered to
meet me with his force of four Horse Artillery guns, an excellent and
strong Regiment of Native Cavalry, and four good and fresh Regiments
of Native Infantry. All the while I believed the enemy’s force to be
at Baranhara, thirty miles from me, but only seven from Loodiana. My
order of march was in writing, also my instructions for the baggage
and detail of its guards, and I read them on the afternoon of the
20th to all the officers in command. I marched in the most regular
order at the hour appointed, with the desire to leave Budowal to my
right, and not move by the interior line, _i.e._ between Gungrana and
Budowal, two fortresses in the occupation of the enemy, distant only
four miles from _both_ my flanks, so that my march would be subject
to double interruption. The large force nearly equal to mine was to
have approached me from Loodiana, within three miles of Budowal on its
own side, on a strong hill and position I well knew of, Sonnact. The
natives here were most hostile, and it is an axiom, and a very just
one, in the conduct of war, ‘distant combinations are not to be relied
on.’ Hence, although I calculated upon this combination, I did not
rely upon it, but adopted my own measures for advance with caution and
circumspection, relying alone on my own resources.
“When I had marched some sixteen or eighteen miles in the most perfect
order of advance to within two miles of Budowal, as day dawned, I
received a communication from Colonel Godby that the enemy had marched
from Baranhara and was encamped around Budowal with his whole force,
and from some villagers I ascertained that the enemy had received
considerable reinforcements. I found myself thus close upon him, and
he in force. I had one of two alternatives, viz. to move on, leaving
Budowal to my right and most probably the moving Sikh army on my
left—in other words, to force my passage; or to leave Budowal to my
left and make a _détour_ towards Gungrana. To return to Jugraon I never
contemplated, which would have exposed Colonel Godby as previously
stated. The stake at issue was too great, hence I changed my order of
march and proceeded with every precaution, leaving the fort of Budowal
on my _left_, and with my troops in order of battle by wheeling into
line to their left if required. Several times during our night march we
had observed rockets firing, as if for signals, and at broad daylight
we discovered the enemy preparing to interrupt my newly adopted line of
march, though his most ample preparation, as I afterwards discovered,
had been made for my reception on the more direct road by which I had
originally intended to move, and upwards of forty pieces of cannon
pointed there, so perfect was his information.
“So soon as the enemy had discovered that I had changed my line of
march for the relief of Loodiana, he immediately attempted to interrupt
my force by moving parallel to my column through a line of villages
which afforded him cover and protection, and by providing him with good
roads facilitated his march, while I was compelled to move in order of
battle over ploughed fields of deep sand. Hence the head of the enemy’s
column, principally a large body of cavalry, rapidly outflanked me a
mile at least, and his rear of guns and infantry equally so. With great
celerity he brought to bear on my troops a considerable number of guns
of very heavy metal. The cavalry moved parallel with the enemy, and
protected from the fire of his guns by a low ridge of sandhills. My
eighteen guns I kept together close in rear of the cavalry, in order
to open a heavy fire on the enemy and to check his advance, thereby
attracting his attention, so soon as the fortunate moment which I saw
approaching arrived.
“This fire, which I continued for some ten minutes, had a most
auxiliary effect, creating slaughter and confusion in the enemy’s
ranks. The enemy’s cannonade upon the column of Infantry had been
previously to this furious. I had reinforced the baggage guard, and
sent orders that it should close up and keep well on the reverse flank
and as much ahead as possible. A few round shot ricocheting among
the camels, many of the drivers abandoned their animals, and our own
followers and the hostile villages in the neighbourhood plundered a
part of the baggage: little of it fell into the hands of the enemy’s
soldiers.
“As the column moved on under this cannonade, which was especially
furious upon the rear of the Infantry, the enemy, with a dexterity
and quickness not to be exceeded, formed a line of seven battalions
directly across my rear, with guns in the intervals of battalions,
for the purpose of attacking _my_ column with _his_ line. This was a
very able and well-executed move, which rendered my position critical
and demanded nerve and decision to evade the coming storm. I would
willingly have attacked this line, and I formed up a part of the 31st
Regiment as a base, when so deep was the sand and so fatigued were my
men, I was compelled to abandon the project. I therefore, under this
fierce cannonade, changed front on the centre of the 31st Regiment and
of the 53rd by what is a difficult move on parade even—a countermarch
on the centre by wings. Then became conspicuous the majesty of
discipline and bravery. This move was executed as accurately as at a
review.
“My Native Regiments were very steady, but I now directed the Infantry
to march on Loodiana in échelon of Battalions, ready to receive the
word ‘Halt, Front’ (when they would thus confront the enemy’s line if
he advanced), and the Cavalry to move in échelon of squadrons, the two
arms mutually supporting, the guns in rear of the Cavalry. The whole
were moving most correctly and the movement was so steady that the
enemy, notwithstanding his overwhelming force, did not attack, but
stood amazed, as it were, fearing to quit his stronghold of Budowal,
and aware that the junction of my force with that of Loodiana was about
to be accomplished.
“I was astonished, I admit, at hearing nothing from Colonel Godby. I
had reason to hope some of my two-hourly dispatches had reached him,
and when at daylight I changed the direction of my march on account
of the enemy having anticipated me, I sent Lieutenant Holmes with a
party of Irregulars, cautioning him to look as sharp to his right on
account of Gungrana as to his left. I soon after sent off Lieutenant
Swetenham of the 16th Lancers, and a short time later Lieutenant Band
Smith of the Engineers. All these officers reached their destination.
From the repeated and urgent requests made by Colonel Godby that I
should advance to his relief, from _his then knowledge_ that the enemy
had anticipated me, I had every reason (supposing he had secured no
_positive information_ of my march from Jugraon or my orders) to
expect some co-operation or demonstration in my support, as I moved
towards him. On the contrary, my first messenger found his troops only
turning out, he having only just received my instructions, and his
force did not move off until the firing had commenced, about half-past
seven or eight, at a distance of between eight and nine miles—another
illustration of the truth of the axiom, ‘distant combinations are not
to be relied on.’ The natural expectation, too, of Colonel Godby’s
move towards me cramped my manœuvres, for had I swerved from the
line on which I expected his co-operation, his force would have been
compromised and in the power of the enemy’s weighty attack. The
reinforcement of four guns, a strong and fresh Regiment of Cavalry, and
four Regiments of fresh Infantry is a powerful reinforcement to a large
army; to me it was nearly one-half of the whole. Decision, coolness,
and determination effected the junction and relief of Loodiana, while
it cut off the enemy from his line of communication with Philour, under
which fortress he had crossed the Sutlej.
“A want of water in a position near the enemy compelled me to encamp
in front of Loodiana, but I established my outposts close upon him,
and frequently made strong patrols up to his position, intending, if
he dared attempt to interrupt our line of communication _viâ_ Busseean
(which I did not, although I so closely watched him, anticipate, so
close was I upon him, and the fortress of Jugraon before him), to move
on, _coûte que coúte_, and attack under any circumstances. Indeed, my
combined force would well have enabled me to do so, had I come up with
him when on the march and out of his entrenchments.
“Meanwhile the Commander-in-Chief, with great foresight and judgment,
ordered the second Brigade of my Division, under Brigadier Wheeler, a
Regiment of Native Cavalry, the Body Guard, 400 strong, and four guns
Horse Artillery, to move from Hurreekee _viâ_ Dhurmcote and Jugraon
to join me, while a second Brigade under Brigadier Taylor was ordered
in support to Dhurmcote, and the Shekawuttee Brigade was moving on
Jugraon. Thus the enemy’s position at Budowal was menaced on three
points.
“He expected considerable reinforcements _viâ_ the Tulwun Ghaut,
eight miles lower down the Sutlej than Philour. He therefore,
again with judgment, abandoned his position of Budowal, in which
I was making vigorous preparations to attack him, and fell back
upon the reinforcement of 12 guns and 4000 of Regular Infantry of
Avitabile’s Corps and a large addition of Cavalry. This movement,
however, must have been premeditated, for the stores of ammunition
and his fortifications around the ford were not the work of a day. I
immediately occupied the enemy’s position at Budowal, and as rapidly
as possible concentrated my force coming from Dhurmcote and Busseean
(viz.: Wheeler’s from the former, and the Shekawuttee from the latter),
while I dispensed with the service of Brigadier Taylor’s Brigade in
reserve at Dhurmcote, feeling myself now sufficiently strong, and being
aware of the importance of Infantry to the Commander-in-Chief, who to
reinforce me had considerably reduced his own means in the immediate
front of the main army of the Sikhs. This is the _précis_ of the
campaign leading to the Battle of Aliwal, and from this period taken up
in my report of that glorious battle, herewith annexed.”[139]