AFFAIRS IN THE PUNJAUB—SIR HENRY HARDINGE SUCCEEDS LORD
ELLENBOROUGH AS GOVERNOR-GENERAL—OUTBREAK OF THE FIRST SIKH
WAR—BATTLE OF MOODKEE.
Cawnpore, 7th September, 1846.
The narrative by way of my history which ceased in 1843 must now be
renewed, as it embraces the most important period of my eventful life,
as far as public services go. In my capacity of Adjutant-General of
Her Majesty’s forces at Headquarters (which in the cold weather moved
about on the plains, in the hot enjoyed the cool and bracing atmosphere
of the Himalayas at Simla), I had every opportunity of watching the
gradually gathering storm in the Punjaub, until it was suspended over
our heads in November, 1845, ready to burst, though where, when, or how
no one dared venture a decided opinion. Most certainly, however, no
one contemplated a powerful invasion, or imagined that the Sikhs were
in communication with the [princes?] and influential men of British
India so far as Delhi. At the period when this was written, the history
of the rise of the Punjaub as a nation was well known to all, but ere
these pages come to light it may be forgotten or partially so. A
slight compendium of this history is therefore annexed.
The kingdom called the Punjaub extends from the Hindoo Koosh (a branch
of the Himalayas) on the north, is bounded by that range on the east,
by the Indus to the west, by the Sutlej, to its confluence with the
Indus, to the south. However, a considerable portion of the territory
_south_ of the Sutlej was under the rule of the Lahore Government, and
this became the seat of the great war in 1845-6.
This tract of country was consolidated by the conquest of various
independent principalities by the ability, enterprise, and foresight of
the celebrated Runjeet Singh, who raised himself to pre-eminence and
absolute power from the middle class of society. Hence the old Sikh
families, the ancient Rajpoots, although subdued into obedience, were
ever distrustful of him and he was ever obnoxious to them; hence the
seeds of discord which so rapidly sprung up on the decease of Runjeet
Singh, and which concluded in this war so fatal to the Sikh.
The whole Punjaub contains about a quarter of a million of Sikhs,
the chief part to be found around Lahore and the beautiful city of
Umritsir. A Sikh cultivator is seldom seen. The Sikhs, although
professing a religion of Brahmanical tenets and established by their
great priest and prophet Govind Gooroo, drink to excess, eat opium and
bangh (a species of wild hemp possessing narcotic and intoxicating
qualities of the most enervating description), and regard the
abstemious Hindoo and the sensual Mussulman with contempt. Hence the
labour of the fields and every other labour fall upon the two latter
races, and they have always been favourably disposed to the British.
[Illustration:
MAP TO ILLUSTRATE THE SUTLEJ CAMPAIGN, 1845-6. [_Opposite p. 498._]
Runjeet Singh’s great policy was a firm adherence to the rulers of
British India. He had observed in 1811 [1808?] the discipline of
some of our Seapoys who formed an escort to Mr. Metcalfe (ultimately
Lord Metcalfe) on an embassy to the Court of Lahore. This escort,
when treacherously attacked by a fanatical sect not then subdued to
Runjeet’s authority, called Akalies, so boldly and ably defended
itself, that, observing the effect of discipline, the acute Runjeet
instantly set to work to organize his own army on a similar footing. He
invited foreigners, especially Frenchmen, to enter his service, and was
liberal to many of them in the extreme. Under such instruction, a most
powerful army sprung up, composed of Cuirassiers, Light Infantry most
highly equipped, numerous Artillery (in which Runjeet had great faith),
and beautifully appointed and organized Infantry. Runjeet spared
neither expense nor exertion, and such a spirit of superiority and
strength was infused into this army that it believed itself invincible
and the most powerful in the world. Runjeet died in June, 1839, leaving
this powerful army, estimated by us as of the following strength:—
40,000 Cavalry, regular and irregular, among which a Brigade of
Akalies in cuirasses and chain armour, “The Invincibles.”
120,000 Regular Infantry.
Innumerable Irregulars—every inhabitant being a soldier.
400 pieces of cannon ready to take the field, (for Runjeet had spared
neither pains nor expense to improve the breed of horses, and his
efforts were attended with great success.)
From the death of Runjeet Singh in 1839 to 1845 a succession of
revolutions and murders of Kings and Princes continued, first one
party, then another, supporting a reputed son of Runjeet on the throne,
who was as sure to be murdered in the sanguinary struggles of that
Reign of Terror. A Hill family, elevated for their personal beauty
rather than their talents (although some of them were far from wanting
abilities), became conspicuous, and many fell with the puppets of
their creation. This family received the soubriquet of Lords of the
Hills, Jummoo being the fortified hold of the head of the family. Its
most conspicuous members were Goolab Singh and Dhyan Singh. Dhyan and
his son Heera Singh were both Prime Ministers, or Wuzeer, and both
were murdered in 1844. Such was the power of the standing army, it
acknowledged no other authority, set up Kings and deposed them at
pleasure, and at the period of the commencement of the war, a boy
(Dhuleep Singh), born of a Hill woman of great ability and reputed the
son of old Runjeet, was the nominal King, Lal Singh was Wuzeer, and Tej
Singh Commander-in-Chief of this rabble (though highly organized and
numerous) army. It must be obvious that such a state of things could
not last. The resources of the treasury were rapidly consuming, and
with them the only power of the Queen Mother, the Rani or Regent, which
consisted in her presents and consequent popularity. All the foreign
officers had absconded except one Frenchman, a man of neither note
nor talent, and a Spanish Engineer by name Hubon, a low-bred man, but
clever, acute, and persevering.
The British Government of India had acknowledged this Regency, and was
desirous to retain amicable relationship with the Punjaub, but in the
middle of the year 1845, so unruly and clamorous for war was the Sikh
army, all negotiations terminated, and a state of uncertainty ensued
which made it necessary for British India, without declaring hostility,
to place itself on a footing to resist it, should so mad an enterprise
ensue.
Meanwhile in 1844 Lord Ellenborough was recalled, and succeeded as
Governor-General by Sir Henry Hardinge, a statesman and a soldier of
Wellington’s, in either capacity celebrated for judgment, ability,
and foresight. Upon his very arrival, he saw that a rupture with
the Punjaub was sooner or later inevitable, and he drew up an able
document on the prospects of British India in such an event, which
he submitted to the Directors. Immediately afterwards he commenced
moving every possible soldier, and commanded the material of war up to
the North-West Frontier, while a large flotilla of boats was built at
Bombay for the purpose of bridges, and sent up the Indus and thence
into the Sutlej opposite Ferozepore, where they were sunk under the
left bank of the river. By these arrangements, dictated by a perfect
military knowledge and by that foresight which bears the stamp of
prediction, Sir Henry Hardinge, in the autumn of 1845, had in readiness
for coming events nine regiments of British Infantry, three regiments
of British Cavalry, a most powerful train of Field Artillery (with
upwards of 100 field-guns, 6 and 9-pounders, and a powerful battering
train in progress), a large force of Regular and Irregular Cavalry, and
forty regiments of Native Infantry. The isolated post and fortress of
Ferozepore had been reinforced by twenty-four field guns, a regiment
of British Infantry, and Cavalry and Native Infantry, until a force
of upwards of 7000 men composed a Corps under Major-General Sir John
Littler, for the double purpose of defending Ferozepore from insult and
watching the ghauts, or fords, of the Sutlej. The assembling force was
put into Brigades and Divisions, and equipped to take the field either
on the initiative or defensive.
In December all negotiations and communications between the Regency
and ourselves had ceased at the dictation of the Sikh army, which
was clamorous for war with the British, and openly vaunted it would
place the Rani and her son upon the Imperial Throne of Delhi, and a
correspondence was actually established with that city and the line
conducting to it, for the supply of provisions to the Sikh army. This
act of treachery on the part of British subjects will show what would
be the stability of British rule in India on any other basis than that
of military power.
The means of obtaining information on the part of our political
officers, as results prove, was defective; nor can any credit attach
to Sir John Littler as a watchful outpost officer, when the enemy
gradually crossed by boats (not a bridge) an army of 70,000 men of all
arms, with an immense train of artillery and overwhelming force of
cavalry, with stores enormous, and positively established themselves
under the Commanders Tej Singh and Lal Singh, ere our authorities were
aware of it, civil or military, fortified a strong position near and
embracing the village of Ferozeshuhur, and made a demonstration as of
attack in front of Ferozepore. This was in the middle of December.
This development and invasion called for, and was met by, the most
active and vigorous measures on the part of the Governor-General and
Council. Every available regiment was pushed forward without waiting
to assemble Divisions and Brigades, although all were in order, and a
very able organization was effected, as far as the programme went. The
troops made double or forced marches, with the result that the force
of cavalry under Brigadier White, the 1st Division under Major-General
Sir Harry Smith,[133] and one Brigade of the 2nd Division under
Major-General Gilbert, reached Moodkee much fatigued and exhausted on
the morning of the eventful 18th December. One of the most able and
enterprising movements at this stage of the war was the evacuation of
Loodiana, except its fort, by order of the Governor-General, and the
march of the troops thence on Busseean, which reinforcement, joining
the troops on their hasty march on Moodkee, ensured the victory about
to be contended for.
On the 18th December a considerable force of the British army had
reached Moodkee, much exhausted, as has been said, by the necessary
length of marches and a want of water and the power of cooking.
Brigades were assembled, but not Divisions. The troops had some of them
barely reached their bivouac, when the advance of the Sikh army with
clouds of cavalry demanded an immediate turn-out in preparation to
resist an attack of fresh and infatuated troops, excited by personal
hatred, natural vanity, and the stimulants of spirits, opium, and
bangh. In place of awaiting the coming storm, our united forces being
compact, each arm in support of the other, the whole on an open plain
ready to receive the onslaught, our troops were hurried unnecessarily
into the field, and the cavalry and artillery rushed into action. Our
cavalry and artillery had driven back the Sikh cavalry most gallantly
into a very jungly or bushy country, when the enemy’s infantry brought
them up and occasioned a very considerable and most unnecessary loss.
The infantry meanwhile advancing, the right Brigade of the 1st
Division upon the right of the army under the command of Brigadier
Wheeler, but under the eye of Sir Harry Smith, was fiercely assailed
by an almost overwhelming force of Sikh infantry. These it boldly
repulsed, and, continuing to advance, took six guns and caused the
enemy an inconceivable loss. The dust was so darkening, the enemy could
only be discovered by its density and the fire.
The first part of this action was on an open country with occasional
large dense and thorny trees, into which the enemy climbed and caused
the 50th Regiment great loss. This Brigade (H.M.’s 50th, and the 42nd
and 48th Regiments Native Infantry) was more engaged than any other
part of the army. Many officers and upwards of 150 soldiers of the 50th
were wounded. Brigadier Wheeler was wounded severely; Major-General
Sale, Q.M.G. of H.M.’s Forces, who had attached himself to Sir Harry
Smith, mortally. On this occasion Sir Harry Smith greatly distinguished
himself on his celebrated black Arab “Jem Crow,” by seizing one of the
colours of H.M.’s 50th Regiment and planting them in the very teeth of
a Sikh column, and gloriously did the Regiment rush on with bayonet,
and fearful was the massacre which ensued. The left Brigade of the 1st
Division was engaged to the left of the line under Brigadier Bolton of
H.M.’s 31st Regiment (who fell mortally wounded), while the Brigades
of the 2nd Division under Major-General Gilbert and Major-General Sir
John McCaskill occupied the centre. Sir John was shot through the heart.
It is a curious circumstance in this battle that so obscured was all
vision by the dust, that it afterwards appeared that the bulk of the
Sikh forces passed in column along the front of the 1st Brigade of the
1st Division, and when repulsed by the 2nd Brigade 1st Division and
[ ] Brigade 2nd Division, were driven again across the front of the
50th, the advance of which was pushed by Sir Harry Smith. After the
troops were halted, the dust dispelled and the moon was up and shining
brightly. The 1st Brigade 1st Division then formed an obtuse angle
with the rest of the army. This brigade had gone right through the
Sikh repulsed columns. The 1st Division this day took twelve of the
seventeen guns captured from the enemy.
The Division lost at Moodkee—
Killed. Wounded. Missing. Total.
79 339 19 437
Both Brigadiers were knocked down, and one died of his wounds.
After the action the troops returned to their camp, which they reached
about half-past twelve.