SIR HUGH GOUGH SUCCEEDS SIR JASPER NICOLLS AS COMMANDER-IN-CHIEF
IN INDIA—AFFAIRS IN GWALIOR—BATTLE OF MAHARAJPORE—HARRY
SMITH MADE K.C.B.
At this period [1843] the time of command of Sir Jasper Nicolls
expired, and Sir Hugh Gough, the hero of Barossa and of China, was
appointed Commander-in-Chief. Headquarters was at the time in the
Himalaya Mountains at Simla, and, Sir Hugh having expressed a wish that
I should meet him, I and my dear wife started in the middle of the
rainy and unhealthy season on the 18th July for Calcutta by dâk.[128]
By this slow process you are carried at the rate of three and a half
miles an hour in a sort of wooden box called a palanquin. You railroad
flyers would regard it as slow indeed for a journey of 1300 miles. We
reached Allahabad, and from thence proceeded by steamboat and found
my new Commander-in-Chief. The parting with Sir J. Nicolls was as
painful as affectionate. With every member of his highly educated and
accomplished family we were on the most intimate and friendly terms,
and he was kind enough by letter to say that he ever regarded me as
a “most upright, straightforward gentleman and soldier.” On parting,
I could not fail to express regret that he had not appointed me to
command in Afghanistan, the only time I ever agitated the subject. His
answer was, “My reasons then are fully in force now, but it was no want
of the highest opinion of your abilities.” I shall ever entertain the
highest respect for Sir Jasper Nicolls as a most shrewd and sensible
man, laborious at papers, expressing himself by letter in as few words
as the Duke himself, and possessing a clear and thorough knowledge of
the affairs of India and its army. In his great error of command—I
allude to Afghanistan—there he was ever consistent, always opposed
to the occupation of that country, so distant from our resources, so
ruinous to our Treasury, but, though right in principle, he should have
yielded to the force of circumstances at the moment, _restored the
fight_, and ultimately given back the country to its lawful owners.
We were both received by Sir Hugh Gough and family with every
demonstration of a wish to cultivate that mutual friendship and good
understanding which education dictates and the good of our service
and the rules of the social compact demand. We were only in Calcutta
from the 1st to the 12th September, but twelve more laborious days we
never passed, what with an excess of correspondence, the meeting with
innumerable old friends, the formation of new, the _fêtes_ to the new
Commander-in-Chief, a great military dinner to Lord Ellenborough,
etc., and, added to it all, the muggy heat and damp of Calcutta. The
twelve days accordingly appeared to us almost months, from excitement
and fatigue mental and bodily.
His Excellency had no recreation from his labours and indefatigable
exertion, exposing himself to sun, wind, and weather both by sea and
land in the most enthusiastic manner. Such was the state of affairs in
Scindiah’s Dominions, it was evident that British interference alone
could establish any peaceful order of things. It was therefore not
only expedient, but necessary, to assemble an army for the purpose
of supporting diplomacy or of acting in open war. Lord Ellenborough
intimated this to Sir Hugh, who, with his characteristic energy, sought
information on all points, and soon saw his position, his resources,
and the means at his disposal to collect that army which should be
irresistible if compelled to take the field, or adequate to making
a demonstration which would no less surely bring about the required
result. To assemble an army in India requires much arrangement and
consideration. There are various points at which the maintenance of an
armed force is indispensable; the extent of country in our occupation
entails in all concentrations particularly long and tedious marches:
lastly, the season of the year must be rigidly attended to, for such is
the fickleness of disease and its awful ravages, that it would need an
excess of folly to leave it out of the account.
Affairs at Gwalior were still in a most disturbed state. The country
was divided into parties. One of them, since the death of the Maharaja
Scindiah [5 February, 1843], had adhered to the widow, a girl of only
fourteen, but intriguing, designing, and in the hands of a cunning
fellow, a sort of Prime Minister. This party was the strongest, and
was inimical to the British Government. Hence it became necessary, in
virtue of existing treaties, to re-establish by force of arms that
amicable relationship which the tranquillity of India demanded, as
well as to support the interests of the Maharaja, Scindiah’s heir by
another wife, a boy of ten years old. An army with a very efficient
battery train was accordingly assembled at Agra under the immediate
command of His Excellency, while a large division under Major-General
Grey was concentrated at and in the vicinity of Cawnpore. While
negotiations were in progress, the troops were to move on Gwalior to
menace the hostile party, so that we might secure the object in view
by negotiation rather than at once appeal to arms. The headquarters
army marched from Agra direct on Dholpore upon the Chumbul, while the
division under General Grey was to create a diversion and threaten
Gwalior by a march to southward. According to the rules of strategy
and correct principles of military combination, this division of the
threatening or invading forces may with great reason be questioned,
when we reflect that the army of Gwalior consisted of 22,000 veteran
troops and for years had been disciplined by European officers and
well supplied with artillery, and thus an overwhelming force might
have been precipitated on Grey and his army destroyed, for he was
perfectly isolated and dependent on his own resources alone. This,
however, had not escaped the observation and due consideration of the
Commander-in-Chief. As we calculate on the power of an enemy, so may we
estimate what, according to his system of operations, he is likely to
attempt. On this occasion it was considered that if the enemy made a
descent on Grey, his division was of sufficient force to defend itself,
while our main army would have rapidly moved on Gwalior and conquered
it without a struggle through the absence of the chief part of its
army, (for strategy is totally unknown to a native army, which usually
posts itself on a well-chosen position and awaits an attack).
The leading incidents which led to the outbreak of war have been so
recently and so distinctly recorded, I have only to observe that
the policy pursued by the Governor-General was of the most correct
character. He gave the State of Gwalior full time for reflexion, and
demanded only such an arrangement as could alone restore the youthful
Maharaja to his birthright, and produce harmony within the State and
peace and tranquillity without. It admits of considerable discussion
whether or not the Governor-General was justified in crossing the
Chumbul, and thereby invading the territory of a kingdom he was
treating with, when one of the great preliminaries had been granted,
viz. the surrender of the Dada Khasgee Wala, the adviser and lover
of the young widow and the Prime Minister. However, the army under
the Commander-in-Chief crossed the Chumbul by ford above Dholpore,
while Grey’s Division entered the dominion of Scindiah _viâ_ Koonah
and crossed the boundary, the river Scinde, in the neighbourhood of
Kohee, avoiding, however, the Antree Pass, which would have exposed
his advance to considerable interruption. The army, after crossing the
Chumbul, moved into a position on the Koharee rivulet (the banks of
which are intersected by small ravines so as to be impassable but by
certain roads), and about eight miles from the ford of the Chumbul. The
position was one rather chosen for the pomp and ceremony of a visit
from the widow, the Maharaja, and the Court, which was expected in the
then state of the negotiations. This meeting was all arranged,[129] but
never came to consummation. The army were so jealous of Grey’s advance,
they concluded, and naturally from their own Mahratta character (being
the most fickle and deceitful people, and capable of any treachery to
advance their desires), that while the Governor-General was encouraging
this meeting, which was to be attended by a considerable body of the
Mahratta army, Grey’s division would move into the rear and seize
the capital and the fortress of Gwalior. The suspicions of natives
(naturally jealous and ready to impute evil to all around them) are
not to be calmed, and the army prohibited this meeting (if the babe
widow and her party ever seriously meditated it) and moved forward in
a hostile attitude, crossing the Ahsin rivulet, which runs parallel to
the Koharee at a distance of eight or nine miles.
I was in the habit of taking long rides every morning to make myself
well acquainted with the country. When out riding on the 28th December,
I fell in with a patrol which the Quartermaster-General of the Army
had been directed to take out for the purpose of reconnoitring the
enemy, who, according to information, had crossed the Ahsin and posted
himself between the villages of Maharajpore and Chounda. The former is
advanced on the plain between the two rivulets, the latter is below the
Ahsin, the banks of which are also intersected by innumerable small
and impassable ravines. I accompanied Colonel Garden, the Q.M.G. On my
return I gave in the memorandum as follows:—
“Camp Hingonah, 28th Dec. 1843.
“Note on the position of the enemy on the left bank of the Ahsin
River:—
“From what I saw this morning, I calculate the force of the enemy
to be 10,000 men, and he fired from ten guns of small calibre. His
position appeared to be on the plain in dense masses of troops, his
left resting on the broken ground of the Ahsin River, his guns drawn
out in front, his right ‘en air,’ as if _more troops_ were coming
up to occupy the position selected. The sooner, therefore, it is
practicable for our army to occupy the right bank of the Koharee
and place itself in front of the enemy’s line, the better, not only
to prevent a further advance of the enemy, but to enable a general
action to be fought in two hours, when desired. This, however, is
a single view of our army, as it does not take into consideration
Major-General Grey’s Division. It therefore rests mainly to be
considered whether General Grey’s troops should not be so brought
into direct communication with the main body as either to attack
simultaneously the enemy’s left flank, or be so posted as to act
upon the line of the enemy when ‘en déroute’ of our main body. To do
this it is obvious that the exact position of General Grey must be
ascertained. If the information of the strength of the enemy renders
it expedient to await direct communication with General Grey, some
little delay is involved. On the contrary, if a general action be at
once desirable, it may be fought by eleven o’clock to-morrow, Friday
the 29th inst. To effect this, the army should march, crossing the
Koharee disencumbered of the ‘impedimenta’ of war, before daylight
the 29th inst. The distance hence to the enemy’s line is within eight
miles. To fight this action early in the morning is most desirable,
in order to enable the pursuit of the fugitives to be protracted,
therefore effective, and to ensure the capture of every gun.
“The morning was very hazy, and the smoke of the camp combining with
it made reconnaissance difficult.”
The army marched before daylight on the 29th Dec.[130] in three
columns, all of which reached their ground with the utmost precision.
The enemy was attacked [Battle of Maharajpore], every gun (54) taken,
and the defeat general; but never did men stand to their guns with
more determined pluck, every gunner being bayoneted or cut down at
his post. It was the same at Puniar [General Grey’s victory of the
same day.] The result of these battles is well known. I was mentioned
in the dispatches of the Commander-in-Chief, Sir Hugh Gough, and was
rewarded with a step in the Most Honourable Military Order of the Bath,
from C.B. (I had worn that decoration since Waterloo, twenty-nine
years before) to K.C.B., the Great Captain of the Age writing to me as
follows:—
“Horse Guards, 29 April, 1844.
“Sir,
“I have the satisfaction to acquaint you that the Secretary of State
has, upon my recommendation, submitted to the Queen your appointment
to be a Knight Commander of the Most Honourable Military Order of the
Bath, of which Her Majesty has been most graciously pleased to approve.
“I have the honor to be, Sir,
“Your most obedient humble servant,
“(Signed) Wellington.”
“Major-General Sir H. G. Smith, K.C.B.”
To which I replied—
“Headquarters, Army of India, Simla, 23rd June, 1844.
“My Lord Duke,
“I have this day had the honour to receive your Grace’s letter, ‘Horse
Guards, 29th April’ acquainting me with an expression of satisfaction
that Her Majesty had, upon your recommendation, been graciously
pleased to appoint me a Knight Commander of the Most Honourable
Military Order of the Bath. While my gratitude to my Sovereign is
unbounded, my heart dictates, it is to your Grace I am indebted for
every honorary distinction, promotion, and appointment I have received
during a long and an eventful period of the history of the world.
Among the many thousands of the gallant soldiers who so nobly fought
and conquered under your Grace, I may conscientiously hope none could
desire more zealously to do his duty, or was ever more actuated by
personal devotion or inspired with greater confidence throughout
the numerous struggles of war, than he who now renders his grateful
thanks for this mark of distinction so honourable to the soldier,
and thus conferred by Her Majesty through the recommendation of his
Commander-in-Chief, the Great Captain of the Age.
“I have, etc.,
“(Signed) H. G. Smith.
“Field Marshal His Grace the Duke of Wellington.”
I have now served my country nearly forty years, I have fought in every
quarter of the globe, I have driven four-in-hand in every quarter, I
have never had a sick certificate, and only once received leave of
absence, which I did for eight months to study mathematics. I have
filled _every_ staff situation of a Regiment and of the General Staff.
I have commanded a Regiment in peace, and have had often a great voice
in war. I entered the army perfectly unknown to the world, in ten years
by force of circumstances I was Lieutenant-Colonel, and I have been
present in as many battles and sieges as any officer of my standing in
the army. I never fought a duel, and only once made a man an apology,
although I am as hot a fellow as the world produces; and I may without
vanity say, the friendship I have experienced equals the love I bear my
comrade, officer or soldier.
My wife has accompanied me throughout the world; she has ever met with
kind friends and never has had controversy or dispute with man or woman.
Harry Smith.
APPENDIX TO CHAPTER XLI.
On the Battle of Maharajpore.
In a letter to Sir James Kempt, dated “Gwalior, 15th January, 1844,”
Harry Smith sketches the events which led to the battle, and cites his
memorandum of 28th December given above. He continues—
“The army did march as described in Sir H. Gough’s dispatches in three
columns, each arriving at its designated post in excellent time—which
I freely admit was scarcely to be expected, having to disengage itself
from a mass of laden elephants, camels, and bullocks and bullock
carts, etc., resembling rather the multitudes of Xerxes than anything
modern, and having to traverse ground on the banks of rivulets most
peculiarly intersected by numerous and deep small ravines, the pigmy
model of a chain of mountains, but even more impassable. On such
ravines was posted the enemy’s left flank; his right extended towards
the village of Maharajpore, which he had filled with Infantry and ably
supported by batteries enfilading its approach, his extreme right
again thrown back upon the ravines of the Ahsin River, as described
in the little pencil sketch enclosed, thus realizing the surmise in
my report, ‘his right “en air,” as if other troops were coming up to
complete the occupation of the position.’ If we could have caught the
enemy in the state he was when reconnoitred the previous day, easy
indeed would have been the victory. These Mahrattas, nor indeed does
any Indian Army, know no more than to occupy a strong position and
hold it as long as able, sticking to their guns _like men_. Having
observed the enemy’s position the day before, it was obvious to me
this morning that he had advanced very considerably, and that he held
the village of Maharajpore in force, which I rode through the day
previous. Upon a plain, and that plain covered with the high stalks
of Jumna corn, not a mound of rising ground even to assist the view,
reconnoitring is nearly nominal. However, so impressed was I from what
a nearer view the day before had given me and what I then saw, that
the enemy attached great importance to his left flank, the line of
his retreat if beaten, I ventured to advocate that flank as the most
eligible point for a weighty attack. However, things were differently
conducted and as the heads of columns appeared, the enemy instantly
opened a well-directed cannonade, particularly from the vicinity of
the village of Maharajpore, and Sir H. Gough ordered an advance. His
dispatch tells the tale, and the mode of resistance, the enemy’s
guns, etc. I need, therefore, only bear testimony to the gallantry of
the enemy’s resistance, which in my conscience I believe and assert
would not have been overcome but for our gallant old Peninsular
comrades, the 39th and 40th Regiments, who carried everything before
them, bayoneting the gunners at their guns to a man. These guns were
most ably posted, each battery flanking and supporting the other by
as heavy a cross-fire of cannon as I ever saw, and grape like hail.
Our leaders of brigades in the neighbourhood and in the village had
various opportunities of displaying heroism, Valiant, Wright 39th and
my Assistant, Major Barr, remarkably so, and many gallant fellows fell
in this noble performance of their duty. The enemy was driven back
at every point with great loss, yielding to force, not retiring in
haste. A more thorough devotedness to their cause no soldiers could
evince, and the annals of their defeat, altho’ an honour to us, can
never be recorded as any disgrace to them. Turn we now to General
Grey’s division. For many days before the 29th our communication was
totally interrupted, and the wisdom of the route and the disunited
approach to Gwalior must be tested by the fortunate result, not by the
established rules and principles of strategy. Grey’s dispatch is not
so well written as it might have been, I am led to understand, nor
does he give full credit to the old Buffs for their gallant _double
allowance_ with which they contributed to the achievements of the day
and the capture of the enemy’s guns, every one of them. The old 50th
had its share too, and the blockheads in the East, who ‘haver’ over
their wine of India’s being in a state to require no British troops,
are wrong: for, liberally contributing the full meed of praise to the
Seapoy Battalions, that praise is so rested on the British soldier’s
example, the want of that ‘point d’appui’ would entail a dire want
indeed, that of victory! Now if we regard the victories recently
obtained over the Mahratta force, 28,000 men whose discipline has
gradually been improving under Christian officers since 1803 (the days
of Lake and Wellington), well supplied with cannon and every implement
of war, animated by a devotion to their cause not to be exceeded—in
a military point of view they are achievements in the field which
yield alone to Assaye and rank with Dieg, Laswarree, and Mehudpore,
and in a political point of view, their importance is immense, struck
in the very heart of India, within the hearing almost of the seat of
government of our Upper Provinces, Agra. Remembering the disasters
in Afghanistan, which still, as they ever will, hold their baneful
influence over British India; reviewing the recent bloody murders,
and present confusion and anarchy at Lahore; the still unsettled
state of Bundelkund; the sickness in Scinde (that accursed Scinde),
the grave of our army; the intrigues at the court of Nepaul, which
have been rife and ready for mischief pending the late contest—then
may my Lord Ellenborough and our country congratulate themselves
upon the re-establishment of the ‘Prestige of our Arms’ as a sure
foundation of our Indian Empire, the very base of which was tremulous,
for it is well known that these Mahrattas have been _advocating
hostility in every court of the East_. It is to be hoped, therefore,
coupled with Lord E.’s moderation and the equity of his acts in thus
re-establishing the youthful Maharaja on his throne, that our country
and its Government will regard this as no war of foreign invasion, no
war of conquest and unjust aggression, but one of absolute necessity
to maintain the one Power paramount in India on the faith of old
treaties of amity, and a demonstration to the present disturbed states
of India, to the well-disposed, and to the World, that the British
Lion will be ever triumphant; and that it will accordingly treat the
soldiers who have achieved victories of such political magnitude
with the liberality shown to _the heroes exiled_ from Affghanistan,
their discomfitures conjured into triumphs of valour, their miserable
retreat through the Khyber Pass into deeds of glory inferior to none
but the passage of San Bernardo by Napoleon. In this hope we may
venture to trust a fair construction will be put on our acts, and that
I may see my gallant comrades promoted as they deserve, and honoured
in the manner recent services have been.
“I shall ever regard this battle as one of the most fortunate
circumstances of my life, if the majority of its remainder is to be
spent in India, by its having acquired me that experience in Indian
warfare all require, and above all, to hold in just estimation your
enemy, a creed I have ever advocated, and to a certain extent, in
every instance practised. In the late conflict _no one_ gave our
foe credit for half his daring or ability; hence our attack was not
quite so scientifically powerful by a combination of the different
arms as it might have been, and the defects of the unwieldy machine
called the British Indian Army rendered most glaring:—its appalling
quantity of baggage, its lack of organization and equipment of the
soldiers, its want of experience in Generals and in officers, the
extreme willingness but total inexpertness and inaptitude of the
soldier in the arts of war, in the conflict, on picquet, on every
duty which a protracted campaign alone can teach effectually. In this
country almost every war has been terminated in one or two pitched
battles fought so soon as the one army comes in sight of the other,
and accordingly all the science attaching to advance and retreat,
the posting of picquets, reconnaissance of the enemy, the daily
contemplating his movements, both when he is before you and on the
march, are lost, and war is reduced at once to ‘there are people drawn
up who will shoot at you, so fire away at them.’ You blindly and
ineptly rush upon them, drive them from the field with considerable
loss, take all their guns, and never see the vestige of them after.
Thus we must judiciously and with foresight organize ourselves for a
campaign in the Punjaub—a very probable event—for the armies of India
are not now the rabble they were in Clive’s time, but organized and
disciplined by European officers of experience (many French), and the
art of war has progressed rapidly among our enemies, whose troops are
invariably far more numerous than those we oppose to them; thus by
superior ability we could alone calculate on their defeat. As it is,
we calculate alone on the bulldog courage of Her Majesty’s soldiers,
and our loss becomes what we lately witnessed.
“To obviate these deficiencies, apparent even to the most
inexperienced eye, we must in the first place reduce our baggage, next
give our Seapoys canteens and haversacks (a Regiment told me they were
exhausted for want of water, the water-carriers having run away). We
must then, every cold season, have divisions of the army assembled,
and post the one half opposite the other, with outlying picquets,
etc., and daily alarms, skirmishes, etc., then general actions with
blank cartridges. Without this the British Indian Army will remain as
it now is—a great unwieldy machine of ignorant officers and soldiers.
The drill of the Seapoy is good enough, and that of his officer, and
never will attain greater perfection, but unless the officers in their
separate commands know how, as I call it, to feed the fight, to bring
up or into action successively in their places their command, when
the attack is ordered, I defy any general to defeat his enemy but by
stupid bull-dog courage. It may be conceit in Harry Smith, but if
10,000 men were given him in one cold season, if by sham fights, etc.,
he did not make them practical soldiers, he would resign in disgust,
for the material is excellent and willing, but now, like a dictionary,
it contains all the words, but cannot write a letter.
“I have given you no account of the death of our gallant old comrade
Churchill; he was game, and tho’ not free from many errors he had
virtues, and his loss cost Juana and me some honest tears.
“Young Somerset is a fine, gallant young fellow who received four
wounds, three severe ones, but is doing well, thank God both for his
sake and his father’s. As I cannot write to all my many friends, if
you think this letter would amuse any of my _old comrades_, soldiers
such as I aim at making, Lord K.,[131] Sir J. Lambert, Sir T. Reynell
(if better), Sir A. Barnard, pray send it. Lord F. Somerset I do not
name, as I know you show him all my effusions which meet your own
approbation.
“Juana was under a heavy cannonade with Lady G., Miss G., and a Mrs.
Curtis on their elephants. Juana had this command of Amazons, and
as she was experienced and they young, her command was anything but
satisfactory.[132] This Gwalior is a very extraordinary place. I have
had some long rides in every direction, and the _débris_ of the army
of Scindiah now disbanding are as handsome, well-clothed and appointed
soldiers, as regular in their encampments, as Frenchmen, and inclined
to fight in their gallant and vivacious style.
“Thus our credit in the victory is the more.
“Faithfully, dear friend,
“(Signed) Harry Smith.”