The successor, however, of Pythagoras, is acknowledged by all men to
have been Aristæus, the son of Damophon the Crotonian, who existing at
the same time as Pythagoras, was seven ages prior to Plato. Aristæus
likewise, was not only thought worthy to succeed Pythagoras in his
school, but also to educate his children, and marry his wife Theano,
because he was eminently skilled in the Pythagoric dogmas. For
Pythagoras himself is said to have taught in his school, forty years
wanting one, and to have lived nearly one hundred years. But Aristæus,
when much advanced in years, relinquished the school; and after him
Mnesarchus succeeded, who was the son of Pythagoras. Bulagoras succeeded
Mnesarchus, in whose time it happened that the city of the Crotonians
was plundered. Gartydas the Crotonian succeeded Bulagoras, on his return
from a journey which he had undertaken prior to the war. Nevertheless on
account of the calamity of his country, he suffered so much anxiety, as
to die prematurely through grief. But it was the custom with the rest of
the Pythagoreans, when they became very old, to liberate themselves from
the body as from a prison.
Moreover, some time after, Aresas Lucanus, being saved through certain
strangers, undertook the management of the school; and to him came
Diodorus Aspendius, who was received into the school, on account of the
paucity of the Pythagoreans it contained. And in Heraclea, indeed, were
Clinias and Philolaus; but at Metapontum, Theorides and Eurytus; and at
Tarentum Archytas. It is also said that Epicharmus was one of the
foreign auditors; but that he was not one of the school. Having however
arrived at Syracuse, he abstained from philosophizing openly, on account
of the tyranny of Hiero. But he inserted the conceptions of the men in
metre, and published in comedies the occult dogmas of Pythagoras.
Of all the Pythagoreans, however, it is probable that many are unknown
and anonymous. But the following are the names of those that are known
and celebrated: Of the Crotonians, Hippostratus, Dymas, Ægon, Æmon,
Sillus, Cleosthenes, Agelas, Episylus, Phyciadas, Ecphantus, Timæus,
Buthius, Eratus, Itmæus, Rhodippus, Bryas, Evandrus, Myllias, Antimedon,
Ageas, Leophron, Agylus, Onatus, Hipposthenes, Cleophron, Alcmæon,
Damocles, Milon, Menon. Of the Metapontines, Brontinus, Parmiseus,
Orestadas, Leon, Damarmenus, Æneas, Chilas, Melisias, Aristeas, Laphion,
Evandrus, Agesidamus, Xenocades, Euryphemus, Aristomenes, Agesarchus,
Alceas, Xenophantes, Thraseus, Arytus, Epiphron, Eiriscus, Megistias,
Leocydes, Thrasymedes, Euphemus, Procles, Antimenes, Lacritus,
Damotages, Pyrrho, Rhexibius, Alopecus, Astylus, Dacidas, Aliochus,
Lacrates, Glycinus. Of the Agrigentines, Empedocles. Of the Eleatæ,
Parmenides. Of the Tarentines, Philolaus, Eurytus, Archytas, Theodorus,
Aristippus, Lycon, Hestiæus, Polemarchus, Asteas, Clinias, Cleon,
Eurymedon, Arceas, Clinagoras, Archippus, Zopyrus, Euthynus, Dicæarchus,
Philonidas, Phrontidas, Lysis, Lysibius, Dinocrates, Echecrates,
Paction, Acusiladas, Icmus, Pisicrates, Clearatus.
Of the Leontines, Phrynichus, Smichias, Aristoclidas, Clinias,
Abroteles, Pisyrrhydus, Bryas, Evandrus, Archemachus, Mimnomachus,
Achmonidas, Dicas, Carophantidas. Of the Sybarites, Metopus, Hippasus,
Proxenus, Evanor, Deanax, Menestor, Diocles, Empedus, Timasius,
Polemæus, Evæus, Tyrsenus. Of the Carthaginians, Miltiades, Anthen,
Odius, Leocritus. Of the Parians, Æetius, Phænecles, Dexitheus,
Alcimachus, Dinarchus, Meton, Timæus, Timesianax, Amærus, Thymaridas. Of
the Locrians, Gyptius, Xenon, Philodamus, Evetes, Adicus, Sthenonidas,
Sosistratus, Euthynus, Zaleucus, Timares. Of the Posidonians, Athamas,
Simus, Proxenus, Cranous, Myes, Bathylaus, Phædon. Of the Lucani,
Ocellus and Occillus who were brothers, Oresandrus, Cerambus, Dardaneus,
Malion. Of the Ægeans, Hippomedon, Timosthenes, Euelthon, Thrasydamus,
Crito, Polyctor. Of the Lacones, Autocharidas, Cleanor, Eurycrates. Of
the Hyperboreans, Abaris. Of the Rheginenses, Aristides, Demosthenes,
Aristocrates, Phytius, Helicaon, Mnesibulus, Hipparchides, Athosion,
Euthycles, Opsimus. Of the Selinuntians, Calais. Of the Syracusans,
Leptines, Phintias, Damon. Of the Samians, Melissus, Lacon, Archippus,
Glorippus, Heloris, Hippon, Of the Caulonienses, Callibrotus, Dicon,
Nastas, Drymon, Xentas. Of the Phliasians, Diocles, Echecrates,
Polymnastus, Phanton. Of the Sicyonians, Poliades, Demon, Sostratius,
Sosthenes. Of the Cyrenæans, Prorus, Melanippus, Aristangelus,
Theodorus. Of the Cyziceni, Pythodorus, Hipposthenes, Butherus,
Xenophilus. Of the Catanæi, Charondas, Lysiades. Of the Corinthians,
Chrysippus. Of the Tyrrhenians, Nausitheus. Of the Athenians, Neocritus.
And of Pontus, Lyramnus. In all, two hundred and eighteen. [And these,
indeed, are not all the Pythagoreans, but of all of them they are the
most famous.[56]]
But the most illustrious Pythagorean women are Timycha, the wife of
Myllias the Crotonian. Philtis, the daughter of Theophrius the
Crotonian, Byndacis, the sister of Ocellus and Occillus, Lucanians.
Chilonis, the daughter of Chilon the Lacedæmonian. Cratesiclea the
Lacedæmonian, the wife of Cleanor the Lacedæmonian. Theano, the wife of
Brontinus of Metapontum. Mya, the wife of Milon the Crotonian. Lasthenia
the Arcadian. Abrotelia, the daughter of Abroteles the Tarentine.
Echecratia the Phliasian. Tyrsenis, the Sybarite. Pisirrhonde, the
Tarentine. Nisleadusa, the Lacedæmonian. Bryo, the Argive. Babelyma, the
Argive. And Cleæchma, the sister of Autocharidas the Lacedæmonian. In
all seventeen.
FRAGMENTS
OF THE
ETHICAL WRITINGS
OF CERTAIN
PYTHAGOREANS.
FROM
HIPPODAMUS, THE THURIAN,
IN HIS TREATISE
ON FELICITY.
Of animals, some are the recipients of felicity, but others are
incapable of receiving it. And those animals, indeed, are receptive of
it that have reason. For felicity cannot subsist without virtue; and
virtue is first ingenerated in that which possesses reason. But those
animals are incapable of receiving felicity, that are destitute of
reason. For neither can that which is deprived of sight, receive the
work or the virtue of sight; nor can that which is destitute of reason,
be the recipient of the work, or the virtue of that which possesses
reason. With respect to felicity, however, and virtue, the former is as
a work, but the latter as a certain art, to that which possesses reason.
But of animals which possess reason, some are self-perfect, and these
are such as are perfect through themselves, and are indigent of nothing
external, either to their existence, or to their existing well and
beautifully. And such, indeed, is God. Those animals, however, are not
self-perfect, which are not perfect through themselves, but are in want
of external causes to their perfection. And man is an animal of this
kind. Of animals, therefore, which are not self-perfect, some indeed are
perfect, but others are not perfect. And those indeed are perfect which
derive their subsistence both from their own [proper] causes, and from
external causes. And they derive it indeed from their own causes,
because they obtain from thence both an excellent nature and deliberate
choice; but from external causes, because they receive from thence
equitable legislation and good rulers. But the animals which are not
perfect, are either such as participate of neither of these, or of some
one of these, or whose souls are entirely depraved. And such will the
man be who is of a description different from the above.
Moreover, of perfect men there are two differences. For some of them are
naturally perfect; but others are perfect according to life. And those
indeed alone that are good, are naturally perfect. But these are such as
possess virtue. For the virtue of the nature of every thing is a summit
and perfection. Thus the virtue of the eye is the summit and perfection
of the nature of the eye. But the virtue of man is the summit and
perfection of the nature of man. Those also are perfect according to
life, who are not only good, but happy. For felicity, indeed, is the
perfection of human life. But human, life is a system of actions: and:
felicity gives completion to the actions. Virtue also and fortune give
completion to actions; virtue, indeed, according to use; but good
fortune according to prosperity. God therefore is neither good through
learning virtue from any one, nor is he happy through being attended by
good fortune. For he is good by nature, and happy by nature, and always
was and will be, and will never cease to be, such; since he is
incorruptible, and naturally good. But man is neither happy nor good by
nature, but requires discipline and providential care. And in order to
become good, indeed; he requires virtue; but in order to become happy,
good fortune. On this account, human felicity summarily consists of
these two things, viz. of praise, and the predication of beatitude. Of
praise indeed, from virtue; but of the predication of beatitude, from
prosperity. It possesses virtue therefore, through a divine destiny, but
prosperity through a mortal allotment. But mortal are suspended from
divine concerns, and terrestrial from such as are celestial. Things
subordinate, also, are suspended from such as are more excellent. And on
this account, the good man who follows the Gods is happy; but he who
follows mortal natures is miserable. For to him who possesses wisdom,
prosperity is good and useful. It is good, indeed, through his knowledge
of the use of it; but it is useful, through his co-operating with
actions. It is beautiful, therefore, when prosperity is present with
intellect, and when sailing as it were with a prosperous wind, actions
are performed looking to virtue; just as a pilot looks to the motions of
the stars. For thus, he who does this will not only follow God, but will
also co-arrange human with divine good.
This also is evident, that [human] life becomes different from
disposition and action. But it is necessary that the disposition should
be either worthy or depraved; and that action should be attended either
with felicity or misery. And a worthy disposition, indeed, participates
of virtue; but a bad one of vice. With respect to actions, also, those
that are prosperous are attended with felicity; (for they derive their
completion through looking to reason) but those that are unfortunate,
are attended with misery; for they are frustrated of the end. Hence, it
is not only necessary to learn virtue, but also to possess and use it,
either for security, or increase, [of property when it is too little]
or, which is the greatest thing of all, for the emendation of families
and cities. For it is not only necessary to have the possession of
things beautiful, but also the use of them. All these things, however,
will take place, when a man lives in a city that uses equitable laws.
And these, indeed, I say, are what is called the horn of Amalthea. For
all things are contained in equitable legislation. And without this, the
greatest good of human nature can neither be effected, nor, when
effected, be increased and become permanent. For this comprehends in
itself virtue, and the tendency to virtue; because excellent natures are
generated according to it. Manners, likewise, studies, and laws, subsist
through this in the most excellent condition; and besides these,
rightly-deciding reason, and piety and sanctity towards the most
honorable natures. So that it is necessary that he who is to be happy,
and whose life is to be prosperous, should live and die in a country
governed by equitable laws, relinquishing all illegality. At the same
time what has been said is attended with necessity. For man is a part of
society, and hence from the same reasoning, will become entire and
perfect, if he not only associates with others, but associates in a
becoming manner. For some things are naturally adapted to subsist in
many things, and not in one thing; others in one thing, and not in many;
but others both in many, and in one thing, and on this account in one
thing, because in many. For harmony, indeed, and symphony and number,
are naturally adapted to be ingenerated in many things. For nothing
which makes a whole from these parts, is sufficient to itself.[57] But
acuteness of seeing and hearing, and swiftness of feet, subsist in one
thing alone. Felicity, however, and the virtue of soul, subsist both in
one thing and in many, in a whole, and in the universe. And on this
account they subsist in one thing, because they also subsist in many:
and they subsist in many, because they are inherent in a whole and in
the universe. For the orderly distribution of the whole nature of things
methodically arranges each particular. And the orderly distribution of
particulars gives completion to the whole of things and to the universe.
But this follows from the whole being naturally prior to the part, and
not the part to the whole. For if the world was not, neither the sun nor
the moon would exist, nor the planets, nor the fixed stars. But the
world existing, each of these also exists.
The truth of this also may be seen in the nature itself of animals. For
if animal had no existence, there would neither be eye, nor mouth, nor
ear. But animal existing, each of these likewise exists. As the whole,
however, is to the part, so is the virtue of the whole to the virtue of
the part. For harmony not existing, and a divine inspection of mundane
affairs, things which are adorned would no longer be able to remain in
an excellent condition. And equitable legislation not existing in a
city, it is not possible for a citizen to be good or happy. Health,
likewise, not existing in the animal, it is not possible for the foot or
the hand to be strong and healthy. For harmony indeed is the virtue of
the world; equitable legislation is the virtue of a city; and health and
strength are the virtue of the body. Each of the parts likewise in these
things is co-arranged on account of the whole and the universe. For the
eyes see on account of the whole body. And the other parts and members
are co-arranged for the sake of the whole [body] and the universe.
FROM
EURYPHAMUS,
IN HIS TREATISE
CONCERNING HUMAN LIFE.
The perfect life of man falls short indeed of the life of God, because
it is not self-perfect, but surpasses that of irrational animals,
because it participates of virtue and felicity. For neither is God in
want of external causes; since being naturally good and happy, he is
perfect from himself; nor any irrational animal. For brutes being
destitute of reason, they are also destitute of the sciences pertaining
to actions. But the nature of man partly consists of his own proper
deliberate choice, and partly is in want of the assistance derived from
divinity. For that which is capable of being fashioned by reason, which
has an intellectual perception of things beautiful and base, can erectly
extend itself from earth, and look to heaven, and can perceive with the
eye of intellect the highest Gods,—that which is capable of all this,
participates likewise of assistance from the Gods. But in consequence of
possessing will, deliberate choice, and a principle of such a kind in
itself as enables it to study virtue, and to be agitated by the storms
of vice, to follow, and also to apostatize from the Gods,—it is likewise
able to be moved by itself. Hence it is a partaker of praise and blame,
honor and ignominy, partly from the Gods and partly from men, according
as it zealously applies itself either to virtue or vice. For the whole
reason of the thing is as follows: Divinity introduced man into the
world as a most exquisite animal, to be reciprocally honored with
himself, and _as the eye of the orderly distribution of things_. Hence
also man gave names to things, becoming himself the character of them.
He likewise invented letters, procuring through these a treasury of
memory. And he imitated the established order of the universe,
co-harmonizing by judicial proceedings and laws the communion of cities.
For no work is performed by men more decorous to the world, or more
worthy of the notice of the Gods, than the apt constitution of a city
governed by good laws, and an orderly distribution of laws and a polity.
For though each man himself by himself is nothing, and is not himself by
himself sufficient to lead a life conformable to the common concord, and
apt composition of a polity, yet he is well adapted to the whole and to
the perfect system of society. For the life of man is the image of a
lyre accurately [harmonized,] and in every respect perfect. For every
lyre requires these three things, apparatus, apt composition, and a
certain musical contrectation. And apparatus indeed, is a preparation of
all the appropriate parts; viz. of the chords, and of the instruments
which co-operate with the well-sounding and striking of the lyre. But
the apt composition is the commixture of the sounds with each other. And
the musical contrectation is the motion of these conformably to the apt
composition. Thus also human life requires these same three things.
Apparatus, indeed, which is the completion of the parts of life. But the
parts of life are the goods of the body, of riches, renown, and friends.
The apt composition is the co-arrangement of these according to virtue
and the laws. And the musical contrectation is the commixture of these
conformably to virtue and the laws; virtue sailing with a prosperous
wind, and having nothing externally resisting it. For felicity does not
consist in being driven from the purpose of voluntary intentions, but in
obtaining them; nor in virtue being without attendants and ministrant
aids; but in completely possessing its own proper powers which are
adapted to actions. For man is not self-perfect, but imperfect. And he
becomes perfect, partly from himself, and partly from an external cause.
He is likewise perfect, either according to nature, or according to
life. And he is perfect indeed according to nature, if he becomes a good
man. For the virtue of each thing is the summit and perfection of the
nature of that thing. Thus the virtue[58] of the eyes is the summit and
perfection of the nature of the eyes; and this is also true of the
virtue of the ears. Thus too, the virtue of man is the summit and
perfection of the nature of man. But man is perfect according to life,
when he becomes happy. For felicity is the perfection and completion of
human goods. Hence, again, virtue and prosperity become the parts of the
life of man. And virtue, indeed, is a part of him so far as he is soul,
but prosperity so far as he is connected with body. But both are parts
of him so far as he is an animal. For it is the province of virtue to
use in a becoming manner the goods which are conformable to nature; but
of prosperity to impart the use of them. And the former, indeed, imparts
deliberate choice and right reason; but the latter, energies and
actions. For to wish what is beautiful in conduct and to endure things
of a dreadful nature, is the proper business of virtue. But it is the
work of prosperity to render deliberate choice successful, and to cause
actions to arrive at the [desired] end. For the general conquers in
conjunction with virtue and good fortune. The pilot sails well in
conjunction with art and prosperous winds. The eye sees well in
conjunction with acuteness of vision[59] and light. And the life of man
becomes most excellent through virtue itself, and prosperity.
FROM
HIPPARCHUS,
IN HIS TREATISE
ON TRANQUILLITY.
Since men live but for a very short period, if their life is compared
with the whole of time, they will make a most beautiful journey as it
were, if they pass through life with tranquillity. This however they
will possess in the most eminent degree, if they accurately and
scientifically know themselves, viz. if they know that they are mortal
and of a fleshly nature, and that they have a body which is corruptible
and can be easily injured, and which is exposed to every thing most
grievous and severe, even to their latest breath. And in the first
place, let us direct our attention to those things which happen to the
body; and these are pleurisy, inflammation of the lungs, phrensy, gout,
stranguary, dysentery, lethargy, epilepsy, putrid ulcers, and ten
thousand other diseases. But the diseases which happen to the soul are
much greater and more dire than these. For all the iniquitous, evil,
illegal, and impious conduct in the life of man, originates from the
passions of the soul. For through preternatural immoderate desires many
have become subject to unrestrained impulses, and have not refrained
from the most unholy pleasures, arising from being connected with
daughters or even mothers. Many also have been induced to destroy their
fathers, and their own offspring. But what occasion is there to be
prolix in narrating externally impending evils, such as excessive rain,
drought, violent heat and cold; so that frequently from the anomalous
state of the air, pestilence and famine are produced, and all-various
calamities, and whole cities become desolate? Since therefore many
such-like calamities are impendent, we should neither be elevated by the
possession of corporeal goods, which may rapidly be consumed by the
incursions of a small fever, nor with what are conceived to be
prosperous external circumstances, which frequently in their own nature
perish more rapidly than they accede. For all these are uncertain and
unstable, and are found to have their existence in many and various
mutations; and no one of them is permanent, or immutable, or stable, or
indivisible. Hence well considering these things, and also being
persuaded, that if what is present and is imparted to us, is able to
remain for the smallest portion of time, it is as much as we ought to
expect; we shall then live in tranquillity and with hilarity, generously
bearing whatever may befal us.
Now, however, many previously conceiving in imagination, that all that
is present with, and imparted to them by nature and fortune, is better
than it is, and not thinking it to be such as it is in reality, but such
as it is able to become when it has arrived at the summit of excellence,
they burden the soul with many great, nefarious, and stupid evils, when
they are suddenly deprived of [these evanescent goods]. And thus it
happens to them that they lead a most bitter and miserable life. But
this takes place in the loss of riches, or the death of friends or
children, or in the privation of certain other things, which are
conceived by them to be most honorable possessions. Afterwards, weeping
and lamenting, they assert of themselves, that they alone are most
unfortunate and miserable, not remembering that these things have
happened, and even now happen, to many others; nor are they able to
understand the life of those that are now in existence, and of those
that have lived in former times, nor to see in what great calamities and
waves of evils, many of the present time are, and of the past have been
involved. Considering with ourselves therefore, that many having lost
their property, have afterwards on account of this very loss been saved,
since hereafter they might either have fallen into the hands of robbers,
or into the power of a tyrant; that many also who have loved certain
persons, and have been benevolently disposed towards them in the
extreme, have afterwards greatly hated them;—considering all these
things, which have been delivered to us by history, and likewise
learning that many have been destroyed by their children, and by those
that they have most dearly loved; and comparing our own life with that
of those who have been more unhappy than we have been, and taking into
account human casualties [in general] and not only such as happen to
ourselves, we shall pass through life with greater tranquillity. For it
is not lawful that he who is himself a man, should think the calamities
of others easy to be borne, and not his own, since he sees that the
whole of life is naturally exposed to many calamities. Those however,
that weep and lament, besides not being able to recover what they have
lost, or recal to life those that are dead, impel the soul to greater
perturbations, in consequence of its being filled with much depravity.
It is requisite therefore, that, being washed and purified, we should by
all possible contrivances wipe away our inveterate stains by the
reasonings of philosophy. But we shall accomplish this by adhering to
prudence and temperance, being satisfied with our present circumstances,
and not aspiring after many things. For men who procure for themselves a
great abundance [of external goods], do not consider that the enjoyment
of them terminates with the present life. We ought therefore to use the
goods that are present; and by the assistance of the beautiful and
venerable things of which philosophy is the source, we shall be
liberated from the insatiable desire of depraved possessions.
FROM
ARCHYTAS,
IN HIS TREATISE CONCERNING
THE GOOD AND HAPPY MAN.
In the first place, it is requisite to know this, that the good man is
not immediately happy from necessity; but that this is the case with the
man who is both happy and good. For the happy man obtains both praise
and the predication of blessedness; but the good man far as he is good
obtains praise alone. The praise also arises from virtue; but the
predication of blessedness from good fortune. And the worthy man,
indeed, becomes such from the goods which he possesses; but the happy
man is sometimes deprived of his felicity. For the power of virtue is
perfectly free, but that of felicity is subject to restraint. For
long-continued diseases of the body, and deprivations of the senses,
cause the florishing condition of felicity to waste away. God, however,
differs from a good man in this, that God indeed not only possesses
virtue genuine and purified from every mortal passion, but his power
also is unwearied and unrestrained, as being adapted to the most
venerable and magnificent production of eternal works. Man indeed, by
the mortal condition of his nature, not only enjoys this power and this
virtue in a less degree; but sometimes through the want of symmetry[60]
in the goods which he possesses, or through powerful custom, or a
depraved nature, or through many other causes, he is unable to possess
in the extreme a good which is perfectly true.
Since therefore of goods, some are eligible for their own sakes, and not
for the sake of another thing; but others are eligible for the sake of
something else, and not on their own account; there is also a certain
third species of goods, which is eligible both on its own account, and
for the sake of another thing. What, therefore, is the good which is
eligible on its own account, and not for the sake of something else? It
is evident that it is felicity. For we aspire after other things for the
sake of this, but we do not desire this for the sake of any thing else.
Again, what are those goods which we desire indeed for the sake of
something else, but which we do not desire on their own account? It is
evident they are such things as are useful, and pre-eligible goods,
which become the causes of our obtaining things which are eligible [on
their own account]; such as corporeal labors, exercise, and frictions
which are employed for the sake of a good habit of body; and also
reading, meditation, and study, which are undertaken for the sake of
things beautiful and virtue. But what are the things which are eligible
on their own account, and also for the sake of something else? They are
such things as the virtues, and the habits of them, deliberate choice
and actions, and whatever adheres to that which is really beautiful.
Hence, that indeed which is eligible on its own account, and not on
account of something else, is a solitary good and one. But that which is
eligible for its own sake, and for the sake of another thing, is triply
divided. For one part of it indeed subsists about the soul; another
about the body; and another pertains to externals. And that which is
about the soul, consists of the virtues of the soul; that which is about
the body, of the virtues of the body; and that which pertains to
externals, consists of friends, glory, honor, and wealth. There is
likewise a similar reasoning with respect to that which is eligible on
account of something else. For one part of it indeed is effective of the
goods of the soul; another part of it, of the goods of the body; and
that which pertains to externals is the cause of wealth, glory, honor,
and friendship.
That virtue however happens to be eligible for its own sake, is evident
from the following considerations. For if things which are naturally
subordinate, I mean the goods of the body, are eligible for their own
sakes, but the soul is better than the body, it is evident that we love
the goods of the soul on their own account, and not for the sake of the
consequences with which they are attended.
There are likewise three definite times of human life; one of
prosperity; another of adversity; and a third subsisting between these.
Since therefore, he is a good man who possesses and uses virtue; but he
uses it according to three seasons; for he uses it either in adversity,
or in prosperity, or in the time between these; and in adversity indeed
he is unhappy, but in prosperity happy, and in the middle condition, he
is not happy [though he is not miserable];—this being the case, it is
evident that felicity is nothing else than the use of virtue in
prosperity. We now speak, however, of the felicity of man. But man is
not soul alone, but is likewise body. For the animal which consists of
both, and that which is constituted from things of this kind is man. For
though the body is naturally adapted to be the instrument of the soul,
yet this as well as the soul is a part of man [so far as he is an
animal.[61]] Hence of goods also, some are the goods of man, but others,
of the parts of man. And the good of man, indeed, is felicity. But of
the parts of man, the good of the soul is prudence, fortitude, justice,
and temperance. And the good of the body is beauty, health, a good
corporeal habit, and excellence of sensation. With respect to externals
however, wealth, glory, honor, and nobility, are naturally adapted to be
attendant on man, and to follow precedaneous goods. The less, also, are
ministrant to the greater goods. Thus friendship, glory, and wealth, are
ministrant both to the body and the soul; but health, strength, and
excellence of sensation, are subservient to the soul; and prudence [i.
e. wisdom] and justice are ministrant to the intellect of the soul.
_Intellect, however, is the satellite of Deity._ For God is the most
excellent, and the leader and ruler of all things. And for the sake of
these, it is necessary that other goods should be present. For the
general, indeed, is the leader of the army; the pilot, of the ship; God,
of the world; and intellect, of soul. But prudence is the leader of the
felicity pertaining to life. For prudence is nothing else than the
science of the felicity which respects human life, or the science of the
goods which naturally pertain to man.
And the felicity, indeed, and life of God are most excellent; but the
felicity of man consists of science, and virtue, and in the third place
of prosperity[62] corporalized. But I mean by science, the wisdom
pertaining to things divine and demoniacal; and by prudence, the wisdom
pertaining to human concerns, and the affairs of life. For it is
requisite to call the virtues which employ reasonings and
demonstrations, sciences. But it is fit to denominate virtue ethical,
and the best habit of the irrational part of the soul, according to
which we are said to possess certain qualities pertaining to manners;
viz. by which we are called liberal, just, and temperate. But it is
requisite to call prosperity, the preter-rational presence of goods, [or
a supply of goods without the assistance of reason,] and which is not
effected on account of it. Since therefore virtue and science are in our
power, but prosperity is not; and since also felicity consists in the
contemplation and performance of things [truly] beautiful; but
contemplations and actions, when they are not prosperous, are attended
with ministrant offices and necessity, but when they proceed in the
right path, produce delight and felicity; and these things are effected
in prosperity;—this being the case, it is evident that _felicity is
nothing else than the use of virtue in prosperity_. Hence the good man
is disposed with respect to prosperity, in the same manner as he who has
an excellent and robust body. For such a one is able to endure heat and
cold, to raise a great burden, and to sustain easily many other
molestations.
Since therefore felicity is the use of virtue in prosperity, we must
speak concerning virtue and prosperity, and in the first place
concerning prosperity. For of goods, some indeed do not admit of excess,
and this is the case with virtue. For there is not any virtue which is
excessive, nor any worthy man who is beyond measure good. For virtue has
the fit and becoming for a rule, and is the habit of the decorous in
practical concerns. But prosperity receives excess and diminution. And
when it is excessive indeed, it generates certain vices, and removes a
man from his natural habit; so that he frequently through this opposes
the constitution of virtue. And this is not only the case with
prosperity, but many other causes likewise may effect the same thing.
For it is by no means proper to wonder, that some of those who play on
the pipe should be arrogant men, who, bidding farewell to truth, ensnare
by a certain false imagination those who are unskilled in music; and to
disbelieve that a thing of this kind does not take place in virtue. For
the more venerable a thing is, so much the more numerous are those that
pretend to the possession of it. For there are many things which distort
the habit and form of virtue; some of which are insidious arts and
affectation; others are kindred physical passions, which sometimes
produce an indecorum[63] contrary to the true disposition [of virtue.]
This also is effected through manners in which men have been nurtured
for a long time; and it not unfrequently happens that it is produced
through youth or old age, and through prosperity or adversity; and by
other very numerous ways. Hence, we ought never to wonder, if sometimes
a distorted judgment is formed of all things, the true disposition being
changed.[64] Thus we see that the most excellent carpenter frequently
errs in the works which are the subjects of his art; and this is also
the case with the general, the pilot, the painter, and in short, with
all artists. And yet at the same time we do not deprive them of the
habit which they possess. For as we do not rank among bad men him who at
certain times acts intemperately, or unjustly, or timidly; so neither do
we place him in the class of good men, who does something right in
things pertaining to temperance, or justice, or fortitude. But it must
be said that the conduct of bad men in things of this kind is casually
right, and that good men [sometimes] err. A true judgment however [in
these instances] is to be formed, not by looking to a certain occasion,
or to a certain extent of time, but to the whole of life. But as
indigence and excess are injurious to the body, yet excess and what are
called superfluities, are naturally adapted to produce greater diseases
[than those caused by indigence]; thus also prosperity or adversity
injure the soul, when they unseasonably happen; yet that which is called
by all men prosperity, is naturally adapted to produce greater diseases
[than adversity], since it intoxicates like wine the reasoning power of
good men.
Hence it is more difficult to bear prosperity in a becoming manner than
adversity. For all men when they continue in adversity, are seen for the
most part to be moderate and orderly in their manners; but in prosperity
they are brave, magnificent, and magnanimous [when they bear it in a
becoming manner]. For adversity has the power of contracting and
depressing the soul; but prosperity, on the contrary, elevates and
expands it. Hence all those that are unfortunate, are in their manners
cautious and prudent; but those that are fortunate are insolent and
confident. But the boundary of prosperity, is that which a good man
would deliberately choose to co-operate with him in his own proper
actions; just as the [proper] magnitude of a ship, and the [proper]
magnitude of a rudder, are such as will enable a good pilot to sail over
a great extent of sea, and to accomplish a great voyage. An excess of
prosperity, however, is not naturally adapted to be vanquished by, but
to vanquish the soul. For as a [very] splendid light causes an
obscuration of sight in the eyes; thus also excessive prosperity darkens
the intellect of the soul. And thus much may suffice concerning
prosperity.
FROM
THEAGES,
IN HIS TREATISE
ON THE VIRTUES.
The order of the soul subsists in such a way, that one part of it is the
reasoning power, another is anger, and another is desire. And the
reasoning power, indeed, has dominion over knowledge; anger over
impetus; and desire intrepidly rules over the appetitions of the soul.
When therefore these three parts pass into one, and exhibit one
appropriate composition, then virtue and concord are produced in the
soul. But when they are divulsed from each other by sedition, then vice
and discord are produced in the soul. It is necessary, however, that
virtue should have these three things, viz. reason, power, and
deliberate choice. The virtue, therefore, of the reasoning power of the
soul is prudence; for it is a habit of judging and contemplating. But
the virtue of the irascible part, is fortitude; for it is a habit of
resisting, and enduring things of a dreadful nature. And the virtue of
the epithymetic or appetitive part is temperance; for it is a moderation
and detention of the pleasures which arise through the body. But the
virtue of the whole soul is justice. For men indeed become bad, either
through vice, or through incontinence, or through a natural ferocity.
But they injure each other, either through gain, or through pleasure, or
through ambition. Vice, therefore, more appropriately belongs to the
reasoning part of the soul. For prudence indeed is similar to art; but
vice to pernicious art. For it invents contrivances for the purpose of
acting unjustly. But incontinence rather pertains to the appetitive part
of the soul. For continence consists in subduing, and incontinence in
not subduing pleasures. And ferocity pertains to the irascible part of
the soul. For when some one, through acting ill from desire, is
gratified not as a man should be, but as a wild beast, then a thing of
this kind is denominated ferocity. The effects also of these
dispositions are consequent to the things for the sake of which they are
performed. For avarice is consequent to vice; but vice is consequent to
the reasoning part of the soul. And ambition, indeed, follows from the
irascible part; and this becoming excessive, generates ferocity. Again,
pleasure pertains to the appetitive part; but this being sought after
more vehemently, generates incontinence. Hence, since the acting
unjustly is produced from so many causes, it is evident that acting
justly is effected through an equal number of causes. For virtue,
indeed, is naturally beneficent and profitable; but vice is productive
of evil, and is noxious.
Since, however, of the parts of the soul, one is the leader, but the
other follows, and the virtues and the vices subsist about these, and in
these; it is evident that with respect to the virtues also, some are
leaders, others are followers, and others, are composed from these. And
the leaders, indeed, are such as prudence; but the followers are such as
fortitude and temperance; and the composites from these, are such as
justice. The passions, however, are the matter of virtue; for the
virtues subsist about, and in these. But of the passions, one is
voluntary, but another is involuntary. And the voluntary, indeed, is
pleasure; but the involuntary is pain. Men also, who have the political
virtues, give intension and remission to these, co-harmonizing the other
parts of the soul, to that part which possesses reason. But the boundary
of this co-adaptation, is for intellect not to be prevented from
accomplishing its proper work, either by indigence, or excess. For that
which is less excellent, is co-arranged for the sake of that which is
more excellent. Thus in the world, every part that is always passive,
subsists for the sake of that which is always moved. And in the
conjunction of animals, the female subsists for the sake of the male.
For the latter sows, generating a soul; but the former alone imparts
matter to that which is generated. In the soul however, the irrational
subsists for the sake of the rational part. For anger and desire are
co-arranged in subserviency to the first part of the soul; the former as
a certain satellite, and guardian of the body; but the latter as a
dispensator and provident curator of necessary wants. But intellect
being established in the highest summit of the body, and having a
prospect in that which is on all sides splendid and transparent,[65]
investigates the wisdom of [real] beings. And this is the work of it
according to nature, viz. having investigated, and obtained the
possession [of truth] to follow those beings who are more excellent and
more honorable than itself. For _the knowledge of things divine and most
honorable, is the principle, cause, and rule of human blessedness_.
FROM
METOPUS,
IN HIS TREATISE
CONCERNING VIRTUE.
The virtue of man is the perfection of the nature of man. For every
being becomes perfect, and arrives at the summit of excellence according
to the proper nature of its virtue. Thus the virtue of a horse, is that
which leads the nature of a horse to its summit. And the same reasoning
is applicable to the several parts of a thing. Thus the virtue of the
eyes is acuteness of vision: and this in the nature of the eyes is the
summit. The virtue of the ears also, is acuteness of hearing: and this
is the summit of the nature of the ears. Thus too, the virtue of the
feet is swiftness: and this is the summit of the nature of the feet. It
is necessary however, that every virtue should have these three things,
reason, power, and deliberate choice; reason indeed, by which it judges
and contemplates; power, by which it prohibits and vanquishes; and
deliberate choice, by which it loves and delights in [what is proper].
To judge therefore, and contemplate, pertain to the dianoetic part of
the soul; but to prohibit and vanquish are the peculiarity of the
irrational[66] part of the soul; and to love and delight in what is
proper, pertain to both the rational and irrational parts. For
deliberate choice consists of dianoia [or the discursive energy of
reason] and appetite. Dianoia therefore, belongs to the rational, but
appetite to the irrational part of the soul. The multitude however, of
all the virtues, may be perceived from the parts of the soul; and in a
similar manner the generation and nature of virtue. For of the parts of
the soul, there are two that rank as the first, viz. the rational and
the irrational parts. And the rational part indeed, is that by which we
judge and contemplate; but the irrational part is that by which we are
impelled and desire. These however, are either concordant or discordant
with each other. But the contest and dissonance between them, are
produced through excess and defect. It is evident therefore, that when
the rational vanquishes the irrational part of the soul, endurance and
continence are produced; and that when the former leads, and the latter
follows, and both accord with each other, then virtue is generated.
Hence, endurance and continence are generated accompanied with pain; but
endurance resists pain, and continence pleasure. Incontinence however,
and effeminacy, neither resist nor vanquish [pleasure]. And on this
account it happens that men fly from good through pain, but reject it
through pleasure. Praise likewise, and blame, and every thing beautiful
in human conduct are produced in these parts of the soul. And in short,
the nature of virtue derives its subsistence after this manner.
The species however, and the parts of it, may be surveyed as follows:
Since there are two parts of the soul, the rational and the irrational;
the latter is divided into the irascible and appetitive. And the
rational part, indeed, is that by which we judge and contemplate; but
the irrational part is that by which we are impelled and desire. And of
this, that which is as it were adapted to defend us, and revenge
incidental molestations, is denominated the irascible part; but that
which is as it were orectic of, and desires to preserve the proper
constitution of the body, is the appetitive part. It is evident
therefore, that the multitude of the virtues, their differences, and
their peculiarities, follow conformably to these parts of the soul.