Every virtue is perfected, as was shown by us in the beginning, from
reason, deliberate choice, and power. Each of these, however, is not by
itself a part of virtue, but the cause of it. Such therefore, as have
the intellective and gnostic part of virtue,[67] are denominated skilful
and intelligent; but such as have the ethical and pre-elective part of
it, are denominated useful and equitable.[68] Since however, man is
naturally adapted to act unjustly from exciting causes; and these are
three, the love of pleasure in corporeal enjoyments; avarice, in the
accumulation of wealth; and ambition, in surpassing those that are equal
and similar to him;—this being the case, it is necessary to know, that
it is possible to oppose to these such things as procure fear, shame,
and desire in men; viz. fear through the laws, shame through the Gods,
and desire through the energies of reason. Hence, it is necessary that
youth should be taught from the first to honor the Gods and the laws.
For from these, it will be manifest, that every human work, and every
kind of human life, by the participation of sanctity and piety, will
sail prosperously [over the sea of generation].
FROM
THEAGES,
IN HIS TREATISE
ON THE VIRTUES.
The principles of all virtue are three; knowledge, power, and deliberate
choice. And knowledge indeed, is that by which we contemplate and form a
judgment of things; power is as it were a certain strength of the
nature[69] from which we derive our subsistence, and is that which gives
stability to our actions; and deliberate choice is as it were certain
hands of the soul by which we are impelled to, and lay hold on the
objects of our choice. The order of the soul also subsists as follows:
One part of it is the reasoning power, another part is anger, and
another is desire. And the reasoning power indeed, is that which has
dominion over knowledge; anger is that which rules over the ardent
impulses of the soul; and desire is that which willingly rules over
appetite. When therefore, these three pass into one, so as to exhibit
one co-adaptation, then virtue and concord are produced in the soul; but
when they are seditious, and divulsed from each other, then vice and
discord are generated in the soul. And when the reasoning power prevails
over the irrational parts of the soul, then endurance and continence are
produced; endurance indeed, in the retention of pains; but continence in
the abstinence from pleasures. But when the irrational parts of the soul
prevail over the reasoning power, then effeminacy and incontinence are
produced; effeminacy indeed, in flying from pain; but incontinence, in
the being vanquished by pleasures. When however, the better part of the
soul governs, but the less excellent part is governed; and the former
leads, but the latter follows, and both consent, and are concordant with
each other, then virtue and every good are generated in the whole soul.
When likewise the appetitive follows the reasoning part of the soul,
then temperance is produced; but when this is the case with the
irascible part, fortitude is produced; and when it takes place in all
the parts of the soul, then justice is the result. For justice is that
which separates all the vices and all the virtues of the soul from each
other. And justice is a certain established order of the apt conjunction
of the parts of the soul, and perfect and supreme virtue. For every good
is contained in this; but the other goods of the soul cannot subsist
without this. Hence justice possesses great strength both among Gods and
men. For this virtue contains the bond by which the whole and the
universe are held together, and also by which Gods and men are
connected. Justice therefore, is said to be Themis among the celestial,
but Dice among the terrestrial Gods; and Law among men. These assertions
however, are indications and symbols, that justice is the supreme
virtue. Hence virtue, when it consists in contemplating and judging, is
called prudence; when in sustaining things of a dreadful nature, it is
denominated fortitude; when in restraining pleasure, temperance; and
when in abstaining from gain, and from injuring our neighbours, justice.
Moreover, the arrangement of virtue according to right reason, and the
transgression of it contrary to right reason, produce [in the former
case] a tendency to the decorous as the final mark, and [in the latter]
the frustration of it. The decorous however, is that which ought to be.
But this does not require either addition or ablation; since it is that
which it is requisite to be. But of the indecorous there are two
species; one of which is excess, and the other defect. And excess
indeed, is more, but deficiency is less, than is decorous. Virtue also,
is a certain habit of the decorous. Hence it is directly, both a summit
and a medium. For thus, things that are decorous are both media and
summits. They are media indeed, because they fall between excess and
deficiency; but they are summits, because they do not require either
addition or ablation. For they are the very things themselves which they
ought to be.
Since however, the virtue of manners is conversant with the passions,
but of the passions pleasure and pain are supreme, it is evident that
virtue does not consist in extirpating the passions of the soul,
pleasure and pain, but in co-harmonizing them. For neither does health,
which is a certain apt mixture of the powers of the body, consist in
expelling the cold and the hot, the moist and the dry; but in these
being [appropriately] mingled together. For it is as it were, a certain
symmetry of these. Thus too, in music, concord does not consist in
expelling the sharp and the flat; but when these are co-harmonized, then
concord is produced, and dissonance is exterminated. In a similar
manner, the hot and the cold, the moist and the dry, being harmoniously
mingled together, health is produced, and disease destroyed. But when
anger, and desire are co-harmonized, the vices and the [other] passions
are extirpated, and the virtues and manners are ingenerated. Deliberate
choice however, in beautiful conduct, is the greatest peculiarity of the
virtue of manners. For it is possible to use reason and power without
virtue; but it is not possible to use deliberate choice without it. For
deliberate choice indicates the dignity of manners. Hence also, the
reasoning power subduing _by force_ anger and desire, produces
continence and endurance. And again, when the reasoning power is
violently dethroned by the irrational parts, then incontinence and
effeminacy are produced. Such dispositions however, of the soul as
these, are half-perfect virtues, and half-perfect vices. For the
reasoning power of the soul is [according to its natural subsistence] in
a healthy, but the irrational parts are in a diseased condition. And so
far indeed, as anger and desire are governed and led by the rational
part of the soul, continence and endurance become virtues; but so far as
this is effected by violence, and not voluntarily, they become vices.
For it is necessary that virtue should perform such things as are fit,
not with pain, but with pleasure. Again, so far as anger and desire
govern the reasoning power, effeminacy and incontinence are produced,
which are certain vices. But so far, as they gratify the passions with
pain, knowing that they are erroneous, in consequence of the eye of the
soul being sane,—so far as this is the case, they are not vices. Hence,
it is evident that virtue must necessarily perform what is fit
voluntarily; that which is involuntary indeed, not being without pain
and fear; and that which is voluntary, not subsisting without pleasure
and delight.
By division also it will at the same time be found that this is the
case. For knowledge and the perception of things, are the province of
the rational part of the soul; but power pertains to the irrational
part. For not to be able to resist pain, or to vanquish pleasure, is the
peculiarity of the irrational part of the soul. But deliberate choice
subsists in both these, viz. in the rational; and also in the irrational
part. For it consists of dianoia and appetite; of which, dianoia indeed,
pertains to the rational, but appetite to the irrational part. Hence
every virtue consists in a co-adaptation of the parts of the soul; and
both will and deliberate choice, entirely subsist in virtue.
Universally therefore, virtue is a certain co-adaptation of the
irrational parts of the soul to the rational part. Virtue however, is
produced through pleasure and pain receiving the boundary of that which
is fit. For true virtue is nothing else than the habit of that which is
fit. But the fit, or the decorous, is that which ought to be; and the
unfit, or indecorous, is that which ought not to be. Of the indecorous
however, there are two species, viz. excess and defect. And excess
indeed, is more than is fit; but defect is less than is fit. But since
the fit is that which ought to be, it is both a summit and a middle. It
is a summit indeed, because it neither requires ablation, nor addition;
but it is a middle, because it subsists between excess and defect. The
fit, however, and the unfit, are to each other as the equal and the
unequal that which is arranged, and that which is without arrangement;
and both the two former and the two latter are finite and infinite.[70]
On this account, the parts of the unequal are referred to the middle,
but not to each other. For the angle is called obtuse which is greater
than a right angle; but that is called acute, which is less than a right
angle. The right line also [in a circle] is greater, which surpasses
that which is drawn from the center. And the day is longer indeed, which
exceeds that of the equinox. Diseases, likewise, of the body are
generated, through the body becoming more hot or more cold [than is
proper]. For that which is more hot [than is fit] exceeds moderation;
and that which is more cold [than is fit] is below mediocrity. The soul
also, and such things as pertain to it, have this disposition and
analogy. For audacity indeed, is an excess of the decorous in the
endurance of things of a dreadful nature; but timidity is a deficiency
of the, decorous. And prodigality is an excess of what is fit in the
expenditure of money; but illiberality is a deficiency in this. And rage
indeed, is an excess of the decorous in the impulse of the irascible
part of the soul; but insensibility is a deficiency of this. The same
reasoning likewise applies to the opposition of the other dispositions
of the soul. It is necessary however, that virtue, since it is a habit
of the decorous, and a medium of the passions, should neither be
[wholly] impassive, nor immoderately passive. For impassivity indeed,
causes the soul to be unimpelled, and to be without an enthusiastic
tendency to the beautiful in conduct; but immoderate passivity causes it
to be full of perturbation, and inconsiderate. It is necessary
therefore, that passion should so present itself to the view, in virtue,
as shadow and outline in a picture. For the animated and the delicate,
and that which imitates the truth, in conjunction with goodness of
colors, are especially effected in a picture through these [i. e.
through shadow and outline]. But the passions of the soul are animated
by the natural incitation and enthusiasm of virtue. For virtue is
generated from the passions, and when generated, again subsists together
with them; just as that which is well harmonized consists of the sharp
and the flat, that which is well mingled consists of the hot and the
cold, and that which is in equilibrium derives its equality of weight
from the heavy and the light. It is not therefore necessary to take away
the passions of the soul; for neither would this be profitable; but it
is requisite that they should be co-harmonized with the rational part,
in conjunction with fitness and mediocrity.
FROM
THE TREATISE OF
ARCHYTAS
ON ETHICAL ERUDITION.
I say that virtue will be found sufficient to the avoidance of
infelicity, and vice to the non-attainment of felicity, if we
judiciously consider the habits [by which these are produced]. For it is
necessary that the bad man should always be miserable; whether he is in
affluence, for he employs it badly; or whether he is in penury; just as
the blind man, whether he has light, and the most splendid visible
object before him, or whether he is in the dark [is always necessarily
without sight]. But the good man is not always happy; for felicity does
not consist in the possession, but in the use of virtue. For neither
does he who has sight always see; for he will not see, if he is without
light. Life, however, is divided into two paths; one of which is more
arduous, and in which the patient Ulysses walked; but the other is more
free from molestation, and is that in which Nestor proceeded. I say
therefore that virtue desires the latter, but is able to proceed in the
former of these paths. The nature however of felicity proclaims it to be
a desirable and stable life, because it gives perfection to the decision
of the soul. Hence the virtuous man who does not obtain such a life as
this, is not indeed happy, nor yet entirely miserable. No one therefore
will dare to say that the good man should be exempt from disease, and
pain, and sorrow. For as we leave certain painful things to the body, so
likewise we must permit them to be present with the soul. The sorrows,
however, of fools are most irrational; but those of wise men proceed
only as far as reason, which gives limitation to things, permits.
Moreover, the boast of apathy dissolves the generosity of virtue, when
it opposes itself to things of an indifferent nature, and not to evils
such as death, and pain, and poverty. For things which are not evils are
easily vanquished. We should therefore exercise ourselves in the
mediocrity of the passions, as we shall then equally avoid
insensibility, and too much passivity, and shall not speak higher of our
nature than we ought.
FROM
ARCHYTAS,
IN HIS TREATISE ON
THE GOOD AND HAPPY MAN.
I say then that the good man is one who uses in a beautiful manner great
things and opportunities. He likewise is able to bear well both
prosperity and adversity. In beautiful and honorable circumstances also,
he becomes worthy of the condition in which he is placed; and when his
fortune is changed, receives it in a proper manner. In short, on all
occasions, he contends well from contingencies that may arise. Nor does
he only thus prepare himself [for whatever may happen], but likewise
those who confide in and contend together with him.
FROM
CRITO,
IN HIS TREATISE ON
PRUDENCE AND PROSPERITY.
Prudence and prosperity subsist, with reference to each other, as
follows: Prudence indeed is effable and possesses reason; for it is
something orderly and definite. But prosperity is ineffable and
irrational; for it is something disorderly and indefinite. And prudence,
indeed, is prior, but prosperity is posterior in beginning and in power.
For the former is naturally adapted to govern and define; but the latter
to be governed and defined. Moreover, both prudence and prosperity
receive co-adaptation, since they concur in one and the same thing. For
it is always necessary that the thing which bounds and co-arranges,
should have a nature which is effable and participates of reason; but
that the thing which is bounded and co-arranged, should be naturally
ineffable and irrational. For the reason of the nature of the infinite
and of that which bounds, thus subsists in all things. For infinites are
always naturally disposed to be bounded and co-arranged by things which
possess reason and prudence, since the former have the order of matter
and essence with relation to the latter. But finites are co-arranged and
bounded from themselves, since they have the order of cause, and of that
which is energetic.
The co-adaptation, however, of these natures in different things,
produces a great and various difference of co-adapted substances. For in
the comprehension of the whole of things, the co-adaptation of both the
natures, i. e. of the nature which is always moved, and of that which is
always passive, is the world. For it is not possible for the whole and
the universe to be otherwise saved, than by that which is generated
being co-adapted to that which is divine, and that which is always
passive to that which is always moved.[71] In man, likewise, the
co-adaptation of the irrational to the rational part of the soul, is
virtue. For it is not possible in these, when there is sedition in both
the parts, that virtue should have a subsistence. In a city also, the
co-adaptation of the governors to the governed, produces strength and
concord. For to govern is the peculiarity of the better nature; but to
be governed, is easier to the subordinate [than to the more excellent]
nature. And strength and concord are common to both. There is, however,
the same mode of adaptation in the universe and in a family: for
allurements[72] and erudition concur with reason in one and the same
thing; and likewise pains and pleasures, prosperity and adversity. For
the life of man requires intension and remission, sorrow and gladness,
prosperity and adversity. For some things are able to collect and retain
the intellect to industry and wisdom; but others impart relaxation and
delight, and thus render the intellect vigorous and prompt to action. If
however one of these prevails in life, then the life of man becomes of
one part, and verges to one part, tending either to sorrow and
difficulty, or to remission and levity. But the co-adaptation of all
these ought to subsist with reference to prudence. For this separates
and distinguishes[73] bound and infinity in actions. Hence prudence is
the leader and mother of the other virtues. For all of them are
co-harmonized and co-arranged with reference to the reason and law of
this virtue. And now my discussion of this subject is terminated. For
the irrational and the effable are in all things. And the latter defines
and bounds; but the former is defined and bounded. That, however, which
consists of both these, is the apt composition of the whole and the
universe.
The following beautiful fragment of Crito on Prudence, is from the
Physical Eclogues of Stobæus, p. 198, and is omitted by Gale in
his Collection of Pythagoric Ethical Fragments in Opusc. Mythol.
&c.
God fashioned man in such a way as to render it manifest, that he is not
through the want of power, or of deliberate choice, incapable of being
impelled to what is beautiful in conduct. For he implanted in him a
principle of such a kind as to comprehend at one and the same time the
possible and the pre-eligible; so that man might be the cause of power,
and the possession of good, but God of impulse and incitation according
to right reason. On this account also, he made him tend to heaven, gave
him an intellective power, and implanted in him a sight called
intellect, which is capable of beholding God. For it is not possible
without God to discover that which is best and most beautiful, nor
without intellect to see God, since every mortal nature is established
in conjunction with a kindred privation of intellect. This however is
not imparted to it by God, but by the essence of generation, and by that
impulse of the soul which is without deliberate choice.
FROM
ARCHYTAS,
IN HIS TREATISE ON
THE GOOD AND HAPPY MAN.
The prudent [i. e. the wise] man will especially become so as follows:
In the first place, being naturally sagacious, possessing a good memory,
and being a lover of labor, he should exercise his dianoetic power
immediately from his youth in reasonings and disciplines, and in
accurate theories, and adhere to genuine philosophy. But after this he
should acquire knowledge and experience in what pertains to the Gods,
the laws, and human lives. For there are two things from which the
disposition of prudence is produced; one of which consists in obtaining
a mathematical and gnostic habit; but the other, in a man perceiving by
himself many theorems and things, and understanding other things through
a certain different mode. For neither is he sufficient to the possession
of prudence, who immediately from his youth has exercised his dianoetic
power in reasonings and disciplines; nor he who being destitute of
these, has heard and has been conversant with a multitude of things. But
the latter will have his dianoetic power blind, through judging of
particulars; and the former through always surveying universals. For as
in computations the amount of the whole is obtained by the addition of
the parts, thus also in things, reason is able to delineate the theory
of universals; but experience has the power of forming a judgment of
particulars.
FROM
ARCHYTAS,
IN HIS TREATISE
ON DISCIPLINES.
It is necessary that you should become scientific, either by learning
from another person, or by discovering yourself the things of which you
have a scientific knowledge. If, therefore, you learn from another
person, that which you learn is foreign; but what you discover yourself
is through yourself, and is your own. Moreover, if you investigate,
discovery will be easy, and soon obtained; but if you do not know how to
investigate, discovery will be to you impossible. And [right] reasoning
indeed, when discovered, causes sedition to cease, and increases
concord. For through this the inexhaustible desire of possessing is
suppressed, and equality prevails; since by this we obtain what is just
in contracts. Hence, on account of this, the poor receive from those who
are able to give; and the rich give to those that are in want, both of
them believing that through this they shall obtain the equal. This
however will be a rule and an impediment to those that act unjustly,
viz. that men who possess scientific knowledge will appease their anger,
prior to the commission of an injury, being persuaded that the
perpetrators of it will not be concealed when it is committed; but that
those who do not possess scientific knowledge, becoming manifest in the
commission of an injury, will be restrained from acting unjustly.
FROM
POLUS,
IN HIS TREATISE
ON JUSTICE.
It appears to me that the justice which subsists among men, may be
called the mother and the nurse of the other virtues. For without this a
man can neither be temperate, nor brave, nor prudent. For it is the
harmony and peace, in conjunction with elegance, of the whole soul. The
strength however of this virtue will become more manifest, if we direct
our attention to the other habits. For they have a partial utility, and
which is referred to one thing; but this is referred to whole systems,
and to a multitude. In the world therefore, it conducts the whole
government of things, and is providence, harmony, and Dice, by the
decree of a certain genus of Gods. But in a city it is justly called
peace, and equitable legislation. And in a house, it is the concord
between the husband and wife; the benevolence of the servant towards the
master; and the anxious care of the master for the welfare of the
servant. In the body likewise, which is the first and dearest thing to
all animals, [so far as they are animals,] it is the health and
intireness of all the parts. But in the soul, it is the wisdom, which
among men subsists from science and justice. If therefore, this virtue
thus disciplines and saves both the whole and the parts [of every thing]
rendering things concordant and familiar with each other, how is it
possible it should not be called by the decision of all men, the mother
and the nurse of all things?
The following fragments also, from the Treatise of Archytas on Wisdom,
are preserved by Iamblichus, in the 3rd Chapter of his
Protreptics, or Exhortations to Philosophy.
“Archytas therefore, in the beginning of his Treatise on Wisdom, exhorts
to the possession of it as follows:
1. “Wisdom as much excels in all human affairs as the sight does the
[other] corporeal senses, intellect the soul, and the sun the stars. For
the sight is the most far-darting, and the most multiform of all the
senses; intellect is the supreme part of the soul, judging by reason and
dianoïa what is fit, and existing as the sight and power of the most
honorable things; and the sun is the eye and soul of things which have a
natural subsistence. For through it all things become visible, are
generated, and rise into existence.[74] Deriving also their roots, and
being generated from thence, they are nourished, increased and excited
by it in conjunction with sense.
2. “Man was generated by far the wisest of all [terrestrial] animals.
For he is able to contemplate the things which exist, and to obtain from
all things science and wisdom. To which also it may be added, that
divinity has engraved and exhibited in him the system of universal
reason, in which all the forms of things in existence are distributed,
and the significations of nouns and verbs. For a place is assigned for
the sounds of the voice, viz. the pharynx, the mouth, and the nostrils.
But as man was generated the instrument of the sounds, through which
nouns and verbs are signified, so likewise of the conceptions which are
beheld in the things that have an existence. And this appears to me to
be the work of wisdom, for the accomplishment of which man was generated
and constituted, and received organs and powers from divinity.
3. “Man was generated and constituted, for the purpose of contemplating
the reason of the whole of nature, and in order that, being himself the
work of wisdom, he might survey the wisdom of the things which
exist.—For if the reason of man is contemplative of the reason of the
whole of nature, and the wisdom also of man perceives and contemplates
the wisdom of the things in existence,—this being acknowledged, it is at
the same time demonstrated, that man is a part of universal reason, and
of the whole of the intellectual nature.
4. “Wisdom is not conversant with a certain definite existing thing, but
is simply conversant with all the things that exist. And it is
requisite, that it should not first investigate the principles of
itself, but the common principles of all beings. For wisdom so subsists
with reference to all beings, that it is the province of it to know and
contemplate the universal accidents of all things. And on this account
wisdom discovers the principles of all beings.
5. “Whoever, therefore, is able to analyze all the genera which are
contained under one and the same principle, and again to compose and
con-numerate them, he appears to me to be the wisest of men, and to
possess the most perfect veracity. Farther still, he will also have
discovered a beautiful place of survey, from which it will be possible
to behold divinity, and all things that are in co-ordination with, and
successive to him, subsisting separately, or distinct from each
other.[75] Having likewise entered this most ample road, being impelled
in a right direction by intellect, and having arrived at the end of his
course, he will have conjoined beginnings with ends, and will know that
God is the principle, middle, and end, of all things which are
accomplished according to justice and right reason.”[76]
PYTHAGORIC ETHICAL SENTENCES
FROM
STOBÆUS,
_Which are omitted in the Opuscula Mythologica, &c. of Gale._
Do not even _think_ of doing what ought not to be done.
Choose rather to be strong in soul than in body.
Be persuaded that things of a laborious nature contribute more than
pleasures to virtue.
Every passion of the soul is most hostile to its salvation.
It is difficult to walk at one and the same time in many paths of
life.[77]
Pythagoras said, it is requisite to choose the most excellent life; for
custom will make it pleasant. Wealth is an infirm anchor, glory is still
more infirm; and in a similar manner the body, dominion, and honor. For
all these are imbecile and powerless. What then are powerful anchors?
Prudence, magnanimity, fortitude. These no tempest can shake. This is
the law of God, that virtue is the only thing that is strong; and that
every thing else is a trifle.
All the parts of human life, in the same manner as those of a statue,
ought to be beautiful.
A statue indeed standing on its basis, but a worthy man on the subject
of his deliberate choice, ought to be immovable.
Frankincense ought to be given to the Gods, but praise to good men.
It is requisite to defend those who are unjustly accused of having acted
injuriously, but to praise those who excel in a certain good.
Neither will the horse be judged to be generous, that is sumptuously
adorned, but the horse whose nature is illustrious; nor is the man
worthy who possesses great wealth, but he whose soul is generous.
When the wise man opens his mouth, the beauties of his soul present
themselves to the view, like the statues in a temple.[78]
Remind yourself that all men assert that wisdom is the greatest good,
but that there are few who strenuously endeavour to obtain this greatest
good.[79] Pythagoras.
Be sober, and remember to be disposed to believe; for these are the
nerves of wisdom. Epicharmus.
It is better to live lying on the grass, confiding in divinity and
yourself, than to lie on a golden bed with perturbation.
You will not be in want of any thing, which it is in the power of
Fortune to give and take away.[80]
Despise all those things, which when liberated from the body you will
not want; and exercising yourself in those things of which when
liberated from the body you will be in want, invoke the Gods to become
your helpers.[81]
Neither is it possible to conceal fire in a garment, nor a base
deviation from rectitude in time.