FIGHTING AT BAY
The forces of France also had been fighting to protect their retreat
southward in these August days of 1914. After the passages of the
Sambre were forced, during the great Mons-Charleroi battle, the
Fifth French Army was placed in very perilous straits by the failure
of the Fourth Army, under General Langle, to hold the Belgian river
town of Givet. Hard pressed in the rear by General von Bülow's
army, and on their right by General von Hausen commanding the Saxon
Army and the Prussian Guard, the Fifth Army of France had to retire
with all possible speed, for their path of retreat was threatened
by a large body of Teutons advancing on Rocroi.
On August 23, 1914, holding their indomitable pursuers in check
by desperate rear-guard action, with their two cavalry divisions
under General Sordêt galloping furiously along the lines of the
western flank to protect the retiring infantry and guns, the Fifth
Army unexpectedly turned at Guise. At that point considerable
reenforcements in troops and material arrived, making the Fifth
Army the strongest in France. It now defeated and drove over the
Oise the German Guard and Tenth Corps, and then continued its
retirement. But the left wing of the French army was unsuccessful,
and Amiens and the passages of the Somme had to be abandoned to
the invaders.
On Sunday, August 23, 1914, the Fourth Army, operating from the
Meuse, was heavily outnumbered by the Saxon army around the river
town of Dinant. They fell back, after furious fighting for the
possession of the bridges, which the French engineers blew up as
the army withdrew southward to the frontier. Soon after, at Givet,
the Germans succeeded in wedging their way across the Meuse. Some
advanced on Rocroi and Rethel, and other corps marched along the
left bank of the Meuse, through wooded country, against a steadily
increasing resistance which culminated at Charleville, a town on
the western bank of the river. There a determined stand was made.
On August 24, 1914, the town of Charleville was evacuated, the
civilians were sent away to join multitudes of other homeless refugees,
and then the French also retired, leaving behind them several machine
guns hidden in houses, placed so that they commanded the town and
the three bridges that connected it with Mézières.
The German advance guards reached the two towns next day, August
25, 1914, which, as we know, witnessed the British retirement toward
Le Cateau. Unmolested, they rode across the three bridges into the
quiet, empty streets. Suddenly, when all had crossed, the bridges
were blown up behind them by contact mines, and the German cavalrymen
were raked by the deadly fire of the machine guns. Nevertheless,
finding their foes were not numerous, they made a courageous stand,
waiting for their main columns to draw nearer. Every French machine
gunner was silenced by the Guards with their Maxims; but when the
main invading army swept into view along the river valley, the
French artillery from the hills around Charleville mowed down the
heads of columns with shrapnel. Still the Teutons advanced with
reckless courage. While their artillery was engaged in a duel with
the French, German sappers threw pontoon bridges across the river,
and finally the French had to retire. Between Charleville and Rethel
there was another battle, resulting in the abandonment of Mézières
by the French.
The retreating army crossed the Semois, a tributary of the Meuse,
which it enters below Mézières, and advanced toward Neufchâteau;
but they were repulsed by the Germans under the Duke of Württemberg.
At Nancy on August 25, 1914, there was another engagement between
the garrison of Toul and the army of the Crown Prince of Bavaria;
after fierce onslaughts the garrison was compelled to yield and
retire. Finally, on August 27, 1914, at Longwy, a fortified town near
Verdun, the army of the German crown prince succeeded in bursting
into France after a long siege, and marched toward the Argonne.
Thus from the western coast almost to Verdun there was a general
Franco-British retreat.
On August 28, 1914, pressed by the German armies commanded by Von
Kluck on the west, by Von Hausen from Dinant and Givet, by Von
Bülow from Charleroi and Namur, the Allies were pushed back upon
a line stretching roughly from Amiens through Noyon-Le Fère to
Mézières; while their forces east of the Meuse between Mézières
and Verdun were retreating before Duke Albrecht of Württemberg,
and to the southeast of Verdun before the Bavarians. All northern
France was thus open to the invaders.
After the battle of Le Cateau, however, the Germans slackened their
pursuit for a very brief interval; partly because the terrific strain
of marching and fighting was telling upon them no less than upon
the Allies, partly because the engineers had blown up the bridges
over every river, canal, and stream, behind the retreating armies,
and partly because, under directions from the French commander in
chief, General Manoury was organizing a new force on the British
left, a new Sixth Army, mainly reserve troops, one corps of line
troops, and General Sordêt's cavalry. On the right of the British
were General Lanrezac's troops; then, between Lanrezac's Fifth
Army and the Fourth Army, came a Ninth Army, under General Foch,
formed of three corps from the south.
Counterattacks were ordered by the French general in chief, continued
during the entire retreat and had frequently brilliant results.
On August 29, 1914, a corps of the Fifth Army and of the divisions
of reserve attacked with success in the direction of St. Quentin
with the object of withdrawing the pressure on the British army.
Two other corps and a division of reserves joined issue with the
Prussian Guard and the Tenth Corps of the German army which debouched
from Guise. This was a very violent battle, known under the name
of the Battle of Guise. At the end of the day, after various
fluctuations in the fight, the Germans were thrown completely over
the Oise and the entire British front was relieved. The Prussian
Guard on that occasion suffered great losses.
August 27, 1914, the Fourth Army under General de Langle de Cary
succeeded likewise in throwing the enemy across the Meuse as he
endeavored to secure a footing on the left bank. The success continued
on the 28th; on that day a division of this army (First Division of
Morocco under the orders of General Humbert) inflicted a sanguinary
defeat on a Saxon army corps in the region of Signy l'Abbaye.
Thanks to these brilliant successes, the retreat was accomplished in
good order and without the French armies being seriously demoralized;
as a matter of fact, they were actually put to flight at no point.
All the French armies were thus found intact and prepared for the
offensive.
The right wing of the German army marched in the direction of Paris
at great speed, and the rapidity of the German onslaught obliged the
French General Staff to prolong the retreat until they were able
to establish a new alignment of forces. The new army established
on the left of the French armies, and intrusted to General Manoury,
was not able to complete its concentration in the localities first
intended. In place of concentrating in the region of Amiens it
was obliged to operate more to the south.
The situation on the evening of September 2, 1914, as a result
of the vigorous onward march of the German right, was as follows:
A corps of German cavalry had crossed the Oise and had reached Château
Thierry. The First German Army (General von Kluck), consisting of
four active army corps and a reserve corps, had passed Compiègne.
The Second Army (General von Bülow), with three active army corps
and two reserve corps, had attained to the region of Laon. The
Third German Army (General van Hausen), with two active army corps
and a reserve corps, had crossed the Aisne and reached Château
Porcin-Attigny.
Farther to the east the Fourth, Fifth, Sixth, and Seventh German
Armies, making about twelve active army corps, four reserve corps,
and numerous Ersatz companies, were in contact with the French
troops (Fourth and Fifth Armies) between Vouziers and Verdun, the
others from Verdun to the Vosges. Such was the situation.
It may be seen, if a map is consulted, that the Fifth French Army,
commanded from August 30 by General Franchet d'Espérey, would have
found itself in grave peril following on the backward bending of
the British and French forces operating on its left, if the French
had accepted the challenge of a decisive battle. The French commander
in chief resolutely chose the alternative that obviated such a
risk, that is, he decided on a postponement of the offensive and
the continuation of the retreat.
Already on September 1, 1914, he prescribed as the extreme limits of
the retreat the line running through Bray-sur-Seine, Nogent-sur-Seine,
Arcis-sur-Aube, Vitry-le-François, and the region north of Bar-le-Due.
That line would have been reached had it been necessary. On the
other hand, it was his intention to attack before it was reached if
the forces could be offensively arrayed, allowing of the cooperation
of the British army and the army of Manoury on the left, and on
the right that of the divisions of reserve that had been held on
the heights of the Meuse.
Meanwhile, late in the afternoon of August 29, 1914, the British
retirement began afresh, and 10,000 French troops also withdrew from
the Somme, blowing up the bridges as they went. Everywhere along
the roads were crowds of country folk and villagers with wagons and
carts piled high with household goods or carrying aged persons and
children, all in panic flight before the dreaded invaders, fleeing
for refuge in Paris. At various places these stricken multitudes
joined the army ambulances, taking the shortest routes. Rumors of
the coming of the uhlans ran along the straggling lines with tales
of the grievous havoc and ruin which these horsemen, vanguards
of the German columns, had wrought in the land. Hardly had the
retirement begun, when a body of uhlans entered Amiens and demanded
from the mayor the surrender of the town. This was formally given,
and the civilians were ordered, on pain of death, not to create the
slightest disturbance and not to take part in any action, overt
or covert, against the soldiery. Afterward, cavalry, infantry,
and artillery took possession of the town on August 30, 1914. On
the same day a German aeroplane dropped bombs on Paris.
While retiring from the thickly wooded country south of Compiègne,
the British First Cavalry Brigade were surprised while dismounted
and at breakfast in the early morning of September 1, 1914. Moving
figures on the distant skyline first attracted the attention of
those who had field glasses, but in the dim light their identity
was not at first revealed. Suddenly all doubt was resolved by a
rain of shells on the camp. Many men and a large number of horses
were killed. At once the order "Action front!" rang out, and the
remaining horses, five to a man, were hurried to cover in the rear,
while on the left a battery of horse artillery went into instant
action. The German attack was pressed hard, and the battery was
momentarily lost until some detachments from the British Third
Corps, with the guns of the artillery brigade, galloped up to its
support. Then they not only recovered their own guns, but also
succeeded in capturing twelve of the enemy's.
On the eventful day of September 3, 1914, the British forces reached
a position south of the Marne between Lagny and Signy-Signets. They
had defended the passage of the river against the German armies
as long as possible, and had destroyed bridges in the path of the
pursuers. Next, at General Joffre's request, they retired some
twelve miles farther southward with a view to taking a position
behind the Seine. In the meantime the Germans had built pontoon
bridges across the Marne, and were threatening the Allies all along
the line of the British forces and the Fifth and Ninth French Armies.
Consequently several outpost actions took place.
By the 1st of September, 1914, the day of the Russian victories
at Lemberg, Von Kluck's army had reached Senlis, only twenty-five
miles from Paris. Despite this imminent danger, the capital was
remarkably quiet and calm; every day, as fateful event crowded
upon event, seemed to renew the resolution and coolness of the
population. It seemed advisable, however, to transfer the seat of
government for the time being from Paris to Bordeaux, after assuring
the defense of the city by every means that could be devised.
The defenses of Paris consisted of three great intrenched camps,
on the north, east, and southwest, respectively. Of these the most
important is the last, which includes all the fortified area to
the south and west of the Seine. A railway over sixty miles in
length connects all the works, and, under the shelter of the forts,
it could not only keep them supplied with the necessary ammunition
and stores, but also it could be utilized to convey troops from
point to point as they might be needed. However, it was an open
secret that even the outer and newer defenses were not of any great
strength. If the Germans broke through the outlying circle of forts,
the inner line would be of small value, and the city itself would
be exposed to long-range bombardment.
Paris was not ready for a siege, and if attacked it would speedily
fall.
Early in the morning of September 3, 1914, President Poincaré,
accompanied by all the ministers, left Paris, and was followed
at noon by the members of the Senate and Chamber of Deputies, and
the reserves of the Banque de France. The higher courts were also
transferred to Bordeaux. The municipal authority was constituted
by the president of the City Council, and the Council of the Seine
Department, who were empowered to direct civil affairs under the
authority of General Galliéni as military governor, the prefect
of Paris, and the prefect of police.
On his appointment to the command, Galliéni did what he could to
strengthen the defenses. Trenches were dug, wire entanglements
were constructed; and hundreds of buildings that had been allowed
to spring up over the military zone of defense were demolished in
order to leave a clear field of fire. The gates of the city were
barred with heavy palisades backed by sandbags, and neighboring
streets also were barricaded for fighting. Certain strategic streets
were obstructed by networks of barbed wire, and in others pits
were dug to the depth of a man's shoulders. The public buildings
were barricaded with sandbags and guarded with machine guns.
But while Paris was preparing for siege and assault the French
staff were concentrating their efforts on making a siege impossible
by a decisive stroke against the German advance.
Hardly had the Government left the city when tidings arrived that
instead of marching on Paris, General von Kluck had swung southeastward
toward the crossing of the Marne. This news was obtained by the
allied flying corps, which had made daring flights over the enemy's
line.
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