THE GREAT RETREAT BEGINS
The German hosts now stood at the gates of France. It was a mighty
spectacle. The soldiery of the Kaiser which had swept their way into
Belgium, there to meet the unexpected resistance of the defenders
of King Albert, had reached their goal--the French frontier.
About the middle of August, 1914, General Joffre, assigned to the
British Expeditionary Force, commanded by Sir John French, the task
of holding Mons against the powerful German advance. The British
force formed the left wing of the line of front that stretched for
some two hundred miles close to the Belgian frontier. Extending
from Arras through the colliery towns of Mons and Charleroi, the
extreme western front of the armies was held by General D'Amade
at Arras, with about 40,000 reserve territorial troops; by General
French, with 80,000 British regulars, at Mons; by the Fifth French
Army of 200,000 first-line troops, under General Lanrezac, near
Charleroi; and by a force of 25,000 Belgian troops at Namur. The
total Allied troops in this field of battle were thus about 345,000
men.
Opposed to them, on the north, were about 700,000 German troops,
General von Kluck farthest to the west, Generals von Bülow and von
Hausen around the Belgian fortress of Namur, Grand Duke Albrecht
of Württemberg in the neighborhood of Maubeuge, and finally, on the
extreme left of the German line, the Army of the Moselle, under
Crown Prince Wilhelm.
The position of the Allied armies was based on the resisting power
of Namur. It was expected that Namur would delay the German advance
as long as Liege had done. Then the French line of frontier
fortresses--Lille, with its half-finished defenses; Maubeuge, with
strong forts and a large garrison; and other strongholds--would
form a still more useful system of fortified points for the Allies.
The German staff, however, had other plans. At Liege they had rashly
endeavored to storm a strong fortress by a massed infantry attack,
which had failed disastrously until their new Krupp siege guns
had been brought up. These quickly demolished the defenses. These
siege guns, therefore, which had thus fully demonstrated their
value against fortifications soon brought about the total defeat
of the French offensive, and compelled the Allies to retreat from
Belgium and northern France. The Germans lost no time in investing
Namur, and on Saturday, as noted above, August 22, 1914, the fortress
fell into the invaders' hands.
On the same day, August 22, 1914, the Fifth French Army, under
the lead of General Lanrezac, was enduring the double stress of
Von Bülow's army thundering against its front, and Von Hausen's two
army corps pressing hard upon its right flank and rear, threatening
its line of retreat. Against such terrific odds the French line at
Dinant and Givet broke, exposing the flank and rear of the whole
army; and by the evening of that day, August 22, the passages of
the River Sambre, near Charleroi, had been forced, and the Fifth
Army was falling back, contesting every mile of the ground with
desperate rear-guard action. The British, meanwhile, defending the
Mons position, were in grave danger of being cut off, enveloped,
and destroyed.
Sir John French had put his two army corps into battle array. He
had about thirty miles of front to defend, with Mons nearly in
the center.
On Sunday afternoon, August 23, 1914, the full weight of the German
onset fell for the first time upon the British.
All that night the British were under the fire of German artillery.
Sir John French realized the danger of his Maubeuge-Jenlain position,
and on Monday evening, August 23, 1914, realizing the importance
of putting a substantial barrier, such as the Somme or the Oise,
between his force and the enemy, gave orders for the retirement
to be continued at five o'clock the next morning, August 24, 1914.
He had decided upon a new position about the town of Le Cateau,
east of Cambrai. Before dawn, August 25, 1914, the southward march
over rough, hilly country was resumed, and toward evening of August
25, 1914, after a long, hard day's fighting march over the highroads,
in midsummer heat and thundershowers, the Guards Brigade and other
regiments of the Second Corps, wet and weary, arrived at the little
market town of Landrecies. From Landrecies, after an encounter with
a German column, they marched south toward Wassigny on Guise.
[Illustration: BATTLE OF MONS AND RETREAT OF ALLIED ARMIES]
While the night attack on Landrecies was raging, the Germans, taxing
their men to the uttermost, marched four other corps through the
tract of country between the west side of the forest and the road
from Valenciennes to Cambrai. These corps were in a position along
Smith-Dorrien's front before dawn of Wednesday, August, 26, 1914,
and in the earliest hours of the morning it became apparent that
the Germans were determined to throw the bulk of their strength
against the British battalions which had moved up to a position
south of the small town of Solesmes, extending to the south of
Cambrai. Thus placed, this force could shield the Second Corps, now
beginning its retreat under pressure of the German army advancing
from Tournai. These troops under General Snow were destined to
play an important part in the impending battle of Le Cateau.
By sunrise the guns of the four German corps were firing from positions
facing the British left, and gray-green masses of infantry were
pressing forward in dense firing lines. In view of this attack,
General Smith-Dorrien judged it impossible to continue his retreat
at daybreak. The First Corps was at that moment scarcely out of
difficulty, and General Sordêt--whose troops had been fighting
hard on the flank of the Fifth French Army, with General Lanrezac,
against General von Bülow's hosts--was unable to help the British,
owing to the exhausted state of his cavalry. The situation was full
of peril; indeed, Wednesday bade fair to become the most critical
day of the retreat.
As the day of August 26, 1914, wore on, General von Kluck, abandoning
frontal attacks, began to use his superior numbers in a great enveloping
move on both flanks, and some of his batteries secured positions
from which they could enfilade the British line. Smith-Dorrien,
having no available reserves, was thus virtually ringed by enemy
guns on one side and by hostile infantry on all sides. "It became
apparent," says Sir John French's dispatch, "that if complete
annihilation was to be avoided, a retirement must be attempted;
and the order was given to commence it about 3.30 p.m. The movement
was covered with the most devoted intrepidity and determination by
the artillery, which had suffered heavily, and the fine work done
by the cavalry in the farther retreat from the position assisted
materially in the completion of this difficult and dangerous operation.
The saving of the left wing could never have been accomplished
unless a commander" (Sir Horace Smith-Dorrien) "of rare coolness
had been present to personally conduct the operation."
This retirement foreshadowed the end of the battle. Worn out by
repeated repulses, the Germans had suffered too heavily to continue
their attacks or to engage in an energetic pursuit. According to
General French's estimate, the British losses during the trying
period from August 23 to August 26, 1914, inclusive, were between
5,000 and 6,000 men, and the losses suffered by the Germans in
their pursuit and attacks across the open country, owing largely to
their dense formation, were much greater. The Battle of Le Cateau
gave the Germans pause. Further retreat of the British could now
be resumed in orderly array; for by now General Sordêt with his
cavalry was relieving the pressure on the British rear, and General
D'Amade with his two reserve divisions from the neighborhood of
Arras was attacking General von Kluck's right, driving it back on
Cambrai. Disaster to the British forces was averted, though the
peril of German interposition between the Allied army and Paris
would soon compel still further withdrawals.
Covered by their gunners, but still under heavy fire of the German
artillery, the British began again to retire southward. Their retreat
was continued far into the night of August 26, 1914, and through
the 27th and 28th; on the last date--after vigorous cavalry
fighting--the exhausted troops halted on a line extending from the
French cathedral town of Noyon through Chauny to La Fère. There
they were joined by reenforcements amounting to double their loss.
Guns to replace those captured or shattered by the enemy were brought
up to the new line. There was a breathing space for a day, while
the British made ready to take part in the next great encounter.
This fourth week in August marked a decisive period in the history
of the Great War. All the French armies, from the east to the west,
as well as the British army, were in retreat over their frontiers.
To what resolution had the French commander in chief come? That
was the question on every lip. What at that moment was the real
situation of the French army? Certainly the first engagements had
not turned out as well as the French could have hoped. The Germans
were reaping the reward of their magnificent preparation for the
war. Their heavy artillery, with which the French army was almost
entirely unprovided, was giving proof of its efficacy and its worth.
The moral effect of those great projectiles launched from great
distances by the immense German guns was considerable. At such
great distances the French cannons of 75, admirable as they were,
could make no effective reply to the German batteries. The French
soldiers were perfectly well aware that they were the targets of the
great German shells while their own cannon could make no parallel
impression on the enemy.
The German army revealed itself as an extraordinary instrument
of war. Its mobility and accouterments were perfect. It had aver
a hundred thousand professional non-commissioned officers or
subofficers, admirably suited to their work, with their men marching
under the control of their eye and finger. In the German army the
active corps, as well as the reserve carps, showed themselves,
thanks to these noncommissioned officers, marvelously equipped.
In the French army the number of noncommissioned officers by profession
totaled hardly half the German figures. The German army, moreover,
was much more abundantly supplied with machine guns than the French.
The Germans had almost twice as many, and they understood how to
use them in defense and attack better than the French. They had
moreover, to a degree far superior to that of the French, studied
the use of fortifications in the field, trenches, wire entanglements,
and so on. The Germans were also at first better trained than the
French reservists; they had spent langer periods in the German
army, and their reserve carps were almost equal to the active carps.
In the French army, on the other hand, an apprenticeship and training
of several weeks were required to give to the divisions of reserve
their full worth. At the end of two weeks, nevertheless, thanks
to the marvelous elasticity of the French soldier and the warlike
qualities of the race, the training was completed. At the beginning
of the month of September the reserve divisions fought with the
same skill, the same keenness, and the same swing as the active
army carps.
Moreover, certain incompetencies had revealed themselves in the
French high command. These General Jaffre attended to without the
loss of an instant. Every general that appeared to him incapable
of fulfilling the task allotted to him was weeded out on the spot,
without considering friendships or the bonds of comradeship, or
intimacy that might be between them.
As things were seen in Paris, all may be summed up in this formula:
That the German army was better prepared for war than the French
army, for the simple reason that Germany had long prepared for the
war, because she had it in view, a thing which could not be said
of France. But the French army revealed right from the beginning the
most admirable and marvelous qualities. The soldiers fought with a
skill and heroism that have never been equaled. Sometimes, indeed,
their enthusiasm and courage carried them too far. It mattered
little. In spite of losses, in spite even of retreat, the morale
of the whole French army on the entire front from Alsace to the
Somme remained extraordinarily high.
The violation of Belgian neutrality and the passage of the German
armies through Belgium had been foreseen by the French General
Staff, but opinions differed in regard to the breadth of the turning
movement likely to be made by the German right wing in crossing
Belgian territory. Among French experts some were of opinion that
the Germans would confine themselves to the right bank of the Meuse,
while others thought that they would cross the Meuse, and make a much
vaster turning movement, thus descending on France in a direction
due north and south.
If the violation of Belgian neutrality was no surprise to the French
Staff, it was nevertheless hardly expected that the Germans would
be able to put in line with such rapidity at the outset all their
reserve formations. Each army corps was supported by its reserve
corps, which showed itself as quick in mobilization and preparation
as the active corps.
Germany, while maintaining sufficient forces on the Russian front,
was still able to put in the field for its great offensive against
France a more numerous body of troops than would have been believed
in France. This permitted them to maintain in Alsace, in Lorraine,
and in Belgian Luxembourg armies as numerous as those which faced
them on the French side, and at the same time to mass the major
part of their troops on the right so as to pour into the valley
of the Oise their chief invading forces.
This explains why the French left, which was exposed to the offensive
of the German right, was obliged to make a rapid retreat, permitting
the German armies of General von Kluck and General von Bülow to
advance with all speed in the direction of Paris.
The French military staff, as soon as they perceived the danger
that threatened, proceeded to a new alignment of forces. As long
as this alignment of forces could not be effected the retreat had
to continue. As soon as it was accomplished, as soon as General
Joffre had his armies well in hand and the situation of his troops
well disposed, he checked the retreat, gave the signal for the
offensive, and so followed the great Battle of the Marne.
The German plan consisted, therefore, in delivering the main blow
through the medium of the right wing of the German forces, consisting
of the army of Von Kluck, the army of Von Bülow, and the army of
Von Hausen, which were to march with all speed in the direction
of Paris.
What plan had the French staff in mind to oppose to this plan of
the Germans? Its plan aimed at checking and holding the greatest
possible number of Germans by a vigorous offensive in Alsace and
Lorraine so as to prevent them from joining the three first German
armies which threatened Paris. In support of this offensive of the
armies of Alsace and Lorraine, the central French armies attacked
in the direction of the Ardennes and Belgian Luxembourg with the
object of checking the center of the German armies and then turning
toward the west so as to cooperate in the offensive of the French
forces which, aided by the British army and the Belgian army, were
fighting in Belgium.
The French armies, which are numbered from the right to the left--that
is, from the east to the west--comprised: A detachment of the Army of
Alsace that was dissolved toward the end of the month of August; the
First Army (General Dubail); the Second Army (General de Castelnau);
the Third Army (General Ruffey, replaced at the end of August,
1914, by General Sarrail); the Fourth Army (General de Langle de
Cary); the Fifth Army (General Lanrezac, replaced in the last days
of August, 1914, by General Franche d'Espérey). At the right of this
army was stationed the British army under the command of General
French.
To what resolution did General Joffre, come? On that memorable
evening of the 24th, and on that morning of the 25th, two alternatives
presented themselves before him. Should they, rather than permit
the enemy to invade the soil of France, make a supreme effort to
check the Germans on the frontier?
This first apparent solution had the evident advantage of abandoning
to the enemy no part of the national soil, but it had some serious
inconveniences. The attack of the German armies operating on the
right (Generals von Kluck, von Bülow, von Hausen) were extremely
menacing. In order to parry this attack it was necessary considerably
to reenforce the French left, and for that purpose to transfer from
the right to the left a certain number of army corps. That is what
the military call, in the language of chess players, "to castle" the
army corps. But this movement could not be accomplished in a few
hours. It required, even with all the perfection of organization
shown by the French railways during this war, a certain number of
days. As long as this operation from the right to the left had
not been accomplished, as long as the left wing of the French army
and even the center remained without the reenforcement of elements
taken from the right, it would have been extremely imprudent, not
to say rash, for the French high command to attempt a decisive
battle. If General Joffre had risked a battle immediately he would
have been playing the game without all his trumps in hand and would
have been in danger of a defeat, and even of a decided disaster,
from which it might have been impossible to recover.
The second alternative consisted in drawing back and in profiting
from a retreat by putting everything in shipshape order to bring
about a new grouping of forces. They would allow the Germans to
advance, and when the occasion showed itself favorable the French
armies, along with the British army, would take the offensive and
wage a decisive battle.
It was to this second decision that General Joffre came. As soon as
on August 25, 1914, he had made up his mind as to what the French
retreat was going to lead he gave orders for a new marshaling of
forces and for preparations with a view to the offensive.
General Joffre has made no objection to the publication of his
orders in detail from that date, August 25, 1914, down to the Battle
of the Marne. They constitute an eloquent and convincing document.
The series of orders were contained in the "Bulletin des Armées
de la République Française," June 6, 1915, Sunday. The first of
these orders, dated August 25, 1914, runs as follows:
"The projected offensive movement not having been found possible
of execution, the consequent operations will be so conducted as
to put in line, on our left, by the junction of the Fourth and
Fifth Armies, the British army, and new forces recruited from the
eastern district, a body capable of taking the offensive while
other armies for the needed interval hold in check the efforts of
the enemy...."
The retreating movement was regulated so as to bring about the following
disposition of forces preparatory to an offensive:
"In the Amiens district a new grouping of forces, formed of elements
conveyed by rail (Seventh Corps, four divisions of reserve, and
perhaps another active army corps), brought together from August
27 to September 2, 1914. This body will remain ready to take the
offensive in the general direction of St. Pol-Arras or Arras-Bapaume."
The same general instructions of August 25, 1914, marks out the
zones of march, and says:
"The movement will be covered by the rear guards spread out at
favorable points of vantage so as to utilize every obstacle for
the purpose of checking, by brief and violent counterattacks in
which the artillery will play the chief part, the march of the
enemy or at least to retard it."
(Signed) J. JOFFRE.
The object of this maneuver is thus already on August 25, 1914,
clearly indicated; it looked not to a defensive, but to an offensive
movement, which was to be resumed as soon as circumstances appeared
favorable. Much is made clear in these orders of General Joffre,
which are characterized by perspicuity, foresight, and precision.
The retreat was effected; but it was only a provisional retreat.
Whenever an occasion presented itself to counterattack the enemy
for the purpose of delaying his advance, that occasion was to be
taken advantage of. And that is, in fact, what took place.
Two days later, on August 27, 1914, General Joffre brought together,
using army corps and divisions recruited elsewhere, a supplementary
army, the Ninth Army, which was detailed to take its place between
the Fourth and Fifth Armies. He intrusted its command to a general,
who, while commanding the Twentieth Corps, had distinguished himself
by his brilliant conduct in Lorraine, General Foch.
The establishment of the army of Manoury on the left of the French
armies so as to fall on the right flank of the Germans when they
marched on Paris; the establishment of a strong army under one
of the best French generals at the center for the purpose of
encountering the main weight of the German army; such were the
two decisions of the French commander in chief, taken on August
25 and 27, 1914, which contained in germ the victory of the Marne,
waged and won two weeks later.
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