THE MARNE--GENERAL PLAN OF BATTLE FIELD
On September 4, 1914, the bugler of Destiny sounded the "Halt!" to
the retreat of the armies of the Allies from the Belgian frontier.
The marvelous fighting machine of the German armies, perhaps the
most superb organization of military potency that has been conceived
by the mind of man, seemed to reach its limit of range. Success
had perched upon the German eagles, and for two weeks there had
been a steady succession of victories. Nevertheless the British
and French armies were not crushed. They were overwhelmed, they
were overpowered, and, under stern military necessity, they were
forced to fall back.
Day after day, under the swinging hammer-head blows of the German
drive, the flower of the forces of the Allies had been compelled
to break. A little less generalship on the part of the defenders,
or a little more recklessness behind that smashing offensive might
have turned this retirement into a rout. Even as it was, the official
dispatches reveal that, while occasional and local retirements had
been considered, such a sweeping retreat was far from contemplated by
Generals Joffre and French. German official dispatches bear testimony
to the intrepid character of the defenders sullenly falling back
and contesting every inch of the way, as much as they do to the
daring and the vivid bravery of the German attackers who hurled
themselves steadily, day after day, upon positions hastily taken
up in the retreat where the retirement could be partly repaid by
the heaviest toll of death.
The great strategical plan of the Germans, which had displayed
itself throughout the entire operations on the western theatre
of war from the very first gun of the campaign, came to its apex
on this September 3, 1914. If the allied armies could develop a
strong enough defense to halt the German offensive at this point,
and especially if they could develop a sufficiently powerful
counteroffensive to strike doubt into the confident expectations
of the armies of the Central Powers, then the strategical plan
had reached a check, which might or might not be a checkmate, as
the fortunes of war might determine. If, on the other hand, the
stand made by the Allies at this point should prove ineffective,
and if the counteroffensive should reveal that the German hosts
had been able to establish impregnable defenses as they marched,
then the original strategic plan of the attackers must be considered
as intact and the peril of France would become greatly intensified.
It is idle, in a war of such astounding magnitude, to speak about
any one single incident as being a "decisive" one. Such a term can
only rightly be applied to conditions where the opposing powers
each have but one organized army in the field, and these armies
meet in a pitched battle. None the less, the several actions which
are known as the Battles of the Marne may be considered as decisive,
to the extent that they decided the limit of the German offensive
at that point. The German General Staff, taking the ordinary and
obvious precautions in the case of a possible repulse, chose and
fortified in the German rear positions to which its forces might
fall back in the event of retreat. These prepared positions had
a secondary contingent value for the Germans in view of the grave
Russian menace that might call at any moment for a transfer of
German troops from the western to the eastern front.
The Battle of the Marne stopped the advance of the main German army
on that line, forcing it back.
[Illustration: BATTLE OF THE MARNE--BEGINNING ON SEPTEMBER 5, 1914]
The scene of the battle ground is one of the most famous in Europe,
not even the plains of Belgium possessing a richer historical
significance than that melancholy plain, the Champagne-Pouilleuse,
upon whose inhospitable flats rested for centuries the curse of a
prophecy, that there would the fate of France be decided, a prophecy
of rare connotation of accuracy, for it refrained from stating what
that fate should be. Yet the historic sense is amplified even more
by remembrance than by prophecy, for in the territory confronting
that huge arc on which 1,400,000 German and Austrian soldiers lay
encamped, awaiting what even the German generals declared to be
"the great decision," there lies, on the old Roman road running
from Chalons a vast oval mound, known to tradition as "the Camp of
Attila." In that country, a Roman general, Aetius, leading a host
of soldiers of whom many were Gauls, broke a vast flood wave of the
Huns as those savage Mongol hordes hurled themselves against Rome's
westernmost possession. On that occasion, however, the Visigoths,
under their King Theodoric, fought side by side with the Gauls.
Then, the dwellers on the banks of the Rhine and on the banks of
the Seine were brothers in arms, now, that same countryside shall
see them locked in deadly conflict.
The morale of tradition is a curious thing, and often will nerve a
sword arm when the most impassioned utterance of a beloved leader
may fail. There were few among the soldiers of France who forgot
that in the south of this same plain of Champagne-Pouilleuse was
the home of Joan of Arc, the Maid of Orleans, patriot and saint,
and more than one French soldier prayed that the same voices which
had whispered in the ear of the virgin of Domremy should guide
the generalissimo who was to lead the armies of France upon the
morrow. Here, tradition again found old alliances severed and new
ones formed, for the Maid of Orleans led the French against the
English, while in the serried ranks awaiting the awful test of
the shock of battle, English and French soldiers lived and slept
as brothers.
The topography of the region of the battle field is of more than
common interest, for modern tactics deal with vaster stretches
of country than would have been considered in any previous war.
This is due, partly, to the large armies handled, partly to the
terrific range of modern artillery, and also to what may be called
the territorial perceptiveness which aeronautical surveys make
possible to a general of to-day. While war has not changed, it is
true that a commander of an army in modern campaign is compelled
to review and to take into account a far larger group of factors. A
modern general must be capable of grasping increased complexities,
and must possess a synthetic mind to be able to reduce all these
complicating factors into a single whole. The first factor of the
battles of the Marne was the topographical factor, the consideration
of the land over which the action was to take place.
Let the River Marne be used as a base from which this topography can
be determined. The Marne rises near Langres, which is the northwest
angle of that pentagon of fortresses (Belfort, Epinal, Langres, Dijon,
and Besançon), which incloses an almost impregnable recuperative
ground for exhausted armies. From Langres the Marne flows almost north
by west for about fifty miles through a hilly and wooded country,
then, taking a more westerly course, it flows for approximately
seventy-five miles almost northwest, across the Plain of Champagne,
past Vitry-le-François and Châlons, thence almost due westward
through the Plateau of Sézanne, by Epernay, Château Thierry, La
Ferté-sous-Jouarre, and Meaux to join the Seine just south of Paris.
In the neighborhood of Meaux, three small tributaries flow into
the Marne--the Ourcq from the north, and the Grand Morin and Petit
Morin from the east. The Marshes of St. Gond, ten miles long from
east to west and a couple of miles across, lie toward the eastern
borders of the Plateau of Sézanne, and form the source of the Petit
Morin, which has been deepened in the reclamation of the marsh
country.
Once more considering the source of the Marne, near Langres, it
will be noted that the River Meuse rises near by, flowing north
by east to Toul, and then north-northwest past Verdun to Sedan,
where it turns due north, flowing through the Ardennes country
to Namur, in Belgium. To the east of the Meuse lies the difficult
forest clad hill barrier, known as the Hills of the Meuse; to the
east extends (as far as Triaucourt) the craggy and broken wooded
country of the Argonne, a natural barrier which stretches southward
in a chain of lakes and forests.
West of this impassible country of the Meuse and the Argonne lies
the plain of Champagne-Pouilleuse, which is almost a steppe, bare
and open, only slightly undulating, overgrown with heath, and studded
here and there by small copses of planted firs, naught but a small
portion of the whole being under cultivation. Between the Forest
of the Argonne and this great plain, which is over a hundred miles
long from north to south and forty miles in width, lies a short
stretch of miniature foothills, with upland meadows here and there,
but crossed in every direction by small ravines filled with shrubs
and low second-growth timber. Here lies the source of the Aisne, a
river destined to live in history; and on the farther side begins
the great plain.
On the west of the plain of Champagne rises, 300 feet, with a curious
clifflike suddenness, the Plateau of Sézanne. The effect is as
though a geological fault had driven the original plateau from
north to south throughout its entire length, and then as though
there had been a general subsidence of the plain, giving rise to
the clifflike formations known as Les Falaises de Champagne, at
the foot of which runs the road from La Fère-Champenoise to Rheims.
The disposition and arrangement of the German forces is next to
be considered. It can be assumed that their objective was Paris.
It is also worthy of remembrance that the German tactical method
has always favored the envelopment of the enemy's flanks rather
than a frontal attack aiming to pierce the enemy's center, which
latter was a favorite method of Napoleon I to reach decision.
The tactical method of envelopment demands great numerical superiority,
and on account of the extreme extension of front necessitated is apt
to become dangerous as perforce the center is left weak. Attempts
to envelop, with which the observer is confronted again and again
when considering the military movements of the Central Powers on
the western battle front, were revealed on the morning of September
3, 1914, in the position occupied by the German forces, and,
correspondingly, in the arrangement of the allied armies.
The German right, on September 3, 1914, and September 4, 1914,
at which time it was nearest to its desired goal of Paris, held
the banks of the Marne from Epernay to the banks of the little
tributary the Ourcq, which runs into the Marne from the north. This
extreme right comprised the Second Corps and the Fourth Reserve
Corps, encamped on the western bank of the little stream the Ourcq;
while the Fourth Corps was given the honor of the tip of the right,
being camped on the Marne at La Ferté-sous-Jouarre, supported by
the Third Corps, the Seventh Corps and the Seventh Corps Reserve.
The Ninth Cavalry Division occupied an advanced position west of
Crécy and the Second Cavalry Division occupied an advanced position
near the British army, north of Coulommiers. These troops constituted
the First German Army, under the command of General von Kluck.
The Allies' left, confronting this position, held strong reserves,
and by the nature of the ground itself, was well placed to prevent
any enveloping movement, dear to the German school of military
tactics. It rested securely on the fortress of Paris, believed
by its constructors to be the most fully fortified city in the
world, and should the German right endeavor to encircle the left
wing of the Allies, should it develop a farther westerly movement,
it would but come in contact with the outer line of those defenses
and thence be deflected in such an enormous arc as to thin the line
beyond the power of keeping it strong enough to resist a piercing
attack at all points. Clearly, then, as long as the extreme left
of the Allies remained in contact with the defenses of Paris, an
enveloping movement was not possible on the easterly flank.
Facing the German extreme right, was the Sixth French Army, one
of the great reserves of General Joffre, which had been steadily
building up since August 29, 1914, with its right on the Marne
and its left at Betz, in the Ourcq Valley, encamped on the western
side of that stream, facing the Second and Fourth Corps of the
Germans. The strengthening of that army from the forces at Paris
was hourly, and while three or four days before it had been felt
that the Sixth French Army was too weak to be placed in so vital a
point--that it should have been supplemented with the Ninth Army--the
results justified the French generalissimo's plans and more than
justified his confidence in the British Army, or Expeditionary
Force, which faced the tip of the German right wing drive and was
encamped on a line from Villeneuve le Comte to Jouy le Chatel, the
center of the British army being at a point five miles southeast
of Coulommiers. This army was under the command of General Sir
John French.
The right center of the German line was held by General von Bülow's
army, consisting of the Ninth Corps, the Tenth Corps, the Tenth
Reserve Corps, and the Guard Corps. This army also was encamped
upon the Marne, stretching from the eastern end of General Von
Kluck's army as far as Epernay. This army thus held the Forests
of Vassy but was confronted by the marshes of St. Gand.
Confronting this right center was, first of all, General Conneau's
Cavalry Corps, which was in touch with the right wing of the British
army under Sir John French. Then, holding the line from Esternay
to Courtaçon lay the Fifth French Army under General d'Espérey.
Full in face of the strongest part of the German right center stood
one of the strongest or General Joffre's new reserves, the Ninth
Army under General Foch, with the marshes of St. Gond in front or
him, and holding a twenty-mile line from Esternay, past Sézanne
to Camp de Mailly, a remarkably well-equipped army, very eager
for the fray.
The hastily replenished corps, largely of Saxons, which had been
General von Hausen's army, lay next to General von Bülow, a little
north of Vitry, and as it proved, a weak spot in the German line.
The left center of the attacking force was under the command of
the Duke of Württemberg and extended across the whole southern
end of the plain of Champagne to the upper streams of the Aisne
south of St. Menhould. The extreme left of this advanced line was
the army of the Imperial Crown Prince, holding the old line on the
Argonne to the south of Verdun. In close relation to this advanced
line, but not directly concerned with the battles of the Marne, were
the armies of the Bavarian Crown Prince, encamped in the plateau
of the Woevre, engaged largely in the task of holding open the
various lines of communication, while far to the south, in the
vicinity of the much battered little town of Mulhouse, lay the
remains of the decimated army or the Alsace campaigns under General
von Heeringen.
Facing this left center came General Langle's Fourth French Army,
covering the southern side of the plain of Chalons, it lay south
of Vitry-le-François, and faced due north. On this army, it was
expected, the brunt of the drive would fall. At this point the French
battle line made a sharp angle, the Third French Army, commanded
by General Sarrail, occupying a base from Bar-le-Duc to Verdun.
It thus faced almost west, skirting the lower edge of the Forest
of Argonne. At the same time it was back to back with the Second
French Army, which covered the great barrier of forts from Verdun
to Toul and Epinal, while the First French Army held the line from
Epinal to Belfort.
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