OF THE UNITY OF GOD

Now then if this is the method adopted by the Law, it may be asked:

What is the way of proving the unity of God by means of the Law; that

is, the knowledge of the religious formula that “there is no god, but

God.” The negation contained in it is an addition to the affirmative,

which the formula contains, while the affirmative has already been

proved. What is the purpose of this negation? We would say that the

method, adopted by the Law, of denying divinity to all but God is

according to the ordinance of God in the Quran, contained in the

following three verses. First, “If there were either in heaven or on

earth gods beside God, verily both would be corrupted.”[49] Secondly,

“God has not begotten issue; neither is there any other God with him;

otherwise every other God would surely take away that which he has

created; and some of them had enabled themselves over the others. Far

be it that from God, which they affirm of Him.”[50] Thirdly, “Say,

unto the idolators, if there were gods with Him, as ye say, they would

surely seek an occasion of making some attempt against the possessor of

the Throne.”[51] The argument contained in the first verse is implanted

in our dispositions by our very nature. For it is well-known that if

there be two kings, and the orders of the one be as effectual as those

of the other, it is not possible to have even a single city under their

guidance. It is impossible to have one action of a single kind from

two actors. So it is necessary that, if both of them begin work at the

same time, the city would be ruined, except in the case that one should

work and the other remain inactive. This is against our conception of

divinity. For when the two actions of the same kind are gathered upon

a single object, then that object must necessarily be destroyed. This

is the meaning of the verse, “If there were either in the heaven or on

earth gods besides God, both would be corrupted.” The verse, “Every god

has surely taken away that which he had created,” has been revealed in

refutation of the argument of those who believe in many gods, entrusted

with different works. For in this case it becomes incumbent that the

gods doing different works be independent of one another, and that they

should not be existent at one and the same time. But as the world is

one it is necessary that there be not in it gods with different duties.

The third verse, “Say unto the idolators if there were gods with him,

as ye say, they would surely seek an occasion of making some attempt

against the Possessor of the Throne,” is like the first, an argument

to prove the impossibility of the existence of two gods, whose duties

are the same. This verse means that had there been in the world any

other god, but the present one, able to create the world and those in

it, so that his relation to it be that of a creator, then he must live

with God on the Throne. Thus there would be found two existent things

of the same kind in a single place. But this is impossible. For when

the relation is one, the related must also be one, that is, they cannot

be gathered in a single place as they cannot live in it. The relation

of God to the Throne is just its opposite: the Throne exists for Him,

and not He for the Throne. That is what God has said, “His Throne is

extended over heaven and earth, and the preservation of them is no

burden unto him.”[52] This is the argument by nature or by Law for

proving the unity of God. The difference between the learned and the

masses is that the learned know more about the creation of the world,

and the purpose of its different parts, like a single body, than the

common people. It is to this that the latter part of the verse refers,

“God forbid! and far, very far, be that which they utter! The seven

heavens praise him, and the earth, and all who are therein: neither is

there anything which doth not celebrate His praise; but ye understand

not their celebration thereof: He is gracious and merciful.”[53] The

argument which the Asharites deduce from this verse, calling it the

“argument of impossibility,” is neither in accordance with natural nor

legal arguments. It is not in accordance with nature, because what

they say is without any proof at all; while it is insufficient by Law,

because the common people cannot understand it, not to speak of their

being satisfied with it. They say, that if there be two gods, then it

is more probable that they would differ. If this were to happen, then

there would be one of the following three cases, there being no fourth

alternative. Either the desire of both of them would be accomplished,

or the desire of neither would not. They say that it is impossible that

the desire of neither of them be accomplished, but if it be so then the

universe would neither be existent nor non-existent. If the desire of

both of them be accomplished, then the universe would be both existent

and non-existent at the same time. So there remains no alternative

but that the desire of one be accomplished, the other’s remaining

unfulfilled. So one whose desire remains unfulfilled is helpless, and

the helpless cannot be a God. The weakness of this argument is that

as it is possible to suppose that they differ, it is just as possible

to presume that they agree, a fact more becoming to the gods than

difference of opinion. If they agree about the creation of the world,

they would be like two craftsmen agreed upon making something. If it

be so then it must be said that their actions help them to work and

live in a single place, except that some one may say, that perhaps one

would do one thing and the other quite another thing, or perhaps they

would work by turns. But this is an objection which cannot be advanced

by the masses. But if any sceptic controversialist were to advance it,

he may be told that one who has power to create one thing has power

to create the whole. So now again it comes to the same thing, whether

they agree or not, and how can they help each other in work? As to

working by turn, it would be a defect in both of them. It is more

probable that if there be two gods, there must be two universes. But

as the universe is one, its Maker must also be one, for a single work

can only be done by one maker. So it is not necessary that we should

understand the verse of God, “and some of them had enabled themselves

over the other,” as pointing to disagreement alone, but it may be taken

as true even in the case of argument, for this also leads to the same

result as disagreement would do. Here lies the difference between us

and the Mutakallimun, about the meaning of this verse, though Abul

Maali has said something almost expressing our own views. By the

foregoing you would understand that the argument which the Mutakallimun

have deduced from this verse is not the one which it really contains.

The impossibility to which their argument leads is not one which

should be deduced from the verse in question. The impossibility which

is deduced from the argument which they think is contained in the

verse, is more than one impossibility, by their dividing it into

three parts, while there is no division in the verse itself. So the

argument which they use is the one which is known to the logicians as

disjunctive syllogism, and is known in their science as definition

and division. But the argument contained in the verse is one which is

known in logic as hypothetical syllogism, which is quite different

from disjunctive syllogism. Any one who would look most cursorily

into this science would know the difference between the two. Then,

again, the impossibility which their argument points out is not that

to which the argument of the Book leads. They say that universe will

either be neither existent nor non-existent, or it will be existent

and non-existent at the same time, or its god would be a helpless and

weak god. These are impossible for ever, because of the impossibility

of more than one. The impossibility which the verse refers to, is not

so for ever, for in it it depends upon a certain period of time, that

is when the universe is found corrupted at the time of its existence.

For he says “If there be any other god but God,” the universe would

be found corrupted. Then he has made an exception that it is not

corrupted, and hence there must not be more than one God. So now it has

become quite clear that this is the method by which God has invited the

people to believe in His existence, and negate the divinity of all but

Him. These are the two propositions which are contained in the article

of Faith, “There are no gods but He.” So one who thinks over these two

propositions, and believes in them by the method which we have pointed

out, is a Muslim in reality, with a belief which is truly Islamic. But

he whose belief is not based upon these arguments, though he confesses

the article, he is a Muslim with the other Muslims, only on account of

the similarity of names.

The Philosophy and Theology of Averroes · 第 13 / 19 题