The attributes which the Divine Book has assigned to the Creator and
Maker of the universe, are only the perfect forms of those which are
found in man, and these are seven in number: Knowledge, life, power,
volition, hearing, seeing and talking.
Now as to knowledge, God in his Divine Book has said the following
“Shall he not know all things who has created them?”[54] The argument
contained in this verse is that a created thing always shows, by the
arrangement which it possesses,--its different parts being made for
the sake of one another for the benefit intended to be derived from
that thing,--that its maker is not nature only, but it must have been
made by one who has arranged all for the end in view. So he must have
a knowledge of it. For instance, when a man looks at a house he knows
that the foundation was laid for the sake of the walls, and the walls
have been raised for the roof. So it becomes clear to him that the
house must have been built by a man knowing the art of building.
This quality is eternal, for it is not fitting that God should possess
it for a time only. But we should not go down deep into this matter,
and should not say, like the Mutakallimun, that He knows the created
things at the time of their creation, by His eternal knowledge,
for then it becomes necessary that the knowledge of the created
thing at the time of its non-existence be the same which is absurd,
when knowledge is said to be dependent upon the existent things.
As an existent thing is sometimes an action, and sometimes only a
potentiality, it is necessary that the knowledge of the two existence
be different, as its time of being in potentiality is quite different
from the time of its being in action. But this the Law does not
explain. On the other hand it maintains quite an opposite position:
that God knows the created thing at the time of its creation, as He
has said, “There falleth no leaf, but He knoweth it; neither is there
a single grain in the dark parts of the earth; neither a green thing,
nor a dry thing, but it is written in the perspicuous book.”[55] So
it is necessary that we should lay down in Law that He knows a thing
before it comes into being; knows a thing when it is, and not when
it should have been; and knows when a thing has been destroyed at
the time of its destruction. This is what the injunctions of the Law
establish. It has been so because the masses cannot understand the
universe through visible things, except in this way. The Mutakallimun
have no argument to advance against it, except that they say that the
knowledge which changes with a change in the existent thing is itself
created, while with God nothing created can be attached. They say so
because they think that that which cannot be separated from the created
thing is itself created. But we have already exposed the fallacy of
this argument. So it is established by the rules described, and it
should not be said that he knows the creation of the created, and the
corruption of the corrupted things, neither by created nor by eternal
knowledge. This is an innovation in Islam, “And is thy Lord forgetful
of thee?”[56]
The attribute of life is quite evident from the attribute of Knowledge.
For our observation shows that one of the conditions of knowledge is
life. According to the Mutakallimun the conditions of an observed
object can be applied to the unseen. What they have said about this is
quite true.
The attribute of volition needs no proof, because it is one of the
conditions of bringing forth a thing, that its maker must intend it.
Such is also the case with power: He must possess power. But to say
that He intended created things by eternal intention is innovation
in religion, which was not known to the learned in Law, and cannot
satisfy the masses who have reached the stage of dogmatics. We should
say that He intends making a thing at the time of its creation, but
does not intend at the time of its non-existence. So God says: “Verily
our speech unto anything when we will the same is that we say unto it,
Be; and it is.”[57] For, as we have said, the common people are never
compelled to advance the argument that He intends doing a thing by
eternal intention, but, as the Mutakallimun have said, that that by
which the created things exist, is itself created.
Now if it be asked, how the attribute of Speech be assigned to and
proved in God, we would say that it can be ascribed to him on account
of the attributes of Knowledge and Power of creation. For speech
is nothing more than act on the part of the speaker to show to the
one addressed the knowledge which he has, or to disclose to him the
knowledge which is in him. This is one of the actions of the maker. And
when that created thing, which is really a creator, man, has power over
this faculty, because he knows and is powerful, how befitting it is
that it should be found in the real Creator. There is another condition
for this action, among the things which we can observe, and that is
that which must be the means of performing it: words. This being so,
it becomes necessary that that action should be performed by God in
the heart of somebody, His chosen servant. It is not necessary that
it should always be through the medium of words, and so created. But
it may happen either through an angel; or through divine inspiration,
that is without the medium of words which He may create, but through an
act to the hearer, which discloses to him the true nature of the thing
meant, or through words which He may create in the ears of him who has
been specialised to hear His words. It is to these three methods that
the verse of the Quran refers, “It is not fit for a man that God should
speak unto him otherwise than by private revelation, or from behind
a veil, or by sending a messenger to reveal, by His permission, that
which He pleaseth.”[58] So revelation is the disclosure of the intended
secrets to the inspired person without the medium of words which He
created, but through an action done on the mind of the one addressed.
So God says, “Afterwards He approached the Prophet and drew unto
him; until He was at the distance of two bows’ length from him or yet
nearer; and He revealed unto His servant that which He revealed.”[59]
The speech from behind the veil is one which is performed through the
medium of words. This is the real speech, and that is the one which God
specially bestowed upon Moses, and so He has said, “And God spake unto
Moses, discoursing with him.”[60] Now as to his words, “or by sending a
messenger to reveal,” this is the third kind mentioned above, that is,
through the medium of some angels. Sometimes God speaks to the learned
men, who are the successors of the prophets, by disclosing arguments
to them. On account of these causes it is true, when the learned men
say, that the Quran is the speech of God. It has now become clear to
you that the Quran, which is the speech of God, is eternal, but the
words expressing it are created by him, and are not human. From it are
excepted the Quranic words which we commonly use in our speech, that
is, these words are our own actions, by the command of God, while the
words of the Quran are those created by God. He who does not understand
these things by this method, cannot understand this argument and cannot
grasp as to how the Quran is the word of God. The alphabets used in the
Quran are our own invention, by the command of God. We have to respect
them, because of them are formed the words created by God, for the
purpose which is not itself created. He who thought of words and not
of meaning, that is, did not separate them, said that the Quran was
created; while he who thought of the meaning which these words express,
said the Quran was not created. But the truth lies in the middle of
these two extreme views. The Asharites deny that the speaker is the
maker of his own speech, for they think that if they admit it, they
must also admit that God is the maker of His speech. Again, when they
believe, that the speech can only exist with the speaker, they think,
they must also believe, taking in view the two foregoing principles,
that God is Himself the creator of His words. In this case He Himself
becomes the place of created things. So they assert that God is the
maker of speech, but it is an eternal attribute in him, like knowledge,
etc. This is the time of the speech in our mind, but not of the speech
which expresses what we have in our mind, that is, the words. As the
Mutazilites thought that speech is the action of the speaker, they said
that by speech is meant only the words uttered. So they believed that
the Quran is “Created.” Since according to them the word is an action
of the speaker, so it is not one of its conditions that it should exist
with the speaker. The Asharites on the other hand, insist that it is
one of its conditions that it should exist only with the speaker.
This is true in both the cases, that is in the case of ideas in our
minds, and the words which express them. But in the case of God, it
is the ideas which stand with Him, and not the words expressing them.
So when the Asharites laid it down as a condition, that the speech be
absolutely dependent upon the speaker, they deny that the speaker is
the maker of his speech; while on the other hand, the Mutazilites, when
they laid it down as a condition that the speaker is the maker of his
speech, ignored the existence of ideas in our minds. In this way there
is some truth, and some falsehood, in the opinions of both of these
sects, as must have become clear by what we have said.
Now we come to the attributes of hearing and seeing. The Law has proved
them to be possessed by God by saying that hearing and seeing are the
two essential qualities for knowing the meaning of things, which cannot
be acquired by intellect. So a maker must know everything about the
object which he is making, it is necessary that he should possess the
two senses of hearing and seeing. So He must have these two faculties.
All this proves their existence in God, by means of the Law, through
the teaching of the knowledge which is found in him. Moreover, One
on whom the name of God and the Adorned is applied must necessarily
possess all the senses. For it is useless for man to worship him
who cannot know that he is being worshipped, as God has said, “O my
father, why dost thou worship that which heareth not, neither seeth,
nor profiteth thee at all;”[61] and, “Do you therefore worship, beside
God, that which cannot profit you at all, nor can it hurt you?”[62]
This is the power which has been ascribed to God, and which the Law has
commanded the common people to know and nothing else.
Of the innovation which this question of attributes has given rise
to, one is whether they are the same as Divine Essence or something
added to it, that is, whether they are found in the essence itself
(_Nafsiyyah_), or are only applied to it, (_Maanawiyyah_). By
_Nafsiyyah_ we mean those attributes which are found in the thing
itself, and are not attached to it for the purpose of adding something
to the essence, for existence, we say one or eternal. By _Maanawiyyah_
we mean the attributes which are applied to a thing for some purpose
which is found in it. The Asharites say that these attributes are only
_Maanawiyyah_, that is qualities which are only added to the Divine
Essence. So they say that he knows by a knowledge which has been added
to His essence, and lives by life attached to it and so on. This has
compelled them to admit that the Creator has a body, for there must be
the quality and the qualified, the bearer and the borne. This is the
condition of the body, so they must say that the essence is existent
by itself, and the qualities exist through it, or they must say that
these attributes are independent of each other, then there must be a
number of gods. This is the belief of the Christians, who say that the
three personifications are those of Existence, Life and Knowledge. God
has said about it the following, “They are certainly infidels, who
say, God is the third of the three.”[63] One of them stands by itself,
the others being dependent upon the former. So it becomes necessary
that there should be essence, existing in itself, and the accidents
depending on something else. The place in which the essence and the
accidents are found together must necessarily be a body. Such is also
the case with the Mutazilites about the question, that the essence and
the attributes are one and the same thing. This they think, is for
the primary principles of knowledge or may be opposed to them. For
they think that according to the primary principles knowledge must be
existent without the one knowing. But knowledge and the one knowing
cannot be the same, except that it may be possible that the two may be
very close to each other, just as the father and the son. This teaching
is very remote for the understanding of the masses, and to explain
it to them in detail is innovation, for it would more likely mislead
than guide them to the right path. The Mutazilites have no argument
to advance in proof of their proposition, for they have none. Such is
also the condition of the Mutakallimun in the case of denying a body
to God. For when they have established it, they are compelled to admit
the creation of the body, because it is a body. We have already said
that they have no argument for it. Those who have such are the learned
people, the philosophers. It is at this point that the Christians have
erred. They believe in the multiplicity of attributes that they are
essences existing not by the help of another, but by themselves, like
the self, (_Zat_). They also believe that the qualities with these
attributes are two in number--knowledge and life. So they say that
God is one from the three causes. That He is three they say because
He exists, lives and knows. They say that He is one, because He is a
collection of all the three qualities. And so there are three religious
opinions among them. One party believes that they are all the self
(_Zat_) alone without any number; the other only believes in numbers of
qualities. This is divided into two parties: one which thinks that they
exist by themselves, and the other which makes them exist by something
else. All this is in contrast with the purpose of the Law.
It being so, it is necessary that one who wants to teach the knowledge
of these things to the common people should tell them as much as the
Law orders him to do--and that is only a confession of their existence
without entering into details. For it is not possible for the common
people to believe and understand them at all. By common people here I
mean all those who are unacquainted with the laws of reasoning, though
they may or may not know the science of scholastic theology. It is not
in the power of scholastic theology to know of these things even when
it is said that it is not a science of reasoning but of dogmatics, for
these things can never be clearly understood by dogmatics alone. So,
by now, the extent of these questions which should be disclosed to the
common people, and the method adopted for this purpose must have become
clear to you by what we have said.