ARISTOTLE (384–322 B. C.)
=Aristotle in the Academy and Lyceum.= Many notable pupils gathered
around Plato during his mastership of more than forty years. Plato’s
nephew, Speusippus, succeeded him as leader of the Academy, and for
the next three hundred and fifty years the Academy is called by various
names. It is the Older Academy under Speusippus and later; then it is
known as the Middle Academy; and then, about 120 B. C., it is known as
the New Academy. The history of the Academy is, however, a part of the
Hellenic-Roman Period. It is sufficient to say here that the leaders
succeeding Plato in the Academy added but little to philosophical
speculation, although much to empirical research. The important fact is
that the sceptre in philosophy passed from the Academy when Plato died
and his greatest pupil Aristotle left it. Just as Plato stood among
the pupils of Socrates as Socrates’ most discriminating interpreter, so
among the pupils of Plato there was one preëminent pupil,――Aristotle.
Aristotle was too great a man to be subordinated to the leadership of
Speusippus. Upon the death of Plato he left the Academy, and fourteen
years later he returned to Athens and founded the Lyceum, which became
under his mastership the most influential Athenian school. The Lyceum
was an inclosed space of ground, like the Academy. It was situated just
outside the walls of Athens, on the right bank of the Ilissus. It was
dedicated to Apollo, decorated with fountains, gardens, and buildings,
and contained one of the great gymnasia of Athens. It was frequented
by philosophers, and is known to have been the favorite walk of
Aristotle and his pupils, whence they got their name of Peripatetics.
Theophrastus, the most eminent pupil of Aristotle, bought a property
near the grove and bequeathed it to the school. It was a religious
foundation, like the Academy. The method of choosing the scholarchs
varied at different times. The name Lyceum is from the same root as
Lycian, and was given to Aristotle’s school from the fact that the
grove was dedicated to the Lycian Apollo.
Here, in the Lyceum, Greek philosophy was brought to its most
complete expression. Here all the threads of Greek cosmological and
anthropological undertakings were finally woven together. Here an
adjustment was accomplished between Aristotle’s two great predecessors,
Plato and Democritus; and materialistic and idealistic realism
crystallized in a theory of development. The great form of Aristotle
rises to speak the final word of pure Greek civilization, at a time
when the custody of Greece had passed from the hands of the Athenians,
the Spartans, the Thebans in succession to the Macedonians. He was the
most influential thinker that history had seen. In his formative power
upon human thought he has scarcely a peer. Dante called him “the master
of those who know.” “In my opinion,” said Cicero, “Aristotle stands
almost alone in philosophy.” Eusebius said of him, “Aristotle, nature’s
private secretary, dipped his pen in thought.” Goethe remarked, “If
now in my quiet days I had youthful faculties at my command, I should
devote myself to Greek, in spite of all the difficulties I know. Nature
and Aristotle should be my sole study. It is beyond all conception what
that man espied, saw, beheld, remarked, observed.”
The portrait that we draw of Aristotle is very different from that
of Plato. Instead of the deeply poetic temper, the man who sees all
things in an ideal unity of infiniteness and vastness, we have before
us now the scientist in search of facts, the accurate man of good
sense, whose imagination does not soar above the clouds, but at the
same time has extraordinary fertility in historical and scientific
theoretical explanations. His was a life filled with the love of truth.
His learning took up into itself the entire range of human knowledge
in such a way as to include its earlier development. And what is more,
he showed an equal interest in all departments. Aristotle was more of
a scientist than Plato, for the theoretical rather than the ethical
interest was fundamental in his work. He is the personification and
completion of pure Greek learning.
=Biography of Aristotle=, 384–322 B. C.
=Brief Chronological Sketch of Aristotle’s Life.=
First Period――Aristotle the Student――37 years.
384–347 B. C.
384 Born in Stagira in Macedonia.
367 Entered the Academy. Remained 19 years.
347 Left the Academy upon the death of Plato.
Second Period――Aristotle the Traveler――12 years.
347–335 B. C.
347 Went to the courts at Atarneus and Mytilene in Asia Minor.
343 Returned to the court of Macedon at Pella, in response to the
summons of King Philip, to teach the young prince Alexander.
Remained 4 years.
340 Went from Pella to Stagira to engage in scientific work.
Remained 5 years.
Third Period――Aristotle the Leader of the Lyceum――13 years.
335–322 B. C.
335 Founded the Lyceum in Athens. Taught and administered the
school 12 years.
323 Fled to Chalcis.
322 Died in Chalcis.
=Aristotle’s Biography in Detail.=
=1. First Period=, 384–347 B. C.――=Early Influences=. Aristotle was
born in Stagira in Macedonia. His father was court physician to King
Amyntas, the founder of the Macedonian power and the father of King
Philip. He came from a long line of physicians (the caste, Asclepiad)
who traced their origin to Asclepius. Little is known about the early
years of Aristotle except that his father and mother died, leaving him
in the guardianship of Proxenus of Atarneus. (Atarneus is the state in
Asia Minor which he later visited.) It can scarcely be doubted that he
was destined by his family to be a physician, and that the empirical
works of Hippocrates and Democritus were the first elements of his
early education. Aristotle grew up in this atmosphere of medicine of
Macedonia, which explains his respect for the results of experience
and his accuracy in details,――all of which contrasts him with the Attic
philosophers.
He was sent by Proxenus to the Academy in 367 B. C., at the age
of eighteen, and he remained there for nineteen years, or until he
was thirty-seven. He was not merely a pupil in the school, but his
brilliancy won for him immediately a prominent position there. He
became a teacher, an attractive writer, and champion of the literary
spirit of the school. Even while he was a member of the Academy he
became a famous man. It is difficult to say just how much influence
the Academy had upon the casting of his thought. His scientific
inclinations were formed before he went to the Academy; he got his
immense scientific erudition in Asia Minor and in Stagira later, after
he left the Academy. Probably the spirit of the Platonic school turned
his attention to ethical and metaphysical theories, and probably it was
due to his stay in the Academy that he became interested in rhetorical
and purely cultural studies. At the same time his own influence must
have been very great in forming the policy of the Academy, and he
was probably responsible for its turning its attention to scientific
matters.
The sources from which Aristotle drew the material of his philosophical
science were therefore (1) his inherited taste for medicine and
empirical science; and (2) the influence of the Academy in ethical,
metaphysical, and cultural subjects. Both these factors appear
throughout the philosophical development of Aristotle. On the other
hand, it must not be forgotten that probably Aristotle’s influence
upon the Academy was as great as that of the Academy upon him. His
own persistence along the line of empirical science shows itself in
his period at Atarneus, Mitylene, and on his return to Stagira. Much
has been said about an estrangement between Aristotle and his teacher,
Plato. This is probably idle gossip. Aristotle held his master in
great esteem, as he himself testifies in his _Ethics_. Aristotle was an
independent and original mind, and probably even in the school he would
point out defects in Plato’s thought, when his aged teacher would lead
his theories upon mistaken lines. Plato said that his pupil Xenocrates
needed the spur, while Aristotle needed the bridle. Aristotle was
called the brain of the Academy.
=2. Second Period=, 347–335 B. C.――=Traveler and Collector=. When
Plato died, and his nephew Speusippus became scholarch of the Academy,
Aristotle, in company with Xenocrates, went to the court of Hermeias,
ruler of Atarneus and Mitylene. Hermeias was another pupil of Plato
at the Academy. Here Aristotle married twice, and here he resided for
six years. In 343 B. C. he obeyed the summons of King Philip to come
to Pella and become the tutor of Alexander. He acted in this capacity
for four years, and seems to have been more fortunate than Plato as
instructor of a king. His influence upon Alexander was very great.
Without losing himself in the impracticable, Aristotle seems to have
impressed high philosophical ideals upon the noble spirit of his kingly
ward. Alexander says of Aristotle, “To my father I owe my life, to
Aristotle the knowledge how to live worthily.” During the tedium of
the protracted campaign in Bactria, Alexander sent for the tragedies
of Euripides, Sophocles, and Æschylus. The _Ethics_ of his teacher
was always with him. The ideals of statesmanship, the wide purposes
in political control, the greatness of the aims of the young conqueror,
as well as his self-control, his aversion to meanness and petty
things, and his sublime moderation were due in part to the teachings
of Aristotle. Never was there a more fortunate conjunction of two great
minds than here.
In 340 B. C., when Alexander entered upon his administrative and
military duties, Aristotle became independent of the Macedonian court.
He spent the most of these four years (340–335 B. C.) in scientific
work at Stagira, in intimate companionship with his young friend
Theophrastus, who later succeeded him as scholarch of the Lyceum.
“Among the special subjects of study in the school of Mieza and Stagira,
natural history formed a part.... Alexander at one time contributed
eight hundred talents to forward his former teacher’s investigations
in zoölogy, placed at his disposal a thousand men throughout Asia
and Greece, with instructions to follow out Aristotle’s directions
in collecting and reporting details concerning the life, conditions,
and habits of animals, and in every way made his campaigns serve the
purpose of scientific investigation.”[33] The reports of the ancients
concerning the vast sums placed at Aristotle’s disposal for use in
scientific investigation are of course exaggerated. That he made large
collections during this period, as well as later, is certain. This was
possible to him, first, because he was a rich man himself, and second,
because of his relations to the courts at Atarneus and Macedonia.
=3. Third Period=, 335–322 B. C.――=Administrator of the Lyceum=.
When Alexander entered upon his campaigns in Asia, and Aristotle
felt himself free from immediate duty to him, he went to Athens and
founded the Lyceum. This school very soon arose above the Academy,
and became the model of later societies of scholars of antiquity. Its
greatness partook of the greatness of Aristotle,――in the universality
of its interests, in the orderliness of its administration, and
in methodical coöperation. For twelve years he was the executive,
teacher, administrator, and inspiration of this school――developing
his philosophy, accumulating materials, and instructing his pupils.
The enormous product of the school could not have been the work of
one pair of hands. Nevertheless the writings, the immense collections,
the ethical and political treatises, show a unity that speaks of one
master-mind that had them under direction. When the Athenians began
to rise against the Macedonian rule, Aristotle’s position in Athens
as a friend of Alexander became unsafe. He fled to Chalcis, excusing
himself, so the tradition goes, because he wished to spare the
Athenians a second crime against philosophy. He died in Chalcis the
next year (322 B. C.).
A comparison of these three periods of Aristotle’s life discloses
the uniformity of that life, from beginning to end. He was, from the
time he entered the Academy to the founding of the Lyceum, a teacher.
Even as pupil of Plato his original mind was influencing the Platonic
teaching into new channels. During his second period he was a traveler,
to be sure; but he was more,――a collector and a king’s tutor. He was
always Aristotle, the philosophical teacher. Hence the periods of his
life cannot be so sharply marked as Plato’s, and the lines that are
drawn point only to phases of a life that had unity, like his doctrine.
His life is a regular development from sources in his first period, and
with no later deviating influence.
=The Writings of Aristotle.= On every page of Plato’s dialogues you
meet Plato; in Aristotle’s writings the personality of the author is
subordinated to his science. The collections of writings transmitted
under the name of Aristotle do not give even an approximately complete
picture of the immense activity of the man. They form, indeed, a
stately memorial, even after the spurious writings have been omitted,
but their bulk is small compared with what we know was the product of
his literary workshop. Forty treatises have been preserved. A catalogue
of the library of Alexandria in 220 B. C. includes a list of one
hundred and forty-six others, which have since been lost. Aristotle
was writer, lecturer, teacher, and the administrator of the Lyceum.
His leadership of that school, his careful direction of his coöperators
in research and study, was not only an instruction but an impulsion
to independent scientific study for all time. His great collections
of scientific data can be explained only by their being the combined
efforts of many different forces, guided and schooled by a common
master. The world was ready to take an account of stock, and Aristotle
was the first encyclopædic philosopher.
=1. The Popular Writings, published by Aristotle himself.= These were
intended for a circle of readers wider than his own school. No one of
these works is extant in complete form. They were written by Aristotle
during his life in the Academy. They were dialogues in form; in content
they were discussions of justice, wealth, wisdom, rhetoric, politics,
love, conduct, prayer, generosity, education, government, etc. They
were less artistic than Plato’s dialogues, but more original and
striking; and they were full of happy inventions and rich thought,
expressed in florid diction. The ancients spoke often of Aristotle’s
“golden flow of thought,” but this cannot truthfully apply to any save
these lost writings.
=2. The Compilations.= These were excerpts from scientific works,
collections of zoölogical, literary, historical, and antiquarian data,
which Aristotle and his pupils had gathered together. Only a few
fragments of the total remain. There were critical notes upon the
Pythagoreans, reports of extracts of Plato’s dialogues, a descriptive
basis for zoölogy with illustrations, collections of previous
rhetorical theories and models, histories of tragedies and comedies,
discussions about Homer, Hesiod, Archilochus, Euripides, and other
poets; there were historical miscellanies and reports concerning one
hundred fifty-eight Greek state constitutions.
=3. The Didactic Writings.= These have in part been preserved, and
they make up the collection of what we have of Aristotle’s writings.
They have a consistently developed terminology, but they are wanting
in grace and beauty of presentation. The plan of the books is generally
the same: the problem is precisely stated; then follows a criticism of
various attempted solutions; then a discussion of the salient points of
the problem; then a marshaling of the facts; and, finally, an attempt
to get a conclusive result. The method is modern in its scientific
procedure and the contrast with Plato is striking. Yet it must not
be inferred that these books of Aristotle are orderly. There are
repetitions, haste, unequal development of parts, and unfulfilled
promises. These books were nothing else than the written notes which
he had made the basis of his lectures and had intended to form into
text-books in some future time. Only parts of the Logic seem to have
been completed for text-book purposes.
These didactic writings are simply arranged as follows (Wallace):
1. The treatise on Logic called _Organon_.
2. Speculative Philosophy.
First Philosophy or Theology or Metaphysics.
Mathematics (writings not extant).
Physics (including the history of animals and the psychology).
3. Practical Philosophy.
Ethics.
Economics.
Politics.
4. Poetic Philosophy.
Art.
Poetry.
Rhetoric.
=Aristotle’s Starting-Point.= The two early influences in Aristotle’s
mental development offer an explanation for his philosophical point
of view. These influences were his empirical training in medicine and
his conceptual training in the moral ideals of the Academy. Plato had
convinced him that if there were to be any true science, it must be
founded on concepts that are unchanging. His own scientific training,
however, reinforced by the influence of Democritus, made him respect
the value of empirical facts. While the philosophical problem for
Aristotle was the same as that for Plato, the difference between
them was in the main a matter of emphasis due to their different
starting-points. Plato started with the refutation of the Protagorean
theory of perception, and consequently he emphasized the value of the
conceptual world; Aristotle, however, felt that Plato had overestimated
the conceptual world, and he emphasized the importance of empirical
facts. Both when a member of the Academy and later, he strongly
contended against Plato’s evaluation of the world of Ideas, because
they so transcended the sense world that they neither explained
nor illuminated it. Aristotle’s reaction against Plato’s theory
furthermore gives us a more correct notion of what Plato really taught.
If conceptions are to enter into knowledge, they must not exist in
the clouds of abstraction. He maintained that Plato had increased
the difficulty of the problem by adding a second world of entities
quite distinct from the world of nature. The same problem that Plato
confronted still exists unanswered, said Aristotle. It is the problem
of the twofold world. If Ideas are apart from things, we could not
know that they existed, we should not be able to know anything about
them, nor should we be able to explain the world through them. It
is true that Plato, in his later draft, had conceived Ideas to be
teleologically related to the physical things, but how could this be if
they were apart from things? Thus in his reaction from Plato’s theory
of Ideas, Aristotle reëstablished the world of perceptual fact. This is
the starting-point of Aristotle.
=The Fundamental Principle in Aristotle’s Philosophy.= The first
question then is, How did Aristotle reëstablish the perceptual fact?
What means did he employ to give the perceptual fact a reality?
The answer to this question will be the statement of Aristotle’s
fundamental principle. It will show his advance over Plato by
showing his new estimate of the perceptual world. Plato accepted
the Protagorean doctrine of perception, but also gave it a new value
by placing perceptions beside conceptions in the world of reality;
Aristotle developed Plato’s teaching about perceptions by linking them
inseparably with conceptions. Aristotle felt that Plato’s difficulties
arose from the lack of close relationship between conceptual Being
and perceptual fact. What is that linkage? What binds abiding reality
and changing phenomena so closely? _The linkage is development._
Development is the relation between conception and perception. It is
the fundamental principle in the philosophy of Aristotle throughout
and places a new estimate upon the value of perception. Perceptual
facts apart from conceptions have no reality; conceptions apart from
perceptions are mere abstractions. In the world of reality conceptual
Being resides in the perceptual facts, and the perceptual facts express
conceptions. They always exist together in a linkage or relationship
that is teleological, purposeful――the linkage of development. An
abstract statement of this relationship is, “Aristotle felt the
conceptual necessity of the empirically actual.” Perhaps the clearest
statement of this fundamental principle can be made in the terms of
evolution. It is this: _true reality is the essence which unfolds in
phenomena_. Notice that this sentence has two parts equally freighted:
_reality is an unfolding essence_; _reality is in phenomena_. The true
universal must be thought as realizing itself through its development
in particulars; the true concept as realizing itself through its
development in percepts; the true abiding Being as realizing itself in
its development through change. On the one hand, reality is the essence
of things; on the other, reality has existence only in things.
True reality is the individual.
The individual consists of two aspects: (1) conceptual being, and
(2) perceptual change.
These two aspects always stand in a relationship.
That relationship is developing purpose.
Here is the key to the teaching of Aristotle that seems to open
the doors of its many chambers. In his metaphysics reality is the
individual developing from possibility to actuality. In physics
individual phenomena get a reality through their development from
lower to higher types. In psychology the individual person is real when
the particulars, the physiological and psychological states, develop
toward the soul, which is their truth. So, too, in the great system of
logic in which Aristotle was pioneer, he is simply trying to give the
particular judgment a meaning by showing its linkage to the universal
judgment. Everywhere the starting-point of Aristotle is the perceptual
fact. Everywhere his purpose is to reëstablish it by showing its
relation to abiding conception in the individual.
It may be well to remark, however, that Aristotle does not altogether
succeed in constructing a consistent theory. In spite of his criticism
of Plato’s transcendent Ideas, in many places Aristotle does not
overcome Plato’s dualism. Frequently he differs from Plato more in
words than in meaning. We shall observe some of his inconsistencies
in their place. We shall see that Aristotle as he meant to be
was different from Aristotle as he was. Aristotle as he meant to
be――Aristotle as the opponent of Plato’s dualism――develops a philosophy
from a single fundamental principle. Aristotle as he was, reverts at
many critical points to Plato’s dualism.
Aristotle’s principle of development may appear at first blush very
much like the modern principle of evolution. As a matter of fact it
was very different. In all Greek philosophy after Socrates the study
of morals was fundamental. The ideal of Socrates, Democritus, Plato,
Aristotle, and the later Schools was a moral ideal. Being moral it was
fixed, and it fixed all the changes of life to it as a centre. Nature
was to the Greek a museum of types oscillating around a perfect form.
There was no evolution in the sense of progress. There was development
within the individual――the boy becomes a man, the seed becomes a flower;
but there was no evolution from genus to genus. Indeed, any variation
of the individual from its type was considered a defect.
=Aristotle’s Logic.= Aristotle felt that there must be a science of the
methods of science; and so successful was he in its formulation that it
has practically remained as he transmitted it. We are struck by the way
in which he divided science into the special sciences, each with its
well-defined field. It was perfectly natural that he should also, with
his great power of abstract reasoning, discuss the body of rules for
legitimate thinking. In science there must be an art of investigation,
just as in rhetoric there is an art of persuasion. At an early period
these logical writings were collected under the name _Organon_, because
the Lyceum regarded them so intimately connected with scientific
procedure as to be the instrument or “organ” of all knowledge. Certain
parts of Aristotle’s _Organon_ are of doubtful genuineness. The
important sections are the _Analytics_, a masterly logical groundwork
of the conclusion and proof, and the _Topics_, which treats of the
inductive methods of probability. Aristotle therefore made logic a
preliminary and separate study, as it should be. It became the preface
to his scientific work.
We shall briefly discuss Aristotle’s logic, because it is an
exemplification of his general philosophical principle. Among the
subjects in the history of philosophy, logic is perhaps the only
one that has had no internal history. Aristotle was the pioneer
in the subject. He left it so finished that scarcely any changes
of consequence could be made in it. The external history of the
Aristotelian logic has, however, been notable. A portion of the
_Categories_ and _De Interpretatione_ was most influential in the
history of the Middle Ages. The _Logic_ had been misunderstood and
misapplied by Aristotle’s own School, so that when it came into the
hands of the Schoolmen it had acquired the reputation of being only an
abstract formal logic. As thus interpreted it was used by the Schoolmen
and attacked by the philosophers of the Renaissance. Such a view of
Aristotle’s logic is unjust to the author. He had conceived logic
in its wholeness to be the true method to be used in investigating
practical scientific problems.
The Sophists had proposed rules of practical value in the study
of individual cases; Socrates had tried to fix upon some universal
principle as the basis of knowledge; Aristotle made a comprehensive
study of the regular forms of thought and the rules that govern the
arrangement of these forms in right thinking. In true Platonic fashion
he conceived physical events in nature to be due to some universal
cause. If, therefore, logical procedure be scientific, it must follow
the ways of nature: logic must deduce particular perceptions from
some universal idea. The necessary thought-relations in which the
particular stands will then appear. Deduction of the particular from
the universal is the true scientific method, used in the explanation
of nature-phenomena; so in proof the same deductive reasoning should
be used. In scientific study we are trying to show the conceptual
necessity of an empirical fact; in proof we are showing the conceptual
necessity of the particular term. Whether we are explaining an event
or proving a conclusion, we are employing the same logical process.
Aristotle thus regarded his logic as the true scientific method for
practical service, not as a merely abstract discipline in verbal
hair-splitting.
Socrates and Plato confined themselves to the study of the concept or
simple term. Aristotle also studied the concept. Indeed, he tried to
find out what concepts are fundamental in our thinking, so fundamental
that they are our thought reduced to its lowest terms. He names ten
of these fundamental concepts and calls them categories. But Aristotle
goes farther than Socrates and Plato, and makes his real point of
departure the judgment. A single term does not express truth. For
truth we must have two terms connected by the verb “is,” _i. e._ some
_relation_ must be shown between them. This is a judgment. Reasoning is
still more complex. It is the putting together or showing the relation
between two judgments. This process takes the form of the syllogism.
The first task of deduction is to present the laws of the syllogism.
These will then be the laws of scientific investigation. According
to these, particulars can be derived with certainty from universal
propositions, provided such universals are established. The syllogism
is in the form of two premises and a derived conclusion. It contains
three terms. The problem is to infer, from the relation that one
of these terms bears to the two other terms, what the two bear to
each other. The principle employed is that of subordination; and the
differentiations of the syllogism can be many, depending on the quality
and quantity of the premises and the distribution of the middle term.
The working of the syllogism in inference has a certainty so great that
Aristotle called it apodictic.
But there is another side to the syllogistic besides the deduction of
proof or the explanation of empirical fact. This is the establishment
of the premises. All deduction presupposes absolute premises. All
deduction is grounded on something not deduced; all proof on something
not proved; all explanation on something that has not been explained.
These presuppositions are universal propositions that can be known
only immediately through intuitions. Aristotle is not altogether
clear as to what these intuitions are. He names such axioms as the
law of contradiction and the law of the excluded middle, and some
special propositions which apply only to particular sciences. Since
the premises which we actually use are not open to proof, but only
strengthened as to the validity of their application, we must use the
method of induction in our search for them. We accumulate data from
opinions and varied experiences, and then we ascend to a generalization
which we take as a premise. The results of induction cannot therefore
be in themselves certain. The results are only probable, and can have
the character of knowledge only as they explain phenomena. Aristotle
means by induction something different from the present use of the
term. Induction in modern times means a kind of proof; Aristotle
means a method of discovery of _relatively_ universal terms where the
absolutely universal cannot be obtained.
There is an ideal involved in this conception of logic that is
interesting. In a perfectly intellectual society there would be a
perfect science in which all particular facts could be derived with
absolute certainty from premises absolutely known. Life and logic would
be identical. We should then be certain not only as to our proof but as
to our premises. Logic has sometimes been used very effectively in this
way. When the mediæval church conceived its dogmas to be the ultimate
premises of truth, it could deduce from them complete rules for living.
To the mediæval mind the perfect science was formulated by deducing it
from the dogma of the church. The dogmas were the absolute premises.
The Renaissance did not doubt the infallibility of the traditional
dogmas so much as the logical method, and Aristotle, who had been so
long artificially identified with the proof of ecclesiastical dogma,
was set aside.
Aristotle, moreover, showed great insight into the present relation
of thought and reality. The sequence of facts in our experience, he
pointed out, is exactly the reverse of what it is in reality. What
is first in reality comes last in our experience, and what is first
in our experience is last in reality. To illustrate: the mission of
the Athenian State in the eternity of things did not appear until
every event in its history had occurred. A perfect being would see the
universal ground before the historical particulars derived from it,
while we look from the particulars to their universal causes. Logic and
metaphysics agree; but they stand in inverted parallelism to historical
and psychological processes. Knowledge is a development from the senses
into the Ideas, and yet, on the other hand, Aristotle never fails to
remind us that this development is the expression of an idea which has
been present from the beginning.
=Aristotle’s Metaphysics.=
=1. Development is Purposeful.= The conception of relation is, of
course, quite as fundamental in Aristotle’s theory of metaphysics as
in his logic. In logic knowledge of the particular is possible through
its relationship to the universal; in metaphysics the relationship is
the relationship of development――the particular has significance and
value through the universal essence that unfolds from within it. If
Aristotle shows genius for abstract thinking by becoming the “Father of
Logic,” he shows equal genius for abstract thinking in his metaphysical
conception of development. He believed that metaphysics applies the
same conditions to things that logic discovers in thought. But in
metaphysics the relationship is not the abstract relationship that
Aristotle saw in Plato, but the vital relation of development in the
life and change of nature.
We have already stated the fundamental principle in Aristotle’s
teaching as _an unfolding essence in phenomena_. The unfolding is the
relationship of development. Reality does not consist in the particular
things of nature, nor in something outside nature, but in this
essential linkage of the perceptual and conceptual in nature. As the
world is spread out before us, it presents objects that are dynamic,
however much they may appear to be static. Everywhere matter is in the
process of forming. The world is a forming, not a formed nor a formless
world. So, also, if you undertook to describe any individual object in
the world, you would have to define it as a forming or developing thing.
A tree, for example, would not be adequately defined or described by
enumerating its parts at any one moment; but you must describe it as
a unitary organism developing from a seed. The reality of the world is
the development of its meaning in its history; the same is true of the
reality of any individual thing in the world. The world and the things
therein have an unfolding essence.
The next point to be observed about Aristotle’s conception is that the
_relationship of development is between two terms_. The individual must
have two aspects: there must be that out of which the development is
passing, and that into which it is passing. Aristotle calls these two
aspects of development respectively Matter and Form. Every object of
nature consists of Form and Matter, and these two terms have passed
into history. To Aristotle everything is Matter becoming Form, or, in
other words, Form realizing itself in Matter. The tree has its Matter
which is becoming Formed, and its Form into which the Matter is growing.
The principle which unites the two is development,――the principle
of the individual. Matter, then, is the possibility or potentiality
of an individual thing――it is the thing given potentially; Form is
its actuality or reality. If you emphasize merely the stages in the
development, you are regarding merely the _occurrences_; if, however,
you emphasize the stages of development as aspects of a unity, you see
its _essence_.
The relationship of development between two terms thus becomes under
Aristotle’s hands _the relation of purpose_. Aristotle calls this
self-realization of the essence in phenomena by the technical word
_entelechy_, _i. e._ in opposition to the earlier conceptions of nature
Aristotle conceived nature teleologically. Teleology or purpose we
found Plato using in his second draft of the Ideas, but more as a
postulate than as an efficient means of explanation. Aristotle uses
teleology as his positive fundamental principle of nature.
=2. Aristotle’s Two Different Conceptions of Purpose.= Aristotle
illustrated his conception of the purposeful relation in nature from
two very different types: (1) the development of organisms; (2) the
development that takes place when an artisan moulds plastic material.
Manifestly here are two different kinds of teleological activities.
In organic growth the Form that realizes itself in Matter is immanent
in the organism; the artist, on the other hand, superimposes the
Form upon the plastic material. In the case of organisms Matter and
Form are separable only by abstraction, and are only two aspects of
a development which is identical from the beginning to the end; in
the case of artistic construction the Matter is first a possibility
existing by itself, and the purpose of the artist is later added unto
it. In the case of organisms Aristotle speaks of two causes,――the
material and the formal; in the case of artistic construction he
employs four causes,――the material, the efficient, the formal, and
the final. Aristotle did not expressly formulate these two different
conceptions of purpose, but he completely applied them in practice.
On the one hand he regarded individual things as self-realizing, and
on the other he looked upon them as realized in other things. This
seemingly harmless difference is really very fundamental, for it is the
difference between Aristotle as he meant to be――Aristotle as the critic
of Plato’s dualism――and Aristotle who reverts to Plato’s teaching.
We find therefore two Aristotles; one a dynamic monist, the other
a transcendent dualist. We cannot say that Aristotle as he meant to
be is the true Aristotle, for he is a dualist in very many important
doctrines.
Aristotle’s conception of purpose as exemplified by organisms is his
original conception, and is what he intended to be the basis of his
philosophy. Here the truly real is the individual determined by its
own Form. It is the dynamic and not the artistic view of life. Activity
is directed to an end not without but _within itself_. The individual
is a complete organic unity at rest within itself. The individual
is primarily the essence or substance. Of the ten categories which
he enumerates, substance from this point of view is to Aristotle the
most important. The nine other categories only describe the states
or relations of the substance. The essence of the individual is the
substance; and Aristotle conceives the substance as the species or
universal in the thing. It is pointed out that even here Aristotle is
guilty of a dualism in the double meaning in which he uses substance.
But the conception of Aristotle here is of an immanent, dynamic reality.
He has in mind the self-contained unity of the individual, whether that
be a tree, a man, or the universe.
Aristotle’s conception of purpose as exemplified by artistic products
preponderates over his original conception of purpose. When he regards
the individual objects in the world, not as self-contained but as
relative to one another, he has a different conception of the world.
In this case the individuals are not realities but have reference to
a reality transcending them. The world is still a developing world,
but the essence that unfolds itself is not _in_ phenomena. It is a
goal for which phenomena strive. The fulfillment of the purpose is
beyond. Individual things are only a scale of values relative to some
transcendent standard. To illustrate: the bud, the blossom, the fruit,
have not their realization in themselves, but as food; again, the
growing tree, the timber lying on the ground, the timber in the house,
have their realization in the completed house; again, in the world at
large, the original nebulous matter of the universe, the first-formed
worlds, the early years of this earth, the succeeding centuries, the
20th century of this world, are only a scale of values for something
in the future.
In facing such facts, Aristotle had to depart from his original
conceptualistic standard of the world as an organic unity and of
individual things having their meaning in themselves. View a thing
by itself, and it seems to be a self-contained reality which unfolds
for itself alone. View a thing with reference to other things, and its
reality is in something else. Here is Aristotle no longer as he meant
to be, but as he really was. He is now Plato’s pupil. Each thing now
is to be regarded, not as containing in itself the two aspects of Form
and Matter, but as the possibility of something and the actuality of
something else. The blossom is the possibility or Matter of the fruit
and the Form or actuality of the bud. The nineteenth century is the
Form of the eighteenth and the Matter of the twentieth. But development
has a limit above and below, according to Aristotle: below, in Matter
that is without Form; above, in Form that is without Matter. Pure Form
is God, who excludes from Himself all Matter or possibility, because He
is perfect. Pure Matter is the lower limit, which is entire possibility,
and exists only to be formed. Here is a dualism as distinct as Plato’s,
which Aristotle not only did not overcome but which he developed. In
the same way that Plato contrasted Ideas and empty space, Aristotle
contrasted God as pure Form and Matter as pure possibility.
In this final dualistic form in which Aristotle left his teaching,
there are three specific doctrines which the student must consider
carefully. They are important because they had great influence in later
orthodox theology and in theories of nature. These special doctrines
are (1) Aristotle’s conception of God; (2) his conception of matter;
(3) his conception of nature.
=3. Aristotle’s Conception of God.= In the Aristotelian system the
assumption of an upper final term of pure Form was necessary, because
Matter as the possible and potential is not endowed with the power of
motion and generation. To Aristotle development is not a process with
temporal beginning and ending, but is a kind of closed circuit. Since
reality is in itself a developing essence, motion is as eternal as
reality. We should not ask, therefore, When did the world begin, and
when will it end? but we can legitimately ask, What is the nature of
reality that keeps motion alive? When we examine individual things, we
find, according to Aristotle’s explanation, that motion is the result
of the influence of Form upon Matter. There is inherent in matter an
impulse to be formed, and there is inherent in Form an active forming
purpose. But we may search individual things in vain for the causal
explanation of motion, since every Form is in turn the Matter for
a higher Form. The chain would be endless and not intelligible if
there did not exist a pure Form, which is unmoved. God as the unmoved
mover is the cause of the world-motion, but God must be the cause in
a different sense from the physical causes, which are themselves moved.
God operates as a cause upon Matter, not as a mechanical cause but as
pure Form,――as a final or teleological cause. God is the cause in the
sense that God excites in Matter the impulse to be actual, like God.
This prime mover is similar to Plato’s Idea of the Good. _As to its
form_ it is eternal, unmovable, unchangeable, wholly independent and
incorporeal, and yet the cause of all generation and change. God is the
perfect Being in whom all possibility is actuality. _As to its content_
God is pure thought. But in respect to his thought God is not like
human thought, which is concerned with external phenomena and changing
things. God is thought that has nothing else for its object than itself
and its own unchanging content. God is “thought of thought.” God’s
contemplation of himself is his own blessed life. Here in Aristotle
is a momentous conception formed for the first time in the history
of thought. Monotheism is for the first time conceptually framed and
scientifically grounded. The monism of Aristotle’s predecessors passes
over into a theism. God is not only immaterial in the sense that Plato
defined the Ideas, but he is spiritual. In Aristotle’s transcendent God,
conceived as pure self-consciousness, we have the ripest fruit of Greek
philosophy.
=4. Aristotle’s Conception of Matter.= The other and lower limit of
Aristotle’s dualism is Matter, “first Matter,” as Aristotle called it.
In itself it is wholly unformed and mere possibility. But it is unlike
pure Form in this respect,――it never exists in itself. God exists
apart from Matter, but since Matter is mere possibility, Matter never
exists apart from Form. Matter has a double character. On the one
hand Matter is that which as an accessory cause makes the world of
phenomena possible; on the other hand it is the source of the lawless
and purposeless in nature. Through its seeking to be formed it makes
the presentation of the Idea possible, and yet it stands as a deterrent
principle to the full presentation of the Form. On the one hand it is
the _sine qua non_ of physical nature, shows itself in real physical
effects, and is the basis of mechanical causation, motion, and impact.
On the other hand it stands in the way of the Forms actualizing
themselves fully, and it prevents the universe from perfecting itself
as God is perfect. While Matter is not an indifferent negative (as in
Plato’s teaching), but the necessary substratum of corporeal things,
it is however the indeterminate, and the ground of the accidental and
purposeless in nature. Matter is the infinite and unlimited, and is
the source of unusual phenomena, like monstrosities and abortions.
Both fate and accident are due to the retarding influence of Matter,
because it obstructs the successful working out of Form. Quite in
accord with Greek thought, Aristotle conceived necessity and chance to
be fundamentally the same, and the Greek custom of drawing lots shows
the universality of the notion.
=5. Aristotle’s Conception of Nature.= Nature is therefore to Aristotle
a far more complex world than Plato had conceived it. Nature has a
double character to Aristotle, as his twofold conception of causation
shows. Nature is composed of mechanical and teleological causes.
Purpose and necessity are the two principles of motion in the world,
and in this twofold conception of causation did Aristotle reconcile
Plato and Democritus. However much Aristotle concedes to the Democritan
idea of mechanical necessity, it is evident that in his conception of
nature the principle of teleology predominates over the mechanical.
The highest actuality is God, and he is a final or teleological cause;
and all results of value in nature come through final causes. Final
causes are primary causes; mechanical causes are secondary causes.
There would be no motion whatever in the universe but for the highest
final cause, God. Yet God is the unmoved mover, and matter cannot move
itself. Motion occurs because matter feels the impulse to form itself
like God. How different this Aristotelian conception of nature from our
modern scientific conception of an impersonal nature under a mechanical
causation that is universal! The teleological conception of nature and
natural events was very strongly intrenched in the human mind during
the Middle Ages, and was not dislodged easily by modern investigation.
Nature was a living thing to Aristotle. It was at once intrinsically
spontaneous, and self-determined and uniform. Its spontaneity was not
that of capricious chance. Its uniformity was that of purpose and end.
On the other hand, the Aristotelian conception of nature is not the
same as either the Christian doctrine of created nature or Darwin’s
theory of ♦evolution. The world of Aristotle had always existed; it
is a limited world in space, but not in time. Also the divine reason
always existed in it. Yet its evolution is not a progressive climbing
sort, like the Darwinian, in which new species evolve. It means only
that there is a relationship of rank and value among nature objects.
Nature is a unity. Teleological change occurs within it.
Nature is therefore a connected system of living beings in the process
of development from Form to Form, approximating the Deity and existing
as the potentiality of the Deity. There is a graded scale of things
of relative worth. But the double standard of estimating the worth of
nature-objects――that of mechanical necessity and that of teleological
cause――makes _two different series_, which find their union only at
the end in God. From our foregoing description of the nature of God,
it will be seen that he has two essential characteristics: he is Being
who ever rests within himself and remains like himself; and he is a
pure reason. He therefore combines in himself the two nature series in
their most ideal character. _Nature-objects in the series of mechanical
necessity_ have as their ideal character just that uniformity,
regularity, and order that we find in the abiding Being of God. The
greater the uniformity, the more nearly like God. _Nature-objects,
in the teleological series_, have as their ideal characteristic the
reason of God. The more nearly rational such a living being is, the
more nearly is it like God. In the one line the series of phenomena
ascends from the disorder of the terrestrial universe to the absolute
uniformity of the stars, which are close to God. In the other line
the series ascends in teleological values from the mechanical and
vegetative characteristics of organisms to their rational activity.
Both series terminate in God. The stars have rational intelligence and
the most uniform motions. Aristotle conceived Physics as the science
that includes the first series, and the second series he conceived to
be included by Psychology, Ethics, and Politics.
=The Mechanical Series,――Aristotle’s Theory of Physics.= The general
astronomical assumptions of the time determined Aristotle’s theory of
the physical world. He adopted the old Pythagorean conception of the
limited world-all: a hollow sphere made up of concentric crystalline
spheres. In opposition to the Pythagoreans, he conceived the earth at
the centre. It is spherical and stationary. Around it the crystalline
spheres revolve, in which the moon, sun, five planets, and fixed stars
are placed. The fixed stars are in the rim of the great sphere, are
outside all, and are nearest therefore to God, who animates all. God
as it were holds the world-all in the hollow of his hand. He moves the
whole, which in turn moves the fifty-five concentric crystal spheres
within. The principle of the movement of fixed stars is that of the
Deity, while the principle of the other spheres is that of the spirits
which reside in them. The movement of the planets have an influence
upon terrestrial life. Aristotle made the usual Pythagorean division
between the celestial and the terrestrial parts of the world-all, which
has had so much influence upon theology. The motion of the world-all is
most perfect, being a circle; its form is most perfect, being a sphere.
The celestial part of this world-all, which is the region lying near
the periphery, is most like God. The motion of this heaven is circular,
and it is the place of uniformity, perfectness, and changeableness.
The stars do not change nor pass away. They are superhuman beings, who
in their regularity are like the blessed gods. The terrestrial part of
the world-all below the moon has motions in straight lines. This is the
theatre of imperfection and irregularity, of increase and diminution.
There are many interesting discussions by Aristotle upon particular
physical matters, such as space, time, the elements. His conception of
motion shows how the series of uniform nature-motions lead up to the
second series of teleological values. In nature there are three kinds
of motion: change of place (mechanical); change in quality (chemical);
change in substance (organic). While change of place is the lowest
kind of motion, it is necessary to chemical and organic changes. Yet
Aristotle refuses to allow that qualitative changes can be reduced to
quantitative changes, but maintains that quality is self-subsistent.
Organic change, or change in substance, on the contrary, has a higher
Form of reality than the lower changes. This stand taken by Aristotle,
in refusing to reduce qualitative to quantitative determinations, shows
how comprehensive and sane a scientist he was. It introduces us to a
psychology and an ethics that are intimately linked to physics, and at
the same time have realms of their own. Let us now turn to the series
of qualitative nature changes, or to psychology, ethics, and politics.
=The Teleological Series: The Qualitative Changes of Phenomena.=
=1. The Psychology of Aristotle.= As the first experimental
psychologist, Aristotle intimately connected his studies in psychology
with his studies in biology and medicine. Man is a part of the world
of nature, and psychology is in part a comparative study. As we pass
upward from the mechanical changes, we find chemical changes of quality,
and then changes of organic life. Studying the organic realm, we
find ♦organisms to consist of souls of relative ranking. There are
vegetative souls, sensitive souls, and rational souls. Plants have
vegetative souls with the powers of assimilation and propagation;
besides vegetative souls animals have sensitive souls, with the powers
of appetition and locomotion; man possesses, besides both these souls,
the rational soul. Here is a series of teleological relationships,
where the purpose of the organism is explained only by the activity
of its soul. The soul builds up its body as a system of organs, and as
an organology the theory of Aristotle has great significance. Nature
strives ever upward, even in the inorganic processes, through an
unbroken series of creations to its highest Form in man. Each step in
the upward progress is the realization of an entelechy, or purpose, and
constitutes for the moment the goal of the impulse to strive. The whole
world is striving to realize the perfect Form. The lower ends, the
mechanical and vegetable and appetitive Forms, are not lost but are
utilized in the process; for they are the Matter upon which the Forms
higher than themselves are built. Every member is both Form and Matter
in the whole series.
The psychology has therefore two parts: (1) the general theory of
animal souls, which possesses rich suggestions; (2) the doctrine of the
Nous as the distinctive characteristic of man. These are the empirical
and speculative sides to Aristotle’s psychology.
Man is an epitome of all the changes in the universe. He has
vegetative, appetitive, and rational souls. Yet there is unity in man,
for the lower souls are subservient to the reason and exist for it.
The appetitive soul is the Form of the vegetative soul, the Matter of
the Rational soul, etc. Accordingly, Aristotle defines the soul as the
entelechy of the body, because bodily human activity is enlisted in the
service of the reason. Reality in man is an unfolding purpose, just as
it is in nature. The real self is this unfolding rational self, whose
possibility is the body; whose actuality is pure reason. The mind is
actualized body, the body is potential mind.
Aristotle made many contributions to psychology about the origin
and value of the several sensations, about the feelings of pleasure
and pain and the desires. He shows his remarkable genius in pointing
to the necessity of a unity of consciousness, which he calls the
“common-sensibility.” His discussion of the Nous, or reason, is of
importance for two reasons: first, because it leads to and illuminates
his ethical theory; and second, because it is an example of his
deviation from his original conceptual position. The reason, according
to his first intention, is the unfolding purpose of the body,――it
is the immanent essence of the body. As Aristotle finally left his
discussion of the Reason, it is as transcendent as his God, or as
any Idea of Plato. The Nous, or Reason, is not a Form of the body,
but a Form of the soul. It is purely immaterial, simple, unchangeable,
and incapable of suffering. It does not originate with the body as a
function. It comes from without as a godlike activity, and will remain
after the body passes away. Its fundamental activity is thought, and
its object is those ultimate principles of Being which are the ultimate
premises of logical thinking.
Aristotle’s theory of the Reason is considerably complicated by his
division of it into two parts,――the active and the passive Reason.
Within itself, the Reason is to be distinguished as Form and Matter.
The passive Reason is the Matter for the active Reason, and the active
Reason is the Form for the passive Reason. By the passive Reason
Aristotle evidently means the individual and developing man. The active
Reason can alone persist after death, but whether absorbed in the Deity
or not he does not say. Immortality to Aristotle in any case is not a
perpetuation of the individuality.
=2. The Ethics of Aristotle.= We have seen that nature phenomena are of
two classes,――those mechanically related, and those related as to their
purposes or ends. Physics is concerned with the first class; psychology
is concerned with the second class. But in a special way are ethics
and politics sciences of the phenomena of the second class――sciences
of teleologically related phenomena. Moral life is an unfolding essence
having a possibility and an actuality. The Possibility or Matter of
the ethical life is our feelings, temperament, disposition, impulses,
and perceptions――just those psychological factors that make up the
endowment of the human personality. The ultimate Form or actuality of
the ethical life is the reason. The reason as the goal of the moral
being determines its character. Man is distinctly a rational being.
Virtue is the process of the ethical life from its possibilities to
its actuality; it is the essence of the ethical life. Virtue is that
continuous state of mind that makes rational activity possible. So much
for the factors that make the ethical situation; the natural endowments
of the mind are its material, the reason is its goal, while the means
of developing the natural endowments into rational activity is virtue.
The situation would be simple enough for us as moral beings if, in our
striving, each had only himself and his own development to consider.
But man lives in a world of men, and his highest good is determined
somewhat by his environment,――by riches, bodily comforts, success.
These are not essentials but only accessories, and the lack of them
is only a limitation. The essential factor is the rational activity.
Nevertheless, these modify the definition of what we mean when we
define rational activity as the highest Good or Form of the moral life.
For the question which Aristotle proposes in his notable treatise of
Ethics is, What is the end or supreme good of human action? The highest
Good for a man among men is Happiness, or well-being; that includes
not only rational activity, but also the pleasures that accrue to
such activity. But what is happiness? It is an end in itself, and
not the means to anything else; it is the result of functioning, a
state of conscious vitality; it accords with the law of excellence of
that functioning. Perfect happiness is, therefore, partly the result
of one’s own individual effort, partly dependent on circumstance.
While virtue is the measure of the worth of different pleasures, yet
pleasures do not always attend our acts in our present society. The
greatest Good is happiness, but since this depends in part on external
goods, the goal to which we should directly attend――the factor within
our control――is rational activity.
There are two classes of virtues based on the two kinds of rational
life,――the practical virtues and the dianoetic virtues. The practical
virtues are those of conduct based upon the rational control of the
impulses; the dianoetic virtues are those of intellectual activity
based upon the development of the perceptions. The perfect moral
development of human nature will consist (1) in the perfect development
and true regulation of the feelings and desires in moral excellence;
and (2) a perfect development of the intellectual faculties for
rational culture.
(a) The Practical Virtues. The essential thing for the individual
to regard, therefore, is the training of his will by right rational
insight. He should seek to direct his impulses by reason, and not only
once but so many times that the impulses will become rational habits.
This is what Aristotle means by training in virtue. It is continuity in
rational activity; it is a permanent development toward reason; it is
the unfolding of the real Self. Aristotle had regard for the facts of
life when he differed from Socrates, who said that virtue is knowledge.
Aristotle did not conceive the will as psychological power independent
of the reason. He doubted if rational insight was more powerful than
the impulses, when the test comes. Experience often shows that although
we may know what is right, an impulse will often drive us into habits
not guided by reason. This presupposes for Aristotle a will that is
free to choose among the desires that one which will lead him along
the path that reason points out.
It is impossible to formulate a rule for the acquirement of the
particular virtues. Each virtue must be treated by itself. The only
principle for guidance is that the reason should always seek the
mean between two extremes. Thus courage is the mean between cowardice
and rashness; temperance between intemperance and insensibility;
friendliness between obsequiousness and brusqueness, etc. Moderation
is the watchword in the cultivation of the practical virtues.
(b) The Dianoetic Virtues are the means toward the attainment of pure
rationality for one’s self. The dianoetic virtues are higher than
the practical. They unfold the pure formal activity of the Nous, and
give the most noble and perfect pleasure. Man finds through them his
possible participation in the divine happiness. These intellectual
virtues may be either theoretical or practical insight; in the latter
case, Aristotle means knowledge of the right in art, and knowledge
of justice. But the purest is Wisdom (θεωρία), which is knowledge for
its own sake. It is the knowledge that God has of himself. Man may
approximate this.
In Aristotle’s ethical theory there appear three features that
are distinctly Greek. (1) The leading question that he asks at the
beginning of the Ethics, What is the end or Supreme Good of human
action? is Greek. The modern writer asks, What is the nature of duty?
(2) The emphasis on the “mean” is Greek. The idea of the “mean” was the
fundamental principle in Greek life, and appeared in such literature
as Gnomic poetry and Plato. (3) The subordination of individual ethical
conduct to the conception of the state is Greek. Aristotle says that
politics will have to settle the question of the Supreme Good, for the
Good of the state and that of the individual are identical.
=The Political Philosophy of Aristotle.= In the present real world
rational activity rather than happiness is the chief concern of man.
Happiness is, however, his highest Good, which he can attain if his
environment favors him. The political environment is a moral factor
to be considered. The state should be the fulfillment of the morals
of the individual, and should also be his ethical trainer. That State
is fulfilling its own possibilities most completely which brings to
the full its natural endowments. Every Constitution is right that has
the weal of the people at heart, so that we find Aristotle holding
this extraordinarily liberal position, that the external structure of
the State is not so much of consequence as that the State should be
the educator of its people and the actualization of its own inherent
possibilities. Aristotle did not construct an ideal state, like Plato.
He merely pointed out some essentials necessary to the well-being
of a state, like education and providence for the future life of the
State. Although the State is the offspring of necessity, and arises
out of the needs of utility, it is the Form or actuality of the inner
self-realization of man from his savagery. Race, blood, soil, and
geographical position are all the Matter of the State; the rational
perfection of these is the Form; the civic virtue is the permanent
means of the social development. The individual in Aristotle’s State is
subordinated, but not absorbed, in the State. He can participate in the
intellectual virtues. Since his own enjoyment in wisdom approximates
God’s, he himself has distinction. Aristotle was a stanch supporter
of marriage and the family relations. No philosopher in ancient times
so elevated the position of woman. He reluctantly consented to the
institution of slavery because it seemed to him a necessity.