PLATO (427–347 B. C.)
=Abdera and Athens.= The materialism of Democritus was the natural
consummation of the thought of the Cosmological Period. The influence
of the Sophistic psychology only enriched it, widened it, and brought
its materialism into a systematic formulation. The Democritan system
from the isolated centre of Abdera points only to the past. Upon the
death of Democritus the school quickly disappeared. Its materialistic
doctrine reappeared from time to time in one form and another,――in
the Skeptics, the Epicureans, and the Stoics. It was reintroduced
as a system into Europe during the Renaissance. So far as Greece was
concerned, the school of Abdera was an early ripening and an early
dying branch.
The school of Athenian immaterialism, the principal tendency of Greek
thought, arose from the centre of Attic civilization and pointed to
the future. It drew its materials from practically the same sources
as the philosophy of Abdera, but the materials were polarized about
the ethical teaching of Socrates. The life of Plato coincides with the
unhappy history of Athens after the death of Pericles (429 B. C.). The
Peloponnesian War began in 431 B. C., two years before the death of
Pericles and four years before the birth of Plato; and it did not end
until 403 B. C. The event most disastrous to the Athenians during this
war was the Sicilian expedition in 413 B. C. Athens was captured by the
Spartans in 403 B. C., and the great walls of the city were destroyed.
The remainder of Plato’s life was contemporaneous with the devastating
wars among the Greek cities, for there was no city strong enough to
hold the balance of power after it left the hands of the Athenians.
In 359 B. C. Macedon began to loom up as a power in the north. The
life of Plato, the formulator of Athenian immaterialism, may be easily
remembered as covering that period between the rise of Sparta and the
rise of Macedon.
=The Difficulties in Understanding the Teaching of Plato.= The theory
of Plato is one of the most involved and one of the most difficult
to understand in the whole history of philosophy. This difficulty of
interpreting Plato as a philosopher depends upon many factors: upon
the artistic literary form of the dialogue in which his philosophy is
presented; upon the conflicting tendencies of thought in Plato himself;
upon the fact that the composition of his dialogues extended over a
period of more than half a century; upon the constant reshaping of the
content as well as the form of his thought; and upon the uncertainty
of the chronological order of his writings. This chronological
order of Plato’s dialogues is an important factor in determining his
teaching. Since the beginning of the nineteenth century a vast amount
of literature has been published on the subject, and many theories of
the dialogue-chronology have been proposed. There are three principal
groups of theories: (1) those based upon purely _a priori_ hypotheses,
as, for example, that of Hermann, that each dialogue is a stage in
the development of Plato’s thought; or that of Schleiermacher, that
Plato had a systematic plan from the beginning; (2) those based upon an
empirical study of the historical allusions in the dialogues themselves
(Zeller, Windelband, _et als._); (3) those recent theories based upon
the “stylometric test,” _i. e._ by an examination of the peculiarities
of the style of Plato. Lutoslawski is a prominent representative of
this method.
The result to the student is bewildering, on account of the differing
conclusions. But since some choice must be made, we shall follow
the order laid down by Windelband,[26] because it is fairly orthodox
and conservative. For convenience to the memory, the writings will
be grouped in the periods of Plato’s life. Our interpretation will
therefore follow Windelband in respect to the character of Plato’s
theory itself.
=The Life and Writings of Plato.= Two important events divide Plato’s
long life of eighty years into three periods. These events were the
death of his master, Socrates, in 399 B. C., and Plato’s return from
Sicily in 387 B. C., after having there come under the influence of the
Pythagoreans. His first period may be called his student life, and was
twenty-eight years long; the second period was that of the traveler,
and was twelve years long; the third period was that of teacher of the
Academy, and was forty years long. The first half of his life therefore
covers the first two periods, and the second half covers his period as
teacher. Probably he was engaged in the composition of the dialogues
during all these periods, and Cicero reports him to have died “pen in
hand” (_scribens est mortuus_).
=1. Plato’s Student Life= (427–399 B. C.). This period closes with the
death of Socrates. His acquaintance with Socrates began when he was
twenty years old, and therefore lasted eight years.
The dialogues written during this period are presentations of the
doctrine of Socrates and do not contain the constructive theory of
Plato. They are concerned either with Socratic subjects or with
Socrates personally, and were written in part during Socrates’ life,
in part directly after his death.
(a) Dialogues written under the influence of Socrates:
_Lysis_, concerning friendship;
_Laches_, concerning courage;
_Charmides_, concerning moderation.
(b) Dialogues written in defense of Socrates:
_Crito_, concerning Socrates’ fidelity to law;
_Apology_, a general defense of Socrates;
_Euthryphro_, concerning Socrates’ true piety.
=2. Plato as Traveler= (399–387 B. C.). During this period Plato made
one short and two long journeys, and after each he returned to Athens.
Upon the death of Socrates he went to Megara, where a former pupil
of Socrates had a school. Upon this journey he was accompanied by
other pupils of Socrates, who, as tradition has it, feared violence to
themselves after the death of their master. Plato remained in Megara
but a short time, and soon returned to Athens. Immediately upon his
return to Athens he went to Cyrene and Egypt, and was away from Athens
about four years (until 395 B. C.). The Egyptian journey had little
influence upon his thought, but must have stimulated his imagination.
He then remained at Athens four years (395–391 B. C.), and during
this time he taught a small circle and wrote his polemics against the
Sophists.
In 391 B. C. Plato made his first Italian journey――to Sicily and
southern Italy. This marks the second critical point in his mental
development. For at this time (1) he came under the influence of the
Italian Pythagoreans, and (2) he attempted and failed in connection
with Dion[27] and Dionysius to erect his ideal state in Syracuse. He
was sold as a slave by Dionysius, redeemed by a friend, and returned
to Athens in 387 B. C., having been away about four years.
It is to be noted that Democritus and Plato were wide travelers,
considering the difficulties of locomotion of the time. Both Democritus
and Plato went to Egypt, and Democritus spent several years in Asia
Minor (see p. 107).
The dialogues written during this period may be divided into (a) the
group of polemics against the Sophists, and (b) the _Meno_.
(a) The polemics against the Sophists (written between his return from
Egypt in 395 B. C. and his first Italian journey in 391 B. C.).
They are an attempt to present a solid front against the Sophists,
and to show the weakness of the Sophistic doctrines. These polemical
dialogues are:
_Protagoras_, a criticism of the Sophistic assumption that virtue
is teachable, because that assumption is incompatible with the
Sophistic fundamental principle;
_Gorgias_, showing how superficial the Sophistic rhetoric is when
compared with true culture, which is the foundation of real
statecraft;
_Euthydemus_, an exposition of the fallacies in the Sophistic
eristic;
_Cratylus_, a criticism of the philological attempts of the
Sophists;
_Theætetus_, a criticism of the Sophistic theories of knowledge;
The First Book of the _Republic_ (the “Dialogue concerning
Justice”), a criticism of the Sophistic naturalistic theory of
the state.
(b) _Meno_, which contains the first positive statement by Plato of
his own constructive theory. It is the first intimation of development
beyond the simple Socratic theory of knowledge. Plato states this,
however, rather timidly, by suggestions and after the manner of a
mathematician.
=3. Plato as Teacher of the Academy= (387–347 B. C.). These forty
years were spent by Plato in Athens as master and teacher of his
school, the Academy, with the exception of two journeys to Italy.
He undertook these journeys in the hope of realizing in a practical
way his political ideals. He made his second Italian journey upon the
invitation of Dion, in the hope of influencing the younger Dionysius,
and the third Italian journey in order to reconcile Dion and Dionysius.
This last journey brought him again into great personal danger.
What was the Academy? It was a public grove or garden in the suburbs of
Athens (see map, p. 219) that had been left to the city for gymnastics
by a public-spirited man named Academus. It had been surrounded by a
wall and had been adorned by olive trees, statues, and temples. Near
this inclosure Plato possessed by inheritance a small estate. It was
here that he opened his school, and few places could be more favorable
for the study of philosophy. Plato bequeathed this estate to the school,
which held the property in a corporate capacity for several centuries.
The leader of the school was called scholarch, and he appointed his own
successor. The school was a kind of religious brotherhood based upon
the worship of the Muses.
Note that Democritus, Plato, and Aristotle finished their education
at an age much beyond what is supposed to be the limit in modern time.
They were, in fact, mature men before they began their life work. Plato
was 32 before he began to teach in Athens and 40 before he set himself
about his real life task in the founding of the Academy. Democritus
was 40 before he returned to Abdera from his travels in Asia Minor.
Aristotle was 41 when he undertook to act as tutor of Alexander, and
49 when he began his administration of the Lyceum.
The dialogues of the third period of Plato’s life contain his
constructive theory, and are his masterpieces of art. The topics with
which they deal show the advance of his thought over the dialogues
of his first period. The purely Socratic dialogues were ethical
discussions; these are ethical, metaphysical, and physical.
_Phædrus_, Plato’s delivery of his programme upon his entrance
into active teaching in the Academy, in 386 B. C.
_Symposium_, an exposition of his entire doctrine in “love
speeches.” It is the most artistic of his writings, and
represents the climax of his intellectual power (385 or
384 B. C.).
_Republic_ (major portion). The composition of the _Republic_
extended over a long period. It is a discussion: (1) concerning
justice (written in the second period, see above); (2) concerning
the ideal state which shall realize justice; (3) concerning the
Idea of the Good and in criticism of the constitutions of states.
It is Plato’s masterpiece and his life work.
_Parmenides_ and _Sophist_, written to express the objections to
the theory of Ideas, and to discuss such objections. (Windelband
holds these dialogues were not written by Plato, but by some
member of his school. This is, however, not the consensus of
opinion.)
_Politicus_, a discussion of the field of knowledge and of action
for a statesman.
_Phædo_, Plato’s final will and testament to the school, written
shortly before his third Sicilian journey, in 361 B. C. It is
his completed conception of the Idea of the Good and of the
relation of other Ideas to it. It contains Anaxagorean and
Pythagorean elements.
_Philebus_, concerning the ingredients of the Idea of the Good.
_Timæus_, Plato’s conception of physical nature, expressed in
mythical form.
_Laws_, the work of Plato’s old age, his revision of the ideal
State.
=Concerning the Dialogues[28] of Plato.= The early philosophers
presented their philosophy in metrical form as poems “concerning
nature”; Socrates perpetuated his teachings through conversations
with men; Plato made his influence permanent by written dialogues;
Aristotle’s philosophy, in the works that have been preserved, stands
in the form of treatises whose sole purpose is that of exposition.
Plato’s dialogues therefore have a twofold place in the history of
literature. On the one hand, in the history of literature proper we
have already mentioned them as standing after the Greek drama in the
development of Greek dialectics; on the other hand, in the development
of philosophical instruction they stand between the conversations of
Socrates and the scientific expositions of Aristotle.
Plato was the first child of Fortune, and the complete preservation
of his works was the most remarkable proof of it. Æschylus was the
author of at least 70 writings, of which 7 are preserved; Euripides
was the author of 95 writings, of which 18 are preserved; Sophocles
had 123 writings, aside from his lyric works, of which 7 are preserved.
Shakespeare wrote 36 plays, Plato wrote 35 dialogues that are genuine.
All of Plato’s writings have come down to us. Why were the writings of
Plato preserved from the destroying hand of time? There are at least
three causes of their preservation: (1) they had intrinsic beauty;
(2) there was contemporary public interest in them; (3) the chief cause,
Plato’s school kept close guard over them.
By the dialogue Plato could employ the Socratic method, give dramatic
effect, and idealize Socrates. The _Republic_ is his crowning literary
effort, and the most complete statement of his mature political views.
Perhaps the _Philebus_ is the best expression of his idea of goodness,
and presents his most complete organization of the sciences. All
Plato’s dialogues have a transparent beauty and a purity of diction;
and they may be taken as a revelation of himself. All are dialogues
save the _Apology_, but the dialogue element grows less and less in
his later works. Socrates is usually the spokesman in them, and to
him is usually given the deciding word. Only a few have a fixed plan
of argument. One thread and then another is followed, and in many no
decision whatever is reached; for the dialogues must always be taken
as artistic products in which philosophical experiences are idealized.
Plato often employs myths or parables to illuminate his arguments. The
situations and the literary adornments show the human touch, and the
conversation often moves to a dramatic close.
In the _Republic_ Plato sought to formulate theoretically certain
political conceptions of the ideal State that were then in the air.
It is interesting to note that his conception influenced the political
idealism of later time, as, for example, Cicero’s _De Republica_,
Augustine’s _City of God_, More’s _Utopia_, Campanella’s _State of the
Sun_, Bacon’s _New Atlantis_, Macchiavelli’s _Il Principe_.
=The Factors in the Construction of Plato’s Doctrine.=
=1. His Inherited Tendencies.= (a) In the first place Plato was by
instinct an aristocrat. His family was one of the most distinguished
in Athens, and traced its descent from Solon and Codrus. In making
an estimate of his philosophy one must take account of the caste of
society in which he was born. His metaphysical theory of Ideas is
aristocratic, and in it he turns from all that is of the earth earthy
to what is above the life of “opinion.” His four cardinal virtues
are possible only to the few. His political attitude was peculiar. He
was hostile to the democracy, and yet his political idealism diverged
so far from the practical politics of Athenian aristocracy that he
completely abstained from public life. With Plato, philosophy once
more retires to the school. Here we have the strange juxtaposition of
Socrates, the teacher, who had been engaged in a practical reformation,
whose father was an artisan and whose mother a midwife, and Plato,
his adoring pupil and truest interpreter,――Plato, the idealist, “whose
speculation is not like the Philistine, whose life is spent in the
market place or the workshop, and whose world is measured by the narrow
boundaries of his native town; it is the lord of the manor, who retires
to his mansion, after having seen the world, and turns his gaze towards
the distant horizon; disdaining the noise of the cross-roads, he
mingles only in the best society, where is heard the most elegant, the
noblest, and the loftiest language that has ever been spoken in the
home of the Muses.”[29]
(b) In the next place Plato had an instinctive love for the beautiful,
and in this he was great, even in his time. Every Periclean Greek was
artistic, but Plato was more than this. He is to be ranked among the
great creators of the art of his day,――with Phidias and Sophocles. He
represented in his person everything ideally Greek. He was a man of
great beauty, a human Apollo, a man endowed with every physical and
mental talent, and his moral character was almost ideal in its purposes.
His real name was Aristocles, and he got his name Plato from his broad
frame. The artistic development of the time appealed to him in his
youth, and he was early interested in the writing of epic and dramatic
poetry. This artistic instinct determined in no small measure not
only the form of the presentation of his thought, but also the content
of the thought itself. It determined his principle of conceiving the
Ideas, the constitution of his State, his theory of pleasure, and his
conception of the highest Good. The artistic form of the presentation
of his writings was as important to him as the matter presented.
=2. His Philosophical Sources.= Plato had received a careful education
that made him familiar with all the scientific theories of current
interest to the Athenians. The elements of the earlier philosophies,
that were fundamental to the mechanical atomism of Democritus, were
recombined in a different way by Plato under the influence of Socrates’
ethical principle. Even Plato’s political and artistic ideals are
subordinate to his entire absorption in the personality and teaching of
Socrates. Heracleitus, Protagoras, Parmenides, and, later, Anaxagoras
and the Pythagoreans, furnished him with his philosophical materials.
We may point out three of the preceding philosophies that had an
especially powerful influence upon him: those of (1) Socrates;
(2) Parmenides; and (3) the Pythagoreans. His revered master, Socrates,
furnished Plato throughout with the conceptual principle, by which he
worked over all his material into his daring system. The influence of
Parmenides upon him was also very great. He speaks of the Eleatic as
“Parmenides, my father.” Plato betook himself to the Eleatic school at
Megara upon the death of Socrates, and this shows that he must already
have been hospitable to the philosophy which taught the conception of
an absolute and eternal essence of things known by the human reason.
The influence of the Pythagoreans was felt by Plato on his first visit
to Italy. This influence grew with him, and seems to dominate the
dialogue of his old age, the _Laws_. The Eleatic Oneness was a single,
immutable block. In the Pythagorean doctrine of numbers he found
the conceptual divisions of that Oneness, and he also found that
such conceptions would give a content to Socrates’ conception of
the Good. Indeed, the numbers seemed to be the conceptual models for
which Socrates was searching. Mathematical truths are independent
of perception. They are innate ideas. They are eternal and immutable
Forms. They were the weapons needed against the Protagorean doctrine of
perception. While Plato agreed with Heracleitus that the visible world
is a changing world, and with Protagoras that our sense-perceptions of
that world can yield only relative truth, he developed his philosophy
almost entirely on its conceptual side; and this is due to the
influence first of Socrates, second of Parmenides, and third of the
Pythagoreans. Plato’s completed philosophy was the theory of Ideas,
worked over in his mind a half-century or more, and is in itself a
history of the development of pure concepts.
=The Divisions of Plato’s Philosophy.= Plato himself had no clear
conception of an exact division of science, and did not confine
himself in a single dialogue to a single science. Aristotle, however,
distinguished in the philosophy of his master dialectic, ethics,
and physics, and these divisions of Plato’s teaching have been
traditionally adopted. The dialectic, as commonly used in his time,
meant “the dialogue or conversation employed as a means of scientific
investigation.” It was transformed by Plato to mean not logical but
metaphysical discussion. Plato was concerned with the laws of Being
rather than the laws of logic, and, as Being to him consisted of
Ideas, his dialectic interest was to reduce experience by division
and induction to some unity. Plato’s dialectic was not logical but
methodological,――logical operations taken as a whole,――by means of
which the Ideas and their relations to one another were to be found.
The physics of Plato is of little value. It was an afterthought to
satisfy the demands of his school. The world of nature phenomena could
never be for Plato the object of true knowledge. Unfortunately, the
teleological physics of Plato was regarded by the Hellenistic time
and the Middle Ages as Plato’s most important achievement. Plato wrote
entirely in the spirit of the Enlightenment, and his works show a
great interest in man as a moral being, but little interest in physical
nature.
=Summary of Plato’s Doctrine.= The interpretation of Plato as set forth
in what follows may be thus summarized: Plato began with the conceptual
form of idealism, suggested by the logical method of Socrates, with
the purpose of solving logical and ethical problems. He advanced to a
teleological idealism, conditioned by the doctrines of Anaxagoras and
the Pythagoreans, with the purpose of applying his doctrine to physical
problems.
=The Formation of Plato’s Metaphysics.= In his earliest period Plato
made these very clear statements: (1) virtue is knowledge; (2) by
knowledge is not meant sense-perceptions. In his final statement of
his philosophy, as he bequeathed it to posterity, he only gave a new
evaluation of these two early principles, although he expressed them in
a highly complex form. “Virtue is knowledge” is the basis of agreement
between Socrates and the Sophists; and “by knowledge is not meant
sense-perceptions” is the basis of their opposition. During Plato’s
early period he was acting as a faithful transcriber of Socrates in the
presentation of this first principle: virtue is knowledge, is teachable,
is one. During Plato’s second period he was called on to defend the
second statement against the Sophists. Plato’s formation of his own
theory begins at this point,――at the point where his defense of his
master was keenest. From this time, for a full half-century, Plato
developed the Socratic principles in a theory that went far beyond
Socrates, but that was never untrue to him.
The simplest way of stating Plato’s formation of his own doctrine
is this: he accepted the Protagorean doctrine of a perceptual world
of relative knowledge; he placed it beside the Socratic theory of
conceptual reality; and as a result he conceived the world to be
twofold. Both Being and Becoming share in reality. There are, on the
one side, the immutable concepts that compose true reality; there
are, on the other side, the changing perceptions that come and go. The
world of true reality _is_, but never _becomes_; the world of relative
reality _becomes_, but never _is_. These two worlds are by nature
separate; one is the object of the reason, the other is the object
of the senses; one is incorporeal, the other is corporeal. The first
world is the immutable One of the Eleatics presented by Plato as a
plural number of Socratic concepts; the other world is the Heracleitan
flux presented as perceivable things. There is true knowledge, but
Protagoras is right in saying that it cannot be found in the perception
of the material world. It is knowledge of an incorporeal world, and
that is precisely the world of Socratic concepts which now in Plato’s
hands become Ideas.
It would, however, be a mistake to suppose that Plato’s conception
of the world was an artificial eclecticism, obtained by putting two
worlds side by side. To be sure, he never was able to bring them into
an organic unity, and the dualism between them is often very marked.
But they do not lie like two drawers in a desk, each having no vital
influence on the character of the other. In the juxtaposition of the
two worlds each gets a new meaning, and the value of each becomes
greater.
In the first place, _perception[30] gets a new value_. The logic of
the Sophistic doctrine of perception was that perceptions are the only
form of knowledge, and even perceptions have no share of truthfulness.
Protagoras himself did not go so far as this absolute skepticism,
but this is the logic of his position. Perceptions can have no value,
because each is a standard to itself. Plato incorporates the perception
theory into his own, and immediately gives it a new value. Perceptions
do not, to be sure, yield true knowledge, but they have a relative
value. They have a value for the practical world, although the highest
they can give is Right Opinion. When we remember that the world of
that day was weary of its own speculations leading to nihilism, it is
remarkable that Plato did not turn away entirely from the doctrine of
the Sophists. On the contrary, he took up the Sophistic doctrine into
his own and gave to it a value which it had not possessed by itself.
In the second place, _conception gets a new value_. What was conception
to Socrates? It was the common content of opinions and perceptions;
it was the universal that was developed inductively out of many
particulars. Socrates brought many particulars together in order to
reveal their common qualities. The abode of conceptions was to Socrates
the half-formed individual opinions and experiences in which conception
lay, as in an envelope; and the conversation was needed to bring it
forth. The concept to Socrates was the logical “nature” of perceptions.
But now since Plato admitted the relative reality of all perceptions,
he was obliged to look elsewhere to account for conceptions. If
the conceptions are true reality, they cannot be the common quality
in opinions, nor the logical “nature” of changing perceptions. The
true conception cannot be contained in the perception. Accordingly
the conception must exist in an incorporeal world and possess an
independent reality. The concepts are hypostasized by Plato. They
become Ideas. Thus the Socratic concept became the Platonic Idea,
and _for the first time in European thought, reality is conceived
as immaterial_. The conceptual world grows under Plato’s hands to be
“other than” the perceptual world, and this was his first step beyond
Socrates. The conceptual world is the perfect reality that cannot be
contained in any material thing nor in the sum of all material things.
The immaterial Ideas are the object of thought, as nature phenomena
are the objects of perception. Ideas are not the abstractions of
perceptions, for the process of thought is not an analysis nor an
abstraction, but an intuition of reality presented in single instances.
Ideas are the reality of which perceptions are the copies or shadows.
Perceptions do not contain the truth. They are only the suggestions or
promptings by which the soul bethinks itself of the Ideas. Material
things merely hint to the soul of the existence of the Ideas.
It is important in this connection to point out that Plato’s conception
of immateriality is not to be taken as what we mean in modern times
by the spiritual or psychical; for, according to Plato, our psychical
functions belong to the world of Becoming, just as the functions of our
body and other perceptual things belong to it. Besides, even the Ideas
of sense qualities have reality. Plato does not identify the human
mind with the incorporeal world of Ideas, nor does he make the modern
dualistic division of the world into mind and matter. The immaterial
world is “other than” the world of perception, and bears the relation
to the material world of the unchanging to the changing, of the simple
to the manifold, of Being to Becoming.
=The Development of Plato’s Metaphysics――The Development of Plato’s
Ideas in the Two Drafts.= The twofold world with its new evaluation
of the Socratic conception and of the Protagorean perception was,
after all, only Plato’s point of departure for his constructive work.
It was his first and undeveloped apprehension of a theory of Ideas.
It appeared first in the _Meno_ in his doctrine of recollection and
immortality, which was written in his second period just after his
series of splendid polemics against the Sophists. From this time
for a full half-century Plato developed the conception of a twofold
world into a Theory of Ideas. In the course of time he found himself
confronted with three problems: (1) How many Ideas are there? (2) What
is the relation between Ideas and physical things? (3) What is the
relation of the Ideas to one another? Plato’s answers to these three
questions compose what is known as his Theory of Ideas. However, he
answers these three questions differently when he first considered
them than later, when his grasp upon the significance of his problem
became more mature. Plato’s Theory of Ideas, therefore, may be said to
have had a development in two stages. These two stages are called his
“two drafts” (Windelband) of the Ideas. We shall now present, first
in summary form and then in more detail, his answers to these three
questions in the two drafts, and thereby show how his theory developed
to its final formulation.
=Brief Comparison of the Two Drafts of the Ideas.=
=1. The Earlier Draft of Ideas.=
(a) _The Number of Ideas_ is infinite.
(b) _The Relation of Ideas to Physical Things_ is similarity. The Ideas
on their side are spoken of as having a “presence” in physical things,
but never fully appearing in them; the physical phenomena on their side
are spoken of as “participating” in the Ideas.
(c) _The Ideas are Related to One Another_ logically, as genera to
species, but they are only roughly classified by Plato.
=2. The Later Draft of Ideas――Plato’s Final Statement.=
(a) _The Number of Ideas_ is limited to those of worth, mathematical
relations, and nature-products, but Plato never arrived at any definite
selection.
(b) _The Relation of Ideas to Physical Things_ is teleological. The
Ideas are the ideal or purposeful ends of physical objects.
(c) _The Ideas are Related to One Another_ teleologically. The Idea of
the Good stands at the head, and is the purposeful end of all the other
Ideas.
=Comparison of the Two Drafts of Ideas in More Detail.=
=1. The Number of Ideas in the Earlier and Later Drafts compared.=
When Plato first presented the Theory of Ideas to himself, he conceived
their number to be infinite. There are Ideas of everything that is
thinkable. There are as many as there are class concepts, as there
are qualities of things in the universe, as there are common nouns
in the language. But it was pointed out to Plato that he had only
reproduced and paralleled in the immaterial world what exists in the
material world; that such a theory did not solve, but only doubled our
difficulties. Then there were technical difficulties in the conception
of the Ideas of everything――of things, qualities, relations,――good, bad,
and indifferent. But what probably appealed to him most cogently was
the raillery to which he found his theory subjected (see _Parmenides_),
that he as a Greek could think of ugly Ideas, like hair and filth,
as real. The result was that in the later drafting of his theory the
number of qualities worthy to be called Ideas becomes very much limited.
Plato makes the elimination from no avowed principle except that of
worth, because as a Greek it was absolutely repellent to him to regard
anything as real except worth. Consequently in his later dialogues
he speaks of (1) Ideas having an inherent value, like the Good and
the Beautiful, (2) Ideas corresponding to nature products, (3) Ideas
of mathematical relations. Norms of value thus take the place of
class-concepts, and in his selection of Ideas his choice is determined
more and more by their moral worth.
=2. The Relation of Ideas and the World of Nature in the Two Drafts
compared.= Plato did not construct his world of Ideas in order to
explain the world of physical nature. His original purpose was to find
an object for knowledge; and his Ideas were born out of his striving
to give a reality to the conceptions of Socrates. In his evaluation
of the doctrine of his master he had drawn a distinction between the
two worlds, but he had not thought of explaining one by the other. They
were related and distinguished, but one threw no light upon the other.
In Plato’s first draft of the Ideas he speaks of this relation as
_imitation_. The phenomena are an imitation of reality. The Ideas are
the originals and physical objects are copies. To state the relation
in modern terms, the laws of the growth of a tree are permanent, while
the tree changes. The lower world of Becoming has a similarity to the
higher world of Being. As the Pythagoreans had conceived things as
imitations of numbers, Plato, strongly influenced by the Pythagoreans,
thought that concrete things correspond to their class concepts only
in a degree. On the one hand, the individual thing partakes of the
universal of the Idea, and this is called “participation” in the Idea.
On the other hand, the word “presence” describes the way the Idea
exists in the thing, which means that the Idea is present in the thing
so long as the thing possesses the quality of the Idea. The Ideas are
present and then withdraw, and thus the perception changes.
In the second drafting of the Ideas, Plato has become conscious
of the need of explaining physical nature by the Ideas. He did not
at first think of explaining the nature of the physical world by his
metaphysical reality. It was an afterthought, and arose out of the
compulsion of having a systematic theory. His conception of the world
of Ideas as the world of true Being ultimately demanded that the world
of physical nature should be not merely “other than” but dependent upon
the Ideas. The Ideas are unchanging; the phenomena are changing. If
the Ideas are the reality of the changing world, in what other sense
can they be its reality than as its cause? The _Meno_, _Theætetus_,
_Symposium_, and _Phædrus_ do not discuss this problem. The _Sophist_
proposes it, and in the _Phædo_ the thought is first expressed that the
Ideas are the causes of physical phenomena appearing as they do appear.
But how can the Ideas be causes, when the very conception of them as
pure and immaterial realities denies to them all qualities of motion
and change? The Platonic theory reached its zenith in its solution
of this problem. The Ideas must be conceived as the causes of nature
phenomena, and still as not moving nor suffering change. They are
teleological causes. They are the realized ends of the phenomenal world.
The world of Ideas is the actual goal of perfection for _physical_
nature. The world of Ideas is not only the truth of all knowledge;
it is also the perfect teleological cause of all actual change. This
thought is developed in the _Philebus_ and the _Republic_, where the
Ideas as a whole, and in particular the Idea of the Good,――to which all
the other Ideas are means,――stand as the final cause of all occurrence.
The physical phenomena stand therefore in a teleological relation to
the Idea of the Good. From the Good all things get their meaning. It
permeates and explains all.
=3. The Relation among the Ideas in the Two Drafts compared.= It was
natural that the conception of a pluralism of Ideas should lead Plato
to a consideration of the law of their relationship. A systematic
theory of a multiplicity of reals involves their orderly relationship.
They cannot exist independently in the same world. What is the
relationship among the Ideas? In the earlier drafting of his theory
Plato was principally attentive to the relations of coördination and
subordination among the Ideas; in the possibility of the division of
class concepts into genera and species. The relationship that he sought
was logical relationship, the relationship that the scientist seeks to
find in the classification of plants or rocks. Just what result Plato
tried to reach by such a logical classification of his realities, it
is difficult to say. He was not successful. His attempt to erect a
logically arranged pyramid of conceptions with the most abstract at the
apex was not carried out.
In his second drafting of the Ideas, Plato felt the inadequacy of
a mere logical relationship among them, and conceived them to be
teleologically related. His reduction of the number of Ideas had
naturally brought about a new conception of their relationship. There
must be some principle for their elimination, for the rejecting of some
and the keeping of others. That principle was the principle of their
ethical worth. That is to say, the Idea of the Good, which had been the
standard for eliminating some concepts from the list of Ideas and for
retaining others, now became for him the principle of the relationship
of the Ideas among themselves. Plato turned from the logical to the
teleological relation among Ideas. The Idea of the Good embraces and
realizes all the others. It is therefore the absolute end of all the
other Ideas, and they bear the relation to it, not of particulars to a
general term, but of means to an end. The principle in their selection
becomes the principle of their arrangement.
=Plato’s Conception of God.= The above sketch of the formation and
development of Plato’s theory of Ideas shows how difficult it would
be to frame a short definition of them that would at the same time be
adequate. As he finally defined them, they are immaterial archetypes
or ideals, dominated by a moral purpose. This dominating moral purpose
in the Ideas is the highest Idea of all, the Idea of the Good, which
stands above all the others and gives to them and to everything else
their value and indeed their actuality.
Is this Idea of the Good the same as God? Plato calls the Good
“Deity” and the “World Reason,” and ascribes to it the name of Nous.
Nevertheless the Idea of the Good is not the same as the Christian God,
and Plato is only showing here the influence of Anaxagoras’ conception
upon him. (See p. 47.) The Idea of the Good is not a person or a
spiritual being. It is merely the absolute ethical end and purpose of
the world. Plato did not attempt to give it a content, any more than
did his master, Socrates; but Plato presupposed it, because it was in
itself the simplest and most comprehensible thing in the world.
=Plato’s Conception of Physical Nature.= Plato constructed a rough
sketch of the philosophy of nature in his later years, in compliance
with the needs of his School, and perhaps with the urging of his pupil,
Aristotle. In his earlier period, he would have nothing of physics,
and was in this respect quite in accord with the spirit of Socrates. To
the end of his life he maintained that there can be no true knowledge
of the physical world; for it is a world of change, and therefore all
scientific conclusions about it could be only probable. In a mythical
account in the _Timæus_ he drew a picture of the constitution of the
world. He conceived a Demiurge or world-forming God to exist, and he
thought that this God made the world out of not-Being or empty space
“with regard to the Ideas.” The world thus constructed is conceived
by Plato as a huge living thing, composed of a visible body and an
invisible soul. The world-soul sets the world-body in a circular motion,
which motion was considered by antiquity to be the most perfect of all
motions. In sharp opposition to the mechanical theory of the world,
Plato conceived the world to be endowed with knowledge, of which the
spherical motion in its return upon itself is the symbol. The world
is unitary and unique, the most perfect and most beautiful world, and
its origin can be traced only to a reason working toward ends. Plato’s
physics, of which the above is an abbreviated account, will be seen
to be of little importance; but it was unfortunately, as we have said,
this side of his doctrine that was emphasized in the Middle Ages.
This mythical account shows, however, the inherent dualism in Plato’s
doctrine. The Idea never fully realizes itself in corporeal things, and
Plato was called on to explain the cause of the evil and imperfection
of the physical world. Moreover, the imperfection of the physical world
got new emphasis in the influence upon him of the Pythagorean doctrine,
which had set the perfect and imperfect worlds in opposition. What
prevents the Idea from fully appearing in phenomena? The more Plato
conceived the world of Ideas as ethical Ideals and a kingdom of pure
worth, and the more teleological the Ideas became, the less could he
regard the Ideas as the cause of imperfection in nature. Ideas are
Being, and the essence of perfection. The cause of imperfection must
therefore be that which has no being whatsoever. The physical world as
“becoming” has participation, not only in that which has Being (Ideas),
but in that which has no Being (empty space). The physical world has a
composite character. It has sprung from the union of the Ideas and an
absolutely negative factor, which Plato calls empty space. This eternal
negative is formless and unfashioned, but it is capable of taking on
all possible forms. The physical universe is therefore neither Ideas
simply, nor matter simply, but a composition of the two. This non-Being
is not like the matter, “unformed stuff,” of Aristotle, from which all
sensible things are made; but it is that in which Ideas have to appear.
The Ideas are plunged into this empty non-Being, which they take on
as a veil. And just this is the origin of imperfection; non-Being
withholds the Ideas from perfect expression. Non-Being, or empty space,
is an indispensable auxiliary to the Ideas, for without it no physical
universe would be possible. But at the same time it is the eternal
foe and obstruction of the Ideas. Its coöperation with the Ideas is
at the same time a resistance to them. It is the perpetual negation of
Being, and the primary cause of imperfection, change, and instability.
On this account the universe can never be like the Ideas, but it
can approximate them. The soul of the world, for example,――which was
regarded by Plato in Pythagorean fashion as number subjecting chaotic
space to harmony,――is the most perfect reproduction of the Idea of the
Good. The existence of matter detracts from the perfection of the world,
but it does not detract from the majesty of the Ideas.
=Plato’s Conception of Man.= Plato needed a psychology of another sort
from that developed by the Cosmologists. His analysis of the mental
life of man stands or falls with his metaphysical theory of Ideas,
but it has this importance: it is the first attempt to understand the
psychical life from within.
The dualism of the two worlds appears in sharp outlines in the narrower
field of the life of man. The soul of man belongs to both worlds. On
the one hand, it belongs to the world of Becoming and partakes of that
world through its sense-perceptions, desires, and their pleasures. In
this lower world it is the principle of life and motion; it is that
which moves itself and other things. On the other hand, it shares in
the world of Being through its intuitive reason or knowledge. It shares
in the instability and change of psychical phenomena; it also possesses
the immutability of reality. Through its perceptions it constructs its
“opinions” or inferences of changing phenomena; through its reason it
has true knowledge of the eternal Ideas. Therefore the soul must bear
in itself traits that correspond to the two worlds. Plato conceives
man to have an irrational and a rational nature; and he divides the
irrational nature into two parts,――the noble irrational part and the
ignoble irrational part. The rational part of man is the reason, the
noble irrational part is the will, the ignoble irrational part is the
sensuous appetites.
{ Rational nature ＝ reason
Man { Irrational nature { Noble ＝ will
{ { Ignoble ＝ sensuous appetites
This is the celebrated doctrine of the “three parts” of the soul. Are
they three parts or three functions of the soul? Plato is not clear
as to this point. He sometimes speaks of them as three divisions, and
treats them as separable in such a way that only the reason is immortal
and the other two parts are mortal. Again, he speaks of the soul as
a unity, which carries with it in the next life all three functions.
In this latter meaning the three parts are three natures or three
different degrees of worth of the unitary soul.
=Plato’s Doctrine of Immortality.= Beginning with this conception of
the dual nature of the human soul, Plato reasons both backward and
forward from it: backward to its pre-existence, and forward from its
post-existence,――its existence after death. In the _Phædo_, Plato has
put into the mouth of what has become his Platonized Socrates his final
thought concerning the relation of this present life to its past and
its future. It is plainly the doctrine of the transmigration of souls,
which he got from the Pythagoreans. The soul has a reality that is
imperishable, and the soul is rewarded or punished for its conduct in
one existence by the kind of existence into which it is metamorphosed.
In prison, on that fatal day when he drank the poison, Socrates
explained to those around him why he was so cheerful at the thought of
death. Is not our present existence a kind of death? Is not the soul
in the present life deterred from true knowledge by the trammels of
the bodily desires? The true philosopher is he who turns away from his
body’s passions,――dies to them, and tries to live the reality of the
world of Ideas. We shall have full knowledge when we pass beyond the
grave and then we shall be rewarded, if we have striven truly. But
at present our body hampers and misleads us with its perceptions
of changing mortality around us, and with its transitory desires.
This life itself is the reward or punishment for our conduct in our
preceding state.
=1. The Immortality of Pre-existence.= What proof does Plato offer
for our existence before this life? The Ideas, these testimonies of
reality, form a part of the human soul. They are eternal, and have not
been created by the soul. Knowledge is not the origination of a new
truth, but is the recognition of Ideas, whose presence the mind merely
records. Greek psychology never got much farther than this. The modern
psychological conception of the soul as a dynamic something, which
creates its own content, was quite foreign to the Greeks. To Plato, as
to all other Greeks, the soul is as passive as the wax that receives
the impress of the seal. All Greek psychology was under this general
limitation: all ideas must be “given” to the soul. Therefore if the
Ideas are not “given” by perception, because perception is of the
changing; if nevertheless the soul finds itself in possession of the
Ideas on the occasion of perception; if the soul did not create the
Ideas, because the soul is by nature passive; the logical and only
conclusion is that the soul was already in possession of the Ideas in
a pre-existent state. Pre-existence is the only way of accounting for
the full-born knowledge of the soul, and it is interesting to note how
important was the pre-existent state to the imagination of the ancient
world.
Plato therefore advanced the doctrine of reminiscence, or as he
called it, _Anamnesis_, as proof of our pre-existence. Knowledge is
recollection. The Ideas have always been present in the mind, and when
we recognize them we have knowledge. The Ideas have no past or future,
but they always exist. It is the mind that undergoes awakening――an
awakening to their existence in itself. When the mind sees the
objects of physical nature, it awakens in painful astonishment at the
contrast between the sense world and the Ideas of its native world of
immateriality. In a mythical representation in the _Phædrus_, Plato
supposes that before the present life our souls have beheld the pure
Ideas in their full reality, that the Ideas had been forgotten in
our birth into the present life, but that the perception of similar
corporeal things calls the soul back to the Ideas themselves. Then the
“Eros” is awakened――the native philosophical impulse or inborn love for
the Ideas, by which the soul is raised again to the knowledge of that
true reality. Only the pure Ideas themselves will satisfy this longing;
the embodiment of the Ideas in art or personalities is not adequate.
The Eros ties us to the Ideas. God does not have this longing, for He
fully knows the Good. The ignorant man does not have this longing, for
he does not suspect the existence of the Ideas in himself. The Eros is
the homesickness that the lover of the truth feels.
Our birth is but a sleep and a forgetting,
The soul that rises in us, our life’s star,
Hath had elsewhere its setting,
And cometh from afar;
Not in entire forgetfulness,
And not in utter nakedness,
But trailing clouds of glory do we come
From God, who is our home.[31]
When, in the _Meno_, the Sophistic dilemma was proposed to Socrates,
“How can inquiry be made into what we know or into what we don’t know?”
Socrates pointed out that the only escape from the dilemma was the
process of recollecting, and that knowledge is the thing recalled.
Socrates then called a slave to him, and by skillfully questioning him
found that the slave recognized the mathematical relationship between
the square on the hypothenuse of a right triangle and the sums of
the squares on the other two sides. “The ignorant slave can only have
been recollecting,” says Socrates. Mathematical knowledge is extracted
from the sense-perception of the slave only because the slave has
through such perception the opportunity of recollecting Ideas present
in himself and not hitherto suspected by himself. In Plato’s system,
mathematical forms have an important place. They are the links by means
of which the Idea shapes space teleologically into the sense world.
=2. The Immortality of Post-Existence.= Plato’s ground for belief in
the existence of soul after death is practically the same as that for
its previous existence. Its destiny hereafter depends upon how far it
has freed itself in this earthly life from the sensuous appetite. As
proofs for future existence Plato mentions the soul’s possession of the
Ideas, the simplicity and unity of the soul, the soul as the principle
of life, and the goodness of God. However weak Plato’s arguments may
be for the existence of future immortality, his absolute belief in it
is one of the chief points in his teaching. It is interesting to note
that the modern western world seems to have no concern in the previous
state of the soul, but through the influence of the Christian religion
has focused its attention upon the future life. Oriental religions
contain the doctrine of pre-existence and the transmigration of souls,
but not in the same sense as Plato. In Plato the soul possesses an
identity that persists. It has all the qualities of the Ideas, but
is also an entity possessing these qualities. It has non-origination,
indestructibility, unity, and changelessness. The doctrine of the
immortality of post-existence had appeared in the Greek religion, but
this is the first time that we have found it as a part of philosophic
teaching. The student will, of course, feel the difficulties in Plato’s
conception as he has presented it. For how can the soul preserve its
individuality as a unity, when the soul belongs in part to a world
which is temporal?
=The Two Tendencies in Plato.= From the doctrine of the two worlds
there are two distinct tendencies running through the entire teaching
of Plato. These are (1) the tendency to glorify nature, and (2) the
tendency to turn away from nature to ascetic contemplation. On the one
hand, Plato felt within himself the light heart-beat of the artist, and
the Hellenic love of life was strong within him. He felt that the Idea
of the Good was realized even in the world of sense, that there was
pleasure in the sensuous imitation of the Idea, in practical artistic
skill, and in an intelligent understanding of mathematical orderings.
These were at least preparations for the highest Good, which consisted
in knowledge of the Ideas. On the other hand, one finds beside this
the ascetic tendency to be repelled by nature, a negative ethics
that would leave the world of sense and would spiritualize the life.
The _Theætetus_ sets up an ideal of retirement for the philosopher,
and points out that he should find refuge as soon as possible from
the evils of the world in the divine presence. The _Phædo_ pictures
the whole life of the philosopher as a dying, a purification of the
soul, an existence in prison, from which escape is only by virtue
and knowledge. This ascetic tendency seems very anti-Greek; and yet
is it foreign to Greek life? In Greek history do we not find, by the
side of the Epic and the glorification of nature, the Mysteries and
the withdrawal of the individual from the world? Both these historic
tendencies appear in Plato, and on the whole the ascetic tendency is
stronger. The Ideas are contrasted with the nature world more often
than they transfigure it. The dualism of Heaven and earth is emphasized,
and the contrast is strongly drawn between the reality of the Ideas and
the temporality of sense.
=Platonic Love.= Described in technical terms, in both Socrates and
Plato, Love (Eros) is the philosophic and not a purely intellectual
impulse. Its rather more didactic character in Socrates of an attempt
to engender knowledge and virtue in others appears in Plato in a larger
way as the personal and practical realization of the truth. Reduced to
its simplest terms, Platonic Love is the longing of the human being in
his imperfectness for perfectness and completeness. It is the innate
desire for immortality.
True love, according to Plato, takes its beginning in the astonishment
or pain at the presentment of the Ideas through remembrance, and the
starting-point of Love in an individual is the principle fundamental
in pre-existence. The philosophic impulse for the Ideas takes the form
of Love, because visible beauty has a special brightness and makes a
strong impression on the mind. Love belongs only to mortal natures;
for they, since they do not possess the divine unchangeableness, have
to propagate themselves continually. Love may be described therefore
as the propagative impulse. On the one side it may be viewed as an
inspiration from above, springing from the higher, divinely-related
nature in man; on the other hand it may be viewed as an aspiration from
below of the sensuous and human in man. On this side it is a yearning
and not a possession; and it presupposes a want. Analyzed in this way,
Love is the middle term between having and not having. It is the union
of the higher and lower natures in man, and throughout the universe
there stirs this longing for the eternal and imperishable.
What is the object of this Love,――of this desire of the finite to fill
itself with the eternal and to generate something enduring? That object
is the possession of the Good, which is happiness. The possession
of the Good is immortality. What is the external condition of Love’s
existence? The presence of Beauty; for this alone, by its harmonious
form, corresponds to our desire and awakens it. Does this Love appear
first in its complete realization? No; there are many kinds of beauty,
and Love is as various in degree and kind as beautiful objects. Love
rises step by step, and is realized in a graduated series of forms.
There is Love for beautiful shapes, sexual love; Love for beautiful
souls, and this appears in works of art, education, and legislation;
Love for beautiful sciences, the seeking of beauty wherever found; and
finally Love for the pure, shapeless, eternal, and unchangeable――the
Idea, which is immortality. All else is preliminary to the dialectical
knowledge of the Ideas. In all this, man is reaching out from his sense
of want for satisfaction, from his poverty to the completed riches of
life. Love bears him on from height to height until, in religion and
Love of the Good, man gains his immortality. In Platonic Love all kinds
of Love have place in pointing the soul onward to the divinely perfect.
Yet this Love for the divinely perfect is the soul’s aspiration from
the beginning, and all the preliminary stages are only the uncertain
attempts to seize the Idea in the copies. Love, therefore, is this
universal struggle of the finite to inform itself with the Idea; and
delight in any one object of beauty is a stage in the development of
this impulse.[32]
=Plato’s Theory of Ethics.= Plato’s Theory of Ideas is, after all,
fundamentally only an outspoken ethical metaphysics, and his Ethics
is his most fruitful accomplishment. Plato’s ethical teaching is
therefore involved in all that we have said about him up to this
point. An understanding of his ethics includes an understanding of the
formation and growth of his dialectic, an insight into his physical
theory, knowledge of the two tendencies which run through his teaching,
and especially an understanding of his doctrine of Love. If some of
the previous exposition is repeated, it will be only to bring out
more fully his ethical teaching as a special science. We shall speak
of three topics under this general subject of his ethics: (1) his
development of his theory of the Good; (2) the four cardinal virtues;
(3) his theory of political society.
=1. Development of Plato’s Theory of the Good.= Plato betrays his
ascetic tendency in his first drafting of the Ideas and, as we have
said, the double-world theory is the cause of this. Only one of the two
worlds is real and will appeal to the Wise Man. The soul belongs to the
supersensible world, and the knowledge, of which virtue consists, takes
man away from the sensible world. Since earthly life is full of evil,
the soul should die to it and turn away as soon as possible to the
divine presence. This ascetic aspect of morality is set forth in the
_Phædo_ and the _Theætetus_.
In the general development of his metaphysics in the second drafting
of his Ideas, Plato’s ethical theory developed also. He not only
went beyond the abstract statement of Socrates, but beyond his own
original asceticism. When he brought his two worlds into teleological
relationship, he was logically compelled to abandon his conception of
ascetic morals. The physical world has now a relative reality, and by
the same sign sense-life has a relative moral value. It was Plato’s
firm conviction that moral conduct makes man truly blessed, in this and
another world. He still held, too, that this blessedness, this complete
perfection of the soul, this sharing in the divine world of the Ideas,
is the Highest Good. Yet he now came to recognize other kinds of
happiness as steps toward the ideal Good. There are varieties of Goods,
as appeared in his doctrine of Love. Besides the intuition of knowledge
and its pleasures, there are physical Goods and their pleasures.
Intellectual pleasure may be unmixed with pain, but there are also
sensuous pleasures unmixed with pain. Here is indeed Plato, the Greek,
speaking; Plato, the Greek artist, impelled by the charm of the Greek
world around him. Strongly as he combated the Cyrenaic hedonism, and
closely as he was allied to Socrates, his Greek nature gave way before
the manifestations of the Idea of the Good in the physical world.
The pleasure in nature objects, in educational development, in the
practical and plastic arts, in mathematical sciences, and in the
orderliness of life――all these became for him preliminary stages in
the full participation in the ethical Good. They came to have for
him a relative value, as expressed in the _Philebus_, _Republic_, and
_Symposium_.
=2. The Four Cardinal Virtues.= But Plato went farther, and was not
content merely to point out the place of human conduct in the twofold
world. He developed his theory of ethics systematically. He classified
the virtues on the basis of his threefold division of the soul.
Naturally enough, in his first draft of his theory, Plato followed
Socrates in reducing the single virtues to one, viz., the virtue of
knowledge. In his second drafting, however, in the later dialogues,
he assumed their distinct independence, and he reflected upon their
respective spheres. A virtue corresponds to each part of the soul. Each
part has its own perfection, which is its virtue. Moreover, in so far
as one or another part of the soul preponderates in different men, so
far are they suited to developing the corresponding virtue.
{ Rational nature――in brain (Wisdom)
Soul (Justice) { Irrational { Noble part――in heart (Courage)
{ nature { Ignoble part――in liver (Temperance)
From the above scheme it will be observed that the rational nature has
the brain as its organ and reaches its perfection or virtue in Wisdom;
that the ignoble irrational nature has the liver as its organ, and
reaches its virtue in self-control or Temperance. Finally, since the
perfection of the whole soul consists in the orderly relation of its
single parts, so subordinated and regulated that the soul can reach its
highest perfection, the fourth and highest virtue is Justice. _The four
cardinal virtues are Temperance, Courage, Wisdom, and Justice._
=3. Plato’s Theory of Political Society.= The virtue, Justice, has
little meaning in individual ethics, and as an ethical perfection can
only be attained in society. There is no English word that is quite the
equivalent for the Greek term, but Justice is the usual translation.
Justice, however, does not contain the moral spirit of the Greek word.
Consistent with his conception of the Ideas in his metaphysics, Plato’s
ideal of moral perfection is to be found, not in the individual, but
in the species. Plato pictures less the perfect man than the perfect
society. Perfect happiness is rather that of the social whole than
of the individual, and this ideal of happiness can be reached only in
the ideal State. That is why the dialogue, the _Republic_, occupies
so important a place in Plato’s writings. It is an attempt to show how
the fourth and last virtue, Justice, can be attained. The first book
was written in Plato’s early period, and was perhaps called a “dialogue
concerning Justice.” Justice is distinctly the social virtue found
only in a perfect society, and it will make possible the fulfillment
of Wisdom, Courage, and Temperance. The individual man is a vital
being whose heart is the central organ, whose characteristic virtue is
courage. His courage is indeed a combination of wisdom and temperance.
The picture is of the individual man, not amenable to society, but in
“a state of warfare.” In such isolation Justice would not exist as a
virtue.
The political state is necessary if the Idea of the Good is to be
manifested in human life. The state is the true educator in Justice,
and at the same time the ideal state will be the realization of Justice.
The task of the state everywhere is the same, to wit, to direct the
common life of man so that every one may be happy through virtue. The
result may be attained only by so ordering the relations of society
that Justice may prevail. Plato’s _Republic_ is a carefully worked-out
plan of such an ideal society. The author made several attempts at
Syracuse with the aid of Dion to get first the elder and then the
younger Dionysius to transform the tyranny into an ideal state. These
attempts resulted disastrously. In the disappointment of his old age
that his ideal scheme had never succeeded, he wrote the _Laws_, which
is a revised version of the _Republic_ with the Pythagorean number
theory as a basis.
The Spartan state is his model. The Platonic Republic is aristocratic.
There is paternal government in everything, censorship of everything.
Each individual’s course is marked out for him. When Greek political
life was undergoing dissolution, Plato raised the ideal of political
unity as necessary to individual happiness as against the anarchism of
segregation. Yet even in this he was reflecting the current distrust of
political institutions. The comparison of existing political conditions
with his own political ideal reinforced his aristocratic leanings,
and made him the more distrustful of the political possibilities
of a democracy. He believed that an intelligently worked out scheme
of government was practicable, and should be forced upon people, if
necessary. In no other way was political salvation possible.
Since the State is the man “writ large,” it has three parts,
corresponding to the three parts of the human soul. There is (1) the
working or peasant class, which corresponds to the appetitive part of
man; the only object of such a class is to furnish food for the State,
and the highest virtue of this class is temperance. The peasant can
only work, eat, and drink, and the highest praise of him is that he
controls his appetites. (2) The warrior class guards the State within
and without; and its characteristic virtue is courage. The will must
show its highest efficiency in guidance of the emotions. (3) Highest
of all is the cultured class of philosophers or rulers, who determine
by their insight the laws that should rule the State. The virtue of
this class is wisdom, for is this class not the brain of the State?
The perfection of the entire State exists when the three classes have
their proper distribution of power. Then does justice exist. The duty
of the rulers is therefore to have the highest wisdom possible, of the
warriors to be unflinching in their devotion to duty, of the peasants
to exercise self-control. Thus Plato’s Republic is an aristocracy in
the hands of the carefully cultured, which consists of the two upper
classes. By means of community of wives, the exposure of deformed
infants, and the State’s education of the children of the two upper
classes, a continuous selection can be made, the two upper classes can
be renewed, and all private ends can be renounced in favor of the State.
Thus the sole end of a community is moral education, and Plato arranges
his ideal community with reference to that. The two upper classes are
a great family, to whom this is intrusted. They have dedicated their
lives to the furthering of science and to its administration.
A SELECTION OF PASSAGES FROM PLATO FOR ENGLISH READERS.
By Professor Benjamin Jowett, late Principal of Balliol College,
Oxford.
The figures refer to the pages in the margin of Professor
Jowett’s translation of Plato’s Dialogues; the letters
(A, B, C, D, E) to the subdivisions of these pages.
FIRST VOLUME.
CHARMIDES.
Socrates prescribes for Charmides’ headache.
156 D (... ‘Such, Charmides, is the nature of the charm’....)
–157 C (... ‘my dear Charmides.’)
LYSIS.
We only trust those who appear to know more than ourselves.
206 D (‘Upon entering’ ...)
–210 B (‘He assented.’)
LACHES.
(1) The art of fighting in armour is useless to the soldier.
182 E (‘I should not like to maintain’ ...)
–184 C (... ‘his opinion of the matter.’)
(2) The harmony of words and deeds.
188 C (‘I have but one feeling’ ...)
–189 B (... ‘the difference of our ages.’)
PROTAGORAS.
(1) The Sophists at the house of Callias.
314 B (... ‘And now let us go’ ...)
–316 A (... ‘rendered his words inaudible.’)
(2) Protagoras tells the story of Prometheus and Epimetheus.
320 D (‘Once upon a time’ ...)
–322 D (... ‘a plague of the state.’)
(3) The education of a Greek child.
325 D (‘Education and admonition’ ...)
–326 E (... ‘would be far more surprising.’)
EUTHYDEMUS.
The doctrinaire politician and the true philosopher.
304 B (‘Such was the discussion, Crito’ ...)
–to end (... ‘and be of good cheer.’)
CRATYLUS.
The significations of the various letters.
426 B (‘My first notions’ ...)
–427 C (... ‘and out of them by imitation compounding
other signs.’ ...)
PHAEDRUS.
(1) The philosopher must study the nature of man.
229 A (‘Let us turn aside,’ ...)
–230 A (... ‘a diviner and lowlier destiny?’ ...)
(2) The banks of the Ilissus.
230 B (... ‘But let me ask you, friend,’ ...)
–E (... ‘in which you can read best.’)
(3) The soul in a figure and her transmigrations.
245 C (‘The soul through all her being’ ...)
–257 A (... ‘leave you a fool in the world below.’)
(4) The true orator.
269 E (‘I conceive Pericles’ ...)
–272 C (... ‘and yet the creation of such an art is not
easy.’)
(5) The tale of Thamus and Theuth.
274 C (‘I have heard a tradition of the ancients’ ...)
–275 C (... ‘that the Theban is right in his view about
letters.’)
(6) Speech better than writing.
275 C (‘I cannot help feeling’ ...)
–277 A (... ‘to the utmost extent of human happiness.’)
(7) The true art of composition.
277 B (‘Until a man knows the truth’ ...)
–278 D (... ‘poet or speech-maker or law-maker.’)
ION.
The inspiration of the poet.
533 C (‘I perceive, Ion,’ ...)
–536 C (... ‘not by art, but by divine inspiration.’)
SYMPOSIUM.
_The Character of Socrates._
(1) His fit of abstraction in the porch.
174 A (‘He said that he met Socrates’ ...)
–175 C (... ‘Socrates entered.’ ...)
(2) His strange appearance and marvellous power of influencing
others.
215 A (‘And now, my boys,’ ...)
–216 G (... ‘so that I am at my wit’s end.’)
(3) His endurance, eccentricity, and bravery.
219 E (... ‘All this happened’ ...)
–222 A (... ‘a good and honourable man.’)
SECOND VOLUME.
MENO.
Learning is only Recollection (ἀνάμνησις): The Immortality of
the Soul proved out of Pindar.
81 A (‘I will tell you why’ ...)
–E (... ‘active and inquisitive.’ ...)
APOLOGY, OR THE DEFENCE OF SOCRATES.
The whole.
CRITO, OR SOCRATES IN PRISON.
The whole.
PHAEDO, OR THE LAST DAY OF SOCRATES’ LIFE.
(1) Socrates in prison.
57–60 C (... ‘pleasure appears to succeed.’)
(2) Why the philosopher is willing to die, although he will not
take his own life.
60 C (‘Upon this Cebes said’ ...)
–69 E (... ‘it will be well.’)
(3) The Description of the Other Life.
107 C (‘But then, O my friends,’ ...)
–115 A (... ‘after I am dead.’)
(4) The Death of Socrates.
115 A (‘When he had done speaking’ ...)
–to end.
GORGIAS.
(1) The good man desires, not a long, but a virtuous, life.
511 A (‘You always contrive’ ...)
–513 A (... ‘their own perdition.’ ...)
(2) The Judgment of the Dead.
523 A (‘Listen, then,’ ...)
–527 A (... ‘any sort of insult.’)
(3) The Moral of the Tale.
527 A (‘Perhaps this may appear’ ...)
–to end.
[Appendix.]
I _Alcibiades._
Socrates humiliates Alcibiades by shewing him his inferiority
to the Kings of Lacedaemon and of Persia.
120 A (‘Why, you surely know’ ...)
–124 B (... ‘ever desired anything.’)
II _Alcibiades._
The Gods approve of simple worship.
148 C (‘The Lacedaemonians, too,’ ...)
–150 B (... ‘for me to oppose.’)
_Eryxias._
The nature of money.
399 E (‘Then now we have to consider’ ...)
–400 E (... ‘of no use to us ... True.’)
THIRD VOLUME.
REPUBLIC.
_Book i._
The commencement of the Dialogue: Cephalus on Old Age.
327–331 B (... ‘is, in my opinion, the greatest.’)
_Book ii._
(1) The argument of Adeimantus.
362 E (... ‘But let me add something more’ ...)
–367 E (... ‘seen or unseen by Gods and men.’)
(2) The true nature of God.
376 D (‘Come, then, and let us pass’ ...)
–383 A (‘Your thoughts ... my own.’)
_Book iii._
(1) Grace and beauty in art and education.
400 D (‘But there is no difficulty’ ...)
–402 A (... ‘made him long familiar.’)
(2) The good physician and the good judge.
408 C (‘All that, Socrates, is excellent,’ ...)
–409 E (‘And in mine also.’)
(3) The true use of music and gymnastic.
409 E (‘This is the sort of medicine’ ...)
–412 A (‘You are quite right, Socrates.’)
_Book iv._
Virtue the health, Vice the disease, of the Soul.
443 C (‘Then our dream has been realized’ ...)
–444 E (‘Assuredly.’)
_Book v._
(1) The right treatment of enemies.
469 A (‘Next, how shall our soldiers’ ...)
–471 C (... ‘like all our previous enactments, are very
good.’)
(2) The last wave:――The Government of Philosophers.
471 C (‘But still I must say, Socrates.’ ...)
–473 E (... ‘is indeed a hard thing.’)
_Book vi._
(1) The Parable of the Pilot.
487 A (‘Here Adeimantus interposed’ ...)
–489 D (‘Precisely so, he said.’)
(2) The low estimation in which Philosophy is held by the World.
493 E (‘You recognize the truth of what I have been saying?’
...)
–497 A (... ‘as well as of himself.’)
_Book vii._
The Allegory of the Cave.
514 A–520 E (... ‘present rulers of the State.’)
_Book viii._
Democracy and the Democratic Man.
555 B (‘Next comes democracy’ ...)
–562 A ( ... ‘the democratic man.’)
_Book ix._
{ The Many-headed Monster. }
{ The City of which the Pattern is laid up in Heaven. }
588 A (‘Well, I said, and now’ ...)
–to the end of the book.
_Book x._
The Vision of Er.
614 B (‘Well, I said, I will tell you a tale;’ ...)
–to the end of the book.
TIMAEUS.
(1) The Tale of Solon.
20 E (‘Then listen, Socrates’ ...)
–26 D ( ... ‘these ancient Athenians.’ ...)
(2) The Balance of Mind and Body.
87 C (‘There is a corresponding enquiry’ ...)
–90 D ( ... ‘the present and the future.’)
CRITIAS, OR THE ISLAND OF ATLANTIS.
The entire Dialogue.
FOURTH VOLUME.
PARMENIDES.
The meeting of Socrates and Parmenides at Athens. Criticism of
the Ideas.
126 A (‘We had come from our home’ ...)
–136 C ( ... ‘and see the real truth.’)
THEAETETUS.
(1) Socrates, a midwife, and the son of a midwife.
148 E (‘These are the pangs of labour’ ...)
–151 E ( ... ‘by the help of God you will be able to tell.’)
(2) The Lawyer and the Philosopher.
172 B ( ... ‘Here arises a new question’ ...)
–177 C ( ... ‘Let us go back to the argument.’)
SOPHIST.
The Pre-Socratic Philosophers and their puzzles.
241 D (‘Will you then forgive me’ ...)
–246 D ( ... ‘but seekers after truth.’)
STATESMAN.
The Reign of Cronos.
269 A (‘Again, we have been often told’ ...)
–274 E (... ‘and at another time in another.’ ...)
PHILEBUS.
{ The first Taste of Logic. }
{ The Art of Dialectic. }
15 C (‘Good; and where shall we begin’ ...)
–17 A (... ‘and true dialectic.’)
FIFTH VOLUME.
LAWS.
_Book i._
(1) The true nature of Education.
643 A (‘You seem to be quite ready to listen’ ...)
–644 B (... ‘of every man while he lives.’)
(2) Man a puppet of the Gods.
644 E (‘Let us look at the matter thus’ ...)
–645 B (... ‘more clearly distinguished by us.’ ...)
_Book iii._
The Origin of Government.
676 A (‘Enough of this’ ...)
–679 E (‘Very true.’)
_Book iv._
(1) The virtuous Tyrant.
709 C (‘And does not a like principle’ ...)
–712 A (... ‘granting our supposition.’)
(2) The life of Virtue.
715 E (‘And now what is to be the next step?’ ...)
–718 A (... ‘for the most part in good hope.’ ...)
_Book v._
(1) { The honour of the Soul. }
{ Precepts for a virtuous life. }
726 A–732 D (... ‘both in jest and earnest.’)
(2) The best and second-best state.
739 A (‘The next move’ ...)
–741 A (... ‘to fight against necessity.’)
(3) Riches and Godliness.
742 D (... ‘The intention, as we affirm’ ...)
–744 A (... ‘the work of legislation.’)
_Book vii._
(1) The good citizen must not lead an inactive life.
806 D (‘What will be the manner of life’ ...)
–808 C (... ‘to the whole state.’)
(2) The education of the young.
808 D (... ‘When the day breaks’ ...)
{ –809 A (... ‘according to the law.’) }
{ 810 A (... ‘A fair time’...) }
{ –812 A (... ‘come to an end.’) }
_Book viii._
The evils of licentiousness.
835 C (... ‘There is, however, another matter’ ...)
–841 E (... ‘wrongly indulged.’)
_Book x._
(1) { The three classes of unbelievers. }
{ Advice to the young. }
885 B (... ‘For we have already said’ ...)
–888 D (... ‘the truth of these matters.’)
(2) God is not an idle ruler of the Universe; but orders all,
even the smallest things, for our good.
899 D (... ‘And now we are to address him’ ...)
–905 D (... ‘any understanding whatsoever’ ...)
(3) God cannot be propitiated by the gifts of the wicked.
905 D (... ‘For I think that we have sufficiently proved’ ...)
–907 D (... ‘will not discredit the lawgiver.’)
_Book xi._
(1) The evils of retail trade, and the cure of them.
918 A (‘After the practices of adulteration’ ...)
–919 C (... ‘shamelessness and meanness.’)
(2) The honour of parents.
930 E (‘Neither God, nor a man’ ...)
–932 A (... ‘to what has now been said.’...)
_Book xii._
(1) The good state in its intercourse with the world.
949 E (‘Now a state’ ...)
–951 C (... ‘is ill-conducted.’)
(2) The Burial of the Dead.
958 C (‘Thus a man is born’ ...)
–960 A (... ‘a fitting penalty.’...)