CHAPTER IX

THE HELLENIC-ROMAN PERIOD (322 B. C.–476 A. D.)

=Its Time Length.=

Greek Period, 300 years.

Hellenic-Roman Period, 800 years.

Middle Ages, 1000 years.

Modern Period, 450 years.

We ought to appreciate at the beginning the enormous time length

of this period. It seems long since modern thought began, but it was

only about 450 years ago. The Hellenic-Roman Period was 800 years

long, or nearly twice as long as modern times. It is, furthermore,

two and a half times as long as the period which we have just been

discussing,――the pure Greek period. Now the Hellenic-Roman Period

and the Middle Ages together form the epoch of human history that is

relatively uncreative. This is an extent of 1800 years, a long interval

when compared with the 750 years of creative history, which represents

the combined length of the pure Greek Period and modern times. In

European history the periods of productive thought have been less than

half as long as those of the unproductive. Yet we must not be misled by

such statistics. History is an organic growth. Its seedtime and growth

are long; its harvest is short.

=The Fall of the Greek Nation and the Persistence of its Civilization.=

The 800 years after the death of Aristotle are named the Hellenic-Roman

Period, because Greek civilization burst its own national boundaries

and became a part of Roman civilization. The Greek nation died;

its culture remained. It is no longer pure Greek, but Greek in the

environment of the Roman world――it becomes Hellenism. With the death

of Alexander in 323 B. C. the motherland of Greece became a prey to

revolutions for 200 years. It was often the battleground of foreigners

and the object of their contentions. Its government and population sank

into hopeless decay. It was incorporated into the Roman empire in 146

B. C. and shared in the depressing times of the Civil Wars of the first

century B. C. By becoming a part of Rome Greece lost its uniqueness

but the world gained its culture as a common heritage. Its autonomy

was forever gone, but its people became the teachers of mankind. In

political power Greece reached its height with Alexander, in creative

thought with Aristotle; then by its own momentum its civilization

persisted as a missionary force to the whole world.

Illustration: THE EMPIRE OF ALEXANDER

(Showing the spread of Hellenism eastward,

beginning 334 B. C. with Alexander’s Campaign)

The overflow of Greek civilization was first eastward, to the nations

of Asia. Alexander, with his military and administrative genius,

had only made a preliminary conquest of these Oriental peoples. The

conquest became permanent through Greek art, learning, and institutions.

In the century after Alexander the habits and customs of the East had

been Hellenized. Greek schools, theatres, and baths were to be found in

almost every city of the East. In the East and Egypt an inexhaustible

field was opened for the founding of new centres of culture. In the

kingdoms partitioned off from the old Alexandrian domain, the kings

were Greek, spoke Greek, adored Greek gods, and preserved Greek

fashions. Amid Asiatics they sought to maintain Greek courts, have

Greek administrative officers, and be surrounded with Greek scholars.

Greek colonists, soldiers, and merchants were attracted to these

kingdoms in such numbers that the natives adopted the costumes,

religions, manners, and even the language of the Greeks. The Orient

ceased to be Asiatic and became Hellenic. The Romans found there in

the first century B. C. peoples like the Greeks who spoke Greek.

Greek civilization began to overflow upon the western world when,

in the second century, Greece with all the other countries upon the

Mediterranean was absorbed by Rome. The conquest of Greece by Rome in

146 B. C. gave currency to Greek art, letters, and morals in Roman life.

That Greek civilization was not lost in this great amalgamation shows

how deep and fundamental it was. The secondary nations disappeared and

none remained to compete with the Greek and Latin. The result was the

superimposition of Greek culture upon Roman society. At the time of the

conquest of Greece, Greek scholars went to Rome in great numbers and

opened schools of eloquence and literature. Later the Roman youths

went to Athens to study. Art and science were gradually introduced into

Rome. The old Roman house got a Greek addition. Statues and paintings

were transported from Greece to Rome. Greek artists were commissioned.

By 100 B. C. the great Romans were living in Greek or Oriental style.

The coarsest Greeks, too, came into Italy and mingled with the Roman

proletariat. Thus, with the complete Latinizing of the peninsula of

Italy in the second century, an increasing Hellenism went hand in hand.

But the two civilizations never completely united. Roman adoption of

Greek culture was never more than a veneer. Greek art and learning were

rarely studied by the Roman except as a parade and luxury. As time went

on the Roman resorted less to the classic and more to the frivolous

modern products of the Greeks. For it must be remembered that when

Greece was conquered by Rome, the Romans were still only peasants,

soldiers, and merchants, without science, art, or philosophy. Before

150 B. C. the Roman children were taught nothing higher than reading,

writing, etc. But the Roman found a culture in Greece that he liked

and imitated. He kept his costume, language, and political laws, but

he adopted Greek letters, art, morals, and incorporated many elements

of the Greek religion into his own.

Two results came from this superimposition of Greek culture upon Roman

society. On the one hand the Greek sought to create a philosophy which

would make him a citizen of the world, since it was no longer an honor

to be a citizen of a Greek city. On the other hand, to the Roman there

came a mixed good. There was a gain to Roman literature and perhaps

to jurisprudence, but a fatal loss to Roman faith and morals. On the

whole Roman vulgarity was only concealed by Greek culture, except in

such spirits as Scipio, Paulus, and the Gracchi, in whom culture was

genuine. The Roman felt the need of rich intellectual life, and he

sought it in the rich treasures and the filth of later Greek culture.

The Greek culture that he found was no longer pure Greek, but Hellenism,

sometimes tinged with Orientalism. It acted as a poison on the Roman

and often was bitterly opposed.

=The Two Parts of the Hellenic-Roman Period.= We must not forget that,

excepting the first 175 years of this period, Rome is the background

upon which all philosophical movements of the time are to be traced.

Upon this background two general movements are prominent, which

divide the period into two parts: (1) the Ethical Period, and (2) the

Religious Period.

=1. The Ethical Period=, 322 B. C.–1 A. D., had its origin in the

Greek culture that was superimposed upon Roman civilization. This

epoch is notable for the rise and controversies of the four celebrated

philosophical Schools of Athens; the introduction of the teaching

of these Schools into Roman society; and the final merging and

reconciliation of these Schools in Eclecticism and Skepticism.

=2. The Religious Period=, 100 B. C.–476 A. D., arose out of

the Oriental religions that swept into Rome before the beginning

of this era. They were modified by their Roman environment,

and intellectualized and systematized by Hellenic culture.

Neo-Pythagoreanism, the Alexandrian-Judaic theosophies in the first

part, Christianity and neo-Platonism in the second part of this period,

are the most important philosophical results.

Note three things. (1) The spiritual life of Rome during these 800

years has its origin in imported foreign movements. The source of the

ethical movement is Greek, that of the religious movement is Oriental.

(2) The two movements overlap. Indeed, each from its beginning to its

end covers about 600 years. More precisely the ethical movement did not

disappear until about 200 A. D.; the religious movement began about 200

B. C. Ethical considerations dominate the first and religious impulses

the second period. (3) The century and a half from 150 B. C. to 1 A. D.

is a period of transition. It is the time when the emphasis changes

from ethics to religion. It is a period of unsettled conditions both

politically and intellectually. Politically it is the time of the Civil

wars and the formation of the empire. Intellectually it is the time of

Eclecticism and Skepticism.

=The Undercurrent of Skepticism in the Hellenic-Roman Period.= If we

go beneath the surface of the chronological divisions of this period,

which have been given above, we shall find their significance in

the undercurrent of Skepticism, which runs from the beginning to

the end of the period, and includes both its ethical and religious

phases. “Skepticism” is a word with a history of its own, but, as

philosophically used, it means the disbelief in the possibility of true

knowledge. Skepticism was the fundamental frame of mind that gradually

grew to conscious expression in the entire ancient world, although it

was entirely at variance with the spirit of the Greek culture that had

been superimposed upon that world. As an undercurrent――a widespread

feeling――Skepticism pervaded the whole period, while at different times

and places it appeared distinctly on the surface. These were 800 years

of lack of confidence in the power of the human reason, but the really

negative character of the time is often concealed by dogmatic teachings

of the philosophical Schools. Dogmatic Skepticism does not appear

except with reference to the positive teachings of the Schools, and

then it appears conspicuously. The successive stages of Skepticism

can have their clear outline, therefore, only after the positive

philosophical teachings, contemporary with it and opposed by it, have

been understood. This is the reason for treating the Skeptics after

and not before the Schools. The reader will, however, lose the whole

meaning of the Hellenic-Roman Period if he does not see that it is

fundamentally Skeptical; that in the Ethical Division the Schools

furnished the occasion of its appearance, and that in the Religious

Division religious faith rose because Skepticism had taken possession

of the field of knowledge. The ethical Schools stood as the last

representatives of the old Greek rationalism of the Systematic Period,

but even they yielded to the Skeptical spirit of the time. Stoicism,

Epicureanism, and Skepticism seek the same end,――the withdrawal of the

individual from the world and his exaltation above his environment.

All three valued science only so far as it would help ethical conduct.

Skepticism alone was avowedly antagonistic to intellectual ideals.

The strength of Skepticism appears more evident when we look at its

growth during this period. At the end of the Ethical Period the Schools

weakened and we find a century and a half (150 B. C.–1 A. D.) of

Skepticism and Eclecticism. There then followed at the beginning of

this era the Religious Period. Man then turned to religion because he

was profoundly skeptical of the trustworthiness of the reason――he felt

that it was so untrustworthy as to be unable to furnish him even a true

theory of moral conduct.

The Skeptical undercurrent of the Hellenic-Roman Period was the

concentration of all the negative results of the Greek Sophists. It

therefore had more than one point of departure,――the philosophies

of Protagoras, of the Megarian, Cynic, and Cyrenaic Schools. This

Sophistic undercurrent fed popular thought during the days of Plato

and Aristotle. It took its formal beginning contemporary with the rise

of the Stoic and Epicurean Schools; and in Athens, Alexandria, and

Rome there rose to the surface the problem of the possibility of human

knowledge. Formally it modified its sweeping negations, when it came in

contact with the pressing needs of morality and of spiritual retirement,

but it was ever present as the significant attitude of the time. While

the nature of the Skeptical teaching stood in the way of its formation

into a School, the doctrine itself, nevertheless, developed into a

system and had its historical growth and culmination. Weber points

out that the first appearance of Skepticism marks in Greece the

inauguration of the age of reason and its reappearance marks the

decline of the age of reason.

=The Fundamental Problem of the Hellenic-Roman Period.= The fundamental

attitude of this period being Skepticism, the fundamental problem

presented to it was therefore a practical one. While at heart the age

doubted the validity of the human reason, it was consciously engaged in

solving a very practical problem. The period had an external side that

was positive. No age can be merely skeptical, especially for so long

a time as 800 years. To doubt the power of the human reason is usually

the occasion of shunting human energies along other lines. The form of

the practical problem of this time was, _What is the highest wisdom for

practical life?_ This is consonant with the skeptical attitude of the

Greek as indicated by these two facts: (1) he had no longer an interest

in speculation except as it afforded a basis for practical wisdom, and

(2) he had no longer an interest in special sciences except as they

yielded practical results. To be sure, it will be found that theories

took to themselves airs of great importance during this period and that

empirical sciences made rapid advances; but it will also be found that

they were always in the service of practical living. The Wise Man of

this age is he who has a scientific doctrine of the purposes and ends

of human life.

For with his entrance into world-wide relations in the Ethical Period

the Athenian found himself confronted with a very different situation

from that which had engaged him during the age of Pericles. His

national existence had gone and could no longer arouse his devotion,

and with it his _ideal_ of a national life had crumbled to pieces.

His epic polytheism had become a dim thing of the distant past, and

there was no longer any external Greek institution to awaken his

slumbering energies. He might, of course, go into retirement and engage

in speculative inquiry, except that this was an age of pressing need.

He was forced to be awake and to adjust himself as an individual to

the many other peoples mixing and mingling in one common civilization.

His relations were enlarged, but his interests were circumscribed. His

philosophy was focused to one fundamental problem, _What, after all, is

the object of human life, and what can give happiness to the individual

amid the turmoil of the time?_ Philosophic studies were narrowed

to ethics, logic, and physics in their practical bearing. How much

narrower, then, the scope of the intellectual life of this time than

that of those men of retired leisure, Plato and Aristotle!

Nor is the fundamental problem different when in the second part of

this period we enter the great sweep of the religious current. The

rise of religious ideals and the shift from ethics to religion was only

the presentation of the practical problem of living with a different

emphasis. Man was now in the dazzling glory of the empire, but that

empire was unable to compensate the individual for the loss of his

political importance. Rome had given to its conquered peoples an

organized legal unity, but no spiritual ideal. It had none to offer.

The individual was the least important factor in the organization. The

present life offered little hope to the individual, except in the light

of a future life. Practical wisdom thus became that which took account

of the rewards and punishments that would come in the life beyond.

The Hellenic-Roman Period is kaleidoscopic and bewildering in its

shiftings; but amid them all is this one conscious problem: “_Show us

the man who is sure of his happiness, whatever the accidents of the

world may bring to him._”

=The Centres of Hellenism.=

=1. Athens.= With the overflow of Hellenism to the east and west the

active history of Athens had ceased, but she became venerated for

what she had been. Greece became hallowed and Athens became the shrine

of Greece in the imaginations of men. Although the city was brutally

ravished, she exercised a charm over the human mind for eight hundred

years after Alexander. Athens remained the intellectual centre through

the entire period. It became the conservative university town, where

philosophy and rhetoric were taught. It is remarkable how many Oriental

philosophers came to Athens to teach, how many youths from the whole

world came to be taught. The rhetorical schools, such as that of

Isocrates, did much toward making Athens the centre of culture, and

they offered for many years the highest practical training to Greek,

Roman, and Oriental. Besides the rhetorical were the philosophical or

dialectical schools, which debated privately questions of speculative

metaphysics. These did not offer public training, but groups of

students were taught in the grounds attached to gymnasia. Four

principal philosophical schools were thus formed,――the Academy of Plato,

the Lyceum of Aristotle, the Porch of the Stoics, and the Gardens

of Epicurus. In the first two we have had especial interest in the

previous period. All four, and especially the Stoic and Epicurean

schools, will engage our attention in this period. They are known in

history as “the Schools.” (See map for their location in Athens.) There

were many minor schools in Athens which later became religious cults.

These Schools lost their original interest in speculative inquiry, and

in this period devoted themselves to the exposition of the teaching of

their respective founders on ethical lines. The University of Athens

was built upon the four Schools. Its chairs were endowed by Hadrian and

the Antonines in the second century A. D. It grew to have an elaborate

organization. It was abolished by Justinian in 529 A. D.

=2. Alexandria.= There were many other centres of Hellenism and of

other learning at this time,――Rhodes, Antioch, Alexandria, ♦Pergamos,

Tarsus,――but none of these could be said to rival Athens in the

veneration of men. Some were much more active and creative than Athens.

Alexandria surpassed Athens and all other cities as the centre of

the natural sciences in the Ethical Period and of religions in the

Religious Period. Here, too, rather than at Athens, were to be found

the real interpreters of Plato and Aristotle. Nothing in ancient times

can be compared to the wonders of the museum of Alexandria, which was

its university. Scholars of every nation were entertained here at the

public expense. A vast botanical garden, a zoölogical collection, an

anatomical museum, an astronomical observatory, a library of seven

hundred thousand volumes were here. Here Euclid (290 B. C.) wrote his

geometry, Eratosthenes pursued his astronomical, geographical, and

historical labors, Apollonius wrote his treatise on conic sections;

and here were made the observations that led to the discovery of the

precession of the equinoxes. Here Ptolemy and his school formulated

the system of astronomy which was authoritative for fifteen hundred

years. Here the Christian theologians were educated, and from this

city neo-Platonism sprang. Literature and art, history, philology and

criticism flourished. The Hebrew Bible was translated into Greek. All

religions were welcomed. Buddhist, Jew, Greek, and Egyptian mingled,

and comparative theology rose to be a science.

=General Characteristics of the Ethical Period= (322 B. C.–1

A. D.)――On the death of Aristotle the hitherto compact body of Greek

thought disintegrated into its several elements. Theoretical and

practical knowledge, which had been so successfully fused in the great

systems of Democritus, Plato, and Aristotle, became separated. The

whole tendency of the time was toward segregation.

=1. The Abandonment of Metaphysical Speculation.= The theoretical

side of philosophy, which had been so successfully completed by the

great Greek masters, now became subordinated and almost completely lost

to view. _Metaphysical speculation was neglected_ except as it threw

light on the practical sciences――on ethics and the natural sciences.

Knowledge was no longer loved for its own sake.

=2. The Growth of Science.= Since theory was regarded as completed,

_attention was naturally turned upon the details of erudition and the

specializing of science_. The natural sciences survived the systems

of philosophy because of their usefulness. There was great interest

in investigations in mathematics, natural science, grammar, philology,

literary history and general history――and all with very rich results.

It was the time of commentaries, criticism, collaboration of the work

of the past and completion of the special work begun by the past. By

far the greater number of the so-called “philosophers” of this time are

connected with special science and literature, and not with metaphysics.

It was in the Greek Islands and Egypt (Alexandria) that this advance

was made. Nevertheless, it must be said that the advance in science

was a good deal restricted. The empirical sciences are dependent on

observation and experiment, and these opportunities were wanting at

this time. Good progress was, however, made in mathematics and the

sciences dependent on reasoning. Reasoning alone is incapable of

advancing a science like physics, for physics depends on investigation.

But even the prevalent skepticism of the time could not doubt the

truths of mathematics.

=3. Ethics became the Central Interest.= For the first time in the

history of European thought ethics was no longer a part of politics.

In the time of the autonomous Greek states ethics and politics were

two sides of the same question both in theory and practice. Ethics

and politics were not disjoined even by the Sophists, who nevertheless

paved the way for the divorce of the two. Now for the first time

ethical questions have become such that the individual must disregard

the iron-bound political situation and answer them entirely with

reference to himself. The decadent Greek state was no longer a moral

entity in the eyes of the people, nor could the concentration of

government in Rome raise the state to moral dignity. Moreover, life had

become cosmopolitan. The nations were commingling. Ethics must meet the

needs of men as human beings, and not as Athenians, Spartans, or Romans.

Vices had become cosmopolitan and virtues must needs be cosmopolitan

also. But cosmopolitanism is in the last analysis only individualism.

The man who conceives his duty so large that it embraces the whole

world is usually cold to any special interests except his own. The

Roman dictators and afterwards the emperor were the personification of

this cosmopolitan individualism which the subjects imitated so far as

they could.

Thus the public life was in danger of being swamped by private

interests and mere enjoyment, by gain and the struggle for existence.

The old belief in the gods, the vigorous political activity for great

ends, the pleasure in free scientific inquiry had disappeared. The

only refuge for the reflective mind was within itself and the study

of its own moral problems. Yet for this a definite science of ethics

was necessary, if the individual was to be systematically independent

of external things. Plato and Aristotle had prepared the way for such

retirement, and the tendency toward ethical separation from the world

of political events was an aspect of the cosmopolitanism of the time.

Ethical individuality and cosmopolitanism go together. The development

of the inner life belongs to those individuals who dwell together

in spiritual community. The same cosmopolitanism was sought by the

skeptics of the period through the abandonment of all knowledge.

=The Schools.= The beginning of the Ethical Period is marked by the

rise of the Schools into prominence, the end of that period by the

fusion of the Schools with one another through either eclecticism

or skepticism. At the beginning of the period each School had its

distinctive doctrine and was in open controversy with the others;

at the end their doctrines were much alike. The Epicurean School was

an exception, for it always remained isolated from the other Schools.

While each School had a host of notable representatives, it would be

difficult to find a creative thinker among them.

Illustration:

MAP OF ATHENS, SHOWING THE LOCATION OF THE FOUR SCHOOLS

(The Academy was three quarters of a mile from the city,

the Lyceum just outside the city, while the Porch was a

colonnade on the market place (Agora). The location of

the Gardens is not precisely known, but it was on the

road to the Academy, just inside the walls.)

We have already given the names of the four Schools: the Stoic or the

Porch, the Epicurean or the Gardens, the Aristotelian (Peripatetic)

or the Lyceum, the Platonic or the Academy. The Stoic and Epicurean

are called the New Schools in contrast with the Lyceum and the Academy,

which are called the Old Schools. The New Schools were of Asiatic

rather than Greek origin, and the Old Schools departed very much

from the teaching of their founders; so that we find a very different

kind of philosophy taught in all four Schools from that taught by the

great Greek Systematizers. All the Schools were Sophistic rather than

Socratic, and may be characterized as the revival of Greek Sophistry.

Besides these Schools there was the group of Skeptics, which cannot be

properly called a School, for from the nature of its doctrine it could

not form an organization. In influence upon the period, the Stoics,

Epicureans, and Skeptics are the most important. They eclipsed the

Academy and Lyceum because with partisan clearness they could formulate

the attitude of the age. The Stoic School made the most important

contribution to succeeding history. The Epicurean School had the most

numerous following. Although the four Schools were not endowed until

the Empire, their life was most vigorous before the Empire during

the Ethical Period. Succession in leadership of the Schools cannot

be completely traced――even that of the Academy shows great gaps. All

record of leadership in the Aristotelian, Stoic, and Epicurean Schools

stops at the close of this period.

=The Old Schools――The Academy and the Lyceum.= The Academy and Lyceum

have a history which in these respects is the same: (1) both abandoned

the ideal of an ethical society and turned to that of individual

happiness; (2) both deviated to Skepticism; (3) both afterward had

a reaction from Skepticism; (4) both developed the Sophistic teaching

rather than that of their founders; (5) both were in common opposition

to the New Schools.

=1. The Academy.= There were three Academies after Plato――called three,

because of the difference in their doctrines. Perhaps it is better to

say that there were three successive epochs of the Academy.

(a) _The Older Academy_, lasting about seventy years, from 347 B. C. to

280 B. C. The successive leaders of this were Speusippus, the nephew of

Plato (d. 339 B. C.), Heracleides of Pontus, Xenocrates (d. 314 B. C.),

Polemo, and Crates. This Academy emphasized at first the tendency

begun by Plato in the _Laws_ toward the Pythagorean numbers, and later

yielded to the contemporary interest in morals.

(b) _The Middle Academy_, lasting about one hundred and fifty years,

from 280 B. C. to 129 B. C. Of this epoch Arcesilaus and Carneades were

the most prominent leaders. This Academy was a form of Skepticism.

(c) _The New Academy_, lasting three hundred years from 120 B. C. to

200 A. D. Among its leaders were Philo of Larissa, who was at Rome in

87 B. C., and Antiochus of Ascalon, who had Cicero as a pupil in Athens

in 79 and 78 B. C. This epoch of the Academy represented a return to

the dogmatism of Plato, but it shows the contemporary eclectic tendency

by its including elements of Stoic and neo-Platonic teachings.

On the whole, the several epochs of the Academy failed to represent

Plato’s theory of the Ideas. The Academy was at first a School of

practical ethics, then a Skepticism, then an eclecticism. It was

related to Plato as the lesser-Socratic schools were to Socrates. The

true developer of Plato was Aristotle and not the Academies.

=2. The Lyceum.= From the death of Aristotle to 200 A. D. the

Lyceum was represented by individuals. The pupils of Aristotle were

distinguished from the master himself in being scientific specialists.

Theophrastus (370–287 B. C.), who followed Aristotle as leader of

the Lyceum, was the most complete representative of Aristotle, and

an attempt to drive out the Schools in Athens in 306 B. C. failed

solely by reason of the respect in which he was held. His significance

lay in natural science, and his two preserved botanical works are

of great importance. Eudemus of Rhodes studied history, mathematics,

and astronomy. Aristoxenes studied music, ethics, psychology, and

history. Dicæarchus showed the first yielding to the contemporary

ethical interest by writing history on its practical side. Science

was continued by the Aristotelians in Sicily, Alexandria, and the

Mediterranean islands. At Athens the School was most interested in

logic, dialectics, and eristics.

The history of the Lyceum was similar to that of the Academy. At

first it was centred in Theophrastus, the brilliant disciple of the

founder,――an administrator who knew how to give an eminent position

to the Lyceum in the intellectual life of Athens. This was followed by

the naturalism and pantheism of Strato. The following generations of

scholarchs were absorbed in empirical investigations. Then, as in the

Academy, came the reaction back to the original purpose of the founder

of the Lyceum. This occurred under Andronicus (about 70 B. C.), the

eleventh head of the School, and under him the original teachings

of Aristotle were reproduced and defended. This went on for several

centuries, until the School was merged in neo-Platonism.

=The New Schools――The Epicureans and the Stoics.= The Stoics,

Epicureans, and Skeptics represent the dogmatic side of this period

more truly than the Platonists and Aristotelians, for they give a

radical expression to its social aspects. The Epicureans had less

philosophical originality; but their doctrine had been born mature in

their founder, and had in consequence a unity and compactness. Stoicism,

on the other hand, was an eclecticism composed of the successive

philosophizings of its champions through many centuries. Stoicism

was represented by many independent and notable thinkers, while

Epicureanism had only one original thinker,――its founder, Epicurus.

Stoicism developed by changing its essentials, while Epicureanism could

change only in its unessentials. Stoicism may be said to have been the

characteristic philosophy of this period, from the fact that it was

created and developed in Athens on the principles of Attic philosophy

by men who had originated in the mixed races of the East, and by

the fact that it was easily accepted and developed by the Romans.

Consistent with the spirit of the Hellenic-Roman Period, it was by

nature an eclecticism that became more eclectic; and as time went on

its teaching approached that of the Academy and Lyceum (second century

B. C.). Epicureanism, however, always remained Epicureanism. Both

Stoicism and Epicureanism were centred at Athens. Epicurus opened his

School in the Gardens in 307 B. C., and Zeno began his lectures in the

Porch in 294 B. C. Both schools were introduced into Rome in the middle

of the second century B. C., or just before the end of the Ethical

Period.

Epicureanism in Rome could easily be perverted into an excuse for

the luxurious tendencies of the time, and since it advocated absolute

government it voiced the feeling of the new Empire――of the Emperor and

the people. As a philosophy it was opportune and popular and at the

same time easily misunderstood. It made no demands upon its disciples.

On the other hand, Stoicism was a discipline and demanded intellectual

acumen. Its insensibility to art and culture was an insuperable

obstacle to its progress in Greece, but on this account it found

congenial soil in Roman society. It made rapid progress among the

noble families, and was especially identified with those patrician

reactionaries who stood for the old régime of the Republic.

We are not surprised to find that the Stoics and Epicureans were

violently opposed to each other. They were the New Schools and

contesting the same ground for favor. They had the same aim and, with

so much in common, their differences were naturally accentuated. In an

age which Adam Smith has likened to the Thirty Years’ War in Germany,

they sought as rivals to offer as an ideal the individual independent

of his surroundings. The Stoic presented one means of attaining this

ideal and the Epicurean another. Both tried to substitute a philosophic

creed for the old religion. And the crowds that still went to the

Academy and Lyceum, and were taught the old dogmatism, must have

looked askance at these new dogmatic Schools. Those crowds had become

second-rate men. The New Schools had at first fewer numbers, but deeper

thinkers. The Greek pupils in the New Schools listened to foreigners

teaching strange creeds in strange tongues. But these new rivals made

their way. Not only at Athens, but at Corinth, Elis, Colophon, and

Heraclea in Pontus the elegant Platonic style was being superseded by

the crude aphorisms of Epicurus and the clumsy arguments of Zeno.

It will be asked, How far did these doctrines during these eight

hundred years permeate the people? Did the New Schools reach the rank

and file of the people to the same degree that the Sophistic teachings

reached the Greeks? Are we to suppose that Stoicism and Epicureanism

were common and popular philosophies? By no means. These philosophies

reached the people of the Roman world no farther than Greek culture

permeated Roman society. Stoicism was consciously taken up by the

large patrician class. The patricians were the cultivated Romans; and

Stoicism has so much in it like the Roman _gravitas_ that it formulated

for the patricians their attitude in this hopeless time. Epicureanism,

on the other hand, in its pure form as Epicurus taught it, or later

as Lucretius poetically expressed it, could find less favor in Rome.

But Epicureanism was easily perverted, and no doubt the educated

voluptuaries of Rome would find in the vitiated doctrine a support and

excuse for their excesses.

=A Summary of the Agreements and Differences of the Stoics and

Epicureans.=

_Their Agreements._

1. Both subordinated theory to practice.

2. Both had the same purpose in their practical philosophy:

(a) to gain peace of mind for the individual,

(b) to gain independence of the world for the individual.

_Their Differences._

_The Stoics._ _The Epicureans._

1. Universal law is supreme. The individual is supreme.

2. Man is a thinking being. Man is a feeling being.

3. Independence is obtained Independence is obtained by

by suppressing the personal idealizing the feelings through

feelings. serenity.

4. The Stoics were religious, The Epicureans were anti-religious,

yet both schools accepted the popular gods.

5. The world is a moral order. The world is a mechanical order.

6. The universal determines The universal is the result of the

the individual. functioning of the individual.

7. The world is the expression The world is the combination of

of an immanent reason. atoms.

A Beginner's History of Philosophy, Vol. 1: Ancient and Mediæval Philosophy · 第 9 / 15 章