historique à la méthode dogmatique, dans toutes les études relatives à
l’esprit humain. La critique littéraire n’est plus que l’exposé des formes
diverses de la beauté, c’est à dire des manières dont les différentes
familles et les différentes âges de l’humanité ont résolu le problème
esthétique. La philosophie n’est que le tableau des solutions proposées
pour résoudre le problème philosophique. La théologie ne doit plus être
que l’histoire des efforts spontanés tentés pour résoudre le problème
divin. L’histoire, en effet, est la forme nécessaire de la science de tout
ce qui est soumis aux lois de la vie changeante et successive. La science
des langues, c’est l’histoire des langues; la science des littératures et
des philosophies, c’est l’histoire des littératures et des philosophies;
la science de l’esprit humain c’est, de même, l’histoire de l’esprit
humain, et non pas seulement l’analyse des rouages de l’âme individuelle.
La psychologie n’envisage que l’individu, et elle l’envisage d’une manière
abstraite, absolue, comme un sujet permanent et toujours identique à
lui-même; aux yeux de la critique la conscience se fait dans l’humanité
comme l’individu; elle a son histoire. Le grand progrès de la critique a
été de substituer la catégorie du _devenir_ â la catégorie de _l’être_, la
conception du relatif à la conception de l’absolu, le mouvement à
l’immobilité. Autrefois, tout était considéré comme étant; on parlait de
philosophie, de droit, de politique, d’art, de poésie, d’une manière
absolue; maintenant tout est considéré comme en voie de se faire....... A
ce point de vue de la science critique, ce qu’on recherche dans l’histoire
de la philosophie, c’est beaucoup moins de la philosophie proprement dite
que de l’histoire.”—(E. Renan, Pref. to _Averroes_, p. vi.)
“Tout n’est que relatif, disions-nous tout à l’heure; il faut ajouter
maintenant: tout n’est que relation. Vérité importune pour l’homme qui,
dans le fatal courant où il est plongé, voudrait trouver un point fixé
s’arrêter un instant, se faire illusion sur la vanité des choses! Vérité
féconde pour la science qui lui doit une intelligence nouvelle de la
réalité, une intuition infiniment plus pénétrante du jeu des forces qui
composent le monde. C’est ce principe qui a fait de l’histoire une science
et de toutes les sciences une histoire. C’est en vertu de ce principe
qu’il n’y a plus de philosophie mais des philosophies qui se succèdent,
qui se complétent en se succèdant, et dont chacune représenté avec un
élément du vrai, une phase du développement de la pensée universelle.
Ainsi la science s’organise elle-même et porte en soi sa critique. La
classification rationnelle des systèmes est leur succession, et le seul
jugement équitable et utile qu’on puisse passer sur eux est celui qu’ils
passent sur eux-mêmes en se transformant. Le vrai n’est plus vrai en soi.
Ce n’est plus une quantité fixe qu’il s’agit de dégager, un objet rond ou
carré qu’on puisse tenir dans la main. Le vrai, le beau, le juste même se
font perpétuellement; ils sont à jamais en train de se constituer, parce
qu’ils ne sont autre chose que l’esprit humain, qui, en se déployant, se
retrouve et se reconnait.”—E. Scherer, (article on Hegel in _Revue des
Deux Mondes_, Feb. 15, 1861.)
Lecture II.
Note 10. p. 46. Neo-Platonism.
On the nature and history of Neo-Platonism, see Ritter’s _History of
Philosophy_, E. T. vol. iv. b. xiii; Creuzer’s _Prolegomena to Plotinus_;
Tennemann’s _Manual of Philosophy_, § 200-222; Hase’s _Church History_, §
50, with the references which the two latter supply; Jules Simon’s and
Vacherot’s works on the _Ecole d’Alexandrie_; B. Constant’s _Du
Polytheisme_, b. xv. Among English works, see Archer Butler’s _Lectures on
Philosophy_, vol. ii. 348 seq.; Lewes’ _History of Philosophy_; Maurice’s
_History of Philosophy_ (part ii.); Donaldson’s _History of Greek
Literature_, ch. 53 and 57; and an essay in R. A. Vaughan’s _Essays and
Remains_, 1858.
The mystic and oriental tendency which Neo-Platonism embodied is seen as
early as Philo in the middle of the first century; but it was Ammonius
Saccus (A.D. 163-243) who developed the new system about A.D. 200. The
chief teachers of it were Plotinus (born 203), who introduced it at Rome;
Porphyry (233-305), who however manifested more of the mystic Pythagorean
spirit and less of the dialectical Platonic; Iamblichus, a generation
later, who also inclined to theurgy; and in the fifth century Hypatia,
killed 415; and Proclus (412-485), who taught at Athens. A growth of
thought is perceptible in the successive members of the school. The
sketches of several of the above-named writers in Smith’s _Biographical
Dictionary_ are full of information, and furnished with useful references.
Note 11. p. 47. The Pseudo-Clementine Literature.
The Pseudo-Clementine literature consists of Homilies and Recognitions;
the latter being in a Latin translation by Rufinus. It is published in
Cotelerius’s _Sancti Patres_, 1698, vol i.
A noble Roman, harassed by his doubts and eager for truth, travels to the
east, and there learns Christian truth, which makes him happy. It is the
former part of the narrative, viz. the doubts of Clemens before becoming a
Christian, which is alluded to in the text, and is adduced by Neander,
_Kirchengeschichte_, i. pp. 54-56, as an instance of the preparation for
the reception of Christianity made by a sense of want in many hearts. But
it is the latter part which is valuable in a literary point of view, on
account of the light which the exposition of Christian doctrine contained
in it throws upon the Judaizing Gnostics, being an attempt to reconcile
Ebionitism with the teaching of St. Paul. Its interest in this point of
view has caused it to be made the subject of several monographs by German
theologians. A list of them, with an account of the phases of doctrine
described, is given in Kurtz’s _Church History_, E. T. § 48, and in Hase’s
_Church History_, § 35, 75, and 80. One of the most important of them is
Schliemann’s _Die Clemetinen_, 1844.
Note 12. p. 48. The Absence Of References To Christianity In Heathen
Writers Of The Second Century.
Tzchirner has investigated this subject in an interesting dissertation,
_Græci et Romani Scriptores cur rerum Christianarum raro meminerint_;
Opusc. Acad. p. 283. Lips. 1829, (translated in the _Journal of Sacred
Literature_, Jan. 1853;) and has discussed the passages where mention is
made of Christianity. The following is the substance of his inquiries.
Though the notices concerning Christianity in heathen writers are scanty,
the silence of Eusebius gives good ground for inferring, that not many
further notices existed concerning it in the works which are lost, than
have been preserved to us. Perhaps a few passages may have been erased in
which Christianity was blasphemed, even in that which is preserved.
The silence concerning Christianity during the first century is not
surprising; because the Christians, if known at all, would be regarded as
a Jewish sect, as in Acts xviii. 15; xxiii. 29; xxv. 19. In the third
century they are both noticed and attacked. The inquiry therefore with
regard to the silence about them, refers only to the period from about
A.D. 80-180.
During this period, among the Greek writers who omit all mention of
Christianity, are Dio Chrysostom; Plutarch (for the passage, _Quæst._ iv,
4. § 3, about happiness consisting in hope, probably does not refer to
them); Œnomaus, who wrote expressly to ridicule religion; Maximus Tyrius;
and Pausanias: and among Latin ones, Juvenal, who several times mentions
the Jews, but only indirectly refers to the Christians (_Sat._ i. 185-7),
Aulus Gellius, and Apuleius; (for the opinion of Warburton, _Div. Leg._ b.
ii. § 4, that an allusion is intended, is now rejected,(1063) unless one
perhaps exists in _Met._ ix. ed. Panck. ii. 195.)
Among those who name Christians we find,—
In Trajan’s reign, Tacitus, who describes their persecution by Nero
(_Ann._ xv. 44); Suetonius, who names them, _Vit. Neron_. ch. 16, and
describes them as seditious, _Vit. Claud._ 25, if indeed the word
_Chresto_ in the paragraph is intended for _Christo_; and Pliny the
younger, in the well-known letter to Trajan (_Ep._ x. 96).
In the reign of Hadrian we find, in a fragment of Hadrian’s works in
Vopiscus’s Life of Saturninus (ch. viii.) a mention of them, comparing
them with Serapid worshippers; and one quoted by Eusebius, _Eccl. Hist._
iv. 9, addressed to a proconsul of Asia. Also Arrian names them in two
passages, in one describing them as obstinate, _Diss. Epictet._ b. iv. ch.
vii. and in the other speaking either of them or of the Jews as βαπτισταί
(b. ii. ch. ii.)
In the reign of the Antonines we find Galen stigmatising them for
obstinacy (_De Pulsuum Diff._ b. iii. ch. iii.), and for believing without
proof (b. ii. ch. iv.); and Marcus Aurelius himself inquires (_Comment._
b. xi. ch. iii), what can be the cause of their inflexibility. His two
epistles which contain allusions to Christianity, one of them attributing
his victory over the Marcomanni to the thundering legion, and the other
stating that it is the business of the gods and not men to punish, are
rejected as spurious.
In the same reign we find Crescens and Fronto, who are treated of
elsewhere, Lect. II. p. 48; and Lucian (p. 49). Tzchirner denies the
allusions supposed to lurk in many passages of Lucian examined by Krebsius
and Eichstadt; but, independently of those in the Peregrinus, ch. xi-xiv,
on which see Lect. II and Note 13, there remains one where Alexander the
magician is said to exclude Christians and Epicureans from his magical
rites. In the same reign we meet with Celsus; after which time the notices
of Christianity are frequent; the account of which will be found in
Lardner’s Works, vol. viii.
If now we pass from the facts to the cause, and ask why the notices are so
few, Tzchirner very properly answers, that the silence in the first
century is explained, partly by the general poverty and retirement of the
Christians, and partly by the circumstance named above, that they were
included among Jews. But in the second century, when Christianity was so
far known that several learned men abandoned heathenism for it, such as
Quadratus, Melito, Justin, Tatian, Athenagoras, Theophilus, Minucius
Felix; Tzchirner refers the silence chiefly to the fact that the opinions
and position of the Christians prevented them from being considered worthy
of attention by members of any of those schools of philosophy whose
probable opinions in reference to it have been already explained in Lect.
II. Celsus alone had the far-sightedness to apprehend danger from them,
both philosophically and politically.
Note 13. p. 49. The Peregrinus Proteus Of Lucian.
The question of Lucian’s intention to injure Christianity has been
discussed and maintained by Krebsius in a Dissertation, _De Malitioso
Luciani Consilio Religionem Christianam scurrili dicacitate vanam et
ridiculam reddendi_, Opusc. Acad. p. 308 seq. The contrary view is
maintained by Eichstadt in a dissertation, _Lucianus num scriptis suis
adjuvare voluerit Religionem Christianam_, Jena, 1822. Krebsius is
extravagant in interpreting many unimportant references in Lucian as
relating to Christianity. See Tzchirner, _Opusc. Acad._ p. 290. Neander
also states his opinion on the question, _Kirchengesch._ i. 269 seq.
The same subject has been discussed with great care and learning by Adolph
Planck, dean of Heidenheim in Würtemburg, _Lucian und Christenthum_, a
contribution to the church history of the second century; originally
published in the _Studien und Kritiken_, 1851, and translated in the
American _Bibliotheca Sacra_, April and July, 1853. He there studies
Lucian’s tract, _the Peregrinus_, (1) in the character which it offers of
Peregrinus as a Cynic, for the purpose of examining the probability of his
death being a parody on Christian martyrdom; (2) in his character as a
Christian, in order to exhibit Lucian’s opinion of Christianity and of the
traits of Christian life brought out; (3) with a view to ascertain the
sources and amount of Lucian’s knowledge of Christianity; discussing
fully, by means of quotations, the evidence of Lucian’s acquaintance with
the early Christian literature.
The analysis of the Peregrinus Proteus is as follows: It professes to be a
letter from Lucian to Cromius narrating Peregrinus’s death. Peregrinus had
gone to Olympia, with the pompous design of displaying his death before
the assembly at the games. Lucian lets us hear the speeches, descriptive
of Peregrinus’s life, delivered before the decisive act. A certain
Theagenes, an admirer of Peregrinus, delivers a bombastic eulogy, § 3-7,
repelling the charge of vanity imputed to him, and comparing his proposed
death with that of Hercules, &c. Lucian opposes to this some invectives
delivered by another, whose name he professes to have forgotten, which
refer, § 7-30, to the history of Peregrinus to which Theagenes had
alluded; tracing his crimes, his journeys from land to land, his turning
Christian in Syria, his expulsion for disobedience, his subsequent
wanderings and crimes, and the universal contempt which he had brought
upon himself. Theagenes replies to this speech; but Lucian preferred to go
to see the wrestling-match. Afterwards however he heard Peregrinus
pronounce his own eulogy, and boast of his sufferings on behalf of
philosophy. Then, after most of the guests had left Elis, § 35, &c.
Peregrinus proceeded to erect his own funeral pile, and consumed himself
on it. Lucian after seeing the end went away, and added a legend about the
appearance of a hawk; which story he soon afterwards found had already
gained credence. The moral which he draws is, that Cromius ought to
despise such people, and impute their conduct to love of fame.
The passages of the work which have specific reference to Christianity
are, § 11-13, which describe Peregrinus’s intercourse with the Christians;
and § 35-41, which describe his martyrdom. The references are to Dindorf’s
ed. Paris 1840.
Note 14. p. 51. The Work Of Celsus.
It is difficult to obtain an exact conception of the work of Celsus. This
is due partly perhaps to its original form; for Origen himself complains
(Cont. Cels. i. 40) of the want of order in Celsus; and partly to the fact
that a mind like that of Origen did not follow his opponent step by step,
but frequently grasped a general principle which enabled him to meet a
group of objections dispersed through different parts of Celsus’s work.
As it was desirable for the object of the lecture to present Celsus’s
views rather than analyse Origen’s treatise, the writer endeavoured, when
preparing it, to select materials from Origen for drawing out a sketch in
systematic form, somewhat in the manner of Neander’s remarks (_Church
History_, i. 274), of Celsus’s views, concerning (1) God and creation; (2)
man’s moral state; (3) the Hebrew and Christian religions in their sacred
books and doctrines. But on the publication of Pressensé’s work (_Hist. de
l’Eglise_, 2e série, ii. pp. 104-142), he perceived the plan of
arrangement there suggested to possess so much more life, that he adopted
it in the text. Pressensé considers that, by a careful study of the
fragments of Celsus quoted by Origen, he is able to reproduce a picture of
the whole work, as well as to gather his opinions. Such an arrangement
must necessarily be hypothetical, like Niebuhr’s treatment of Roman
history, though extremely probable. It will be observed however, by
noticing the references to Origen’s work in the foot-notes of Pressensé’s
text, and of Lecture II. in this volume, that the arrangement suggested
for Celsus’s treatise does not always coincide with the order in which
Origen has quoted the parts of it. Also the references to the later books
of Origen will be seen to be fewer than to the earlier; a circumstance
which arises from the quotations from Celsus’s work being fewer in those
books, and from the thoughts of Origen in them being a continuation of
those presented earlier. Pressensé’s arrangement has the disadvantage too
of leaving out many of the critical difficulties which Celsus alleges in
the scriptures; but he rightly points out that they are all corollaries
from a philosophical principle. The reader may accordingly consult Neander
for a systematic view of Celsus’s opinions, and Pressensé for a theory of
the arrangement of his work.
It may be useful to give a brief statement of the order in which Celsus’s
objections occur in Origen’s treatise, so as to show the manner in which
the subject is there developed.
The first half of book i. is prefatory (ch. i-xl.); the second half,
together with b. ii. contains the attack by the Jew on Christianity given
in Lect. II. The early part of b. iii. (1-9) contains Origen’s refutation
of the Jew. The subsequent parts and remaining books give Origen’s
refutation of Celsus’s own attack on Christianity. First, Celsus attacks
the character of Christians in the remainder of b. iii. In b. iv. he
returns to his attack on Judaism, and on the scriptures of the Old
Testament, especially on many of the narratives; either regarding them as
false, or as borrowed; and objecting to their anthropomorphic character;
also objecting to the account of man’s place in creation, and of divine
interference. In b. v. he continues his attack on the doctrines of both
religions, chiefly so far as he considers them to be untrue; and in b. vi.
so far as he considers them to be borrowed, dragging to light the
difference which existed between Judaism and Christianity. In b. vii. the
subject of prophecy and some other doctrines, as well as the ethics of
Christianity, are examined; and in b. viii, when the attack on
Christianity is mainly over, a defence of paganism is offered by Celsus.
A detailed analysis of Origen’s treatise, which is intricate, will be
found in Schramm’s _Analysis Patrum_, vol. iv. 1782. Pressensé’s view of
Origen’s arguments is given, _Hist._ vol. 2e Serie, t. ii. pp. 281-361.
See also Lardner’s Works, viii. 19. Hase (_Church History_, § 51) refers
to several German works which relate to Celsus.
Note 15. p. 56. The Charges Against Christians, And Causes Of Persecution,
In The Second Century.
The learned Kortholt, Professor at Kiel, in his work, the _Paganus
Obtrectator, sive Liber de Calumniis Gentilium in Veteres Christianos_
(1703), has carefully collected references to the objections raised by the
Pagans against Christianity. He has arranged them according to the
subjects, irrespective of the chronological order in which they were
respectively suggested; viz. (1) those which relate to the origin and
nature of Christianity, such as its novelty, its alleged want of
originality, &c.; (2) false charges about public worship; (3) false
charges about life and morals. If we exclude on the one hand those charges
which are gathered out of Celsus (in Origen), and on the other those from
apologists later than the date of Porphyry, the charges between these
limits, which are learned from the apologists Minucius Felix, Theophilus
(ad Autolycum), and Tertullian, exhibit the objections which were
encountered in Rome, Syria, and North Africa, respectively. They chiefly
belong to the prejudices adduced in the second and third of the classes
made by Kortholt. Among the more intelligible objections which belong to
his first class, are found the charges of the novelty of Christianity (ch.
i. in his book), the superstitious character of it (ix. and x.), and the
want of cultivation in its supporters (xi.). Among the prejudices about
public worship (class 2) in his work, we meet with the charge of
ass-worship (in Tertullian and Minucius Felix, ch. xi.); sky and sun
worship (ii. and iii.); priest and cross worship (iv, and vi.); and secret
sacred rites (ix.). Among the false charges about life and morals (which
form class 3), we meet with that of private and nocturnal meetings
forbidden by law, and the Agapæ (v.); Thyestean banquets (Theoph. and
Tertull. ix.); secret insignia (xvi.); treason (vii.); and hatred of
humanity (viii.).
All these charges will be seen to be such as mark the transition from a
state of indifference to Christianity to that more distinct comprehension
of its nature which afterwards existed. Their character indicates a moment
when the new religion was forcing itself on public attention as a secret
organization ramifying through the Roman world. In the main they resolved
themselves into two heads; (1) the vulgar prejudices arising from
ignorance; and (2) the alarm at the political danger arising from a vast
secret society. The latter charges reappear in the works of later
apologists; but the former are peculiar to this special period, between
the time of Celsus and of Porphyry.
Among the vulgar prejudices thus named, the only two that need further
mention are the charges of priest-worship and ass-worship. The former
charge, named by Minucius Felix, ch. ix, and thus described here by a
euphemism, may be seen in Kortholt, b. ii. ch. iv. p. 319; it probably
arose from the homage paid to the bishop on bended knee at ordination. The
latter, taken out of Minucius Felix (ch. ii.), and Tertullian (Apol. 16),
is more singular and puzzling even after the discussions by older authors
which Kortholt cites, b. ii. ch. i. p. 256, &c. But the fact of the charge
has been corroborated by the recent discovery in excavations made in some
substructions on the Palatine hill, of a _graffito_ or pencil-scratching,
in which a person is worshipping toward a cross, on which hangs suspended
a human figure with the head of a horse, or perhaps wild ass, and
underneath is the inscription “Alexamenus is worshipping God,” Αλεξαμενος
σεβετε [sic for σεβεται] Θεον. It can hardly be doubted that it is a pagan
caricature of Christian worship, embodying the absurd prejudice which
Minucius names. A brief account of it may be seen in the _Edinburgh
Review_, No. 224, for October, 1859, p. 436, and more fully in _Un
Graffito Blasfemo nel Palazzo dei Cesari (Civiltà Cattolica_, serie iii.
vol. iv. Roma, 1856). The difficulty that the inscription is in Greek,
will be explained by the fact that the church of Rome was Greek as late as
the time of the writings of the so-called Hippolytus.
The other great class of objections to Christianity, which consisted in
imputing the charge of treason, expressed itself in deeds as well as
words, and was made the ground of the public persecution of them.
We cannot wonder that the profession of Christianity exposed persons to
the suspicion of treason. When we add the fact that Christians declined
obstinately to conform to the practice which had grown up, of performing
sacrifice to the honour of the reigning emperors as the impersonation of
the dignity of the state; and when we consider the organization among
Christians, the league of purpose which was evident among them, we can
understand how fully they laid themselves open to the charge of treason,
the “crimen læsæ majestatis.” Perhaps too at particular moments they were
in danger of giving real ground for suspicion in reference to this point.
The warnings of St. Paul and St. Peter give ground for inferring that
there was danger of this even in their times. (Rom. xiii. 1 seq.; 1 Pet.
ii. 13 seq.)
A greater difficulty than discovering plausible grounds which may have
created the suspicion of treason is, to find the causes why a people so
tolerant as the Romans should exhibit so persecuting a spirit against
Christianity; but we must remember, first, that the idea as distinct from
the practice of toleration was unknown; and secondly, that the practice of
toleration was only supposed to be obligatory when the particular religion
had been licensed.