regarded as typical of the views of a party. They reproduce the critical
difficulties of Maimonides and Spinoza, which seem never to have found
favour with the Jews; but the general similarity of the doctrinal part of
Salvador’s system to that just described is very observable.
Note 5. p. 12. The Contest Of Christianity With Mahometanism.
The contest of Christianity with Mahometanism, so far as it has been a
struggle of argument and not of the sword, offers few remarkable points.
In the first sweep of the Mahometan conquest, when the Christian nations
succumbed both in the east and west, there was no field for a question of
truth. It was only in Christian nations which were removed from peril, and
yet sufficiently in contact to entertain the question of the claims of the
Mahometan religion, that a consideration of its nature, regarded as a
system of doctrine, could arise. Accordingly it is in Constantinople, or
in Spain and the other parts of western Europe which came into connexion
with the Moors, that works of this character appear.
The history may be conveniently arranged in three periods, each of which
is marked by works of defence, some called forth by danger, a real demand,
but subsiding into or connected with inquiries prompted only by literary
tastes. The first is from the twelfth to the middle of the sixteenth
century; the second during the seventeenth and eighteenth; the third
during the present century.
1. A notice of the Mahometan religion exists in a work of J. Damascenus,
in the eighth century; and Euthymius Zigabenus, a Byzantine writer of the
twelfth: but the first important treatise written directly against it was
in 1210, _Richardi Confutatio_, edited in 1543 by Bibliander from a Greek
copy. The refutation of Averroes by Aquinas, about 1250, can hardly be
quoted as an instance of a work against the Mahometan religion, being
rather against its philosophy. A treatise exists by John Cantacuzene,
written a little after 1350; which is to be explained probably by the
circumstance that the danger from Mahometan powers in the east directed
the attention of a literary man to the religion and institutions which
they professed. Thus far the works were called forth by a real demand.
A series of treatises however commences about the time of the expulsion of
the Moors from Spain, the cause of the existence of which is not so easy
of explanation. Such are those in Spain by Alphonso de Spina, 1487, and by
Turrecremata (see Eichhorn’s _Gesch. der Lit._ vi.); by Nicholas de Cuza,
published in 1543; in Italy about 1500 by Ludovicus Vives, and
Volterranus; one by Philip Melancthon in reference to the reading of the
Koran; and a collection of treatises, including those of Richardus,
Cantacuzene, Vives, and Melancthon, published by Bibliander in 1543.
Probably the first two of this list may have been the relic of the crusade
of Christianity against the Moorish religion; the next two possibly were
called forth by the interest excited in reference to Mahometans by reason
of their conquests, or less probably by the influence of their philosophy
at Padua (see Lect. III. p. 100 seq.). The two last are hardly to be
explained, except by supposing them to be an offshoot of the Renaissance,
and called forth by the largeness of literary taste and inquiry excited by
that event.
2. When we pass into the seventeenth century, we find a series of
treatises on the same subject, which must be explained by the cause just
named, the newly acquired interest in Arabic and other eastern tongues. We
meet however with others, called forth by the missionary exertions which
had brought the Christians into contact with Mahometans in the east.
The treatise by Bleda, _Defensio Fidei Christianæ_, 1610, stands alone,
unconnected with any cause. It was partly a defence of the conduct of
Christians towards the Mahometans. A real interest however belongs to the
work of Guadagnoli in 1631. A catholic missionary, Hieronymo Xavier, had
composed in 1596 a treatise in Persian against Mahometanism, in which the
general principle of theism was laid down as opposed to the Mahometan
doctrine of absorption; next the peculiar doctrines of Christianity
stated; and lastly, a contrast drawn between the two religions. See Lee’s
_Tracts on Christianity and Mahometanism_ (below, _pref._ p. 5 seq.).
This work was answered in 1621 by a Persian nobleman named Ahmed Ibn Zain
Elébidín. The line adopted by him was, (1) to show that the coming of
Mahomet was predicted in the Old Testament (Hab. iii. 3); (2) to argue
that Mahomet’s teaching was not more opposed to Christ’s than his was to
that of Moses, and that therefore both ought to be admitted, or both
rejected; (3) to point out critically the discrepancies in the Gospels;
(4) to attack the doctrines of the Trinity and Christ’s deity. (Lee,
_pref._ 41 seq.)
This work was answered (1631) by a treatise in Latin by P. Guadagnoli,
dedicated to Pope Urban VIII. It is divided into four parts; (1)
respecting the objections about the Trinity; (2) the Incarnation; (3) the
authority of Scripture; (4) the claims of the Koran and of Mahomet. (Lee,
_pref._ 108 seq. who also gives references (p. 113) to a few other
writers, chiefly in the seventeenth century.)
The further works of defence produced in this century arose as it were
accidentally. The lengthy summary of the Mahometan controversy in
Hoornbeek’s _Summa Controversiarum_, 1653, p. 75 seq. was either
introduced merely to give completeness to the work as a treatise on
polemic, or was called forth by considerations connected with missions, as
is made probable by his work _De Conversione Gentilium et Indorum_. Le
Moyne’s publication on the subject in the _Varia Sacra_, vol. i. 1685,
arose from the accidental discovery of an old treatise, _Bartholomæi
Edess. Confutatio Hagareni_. A third work of this kind, Maracci’s
_Criticism on the Koran_, 1698, arose from the circumstance that the pope
would not allow the publication of an edition of the Koran, without an
accompanying refutation of each part of it. The work of Hottinger (_Hist.
Orient._ b. i.), Pfeiffer’s _Theol. Judaica et Mahom._ and Kortholt’s _De
Relig. Mahom._ 1663, form the transition into an independent literary
investigation; which is seen in the literary inquiries concerning the life
of Mahomet, as well as his doctrine, in Pocock, Prideaux 1697, Reland
1707, Boulainvilliers 1730, and the translation of the Koran by Sale 1734.
A slightly controversial tone pervades some of them. The materials
collected by them were occasionally used by deist and infidel writers
(e.g. by Chubb), for instituting an unfavourable comparison between Christ
and Mahomet.
The great literary historians of that period give lists of the previous
writers connected with the investigation. See J. A. Fabricius, _Biblioth.
Græc._ ed. 1715, vol. vii. p. 136; Walch, _Biblioth. Theol. Sel._ vol. i.
chap. v. sect. 9. A summary of the arguments used in the controversy is
given in J. Fabricius, _Delectus Argumentorum_, p. 41, &c. and Stapfer’s
_Inst. Theol. Polem._ iii. p. 289, &c.
3. In the present century the literature in reference to Mahometanism is,
as in the former instances, twofold in kind. Part of it has been called
forth by missionary contests in the east; part by literary or historic
tastes, and the modern love of carrying the comparative method of study
into every branch of history.
The first class is illustrated by the discussions at Shiraz in 1811,
between the saintly Henry Martyn and some Persian Moollas. The controversy
was opened by a tract, sophistical but acute, written by Mirza Ibrahim;
(Lee, pp. 1-39); the object of which was to show the superiority of the
standing miracle seen in the excellence of the Koran, over the ancient
miracles of Christianity. Martyn replied to this in a series of tracts
(Lee, p. 80 seq.), and was again met by Mohammed Ruza of Hamadan, in a
much more elaborate work, in which, among other arguments, the writer
attempts to show predictions of Mahomet in the Old Testament, and in the
New applying to him the promise of the Paraclete (Lee, pp. 161-450). These
tracts were translated in 1824, with an elaborate preface containing an
account of the preceding controversy of Guadagnoli, by Professor S. Lee of
Cambridge, _Controversial Tracts on Christianity and Mahometanism_, which
is the work so frequently cited above. To complete the history it is
necessary to add, that a discussion was held a few years ago between an
accomplished Mahometan and Mr. French, a learned missionary at Agra.
The literary aspect of the subject, not however wholly free from
controversy, was opened by White, in the _Bampton Lectures_ for 1784; and
abundant sources have lately been furnished. Among them are, Sprenger’s
_Life of Mahomet_, 1851, and Muir’s, 1858. Also a new translation of the
Koran by the Rev. J. M. Rodwell, where the Suras are arranged
chronologically. The following ought also to be added, Dr. Macbride’s
_Mahometan Religion Explained_, 1857; Arnold on Mahometanism, 1859;
Tholuck’s _Vermischte Schriften_, i. (1-27); _Die Wunder Mohammed’s und
der Character des Religionstifters_; Dr. Stanley’s _Lectures on the
History of the Eastern Church_, lect. viii. and the references there
given; Maurice’s _Religions of the World_; and Renan’s _Etudes d’Histoire
Religieuse_. (Ess. iv.) The modern study has been directed more especially
to attain a greater knowledge of Mahomet’s life, character, and writings;
the antecedent religious condition of Arabia;(1059) and the
characteristics of Mahometanism, when put into comparison with other
creeds, and when viewed psychologically in relation to the human mind.
The materials also for a study of the Mahometan form of philosophy, both
in itself and in its relation to the religion, have been furnished by Aug.
Schmoelders, _Essai sur les Ecoles Philosophiques chez les Arabes_, 1842.
See also Ritter’s _Chr. Phil._ iii. 665 seq.; iv. 1-181.
Note 6. p. 12. Unitarianism.
It may be useful to indicate the chief stages of the history of
Unitarianism, and the sources of information with regard to it, as it
bears a close analogy to some forms of free thought, such as deism,(1060)
and connects itself more or less nearly with forms of rationalism which
occur in the course of the history.
The first instance of it is in the early ages, either as a Jewish Gnostic
sect, Ebionitism, or in some of the other forms of Gnosticism; passing in
the east into Arianism, which lowered God, and in the west into
Pelagianism, which elevated man. For this period see F. Lange, _Geschichte
und Lehrbegriff d. Unitarier vor d. Nicaenischen Synode_, 1831;
Hagenbach’s _Dogmengeschichte_, § 23; and the church histories which treat
of this period.
In the middle ages the tendency may be considered to be mainly represented
by Mahometanism, and hardly exists at all in the Christian church.
Its modern form arises at the time of the Reformation.
1. Originating in Italy, it exists as a doctrine in Switzerland and
Germany from 1525-1560. See F. Trechsel’s _Die Protest. Antitrinitarier
vor Faustus Socinus_, 1844. The best known names are Servetus, Lelio
Sozini, and Ochino.
2. It exists as a church at Racow in Poland, where the exiles found a
refuge. Here Faustus Sozinus (1539-1603), nephew of Lelio, and J.
Crellius, are the best known names. In 1609 Schmelz drew up the Socinian
Formula, the Racovian Catechism. It was also here that the collection of
Socinian writers, the _Bibliotheca Fratrum Polonorum_, 1626, was
published. The history of the sect up to this point may be found in the
Introduction to _Rees’s Translation of the Racovian Catechism_, 1818. Also
see Hallam’s _History of Literature_, i. 554. ii. 335; Mosheim’s _Church
History_, sixteenth century, §2. P. ii. ch. iv; Hase’s _Church History_
(Engl. Transl.), § 371, 2. The Socinians were driven out of Poland in
1658, by the influence of the Jesuits; and, passing into Holland, became
absorbed in the church of the Remonstrants or Arminians.
3. The next stage of Socinianism is, as a doctrine, in England in the
seventeenth century. In 1611 two persons, Hammont and Lewis, suffered
martyrdom for it; and it spread widely during the Long Parliament. (See
Dr. Owen’s _Vind. Evangel._ pref.) The chief teacher was J. Biddle
(1615-1662). The interest of it arises from its supposed parallelism to
the Arminianism of Hales in the time of Charles I, and to the
latitudinarian party of Whichcote and More in that of Charles II. But the
parallel is not quite correct. The study of Arminius’s writings (see J.
Nicholls’s translation, 1825,) shows that he was not a Pelagian,(1061) if
even his successors were. But even Episcopius and Limborch hardly reached
this point. Hales resembled Episcopius. Nor is the parallel much nearer
with “the latitude men;” for Socinianism lacked their Platonizing
tendency. The Arian tendency, which commenced at the end of the century,
both in the church, in such writers as Whiston and Clarke, and among the
presbyterians, offers a nearer parallel, in being, like Socinianism,
Unitarian in tendency. On this period see Hagenbach’s _Dogmengesch_.
(Notes to § 234.)
4. Its next form, was as a set of congregations in England in the
eighteenth century, chiefly arising out of the presbyterians; marked by
great names, such as Lardner, Lowman, Priestley.(1062) Shortly before the
close of the century, it was introduced into America.
5. Its last form is a modification of the old Socinian view, formed under
the pressure of evangelical religion on the one side and rationalist
criticism on the other. The accomplished writers, Channing in America and
Mr. J. Martineau in England, are the best types of this form. Priestley,
Channing, and Martineau, are the examples of the successive phases of
modern Unitarianism: Priestley, of the old Socinianism building itself
upon a sensational philosophy; Channing, of the attempt to gain a larger
development of the spiritual element; Martineau, of the elevation of view
induced by the philosophy of Cousin, and the introduction of the idea of
historical progress in religious ideas. In reference to this part of the
history see E. Renan’s Essay on Channing, _Etudes de l’Hist. Relig._ p.
357; E. Ellis’s _Half Century of Unitarian Controversy_ (in America),
1858; J. J. Taylor’s _Retrospect of Religious Life in England_, 1845; Dr.
Beard’s _Unitarianism in its Actual State_; and other references given in
the notes to H. B. Smith’s translation of Hagenbach’s _Dogmengesch_. New
York, 1862. ii. p. 441.
In addition to the above references, materials for the history will be
found in Sandius, _Biblioth. Antitrin._ 1684; Bock’s _Hist. Antitrin._
1774; Otto Foch’s _Der Socinianismus_, &c. 1847; and an article in the
_North British Review_, No. 60, for May 1859. The history of the
controversial literature on the subject is given in Pfaff’s _Introd. in
Hist. Theol. Lit._ vol. ii. p. 320 seq.; and more fully in Walch’s
_Biblioth. Theol. Select._ vol. i. p. 902 seq. For a digest of the
arguments used in the controversy, see Hoornbeek’s _Summa Controv._ 1653,
p. 440; J. Fabricius, _Consid. Var. Controv._ pp. 99-208; and Stapfer’s
_Inst. Theol. Polem._ vol. iii. c. 12.
Note 7. p. 24. Classification Of Metaphysical Inquiries.
(_a_) This first subdivision of Metaphysics into Psychology and Ontology
is very neatly stated by Professor Mansel (art. _Metaphysics in Encycl.
Britann._ 8th ed. p. 555, and p. 23 in the reprint of the article, 1860);
Cfr. also Archer Butler’s _Lect. on Phil._ vol. i. lect. i-iii.
(_b_) It must be understood, that when we pass here from a division of the
inquiries concerning the mind to a supposed division of the mind itself,
we imply only a division of states of consciousness or mental functions,
not an absolute and real division of the mind itself. Distinctness of
structure is only the inference; distinctness of function is a fact, given
in the act of consciousness.
(_c_) The distinctness of the Will, as a faculty, from the emotions will
be disputed by many. It is maintained by Maine de Biran, and the Eclectic
school of France. Mr. Mill, _Logic_, vol. ii. b. vi. ch. ii, implies the
contrary, and regards Will to be a particular state of feeling.
(_d_) The difference of the presentative from the representative
consciousness is now generally understood, since the arguments of Sir W.
Hamilton have been commonly known. See his edition of Reid, note B. p.
804; _Discussions_, Ess. ii. and _Lect. on Metaphysics_; Mansel’s work
above cited, p. 560, 584; Morell’s _Phil. of Relig._ ch. ii.
(_e_) The separation of Intuition from Perception is a point much
disputed. It is maintained by Schelling and by Cousin, and made familiar
by Coleridge, _Aids to Reflection_, i. p. 168 seq. See also Morell’s
_Philos. of Relig._ ch. ii; _Hist. of Phil._ ii. p. 487 seq. Among English
psychologists however, intuition is identified with perception; or if
slightly distinguished, as by Mr. Mansel, it is made synonymous with every
“presentative” act of consciousness, and thus includes the consciousness
of our own minds, as well as the sensational consciousness usually denoted
by the word “perception.” With reference to the view intended on this
subject in these lectures, see a note on p. 28.
(_f_) With reference to these schools, see Morell’s _Hist. of Philosophy_
(vol. i. Introduction); and Cousin’s _Cours de la Philosophie_ du 18me
Siècle.
(_g_) This subdivision of the subject matter of Ontology is well stated by
Mansel in the _Encyc. Britann._ above cited, 603, 613 seq. This work of
Mr. Mansel is on the whole the clearest exposition of Psychology, studied
from the side of consciousness, which has appeared. Mr. Morell’s recent
work on Psychology presents a view different from his former ones, and
unites the physiological treatment of the inquiry; being borrowed partly
from the recent speculations which the teaching of Herbert has induced in
Germany. See Note 41.
Note 8. p. 28. Quotation From Guizot On Prayer.
The following eloquent remarks seem worth quoting, as illustrative of the
instinct in the soul of man to perform the act of prayer; the natural
outgoing of the human soul after the infinite Being. They are taken from
Guizot, _L’Eglise et la Société Chrétienne_, 1861.
“Seul entre tous les étres ici-bas l’homme prie. Parmi ses instincts
moraux, il n’y en a point de plus naturel, de plus universel, de plus
invincible que la prière. L’enfant s’y porte avec une docilité empressée.
Le vieillard s’y replie comme dans un refuge contre la décadence et
l’isolement. La prière monte d’elle-même sur les jeunes lèvres qui
balbutient à peine le nom de Dieu et sur les lèvres mourantes qui n’ont
plus la force de le prononcer. Chez tous les peuples, célèbres ou obscurs,
civilisés ou barbares, on rencontre à chaque pas des actes et des formules
d’invocation. Partout où vivent des hommes, dans certaines circonstances,
à certaines heures, sous l’empire de certaines impressions de l’âme, les
yeux s’élèvent, les mains se joignent, les genoux fléchissent, pour
implorer ou pour rendre grâces, pour adorer ou pour apaiser. Avec
transport ou avec tremblement, publiquement ou dans le secret de son cœur,
c’est à la prière que l’homme s’adresse, en dernier recours, pour combler
les vides de son âme ou porter les fardeaux de sa destinée; c’est dans la
prière qu’il cherche, quand tout lui manque, de l’appui pour sa faiblesse,
de la consolation dans ses douleurs, de l’espérance pour sa vertu.” (p.
22.)
“Il y a, dans l’acte naturel et universel de la prière, une foi naturelle
et universelle dans cette action permanente, et toujours libre, de Dieu
sur l’homme et sur sa destinée.” (p. 24.)
“ ‘Les voies de Dieu ne sont pas nos voies:’ nous y marchons sans les
connaître; croire sans voir et prier sans prévoir, c’est la condition que
Dieu a faite à l’homme en ce monde, pour tout ce qui en dépasse les
limites.” (p. 25.)
Note 9. p. 31. On The Modern View Of The Historical Method In Philosophy.
It has been implied in the text, at this place, and also in the preface,
that the “historic method of study” is the great feature of this century.
The term is ambiguous. The meaning of it however is, that each problem
ought to be approached from the historic side. Whether the problem be a
fact of society, or of thought, or of morals, in each case the questions
are asked—What are its antecedents? how did it happen? How came it that
men accepted it?—This is a method exactly the reverse of that which was
common in the last century. The question then was, Is a thing true? The
question now is a preliminary one, How came it that it was thought to be
true? It is probable that in many minds there is a slight tendency to
pantheism in this method of study. The universe is looked at as ever in
course of development; evil as “good in the making;” no fact as wholly
bad; no thought as wholly false. But, without involving such a tendency,
whatever is true in the method may be appropriated. It starts only with
the assumption that the human race is in a state of movement; and that
Providence has lessons to teach us if we watch this movement. It is the
method of learning by experience of the past, a lesson for conduct in the
future.
The method thus explained, however, is used for two different purposes.
Either it is intended to be the preliminary process preparatory to
discovery, or it is designed to take the place of discovery. In the former
case, we ask why men have thought a thing true, for the purpose of
afterwards discovering, by the use of other methods, what is true; in the
latter we rest content with the historical investigation, and consider the
attempt to discover absolute truth to be impossible; and regard the
problem of philosophy to be, to gather up the elements of truth in the
past. In the former case truth is absolute, though particular ages may
have blindly groped after it; in the latter it is relative. In the former,
the history of philosophy is the preliminary to philosophy; in the latter
it is philosophy. In the former, philosophy is a science; in the latter it
is a form of criticism. The former view is held by the school of Schelling
and Cousin; the latter is an offshoot of that of Hegel. The former marked
French literature until recent years; the latter is expressed in it at the
present time; and is stated by no one so clearly as by Renan and Soberer.
Most English writers will justly prefer the former view; but the
explanation of the latter, given in the two passages which follow, is
expressed with such clearness, and will be of so much use in explaining
subsequent allusions in these lectures (especially Lect. VII. and VIII.),
that it is desirable to print it here.