liberty of conscience, was alien to the views of the whole ancient world.
Indeed it is of quite modern introduction. It was not known even in
Christendom, not even in the protestant part of it, till the seventeenth
century. It was Milton who first enunciated the principle in its breadth.
The idea of individualism, though long in spreading, was created in germ
by two causes; viz.. the free spirit of independence introduced by the
Teutonic system; and the idea of the sacredness of the individual soul
introduced through Christianity. If the highest end of man be to live for
eternity, not to live for society, the individual is invested with a new
dignity; and we feel the impropriety of trespassing upon the sphere for
which each man is personally responsible. In the ancient world however,
where this idea was unknown, all the elements of life, religion, and
morals, were made subordinate to the political. The state was supreme.
Looked at accordingly from the ancient point of view, a defection from the
religion of the state could not appear otherwise than as a crime against
the state. The Romans did certainly exercise religious toleration to the
religions of nations which they conquered; and in this way the religion of
the Jews was a tolerated creed, a _religio licita_; but it was such for
the Jews alone; and deviation from the state religion was, as we know from
the great lawyers, unlawful. Though doubtless from the abundance of
foreigners who crowded to Rome, many foreign religious practices became
common, yet a special decree of the senate was necessary before any Roman
citizen could be allowed to join in the observance of any such foreign
rites. When we consider the free use made by the Christians, for the
purposes of worship and burial, of the catacombs, by which the plain in
the neighbourhood of Rome is honeycombed, we may conjecture that the
vigilance of the imperial police cannot have been strictly exercised; yet
occasionally severe laws were passed to repress the evil of the
introduction of foreign sacred rites. We may thus accordingly understand
the causes of the persecution of Christians, as we before understood the
grounds of the prejudice against them.
Note 16. p. 61. Modern Criticism On The Book Of Daniel.
Some account of the modern criticism on the book of Daniel has been
introduced into the text of Lect. II. (see pp. 60, 61,) and the chief
recent writers on it have been enumerated (p. 60, note). Also the
refutation of one argument used against the authenticity of the book, viz.
that drawn from the occurrence of Greek words in it, was given in a note
on p. 60.
The other arguments which have been advanced against it, in addition to
those there named, are, (1) that the angelology and ascetic doctrines are
too recent to be of the time of Daniel; (2) that the miracles are of a
“grotesque” character, like those which belong to the apocryphal books;
(3) that the measure of the golden statue of Dura, sixty cubits by six, is
irreconcileable with any theory of proportion suited to the human figure,
and still more so with the canon of Assyrian art, as seen in their
sculpture, and can apply only to an obelisk; (4) that Daniel has made
honourable mention of himself; (5) that the position of the book in the
third part of the Jewish canon, the Cethubim or Hagiographa, shows that it
was written later than the captivity.
The replies made to these objections are as follows: In reference to No.
(1), it is denied that the angelology and asceticism necessarily prove a
late period, by referring to traces of them in earlier Hebrew literature:
No. (2) that the difficulty which has reference to the character of the
miracles is only one of degree; and that the greatness of a miracle is no
absolute ground for disbelief if miracles be once admitted: (3) the
inferences about the statue are conceded, but reconciled with the text. As
the word עלם (iii. 1) does not necessarily mean a statue (see Buxtorf’s
_Lexicon, sub voc._), it is possible to conceive it to apply to an
obelisk, the existence of which in Assyria is confirmed by recent
excavations. (4) Daniel’s honourable mention of himself is not improper
when taken in its connexion. (5) The argument which relates to the third
division of the canon is a difficulty common to several other books, and
depends on the theory that the principle of arrangement of the three parts
of the canon was founded on the date of composition, and not on the
subject matter, which is disputed.
In reference to the definite character of the predictions in the book of
Daniel, the difficulty stated in the text (p. 61), reply is easy. If the
miraculous character of prophecy be admitted, the definite character,
though a peculiarity, cannot be a difficulty. The definiteness too in this
instance does not differ in kind, hardly even in degree, from the case of
other prophecies, but must be admitted to be paralleled elsewhere, if the
objector does not assail those equally by the same process. The pretence
that the definite character ends at the reign of Antiochus is shown to be
incorrect, by proving (1) that the prophecy about the Messiah (ix. 24-26)
cannot refer to the Maccabean deliverers; and (2) that the fourth empire
predicted is the Roman, which thus would be equally future even to a
writer of the Maccabean era.
The further argument used in defence of the book, that the New Testament
authenticates the authorship of Daniel, is necessarily only of value to
those who admit, first, the authority of the New Testament, and who,
secondly, allow that the New Testament writers never accommodate
themselves on questions of criticism to the mental state of their hearers.
The opponents of this view on the contrary assert, that the quotations in
the New Testament only affirm the predicate, not the subject; the truth of
the theological sentiment quoted, not the literary question of the
authorship of the book from which it is quoted.
An instructive paper on the book of Daniel by Mr. Westcott appeared in
Smith’s _Biblical Dictionary_, from which a few of the references to
authors on Daniel (p. 60, note) were taken; and another in Kitto’s
_Biblical Encyclopædia_ by the lamented Hävernick.
Note 17. p. 64. The Reply Of Eusebius To Hierocles.
In his book against Hierocles, Eusebius states (b. i.), that he refutes
only that portion of the work which related to Apollonius of Tyana;
referring to Origen’s answer to Celsus for a reply to the remainder of it;
and discusses only the parallel of Apollonius and Jesus Christ. In b. i.
he gives an outline of the argument of his opponent, with quotations, and
states his own opinion about Apollonius; throwing discredit on the
veracity of the sources of the memoirs; and proceeds to criticise the
prodigies attributed to him, arguing that the statements are incredible,
or borrowed, or materially contradictory. Discussing each book in
succession, he replies in b. i. to the statements respecting the early
part of Apollonius’s life; in b. ii. to that which concerned the journey
into India; in b. iii. to that which related to his intercourse with the
Brahmins; in b. iv. to his journey in Greece; in b. v. to his introduction
to Vespasian in Egypt; in b. vi. and vii. to his miracles; and in b. viii.
to his pretence to foreknowledge. He adds remarks on his death, and on the
necessity of faith; and repeats his opinion respecting the character of
Apollonius.
Note 18. p. 67. The Philopatris Of The Pseudo-Lucian.
This dialogue was held to be genuine by Fabricius; but Gesner disproved
it, _De Philopatride Lucianeo Dialogo Dissertatio_, 1730. See also
Neander’s _Church History_, E. T. (Bohn) iii. 127, note.
The work hardly merits an analysis. Critias, looking ill, is met by
Triepho. After a little banter, in which Triepho makes fun of the gods by
whom Critias swears, and of their history (§ 2-18), Critias confesses that
the cause that has made him pale is the hearing bad news at an assembly of
Christians. Having first heard two Christian sermons, the one by a
coughing preacher, who was proclaiming release from debt, the other by a
threadbare mountaineer preaching a golden age, he had afterwards been
persuaded to go to a private Christian meeting; and it was the prediction
which he there heard of woes to the state which had so much frightened
him, § 20-27. Triepho has not patience to hear him narrate the
particulars. Another person enters, and the curtain falls.
The theology of the dialogue is, if viewed on its negative side, the
ridicule of heathen mythology and of Christian doctrines and habits; and
on its positive, the proclamation of one God as the object of worship. The
work exhibits internal evidence of a knowledge of Christian practices, §
20, &c., and Christian doctrines, such as the Trinity, § 12; uses
Christian phraseology, § 18; and calls Christians by the name given by
Julian, Galilæan, § 12.
Note 19. p. 87. The Work Of Julian Against Christianity.
It has been already stated that our knowledge of the contents of Julian’s
lost book is obtained from Cyril’s reply to it; the text of which is
accordingly given in Spanheim’s edition of Julian. It is supposed to have
consisted of seven books; but Cyril replies only to three.
In the brief account given in the text of Lect. II. no attempt was made to
form a hypothetical restoration of Julian’s work from the fragments, such
as that which Pressensé has attempted with regard to Celsus; but only a
few of Julian’s principles were presented concerning the following
subjects: (1) on God; (2) on the Hebrew, and (3) the Christian religion. A
few hints however toward such a scheme, may not be uninteresting. If, as
seems probable, Cyril took the statements of Julian in the order in which
they stood in the now lost work, the plan of Julian’s work may have been
somewhat as follows.
He proposed to institute a comparison between the Hebrew and Christian
religions and literature on the one hand, and the Greek on the other. If
we may judge from the purport of b. i. of Cyril’s work, Julian laid
himself open to an attack by maintaining the superior antiquity of
heathenism, forgetting that the Hebrew system was older than the Greek. At
least Cyril establishes this elaborately, and argues the direct derivation
of many parts of the heathen system from the Jews. The argument on
Julian’s part seems to have been conducted by an examination of successive
points in the Hebrew history and system. In the beginning the Hebrew
cosmogony suggested an argument for the superiority of the Platonic theory
over the Mosaic. (_Cyril._ b. ii.) Next he successively attacked the
account of Paradise as a fable; entering upon both the probability of the
story (_Id._ b. iii.) and the moral features of the Deity brought out in
the narrative. He seems also to have passed from the idea of creation to
that of providence, and to have dwelt on the inferiority of the Hebrew
scheme as a theory of providence, in having an absence of inferior deities
beneath the supreme one; and resists the idea of the obligation of all men
to embrace one creed, inasmuch as they do not possess one character.
(_Id._ b. iv.) Next, turning to the Mosaic moral law, he argued against
its originality, except in relation to the sabbath; and passing through
several of the narratives of Jewish history, he pointed out
characteristics of anger in the Jewish conception of Deity; and compared
by instances the Greek legislators and kings with Jewish. (_Id._ b. v.)
Next he seems to have passed from Judaism to Christianity, and attacked
the miracles, and the Christian morals and practices; challenged the
reasons for prophecy; and rallied the Christians on accepting a religion
derived from so insignificant a nation as the Jews. (_Id._ b. vi.) He
seems next to have returned to the comparison of Greek and Hebrew
warriors, and of Greek and Jewish science, and the educational value of
the two literatures; and reverted to the subject of Christianity, by
representing it as a deviation from the very religion on which it
depended. (_Id._ b. vii.) He continued this argument by the special
example of prophecy, examining several instances wherein he contended that
Christians had abandoned the Jewish sense of them. (_Id._ b. viii.) Next
he seems to have continued a similar argument with regard to the Jewish
typical system, and the utter dissimilarity of the Christian ideas from
its purpose (_Id._ b. ix.); next to have assailed Christianity, by trying
to show that there had been a similar development in Christianity itself,
and a departure from its primitive form analogous to that which
Christianity bore to Judaism, alleging, incorrectly, that St. John was the
first to teach the divinity of Christ; and instanced examples,
objectionable in practice, such as the worship of martyrs’ tombs; and
alleged against Christianity an eclectic spirit which had appropriated
parts of the Jewish system but not the whole. (_Id._ b. x.)
The reader must however be apprised that the above scheme is entirely
hypothetical. The objections of Julian are facts; the _lacunæ_ are filled
up by conjecture.
The general spirit of Cyril’s answer is the _argumentum ad hominem_;
showing that the same faults, even if true, are equally true of the Greek
scheme of religion.
Lecture III.
Note 20. p. 89. On The Legendary Work, Entitled “De Tribus Impostoribus.”
Full particulars concerning the chapter in literary history which relates
to this work, will be found in Prosper Marchand’s _Dictionnaire
Historique_, 1758 (vol. i. pp. 312-319), and more briefly in F. W.
Genthe’s _De Imposturis Religionum breve Compendium_, 1833. Both give
lists of the earlier writers who have treated of the subject; among which
the most useful will be found to be B. G. Struve, _Dissertatio de Doctis
Impostoribus_, 1703 (§ 9-23); De La Monnaie, _Lettre sur le Prétendu
Livre_; and Calmet, _Dictionnaire_, article _Imposteur_.
The rumours concerning the existence of a book with the title “De Tribus
Impostoribus” commence in the thirteenth century. About the sixteenth,
more definite but still unsatisfactory statements appear respecting its
existence. Its authorship has been attributed to above twenty
distinguished persons; such as Frederick II, Boccaccio, Pomponatius,
Bruno, Vanini, &c.; the reasons for which in each case are explained in
Marchand. De La Monnaie however wrote, questioning the existence of the
book. A reply to his letter respecting it was published in French at the
Hague in 1716, which pretended to offer an analysis of the ancient work;
the falsehood of which however is shown by the Spinozist philosophy
contained in it. Genthe in his tract, besides a literary introduction in
German, republishes the French tract just named; and also a second tract
in Latin, equally a fabrication, bearing a slightly different title, _De
Imposturis Religionum_, Lucianlike in its tone, which, by an allusion to
Loyola (§ 20), cannot be older than the sixteenth century, and is probably
of German origin. Both writers conclude that the existence of the book in
the middle ages was legendary. Renan (_Averroes_, pp. 280, and 272-300),
and Laurent (_La Reforme_, pp. 345-8), coincide in this conclusion. The
title was a _mot_, not a fact.
It is hardly necessary to state that the numerous writers who, like
Kortholt, have adopted the title “De Tribus Impostoribus” for their books,
have merely used the name in irony, and do not profess to give transcripts
of the old work.
Lecture IV.
Note 21. p. 118. On Some Technical Terms In The History Of Unbelief.
There are a few terms, which are frequently used in reference to unbelief,
of which it would be interesting to trace the meaning and history. A few
notes in reference to this subject may both prevent ambiguity and throw
some light on a chapter in the history of language. The words alluded to
are the following: 1. INFIDEL; 2. ATHEIST; 3. PANTHEIST; 4. DEIST; 5.
NATURALIST; 6. FREETHINKER; 7. RATIONALIST; 8. SCEPTIC.
1. INFIDEL.—This word began to be restricted as a technical term, about
the time of the Crusades and throughout the middle ages, to denote
Mahometan; as being _par excellence_ the kind of unbelievers with which
Christians were brought into contact. Perhaps the first instance of its
use in the more modern sense, of disbeliever generally, is in the Collect
for Good Friday, “all Jews, Turks, _infidels_, heretics;” which words were
apparently inserted by the Reformers in the first Prayer Book (1547); the
rest of the prayer, except these words, existing in the Latin Collect of
the ancient Service-book from which it is translated. Ordinarily however,
during the sixteenth century, it is found in the popular sense of
_unfaithful_; a meaning which the increasing prevalence of Latin words was
likely to bring into use. In writers of the seventeenth, the use of it in
the sense of _unbeliever_ becomes more common: an instance from Milton is
cited in Richardson’s Dictionary. In the beginning of the eighteenth
century it becomes quite common in theological writers in its modern
sense; and toward the end of the century was frequently appropriated to
express the form of unbelief which existed in France; a use which probably
arose from the circumstance that the French unbelievers did not adopt a
special name for their tenets, as the English did, who had a positive
creed, (Deism,) and not merely, like the French, a disintegration of
belief.
2. ATHEIST.—This word needs little discussion. In modern times it is first
applied by the theological writers of the sixteenth century, to describe
the unbelief of such persons as Pomponatius; and in the seventeenth it is
used, by Bacon (Essay on Atheism), Milton, (Paradise lost, b. vi.), and
Bunyan (Pilgrim), to imply general unbelief, of which the disbelief in a
Deity is the principal sign. Toward the end of the same century it is not
unfrequently found, e.g. in Kortholt’s _De Tribus Impostoribus_, 1680, to
include Deism such as that of Hobbes, as well as blank Pantheism like
Spinoza’s, which more justly deserves the name. The same use is seen in
Colerus’s work against Spinoza, _Arcana Atheismi Revelata_. Tillotson
(serm. i. on Atheism); and Bentley (Boyle Lectures) use the word more
exactly; and the invention of the term Deism induced, in the writers of
the eighteenth century, a more limited and exact use of the former term.
But in Germany, Reimannus (_Historia Univ. Atheismi_, 1725, p. 437 seq.)
and Buddeus (_De Atheismo et Superstitione_, 1723, ch. iii. § 2), use it
most widely, and especially make it include disbelief of immortality. Also
Walch, _Bibliotheca Theol. Selecta_, 1757, uses it to include the
Pantheism of Spinoza, (vol. i. p. 676, &c.) This transference of the term
to embrace all kinds of unbelief has been well compared with the extension
of the term βάρβαρος by the Greeks.(1064) The wide use of the term is
partly to be attributed to the doubt which Christian men had whether any
one could really disbelieve the being of a God,—an opinion increased by
the Cartesian notions then common concerning innate ideas; and whether
accordingly the term Atheist could mean anything different from Deist.
Compare Buddeus’s _Isagoge_, p. 1203, and the chapter “An dentur Athei” in
his work _De Atheismo_. (ch. i.) By the time of Stapfer’s work, _Instit.
Theol. Polem._ 1744, the two terms were distinguished; see vol. ii. ch.
vi. and vii. and cfr. p. 587.
The term was subsequently applied to describe the views of the French
writers, such as D’Holbach, who did not see the necessity for believing in
a personal first Cause. In more modern times it is frequently applied to
such writers as Comte; whose view is indeed atheism, but differs from that
of former times, in that it is the refusal to entertain the question of a
Deity as not being discoverable by the evidence of sense and science,
rather than the absolute denial of his existence. The Comtists also hold
firmly the marks of order, law, mind, in nature, and not the fortuitous
concurrence of atoms, as was the case with the atheists of France.
3. PANTHEIST.—One of the first uses of this word is by Toland in the
_Pantheisticon_, 1720, where however it has its ancient polytheistic
sense. It is a little later that it passes from the idea of the worship of
the whole of the gods to the worship of the entire universe looked at as
God.
This exacter application of it is more modern. It is now used to denote
the disbelief of a personal first Cause: but a distinction ought to be
made between the Pantheism like that of Averroes, which regards the world
as an emanation, and sustained by an _anima mundi_; and that which, like
the view of Spinoza, regards the sum total of all things to be Deity. This
distinction was noticed and illustrated in p. 107. The account of the word
in Krug’s _Philosoph. Lexicon_ is worth consulting.
4. DEIST.—One of the first instances of the use of this word occurs in
Viret, _Epistr. Dedicat. du 2. vol de l’Instruction Chrétienne_, 1563,
quoted by Bayle, _Dictionnaire_, (note under the word Viret.) It is
appropriated in the middle of the seventeenth century by Herbert to his
scheme, and afterwards by Blount (_Oracles of Reason_, p. 99), to
distinguish themselves from Atheists. In strict truth, Herbert calls
himself a _Theist_; which slightly differs from the subsequent term
_Deist_, in so far as it is intended to convey the idea of that which he
thought to be the true worship of God. It is theism as opposed to error,
rather than natural religion as opposed to revealed: whereas deism always
implies a position antagonistic to revealed religion. But the distinction
is soon lost sight of; and Nichols (1696) entitles his work against the
deists, _Conference with a Theist_. Towards the close of the seventeenth
century, and in the beginning of the eighteenth, the Christian writers
sometimes even use Deist as interchangeable with Atheist, as shown above.
It is also used as synonymous with one of the senses of the word
_Naturalist_. See below, under the latter word; and cfr. Stapfer, _Inst.
Polem._ vol. ii. p. 742, with p. 883.
5. NATURALIST.—This word is used in two senses; an objective and a
subjective. Naturalism, in the former, is the belief which identifies God
with nature; in the latter, the belief in the sufficiency of natural as
distinct from revealed religion. The former is Pantheism, the latter
Deism. In the former sense it is applied to Spinoza and others; e.g. in
Walch’s _Biblioth. Theol. Select._ i. 745 seq. In the latter sense it
occurs as early as 1588 in France, in the writings of J. Bodin (_Colloq.
Heptapl._ 31. Rem. 2); and towards the end of the seventeenth century both
in Germany and England, e.g. in Kortholt’s _De Trib. Impost._ 1680; and
the Quaker, Barclay’s _Apologia_, 1679, p. 28. At the end of the
seventeenth century, and in the eighteenth, the name was applied in
England to deists, (e.g. in Nichols’s _Conference with a Theist_, pref. §
15); and in Germany it became a commonly known word, owing to the spread
of the Wolffian philosophy. Stapfer (_Instit. Theol. Polem._ 1744, vol.
ii. p. 881), using Wolffian phraseology, divides this latter kind of
naturalism into two kinds, viz. philosophical and theological. The
philosophical kind maintains the sufficiency of natural religion, and
disbelieves revealed; the theological kind holds the truth of revelation,
but regards it as unnecessary, as being only a republication of natural
religion. The adherent of the former is the “Naturalist” of Kant; the
latter his “pure Rationalist” (_Verg. Religion Innerhalb, &c._); the
former the Deist, the latter the Rationalist, of a school like that of
Wegscheider, &c. (See Lect. VI.)
Cfr. Bretschneider’s _Handbuch der Dogmatik_; i. 72. note. Hahn, _De
Rationalismi Indole_ (quoted by Rose on Rationalism, 2d ed. Introd. p. 20)
names writers who make a third kind of naturalism, viz. Pelagianism; but
this is rare.
6. FREETHINKER.—This term first appears toward the close of the
seventeenth century. It is used of Toland, “a candid Freethinker,” by
Molyneux, in a letter to Locke 1697 (_Locke’s Works_, fol. ed. iii. 624);
and Shaftesbury in 1709 speaks of “our modern free-writers,” _Works_, vol.
i. p. 65. But it was Collins in 1713, in his _Discourse of Freethinking_,
who first appropriated the name to express the independence of inquiry
which was claimed by the deists. The use of the word expressed the spirit
of a nation like the English, in which, subsequently to the change of
dynasty, freedom to think and speak was held to be every man’s charter.
Lechler has remarked the absence of a parallel word in other languages.
The French expression _Esprit fort_, the title of a work of La Bruyère,
does not convey quite the same idea as _Freethinker_. _Esprit_ expresses
the French liveliness, not the reflective self-consciousness of the
English mind of the eighteenth century: the _fort_ is a relic of the pride
of feudalism; whilst the _free_ of the English Freethinker implies the
reaction against it. The English term smacks of democracy; the French
carries with it the notion of aristocracy. (Lechler, _Gesch. des Engl.
Deismus_, p. 458.) There is no word to express the English idea in foreign
languages, except the literal translation of the English term. Even then,
in French the expression _la libre pensée_ has changed its meaning; since
it is now frequently used to describe the struggle, good as well as evil,
of the human mind against authority. It thus loses the unfavourable sense
which originally belonged to the corresponding English expression.