we had invested the town by our operations in October and November
1914, was a source of constant annoyance to the British, whilst
our position on the Belgian coast seemed to our cousins across the
Channel like an apparition whose shadow lay over the British Isles and
especially menaced the traffic-routes between England and France. The
British therefore continually tried their utmost to free themselves
of this menace and their pressure produced counter measures. Thus in
December 1914 heavy fighting again occurred, especially near the sea at
NIEUPORT, and also at BIXSCHOOTE and ZWARTELEEN. On Christmas Eve the
French vainly attacked BIXSCHOOTE: their hope of catching the Germans
dreaming heavily on that evening was of no avail. When spring lifted
the mist that hung over Flanders, a German offensive took place during
April and May that forced the northern part of the YPRES salient back
to within three miles of the town.[117] After this the positions only
altered very slightly. In March 1916 the British blew up our front
trench positions at ST. ELOI by five colossal mines, but were unable
to hold on to the ground thus destroyed. In 1917 the death-agony
of YPRES was renewed, and for months war raged over the plains of
Flanders; the fighting was as furious as in October and November 1914.
The young soldiers of those days have now become veterans, who know
war and do not fear it even in its most terrible forms. The enemy are
those same British against whom Crown Prince Rupert of Bavaria, in
exhorting the troops to battle in 1914, once said: 'Therefore when you
are fighting this particular enemy retaliate for his deceit and for
having occasioned all this great sacrifice; show him that the Germans
are not so easy to wipe out of the world's history as he imagines, show
it by redoubling the strength behind your blows. In front of you is the
opponent who is the greatest obstacle to peace. On! at him!'
He spoke as a prophet. Hate of the British who were so jealous of us,
who brought on the war for the sake of their money-bags and spread the
conflagration all over the world, who at first hoped that it would be
but necessary to pour out their silver bullets to annihilate Germany:
all this steeled the hearts of our warriors in Flanders, whose creed
was the justice of the German cause. And the British efforts to wrest
Flanders away from us again were stifled in mud and in blood. The
fighting in 1917 was perhaps more severe than that of those stormy
autumn days of 1914, but the objective for us was ever the same: to
keep the enemy far, far from our homes. In this we succeeded in 1917 as
in 1914.
Flanders! The word is heard by every one in the German Fatherland
with a silent shudder, but also with just and intense pride. It was
there that the British were made to realise that German heroism was
not to be vanquished, not even by the use of the war material which
the whole world had been manufacturing for years. When we read that up
to the 14th November 1914, 40 divisions had been put into the battle
round YPRES by the Western Allies, whilst only 25 German divisions
were opposed to them,[118] and that in the course of the Flanders
battle of 1917, 99 British and French divisions struggled in vain
against a greatly inferior German force, it says much for our troops.
But far from all. For the enemy's superiority in material, in guns,
trench-mortars, machine-guns, aeroplanes, etc., was two, three, and
even fourfold. Who can doubt but that a nation whose sons know how to
fight like this, must win? Let us only hold the hope that the seeds of
blood sown in Flanders will bring forth rich and splendid fruit for the
German Fatherland. This indeed would be the highest reward that could
be bestowed on those of us who fought there.
APPENDIX
ORDER OF BATTLE OF THE FOURTH ARMY
from 10th Oct. 1914 to 16th Nov. 1914.
_Commander_ General Duke Albert of Würtemburg.
_Chief of Staff_ Major-General Ilse.
III Reserve Corps (General of Infantry von Beseler).
5th Reserve Division.
6th Reserve Division.
4th _Ersatz_ Division.
XXII Reserve Corps (General of Cavalry von Falkenhayn).
43rd Reserve Division.
44th Reserve Division.
XXIII Reserve Corps (General of Cavalry von Kleist).
45th Reserve Division.
46th Reserve Division.
XXVI Reserve Corps (General of Infantry von Hügel).
51st Reserve Division.
52nd Reserve Division.
XXVII Reserve Corps. (Lieut.-General von Carlowitz,
relieved on 27th Oct. by
General of Artillery von Schubert).
53rd (Saxon) Reserve Division.
54th (Würtemburg) Reserve Division.
The following units were also attached at various times:--
9th Reserve Division.
6th Bavarian Reserve Division.
Marine Division.
38th _Landwehr_ Brigade.
37th _Landwehr_ Brigade.
2nd _Ersatz_ Brigade.
Guard Cavalry Division.
ORDER OF BATTLE OF THE ARMY GROUP FABECK
from 27th Oct. 1914 to 20th Nov. 1914.
_Commander_ General of Infantry von Fabeck, Commanding
XIII (Würtemburg) Corps.
_Chief of Staff_ Lieut.-Colonel von Lossberg.
XV Corps (General von Deimling).
30th Infantry Division.
39th Infantry Division.
(This Corps left the Army Group Fabeck on the 8th Nov. 1914.)
II Bavarian Corps (General of Infantry von Martini,
relieved on the 5th Nov. 1914
by General of Cavalry von Stetten).
3rd Bavarian Infantry Division.
4th Bavarian Infantry Division.
26th (Würtemburg) (Lieut.-General William, Duke of Urach).
Infantry Division
Group GEROK was also temporarily in the Army Group FABECK.
ORDER OF BATTLE OF THE GROUP GEROK
_Commander_ General of Infantry von Gerok,
Commanding Reserve Corps.
1st Cavalry Corps (Lieut.-General von Richthofen).
2 Cavalry Divisions.[119]
2nd Cavalry Corps (General of Cavalry von der Marwitz).
2 Cavalry Divisions.[120]
6th Bavarian Reserve Division.
3rd Infantry Division.
25th Reserve Division.
11th _Landwehr_ Brigade.
2nd Cavalry Division.
Bavarian Cavalry Division.
ORDER OF BATTLE OF THE ARMY GROUP LINSINGEN
from 8th Nov. 1914 to 18th Nov. 1914.
_Commander_ General of Infantry von Linsingen,
Commanding II Corps.
_Chief of Staff_ Colonel von Hammerstein-Gesmold.
XV Corps (General of Infantry von Deimling).
30th Infantry Division.
39th Infantry Division.
also from 16th Nov., Hofmann's Composite Division.
Plettenberg's Corps (General of Infantry von Plettenberg,
Commanding Guard Corps).
4th Infantry Division.
Winckler's Composite Guard Division.
FOOTNOTES:
[1] _See p. 115._
[2] _Fourth Army Cavalry._
_I._ _Cavalry Corps_ _Guard and 4th Cavalry Divisions, p. 64._
_II._ " _3rd and 7th Cavalry Divisions, p. 90._
_IV._ " _3 Cavalry Divisions, p. 25._
_2nd Cavalry Division, p. 92._
_Bavarian Cavalry Division, p. 92._
_Total, 9 Cavalry Divisions._
_The Army Cavalry of the Sixth Army is stated on p. 56 to have been
eight divisions, among which, according to p. 57, were the 3rd, 7th and
Bavarian Cavalry Divisions, included above in the Army Cavalry of the
Fourth Army._
_It may be noted that in 'Liège-Namur' in the same series of General
Staff Monographs the composition of the II Cavalry Corps is given as
the 2nd, 4th and 9th Cavalry Divisions._
[3] _There is a further mistake (see footnote 110): the King's were not
present at the place referred to, but in another part of the field. The
honour of fighting the German Guards at one to eight, for the battalion
was under four hundred strong, appears to belong to the 2nd Oxfordshire
and Buckinghamshire Light Infantry._
[4] _The British advance was checked on the Aisne on 14th not 13th
September._
[5] The Seventh Army was not put in on the extreme right wing but
between the First and Third Armies after the heavy French attacks south
of Laon in the middle of September.
[6] _'2000 British' belonged to the newly raised Royal Naval Division
which had been thrown into Antwerp in the endeavour to prolong the
resistance of that fortress._
[7] The XXIV Reserve Corps was sent to the neighbourhood of Metz.
[8] _Only the British III Corps and Cavalry Corps of two Divisions were
available to oppose them._
[9] _These 'considerable hostile forces' consisted of the 7th Division
and Byng's Cavalry Division, which reached Ypres on 14th October, after
having moved up to Ghent to help cover the retreat of the Belgian army
from Antwerp._
[10] _Needless to point out that General Joffre was never 'Allied
Commander.'_
[11] _At this date Calais had not yet become a base for the British
army, and there were no British establishments of any kind there._
[12] _The II Corps completed its detrainment at Abbeville on 8th
October, and moved forward, covered by the cavalry, on the 11th; by the
18th it had reached the line Givenchy-Villaines-Lorgies-Herlies after
considerable fighting._
[13] _On 18th October the III Corps had its left Division, the
4th, astride the Lys from Ploegsteert Wood to Frelinghien,
while the 6th Division on the right had reached the line
Premesques-Ennettières-Radinghem (S.E. of Armentières). General
Conneau's French Cavalry Corps filled the gap between its right and the
left of the II Corps._
[14] _The British Cavalry Corps (there was only one, the number is
superfluous and suggests there were more) did not extend as far as
Gheluvelt: its left was on the Ypres-Comines canal near Houthem._
[15] _The I Corps did not reach Bixschoote on 18th October: its leading
Division, the 2nd, did not reach the area Poperinghe-Boeschepe till
19th October: the 1st Division was still detraining in the Hazebrouck
area on 18th October._
[16] _'Armée' in the original, but this is no doubt a misprint._
[17] _This statement as to Sir J. French's intentions is inaccurate.
The II and III Corps were ordered to stand on the defensive, but the
orders issued to the I Corps on 20th October were for an attack._
[18] _Between Armentières and the sea the British had only the I
Corps, less than half the III Corps, the Cavalry Corps, the IV Corps
(composed of one Division only), the French had a weak Cavalry Corps
and two Territorial Divisions, the six Belgian Divisions were reduced
to about one half of their establishment, so that the claim that the
Allied forces outnumbered the Germans is hardly tenable. The value of
the statement that 'the relative strength of the opposing forces never
appreciably altered in our favour' will become apparent as the book is
read, and as it is shown that the same British units, reinforced only
by a weak composite Division drawn from the II Corps, were attacked by
a succession of fresh German Corps, that the same units who repulsed
the attacks at Langemarck on 23rd October, were in line at Gheluvelt
on 31st October when the Prussian Guard attacked on 11th November. See
also Introduction._
[19] _'The heights of St. Eloi' is a phrase which suggests that the
author cannot have visited the ground nor studied a contoured map of
the area round Ypres._
[20] _The British and French in Belgium were hardly in their own
country._
[21] _British torpedo boats do not carry 'heavy artillery.'_
[22] _The vessels described as flat-bottomed boats were presumably the
Monitors 'Severn,' 'Humber,' and 'Mersey.'_
[23] _This narrative omits the advance of the 7th Division on Menin,
19th October, which was going well when it had to be suspended on
account of the threatening advance of strong German columns from the
eastward. The division was skilfully extricated and fell back to the
line Kruseik-Noordwesthoek-Broodseinde-Zonnebeke, the Germans failing
to press their pursuit._
[24] _The constant exaggeration by this narrative of the strength of
very hastily constructed British trenches is a noteworthy feature._
[25] _There were no British heavy batteries in this quarter, unless it
is to the guns of Rear-Admiral Hood's squadron that reference is made._
[26] _There was no British artillery present in this quarter._
[27] See pages 23-24.
[28] See _Les pages de gloire de l'Armée Belge: à Dixmuide_.
[29] _The narrative omits to state precisely the nature of the
opposition which was encountered in the Houthulst area. Actually the
Allied force in this quarter merely consisted of General de Mitry's
French Cavalry Corps and a few battalions of French Cyclists and
Territorials. These were driven back without being able to offer much
resistance, and in consequence uncovered the flank of the I British
Corps just as it began its advance north-east of Ypres on Poelcapelle
and Passchendaele (21st October). This forced Sir Douglas Haig to
divert his reserves to protect his left flank, and therefore to suspend
his attack which had been making good progress on a line south-east
from Langemarck to Zonnebeke, where he linked up with the left of the
7th Division._
[30] _By no means the whole of the 1st British Division was holding
the line of the Kortebeck. From Steenstraate, which was held by the
1st Scots Guards, who were never seriously pressed on 22nd October,
the 1st Cameron Highlanders were extended over a wide front nearly to
Langemarck, where the 1st Coldstream Guards connected them up with the
3rd Infantry Brigade (1st Queen's, 1st S.W.B., 1st Gloucesters, and 2nd
Welsh) which was holding a position north and north-east of Langemarck.
The rest of the infantry of the 1st Division was in reserve, and only
one 18-pounder battery (46th Batty. R.F.A.) was available to support
the Camerons. On the rigid of the 3rd Infantry Brigade the 2nd Division
carried on the line south-east to Zonnebeke with the 5th Infantry
Brigade on its left and the 4th (Guards) Brigade on its right. This
division was about on the line of the Zonnebeke-Langemarck road: it
repulsed several counter-attacks on the afternoon of 21st October and
night 21st-22nd._
[31] _The British troops had not detrained at Poperinghe, but in the
Hazebrouck area._
[32] _This account is altogether at variance with the facts. On
the afternoon of 22nd October the Germans at length succeeded in
breaking through the thin and widely extended line of the 1st Cameron
Highlanders, and pushed them back south of the Langemarck-Bixschoote
road, capturing the Kortekeer Cabaret. They failed to press forward;
however reinforcements, the 1st Northamptonshires and 1st Black Watch,
arrived, and counter-attacks were made which checked all further German
advance. Next morning (23rd October) further reinforcements came up,
the 1st Loyal North Lancashires and 2nd K.R.R.C. of the 2nd Infantry
Brigade, part of the 2nd South Staffordshires from the 6th Infantry
Brigade. Finally, on the arrival of 1st Queen's of the 3rd Infantry
Brigade, a most successful counter-attack was launched, the Queen's
retook the Kortekeer Cabaret, and the Germans were driven right back,
nearly 500 being taken and very heavy losses inflicted on them. The old
trenches 800 yards north of the road were actually recovered, but late
in the evening a fresh German attack recovered the advanced position
reached by our counter-attack, and a new line was taken up about the
line of the Langemarck-Bixschoote road. Meanwhile during this action,
in which less than two British infantry brigades had defeated the 46th
Reserve Division, the rest of the 1st Division at Langemarck had been
heavily attacked, apparently (cf. p. 40) by the 51st Reserve Division,
which had been completely worsted. In this part of the action very
notable service was done by two platoons of the Gloucesters just north
of Langemarck, who expended an average of 400 rounds a man, and though
attacked in front and flank by very superior numbers, maintained their
position intact. The British accounts testify to the gallantry with
which the German attacks were pressed, officers carrying regimental
colours ran on ahead of the men and planted the colours in the ground
to give their men a point to make for, a mounted officer rode forward,
exposing himself recklessly, to encourage his soldiers, but the
musketry of the British infantry was too much for the Germans, and the
attack was completely repulsed._
[33] _Throughout this narrative it is astonishing to read of the
repeated reinforcements which Sir John French received. Actually,
except for a few drafts, no reinforcements joined the British in the
Ypres salient before the end of October: subsequently two Territorial
battalions, the Hertfordshires and the London Scottish, two Yeomanry
regiments, the North Somersets and the Leicestershires, and the 3rd
Dragoon Guards, the belated last unit of the 3rd Cavalry Division, were
added to the force, while the exhausted infantry of the 7th Division
were replaced by three composite brigades from the II Corps, set free
after three weeks of strenuous fighting near La Bassée by the arrival
of the Meerut Division, and greatly below strength._
[34] _The British counter-attack at the Kortekeer Cabaret did not aim
at doing more than recover the ground lost on 22nd October: it was not
an attempt at break-through, and was quite successful in its immediate
object._
[35] _On 20th October the 7th Division held the line from Zandvoorde
to Kruiseik, thence to Broodseinde cross-roads east of Zonnebeke, the
line being continued by the 3rd Cavalry Division to Passchendaele. The
German 52nd Reserve Division and the XXVII Reserve Corps were thus
faced by less than half their numbers. Nevertheless the only effect
of their attack was that after the 51st Reserve Division had driven
the French out of Westroosebeke, the British Cavalry found its flank
exposed and had to retire on St. Julien, the 7th Division throwing
back its left flank to conform. There was no fighting for Keiberg, and
the expulsion of the 7th Division from Becelaere (mentioned nine lines
below) after heavy street fighting, seems to be based on the slender
foundation that a British reconnaissance was made in the direction
of Gheluwe covered by two battalions nearer Terhand, which fell back
without being seriously pressed. The Germans advancing in the evening
from Becelaere were sharply repulsed by the centre infantry brigade of
the 7th Division east of Polygon Wood. The events of 21st-22nd October
on the front from Langemarck to Kruiseik are somewhat slurred over
in this narrative. Briefly, on 21st October the Germans pressed all
along the line of the 7th Division without success except on the left,
where by enfilade fire from Passchendaele they forced the left of the
22nd Infantry Brigade to fall back to the south-west of Zonnebeke.
Meanwhile the advance of the I Corps relieved the pressure, and though,
as already explained (see footnote 29), the uncovering of the left
of the I Corps prevented the advance being pressed beyond the line
Zonnebeke-Langemarck, this line was made good and the German efforts
to advance successfully repulsed. On 22nd October the Germans attacked
the line of the 2nd Division north-west of Zonnebeke, but were easily
repulsed, while further to their left they renewed their attacks on the
21st Infantry Brigade east of Polygon Wood with equal ill-success._
[36] _The IX French Corps was not yet up at the front. It did not begin
relieving the 2nd Division till the afternoon of 23rd October._
[37] _The 'well-planned maze of trenches behind broad wire
entanglements' would have been most welcome to the British.
Unfortunately there had been no time or opportunity to do more than
dig in hastily where the advance of the I Corps had been checked,
while such trenches as the 7th Division had dug at Zonnebeke were
hastily prepared in such loose and sandy soil that they collapsed when
bombarded; wire was conspicuous by its absence._
[38] _The only thing in the nature of a 'fortress' at Langemarck was
a small redoubt, built by the 26th Field Company R.E. on the night of
22nd-23rd October, and held by two platoons of the Gloucesters._
[39] _This is hardly a recognisable account of what took place. The
relief of the 1st Division by a French Territorial division did not
take place till the night 24th-25th, but the 2nd Division was relieved
by a division of the French IX Corps, and by the morning of 24th
October it was concentrated at St. Jean in reserve. In the course of
the morning of 24th October the Reserve Division attacked the line of
the 21st Infantry Brigade in overwhelming strength, and broke through
north of Reutel, penetrating into Polygon Wood. It was cleared out by a
counter-attack by the 5th Infantry Brigade, 2nd Division, and the 2nd
R. Warwicks of the 7th Division, and in the afternoon an advance was
made north of Polygon Wood by the 6th Infantry Brigade in co-operation
with the French IX Corps on the left. Fair progress was made, the 6th
Infantry Brigade crossing to the east of the Werwicq-Staden road.
Further south the 7th Division held its own successfully and all
attacks were repulsed._
[40] _It has already been pointed out that the Belgian divisions were
much below establishment._
[41] See _Les pages de gloire de l'Armée Belge: à Dixmuide_.
[42] _This testimony to the effective character of the help given by
Admiral Hood's squadron is noteworthy, and contradicts what was said in
the narrative on page 22._
[43] _The hamlet of Reutel had fallen into German hands on 24th October
(footnote 39), but the counter-attacks of the 2nd Division had
re-established the line on the eastern border of Polygon Wood, and
between 24th October and the morning of 29th October what changes there
were on the eastern face of the Ypres salient had been in favour of
the British. The 6th Infantry Brigade made considerable progress east
of the Werwicq-Staden road in co-operation with the French IX Corps
which pushed east and north-east from Zonnebeke. By the showing of this
narrative the German forces in this area were decidedly superior in
numbers to those engaged in the attacks._
[44] _The above account presumably refers to the attack of the 18th
French Division and 2nd British Division on 25th October, when a
German battery was captured by the 1st Royal Berkshires and the French
unit with which they were co-operating. Further to the British right,
however, less progress was made, but the implication that the British
reached Becelaere and were then thrust back by the 54th Reserve
Division at the point of the bayonet is unfounded; the force engaged on
this quarter only consisted of two battalions and the artillery support
available was insufficient to allow the advance to be pressed home; it
was therefore abandoned after a small gain of ground had been made._
[45] _The British who were streaming down from the high ground about
Wytschaete and Messines consisted of five brigades of cavalry (perhaps
4000) and one brigade of the newly arrived Lahore Division._
[46] _There was very severe fighting south of the Menin road during the
period 25th-28th October, particularly at Kruiseik, which formed the
south-eastern angle of the east face of the salient. This position was
obstinately defended by the 20th Infantry Brigade, 7th Division, which
held on under heavy bombardments and repulsed many attacks, notably
on the night of the 27th-28th October when over 200 of the 242nd
Reserve Infantry Regiment (XXVII Reserve Corps) who had penetrated into
Kruiseik were captured by a counter-attack of one company 2nd Scots
Guards. The Germans renewed their attack in great force next day, and
succeeded in dislodging the 20th Infantry Brigade from Kruiseik, but
a new line was formed in rear, blunting the salient, and with the aid
of the 1st Division (in reserve since 24th October) the position was
successfully maintained. Elsewhere the 7th Division, which was holding
a line reaching back to Zandvoorde where the 3rd Cavalry Division
connected it up with the left of General Allenby's Cavalry Corps on the
Ypres-Comines canal, held its ground._
[47] _This account does not tell the story of 29th October very
intelligibly. The British front had been readjusted, and was now held
by the 2nd Division on the left, from the junction with the French to
west of Reutel, thence to the 9th kilometre on the Ypres-Menin road by
the 1st Division, thence to Zandvoorde by the 7th Division with the
3rd Cavalry Division on their right. Under cover of a mist the Germans
(apparently the 6th Bavarian Reserve Division) attacked in force
against the junction of the 1st and 7th Divisions, broke through at the
9th kilo cross-roads, and rolled up the battalions to right and left
after very severe fighting, in which the 1st Grenadier Guards and 2nd
Gordon Highlanders of the 7th Division distinguished themselves greatly
by repeated counter-attacks. The resistance of the troops in the front
line delayed the Germans long enough to allow the reserves of the 1st
Division to be put in, and their counter-attacks recovered all but the
most advanced trenches. The Germans did not ever penetrate as far as
Gheluvelt, and their final gain of ground was inconsiderable._