of DIXMUDE, on the 10th November. The XXIII Reserve Corps had made
a successful attack on NOORDSCHOOTE and through BIXSCHOOTE against
HET SAS. A long and bitter struggle took place for the high ground
south-west of BIXSCHOOTE; but by evening the canal had been reached
along almost its whole length between NOORDSCHOOTE and BIXSCHOOTE,
whilst about a brigade of the 45th Reserve Division and weak
detachments of the 46th had crossed it. The inundation had however
gradually extended southwards as far as this district, and put any
far-reaching extension of this success out of the question. The XXIII
Reserve Corps took prisoner about 1000 men and captured a considerable
number of machine-guns in this operation.
The reinforced III Reserve Corps had had a particularly hard fight
on both sides of LANGEMARCK. Throughout the 9th November and during
the following night the French delivered heavy attacks there and had
been everywhere repulsed. Rows of corpses lay in front of the III
Reserve Corps, on the left wing of which the 9th Reserve Division,
now affiliated to the Fourth Army, had been brought up into the line.
Making every use of the element of surprise, General von Beseler had
ordered the assault to begin at 6.30 A.M. Punctually at this moment, as
dawn was breaking, the bugles sounded the attack. On the right wing the
44th Reserve Division pushed forward till close up to HET SAS, taking
prisoner 14 officers and 1154 men. The official despatch, in reporting
this advance, says: 'West of LANGEMARCK our young regiments advanced
against the enemy's front line singing "_Deutschland, Deutschland
über alles_," and captured it.' The left wing of the division hung a
good way back, as the 5th Reserve Division on its left was unable to
push on so rapidly. It had broken into the enemy's first position,
but its eastern wing was completely held up in front of LANGEMARCK.
The 6th Reserve Division had attacked the place from north and east,
without being able to take it. Documents discovered afterwards prove
that the enemy had concentrated strong forces here for a big attack
that he himself intended to make on the 10th, and these were now
defending every yard of ground with the utmost determination. The 9th
Reserve Division had at first made good progress in the direction of
ST. JULIEN, but it came under a heavy cross-fire, and was thereby
compelled to give up a large part of the ground gained. General von
Beseler therefore decided to pull out the main body of the 9th Reserve
Division, and move it to his right wing, where the 44th and 5th Reserve
Divisions had had a decided success in the direction of HET SAS.
After the first line of trenches had been taken, the attack of the XXVI
and XXVII Reserve Corps was very soon held up by wire entanglements
which had not been destroyed by our guns, and by a second line of
trenches provided with every modern device. The XXVII Reserve Corps
spent most of the day in making such disposition of its forces as would
enable it to give the utmost support to the Army Group Linsingen, which
was getting ready to attack further south on the morrow.
In the Army Group Linsingen, however, the preparations of Plettenberg's
Corps for an offensive on the morning of the 10th were not sufficiently
advanced to allow it to take place on that day. Further, the dense
autumn mists prevented the necessary reconnaissances. With the
concurrence of General von Linsingen, and after arrangement with the
neighbouring troops, General Baron von Plettenberg therefore decided
to attack on the 11th November. On the front of Deimling's (XV)
Corps the 10th November, up to four in the afternoon, was spent in a
preparatory artillery bombardment; especially good work was done by
means of heavy enfilade fire from the south, carried out by a massed
group of artillery consisting of three batteries of heavy howitzers,
three batteries of mortars, a battery of 10-cm. guns and a battery of
long 15-cm. guns, all under the orders of Colonel Gartmayr, commanding
the 1st Bavarian Field Artillery Regiment. After the bombardment both
divisions of the Corps advanced to the attack and, in co-operation with
the II Bavarian Corps fighting on the high ground of ST. ELOI, were
able to gain some hundreds of yards.
[Illustration: THE ATTACK OF THE SIXTH ARMY.
ON NOVEMBER 11TH. 1914.]
On the 11th November the combined offensive of the Fourth Army and
the Army Groups Linsingen and Fabeck took place. The remainder of the
Fourth and Sixth Armies continued their attacks. The great efforts
made by the Fourth Army on the 10th had considerably weakened it, and
further handicapped by a heavy rain-storm which beat in the faces
of the attacking troops, no special success was gained by it on the
11th; nevertheless the enemy was everywhere held to his ground and
prevented from transferring any troops to other parts of the front. On
the extreme right wing the Marine Division made a successful attack
on NIEUPORT, capturing several hundred prisoners. At the same time the
Guard Cavalry Division, affiliated to the Fourth Army, was sent up to
the YSER, in order to relieve part of the 4th _Ersatz_ Division, which
went into Army Reserve. On the left wing of the Army, the XXVI and
XXVII Reserve Corps worked their way towards the hostile positions
by sapping, whilst the units on the extreme south flank of the XXVII
Reserve Corps attacked in close co-operation with Plettenberg's Corps.
On the 11th, in pouring rain, the Army Groups Linsingen and Fabeck
began the last phase of this severe and terrible struggle for YPRES;
and it was destined to fix the general line on which the opposing
armies were to remain rooted till the spring of 1915.
Von Winckler's Guard Division fought on the right wing of the Army
Group Linsingen, and for us the day was to be a historic, though costly
one. In former wars the Guard had always been in the heat of the fray
at its most critical stages, and the sons were to show themselves
worthy of their fathers. The spirit of Frederick the Great and the
glory of St. Privat shone again on the battlefield of YPRES. The
British speak of the attack of the Guard as a most brilliant feat of
arms.
Before the infantry of the Division could come into immediate contact
with the enemy, a broad zone had to be crossed under his artillery
fire: through the hail of shell the pride and iron discipline of the
Guard brought its regiments unshaken. At 7.30 A.M. the German batteries
opened, and a furious bombardment continued for two and a half hours,
and then the infantry attack began. It struck against two divisions of
the I British Corps, a war experienced foe, whose fighting methods were
well adapted to the country.[104] The artillery preparation however
had been a thorough one, and in spite of the enemy's superiority in
numbers the advance made good progress, so that shortly after 10 A.M.
the strong position along the southern edge of the POLYGON Wood was in
the possession of the 3rd Guard Regiment.[105]
At the same time the butt ends and bayonets of H.M. the Emperor's
1st Guard Regiment had forced a way through the wire entanglements
and trenches in front of VERBECK farm, and it was taken in the first
assault. The regiment had thereby captured an excellent position
from which to support the right wing of the attack.[106] Led by its
fearless commander, Prince Eitel Friedrich of Prussia, it then pressed
on without a moment's delay into the wood north-west of the farm.
Meanwhile the 3rd Guard Regiment was still engaged along the southern
edges of the woods west of REUTEL, with its front facing north, and
it put in its last reserves to help forward the left wing of the 54th
Reserve Division.
[Illustration: THE ATTACK OF THE 2ND. GUARD DIVISION.
ON NOVEMBER 11TH. 1914.]
At 10 A.M., on the last artillery salvo, the battalions of the
4th Guard Brigade advanced to the assault on both sides of the
YPRES-GHELUVELT main road, and they took the front British trenches in
their stride.
The Emperor Francis' 2nd Guard Grenadier Regiment attacked from
VELDHOEK against the corner of the HERENTHAGE Wood, north of the
YPRES-GHELUVELT road, and took its edge. The wood itself gave the
infantry endless trouble, for it was impossible to see a yard ahead in
its thick undergrowth, which was over six feet high.[107] Suddenly at a
few paces' distance, machine-guns would open on our troops from behind
a bush or a tree-trunk. Thus the task set the Grenadiers proved to be
an extremely difficult one, the more so as they had lost many of their
officers and N.C.O.'s in the first rush across the open. Nevertheless,
the defence-works inside the wood were quickly taken one after another,
but more strong points protected by wire entanglements untouched by
our artillery fire were encountered. The Fusilier Battalion forced
its way through to the château of VELDHOEK, which was surrounded by
a marsh and an impenetrable hedge. The men were trying to work their
way one by one through the latter by cutting gaps in it, when suddenly
a deafening roar of rifle and machine-gun burst upon them. It came
from the château on their right, from some flanking trenches on their
left, and from trees behind the line. A number of the few remaining
officers fell, and finally the battalion had to retire a short distance
in order to reorganise. But it soon came forward once more, and the
companies pressed on till they were close up to the château itself,
when another annihilating fusillade was opened on them from all sides.
Simultaneously the British made a flank attack along the hedge in order
to cut off the men who had got through. Machine-guns firing from trees
and from the château windows completely stopped any communication
with them. Very few only of these foremost troops, who were commanded
by Captain von Rieben, succeeded in getting away. Those who did were
assembled by Captain Baron von Sell at the eastern edge of the wood
and were, with part of the 1st Battalion, led forward again to the
relief of the Fusiliers who were surrounded. The attack of Captain von
Sell developed however into small isolated combats, and though the
boldest followed their leader nearly up to the château again, they
were received there with such heavy fire from right and left that it
appeared that they would have to retire again and reorganise. Before
this could be carried out, a British counter-attack was launched; but
our men, disorganised and mixed up as they were, held fast to their
ground and stopped the attack, although at first both their flanks were
in the air.[108]
Queen Augusta's 4th Guard Grenadier Regiment, advancing south of the
main road, at once suffered such heavy losses that the first two
attacks made no headway. When however part of the regiment near the
main road pushed forward along it, echeloned behind its sister-regiment
on the right, and then turned southwards, the advance made good
progress, and a firm footing was gained in HERENTHAGE Wood south of
the road. The reverses met with by the Emperor Francis' 2nd Grenadiers
unfortunately enabled the British to bring such a heavy enfilade fire
to bear on Queen Augusta's 4th Grenadiers, that their advance had to
be stopped.[109]
At 5 P.M. German Guard troops had a tussle with the British Guards. The
King's Liverpool Regiment made a counter-attack from the NUN'S Wood
(Nonne Bosch) against the extreme left of the 1st Guard Foot Regiment
and the northern wing of the 2nd Guard Grenadiers. The point of attack
was well chosen, and took both the regiments in flank, for the 1st
Guard Infantry Brigade was at this time heavily engaged, and held up in
the woods (POLYGON Wood and the eastern part of the NONNE BOSCH), with
its front facing north, and the 2nd Guard Grenadier Regiment, having
spent all its energies against the château of VELDHOEK, lay with its
front facing west.[110] However, the British troops ran into their own
artillery fire near the NONNE BOSCH, and the attack broke up and came
to a standstill in front of our thin and scattered lines. Any further
advance on the 11th November by our Guard troops north of the road was
now out of the question.
In the southern part of the HERENTHAGE Wood the 4th Infantry Division
pushed on, though here too great difficulties were encountered. Deep
trenches, broad obstacles, and enfilade machine-gun fire combined to
make our progress slow, especially on the right wing.
The XV Corps in close co-operation with the left wing of the
Pomeranians gained ground in the woods near and around ZWARTELEEN; the
capture of Hill 60 near ZWARTELEEN was of exceptional importance. From
this elevation another direct view over the country round YPRES was
obtained.
South of the canal the II Bavarian Corps with much thinned ranks
stormed forward again. The bit of wood north-east of WYTSCHAETE, which
had already changed hands several times, was now taken by it. The heavy
artillery again rendered invaluable services. Several strong hostile
counter-attacks were held up chiefly owing to the way in which at the
critical moment our guns always protected the infantry lines by a
barrage.
In the area near WYTSCHAETE, the 11th November was the day of the
heaviest fighting. In the woods north of it, Bavarians and Hessians
pressed forward together, slowly but surely. A French battery and four
machine-guns were taken by the 168th Infantry Regiment at a farm about
150 yards north of WYTSCHAETE, but the guns were so firmly embedded in
the sodden ground, that they could not be got away by the infantry.
When the buildings were evacuated again, owing to the heavy fire of
the French on them, the guns, made unserviceable by us, remained as a
neutral battery between the lines. It must be recorded here that in
the fight for one single farm the Hessians took prisoners belonging to
three different regiments, a fact that proves what masses the enemy had
put in to the fight on the YPRES front, and to what an extent he had to
concentrate his units to ward off our attacks.
On and to the west of the MESSINES ridge the line remained almost
unaltered during the 11th November. The very severe effect of the
enemy's artillery fire from Mount KEMMEL on this front and the enfilade
fire of artillery and machine-guns from PLOEGSTEERT Wood compelled our
men to remain in their trenches.
Taken as a whole the operations on the 11th November were a great
success. A series of brilliant feats, many of which it has been
impossible even to mention in this short account, far less adequately
describe, gave us unchallenged possession of positions from which any
concentration of the enemy near YPRES could be seen, and immediately
opened on by artillery. It is true, however, that no break through of
the enemy's lines had been accomplished: his numerical superiority and,
more especially, the strength of his positions held up our offensive.
The weather conditions, storm and rain, had also contributed towards
the result.[111]
The furious character of the fighting on the 11th November did not
abate on the following day, but on the whole the situation remained
unaltered. The general character of the operations on the entire
front of the Fourth and Sixth Armies was now changed, and sapping was
eventually resorted to, though here and there successes in open warfare
were gained. For instance the XXII Reserve Corps managed to strengthen
its detachments across the YSER at DIXMUDE, and on the 12th the 201st
Reserve Infantry Regiment, under Major Baron von Wedekind, stormed
the enemy's defences opposite it on the western bank of the YSER, and
held them under great difficulties. Constant rain had filled the badly
constructed trenches with mud so that our troops had to support the
enemy's bombardment and resist his counter-attacks lying in the open.
At BIXSCHOOTE the enemy again attempted strong counter-attacks,
but they were stopped largely by the muddy state of the country.
On the 14th November there was a recrudescence of severe fighting.
Owing to the misty weather our relieving troops occupied a reserve
position instead of the original front line; by the time the error was
discovered, our watchful opponents were already in the front German
position. Our men, however, gave them no rest there, for their honour
would not suffer the surrender in this manner of their success of the
10th November. Without waiting for any orders from higher authority
or for reinforcements they attacked and retook the strong position
on the rising ground south-west of BIXSCHOOTE. On the front of the
Sixth Army HERENTHAGE Wood was completely taken by the Guard on the
14th November after severe hand-to-hand fighting.[112] After the
artillery had prepared the way as far as was possible in that difficult
and wooded neighbourhood, the infantry, whose fighting spirit was by
no means damped by the events of the 11th November, advanced to the
assault. In the château of HERENTHAGE a large number of British snipers
surrendered. The XV Corps had another success in the wooded district of
ZWARTELEEN after being reinforced by Hofmann's composite Division. A
strong system of trenches and dug-outs were taken, as well as a large
number of prisoners.
On the 13th November the Park of WYTSCHAETE was captured from the
French by the Pomeranians and Bavarians. A counter-attack, in which
the French advanced against our positions shouting, 'Don't shoot,' in
German, cost them heavy losses; and the Bavarians, whose tempers were
roused by this treachery, drove them back to their original positions.
On the 20th November the farm 150 yards north of WYTSCHAETE, for which
such a severe fight had been made on the 11th, was finally captured by
us. We thereby obtained a position in the WYTSCHAETE salient which,
although overlooked from Mount KEMMEL, gave us such a commanding view
of all the ground between Mount KEMMEL and the WYTSCHAETE-MESSINES
ridge that surprise attacks by the enemy in this district were now out
of the question.[113] On the rest of the Flanders front only small
fights took place, and on the 17th November the commander of the
Fourth Army decided to give up any idea of continuing the offensive;
a decision to which he was compelled by the low fighting strength
of his troops and the bad autumn weather, which was affecting their
health.[114] The frequent downpours of rain during November had caused
a constant rising of the water-level, and it became urgently necessary
to provide regular reliefs for the troops, for they were worn out by
the constant fighting under such bad weather conditions. Clear signs
of exhaustion in the enemy's ranks on the front opposite the Fourth
and Sixth Armies were also noticed. This permitted our gallant Fourth
Army gradually to construct a good line of trenches and erect wire
entanglements. As soon as these were completed rest-billets were
allotted further to the rear and the men found quiet and pleasant
quarters in the villages of Flanders untouched by war, with a not
unfriendly population. The German General Staff fully concurred in
the decision of the commander of the Fourth Army made on the 17th
November. They at the same time expressed the hope that the Army would
be prepared to hold its positions even against superior hostile forces.
This expectation was completely fulfilled by the Fourth Army, and
although at that time there were four and one-half French Corps, as
well as the 25,000 Belgian troops, opposed to the forces of Duke Albert
of Würtemburg, they never obtained a success of any consequence.
The threat against our right flank ceased soon afterwards. British
monitors appeared a few times towards the end of November off the
roadstead of OSTEND. They bombarded the canal exit and our positions
near by: but their fire was as ineffective as before. The 'glorious'
activities of the British Grand Fleet along the Flanders coast came to
a speedy end as soon as our ill-famed sea-rats, the U-boats, began to
put in an appearance there.[115]
The developments on the front of the Sixth Army during the second
half of November 1914 were similar to those of the Fourth Army. For
some time the sapping was continued, but from the 20th onwards strong
detachments were taken from it and entrained for the Eastern Front,
where General von Hindenburg was able, in the fighting round Lodz, to
bring the Russian steam-roller to a standstill, and finally make it
roll back again.
From this time onwards the line of demarcation between the Fourth and
Sixth Armies was the COMINES-YPRES canal.
CONCLUSION
As the November storms passed and frost and icy winds heralded to
the mild climate of Flanders the approach of winter, the unbroken
defensive lines of both sides were being slowly strengthened. The
effect of artillery fire compelled them to make cover in good trenches
and behind thick breast-works. As the armament in use became more and
more powerful, artificial shelter, where the surface water allowed
it, had to be made deeper and deeper in the earth. At first passive
defence was little understood by the German troops, as instruction in
the offensive had dominated all other in their peace-training, and in
the short period available after they were called up the volunteers
had only been trained in the principles of attack. Their sense of
superiority over their opponents did not let them rest content with
merely holding positions. The high sense of duty in each individual
was of assistance, and the methods of defensive warfare were quickly
learnt. The continuous bad weather in the autumn and winter in this
water-logged country caused great suffering; and the troops sent off to
Russia to fight under the great victor of TANNENBURG were much envied.
The despatch of men eastward showed those left behind that any hope of
a final decision at YPRES had disappeared.
The first battle of YPRES was a German victory,[116] for it marked the
failure of the enemy's intention to fall on the rear of our Western
Armies, to free the rich districts of Northern France and the whole
of Belgium (thus preventing us from making use of their valuable
resources), and to use the YPRES area as a base for the Belgian, French
and British advance on the RHINE. The Belgian coast was now firmly in
our possession, and offered a good starting-place for naval operations
against England. But we had not succeeded in making the decisive
break-through, and the dream of ending the campaign in the west in our
favour during 1914 had to be consigned to its grave. It is only natural
that the German General Staff found it difficult thoroughly to realise
this unpleasant fact, and only did so with reluctance; but endeavour
has been made in this account to bring out the main reasons which led
to this result of the battle. Nevertheless, great things had been
accomplished. The Army of Duke Albert of Würtemburg, by its advance
and determined attack, had prevented the big offensive planned by the
enemy; the Fourth and Sixth Armies together had forced a superior
opponent into the defensive, and, in spite of his having called in the
sea to his assistance, had driven him back continually, until positions
had been reached which enabled German troops to be spared to carry out
an offensive on the Eastern Front. As during the battle of the Marne,
so now the spectre of a Russian invasion appeared threateningly before
the German Nation, and the whole country knew what it would mean if it
should materialise. Our forces on the Eastern Front were far too weak,
and even the genius of a Hindenburg could not decisively defeat the
masses of the Grand Duke Nicolas without reinforcements. Thus it came
about that we had to lie and wait in front of the gates of YPRES, while
all the available men from Flanders were hurried across to Poland, to
help Hindenburg pave the way to victory.