on the La Bassée-Armentières front as quite distinct from the main
battle for Ypres. During the period 20th-29th October the II and III
Corps had a hard defensive battle to fight, the only assistance they
received being on the arrival on 23rd October of the Jullundur Brigade
and the divisional troops of the Lahore Division, which replaced
General Conneau's French Cavalry at the junction between the two Corps.
As the net result of this fighting the II and III Corps were forced
back to a line running north by east from Givenchy, west of Neuve
Chapelle, past Bois Grenier, south-east of Armentières to the Lys at
Houplines, part of the 4th Division continuing the line on the left
bank of the Lys to the junction with the Cavalry Corps just south of
Messines. The German attacks on this front were strongly pressed, and
the strain on the II and III Corps was very severe._
[49] _In view of the reiterated statements about the superior numbers
of the Allies, it is worth pointing out that this new Army Group by
itself amounted to about two-thirds of the original strength of the
British forces engaged between La Bassée and Zonnebeke. For its Order
of Battle see at end of book._
[50] _If the flooding of the country by the Belgians had barred the
further advance of the Germans along the coast, it had equally covered
the German extreme right against any chance of a counter-attack,
and enabled them to divert the III Reserve Corps to the south; the
Belgians, however, were in no position to deflect any forces to the
assistance of their Allies._
[51] _No mass attacks were made by the British on 30th and 31st
October. It will be noticed that the French IX Corps is spoken of here
as though it had been an additional reinforcement; it had been in
action on the Zonnebeke area since 24th October._
[52] _The heavy artillery at the disposal of the British
Commander-in-Chief amounted at this time to two batteries of 6-inch
howitzers, six of 60-pounders, and three of 4·7-inch guns, a total of
forty-four guns and howitzers in all (each battery having four guns)._
[53] _At this time the Allied line from the Menin road south was held
by the 7th Division, supported by about two infantry brigades of the
I Corps, the line being carried on thence to Messines by part of the
XVI French Corps and British Cavalry Divisions, and two battalions of
the Lahore Division. Nearly all these units had been heavily engaged
for a week or more, and were much under strength, but even at full war
establishment would have been outnumbered by nearly two to one._
[54] _See footnote 51. The IX French Corps is mentioned for the third
time as a new arrival._
[55] See page 62.
[56] _It is difficult to see how this assertion can be supported on the
statements previously given, even apart from the fact that the German
units were fresh and the British troops facing them reduced by previous
heavy losses. The British claim to have held out against great odds
is no more than the bare truth. The battalions of the 1st Division
who had held up the attack of the 46th Reserve Division north-west of
Langemarck on 23rd October were still in the line when the Prussian
Guard attacked on 11th November--or rather a scanty remnant of them
was: in the interval they had fought and held up a succession of
attacks._
[57] _The 7th Division had never left the line; a few battalions only
had been given a day's rest, but the division as a whole had not been
relieved._
[58] _These squadrons belonged to the 1st and 2nd Life Guards, each of
which regiments had a squadron cut off when Zandvoorde was stormed.
None of the III British Corps were in this area, the extreme left of
the Corps being about the river Douve, south of Messines._
[59] _There was no strong counter-attack in the Wambeke area: the very
thin line of the 2nd Cavalry Division (perhaps 3000 rifles on a front
of two miles) was forced back to a position much nearer Wytschaete and
St. Eloi, where it received reinforcements amounting to about a brigade
of French infantry._
[60] Messines ridge.
[61] _The amount of work it had been possible to do there in preparing
the position for defence had been very much restricted by lack of
time and want of labour. 'Deep trenches protected by broad wire
entanglements' is a much exaggerated statement._
[62] _An attack was made by the Germans on Messines about this time,
but was decisively repulsed._
[63] _I and II Cavalry Corps. See Order of Battle._
[64] _The Germans at one time broke the line of the 19th Infantry
Brigade on the right of the III Corps near Bois Grenier, but were
dislodged by a counter-attack by the 2nd Argyll and Sutherland
Highlanders and 1st Middlesex. In Ploegsteert Wood there was also heavy
fighting, the 1st Hampshires distinguishing themselves in particular by
a very stubborn resistance._
[65] _Except at Zandvoorde the German attacks north of the Ypres-Comines
canal were not successful, and their success at Zandvoorde was brought
to a standstill by the arrival of two battalions of the 1st Division
under Brigadier-General Bulfin, and three of the 2nd Division under
Brigadier-General Lord Cavan, whose intervention enabled a new line
to be formed north-west of Zandvoorde. To the east of Zandvoorde the
7th Division was forced to fall back nearer to Gheluvelt, but east of
Gheluvelt itself the Germans made no progress._
[66] _The arrival of the Meerut Division on 29th October allowed some
of the most exhausted units of the II Corps to be relieved on the front
east of Festubert, south-east of Richebourg St. Vaast, west of Neuve
Chapelle, but these battalions were not destined to enjoy a very long
spell of rest._
[67] _The 'reinforcements' which the Allies had received on 29th-30th
October were not even sufficient to redress the balance against them.
(See footnote 66.)_
[68] _The troops holding Gheluvelt consisted of two battalions of the
3rd Infantry Brigade, with portions of two of the 2nd Infantry Brigade,
at most 2000 men. Against these the Germans by their own account put in
about eight battalions._
[69] _It would not be gathered from this account that the British
artillery had, as was the case, already been severely restricted as to
ammunition expenditure._
[70] _The statement that 'many attacks had to be delivered against
fresh troops in good sheltered entrenchments' is almost ludicrous in
its travesty of the facts._
[71] _It was not in 'long colonial wars' but in careful training on
the ranges that the majority of the defenders of Ypres had learnt that
mastery of the rifle which was the mainstay of the success of the
defence. Between the close of the South African War (1902) and the
outbreak of war in 1914, scarcely any British troops had been on active
service._
[72] _The position west of Reutel was maintained intact on 31st
October, the right of the 2nd Division and left of the 1st Division
holding on successfully even after the centre of the 1st Division had
been pierced at Gheluvelt._
[73] _The picture of the great profusion of machine-guns in the
British possession is a little dimmed by the recollection that the war
establishments allowed two machine-guns per infantry battalion, that
by 31st October there had been no time to produce enough machine-guns
to increase the establishment; indeed, most battalions had already one
or both their guns put out of action. The Germans clearly took for
machine-gun fire the rapid fire which the infantry of the original
Expeditionary Force could maintain._
[74] _The capture of Gheluvelt was earlier than 3 p.m. by at least an
hour, 1 or 1.30 p.m. seems more like the correct time. The 'château
and park,' north of Gheluvelt, were held by the 1st South Wales
Borderers, who maintained their ground, although their right was left
in the air by the loss of the village, until the 2nd Worcesters came
up and delivered their celebrated counter-attack past the right of the
S.W.B. This apparently occurred about 2 p.m. The German account is,
however, accurate in saying that Gheluvelt was not retaken; what the
Worcesters did was that they completely checked the German efforts to
push forward; the position their counter-attack reached enabled them to
flank any advance west of Gheluvelt._
[75] _The German claim to have captured three guns does not seem
founded on fact: one gun of the 117th Field Battery was lost, but was
subsequently retaken._
[76] _The left of the XV Corps, which was in action against the
detachments under Brigadier-Generals Bulfin and Lord Cavan, and the
right of the 7th Division, in the woods later known as Shrewsbury
Forest, was successfully held in check: it gained but a little ground,
and at one point a most successful counter-attack drove the Germans
back a long way, many casualties being inflicted and prisoners taken._
[77] _The Staffs of both 1st and 2nd Divisions were there. Major-General
Lomax, commanding the 1st Division, and Major-General Munro, commanding
the 2nd Division, were wounded. Neither was killed, but the former died
many months after of his wounds._
[78] _During the course of 31st October French reinforcements of the
XVI Corps had arrived and were taking over the left of the line held
by the Cavalry Corps, relieving the 3rd and 5th Cavalry Brigades
north-west of Hollebeke and south-east of St. Eloi. The French were,
however, unable to make much ground by their counter-attacks, and
further to the British right the 4th Cavalry Brigade was heavily
pressed. It was here that the London Scottish were put in to recover
trenches which had been lost east of the Messines-Wytschaete road._
[79] _Accurate details of the fighting which went on through the
night of 31st October-1st November round Wytschaete are extremely
difficult to disentangle. It seems that the 4th Cavalry Brigade
was forced out of the village somewhere between 2 and 3 a.m., that
the advance of the Germans was then held up west of the village,
counter-attacks by two battalions of the 3rd Division, which had just
arrived from La Bassée-Neuve Chapelle area, assisting to check them.
Subsequently these battalions (1st Northumberland Fusiliers and 1st
Lincolnshires) were also forced back, but by this time more French
reinforcements were coming up with some of the 5th Cavalry Brigade,
and their counter-attacks, though not wholly successful, prevented
further German progress. But the admission of this account that two
whole German regiments (six battalions) were engaged in the attack is
a fine testimony to the resistance made by the 2nd Cavalry Division
and attached infantry at Wytschaete with odds of more than two to one
against them._
[80] _The forces available for the defence of Messines were the 1st
Cavalry Division, much reduced by the previous fighting, assisted by
portions of the 57th Rifles (Lahore Division) and two battalions of the
5th Division (the 2nd King's Own Scottish Borderers, 2nd King's Own
Yorkshire L.I., both recently relieved from the trenches near Neuve
Chapelle and much below strength). The twelve battalions of the 26th
(Würtemburg) Division were thus in overwhelming superiority. The only
artillery available to assist the defence were the 13-pounders of the
R.H.A. batteries attached to the Cavalry Corps._
[81] _i.e. Würtemburg._
[82] _This is not accurate. Poezelhoek Château had to be evacuated
during the night of 31st October-1st November, owing to the withdrawal
of the line made necessary by the loss of Gheluvelt; but the Germans
did not molest the retirement to the new position, and such attempts
as they made in the course of 1st November to press on westward
beyond Gheluvelt were unsuccessful. The British accounts do not give
the impression that the German attacks on this day were very heavily
pressed in this quarter; at any rate they failed to make any ground._
[83] _The hardest fighting of 1st November in the Ypres salient was
in the area north-west of Zandvoorde where the detachments under
Brigadier-Generals Bulfin and Lord Cavan were sharply engaged, as
were also the remnants of the 7th Division, now holding a position
south-east and south of the Herenthage Wood. A feature of this day's
fighting was a counter-attack by the 26th Field Company R.E., acting as
infantry in default of any infantry reserves, which checked the efforts
of the Germans to advance north of Groenenburg Farm (north-west of
Zandvoorde)._
[84] _The Indian units hitherto employed under the Cavalry Corps (57th
Rifles and 129th Baluchis) had already been withdrawn to Kemmel, and
were not in action near Oosttaverne on 1st November. This account of
the 'treacherous methods of the Indians' smacks of the conventional; it
is what was attributed to the Ghurkhas in some sections of the German
Press, and seems inserted rather to excite odium against the British
for calling in Asiatics to oppose the disciples of 'Kultur.'_
[85] _French Divisions. By the afternoon of 1st November the French
had taken over the defence of Wytschaete. The 2nd Cavalry Division
assembled on a line east of Kemmel and Wulverghem._
[86] _These 'reinforcements of newly arrived British troops' are
imaginary._
[87] _The Germans, attacking along the Menin road, succeeded in
breaking our line at this point and captured two guns which had been
pushed up into the front trenches. However, the 1st Scots Guards,
though taken in flank, held on north of the road till a counter-attack
by the 1st Black Watch re-established the line, while south of the road
a counter-attack by the remnants of the 2nd and 3rd Brigade cleared
the Herenthage Wood completely, but did not regain the front trenches
a little eastward. Further to the right Lord Cavern's detachment
(Brigadier-General Bulfin had been wounded on 1st November, and his
battalions had come under Lord Cavan's orders) and the remnants of
the 1st Grenadiers and 2nd Border Regiment (7th Division) held their
own successfully and inflicted very heavy losses on the Germans, i.e.
Deimling's left wing._
[88] _The credit for the gallant defence of Wytschaete on this day
belongs solely to the French; no British troops were in action there._
[89] _After the capture of Messines and Wytschaete the severity of
the fighting in this quarter died down rapidly. The French made some
attempts to recover Wytschaete, while the Germans managed to capture
Hill 75 (Spanbroekmolen), but could advance no further, and the
British Cavalry Corps established itself firmly in trenches north-east
of Wulverghem. Supported by the artillery of the 5th Division, it
maintained itself on this line till relieved by the infantry of the 5th
Division about the middle of November._
[90] _The chaplain of the Guard Cavalry Division, 'Hofprediger' Dr.
Vogel, in his book '3000 Kilometer mit der Garde-Kavallerie' (p.
212), says the attack was made and failed, but 'next day the English
abandoned the farm: this may have been due either to the power of our
8-inch howitzers, or to the moral effect of the attack of the Guard
Dragoons.'_
[91] _What other British troops were present in the Ypres salient
except the I and IV Corps this narrative does not pause to state, for
the simple reason that there were none. The I Corps was not relieved,
though some French battalions were put into the line near Veldhoek;
but in the course of 5th November the remnant of the infantry of the
7th Division was relieved by the two composite brigades from the II
Corps composed of battalions which had had three weeks' fighting near
La Bassée and had then to be thrust in after only two or three days'
rest to hold some of the most difficult parts of the line south-east
of Ypres. The 7th Infantry Division when relieved amounted to less
than a third of their original strength, without taking into account
the drafts that had joined since they landed, which amounted to 2000
or more. Most of the battalions of the 1st Division were in scarcely
better case._
[92] _These 'successive lines of rearward positions' did not exist
except on paper during the period to be included in the 'Battle of
Ypres,' i.e. to 17th November._
[93] _During the period 2nd-11th November the most serious fighting
on the British front was between 6th and 8th November. On the 6th the
Germans attacked near Zwarteleen and gained ground, some of which
was recovered by a fine counter-attack delivered by the 7th Cavalry
Brigade (cf. page 93, line 30), while further counter-attacks by the
22nd Infantry Brigade, brought back just as it had been drawn out
for a rest, and by portions of the 1st Division further improved the
line next day. On that day (7th November) a sharp attack on the 3rd
Division, which had now taken over the line south of the Menin road,
gained a little ground east of the Herenthage Wood. This part of the
line was again attacked in force on 8th November, and the line was
broken near Veldhoek, but was restored after some sharp fighting and
several counter-attacks. Further north again, in Polygon Wood and to
the east of it, the 2nd Division, though repeatedly attacked, more than
held its own. In the fighting near Veldhoek a prominent part was taken
by two battalions of Zouaves who had filled a gap in the line of the
1st Division._
[94] _St. Eloi is hardly situated 'on high ground,' as it is on
the down slope where the Warneton-Ypres road descends into the
low ground after crossing the north-easterly continuation of the
Messines-Wytschaete ridge._
[95] _The allusion is not understood._
[96] _The heavy artillery at Sir John French's disposal at this period
was still extremely limited, and its effectiveness was greatly hampered
by the lack of ammunition, stringent restrictions having to be placed
on the ammunition expenditure of guns of all calibres. Fortunately for
the Allies a similar handicap was beginning to make itself felt among
the Germans; even their preparations had been hardly equal to the vast
ammunition expenditure which had been incurred._
[97] _The portion of the Ypres salient attacked by the XXIII Corps was
defended by French troops alone; there were no British north of the
Broodseinde cross-roads._
[98] _The enemy is giving the Allies credit for his own tricks._
[99] _However, when British troops took over the coastal sector in 1917
Lombartzyde was in Allied possession._
[100] For Order of Battle, see Appendix.
[101] _A Machine-Gun Detachment (Abtheilung) is a mounted battery with
six guns._
[102] Consisting of the 4th _Ersatz_ Division and the 43rd Reserve
Division.
[103] _It is not clear why a British assertion about the defence of
Dixmude should be quoted, nor indeed is it clear what shape this
assertion can have taken, as no British troops were concerned in the
Dixmude fighting, nor could there have been any occasion for any
official British announcement about Dixmude._
_In the diagram above, for 201st, 202nd, and 203rd Res. Jäger Regt.
read Res. Infantry Regt._
[104] _The frontage attacked by the twelve battalions of General von
Winckler's Guard Division, far from being held by two British Divisions
was held from north to south by the 1st Infantry Brigade, now reduced
to some 800 bayonets, a battalion of Zouaves and the left brigade of
the 3rd Division, little over 1200 strong. Even if the whole of the
3rd Guard Regiment may have been absorbed in the task of covering the
main attack from the British troops lining the southern edge of the
Polygon Wood, the superiority of the attacking force was sufficiently
pronounced._
[105] _The Germans do not appear to have penetrated into the Polygon
Wood at any point. The northern end of the breach in the British
line was marked by a 'strong point' which had been erected near the
south-west corner of the wood, known later as 'Black Watch Corner':
this was successfully defended all day by a very weak company of the
Black Watch. Attacks were made on the 1st King's lining the southern
edge of the wood, apparently by the 3rd Guard Regiment, and also
further eastward and to the left of the King's, on the 2nd Coldstream
Guards. The Germans in this quarter would seem to have belonged to the
54th Reserve Division: at neither of these points did the attackers
meet with any success._
[106] _A thick mist which prevented the troops holding the front line
trenches from seeing far to their front undoubtedly played an important
part in concealing the advance of the German Guard, and contributed
appreciably to its success._
[107] _This is the eastern part of the wood known later as 'Inverness
Copse.'_
[108] _This counter-attack may be identified with one delivered by the
1st Scots Fusiliers and one company 2nd Duke of Wellington's._
[109] _The 4th (Queen Augusta's) Guard Grenadiers seem to have attacked
the right of the line held by the 9th Infantry Brigade and to have been
repulsed by the 1st Lincolnshires and 1st Northumberland Fusiliers.
Further to the British right the 15th and 7th Infantry Brigades were
also attacked, but by the 4th Division, not by the Guards. Here the
Germans made no progress._
[110] _This part of the German account is not borne out by the British
versions. The main body of the 1st Guard Regiment, which broke
through the thinly held line of the 1st Infantry Brigade, pressed on
north-west into the Nonne Bosch Wood, pushing right through it, and
coming out into the open on the western edge. Here their progress was
arrested mainly by the gunners of XLI Brigade, R.F.A., who held them
up with rifle fire at short range. Various details of Royal Engineers,
orderlies from Headquarters, transport men, rallied stragglers of
the 1st Brigade, assisted to stop the Germans, but the situation was
critical until about noon or a little later the 2nd Oxford and Bucks
L.I. arrived on the scene. This battalion had been engaged for several
days near Zwarteleen, and had just been brought up to Westhoek to act
as Divisional Reserve. Though under 400 strong the battalion promptly
counter-attacked the Nonne Bosch Wood and drove the Germans out
headlong. Many of them were caught as they escaped on the eastern and
southern sides by the fire of the 2nd Highland L.I., now on the western
edge of Polygon Wood, and of the 1st Northamptonshires, who had come
up to Glencorse Wood, south-west of the Nonne Bosch, and with other
units of the 2nd and 3rd Infantry Brigades had filled the gap which
extended thence to the Menin road. Thus those of the 1st Guard Regiment
who had pushed straight on westward were prevented from penetrating
any further. The King's, to whom this account gives the credit for
the Oxfordshire's counter-attack, had been engaged with the 3rd Guard
Regiment further to the north, completely defeating their attacks on
the Polygon, but not making any counter-attack. It is worth recalling
that at the critical moment of the battle of Waterloo it was the 2nd
Oxford and Bucks L.I., then 52nd Light Infantry, who played the chief
part in the defeat of Napoleon's Guard._
_The defeat of the 2nd Guard Grenadiers does not appear to have been
the work of the 2nd Oxford and Bucks L.I., but of the other battalions,
chiefly from the 2nd and 3rd Infantry Brigades, who were pushed forward
rather earlier between Glencorse Wood and Inverness Copse._
[111] _The author must be thankful for minor mercies if he can reckon
11th November as a day of great success. The gain of ground at Veldhoek
was trifling in extent and value, and though 'Hill 60' and the wood
north of Wytschaete were more important points, there is no doubt that
the throwing of the German Guard into the struggle had been expected
to produce a break-through. The 'numerical superiority' once again
attributed to the Allies was about as unreal as the alleged strength
of the positions, hastily dug, imperfectly wired and almost wholly
lacking supporting points and communications, which had such a much
more formidable character in the eyes of the Germans than they ever
possessed in reality. The gallantry and vigour with which the German
Guard pushed its attack will be readily admitted, but the honours
of 11th November 1914 go to the weary men who after three weeks of
incessant fighting met and drove back these fresh and famous troops._