came to the conclusion that the offensive of the Army Group Fabeck
could lead to no decisive results. The forces available were still
too weak to break through the enemy's strongly entrenched positions,
particularly as he was continually bringing up fresh reinforcements to
the battle-front.
If the attempt to break through south of YPRES was not to be entirely
abandoned, and a purely defensive war on the Western Front thereby
avoided, more troops would have to be brought up for the YPRES battle
from other sectors of the front. As a beginning the 2nd and the
Bavarian Cavalry Divisions were affiliated to the Army Group Fabeck,
the Bavarian Cavalry Division being allotted to the XV Corps and the
2nd Cavalry Division to the II Bavarian Corps. The German General
Staff also placed the II Corps and the 4th Infantry Division at the
disposal of General von Fabeck, and they began to detrain at LILLE on
the 5th November. On the 3rd Crown Prince Rupert of Bavaria ordered
the XXIV Reserve Corps and the 25th Reserve Division to be taken from
the Sixth Army, west of LILLE; and this was followed by an order on
the 4th to withdraw all the troops of the Guard Corps available from
their positions, and for their sector of the front to be taken over by
the IV Corps at ARRAS. Accordingly a composite Division of the Guard
Corps, consisting of the 1st and 4th Guard Infantry Brigades, under
Lieutenant-General von Winckler, marched for ROUBAIX, which was reached
on the 7th. More heavy artillery was also handed over to the Army Group
Fabeck, and, in addition, all the artillery ammunition allotted to the
Sixth Army. The intention of the German General Staff, communicated
to the commander of the Sixth Army on the 4th November, was: to push
the attack to the immediate north (of the elbow) of the COMINES-YPRES
canal, and to put in all available forces to break through there.
In the meantime, however, General von Fabeck, in accordance with
instructions previously issued by the commander of the Sixth Army,
had placed the XXIV Reserve Corps and the 25th Reserve Division on
the left wing of the II Bavarian Corps, and had there formed a Group
Gerok, to which the 6th Bavarian Reserve Division was added. Thus for
the offensive north of the COMINES-YPRES canal there were left the II
Corps and Guard Corps (the 4th Division and the mixed Division of von
Winckler), besides the XV Corps which was already in position there.
The fighting continued along the front of the Army Group until the
10th, when these troops were ready to attack. No time was to be given
the enemy to recover, or to strengthen his positions.
The XV Corps, which in the meantime had extended its left wing to
the COMINES-YPRES canal, won ground daily, especially on the 6th
November, when the 39th Division delivered a heavy attack near KLEIN
ZILLEBEKE and drove the recently arrived French troops from their
position, capturing four hundred prisoners in the farm buildings. The
troops, advancing with their bands playing, also stormed parts of
ZWARTELEEN, a village widely scattered among the woods and meadows.
The artillery fired at point-blank range, as the November mist made
observation impossible at any distance. French counter-attacks and
an attack by British cavalry, which attempted to make good the
retirement of the French, were repulsed. Their casualties were heavy,
the 1st and 2nd British Life Guards being decimated. The enemy's
counter-attacks on the 7th and 8th November, in which the much
weakened 7th British Division, as well as the Zouaves, took part,
had also no success. On the 8th November the 148th Infantry Regiment
captured the fortified position along the western edge of VELDHOEK;
with a strong counter-attack the French made a bid to recover the lost
ground. Lieutenant-Colonel Linker, the gallant regimental commander,
hastily gathered together all the supports within reach, including
_Landwehr_ men of the 54th Reserve Division, and led them forward to
meet the advancing enemy; he himself was mortally wounded at the head
of his victorious followers. The French hurriedly retired, suffering
considerable loss.[93]
The II Bavarian Corps was kept busily employed by the hostile
counter-attacks near the canal; the enemy offered very stubborn
resistance in order to keep possession of the high ground from which
YPRES can be seen. The Bavarians, however, not only maintained their
positions, but, by an irresistible attack on the 9th and 10th November,
took the high ground on which ST. ELOI is situated.[94] To the 5th
Bavarian Infantry Brigade is due all the credit for this fine feat. The
enemy remained for a long time in the houses of ST. ELOI, but the high
ground was of primary, perhaps even decisive, importance; for it gave
us a bird's-eye view of the country east of YPRES, where the mass of
the British field artillery was in position.
The fighting further south which the troops of the Group Gerok had in
and north of WYTSCHAETE was equally heavy. The northern edge formed the
dividing line between the Groups Gerok and Urach. The enemy kept the
village under heavy fire in order to hinder the work of our observers,
the mere sight of a man anywhere being sufficient to draw his artillery
fire. Our stereo-telescopes were therefore used through loopholes in
the ruins or at the chimney openings, and the observers were often far
safer on such lofty perches than our reserves in the cellars of the
battered village. Only slow progress could be made in the woods lying
to the north-west.
The Group Urach also was unable to make much headway. On its right
wing, the 3rd Infantry Division struggled hard to get possession of the
Park north-west of WYTSCHAETE. After a whole day's fighting the 34th
Fusilier Regiment forced its way into the hospice, a fine old convent
at the northern entrance to the village; from its roof the enemy had
been able to get a splendid view of our positions in the valley south
of WYTSCHAETE. In spite of a most thorough bombardment our attack was
very costly, and although the Park was enveloped on two sides, it was
found impossible to enter it. From this patch of wood heavy enfilade
fire swept the positions of the 6th Bavarian Division to the north,
and the trenches of the 3rd Prussian Division to the south. It was
surrounded by a wall and moat as well as by wire entanglements, the
impenetrable undergrowth being entangled with a maze of wire. Frenchmen
with machine-guns were roped to the trunks of some of the trees, and
they were found dead hanging from the shell-torn stumps when the Park
of WYTSCHAETE was finally stormed on the 13th November by the 21st
Reserve Infantry Regiment of the 6th Bavarian Division, with the 2nd
Grenadiers and 34th Fusiliers of the 3rd Prussian Division. There is
a legend connected with WYTSCHAETE Park, and the scene was worthy of
it.[95]
The 26th Infantry Division during these days had advanced its lines
to the western slopes of the WYTSCHAETE-MESSINES ridge, and in places
across the valley, by sapping. This operation cost many casualties,
as the British on Mount KEMMEL were able to watch every movement in
our trenches, and could immediately bring them under the fire of field
or heavy artillery, or even of long-range naval guns, and they were
by no means sparing with their ammunition. Fortunately our losses
were for the most part only in the front lines, but our shortage of
ammunition compelled us to husband it.[96] Owing to the conformation
of the ground and to the weather preventing any air-reconnaissances,
we were unable to range accurately on the enemy's artillery, and the
most we could do was to disturb their means of fire-direction. Their
observation posts on Mount KEMMEL were soon discovered, and the fight
now began against the observers there as well as against those posted
in the towers of YPRES. So the blame must not be laid on us for the
gradual destruction of those magnificent buildings of YPRES, which gave
such a fine view of the whole countryside.
Further to the south no noteworthy progress was made either by the
Cavalry Corps, or on the front of the Sixth Army.
Such then was the general situation when, on the 10th November, the
new forces lay ready to take the offensive in their positions north of
the COMINES-YPRES canal. Before going further, however, the operations
of the Fourth Army from the last days of October must for a moment be
touched on.
THE OPERATIONS OF THE FOURTH ARMY FROM THE END OF OCTOBER TO THE 9TH
NOVEMBER 1914
Whilst the northern wing of the Sixth Army under General von Fabeck
was engaged in the heavy fighting just described, the Fourth Army
of Duke Albert of Würtemburg had been doing its utmost, by means of
constant attacks, to prevent the enemy from withdrawing any troops from
his front to support his endangered positions near YPRES. By 11 A.M.
on the 3rd November the reorganisation of the German forces rendered
necessary by the inundation of the front between the coast and DIXMUDE
had been sufficiently completed to enable an offensive to be delivered
on this day, on the line DIXMUDE-GHELUVELT. The right flank, from
DIXMUDE to the coast, was secured by the 38th _Landwehr_ Brigade, 4th
_Ersatz_ Division, and part of the 43rd Reserve Division, all under the
orders of the general officer commanding the XXII Reserve Corps. The
dispositions of the attacking troops were as follows: the XXIII Reserve
Corps in the sector NOORDSCHOOTE-BIXSCHOOTE; the III Reserve Corps,
including the 44th Reserve Division, on both sides of LANGEMARCK,
facing the front HET SAS-ST. JULIEN (this was the most important group
in the offensive); the XXVI and XXVII Reserve Corps were to the south
again, with the left flank resting on the GHELUVELT-YPRES main road.[97]
By the evening of the 5th the XXIII Reserve Corps had been able
to gain ground at and north of BIXSCHOOTE, while the 5th Reserve
Division advancing from the north had forced its way close up to the
western edge of LANGEMARCK. But all our efforts to capture this place
by attacks from north and east, in spite of reinforcements being
brought up, failed. It became evident that the enemy's skilfully
placed and more numerous artillery, combined with his well-wired
infantry positions in a country so favourable for defence, were more
than a match for our guns, especially at a time when ammunition was
scarce, and the misty weather prevented observation from aeroplanes.
A continuation of the offensive here would only have meant a useless
sacrifice of life. It was therefore decided with deep regret to resort
to the long and wearisome task of sapping in order to hold the enemy.
The situation of the Fourth Army indeed was no enviable one. Here
in the plains of Flanders, operations were effected by the November
weather and heavy rains, far more than in the country east and south
of YPRES. The troops had to endure great hardships; their trenches
rapidly filled with water, and were necessarily so shallow as to give
insufficient protection against artillery fire. In several places they
had to be evacuated altogether, and the men lay out in the open with
only a hastily constructed wire entanglement in front to secure them
against surprise attacks. Sapping too proved most difficult in this
water-logged district. Frequently it could only be carried on by piling
up sand-bag parapets, and these being easily seen by the enemy were
promptly shelled. Thus the attack made slow progress. Regular reliefs
for the troops in the front line were out of the question, for the
units available at that time were too weak; and in any case, the men
found relief time a very dangerous moment, as the enemy was able to
observe every movement, especially where he still held good observation
points, as at BIXSCHOOTE and LANGEMARCK.
A very extensive system of espionage served to complete his knowledge
of our intentions. Individual soldiers were left behind in civilian
clothing, with concealed telephonic communication; they kept hidden
during the daytime in attics and cellars, and reported our movements
and dispositions quickly and accurately to their headquarters.[98]
A great deal of information was also given away by the Belgian
population, who crossed the German lines by secret bypaths, or sent
news across by carrier-pigeons, or by lights and signals. Although the
punishment meted out to espionage was severe, the Belgians always kept
up this form of patriotic work. It was extremely harmful to us, and its
effect could be diminished only by maintaining thorough surveillance
of the country in rear of our lines. Our reserves, about which the
enemy was always well informed, had for the above reasons to be kept
close up behind the front lines in order to be near at hand at the
critical moment. Their movements, as well as the sending up of all
the necessary supplies, were often matters of extreme difficulty.
Generally the reserves had to bivouac on sodden meadows, the farms in
the neighbourhood being insufficient to provide shelter for them all.
The troops who were withdrawn from the front line and put in reserve
had therefore small opportunity for either rest or recreation.
The insecurity of our communications back into the interior of Belgium
must be passed over almost without mention, except to say that here
too a colossal task had been set; for the weak force allotted to the
General-Governor had not only to garrison Belgium, but to provide
observation posts along the Dutch frontier. In carrying out these
duties, the old _Landsturm_ troops showed a spirit of endurance which
said much for the military training they had received many years
before. The work of keeping watch over the excited population was not
without its dangers, and all praise is due to these garrison troops and
to the auxiliary troops sent from Germany to their assistance. Thanks
to them, the long lines of communication through conquered Belgium were
not disturbed, and the supply of the northern wing of our army suffered
no interruption from the enemy. For the honour of all concerned this
must be put on record.
On the 4th and 7th November the enemy made attacks on a larger scale
along the coast. On the 4th, believing that we had left only weak
outposts behind, even opposite NIEUPORT, when we retired to the eastern
bank of the canal, two to three Belgian regiments advanced through
LOMBARTZYDE. At first they gained a slight success, but were shortly
afterwards attacked by part of the 38th _Landwehr_ Brigade from the
east, and by the 33rd _Ersatz_ Brigade from the south, and driven back.
Detachments of the Marine Division pursued the fleeing Belgians. The
second attack made by about five thousand French troops, which took
place on the 7th, fared far worse; the whole of LOMBARTZYDE was taken
by our counter-attack, and the enemy losses were very heavy.[99]
On the 9th November the 38th _Landwehr_ Brigade was relieved by parts
of the Marine Division, for the 10th November was the day on which the
new offensive was to be made with fresh troops against YPRES from the
south-east.
THE LAST PHASE
When the 4th Division and von Winckler's Guard Division were sent
forward on the 9th November into the northern part of the fighting
line, formerly occupied by the XV Corps, the II Bavarian Corps, from
the heights of ST. ELOI it had just stormed, was able to look right
down on YPRES. The orders of the Sixth Army commander, dated the
7th and 8th November, had given all the necessary instructions for
the employment of the new units. The 4th Infantry Division and von
Winckler's Guard Division were placed under the commander of the
Guard Corps, General Baron von Plettenberg, and were to be called
Plettenberg's Corps. The XV Corps and Plettenberg's Corps formed the
Army Group Linsingen.[100]
The task set the troops of General von Linsingen was 'to drive back
and crush the enemy lying north of the canal (COMINES-YPRES); the
main weight of the attack is to be delivered by the left wing. The
Army Group Fabeck is to maintain its positions west of the canal,
its task being to continue pressing forward and at the same time to
support the attack of the left wing of the Army Group Linsingen, by as
powerful enfilade fire as possible from its right flank batteries.' The
decisive attack was to begin on the 10th November, when another strong
reinforcement of engineers would have arrived. All the other units of
the Sixth Army and the whole of the Fourth Army were also, according to
arrangement, to attack on this day with increased energy, so that the
enemy should be allowed no rest, and held to his positions along the
whole front.
On the stroke of 7 A.M. the Fourth Army advanced to the attack. This
tenth day of November was to be a famous one in its history. The
sectors of attack for each of the Corps remained, generally speaking,
the same, except that the left wing of the XXVII Reserve Corps had been
closed in slightly to the north. Strengthened by the Guard _Jäger_
Battalion, a Guard Machine-Gun Detachment[101] and the 9th Machine-Gun
Detachment, this Corps was to advance towards the POLYGON Wood.
The orders for the XXII Reserve Corps ran as follows: 'The XXII Reserve
Corps[102] in co-operation with the Marine Division will secure the
YSER canal front, and will take DIXMUDE.' Immediately north of DIXMUDE
the 4th _Ersatz_ Division was in position, with the 43rd Reserve
Division to the east and south, the two divisions together making a
semicircle of steel round the objective. This time our troops were
determined to take the town so stubbornly defended by the French
infantry. The enemy fully realised the importance of this bridge-head.
Besides holding a strong German force always in the vicinity, it
covered the canal-crossing nearest to Calais. On the 9th its garrison
was further reinforced by the arrival of fresh French troops.
The rain of the previous days had made the ground over which the attack
on DIXMUDE was to be carried out very heavy going. The HANDZAEME canal,
running east and west, divides it into two parts, the northerly one
being particularly swampy and difficult to cross. The main attack had
therefore to be made from the east and south-east on a comparatively
narrow front. The town itself comprised both modern and obsolete
fortifications, but the first strongholds of the defenders were the
railway buildings and cemetery situated to the east of it. The railway
embankment had been transformed into a very strong defensive position,
and a heavy fire was expected from it when we advanced from the high
embankments of the YSER. Under the cover of darkness the division was
able to push its front line to an assault position within two hundred
yards of the enemy, and at dawn on the 10th the artillery bombardment
began. Our heaviest guns took part and countless shells from our
_Minenwerfer_ did their utmost to break down the enemy's resistance.
By 7.40 A.M. our first attempt to take the enemy's advanced positions
had failed, and another artillery bombardment against his obstacles and
flanking posts was ordered. At 9.30 A.M. the advanced stronghold at
the cemetery was stormed. Our infantry had scarcely got into position
there before the artillery observers arrived to direct the fire of
their batteries from the front line on to the next strong point. The
artillery bombardment lasted throughout the morning until 1 P.M. when
the general assault was ordered. The infantry, with detachments of
sappers carrying hand-grenades and various material useful in an
assault, had worked its way forward close up to the line of obstacles.
The 201st Reserve Infantry Regiment advanced rapidly at first by
frontal attack. North of it, the 15th Reserve _Jäger_ Battalion under
Captain Hameln worked forward across the deep marshes between the
canal and the railway. The 202nd Reserve Infantry Regiment came under
a heavy enfilade fire from the YSER embankment, and at 1.30 P.M.
orders were issued for the Corps reserve under Colonel Teetzmann,
consisting of a few battalions of the 43rd Reserve Division and of the
4th _Ersatz_ Division, to be brought up into the line. Its task was
to help carry forward the attack of the 202nd Regiment against the
railway embankment, and to secure the left flank of the advance. The
nearer the attack approached to the town, the more desperate became
the resistance of its defenders. The gallant commander of the 201st
Reserve Regiment, General von Seydewitz, always in the front line
encouraging his men, was killed leading the attack just as his regiment
and the _Jäger_ entered the devastated town at about 3.30 P.M. Our
well-directed artillery fire had cleared the front at the critical
moment, and the enemy withdrew to the flanks of and behind DIXMUDE, but
did not cease to offer resistance. He held the railway embankment south
of the town with particular tenacity. Even when this had been finally
stormed, the 202nd Regiment had to continue the fight, with heavy loss,
among the burning houses in the southern part of the town, until the
201st Regiment by a wheel southwards were able to give assistance.
Teetzmann's brigade in its attack on the YSER embankment, to protect
the flank of the division, had meanwhile reached the river. Thence it
pressed on towards the bridges west of the town, so that the enemy's
retreat was threatened. In spite of this, however, he gave nothing
up without a struggle, and every block of houses had to be captured:
in fact the street fighting that ensued was hardly less bitter and
terrible than at WYTSCHAETE and MESSINES.
During the struggle in DIXMUDE, the French artillery fired into the
place regardless of friend or foe, and both suffered alike. The fight
was still raging among the houses at the northern exit, where von
Beerst was only making slow progress with the advanced detachments of
the 4th _Ersatz_ Division, when our reserves were assembled in the
market-square to deliver the final blow. The French infantry and Marine
Fusiliers put up a desperate defence, but finally had to give way, for
though not numerically superior, the offensive spirit of the German
troops overcame all resistance. It was not until the west bank of the
canal had been reached, that the mass of the enemy put up another
defence.
DIXMUDE was captured, and the French had been driven back across the
canal. A combined counter-attack by Belgians, Zouaves and French, which
began during the evening and continued into the night, was unable to
alter the situation, and though DIXMUDE in consequence was under the
heaviest fire, our troops held their ground. Weak detachments of the
4th _Ersatz_ Division were even able to cross the river north of the
town under cover of darkness, though the extreme swampiness of the
ground prevented them carrying their success any further. The enemy had
prepared the bridges, west of DIXMUDE, for demolition some time before
and had constructed strong positions along the west bank of the YSER.
These were especially good, as the ground there is higher and overlooks
that on the east bank. Our artillery had therefore to make another
preparatory bombardment. The spoils taken at DIXMUDE were considerable,
and in spite of the fact that the British assert that the Allies only
lost a few hundred men, we took in prisoners alone 17 officers and 1400
men.[103]
[Illustration: THE CAPTURE OF DIXMUDE.
ON NOVEMBER 10TH. 1914.]