ON OCTOBER 31ST. 1914.]
After sufficient artillery preparation the British stronghold of
GHELUVELT was to be attacked from south and east simultaneously.
Colonel von Aldershausen, commanding the 105th Infantry Regiment, was
to direct the attack from the east. Besides two battalions of his own
regiment, there were placed under his command the 1st Battalion of the
143rd Infantry Regiment and a strong mixed detachment from the 54th
Reserve Division, mainly belonging to the 245th Reserve Regiment and
the 26th Reserve _Jäger_ Battalion. The 99th Infantry Regiment was to
make the attack from the south.[68] During the morning, in spite of
the heaviest fighting, no success was achieved, and isolated attacks
were repulsed by British counter-movements. At about 11 A.M. our
converging attack was begun. The commanders of the 54th Reserve and
30th Infantry Divisions with their artillery leaders, as well as the
general commanding the XV Corps, were again in the foremost lines,
though the last, General von Deimling, was wounded almost at once by
a shell-splinter. Towards midday the attack began to gain ground. His
Majesty the Kaiser, who had arrived at the battle headquarters of
the Sixth Army, watched the infantry working its way through the maze
of the enemy's obstacles and entrenchments. It was well supported by
artillery, some of the guns being moved forward with the front line.
The British and French artillery fired as rapidly as they knew how,[69]
and over every bush, hedge and fragment of wall floated a thin film of
smoke, betraying a machine-gun rattling out bullets. But it was all of
no avail: the attackers kept on advancing. More hostile strongholds
were constantly being discovered; even all the points known to be of
importance could not be given sufficient bombardments by our artillery,
so that many attacks had to be delivered against fresh troops in good
sheltered entrenchments untouched by our guns.[70] Many of our gallant
men were killed, and the officers, who were the first to rise in the
assault, were the special target of the enemy's sharpshooters, well
trained in long colonial wars.[71] Once our troops entered an enemy's
position, the resistance was only slight, and the German showed his
superiority in single combat. It was only the enemy's counter-attacks,
delivered with remarkable accuracy and rapidity, that regained some
of his lost ground, but they did not, however, compromise the general
success of the day. The XXVII Reserve Corps pressed forward into the
dense woods near REUTEL,[72] which were defended by a strong system of
obstacles and by a quantity of machine-guns, hidden in some cases up in
trees.[73]
While this was in progress the last assault on GHELUVELT was taking
place. The attacks from east and south both broke into the village,
and by 3 P.M. the whole place with its château and park was in German
possession.[74] Colonel von Hügel took his storming parties of the
54th Reserve Division northwards through and beyond the village, while
Captain Reiner galloped his batteries close up to it. It was then,
however, that fresh hostile reserves were launched against GHELUVELT.
The 16th Reserve Regiment of the 6th Bavarian Reserve Division was
hurried up to meet them, its gallant commander, Colonel List, dying a
hero's death during the movement. For a short time our own artillery
fired into the backs of the Bavarian ranks: for the men were wearing
caps and were thus mistaken for British troops. Nevertheless the
enemy's counter-attack failed and GHELUVELT became and remained ours,
and we captured besides 17 officers and 1000 men, and 3 guns.[75]
The enemy prevented our further advance beyond GHELUVELT by a heavy
fire from a new and strong position along the edge of the woods west
of GHELUVELT. Here a new fortress had been made, which would have to
be broken down by our artillery before it could be attacked. On the
left wing of the XV Corps the German assaults also failed in front of
some small woods which had been turned into strong points; the 39th
Infantry Division was able to advance only some 500 yards, though it
took a number of prisoners.[76] The artillery of the XV Corps had an
accidental success on this day which must have interfered with the
enemy's staff work for some time. During the bombardment of HOOGE, a
direct hit was made on a house in which the Staff of the 1st British
Division were working: one general and several staff officers were
killed.[77] After heavy fighting at close quarters the II Bavarian
Corps gained ground along the whole of its wide sector of attack on
the 31st October. The right wing took possession of the edges of the
woods west of HOLLEBEKE, whilst the left of the Corps advanced as far
as OOSTTAVERNE. The 6th Bavarian Reserve Division had been brought into
line immediately south of it, in order to make the attack on WYTSCHAETE.
We now come to the most vital point of the battle: who was to be the
victor in the fight for the WYTSCHAETE-MESSINES ridge? The 6th Bavarian
Reserve Division had worked forward by daylight towards WYTSCHAETE,
regardless of the heavy artillery fire directed from the high ground
on our troops moving up from the valley.[78] At nightfall the left
wing of the II Bavarian Corps was still hanging back, unable to
break the strong resistance opposed to it, but in spite of this the
Bavarian Reserve Division dared to make its attack. The 17th Reserve
Infantry Regiment was to enter WYTSCHAETE from the east and the 21st
from the south. All the preparations had been carefully made. The men
wore white arm-bands as a distinguishing mark when at close quarters
with the enemy in the darkness. Water bottles were packed away in the
haversacks; rifles were unloaded and bayonets fixed. It was hoped to
take the enemy by surprise, and not a light betrayed our arrival in
the assembly positions. The hostile artillery fire slackened during the
night, but frequent star-shells lighted up the darkness and showed that
our opponents were keeping a careful watch. The clear moon must have
helped them to see our movements. At 2 A.M. (1st Nov.) the Bavarians
advanced from their assembly positions, taking little notice of the
enemy's artillery which began to open on them. The general direction of
the attack was given by the windmill of Wytschaete, which was clearly
outlined in the moonlight against the sky. The 17th Reserve Infantry
Regiment under Colonel Hofmann rapidly reached the edge of the village
and pushed through to the western exit. The surprise had succeeded, and
numbers of the enemy who still held out in isolated ruins were either
killed in a hand-to-hand fight, or taken prisoner.[79] Unfortunately,
however, our own guns continued to bombard the village, as the news
of the victory of the 17th Regiment was not communicated to them
sufficiently quickly. At about 6 A.M. Colonel Hofmann therefore
decided to withdraw his victorious troops temporarily to the eastern
edge of WYTSCHAETE, and to reorganise there. It so happened that the
21st Reserve Regiment arrived on the southern side of the village at
this moment, its advance having been delayed by a heavy enfilade fire
from the south-west. When the men of the 21st Regiment in the first dim
light of dawn saw the figures of men wearing caps running eastwards
among the ruins, they immediately opened fire on them. Nevertheless, in
spite of the losses incurred through this mistake, the 17th Regiment
held its ground at the eastern edge of the village. The error was
quickly remedied by singing patriotic songs and by flag-signals, and
communication was regained with the neighbouring infantry and with
the artillery. A strong counter-attack, however, was now made by six
regiments of the XVI French Corps, which had arrived during the night,
and the gallant 17th had slowly to withdraw again from the high ground.
The fighting around MESSINES on the 31st had been equally severe. On
the 30th the 26th Infantry Division under Duke William of Urach had
already got its patrols up to the edge of the village, but before any
assault could be made an artillery preparation was required, especially
against the northern sector. On the morning of the 31st October our
howitzers and trench-mortars bombarded the enemy in his trenches, and
by 10.30 A.M. the moment had arrived for the Würtemburg troops to
advance.
The 122nd Fusilier Regiment was to attack the ridge north of MESSINES,
along which runs the road to WYTSCHAETE, whilst the 125th Infantry
Regiment was to advance against MESSINES itself, and the 119th
Grenadier Regiment against the enemy's trenches immediately south of
it. The hostile position was so strong that a force greatly inferior in
strength would be able to hold it against an attack coming up from the
valley. Bare sloping ground lay in front of it, and only a few hedges
limited the field of view, so that every advance and assembly position
for miles round could be seen. A strong British garrison held MESSINES:
the trenches had been well made, and were covered by a continuous and
broad system of obstacles.[80]
[Illustration: THE CAPTURE OF MESSINES.
ON OCTOBER 31ST. 1914 BY THE 26TH. INFANTRY DIVISION.]
The way in which the Swabian troops[81] broke down the enemy's
resistance was indeed a masterpiece. Neither the enemy's artillery
fire, which imperilled the advance of the reserves, nor the British
machine-guns, a large number of which enfiladed the attack from the
south, could restrain the dash of the Würtemburg troops. At 11 A.M. the
125th Stuttgart Infantry Regiment had got possession of the north-east
corner of MESSINES. The road entering the village from GAPAARD was
blocked by a barricade; and after storming it, another one, a hundred
yards further inside the village, closed the way. The streets could
not be used for our advance, being choked with debris, and under heavy
rifle and machine-gun fire, so the attackers had to make their way
through or over the walls. There are a number of large, well-built
houses in MESSINES, which the enemy had turned into a succession of
strongholds, but they were rapidly blown up by our sappers. The convent
looked especially impregnable with its walls a yard thick, and strong
towers from which machine-guns and rifles fired frantically. Captain
Heinrich's Würtemburg battery of the 65th Field Artillery Regiment was
therefore brought up, the men dragging the guns through the streets,
as horses could not move along them, and the infantry carrying up
the ammunition. The convent was soon in flames, burying its stubborn
defenders under its ruins. Lieutenant Mösner of the 125th Infantry
Regiment, following a narrow footpath through gardens and backyards,
was the first to make an entry into the market-square. With a few
stout-hearted followers he occupied a large building there which he
defended without any support till the evening against great odds. Not
until nightfall were others of his regiment able to reach him, and
secure the position he had held so courageously. This day of street
fighting had cost very dear, and our casualty list was a large one. A
part of the 122nd Fusilier Regiment fighting north of MESSINES had also
had to be directed on to the village, and by the evening a continuous
line had been successfully formed through the centre of it. Isolated
fighting continued throughout the night, and in order to keep up
communication amidst the ruins and recognise one another in the dark,
the Würtemburg troops sang folk-songs. The chorus of voices mixed with
the rattle of machine-guns, the roar of artillery in the streets, and
the crackle of the burning and falling houses, all combined to make a
magnificent and unsurpassed piece of battle-music.
North of the village the left wing of the 122nd Infantry Regiment
established itself on the MESSINES-WYTSCHAETE road: but its right wing
was unable to capture the high ground, as WYTSCHAETE itself was still
in British hands. The 119th Grenadiers suffered severely: the progress
of the other regiment of their brigade, the 125th Infantry Regiment,
had roused their ambition, but a heavy enfilade fire swept their ranks
from the south where the Cavalry Corps were still unable to advance.
They were compelled by heavy losses to be content with the task of
securing the left flank of their division.
On the evening of the 31st the gallant attackers were rewarded for
their deeds of immortal fame by a message of warm praise from the
Emperor.
The final objective, however, had not yet been attained, although in
the south the high ground had been reached and artillery observers sent
forward there, so that the enemy's positions could be accurately ranged
on right up to Mount KEMMEL. The main pressure of the attack would
therefore have to be continued here, on the left wing of the Army Group
Fabeck.
During the 1st November the 3rd Infantry Division arrived in the area
COMINES-WARNETON, north of the LYS, as reserve to the Army Group.
On the morning of the 1st November a thick mist lay over the country,
so that the infantry got a few hours' rest before the continuous
shelling of the enemy's artillery began. As soon as the mist cleared,
the battle broke out anew, on a twelve-mile front. In the north the
Saxon and Würtemburg divisions of the XXVII Reserve Corps further
extended their successes of the previous days. The line was advanced
up to the château of POEZELHOEK, which was taken from the 1st British
Division after a heavy fight.[82]
The divisions of Deimling's XV Corps attacked with the right wing on
the GHELUVELT-YPRES main road and the left on KLEIN ZILLEBEKE. They
advanced but slowly, fighting hard the whole day. The small, dense
woods, defended with the utmost tenacity, again made progress very
difficult. The 30th Division managed to reach the eastern edge of the
HERENTHAGE Wood, where the 3rd British Cavalry Division, supported
by infantry, was in position. The wood north of ZANDVOORDE gave
exceptional trouble, but it was finally outflanked on both sides, and
its defenders taken prisoner.[83]
The II Bavarian Corps advanced to the attack on both sides of the
COMINES-YPRES canal, and drove the enemy back as far as the sharp bend
in it. The left wing captured the small wood west of OOSTTAVERNE which
was defended by Indian and British troops. The treacherous methods of
the Indians greatly exasperated our men: crouching in the hedges, and
with machine-guns concealed up trees, the defeated Asiatics allowed
our troops to pass them, and then got up and stabbed them in the back
with their knives.[84] The 6th Bavarian Reserve Division had withdrawn,
on the morning of the 1st November, to its positions of the previous
evening, and at midday began its attack once more. Confidence and
enthusiasm served to obliterate the bad memories of the past night, and
the dense lines now rose simultaneously from their positions as if on
parade. Very many of their dead or wounded still lay at the foot of the
heights, but the gallant division stormed the slopes again, and by 4
P.M. had reached the eastern edge of WYTSCHAETE. It was not possible to
push up reserves owing to heavy artillery fire, and at this moment the
enemy counter-attacked with two fresh divisions.[85] The Bavarians, who
had become disorganised during the assault, were forced to evacuate the
village again under cover of darkness, after having actually entered
it at about 5 P.M. They had suffered very heavily during the attack,
being fired at from flank and rear, for the right wing of the 26th
Infantry Division was unable to take all the high ground north-west of
MESSINES until the evening of the 1st November. Fierce street fighting
had gone on in MESSINES throughout the day, till finally the Würtemburg
troops gained the upper hand and cleared the enemy out of the village
to its western edge. The British were driven back down the western
slope of the ridge, and had to entrench themselves in the valley,
losing heavily in the operation. As soon as its right wing reached the
MESSINES-WYTSCHAETE road that evening the 26th Infantry Division held
almost the whole of the famous ridge, and the preliminary condition
for the capture of WYTSCHAETE was obtained. The 6th Bavarian Reserve
Division, however, was not able to carry out a third assault without
assistance, and General von Fabeck during the night of the 1st-2nd
therefore advanced the 3rd Prussian Division from its assembly area
WAMBEKE-GARDE DIEU into the fighting line, in order to carry forward
the attack through and beyond WYTSCHAETE towards KEMMEL.
After a comparatively quiet night the battle opened again on the
morning of the 2nd November along the whole front of the Army Group
Fabeck. His indefatigable troops, some of whom had already endured
twelve days of the heaviest fighting that had taken place in the
campaign, attacked their strongly entrenched opponent once more. The
enemy was at least as strong as they were in fighting units on the
battle-front, and besides was able to bring up reinforcements of newly
arrived British and French troops.[86]
On the eastern side of the _Ypres_ salient General von Deimling
attacked on a front of nearly four miles. His Corps, which had won its
laurels in Alsace, in Lorraine and in Northern France, again, in spite
of heavy casualties, continued its advance of the previous days. The
30th Division entered VELDHOEK and established itself firmly in the
north-eastern corner of the HERENTHAGE WOOD.[87] The attack had been
facilitated by a simultaneous advance of the XXVII Reserve Corps,
which had pressed forward some hundred yards north of VELDHOEK. Von
Deimling's left wing had advanced in the direction of KLEIN ZILLEBEKE,
but was held up by the difficult wooded country east of ZWARTELEEN. It
had to wait here for assistance from the neighbouring troops on its
left.
The II Bavarian Corps had been held up early on the morning of the
2nd November by strong hostile counter-attacks in the sector west of
HOLLEBEKE. They were all, however, repulsed and the Corps was even able
to make a slight advance on the right wing during the day.
WYTSCHAETE was again the centre of the heaviest fighting on this
day.[88] The Bavarian Reserve Division was, at its own request, to
attack the village; the enemy's position immediately south of it
was allotted as objective to the 3rd Division. The 42nd Infantry
Regiment and an _Abtheilung_ (3 batteries) of the 17th Field Artillery
Regiment remained in Army Reserve. At 7 A.M. a fierce artillery duel
began, and the enemy, quickly realising the danger threatening him,
hurried up strong reserves to WYTSCHAETE. Kiefhaber's brigade of the
6th Bavarian Reserve Division rose to the assault. Under a hail of
shrapnel the youngsters stormed the eastern and southern slopes of the
WYTSCHAETE ridge for the third time, though with considerable loss,
the enemy's machine-guns causing great havoc in their ranks. As soon
as the foremost of them had reached the windmill the enemy launched
a counter-attack; but this time the Bavarians were not content with
simply holding their ground; their supports were brought up at the
critical moment and pressed forward into the village. Furious street
fighting now ensued, and the Bavarians having to deal with every house
became greatly disorganised. Taking advantage of this the British and
French commanders sent forward fresh masses into the line, trying to
turn the balance in their favour at this important point by employing
every available man. It was 3.10 P.M. when a cry for help reached the
Pomeranian (3rd) Division from their Bavarian neighbours, and it was
not uttered in vain. Shortly before, the Stettin Grenadier Regiment
had captured the long-coveted high ground south-west of WYTSCHAETE,
the struggle for a large farmhouse on it having been especially
severe. Without possession of this the south flank of the village
could not be held. Count Gneisenau's Colberg Grenadiers were then sent
forward to support the Bavarians, and the enemy was unable to hold
out in WYTSCHAETE against the rifle-butts and bayonets of the united
Pomeranians and Bavarians. Soon after 5 P.M. the village, as far as its
western edge, was in German hands, although the fighting continued till
well into the night among the ruins with detachments of the enemy who
would not surrender.
By the capture of WYTSCHAETE a fine commanding position had been
obtained, but the village itself, once so pleasant to the view, was
now terrible to look upon. The church was in flames, and the windmill
flared like a beacon in the darkness. Friend and foe lay wounded
side by side among the smouldering ruins. The enemy was fully aware
of the importance of WYTSCHAETE, but he had been so weakened that he
was unable to recover for another big counter-attack. He therefore
contented himself with small and fruitless efforts, only one of
which succeeded in temporarily entering the village during the 3rd.
Nevertheless for the next few days it lay under the constant fire of
heavy artillery, though our heroic observers did not allow this to
interfere with their work.
Many of the inhabitants still remained in WYTSCHAETE, as in MESSINES,
and it was pathetic to see how they clung to their devastated patches
of ground, regardless of danger. In spite of many offers from the
Germans, these Belgian inhabitants remained with their last scrap of
property, preferring to die by the shell that destroyed their homes.
A small wood north-west of WYTSCHAETE, called the Park, was still
a dangerous point. This dense copse was surrounded by a system of
trenches and several rows of obstacles. With the help of skilfully
sited flanking arrangements and shell-proof shelters, it had been
turned into an almost impregnable stronghold, and cost us many days of
heavy fighting before it was finally taken.
The 26th Infantry Division, after its capture of MESSINES, immediately
put the high ground into a state of defence. Its left brigade, the
51st, which was in position there, was relieved on the 2nd November
by the 11th _Landwehr_ Brigade, and sent back to the Army Reserve.
The 52nd Brigade, on the right wing of the division, in co-operation
with the 3rd Infantry Division, advanced across the STEENBEEK stream.
However, no progress of importance could be made there, as every
movement could be immediately brought under most effective artillery
fire from the commanding positions on Mount KEMMEL.[89]
On the 3rd November the formation of a 'Group Urach' was ordered,
consisting of the 3rd and 26th Infantry Divisions, to continue the
attack against the high ground east of KEMMEL; but in the following
days it was unable to make any essential alteration in the general
situation in this sector.
A part of the Army Cavalry was still in action south of, and
co-operating with, the 26th Infantry Division, in spite of the small
force of artillery and engineers included in it. On the 2nd November
it made a surprise attack on foot against the farm KLEIN DOUVE with
complete success.[90] On the 4th November the I Cavalry Corps was
relieved by the II, consisting of the 3rd and 7th Cavalry Divisions.
In the early days of November the conduct of the enemy's operations
against the Army Group Fabeck underwent a very noticeable change.
The German attacks had destroyed any prospect of success for the
big offensive movement which had been planned. The British troops,
especially the I and IV Corps,[91] were so played out that they had
to be relieved by parts of the French Army. The enemy's commanders,
however, realised that even these fresh troops would be unable to make
much headway against our men, and they therefore decided to remain on
the defensive and to create a deep zone of trench-systems. The heavy
fighting had made havoc of their front trenches, or at least had badly
damaged them. The civil population and all other available labour,
therefore, were now called upon to dig successive lines of rearward
positions for a long way westwards.[92] These preparations were soon
discovered by our airmen.