his attacking troops on the far side of the canal, behind whom a
sheet of water, 2000 to 3000 yards broad, was constantly deepening.
The decision was an exceedingly hard one for him to make, yet it had
to be done. The attack would have to be given up and the greater
part of the western bank of the river evacuated. The order was
issued and carried out during the night of the 30th-31st October. In
spite of the dangers due to the altered appearance of the country
and the consequent difficulty in finding the way, and although the
Franco-Belgian artillery kept the YSER crossings under constant
heavy fire, the withdrawal was a brilliant success. Not a wounded
man nor rifle fell into the enemy's hands, and the movement was so
well covered that the enemy did not notice we had disengaged until
it was too late. A small detachment of gallant Brandenburgers under
Lieutenant Buchholz remained behind for a long time in PERVYSE. In
front of them the enemy was sweeping the village with artillery
and infantry fire and behind them was the edge of an apparently
boundless sea. A French colonel offered Lieutenant Buchholz honourable
conditions if he would surrender; but he indignantly rejected the
offer: his only answer to the colonel was to slip off with his little
band of followers. They rejoined their unit successfully. The enemy
only followed up slowly along the roads, with weak detachments of
infantry. Our rear-guards remained west of the canal on the line ST.
GEORGE-STUYVEKENSKERKE, whilst the main body on the 31st took up its
new position east of the YSER as follows: the 5th Reserve Division
north of the main road ST. PIERRE CAPPELLE-MANNEKENSVERE; the 4th
_Ersatz_ Division in the area MANNEKENSVERE-SCHOORE; and the 6th
Reserve Division to the south of it. One battalion and one battery
of the 4th _Ersatz_ Division remained facing NIEUPORT, extending
northwards to the coast. A new defensive position was selected along
the line WESTENDE-MANNEKENSVERE-SCHOORE-KASTEELHOEK: a continuation of
the attack was now out of the question, as the water was still rising
west of the YSER. On 31st October and 1st November, however, the XXII
Reserve Corps again tried to press its attack southwards on the east
bank of the river, in order to isolate the DIXMUDE bridge-head, but
here also the ever-rising flood soon prevented movement, and on the
evening of the 1st these brave troops also had to yield to the forces
of nature and withdraw behind the YSER. This operation was carried out
in bright moonlight on the night of the 1st-2nd, and was unmolested by
the enemy, for he lay in his position exhausted and heedless. Thus for
the time being DIXMUDE remained in possession of the French.
The Army Commander had issued definite instructions on the evening of
the 24th October to the XXIII, XXVI and XXVII Reserve Corps to the
effect that they were to maintain and strengthen their positions, and
take every opportunity of seizing important points on their immediate
front. In the execution of this order the German troops experienced
a good deal of heavy fighting during the subsequent days. The XXVII
Reserve Corps succeeded in capturing REUTEL and holding it;[43]
but in the meantime heavy hostile attacks were begun against the
XXIII, XXVI and the extreme right wing of the XXVII Reserve Corps.
The British, continually reinforced by the arrival of French units,
endeavoured to break through, and used all their strength. Indeed,
in many places the situation of these German volunteer corps became
critical. Thanks to his good observation posts the enemy was able to
keep our roads of advance and communications under artillery fire. As
the roads were already broken up by the constant rain, the ammunition
supply of our artillery, inferior in any case to our opponents',
failed. Nevertheless, in spite of all difficulties our counter-attacks
continued. The fighting was especially severe on the front of the XXVI
and XXVII Reserve Corps on 25th, 26th and 27th October. In this sector
the British and French made a succession of attacks in the direction
POELKAPPELLE, PASSCHENDAELE and east of ZONNEBEKE. The 37th _Landwehr_
Brigade and the 2nd _Ersatz_ Brigade, under the command of General
von Meyer, had to be sent up into the fighting line, in addition to
detachments of the Marine Division and of the 38th _Landwehr_ Brigade.
These _Landwehr_ men, far from being weighed down by their years,
gave effective support to the terribly thinned ranks of their younger
friends, and the line was restored. In the heat of the fighting on the
evening of the 26th General von Meyer was mortally wounded: may his
memory be duly honoured.
An exceptionally heavy British and French attack was delivered on the
24th and 25th near ZONNEBEKE, against the inner flanks of the XXVI and
XXVII Reserve Corps. The points of junction of formations are always
the weakest parts of the defence, and when the General Staff Officer
of the XXVII Reserve Corps asked for the support of the Corps on his
right, he received the reply that no infantry could be spared 'for the
enemy....' And at that moment the telephone circuit failed. There was
nothing to do but close the gap between the two Corps by an artillery
barrage, and to trust to the skill of the troops and their leaders.
The Saxon gunners of the 53rd Reserve Division shelled the advancing
enemy as fast as they were able, and by this aid the infantry was
finally enabled to come up and close the gap again. At the same time
the enemy made a strong attack further to the south. The report came in
that he had surrounded BECELAERE; but before his supports could assist
him, the bayonets of the 54th Reserve Division had driven back his
assaulting troops.[44] The Corps was able to hold its old line from the
cross-roads east of ZONNEBEKE through REUTEL to POEZELHOEK. Comparative
quiet followed on the 28th and morning of the 29th, for both sides were
very exhausted. On the 28th the 6th Bavarian Reserve Division arrived
at DADIZEELE as Army Reserve.
The Army Cavalry of the Sixth Army, consisting of eight Cavalry
Divisions and several _Jäger_ battalions under General von der Marwitz,
was in action on the left of the Fourth Army. It closed the gap between
the latter and the infantry of the Sixth Army, which lay half-way
between WARNETON and ARMENTIÈRES. The enemy could not be attacked
here by any form of mounted action; so far from this being possible,
ground could be gained only by wearisome fighting on foot, to which the
cavalrymen were unaccustomed. Nevertheless they carried out this task
in brilliant fashion, and whilst the southern wing, in a bad position
and scarcely entrenched at all, stubbornly held up the British who were
streaming down from the high ground about WYTSCHAETE and MESSINES,[45]
the 3rd, 7th and Bavarian Cavalry Divisions, with the 4th, 9th and 10th
_Jäger_ battalions and five battalions of the 11th _Landwehr_ Brigade
brought forward from Lille, advanced under General von Stetten to the
assault of the line KRUISEIK-ZANDVOORDE and west of it. This direction
was taken in order to be able to attack from the south against the
rear of the enemy holding up the XXVII Reserve Corps. The 25th to
29th October were memorable and glorious days for this Cavalry Corps.
Among other achievements, the 3rd Cavalry Division was able to capture
KRUISEIK on the 26th after heavy street fighting.[46] In co-operation
with the left wing of the XXVII Reserve Corps, next to which the
16th Bavarian Reserve Infantry Regiment of the 6th Bavarian Reserve
Division had been placed, taking a prominent part in the fighting under
Colonel List, General von Stetten, on the 29th, carried forward the
attack against GHELUVELT, the key of the enemy's position. More than
600 British prisoners and 5 machine-guns were taken by our victorious
cavalry.[47] Simultaneously on this day, the troops of General von
Stetten filled another rôle. They were covering the concentration of
new German forces which was in the course of completion behind their
battle-front.
THE ATTEMPT TO BREAK THROUGH SOUTH OF YPRES
Throughout the fighting of the Fourth Army during October, the Sixth
Army under Crown Prince Rupert of Bavaria had remained on the offensive
on the line ARRAS-LA BASSÉE--east of ARMENTIÈRES;[48] but although
fresh reinforcements had been sent up to that part of the front by the
German General Staff, a break-through had not been possible. Both sides
had gradually changed their objectives and now merely sought to prevent
any movement of the opposing forces from that front to the decisive
zone of operations between NIEUPORT and YPRES. Any weakness in the
enemy's line, however, was utilised to gain new and improved positions
from which another effort to break through might be made as soon as
possible. Owing to the failure of the offensive south of NIEUPORT,
a decision under the conditions existing there could not be hoped
for; the German General Staff therefore began considering a plan for
concentrating a strong new army of attack between the Fourth and the
Sixth Armies behind the position occupied by the Army Cavalry, and for
breaking through with it on the front WERWICQ-WARNETON, south of YPRES.
On 27th October Lieut.-General von Falkenhayn arrived at the
Headquarters of the Sixth Army to discuss this operation. The plan was
arranged and orders were issued accordingly. A new 'Army Group' was
to be affiliated to the Sixth Army, under the command of General von
Fabeck, commander of the XIII Würtemburg Corps.[49] It would consist
of the II Bavarian and the XV Corps (now on its way up from the south
to join the Sixth Army), the 6th Bavarian Reserve Division (still in
reserve to the Fourth Army), and the 26th Würtemburg Division (of the
Sixth Army, which was about to be relieved by the 48th Reserve Division
recently arrived from the Fifth Army). In addition to these formations
all the available heavy artillery of the Sixth Army would be brought
up to assist, and if necessary the attacks further south would be
partially discontinued. The offensive was to take place on the 30th
October from the general line WERWICQ-DEULEMONT in a north-easterly
direction. In the meantime the 3rd Division of the II Corps was also
to be brought up by rail to LILLE. The orders of the German General
Staff pointed out that the united co-operation of the Fourth and Sixth
Armies was an essential condition for the success of the operation.
Crown Prince Rupert of Bavaria therefore ordered the entire right wing
and centre of the Sixth Army to continue their holding attacks, and
Duke Albert of Würtemburg ordered a general attack of his Army for the
30th October.
How the flooding of the YSER on the front of the right wing of the
Fourth Army brought the offensive of the III and XXII Reserve Corps to
a standstill has already been described. From the 1st November the 4th
_Ersatz_ Division took over the protection of the line of the flooded
area from the coast to TERVAETE, whilst the III Reserve Corps was moved
southwards to the district ZARREN-STADEN in order to reinforce the
XXIII or XXVI Reserve Corps, as the situation might require.[50] To
the XXII Reserve Corps was allotted the task of holding the two French
divisions stationed in the DIXMUDE bridge-head, which formed a constant
threat to the German front. The Corps carried out this task admirably.
On the morning of the 30th October the XXIII, XXVI and XXVII Reserve
Corps advanced to the attack as ordered. The first-named under General
von Kleist succeeded in storming and holding the ruins of BIXSCHOOTE.
After five hours' desperate fighting, the 211th and 216th Reserve
Infantry Regiments entered the devastated village which had been
occupied by two French infantry regiments. Its low-lying situation,
and the hopelessness of finding cover among the battered houses,
resulted in the victorious German regiments being exposed to a very
heavy artillery fire to such an extent, that the casualties in the
village were greater than during the assault. In consequence the
commander decided to withdraw and take up a line along the northern
edge of BIXSCHOOTE, leaving in the village itself only sufficient
outposts to repulse hostile counter-attacks. The division on the
left wing of the Corps also made progress and reached the main road
BIXSCHOOTE-LANGEMARCK in places. The XXVI Reserve Corps attacked
LANGEMARCK with its right wing, but was unable to take it. In spite of
gallant efforts only a few hundred yards of ground were gained by the
evening of the 31st, when these useless attacks were stopped by order.
The centre and left wing of this Corps as well as the right wing of the
XXVII Reserve Corps were held to their positions by superior hostile
artillery fire, and also by mass attacks of the British and French
during the 30th and 31st. The II and IX French Corps had just arrived,
and in the presence of General Joffre an attempt to break through
our line was to be made on this sector of the front.[51] The German
defenders, however, held stoutly to their positions, and thus enabled
the offensive of the Army Group of General von Fabeck to take place.
In conjunction with this the centre and left wing of the XXVII Reserve
Corps, under its new commander, General von Schubert, simultaneously
advanced in the direction of GHELUVELT.
During the night of the 27th-28th October the 26th Infantry Division
was relieved in its battle-position west of LILLE by the 48th Reserve
Division, and by the evening of the 29th the assembly of the Army Group
Fabeck was completed without disturbance.
The heavy artillery placed at the disposal of the Army Group consisted
of 8 batteries of mortars, 20 battalions of heavy field-howitzers, each
of 3 batteries, and a 30·5 cm. coast defence mortar.[52] In addition to
the troops already mentioned, the 1st Cavalry Corps, the four _Jäger_
battalions of the Army Cavalry and the 11th _Landwehr_ Brigade were
put under the command of General von Fabeck. On the night of the 30th
October this new army of attack relieved the two northern Cavalry
Corps, and took over their outpost lines. On the following morning the
offensive began.[53] The XV Corps under General von Deimling attacked
south of the MENIN-YPRES road, with its left wing on ZANDVOORDE, the
II Bavarian Corps was on its left, with its left wing on WAMBEKE;
further south again was the 26th Infantry Division with its left wing
on MESSINES. In co-operation with these the 1st Cavalry Corps with the
4th and Guard Cavalry Divisions, strengthened by two battalions of the
XIX Saxon Corps, which was attacking to the left of it, was ordered
to advance on ST. YVES and PLOEGSTEERT Wood. The 6th Bavarian Reserve
Division moved to the line MENIN-WERWICQ. The Army Cavalry which had
been relieved was withdrawn to act as reserve to the Sixth Army, one
Cavalry Corps being placed behind the right wing of the Army to be at
hand to fill up a slight gap which existed between the Fourth Army and
the Army Group Fabeck should it be necessary.
The enemy had intercalated part of the XVI French Corps between the 7th
Division of the IV British Corps and the British Cavalry Corps, before
the advance of von Fabeck's Army; the II and IX French Corps had also
recently arrived[54] on the northern side of the YPRES salient.[55]
Again, therefore, the enemy had a numerical superiority[56] in what was
the second and severest part of the battle on the YSER. The British
in their reports have added together all the German Corps which were
brought up piecemeal for the fighting on the YSER and at YPRES, both
at this period and later on; and they describe the situation so as
to give the impression that they had held up with inferior numbers
the simultaneous attacks of all these Corps from the outset. They go
further and use the figures obtained in this way to turn their defeat
into a victory. They boast of having held out against great odds,
gladly forgetting that their original intention both before and during
the battle had been to overrun our positions and drive us back to the
Rhine.
The character of the fighting which began with the appearance of the
new German Army Group on the scene had almost the savagery of the
Middle Ages in it. The enemy turned every house, every wood and every
wall into a strong point, and each of them had to be stormed by our
men with heavy loss. Even when the first line of these fortifications
had been taken they were confronted by a second one immediately behind
it; for the enemy showed great skill in taking every advantage of the
ground, unfavourable in any case to the attacker. To the east and
south-east of YPRES, even more developed than in the north, there were
thick hedges, wire fences and broad dykes. Numerous woods also of
all sizes with dense undergrowth made the country almost impassable
and most difficult for observation purposes. Our movements were
constantly being limited to the roads which were swept by the enemy's
machine-guns. Owing to the preparatory artillery bombardments the
villages were mostly in ruins by the time the infantry reached them,
but the enemy fought desperately for every heap of stones and every
pile of bricks before abandoning them. In the few village streets
that remained worthy of the name the fighting generally developed
into isolated individual combats, and no description can do adequate
justice to the bravery of the German troops on such occasions. Our men
advanced to the attack as if they were back on the barrack square, and
an Englishman writes: 'They advanced towards us singing patriotic songs
and with their bands playing.' There was such enthusiasm that even the
weakest were carried along by it, and made regardless of losses. The
battle of YPRES in the autumn of 1914 will be a memorial to German
heroism and self-sacrifice for all time, and will long remain a source
of inspiration for the historian and the poet.
By the 29th Field-Marshal French had realised the importance of the
attacks developing from the south-east against YPRES. They threatened
his position along the high ground on the line GHELUVELT-PASSCHENDAELE
and aimed directly at, and by the shortest way to, the town, the pivot
on which all the Franco-British offensive plans rested. On this day,
therefore, the British commander sent up the 7th Division into the
line again, although it had only just been relieved owing to its heavy
losses.[57]
[Illustration: THE ATTACK OF THE ARMY GROUP FABECK.
ON OCTOBER 30TH. 1914.]
Daybreak on the 30th October was dull and misty. Our heavy guns
began the bombardment of the enemy's well-constructed lines at about
7.45 A.M., but observation was made very difficult by the weather
conditions, and could only be carried out from the foremost infantry
lines. The telephonic communication rendered necessary was frequently
cut by the enemy's shells; but, in spite of this, our heavy batteries
were able to make such excellent practice that at the most vital points
of the enemy's position the spirit of the defenders appeared to be
completely broken. The high ground about ZANDVOORDE offers a typical
case. Although only 130 feet high, it was a corner-stone of the British
defence and one of the main observation posts for the artillery. At
9 A.M. our troops charged the hostile position there, and by 11 A.M.
ZANDVOORDE itself was in the possession of the 30th Infantry Division;
the 4th, 10th and 1st Bavarian _Jäger_ battalions of the Army Cavalry
took a great share in the success. Soon afterwards the high ground
north-east and immediately west of the village fell into German hands.
Two whole British squadrons with their machine-guns lay, dead and
wounded, completely annihilated in one meadow on the battlefield.[58]
Further south the II Bavarian Corps had driven back British cavalry
supported by part of the III British Corps. After a severe hand-to-hand
encounter it took possession of the château, and finally also of the
village of HOLLEBEKE. The left wing of the Corps pushed forward as
far as the WAMBEKE stream, north of the village of the same name, but
had here to put in all its reserves to hold its ground against strong
hostile counter-attacks.[59]
On the left of the Bavarians the 26th Infantry Division was engaged
in heavy fighting, the position confronting it being a particularly
strong one. It lay along a prominent ridge from 180 to 250 feet
high,[60] running north and south, eastwards of Mount KEMMEL, and gave
the enemy an extensive view eastwards over our lines. The defence
of this ridge was greatly facilitated by the villages of WYTSCHAETE
and MESSINES on it. These had been turned into fortresses, and were
connected by deep trenches protected by broad wire entanglements.[61]
Owing to observation difficulties, and to the misty weather preventing
the airmen from giving assistance, our artillery was unable from its
positions in the valley to bring a sufficiently heavy bombardment on
the enemy's lines; and, though the Würtemburg troops attacked with
great gallantry, the enemy was too well prepared for the assault. On
the right wing the 122nd Fusilier Regiment (Emperor Franz Joseph of
Austria) took the fortified village of WAMBEKE, and on the left wing
the 51st Infantry Brigade worked forward slowly towards MESSINES. The
ridge north-east of the last-named village was stormed, but the assault
on the locality itself, which was to have been delivered at 7.10 in
the evening, could not get on owing to heavy enfilade fire from the
south which held back the attackers some hundred yards away from its
edge.[62] The Cavalry Corps[63] had gained ground at first, but, in
consequence of their weakness in artillery, they had been unable to
take ST. YVES or to make progress against the strongly fortified wood
south-west of it. The same story describes the day's work of the XIX
Corps[64] fighting to the south of the cavalry.
On the extreme right wing of the Army Group also the attack on the
30th October had not had the success expected. The combined efforts
of the 54th Reserve Division and the right wing of the 30th Division
had not been able to carry us into GHELUVELT.[65] General von Deimling
and Major-General Wild von Hohenborn went forward themselves into the
front line to encourage the men, but the enemy defended his positions
desperately, and held on firmly to the main points of his line. Another
artillery bombardment was therefore considered necessary.
From the enemy's point of view, however, the situation was anything
but rosy on the evening of the 30th October. The entry of General von
Deimling's troops into ZANDVOORDE endangered the southern side of the
YPRES salient, and the capture of HOLLEBEKE brought the Germans within
three miles of YPRES itself. YPRES was indeed in danger. Field-Marshal
French had put Indian troops into the fighting line on the 30th, and he
now brought all the available British and French reserves towards the
line ZANDVOORDE-HOLLEBEKE in order to support the 7th British Division,
which had been fought to a standstill.[66] During the night, therefore,
the fighting never ceased: attacks and counter-attacks continued
along the whole front, and under cover of darkness the indefatigable
Würtemburg troops again tried to storm MESSINES.
On the 31st October the Germans had at first but few fresh troops
to meet the enemy's reinforcements;[67] so the 6th Bavarian Reserve
Division was brought up in readiness north of the LYS behind the II
Bavarian Corps. General von Fabeck had from the outset realised that
the WYTSCHAETE-MESSINES ridge was of decisive importance, and that
every effort must be made to take it; on the 31st, therefore, the main
pressure was to be exerted along the southern sector of attack of the
II Bavarian Corps.
According to the enemy's accounts the 31st October 1914 was one of
the most critical days at his headquarters. For us it was a day of
great glory, and the British state unreservedly in their reports of
the fighting, that the bravery of our men was beyond all praise. It is
true that this last October day of the first war-year did not give us
YPRES, but our semicircle around the town became so reduced that it
was brought within range of our artillery from three sides, and there
could be no more threats of a big hostile offensive based on the YPRES
district. The fact that neither the enemy's commanders nor their troops
gave way under the strong pressure we put on them, but continued to
fight the battle round YPRES, though their situation was most perilous,
gives us an opportunity to acknowledge that there were men of real
worth opposed to us who did their duty thoroughly.
At dawn on Sunday the 31st October, in fine weather, a heavy artillery
bombardment of the new hostile positions was begun on a front of ten
and a half miles. The enemy's batteries were not long in replying;
being so difficult to locate they had not suffered much in the previous
fighting. Terrific artillery fire lasted throughout the morning,
the British and French shells fell long distances behind our lines,
blocking streets and bridges, and devastating the villages as far
back as the LYS, so that any regular transport of supplies became
impossible. At GHELUVELT, however, the important northern corner of the
Army Group Fabeck, the enemy's hail of shells had but little result,
because our capture of the high ground at ZANDVOORDE had made the work
of observation very difficult.