driven the enemy out of HOUTHULST Forest,[29] whilst its sister-division
had advanced north of the STEENEBECK, and with its northern wing
supporting the Corps fighting immediately north of it, had pushed
forward to beyond WOUMEN. On the morning of the 22nd the heavy
artillery opened fire against the French positions on the YSER canal
to prepare the break-through. Unfortunately however only the northern
Division was able to reach the sector allotted to the Corps, and an
Army Order directed the 46th Reserve Division to the south-west against
the line BIXSCHOOTE-LANGEMARCK, in order to help carry forward the
attack of the XXVI Reserve Corps, which was completely held up in front
of the latter place. As a result of this the advance of von Kleist's
Corps also came to a standstill, although it had achieved considerable
fame during the day. In spite of a desperate resistance the 210th
Reserve Regiment stormed the strongly entrenched village of MERCKEM and
the village of LUYGHEM lying north of it; a daring attack by the 209th
and 212th Reserve Regiments broke through the enemy's positions on the
MURTJE VAART, whilst the 46th Reserve Division attempted to overrun the
KORTEBECK sector, supported by the concentrated fire of its artillery
in position along the south-western edge of HOUTHULST Forest. The 216th
Reserve Regiment took MANGELAERE by storm, in doing which its gallant
commander, Colonel von Grothe, was killed at the head of his troops.
The 1st British Division held a strong position along the KORTEBECK, in
touch with the French, and artillery of every calibre near NOORDSCHOOTE
enfiladed the German attack.[30] The British themselves speak of our
attack as a magnificent feat of arms carried out with infinite courage
and brilliant discipline. The men sang songs as they charged through
a hail of bullets in closed ranks up to the enemy's defences. The
212th Reserve Regiment under Colonel Basedow, reinforced and carried
forward by fresh detachments of the 209th Reserve Regiment, pushed its
way into the strongly fortified village of BIXSCHOOTE. The enemy on
our side of the canal, on the line BIXSCHOOTE-LANGEMARCK-ZONNEBEKE,
was threatened with annihilation. BIXSCHOOTE commanded the main road
and the canal-crossing to POPERINGHE, where the enemy was detraining
his reinforcements.[31] The British therefore fought with the courage
of desperation: for not only was the fate of the high ground east
and north-east of YPRES now in the balance, but also the chance of
being able to carry out the great Anglo-French offensive which had
been planned. YPRES and the high ground east of the canal were on
no account to be lost, and furious counter-attacks were therefore
delivered against the intermingled German units. Nevertheless our
gallant volunteers pressed on, using their bayonets and the butts of
their rifles, until the furious hand-to-hand fighting was finally
decided in our favour. At 6.30 that evening BIXSCHOOTE was ours.
Unfortunately, however, owing to an order being misunderstood, it was
lost again during the night: the exhausted attacking troops were to
be relieved under cover of darkness, but they assembled and marched
back before the relieving force had arrived. The enemy, ever watchful,
immediately advanced into the evacuated village and took position
among the ruins. Simultaneously a big hostile counter-attack drove the
46th Reserve Division from the high ground south of KORTEBECK, which it
had captured, and pressed it back beyond the stream again. The spirit
and strength of the young and inexperienced troops seemed to be broken,
and only a few of the subordinate commanders had yet learnt how to deal
with critical situations. Officers of the General Staff and Divisional
Staffs had to help to reorganise the men; they immediately turned and
followed their new leaders, and were taken forward again to the attack.
Thus on the 23rd the high ground south of the KORTEBECK was won back
by the 46th Reserve Division, but BIXSCHOOTE remained lost to us, and
LANGEMARCK could not be captured.[32]
On 22nd October, for the first time, our attack was directed from the
north against YPRES. If the British and French did not intend to give
up their offensive plans, and thereby their last hope of retaking
Belgium and the wealthy provinces of Northern France from the hated
German, they would have to maintain their positions along the YPRES
bridge-head east of the canal between COMINES and the coast. For this
reason the country round YPRES was the central area of the Anglo-French
defence from the beginning to the end of the battle. Our opponents
defended this position on a wide semicircle by successive lines of
trenches and with their best troops. Every wood, every village, every
farm and even every large copse has won for itself a fame of blood.
The reinforcements which Field-Marshal French received in abundance
he placed round YPRES, but not only for defensive purposes; they were
more often used to deliver attack after attack against our young troops
who had been weakened by the hard fighting; and on 23rd October they
were already being employed in this manner against the 46th Reserve
Division.[33] He hoped to use the opportunity of our retirement behind
the KORTEBECK to break through our line and to roll up the part of the
front lying to the north of it as far as the sea, and thus to regain
the initiative and freedom of manoeuvre on this extreme wing.[34]
However, the blow was parried by the 46th Reserve Division. In ragged,
badly placed lines the German units, which had scarcely had time to
reorganise, brought the hostile masses to a standstill and won back in
a counter-attack the ground which they had lost during the night. On
this occasion, also, the gunners shared with the infantry the honours
of the day. The fire of the guns, brought up into the foremost lines,
made wide gaps in the attacking columns and the enemy's losses must
have been terrible. Our own troops had also suffered severely in the
constant fighting and under the everlasting hostile artillery fire.
Some of our regiments had been reduced to half their strength. But in
spite of it the British did not succeed in breaking through between the
XXIII and XXVI Reserve Corps.
The XXVI and XXVII Reserve Corps were by this time completely
held up in front of strongly entrenched positions on the line
LANGEMARCK-ZONNEBEKE-GHELUVELT and opposed to an enemy who was
becoming stronger every day and making the most desperate efforts to
regain his freedom of action and begin a big offensive himself. The
XXVI Reserve Corps, which advanced on the morning of the 20th, the
51st Reserve Division from the area west of ROULERS, and the other
Division from MORSLEDE, encountered a stubborn resistance along the
ridge WESTROOSEBEKE-PASSCHENDAELE-KEIBERG. Fighting under the eyes
of their general, who was himself in the thick of the struggle, the
51st Reserve Division stormed the slope on to the ridge and entered
WESTROOSEBEKE. The French division defending it was driven out at
four in the afternoon and, attacking incessantly, the gallant 51st,
supported by the 23rd Reserve _Jäger_ Battalion, reached a line from
the railway-station north-west of POELCAPPELLE to POELCAPPELLE itself
during the evening. The attack was all the more daring through the fact
that HOUTHULST Forest was still in the enemy's hands, and the flank
of the division therefore appeared to be threatened. Meanwhile the
52nd Reserve Division had taken PASSCHENDAELE, KEIBERG and the high
ground between them from the British; the artillery again deserving
the highest praise for its co-operation.[35] The attack, however, was
brought to a standstill in front of the enemy's main position at the
cross-roads east of ZONNEBEKE. The XXVII Reserve Corps commanded by
General von Carlowitz, formerly Saxon War Minister, lay in close touch
with the 52nd Reserve Division on the evening of the 20th. Advancing in
four columns and by constant fighting it had forced its way westwards.
The Würtemburg Division had succeeded in driving the 7th British
Division out of BECELAERE after heavy street fighting, and the left
wing was bent back on TERHAND. Communication was there obtained with
the 3rd Cavalry Division, fighting on the right wing of the Sixth Army,
which had captured a hostile position north-east of KRUISEIK.
On the morning of the 22nd a strong position lay to our immediate front.
It followed a line BIXSCHOOTE-LANGEMARCK-ZONNEBEKE-REUTEL-GHELUVELT;
and the I and IV British, as well as the IX French Corps,[36]
all picked troops, had already been located there. They had dug a
well-planned maze of trenches behind broad wire entanglements before
a single German shell arrived to disturb their work.[37] The few
stretches of rising ground in the district had been included in the
skilfully selected positions as observation posts, and the defenders
were thus able to bring our advancing columns under accurate artillery
fire at long range. This was especially the case from the high ground
near ZONNEBEKE, whence the whole ground in front of the position as
far as LANGEMARCK could be enfiladed. All these difficulties, however,
were not sufficient to deter the offensive spirit of the German
troops, and '_Vorwärts_' was still their watchword: forwards and back
with the enemy, so that the rigid western front might once more be
mobile. The main body of the XXVI Reserve Corps attacked the fortress
of LANGEMARCK[38] from north and east, whilst the XXVII Reserve Corps
fought for the upper hand in the woods between ZONNEBEKE and BECELAERE.
The great efforts made by the artillery to follow up the infantrymen
with its guns and support them with their fire were in vain, owing
to the difficult country, and the well-aimed fire from the enemy's
prepared positions reaped a big harvest. Leaders of all grades were
killed, and officers of high rank took their places and reorganised the
intermingled units.
With the failure of the 46th Reserve Division to gain a decisive
victory between BIXSCHOOTE and LANGEMARCK on 22nd and 23rd October
the fate of the XXVI and XXVII Reserve Corps was also settled. For
the time being any further thought of a break-through was out of the
question. The troops up till now had met the enemy full of a keen
fighting spirit, and had stormed his positions singing '_Deutschland,
Deutschland über alles'_ regardless of casualties, and had been one and
all ready to die for their country; but they had suffered heavily in
the contest against a war-experienced and numerically superior opponent
entrenched in strongly fortified positions. Even when the last reserves
of the Army, the 37th _Landwehr_ Brigade and the 2nd _Ersatz_ Brigade,
had been placed at the disposal of the XXVI Reserve Corps, they could
only be used to stiffen the defence. During the night of 23rd-24th
October the expected Anglo-French counter-attacks began, and continued
throughout the 24th, against the front of the XXVI and the right wing
of the XXVII Reserve Corps. By utilising temporary local successes and
putting in fresh forces the enemy vainly hoped to prepare the way for a
break-through; but the German troops though weakened held up all these
furious onslaughts from positions which had never been selected for
defence, but were merely those reached at the close of the attack.[39]
The Commander of the Fourth Army was forced to continue ordering all
his Corps to attack, in order to co-operate with the Sixth Army which
was attacking and, besides this, to pin the enemy's forces opposed
to him to their ground: for in the north a decision appeared to be
imminent on the front of General von Beseler's III Reserve Corps: in
addition to the entire infantry of the 6th Reserve Division, which had
crossed the canal by the morning of 24th October, the infantry of the
5th Reserve Division and five battalions of the 44th Reserve Division
succeeded in crossing the YSER during that day. The enemy was compelled
to evacuate the western bank of the canal from ST. GEORGE to south-east
of STUYVEKENSKERKE, in spite of the fact that there had been one French
and four Belgian Divisions[40] opposing the III Reserve Corps, and
that the ten howitzer batteries had proved insufficient to engage the
Belgian, French and British artillery successfully. In consequence of
this inferiority the old and new canal crossings lay under constant
concentrated fire, and all our efforts to transport guns over the
waterway failed. Many a fine piece of engineering carried out by our
indefatigable sappers was destroyed by the enemy's shells. The supply
of ammunition and field-dressings became a matter of the greatest
difficulty, as all the roads leading to the rear across the swampy
meadows were continuously shelled for a long way back. Nevertheless our
front troops held on firmly to their new positions. The next operation
was to break through the enemy's position here once and for all, though
it was clear from the beginning that the attack would be a very severe
one. Belgian and French working parties had dug a series of positions
between the YSER and the NIEUPORT-BIXSCHOOTE railway, from which the
ground in front could be commanded with frontal and enfilade fire from
skilfully placed machine-guns and well-concealed batteries. On both
wings, according to the latest information at hand, strong hostile
attacks were threatening us, that is to say, near NIEUPORT as well as
near and to the south of DIXMUDE. To meet these the Army Commander had
replaced the 4th _Ersatz_ Division, which had been echeloned back along
the coast as a precaution against hostile landings, by detachments of
the Marine Division, and a few troops placed at his disposition by the
Governor of Belgium, and had ordered it to march to THOUROUT. At the
same time, by order of General von Beseler, long-range guns were placed
to prevent the enemy from concentrating for an attack in the NIEUPORT
district. However, the expected attack took place in the neighbourhood
of DIXMUDE, and was directed against those battalions of the 44th
Reserve Division which had crossed to the west of the YSER. The enemy
realised the great danger that threatened his bridge-head from the
north-west, and put all available Belgian and French reserves into
the attack. Thus between five and six battalions from three Belgian
regiments and the Marine Fusiliers under Admiral Ronarch, with a strong
force of artillery, advanced to the attack of our southern flank. The
Belgians themselves describe this attack in the following words: 'One
saw the companies doubling forward in small groups, lying down on
the officers' signal, and then getting up to go forward again until
they finally deployed into their attacking lines. But unfortunately
they were asked to accomplish a superhuman task, and whole rows of
the men were mown down by the machine-guns. Company after company was
decimated, and in spite of the energy of their leaders they had to give
way, death having taken too heavy a toll of their ranks. The Marine
Fusiliers, who attacked with uncommon gallantry, soon shared the same
fate. But all this sacrifice was not in vain--it stopped the enemy's
advance.'[41]
It will be understood then that the first thing for the weak and widely
separated battalions of the 44th Reserve Division to do on the 25th was
to get breathing space and reorganise, even though they were exposed
all the time to the heaviest fire from west, south and south-east.
Further to the north, however, on the morning of the 25th, the 5th and
6th Reserve Divisions had succeeded in bringing their field-batteries
across the river, and as soon as the whole artillery of these two
divisions had been concentrated under the expert leadership of General
von Ziethen, it began to prepare the way for the infantry attack. By
midday both the divisions were advancing steadily towards the railway
embankment on the line RAMSCAPPELLE-PERVYSE. The Belgians had to
evacuate position after position. Then suddenly heavy enfilade fire was
poured in by the enemy's artillery about NIEUPORT; and simultaneously
a brigade of the 6th Reserve Division south-east of PERVYSE had to be
directed southwards in order not to lose touch with the right wing of
the 44th Reserve Division. There were no reinforcements to fill up the
gaps, and thus the attack came shortly afterwards to a standstill.
A very heavy thunder of guns rumbled incessantly from the south: the
German artillery, including 42-centimetre guns, had bombarded DIXMUDE
throughout the 24th October and morning of the 25th, and now the 43rd
Reserve Division had begun its assault on the town. It resulted in
the most violent street fighting; fast and furious came the bullets
from the machine-guns posted in the houses along the edge of the town,
and from the shells from the batteries massed west of the YSER, but
nothing could hold up our attack. The Belgians have given the following
description of the power of the German assault: 'What plunder must not
they have been promised, to allow themselves to be killed in such a
way? What drink must they not have taken to give themselves such animal
courage? Like devils, thirsting for blood, they storm forward with the
howls of wild beasts; lusting to massacre, they tread the wounded under
foot and stumble over the dead: and, though shot down in hundreds, they
keep coming on. Then follow isolated fights with bayonets and the butts
of rifles: some are impaled, others strangled or have their skulls
bashed in.' The fight swayed backwards and forwards till well into the
night: guns brought up into the front line fired at point-blank range:
both sides put in their last reserves.
During the night, rifles were unloaded, bayonets fixed, and we attacked
again. A small German detachment of about fifty men advanced across
the YSER bridge, but in endeavouring to assault the enemy's batteries,
it succumbed to greatly superior numbers. Thus the morning of 26th
October found the attackers back in their assault-positions: their
courage, spirit and indifference to death having added another leaf of
fame to the chaplet of the Guards. It was clear, however, that another
artillery bombardment was indispensable to success, and it was carried
out on the 26th and 27th.
That heavy losses were suffered by the Belgians and the French Marine
Fusiliers in the fighting just described is shown by the fact that
on the morning of the 26th Senegalese troops who had been hurriedly
brought up took over the defence of the bridge-head. A German attack on
the 28th was able to make some progress on the southern flank against
these fresh troops, but a decision could not be obtained. No further
effort was made on the 29th, for there was a shortage of artillery
ammunition. The eastern edge of the town was, however, bombarded by
trench-mortars, which had just arrived, with good effect.
Army Orders for the 30th prescribed that the XXII Reserve Corps should
only leave a weak force of from three to four battalions on the eastern
bank of the Yser opposite DIXMUDE; that DIXMUDE should be kept under
heavy artillery fire; and that the remainder of the 43rd Reserve
Division should cross the YSER, north of DIXMUDE, in order to attack
the town from the rear.
North-west of DIXMUDE, by the evening of the 29th, the troops of
General von Beseler and the 44th Reserve Division had worked their
way forward some 300 yards towards the railway embankment. Only one
brigade of the 4th _Ersatz_ Division was still north-east of NIEUPORT:
all the rest were taking part in the struggle further south, and west
of the YSER. NIEUPORT was shut in on the south: the left wing of the
44th Reserve Division lay west of BEERST, as protection against the
strong hostile forces near the river about DIXMUDE: the Belgians and
recently-arrived French forces held the railway embankment between
NIEUPORT and DIXMUDE. Broad stretches of wire entanglements lay in
front of this strong position, and the efforts of our troops had been
almost superhuman in their advance over this ground: it was intersected
with patches of marsh, dykes often fifteen yards broad, and thick,
wired hedges. So strong, however, was the pressure against the enemy
that the French were compelled to reduce their forces about NIEUPORT
and north of it to weak detachments, and send constant reinforcements
to the area PERVYSE-RAMSCAPPELLE. A German airman, who was killed on
the morning of the 30th, had shortly before his death reported that
the enemy were beginning to withdraw. Our assault began at 6.30 A.M.,
though the ground in the area of the 5th and 6th Reserve Divisions
had become extraordinarily swampy. It seemed impossible that the
recent rains could have raised the level of the ground-water to such
an extent. Nevertheless the attack made considerable progress. The
11th Brigade of the 6th Reserve Division succeeded in forcing its way
into the eastern part of the strongly-fortified village of PERVYSE,
whilst of the 5th Reserve Division, the 48th and 52nd Reserve Regiments
reached the railway embankment, and the 48th pushed on beyond it
towards RAMSCAPPELLE. Although every house had to be attacked, it
succeeded in reaching the western end of the village. The 12th Reserve
Regiment also made considerable advance.
The resistance of the enemy was broken, and when the 33rd _Ersatz_
Brigade on the northern wing advanced from the north-east against
NIEUPORT, the enemy retired. Airmen reported enemy's columns retreating
towards FURNES. Nothing could stop the victorious advance of General
von Beseler's troops, not even the heaviest guns of the British
battleships, cruisers and torpedo-boats, which, from far out at sea,
enfiladed the German attack at a range of 20,000 yards, nor the
incessant counter-attacks of the Franco-Belgian Divisions. On the
evening of the 30th RAMSCAPPELLE was completely in German possession,
the railway embankment south of it had been reached and even crossed in
places; in PERVYSE the fight was progressing favourably, and south of
it the 12th Reserve Brigade, delayed by the numerous broad dykes, was
working forward to the railway. Still further south the 44th Reserve
Division was in full advance towards the railway embankment east of
OOSTKERKE, whilst the main body of the 43rd Reserve Division had
crossed the YSER, without casualties, and had been sent forward in the
direction of CAESKERKE.
The attack was to have been continued on the following morning, and
General von Beseler intended to withdraw the last part of the 4th
_Ersatz_ Division, the 33rd _Ersatz_ Brigade, from the area north-east
of NIEUPORT, for the fire of the enemy's naval guns from the sea[42]
and the difficulties of the country appeared to militate against any
prospects of a rapid success there. At 11.30 P.M., however, a General
Staff Officer of the 6th Reserve Division reported that the attack
could be continued no further owing to the constant rising of the
water. What had happened? On the morning of the 30th the advancing
troops had been up to their ankles in water; then it had gradually
risen until they were now wading up to their knees, and they could
scarcely drag their feet out of the clayey soil. If any one lay down
for a moment under the heavy artillery, machine-gun and rifle fire, he
was lost. The rise of the waters was attributed to the torrential rain
of the previous few days, and it was hoped that on the approach of dry
weather the excellent system of canals would soon drain it off. But
the rising flood soon prevented the movement of wagons with ammunition
and supplies, and when the attackers looked back from the railway
embankment, it seemed to them as if the whole country had sunk behind
them: the green meadows were covered with dirty, yellow water, and the
general line of the roads was only indicated by the houses and the rows
of partly covered trees. It soon became evident that the enemy must
have blown up the canal-sluices, and called in the sea to his aid.
The advance of General von Beseler's III Reserve Corps had been the
culmination of the crisis for our opponent; all his reserves had been
put in to stop it, but in vain. If the Germans could only succeed in
pushing the exhausted Belgians and French out of their way, the road to
DUNKIRK and CALAIS was open. Warnings, friendly and otherwise, had been
given by the Allies to the Belgians that they must 'hold out'; but they
were no more able to resist the attacks of the victors of ANTWERP now
than when behind fortress ramparts. Their fighting spirit was broken;
so, influenced by the wishes of the British and the French, King Albert
finally decided to employ this last desperate means of defence, and
place a wide expanse of his fair country under water. The water-level
rose slowly and insidiously until, on the evening of the 30th, the
YSER north of DIXMUDE had almost everywhere overflowed its banks. The
inundation destroyed buildings as well as soil, but it enabled the
worn-out defenders to recover their sore-threatened security.