appointed destinations on the evening of the 18th without meeting any
strong resistance. Along almost the whole front our advanced guards
and patrols came into touch with weak hostile detachments who were
awaiting our advance well entrenched, and surprised us with infantry
and artillery fire. At ROULERS a hot skirmish took place. Aeroplanes
circling round, motor-lorries bustling about, and cavalry patrols
pushing well forward showed that the British now realised the strength
of the new German forces.
[Illustration: DISPOSITIONS ON OCTOBER 20TH. 1914.
_On 20th October none of the I British Corps were on the right of
the IV Corps; the map should read British Cavalry Corps. It is also
inaccurate to represent the whole III British Corps as north of
Armentières--only one of its Divisions was--while the II Corps was
certainly too closely pressed to detach any troops to the north as
depicted in the diagram._]
In the meantime, on the extreme right wing of the Army, the troops
of General von Beseler had opened the battle on the Yser. During
its advance northwards to cross the Yser at the appointed places
the III Reserve Corps had encountered strong opposition east of the
river-barrier. The men knew they were on the decisive wing of the
attack, and they pushed ahead everywhere regardless of loss. In a rapid
assault the 4th _Ersatz_ Division captured WESTENDE from the Belgians,
although a gallant defence was put up, and in spite of the fact that
British torpedo-boats and cruisers took part in the action from the
sea with their heavy artillery[21] both during the advance and the
fight for the town. Further south the 5th Reserve Division deployed to
attack a strongly entrenched hostile position. The 3rd Reserve _Jäger_
Battalion captured the obstinately defended village of ST. PIERRE
CAPPELLE after severe hand-to-hand fighting, whilst the main body of
the division succeeded in pushing forward to the neighbourhood of
SCHOORE. The 6th Reserve Division, commanded by General von Neudorff,
also closed with the enemy. It captured LEKE, and KEYEM, defended by
the 4th Belgian Division; but even this Brandenburg Division, for all
its war experience, found the task of forcing the crossings over the
YSER too much for it.
The fighting on 18th October resulted in bringing us a thousand or two
thousand yards nearer the YSER, but it had shown that the fight for
the river line was to be a severe one. The Belgians seemed determined
to sell the last acres of their kingdom only at the highest possible
price. Four lines of trenches had been dug, and it could be seen that
every modern scientific resource had been employed in putting the
villages on the eastern bank of the river into a state of defence. A
great number of guns, very skilfully placed and concealed, shelled the
ground for a considerable distance east of the river, and in addition
to this our right flank was enfiladed by the heavy naval guns from the
sea. Battleships, cruisers and torpedo-boats worried the rear and flank
of the 4th _Ersatz_ Division with their fire, and the British had even
brought heavy artillery on flat-bottomed boats close inshore.[22] They
used a great quantity of ammunition, but the effect of it all was only
slight, for the fire of the naval guns was much dispersed and indicated
bad observation. It became still more erratic when our long-range guns
were brought into action against the British Fleet. Detachments of
the 4th _Ersatz_ Division had to be echeloned back as far as Ostend,
in order to defend the coast against hostile landings. During the day
the General Commanding the III Reserve Corps decided not to allow the
4th _Ersatz_ Division to cross the YSER at NIEUPORT, on account of
the heavy fire from the British naval guns, but to make it pass with
the main body of the Corps behind the 5th Reserve Division in whose
area the fight appeared to be progressing favourably. The _Ersatz_
Division was informed accordingly. On the 19th another effort would
have to be made to force the crossings of the river by frontal attack,
for everywhere to the south strong opposition had been encountered.
From near DIXMUDE French troops carried on the line of the compact
Belgian Army. It was against these that the new Reserve Corps were now
advancing.
On the night of the 18th and morning of the 19th October a strong
attack was delivered from the west by the 4th Belgian Division, and
from the south-west by a brigade of the 5th Belgian Division and a
brigade of French Marine Fusiliers under Admiral Ronarch, against
KEYEM, held by part of the 6th Reserve Division. They were driven
back after heavy fighting. During the 19th the southern wing of the
Brandenburg (III) Reserve Corps succeeded in advancing nearer the river
and, on its left, part of the artillery of the XXII Reserve Corps came
into action in support of it, thereby partly relieving the III Reserve
Corps, which until that day had been fighting unassisted.
On the 19th more or less heavy fighting developed on the whole front
of the Fourth Army. The XXII Reserve Corps advanced on BEERST and
DIXMUDE and fought its way up into line with the III Reserve Corps.
In front of it lay the strong bridge-head of DIXMUDE, well provided
with heavy guns. The whole XXIII Reserve Corps had to be deployed
into battle-formation, as every locality was obstinately defended
by the enemy. In the advance of the 45th Reserve Division the 209th
Reserve Regiment late in the evening took HANDZAEME after severe
street fighting, and the 212th Reserve Regiment took the village of
GITS, whilst CORTEMARCK was evacuated by the enemy during the attack.
The 46th Reserve Division in a running fight crossed the main road to
THOUROUT, north of ROULERS, and by the evening had arrived close to
STADEN. Heavy street fighting in the latter place continued during
the night: the enemy, supported by the population, offered strong
resistance in every house, so that isolated actions continued behind
our front lines, endangering the cohesion of the attacking troops, but
never to a serious extent.
The XXVI Reserve Corps encountered strong opposition at RUMBEKE,
south-east of ROULERS; but all the enemy's efforts were in vain,
and the 233rd Reserve Infantry Regiment, under the eyes of its
Corps Commander, General von Hügel, forced its way through the rows
of houses, many of which were defended with light artillery and
machine-guns. A very heavy fight took place for the possession of
ROULERS, which was stubbornly defended by the French; barricades were
put up across the streets, machine-guns fired from holes in the roofs
and windows, and concealed mines exploded among the advancing troops.
In spite of all this, by 5 P.M. ROULERS was taken by the 233rd, 234th
and 235th Reserve Infantry Regiments, attacking from north, east and
south respectively. Further to the south, after a small skirmish with
British cavalry, the 52nd Reserve Division reached MORSLEDE, its
objective for the day. On its left again, the XXVII Reserve Corps had
come into contact with the 3rd British Cavalry Division which tried to
hold up the Corps in an advanced position at ROLLEGHEM-CAPPELLE. After
a lively encounter the British cavalry was thrown back on to the 7th
British Division, which held a strong position about DADIZEELE.[23]
Thus by the evening of 19th October the situation had been considerably
cleared up, in so far as we now knew that the Belgians, French and
British not only held the YSER and the YPRES canal, but also the high
ground east and north-east of YPRES. Everything pointed to the fact
that an unexpectedly strong opponent was awaiting us in this difficult
country, and that a very arduous task confronted the comparatively
untrained troops of Duke Albert of Würtemburg's Army. In the meantime
the Commander of the Sixth Army, Crown Prince Rupert of Bavaria, after
a discussion at Army Headquarters with General von Falkenhayn, Chief
of the General Staff, decided to renew the attack, as the left wing of
the Fourth Army had now come up on his immediate right. In consequence
of this decision, the XIII Corps was moved from its position on the
line MENIN-WARNETON and replaced by three Cavalry Divisions of the
IV Cavalry Corps. There can be no doubt that the attacks of the
Sixth Army, which began on the 20th and were continued with frequent
reinforcements of fresh troops, had the effect of holding the enemy and
drawing a strong force to meet them. They were not, however, destined
to have any decisive success, for the offensive strength of the Sixth
Army had been reduced by previous fighting, and it was not sufficient
to break through the enemy's strongly entrenched positions.[24] All the
more therefore were the hopes of Germany centred in the Fourth Army,
which was fighting further northwards, for in its hands lay the fate of
the campaign in Western Europe at this period.
THE OPERATIONS OF THE FOURTH ARMY FROM 20TH OCTOBER TO 31ST OCTOBER 1914
On 20th October the battle broke out along the whole line, on a front
of about sixty miles. The enemy had got into position, and was prepared
to meet the attack of Duke Albert of Würtemburg's Army. On the very
day that the British, French and Belgians intended to begin their
advance they found themselves compelled to exert all their strength to
maintain their positions against our offensive. The British and French
had to bring up constant reinforcements, and a hard and bitter struggle
began for every yard of ground. The spirit in which our opponents
were fighting is reflected in an order of the 4th Belgian Division,
picked up in PERVYSE on 16th October. This ran: 'The fate of the whole
campaign probably depends on our resistance. I (General Michel) implore
officers and men, notwithstanding what efforts they may be called upon
to make, to do even more than their mere duty. The salvation of the
country and therefore of each individual among us depends on it. Let us
then resist to our utmost.'
We shall see how far the soldiers of the Fourth Army, opposed to such
a determined and numerically superior enemy, were able to justify the
confidence which had been placed in them, a confidence expressed in the
following proclamations by their highest commanders on their arrival in
Belgium:
GREAT HEADQUARTERS,
_14th October 1914_.
TO THE FOURTH ARMY,--I offer my welcome to the Fourth Army, and
especially to its newly-formed Reserve Corps, and I am confident
that these troops will act with the same devotion and bravery as
the rest of the German Army.
Advance, with the help of God--my watchword.
(Signed) WILLIAM, I. R.
_ARMY ORDER._
I am pleased to take over the command of the Army entrusted to me
by the Emperor. I am fully confident that the Corps which have been
called upon to bring about the final decision in this theatre of
war will do their duty to their last breath with the old German
spirit of courage and trust, and that every officer and every man
is ready to give his last drop of blood for the just and sacred
cause of our Fatherland. With God's assistance victory will then
crown our efforts.
Up and at the enemy. Hurrah for the Emperor.
(Signed) DUKE ALBERT OF WÜRTEMBURG,
_General and Army Commander_.
ARMY HEADQUARTERS, BRUSSELS,
_15th October 1914_.
Who can deny that the task set to the Fourth Army was not an infinitely
difficult one. It would have probably been achieved nevertheless if the
Belgians at the moment of their greatest peril had not called the sea
to their aid to bring the German attack to a halt. Let us, however, now
get down to the facts.
On 20th October the III Reserve Corps, the battering ram of the Fourth
Army, began an attack with its 5th Reserve Division, supported by
almost the whole of the Corps artillery, against the sector of the Yser
west of the line MANNEKENSVERE-SCHOORBAKKE. The 4th _Ersatz_ Division
to the north and the 6th Reserve Division to the south co-operated.
By the early hours of the 22nd, the 5th and 6th Reserve Divisions had
driven the enemy back across the river in spite of the support given
him by British and French heavy batteries.[25] In front of the 4th
_Ersatz_ Division the enemy still held a bridge-head at LOMBARTZYDE.
At 8.15 A.M. on the 22nd the glad tidings reached the Staff of the 6th
Reserve Division, that part of the 26th Reserve Infantry Regiment had
crossed the YSER. Under cover of darkness the 1st and 2nd Battalions
of this regiment had worked their way up to the north-eastern part of
the bend of the YSER, south of SCHOORE, and had got into the enemy's
outposts on the eastern bank with the bayonet. Not a shot had been
fired, and not an unnecessary noise had disturbed the quiet of the
dawning day. Volunteers from the engineers silently and rapidly laid
bridging material over the canal. In addition an old footbridge west of
KEYEM, which had been blown up and lay in the water, was very quickly
made serviceable again with some planks and baulks. The Belgians had
considered their position sufficiently protected by the river, and by
the outposts along the eastern bank. By 6 A.M. German patrols were on
the far side of the YSER, and the enemy's infantry and machine-gun fire
began only when they started to make a further advance. Three companies
of the 1st and two companies of the 2nd Battalion, however, as well as
part of the 24th Reserve Infantry Regiment, had already crossed the
temporary bridges at the double and taken up a position on the western
bank: so that, in all, 2½ battalions and a machine-gun company were now
on the western bank.
The enemy realised the seriousness of the situation, and prepared a
thoroughly unpleasant day for those who had crossed. Heavy and light
guns of the British and French artillery[26] hammered incessantly
against the narrow German bridge-head and the bridges to it. Lying
without cover in the swampy meadows the infantry was exposed beyond
all help to the enemy's rifle and machine-gun fire from west and
south-west. The small force repulsed counter-attacks again and again,
but to attempt sending reinforcements across to it was hopeless. Some
gallant gunners, however, who had brought their guns close up to the
eastern bank, were able to give great help to their friends in their
critical situation. Thus assisted the infantry succeeded in holding
the position, and during the following night was able to make it
sufficiently strong to afford very small prospect of success to any
further hostile efforts. During the night several Belgian attacks
with strong forces were repulsed with heavy loss, and the 6th Reserve
Division was able to put a further 2½ battalions across to the western
bank of the YSER bend. On the 23rd we gained possession of TERVAETE,
and the dangerous enfilade fire on our new positions was thereby
considerably diminished. Dawn on 24th October saw all the infantry
of the 6th Reserve Division west of the river. A pontoon bridge was
thrown across the north-eastern part of the YSER bend, but it was
still impossible to bring guns forward on account of the enemy's
heavy artillery fire. The 5th Reserve Division still lay in its battle
positions along the river bank north of SCHOORBAKKE, but every time
attempts were made to cross the French and Belgian artillery smashed
the bridges to pieces. The 4th _Ersatz_ Division suffered heavily,
as it was subjected to constant artillery fire from three sides, and
to entrench was hopeless on account of the shifting sands and the
high level of the ground water. Whenever fire ceased during the night
strong hostile attacks soon followed; but they were all repulsed.
The withdrawal of the main body of the _Ersatz_ Division behind the
6th Reserve Division to cross the YSER, as General von Beseler had
once planned, had become impracticable for the moment, for it had
been discovered through the statements of prisoners that the 42nd
French Division had arrived in NIEUPORT to assist the Belgians. The
4th _Ersatz_ Division, which had been weakened on the 18th by the
transfer of one of its three brigades to the 5th Reserve Division,
could not be expected to bring the new enemy to his knees by the
running fight that it had been hitherto conducting. The canal alone was
sufficient obstacle to make this impracticable; in addition, the fire
of the enemy's naval guns from the sea prevented any large offensive
operations in the area in question. Thus the _Ersatz_ troops were
compelled to resign themselves to the weary task of maintaining their
positions under the cross-fire of guns of every calibre, to driving
back the hostile attacks, and to holding the Belgian and French forces
off in front of them by continually threatening to take the offensive.
It was not until some long-range batteries were placed at the disposal
of the division that its position improved. A couple of direct hits
on the enemy's ships soon taught them that they could no longer carry
on their good work undisturbed. Their activity at once noticeably
decreased, and the more the German coast-guns gave tongue seawards from
the dunes, the further the ships moved away from the coast and the less
were they seen.
General von Beseler never for a moment doubted that the decision lay
with the 5th and 6th Reserve Divisions, especially as the four Corps of
the Fourth Army, fighting further south, had not yet been able to reach
the canal-barrier with any considerable forces.
The XXII Reserve Corps, commanded by General of Cavalry von Falkenhayn,
had in the meantime come into line south of General von Beseler's
troops, and had already fought some successful actions. It had arrived
on the 19th in the district east of BEERST and about VLADSLOO, just
in time to help in driving back the Franco-Belgian attack against the
southern flank of the 6th Reserve Division.[27] That same evening
it was ordered to attack from north and south against the DIXMUDE
bridge-head, an exceptionally difficult task. In addition to the fact
that the swampy meadows of the YSER canal limited freedom of movement
to an enormous extent, the HANDZAEME canal, running at right angles to
it from east to west, formed a most difficult obstacle. DIXMUDE lay
at the junction of these two waterways, and behind its bridge-head
lines were the Belgian 'Iron' Brigade under Colonel Meiser, the French
Marine Fusilier Brigade under Admiral Ronarch, and part of the 5th
Belgian Division, determined to defend the place at all costs. About
eighty guns of every calibre commanded with frontal and enfilade fire
the ground over which Falkenhayn's Corps would have to attack. On the
20th, in spite of all these difficulties, the 44th Reserve Division,
on the northern wing of the Corps, captured BEERST and reached the
canal bank west of KASTEELHOEK in touch with von Beseler's Corps.
The 43rd Reserve Division, advancing on the left wing, took VLADSLOO
and several villages south-east of it on the northern bank of the
HANDZAEME Canal. By the light of the conflagration of those villages
the reach of the canal between EESSEN and ZARREN was crossed on hastily
constructed footbridges, and a further advance made in a south-westerly
direction. EESSEN itself was occupied, and the attack brought us to
within a hundred yards of the enemy. He realised his extremely critical
situation,[28] and his cyclists and all possible reserves at hand
were put in to the fight. Owing to the severe hostile artillery fire
the German losses were by no means slight. On one occasion when our
advancing infantry units were losing touch with one another in this
difficult country, a big hostile counter-attack was delivered from
DIXMUDE. After a heavy struggle the onrush of the enemy was held up,
mainly owing to our artillery, which heroically brought its guns up
into position immediately behind the infantry front line.
During the night the 43rd Reserve Division reorganised in order to
recommence its attack on the bridge-head from east and south-east
on the following morning. Days of terrific fighting ensued. The
garrison of the bridge-head had received orders to hold out to the
last man, and had been informed that any one who attempted to desert
would be shot without mercy by men placed for this purpose to guard
all the exits from the town. The Belgians were indeed fighting for
their very existence as a nation. Nevertheless by the 21st October
the 43rd Reserve Division, which consisted of volunteers from the
Guard Corps Reservists, had taken the château south of DIXMUDE, and
WOUMEN. The opposing sides lay within a hundred yards of each other.
Artillery preparation, attack and counter-attack went on incessantly.
Our artillery did fearful havoc and DIXMUDE was in flames. The
Franco-Belgian garrison was, however, constantly reinforced, and
conducted itself most gallantly. From the north the battalions of the
44th Reserve Division were able to advance slightly and drive the enemy
back on to the town, and German batteries were brought up into, and
at times even in front of, the infantry front line. Although we were
unable to force our way into DIXMUDE, on the evening of the 23rd our
troops were in position all round it.
On the left of the XXII Reserve Corps, the XXIII Reserve Corps, under
General of Cavalry von Kleist, had advanced at 9 A.M. on 20th October
on the front HANDZAEME-STADEN in order to reach the canal on the line
NOORDSCHOOTE-BIXSCHOOTE. The 45th Reserve Division was on the right
and the 46th Reserve Division on the left. After some hours of street
fighting STADEN was finally surrounded and taken by the 46th Reserve
Division. By nightfall a line from CLERCKEN to the eastern edge of
HOUTHULST Forest was reached. On the 21st the Corps had to cross a
stretch of country which put these partially trained troops and their
inexperienced officers to a very severe test. The great forest of
HOUTHULST with its dense undergrowth made it exceedingly difficult to
keep direction in the attack and to maintain communication between
units fighting an invisible opponent. Small swampy streams such as the
STEENEBECK offered favourable opportunities to the enemy to put up a
strong defence behind a succession of depressions. Thus our gallant
troops after every successful assault found themselves confronted by
another strong position: but unwavering and regardless of loss, they
continued their advance.