Transcriber's Note:
Every effort has been made to replicate this text as faithfully as
possible.
On page 92, in "the 25th Reserve Division to be taken from the Sixth
Army," "from" is a correction of "fron".
Italic text has been marked with _underscores_.
Bold text has been marked with =equals signs=.
OE ligatures have been expanded.
YPRES, 1914
MONS, AND THE RETREAT
By Captain G. S. GORDON
With an Introduction by Field-Marshal LORD FRENCH
1/6 _net_.
=The Evening News.=--'... The true history of those amazing and
heroic days, briefly and clearly told by a soldier and an expert.'
THE MARNE CAMPAIGN
By Lieut. Col. F. E. WHITTON, C.M.G.
10/6 _net_.
=Saturday Review.=--'... Clear and concise ... gives a much better
general impression of the Battle of the Marne than any other we
know.'
1914
By Field-Marshal VISCOUNT FRENCH of Ypres, K.P., O.M., etc.
With a Preface by MARÉCHAL FOCH
21/- _net_.
CONSTABLE AND CO. LTD., LONDON.
YPRES, 1914
AN OFFICIAL ACCOUNT PUBLISHED BY
ORDER OF THE GERMAN GENERAL STAFF
TRANSLATION BY G. C. W.
WITH INTRODUCTION AND NOTES BY THE
HISTORICAL SECTION (MILITARY BRANCH)
COMMITTEE OF IMPERIAL DEFENCE
LONDON
CONSTABLE AND COMPANY LTD
1919
_Printed in Great Britain_
CONTENTS
PAGE
INTRODUCTION ix
GERMAN PREFACE xxiii
PRELIMINARY REMARKS 1
THE THEATRE OF OPERATIONS 13
THE ADVANCE OF THE FOURTH ARMY 19
THE OPERATIONS OF THE FOURTH ARMY, 20TH-31ST
OCTOBER 1914 26
THE ATTEMPT TO BREAK THROUGH SOUTH OF YPRES 59
THE OPERATIONS OF THE FOURTH ARMY FROM THE END
OF OCTOBER TO THE 9TH NOVEMBER 1914 98
THE LAST PHASE 103
CONCLUSION 126
APPENDIX
ORDER OF BATTLE OF THE FOURTH ARMY 131
ORDER OF BATTLE OF THE ARMY GROUP FABECK 132
ORDER OF BATTLE OF THE GROUP GEROK 133
ORDER OF BATTLE OF THE ARMY GROUP LINSINGEN 133
INDEX 135
ILLUSTRATIONS
SKETCH MAPS IN TEXT
PAGE
DISPOSITIONS ON 20TH OCTOBER 1914 20
THE ATTACK OF THE ARMY GROUP FABECK ON 30TH OCTOBER 1914 67
THE ATTACK OF THE ARMY GROUP FABECK ON 31ST OCTOBER 1914 73
THE CAPTURE OF MESSINES ON 31ST OCTOBER 1914 81
THE CAPTURE OF DIXMUDE ON 10TH NOVEMBER 1914 108
THE ATTACK OF THE SIXTH ARMY ON 11TH NOVEMBER 1914 112
THE ATTACK OF THE 2ND GUARD DIVISION ON 11TH NOVEMBER 1914 115
INTRODUCTION
The German book of which a translation is here given was written in
the autumn of 1917 by Captain Otto Schwink, a General Staff Officer,
by order of the Chief of the General Staff of the Field Army, and is
stated to be founded on official documents. It forms one of a series
of monographs, partly projected, partly published, on the various
phases of the war, but is the only one that is available dealing with
operations in which the British Army was engaged. Several concerned
with the Eastern theatre of war have already appeared, and one other
entitled 'LIÈGE-NAMUR,' relating to the Western.
Field-Marshal Viscount French, in his book '1914,' has said that the
period 27th to 31st October during the first battle of YPRES was
'more momentous and fateful than any other which I directed during my
period of service as Commander-in-Chief in the field. 31st October
and 1st November will remain for ever memorable in the history of our
country, for during those two days no more than a thin and straggling
line of tired-out British soldiers stood between the Empire and its
practical ruin as an independent first-class Power.' The German account
accentuates the truth of Lord French's appreciation of the great peril
in which the Army and the Nation stood. It tells us of the enemy's
plans, and of the large forces that he brought up with great skill
and secrecy to carry them out, and, generally, to use Marshal Foch's
expression, lets us 'know what was going on in the other fellow's
house.' But it does more than that: unconsciously perhaps, it bears
convincing testimony to the fighting powers of the British Army,
the determination of its leaders, the extraordinary effectiveness
of the fire of its artillery and of its cavalry and infantry, and
the skill of its engineers; for it repeatedly credits Field-Marshal
Sir John French with 'reinforcements in abundance,' insists that our
troops 'fought desperately for every heap of stones and every pile of
bricks before abandoning them,' and definitely records that 'the fact
that neither the enemy's commanders nor their troops gave way under
the strong pressure we put on them ... gives us the opportunity to
acknowledge that there were men of real worth opposed to us who did
their duty thoroughly.' We are further told that the effect of our
artillery was such that 'it was not possible to push up reserves owing
to heavy artillery fire'; that 'all roads leading to the rear were
continuously shelled for a long way back'; that the German 'advancing
columns were under accurate artillery fire at long range'; that our
shells 'blocked streets and bridges and devastated villages so far
back that any regular transport of supplies became impossible.' As
regards rifle and machine-gun fire, we are credited with 'quantities of
machine-guns,' 'large numbers of machine-guns,' etc.; with the result
that 'the roads were swept by machine-guns'; and that 'over every bush,
hedge and fragment of wall floated a thin film of smoke betraying a
machine-gun rattling out bullets.' At that date we had no machine-gun
units, and there were only two machine-guns on the establishment of
a battalion, and of these many had been damaged, and had not yet been
replaced; actually machine-guns were few and far between. The only
inference to be drawn is that the rapid fire of the British rifleman,
were he infantryman, cavalryman or sapper, was mistaken for machine-gun
fire both as regards volume and effect. Our simple defences, to
complete which both time and labour had been lacking, became in German
eyes 'a well-planned maze of trenches,' 'a maze of obstacles and
entrenchments'; and we had 'turned every house, every wood and every
wall into a strong point'; 'the villages of WYTSCHAETE and MESSINES ...
had been converted into fortresses' (_Festungen_); as also the edge
of a wood near GHELUVELT and LANGEMARCK. As at the last-named place
there was only a small redoubt with a garrison of two platoons, and the
'broad wire entanglements' described by the German General Staff were
in reality but trifling obstacles of the kind that the Germans 'took
in their stride,'[1] the lavish praise, were it not for the result of
the battle, might be deemed exaggerated. Part of it undoubtedly is.
It is fair, however, to deduce that the German nation had to be given
some explanation why the 'contemptible little Army' had not been pushed
straightway into the sea.
The monograph is frankly intended to present the views that the German
General Staff wish should be held as regards the battles, and prevent,
as their Preface says, the currency of 'the legends and rumours
which take such an easy hold on the popular imagination and are so
difficult, if not impossible, to correct afterwards.' One cannot
naturally expect the whole truth to be revealed yet; that it is not
will be seen from the notes. The elder von Moltke said, when pressed
by his nephews to write a true account of 1870-1--to their future
financial advantage--'It can't be done yet. Too many highly placed
personages (_hohe Herrschaften_) would suffer in their reputations.'
It was not until twenty-five years after the Franco-Prussian War
that Fritz Hönig, Kunz and other German military historians who had
been given access to the records, were allowed to draw back the veil
a little. The publication of the French General Staff account began
even later. What is now given to us is, however, amply sufficient
to follow the main German plans and movements; but the difficulties
that prevented the enemy from making successful use of the enormous
number of troops at his disposal and his superior equipment in heavy
artillery, machine-guns, aeroplanes, hand-grenades and other trench
warfare material, are untold. Until we learn more we may fairly
attribute our victory to the military qualities of the British, French
and Belgian troops, and the obstinate refusal of all ranks to admit
defeat.
The German General Staff specially claim that the first battle of
YPRES was a German victory, 'for it marked the failure of the enemy's
intention to fall on the rear of our Western Armies, to free the rich
districts of Northern France and the whole of Belgium,' etc. etc.
Granted that we did so fail, the battle can, on that General Staff's
own evidence, be regarded as a drawn one. For it is definitely stated
in the monograph that the object of the operations was 'successfully
closing with the enemy ... and gaining CALAIS, the aim and object
of the 1914 campaign'--this the German Army notoriously did not do.
The intention to break through is repeatedly stated: 'although fresh
reinforcements had been sent up by the German General Staff ... a
break-through had not been possible.' 'Another effort to break through
should be made as soon as possible.' We are told that Fabeck's Army
Group (eventually nine infantry and five cavalry divisions) was formed
'as a strong new army of attack ... for breaking through on the front
WERWICQ-WARNETON.' Linsingen's Army Group (five divisions) after the
failure of von Fabeck was formed 'to drive back and crush the enemy
lying north of the (COMINES-YPRES) canal ... and to break through
there.' Finally, however, it is admitted that 'no break-through of the
enemy's lines had been accomplished.... We had not succeeded in making
the decisive break-through, and the dream of ending the campaign in
the west in our favour had to be consigned to its grave.' In fact, the
book is largely an apologia and a confession of failure which mere
protestations of victory cannot alter.
The effects of a German victory on the course of the war, with the
Channel ports in German hands, as compared with those of an Allied
victory in Flanders, which at that period of the war and at that season
of the year could have resulted in little more than pushing the enemy
back into Belgium a few miles, may be easily imagined. If the battle
was a tactical draw, at least we had a strategic balance in our favour.
The principal reasons advanced for the German ill-success are 'the
enemy's numerical superiority, and the strength of his positions,' and
of course the drastic course taken by the Belgians of 'calling in the
sea to their aid.'
There is constant repetition of these pleas throughout the book. To
those who were there and saw our 'thin and straggling line' and the
hastily constructed and lightly wired defences: mere isolated posts and
broken lengths of shallow holes with occasional thin belts of wire, and
none of the communication trenches of a later date, they provoke only
amazement. Even German myopia cannot be the cause of such statements.
As regards the superiority of numbers, the following appears to be
the approximate state of the case as regards the infantry on the
battle front from ARMENTIÈRES (inclusive) to the sea dealt with
in the monograph. It is necessary to count in battalions, as the
Germans had two or three with each cavalry division, and the British
Commander-in-Chief enumerates the reinforcements sent up to YPRES from
the II and Indian Corps by battalions, and two Territorial battalions,
London Scottish and Hertfordshires, also took part. The total figures
are:--
British, French, Belgian 263 battalions.
German 426 battalions.
That is roughly a proportion of Allies to Germans of 13 to 21. Viscount
French in his '1914' says 7 to 12 Corps, which is much the same: 52
to 84 as against 49 to 84, and very different from the German claim
of '40 divisions to 25.' Actually in infantry divisions the Allies
had only 22, even counting as complete the Belgian six, which had
only the strength of German brigades. Any future correction of the
figures, when actual bayonets present can be counted, will probably
emphasise the German superiority in numbers still more, and the
enemy indisputably had the advantage of united command, homogeneous
formations and uniform material which were lacking in the Allied force.
As regards the cavalry the Western Allies had six divisions, including
one of three brigades. The enemy had at least nine, possibly more (one,
the Guard Cavalry Division, of three brigades), as it is not clear from
the German account how much cavalry was transferred from the Sixth Army
to the Fourth Army.[2] It may be noted that a German cavalry division
included, with its two or three cavalry brigades, horse artillery
batteries and the two or three _Jäger_ battalions, three or more
machine-gun batteries and two or more companies of cyclists; and was
thus, unlike ours, a force of all arms.
The German General Staff reveal nothing about the exact strength of the
artillery. In a footnote it is mentioned that in addition to infantry
divisions the III Reserve Corps contained siege artillery, _Pionier_
formations and other technical troops; and in the text that 'all the
available heavy artillery of the Sixth Army to be brought up (to assist
the Fourth Army) for the break-through.' The Germans had trench-mortars
(_Minenwerfer_) which are several times mentioned, whilst our first
ones were still in the process of improvisation by the Engineers of the
Indian Corps at BETHUNE.
The statement that 'the enemy's' (_i.e._ British, French and Belgian)
'superiority in material, in guns, trench-mortars, machine-guns and
aeroplanes, etc., was two, three, even fourfold' is palpably nonsense
when said of 1914, though true perhaps in 1917 when the monograph was
written.
The fact seems to be that the Germans cannot understand defeat in war
except on the premise that the victor had superiority of numbers. To
show to what extent this creed obtains: in the late Dr. Wylie's _Henry
V._, vol. II. page 216, will be found an account of a German theory,
accepted by the well-known historian Delbrück, that the English won at
Agincourt on account of superior numbers, although contemporary history
is practically unanimous that the French were ten to one. Dr. Wylie
sums it up thus:
'Starting with the belief that the defeat of the French is
inexplicable on the assumption that they greatly outnumbered the
English, and finding that all contemporary authorities, both French
and English, are agreed that they did, the writer builds up a
theory that all the known facts can be explained on the supposition
that the French were really much inferior to us in numbers ... and
concludes that he cannot be far wrong if he puts the total number
of French (the English being 6000) at something between 4000 and
7000.'
It may not be out of place to add that a German Staff Officer
captured during the Ypres fighting said to his escort as he was being
taken away: 'Now I am out of it, do tell me where your reserves are
concealed; in what woods are they?' and he refused to believe that we
had none. Apparently it was inconceivable to the German General Staff
that we should stand to fight unless we had superior numbers; and these
not being visible in the field, they must be hidden away somewhere.
Further light on what the Germans imagined is thrown by prisoners,
who definitely stated that their main attack was made south of YPRES,
because it was thought that our main reserves were near ST. JEAN,
north-east of that town. From others it was gathered that what could
be seen of our army in that quarter was in such small and scattered
parties that it was taken to be an outpost line covering important
concentrations, and the Germans did not press on, fearing a trap.
It is, however, possible that the German miscalculation of the number
of formations engaged may not be altogether due to imaginary reserves,
as regards the British Army. Before the war the Great General Staff
knew very little about us. The collection of 'intelligence' with
regard to the British Empire was dealt with by a Section known in the
Moltkestrasse as the 'Demi-monde Section,' because it was responsible
for so many countries; and this Section admittedly had little time
to devote to us. Our organisation was different from that of any of
the great European armies. Their field artillery brigades contained
seventy-two guns, whereas ours had only eighteen guns or howitzers;
their infantry brigades consisted of two regiments, each of three
battalions, that is six battalions, not four as in the original British
Expeditionary Force. To a German, therefore, an infantry brigade meant
six battalions, not four, and if a prisoner said that he belonged to
the Blankshire Regiment, the German might possibly believe he had
identified three battalions, whereas only one would be present. This
is actually brought out on page 118, when the author speaks of the 1st
Battalion of the King's (Liverpool) Regiment as the _Königsregiment
Liverpool_, and indicates his ignorance of the British Army, when
this single battalion engages the German _Garde Regiment zu Fuss_, by
describing the fight not only as one of regiment against regiment, but
as _Garde gegen Garde_ (Guard against Guards).[3] Such is the fighting
value of an English Line battalion. A victory over it is certainly
claimed, but the significant sentence immediately follows: 'any further
advance on the 11th November by our Guard troops north of the road was
now out of the question.'
It may be as well to point out that the 'volunteers' who it is said
flocked to the barracks to form the Reserve Corps XXII to XXVII were
not all volunteers in our sense of the word. The General Staff only
claims that 75 per cent. were untrained, a very different state of
affairs from our New Armies, which had not 1 per cent. of trained
soldiers. Many of the 'volunteers' were fully trained men liable
to service, who merely anticipated their recall to the colours. It
was well known before the war that in each army corps area Germany
intended to form one 'Active' Corps and one or more 'Reserve' Corps.
The original armies of invasion all contained Reserve Corps notably the
IV Reserve of von Kluck's Army, which marched and fought just as the
active ones did. These first formed Reserve Corps were, it is believed,
entirely made up of trained men, but those with the higher numbers
XXII, XXIII, XXVI and XXVII, which appear in the Fourth Army, probably
did contain a good percentage of men untrained before the war.
_Ersatz_ divisions were formed of the balance of reservists after the
Reserve divisions had been organised, and of untrained men liable for
service. After a time the words 'Active,' 'Reserve,' and '_Ersatz_'
applied to formations lost their significance, as the same classes of
men were to be found in all of them.
No attempt has been made to tone down the author's patriotic sentiments
and occasional lapses from good taste; the general nature of the
narrative is too satisfactory to the British Army to make any omissions
necessary when presenting it to the British public.
The footnotes deal with a number of the more important points raised,
but are not exhaustive.
* * * * *
_Note._--The German time, at the period of the year in question one
hour earlier than ours, has been adhered to.
The Notes of the Historical Section are distinguished from those of
the Author by being printed in italics.
In preparing the translation for issue it has not been thought
necessary to supply all the maps provided in the original, as the
general lie of the country must be fairly well known to British
readers.
(_Translation of Title Page_)
Monographs on the Great War
THE BATTLE ON THE YSER AND OF
YPRES IN THE AUTUMN 1914
(DIE SCHLACHT AN DER YSER UND
BEI YPERN IM HERBST 1914)
FROM OFFICIAL SOURCES
PUBLISHED
BY ORDER OF THE GERMAN GENERAL STAFF
OLDENBURG, 1918, GERHARD STALLING
PREFACE
BY GERMAN GREAT HEADQUARTERS
The gigantic scale of the present war defies comparison with those of
the past, and battles which formerly held the world in suspense are
now almost forgotten. The German people have been kept informed of the
progress of events on all fronts since the 4th August 1914, by the
daily official reports of the German General Staff, but the general
public will have been unable to gather from these a coherent and
continuous story of the operations.
For this reason the General Staff of the German Field Army has decided
to permit the publication of a series of monographs which will give the
German people a general knowledge of the course of the most important
operations in this colossal struggle of nations.
These monographs cannot be called histories of the war; years, even
decades, must pass before all the true inwardness and connection of
events will be completely revealed. This can only be done when the
archives of our opponents have been opened to the world as well as our
own and those of the General Staffs of our Allies. In the meantime the
German people will be given descriptions of the most important of
the battles, written by men who took part in them, and have had the
official records at their disposal.
It is possible that later research may make alterations here and there
necessary, but this appears no reason for delaying publications based
on official documents, indeed to do so would only serve to foster
the legends and rumours which so easily take hold of the popular
imagination and are so difficult, if not impossible, to correct
afterwards.
This series of monographs is not therefore intended as an addition to
military science, but has been written for all classes of the German
public who have borne the burden of the war, and especially for those
who have fought in the operations, in order to increase their knowledge
of the great events for the success of which they have so gladly
offered their lives.
GENERAL STAFF OF THE FIELD ARMY.
GERMAN GREAT HEADQUARTERS,
_Autumn, 1917_.
PRELIMINARY REMARKS
There is no more brilliant campaign in history than the advance of
our armies against the Western Powers in August and early September
1914. The weak French attacks into Alsace, the short-lived effort to
beat back the centre and right wing of our striking-force, the active
defence of the Allied hostile armies and the passive resistance of the
great Belgian and French fortresses, all failed to stop our triumphal
march. The patriotic devotion and unexampled courage of each individual
German soldier, combined with the able leading of his commanders,
overcame all opposition and sent home the news of countless German
victories. It was not long before the walls and hearts of Paris were
trembling, and it seemed as if the conspiracy which half the world
had been weaving against us for so many years was to be brought to a
rapid conclusion. Then came the battle of the Marne, in the course of
which the centre and right wings of the German Western Army were, it
is true, withdrawn, but only to fight again as soon as possible, under
more favourable strategic conditions. The enemy, not expecting our
withdrawal, only followed slowly, and on 13th September[4] our troops
brought him to a standstill along a line extending from the Swiss
frontier to the Aisne, north-east of Compiègne. In the trench warfare
which now began our pursuers soon discovered that our strength had been
by no means broken, or even materially weakened, by the hard fighting.
As early as 5th September, before the battle of the Marne, the Chief
of the German General Staff had ordered the right wing should be
reinforced by the newly-formed Seventh Army.[5] It soon became clear
to the opposing commanders that any attempt to break through the
new German front was doomed to failure, and that a decisive success
could only be obtained by making an outflanking movement on a large
scale against the German right wing. Thus began what our opponents
have called the 'Race to the Sea,' in which each party tried to
gain a decision by outflanking the other's western wing. The good
communications of France, especially in the north, enabled the Allied
troops to be moved far more rapidly than our own, for the German
General Staff had at their disposal only the few Franco-Belgian
railways which had been repaired, and these were already overburdened
with transport of material of every description. In spite of this,
however, the French and British attacks failed to drive back the German
right wing at any point. Not only did they find German troops ready to
meet them in every case, but we were also generally able to keep the
initiative in our hands.
In this manner by the end of September the opposing flanks had been
extended to the district north of the Somme, about Péronne-Albert. A
few days later began the interminable fighting round Arras and Lens,
and by the middle of October our advanced troops were near Lille,
marching through the richest industrial country of France. The Army
Cavalry was placed so as to threaten the hostile left flank, and to
bring pressure against the communications with England. Our cavalry
patrols pushed forward as far as Cassel and Hazebrouck, the pivots of
the enemy's movements, but they had to retire eastwards again when
superior hostile forces moved up to the north-east. The reports which
they brought back with them all pointed to preparations by the enemy
for an attack on a large scale, and for another effort to turn the
fortunes of the campaign to his favour. With this in view all available
troops, including newly-arrived detachments from England, were to be
used to break through the gap between Lille and Antwerp against our
right wing, roll it up and begin the advance against the northern Rhine.
It must be remembered that at the time this plan was conceived
the fortresses of Lille and Antwerp were still in French and
Belgian possession. It was hoped that Lille, with its well-built
fortifications, even though they were not quite up-to-date, would at
least hold up the German right wing for a time. Antwerp was defended by
the whole Belgian Army of from five to six divisions which were to be
reinforced by British troops, and it was confidently expected that this
garrison would be sufficiently strong to hold the most modern fortress
in Western Europe against any attack, especially if, as was generally
believed, this could only be carried out by comparatively weak forces.
Thus it seemed that the area of concentration for the Franco-Belgian
masses was secure until all preparations were ready for the blow to be
delivered through weakly-held Belgium against the rear of the German
armies in the west. The plan was a bold one, but it was countered by a
big attack of considerable German forces in the same neighbourhood and
at the same time. The two opponents met and held each other up on the
Yser and at Ypres, and here the last hope of our enemy to seize Belgium
and gain possession of the rich provinces of Northern France before the
end of the year was frustrated. The question arises how the Germans
were able to find the men to do this, since it had been necessary to
send considerable forces to the Eastern front to stop the Russian
advance.
Whoever has lived through those great days of August 1914, and
witnessed the wonderful enthusiasm of the German nation, will never
forget that within a few days more than a million volunteers entered
German barracks to prepare to fight the enemies who were hemming in
Germany. Workmen, students, peasants, townspeople, teachers, traders,
officials, high and low, all hastened to join the colours. There was
such a constant stream of men that finally they had to be sent away,
and put off till a later date, for there was neither equipment nor
clothing left for them. By 16th August, before the advance in the
west had begun, the Prussian War Minister in Berlin had ordered the
formation of five new Reserve Corps to be numbered from XXII to XXVI,
whilst Bavaria formed the 6th Bavarian Reserve Division, and Saxony and
Würtemburg together brought the XXVII Reserve Corps into being. Old and
young had taken up arms in August 1914, in their enthusiasm to defend
their country, and 75 per cent. of the new Corps consisted of these
volunteers, the remainder being trained men of both categories of the
_Landwehr_ and the _Landsturm_, as well as some reservists from the
depôts, who joined up in September. All these men, ranging from sixteen
to fifty years of age, realised the seriousness of the moment, and the
need of their country: they were anxious to become useful soldiers as
quickly as possible to help in overthrowing our malicious enemies.
Some regiments consisted entirely of students; whole classes of the
higher educational schools came with their teachers and joined the same
company or battery. Countless retired officers placed themselves at the
disposal of the Government, and the country will never forget these
patriots who took over commands in the new units, the formation of
which was mainly due to their willing and unselfish work.
The transport of the XXII, XXIII, XXIV, XXVI and XXVII Reserve Corps to
the Western Front began on 10th October, and the 6th Bavarian Reserve
Division followed shortly after. Only comparatively few experienced
commanders were available for the units, and it was left to their keen
and patriotic spirit to compensate as far as possible for what the men
still lacked to play their part in the great struggle.
The situation of the armies on the Western Front at this time was as
follows. In the neighbourhood of Lille the northern wing of the Sixth
Army was fighting against an ever-increasing enemy. On 9th October,
Antwerp, in spite of its strong fortifications and garrison, was
taken after a twelve days' siege directed by General von Beseler,
commanding the III Reserve Corps, and well known in peace time as
Chief of the Engineer Corps and Inspector-General of Fortifications.
The victorious besiegers had carried all before them. As they were
numerically insufficient to invest Antwerp on the west, south and
east, a break-through was attempted on a comparatively narrow front.
It was completely successful, and Antwerp was occupied; but the main
body of the Belgian army, in good fighting order, was able to escape
westwards along the coast, to await the arrival of British and French
reinforcements behind the Yser. Only about 5000 Belgians were taken
prisoner, but some 20,000 Belgian and 2000 British troops[6] were
forced into Holland. In consequence of this new situation, and of the
reports of hostile concentrations in the area Calais-Dunkirk-Lille,
the German General Staff decided to form a new Fourth Army under Duke
Albert of Würtemburg. It was to be composed of the XXII, XXIII, XXVI,
and XXVII Reserve Corps,[7] and was joined later on by the III Reserve
Corps with the 4th _Ersatz_ Division. By 13th October the detainment of
this new Army was in full progress west and south-west of Brussels. On
the evening of 14th October the four Reserve Corps began their march
to the line Eecloo (fifteen miles east of Bruges)--Deynze--point four
miles west of Audenarde.
In the meantime we had occupied the fortified town of Lille. It had
been entered on 12th October by part of the XIX Saxon Corps and some
_Landwehr_ troops, after the town had suffered considerably owing to
the useless efforts of French territorial troops to defend it. The
order to the garrison was: 'The town is to be held till the Tenth
French Army arrives'; it resulted in the capture of 4500 French
prisoners, who were sent to Germany. On the 14th the right wing of the
Sixth Army, consisting of the XIII Würtemburg and XIX Saxon Corps,
pushed forward to the Lys, behind a screen of three Cavalry Corps.[8]
They took up a position covering Lille, from Menin through Comines to
Warneton and thence east of Armentières, where they came into touch
with the 14th Infantry Division which was further south near the
western forts of Lille. To the north of the Sixth Army, the III Reserve
Corps, with its three divisions from Antwerp, was advancing westwards
on a broad front. By the 14th it had driven back the hostile rearguards
and reached a line from Bruges to near Ghent. Airmen and reconnaissance
detachments had recognised movements of large bodies of troops about
Hazebrouck, Lillers and St. Omer and reported disembarkations on a big
scale at Dunkirk and Calais. In addition to this, considerable hostile
forces had reached Ypres, and appeared to be facing more or less
southwards opposite the northern wing of the Sixth Army.[9]
An order issued on 14th October, by the Chief of the German General
Staff, gave the following instructions for the German forces between
Lille and the sea. The Sixth Army was at first to remain entirely on
the defensive along the line Menin-Armentières-La Bassée and to await
the attack of our new Fourth Army against the left flank of the enemy.
The offensive action of the Fourth Army after its deployment was to
be so directed that the III Reserve Corps, which now belonged to it,
should move as its right wing in echelon along the coast, whilst its
left was to advance through Menin.
In accordance with these orders the III Reserve Corps occupied Ostend
on the 15th, its left wing reaching the line of the Thourout-Roulers
road. The Corps was then ordered not to advance further for a few
days, so as to avoid the attention of the British and French, who
were advancing against the north wing of the Sixth Army, being drawn
prematurely to movements in this neighbourhood. Only patrols therefore
were sent out to reconnoitre across the Yser and the canal south of
it. On the 17th the XXII, XXIII, XXVI and XXVII Reserve Corps reached
the line Oostcamp (south of Bruges)-Thielt--point six miles east of
Courtrai. On the advance of these four new Corps, the III Reserve
Corps was to draw away to the right wing, and during the 17th and the
following morning it moved up to the sector of attack allotted to it
immediately south of the coast, and cleared the front of the Fourth
Army. The reconnaissance activity of the previous days had in places
led to severe fighting, especially on the southern wing in front of the
6th Reserve Division. It was found that the Belgian rearguards still
held part of the ground east of the Yser and of the canal to Ypres. Any
attempt to advance beyond this water-barrier was out of the question,
as the bridges had been blown up and the whole line put in a state of
defence.
The screening of the advancing Fourth Army by the III Reserve Corps
was a brilliant success. At midday on the 18th, Field-Marshal French,
who was to direct the enemy's attack from the line of the Yser, was
still in ignorance of our new Army. He believed he had time to prepare
for his attack, and his only immediate care was to secure the line
from Armentières to the sea for the deployment. After the events on
the Marne, Field-Marshal French had particularly requested General
Joffre, the Allied commander,[10] that he might be placed on the
northern flank of the line. He would then be close to Calais, which had
already become an English town,[11] he would be able to protect the
communications to his country; and, further, the fame to be gained by
a decisive and final victory attracted this ambitious commander to the
north. As a result the II British Corps under General Smith-Dorrien was
now in action against the strong German positions between Vermelles
(four miles south-west of La Bassée) and Laventie (west of Lille).[12]
Further to the north the III British Corps was fighting against the
Saxons advancing from Lille and our I, II and IV Cavalry Corps.[13]
The I British Cavalry Corps was covering the hostile advance on the
line Messines-Gheluvelt, south-east of Ypres.[14] Immediately to the
north again, the newly formed IV British Corps, consisting of the 7th
Infantry Division and 3rd Cavalry Division, had arrived in the area
Gheluvelt-Zonnebeke, pursued in its retreat by von Beseler's columns
(III Reserve Corps). On its left the I British Corps had marched up to
Bixschoote,[15] and the gap between this place and Dixmude had been
closed by a French Cavalry Division which connected up with the Belgian
Army. The last, reinforced by two French Territorial divisions, was
engaged in preparing the line of the Yser up to the sea for the most
stubborn defence. These strong forces were to cover the arrival of the
VIII and X French Corps[16] and were to deliver the first blow against
our supposed right wing.
On the 18th one of our cyclist patrols which had gone out far in
advance of its Corps was surrounded near Roulers, and it was only by
its capture that the enemy definitely discovered the arrival of the
new German Corps, whose formation, however, had not been unknown to
him, thanks to his good Secret Service system. Field-Marshal French
was now confronted with a new situation. The preparations for his big
attack were not yet completed. The superiority of the masses already
concentrated did not yet appear to him to be sufficient to guarantee
success against the enemy's advance. The British commander therefore
decided to remain on the defensive[17] against our new Fourth Army,
until the completion of the French concentration. His line was already
closed up to the sea, it was naturally strong, and fresh troops were
arriving daily. The danger threatening Dunkirk and Calais had the
effect of making England put forth her full energy; the British troops
fought desperately to defend every inch of ground, using every possible
means to keep up the sinking spirits of the Belgians. They demanded and
received rapid assistance from the French, and were backed up by fresh
reinforcements from England.
From the German point of view the patriotic enthusiasm and unconditional
determination to win the war which pervaded the new Fourth Army
gave every prospect of successfully closing with the enemy, who was
apparently still engaged in concentrating and reorganising his forces,
and gaining Calais, the aim and object of the 1914 campaign.
Our offensive, however, struck against a powerful army, fully deployed
and ready to meet us. The British boast that they held up our attack
with a great inferiority of numbers, but this was only true in the
case of the 7th Division during the first two days in the small sector
ZONNEBEKE-GHELUVELT. On 22nd October between ARMENTIÈRES and the sea
there were eight Corps opposed to the seven attacking German Corps;
and, besides, the enemy had prepared a series of lines of strong
trenches covered by an extensive system of artificial obstacles. In
the course of the operations that developed, the relative strength of
the opposing forces never appreciably altered in our favour.[18] The
moral strength of our troops made up for the numerical superiority of
the enemy. Our attack drove the hostile lines well back and destroyed,
it is hoped for ever, the ambition of our opponent to regain Belgium by
force of arms.
The great desire of the Germans to defeat the hostile northern wing,
and to hit hardest the most hated of all our enemies, and, on the other
side, the obstinate determination of the British to hold on to the
passages to their country, and to carry out the offensive to the Rhine
with all their resources, resulted in this battle being one of the most
severe of the whole war. The deeds of our troops, old and young, in the
battle on the YSER and of YPRES can never be sufficiently praised, and
in spite of great losses their enthusiasm remained unchecked and their
offensive spirit unbroken.
THE THEATRE OF OPERATIONS
The country in which it was hoped to bring about the final decision of
the campaign of 1914 was not favourable to an attack from east to west.
Western Flanders, the most western part of Belgium, is almost
completely flat, and lies only slightly above sea-level, and in some
parts is even below it. Mount KEMMEL, in the south, is the only
exception; rising to a height of over 500 feet, it is the watch-tower
of Western Flanders. Before the war it was a well-wooded ridge with
pretty enclosures and villages. From its slopes and summits could be
seen the whole countryside from LILLE to MENIN and DIXMUDE.
The possession of this hill was of great importance. Our cavalry
actually occupied it during the early days of October, but when the
enemy advanced he immediately attacked it. The XIX Saxon Corps was
still too far away to help, and so Mount KEMMEL fell into the enemy's
hands. During the battle of YPRES it was his best observation post, and
of the utmost assistance to his artillery.
We repeatedly succeeded in gaining a footing on the eastern crest
of the ridge in front of YPRES, but in the autumn of 1914, as also
later in the war, this was always the signal for the most desperate
fighting. It was thus that the heights of ST. ELOI,[19] the high-lying
buildings of HOOGE and the village of WYTSCHAETE won their sanguinary
fame.
Lying in the midst of luxuriant meadows, with its high ramparts and
fine buildings, YPRES was formerly one of the most picturesque towns in
Flanders. In the fourteenth century it had a considerable importance,
and became the centre of the cloth-weaving trade on its introduction
from Italy. BRUGES, lying close to the coast, became the market for its
wares. The Clothweavers' Guild, which accumulated great wealth, erected
in YPRES a fine Gothic hall, whose towers with those of St. Martin's
Church were landmarks for miles round. In modern times, however, the
importance of the town greatly diminished. The cloth-weaving industry
drifted away to the factories of MENIN and COURTRAI; and YPRES, like
its dead neighbour BRUGES, remained only a half-forgotten memory of its
former brilliance.
The war has brought fresh importance to the town, but of a mournful
kind. On the impact of the German and Anglo-French masses in Flanders
in the autumn of 1914, it became the central pivot of the operations.
The enemy dug his heels into the high ground in front of it; for, as
an Englishman has written, it had become a point of honour to hold the
town. YPRES lay so close to the front that our advance could be seen
from its towers, and the enemy was able to use it for concealing his
batteries and sheltering his reserves. For the sake of our troops we
had to bring it under fire; for German life is more precious than the
finest Gothic architecture. Thus the mythical death of YPRES became a
reality: no tower now sends forth its light across the countryside, and
a wilderness of wrecked and burnt-out houses replaces the pretty town
so full of legend and tradition in the history of Flanders.
The streams which run northwards from the hills about YPRES unite
for the most part near the town and flow into the YSER canal, which
connects the LYS at COMINES with the sea at NIEUPORT. This canal passes
through the YPRES ridge near HOLLEBEKE and, following northwards the
course of a small canalised tributary of the YSER, meets the YSER
itself south of DIXMUDE. The dunes at NIEUPORT have been cut through by
engineers for its exit to the sea. It is only from DIXMUDE northwards
that the canal becomes an obstacle which requires proper bridging
equipment for its passage. Its high embankments to the south of
DIXMUDE, however, give excellent cover in the otherwise flat country
and greatly simplify the task of the defender.
The canal acquired a decisive importance when the hard-pressed
Belgians, during the battle on the night of 29th-30th October, let
in the sea at flood-tide through the sluices into the canal, and
then by blowing up the sluice-gates at NIEUPORT, allowed it to flood
the battlefield along the lower YSER. By this means they succeeded
in placing broad stretches of country under water, so much so that
any extensive military operations in that district became out of the
question. The high water-level greatly influenced all movements over
a very large area. By his order the King of the Belgians destroyed
for years the natural wealth of a considerable part of his fertile
country, for the sea-water must have ruined all vegetation down to its
very roots.
The country on both sides of the canal is flat, and difficult for
observation purposes. The high level of the water necessitates drainage
of the meadows, which for this purpose are intersected by deep dykes
which have muddy bottoms. The banks of the dykes are bordered with
willows, and thick-set hedges form the boundaries of the cultivated
areas. Generally speaking, the villages do not consist of groups of
houses: the farms are dispersed either singly, or in rows forming a
single street. The country is densely populated and is consequently
well provided with roads. But these are only good where they have been
made on embankments and are paved. The frequent rains, which begin
towards the end of October, rapidly turn the other roads into mere mud
tracks and in many cases make them quite useless for long columns of
traffic.
The digging of trenches was greatly complicated by rain and
surface-water. The loam soil was on the whole easy to work in; but it
was only on the high ground that trenches could be dug deep enough to
give sufficient cover against the enemy's artillery fire; on the flat,
low-lying ground they could not in many cases be made more than two
feet deep.
A few miles south of the coast the country assumes quite another
character: there are no more hedges and canals: instead gently rolling
sand-hills separate the land from the sea, and this deposited sand is
not fertile like the plains south of them. A belt of dunes prevents the
sea encroaching on the land.
The greatest trouble of the attacker in all parts of Flanders is the
difficulty of observation. The enemy, fighting in his own country,[20]
had every advantage, while our artillery observation posts were only
found with the utmost trouble. Our fire had to be directed from the
front line, and it frequently happened that our brave artillerymen
had to bring up their guns into the front infantry lines in order to
use them effectively. Although the enemy was able to range extremely
accurately on our guns which were thus quickly disclosed, nothing could
prevent the German gunners from following the attacking infantry.
Observation from aeroplanes was made very difficult by the many hedges
and villages, so that it took a long time to discover the enemy's
dispositions and give our artillery good targets.
Finally, the flat nature of the country and the consequent limitations
of view were all to the advantage of the defenders, who were everywhere
able to surprise the attackers. Our troops were always finding fresh
defensive lines in front of them without knowing whether they were
occupied or not. The British, many of whom had fought in a colonial
war against the most cunning of enemies in equally difficult country,
allowed the attacker to come to close quarters and then opened a
devastating fire at point-blank range from rifles and machine-guns
concealed in houses and trees.
In many cases the hedges and dykes split up the German attacks so that
even the biggest operations degenerated into disconnected actions which
made the greatest demands on the powers of endurance and individual
skill of our volunteers. In spite of all these difficulties our men,
both old and young, even when left to act on their own initiative,
showed a spirit of heroism and self-sacrifice which makes the battle on
the YSER a sacred memory both for the Army and the Nation, and every
one who took part in it may say with pride, 'I was there.'
THE ADVANCE OF THE FOURTH ARMY
An Army Order of 16th October 1914 gave the following instructions for
the 18th:--
The III Reserve Corps to march to the line COXYDE-FURNES-OEREN,
west of the YSER.
The XXII Reserve Corps to the line AERTRYCKE-THOUROUT.
The XXIII Reserve Corps to the line LICHTERVELDE-ARDOYE.
The XXVI Reserve Corps to the Area EMELGHEM-ISEGHEM, and, on the
left wing, the XXVII Reserve Corps to the line LENDELEDE-COURTRAI.