Again therefore, resuming what we have said, we repeat, that the

paternal cause commences from the supreme union of intelligibles; but

the paternal and at the same time effective cause is consubsistent

in the intelligible paradigm; and the effective and at the same time

paternal cause is defined according to the whole demiurgus. But the

cause which is alone effective and fabricative, pertains to the junior

Gods who give subsistence to partial and mortal things. The peculiarity

therefore of the demiurgic cause is effective and paternal. And this

Timæus asserts, not only in the beginning of the discourse about it,

in which he says, “[To discover] therefore, the artificer and father

of this universe, &c.;” but also in the speech to the junior Gods, he

does the same thing; for the demiurgus in a similar manner says to

them: “Gods of Gods of whom I am the demiurgus and father, [Whatever

is generated by me is indissoluble, I being willing that it should be

so.]” For he does not call himself father and demiurgus, but demiurgus

and father, just as there [Timæus calls him] fabricator and father.

And not in the Timæus only is this mode of the arrangement of the

names defined, but in the Politicus also, the Elean guest speaking

about the world says that it imitates the instruction of its demiurgus

and father; and in the beginning indeed, he uses these names more

accurately, but in the end more negligently. Since Plato therefore,

every where preserves this order of names unchanged, it is evident to

those who are not entirely unskilled in things of this kind, that he

defines the demiurgic monad according to this peculiarity, and that

he considers it to be effective and at the same time paternal. For

because indeed, it is the end of the intellectual triad, it is allotted

a paternal transcendency with respect to all the second genera of

Gods; but because it produces from itself all the partial genera and

species of beings, it possesses an effective cause of the natures to

which it gives subsistence. And because indeed, it is father, power

is in it, and at the same time intellect. For the demiurgus himself

says, “Imitating the power which I employed in your generation.” And

again, Timæus says concerning the demiurgus; “Whatever ideas intellect

perceived in animal itself, such and so many he conceived by the

dianoëtic energy is necessary for this universe to contain.” Hence

he is father, and the power of the father is in him, and intellect.

All these however, are in him intellectually, and not intelligibly.

Hence, I think he is called father indeed, not simply, but together

with effector and demiurgus; and power, not by itself, but the power

of the demiurgus and father. For he who calls himself demiurgus and

father, says that it is the power of himself. But he is immediately

called intellect, without the addition of power, and the other

appellations. “Whatever ideas therefore intellect perceived,” &c. For

all things are in him intellectually, and both power and father, by

which he imitates the intelligible paradigm. For in him all things

were intelligibly,[264] viz. bound, infinity, and that which is mixed

from both these. These, however, are father, power, and intellect.

But the intellectual of the paradigm indeed was intelligible in the

intelligible Gods, subsisting prior to an intellectual cause. The

intellectual however of the demiurgus, is of itself intellectual, being

intellectual in intellectuals, as was before observed. Because indeed,

as we have said, he is father, power is in him, and also intellect. But

because these are defined according to the effective and demiurgic, he

is coarranged with the vivific order, and together with it constitutes

the genera of life, and vivifies the whole world. What this order is

however, and where it is arranged, we shall shortly survey. But thus

much is evident from what has been said, that so far as he is the

demiurgus, he requires contact with the vivific order, together with

it generates total lives, and conjoins it to himself. Disseminating,

however, all the measures of life in it, and together with it adorning

and producing them, he again converts them to himself. For it belongs

to him to generate all things, and to recall all things to himself, no

less than to generate them, because he is established at the end of the

intellectual order, and is the demiurgic intellect. As he is therefore

demiurgic, he gives subsistence to all things; but as intellect, he

convolves multitude to union, and converts it to himself. He also

accomplishes both these, by the words which he delivers to the junior

Gods. For he fills them with demiurgic and prolific power, collects

them to himself, constitutes himself the object of desire as it were to

the multitude of Gods, and extends about himself all the demiurgi in

the world.

CHAPTER XVII.

In the third place therefore, let us purify our conceptions about the

demiurgic cause according to other projecting energies of intellect,

following for this purpose Timæus. In the first place then, Timæus in

the beginning of the theory concerning the demiurgus, sufficiently

exhibits his goodness, and his unenvying and abundant communication of

demiurgic reasons, being impelled to this from the seat of goodness

which is inherent in him, and from his exuberant deity. For his

goodness and his unenvying abundance, are not as it were a certain

habit of good, and a power, or a form itself by itself existing prior

to many goods, but it is one ineffable participation of good, and

_the one_ of the demiurgic order; according to which the demiurgus

also is a God, and fills all things with their proper good. For because

there is deity in him which desires to adorn and arrange all things,

and an hyparxis which is extended to the providence of the whole of

things, on this account he establishes the principle of fabrication.

His goodness therefore is nothing else than demiurgic deity. But his

will is the progeny of the energy of his goodness, bounding the end

of his power. For since in the demiurgus of wholes there are, as we

have said, father, power, and intellect, and these subsist in him

intellectually, according to each of these he is filled with the

participation of _the one_. And through goodness indeed, that

which is paternal in him, and which is as it were the intelligible of

intellect, is illuminated. But through will, his power is governed,

and is extended to one intelligible good. And through providence, his

intellect is perfect, and gives subsistence to all things. All these

likewise are the progeny of the one deity in the demiurgus.

In the first place, therefore, as I have said, Timæus unfolds through

these things the divine peculiarity of the demiurgus. But in the

second place, he presents to our view the intelligible cause which

is in him, and also the united paradigmatic cause of wholes which he

contains. For to make all things similar to himself, evinces that he

is the intelligible paradigm of every thing beautiful and good in the

world. For because he gives subsistence to all things by his very

being, that to which he gives subsistence is the image of himself. And

according to this reasoning the demiurgus is not only a God, but he

contains in himself the intelligible, and true being, and antecedently

comprehends not only the final cause of mundane natures, but also the

paradigmatic cause. But again, in the third place, Timæus celebrates

the demiurgic power, and the principle which abolishes every thing

disorderly and indefinite, and prepares the beautiful alone and the

good to have dominion in wholes. For the assertion that the demiurgus

to the utmost of his power suffered nothing evil and vile to exist,

indicates his unconquerable power, which adorns things material in an

unpolluted manner, and imparts by illumination bound to indefinite, and

order to disorderly natures.

In which part of the Timæus, likewise, this dogma of Plato will appear

to you to be admirable, that matter is generated from some one of the

Gods situated above the demiurgus. For the demiurgus receiving matter

occupied by the vestiges of forms, thus himself introduces into it all

the perfection of ornament and arrangement. Matter, therefore, and the

whole of that which is the subject of bodies, proceed supernally from

the first principles, which on account of their exuberance of power,

are able to generate even the last of beings. But the demiurgus of the

universe, imparts by illumination, order, bound, and ornament, and

the whole world is fabricated an image of intelligibles, through the

communication of forms.

In the fourth place therefore, let us survey how Timæus unfolds to

us the demiurgic intellect. “By a reasoning process,” says he, “the

demiurgus discovered from the things which are visible according to

nature, that no work which is destitute of intelligence can ever become

more beautiful than that which possesses intellect.” What therefore is

this reasoning? What is the discovery, and whence does it originate?

Reasoning, therefore, is indeed distributed intellection, looking to

itself, and in itself investigating good. For every one who reasons,

passes from one thing to another, and being converted to himself,

searches after good. The demiurgic intellect, therefore, in adorning

and arranging the universe subsists analogously to him who reasons; for

he emits the divided causes of mundane natures, which preexist unitedly

in intelligibles. For those things which intelligible intellect

constitutes uniformly and exemptly, these intellectual intellect

separating, distributing into parts, and as it were fabricating by

itself, generates. Reasoning therefore is the being filled with the

intelligible, and an all-perfect union with it. By which also it is

evident that it is not fit to think this reasoning [of the demiurgus]

is either investigation or doubt, or a wandering of divine intellect,

but that it is stable intelligence intellectually perceiving the

multiform causes of beings. For intellect is always united to the

intelligible, and is filled with its own intelligibles. And in a

similar manner it is intellect in energy, and intelligible. For at

one and the same time, it intellectually perceives and is perceived,

discovers itself, entering into itself, and the reasoning also finds

what this intelligence is, but not according to transition. For the

intelligence of the Gods is eternal. And invention with them is not the

discovery of that which is absent; for all things are always present

to the intellect of the Gods. The intelligible likewise there is not

separated from intellect. The conversion, therefore, of intellect to

itself may be called reasoning; but the being filled from intelligibles

invention. And intelligibles themselves may be denominated things

visible according to nature. For because Timæus had denominated the

unadorned subject of bodies when it was vanquished by the obscure

vestiges of forms, visible, hence, I think, he calls intelligibles

visible according to nature. For it is according to nature, to

intellect to look to these, and not to things subordinate to these. As,

therefore, he says, that intellect itself sees intelligibles, after

the same manner also he calls intelligibles things naturally visible,

and converts intellect to the intelligible, as that which sees to

that which is seen. If, therefore, intellect sees animal itself, and

assimilates to it the whole world, it may be said that animal itself

is visible to the demiurgus of the universe. For there the most

splendid of intelligibles subsists; and this is that which we before

demonstrated, when we said that there the fountain of beauty shines

forth, which Socrates, in the Phædrus, denominates splendid and fulgid.

CHAPTER XVIII.

Such therefore are the conceptions which are to be assumed of the

demiurgic cause, and from these things they are to be derived. We shall

however obtain one perfection of the summit of the dogmas concerning

it, if we are able to survey the words which this cause extends to the

junior demiurgi, and to unfold the concealed meaning of them. This,

therefore, we shall also do, establishing the following principle

of the explanation of them: The energies and powers of the Gods are

twofold. And some indeed abide in, and energize about them, and have

for their end one hypostasis, and which is united to essence. But

others proceed from them, exhibit an efficacious power about secondary

natures, and coexist with the multitude of their recipients, and

with the peculiarity of essence. These, however, being twofold, the

secondary are suspended from those that are prior to them, are defined

about them, and receive their proper hyparxis according to them. For

it is every where necessary that externally proceeding should be the

images of internal energies, evolving the at-once-collected nature of

their indivisibility; multiplying that in them which is united, and

dividing their impartibility.

According to this reasoning, therefore, the energy of nature is

also twofold, one being that which abides in it, according to which

it connects itself, and the reasons it contains, but the other

proceeding from it, through which also bodies are filled with these

physical powers, which being moved by nature, act on each other,

and physically suffer by each other. Again, the motion of the soul

likewise is twofold. And the one indeed is self-motive, is converted

to itself, is of itself, concurs with the life of the soul, and is

without any difference with respect to it. But the other is incumbent

on alter-motive natures, moves these, and about these extends the

power of itself. The energy of intellect, therefore, is likewise

twofold. And one indeed is intellectual, is united to true beings,

and is impartible, being co-existent with the intelligible itself of

intellect, or rather being the intelligible itself, and intellect.

For intellect is not of itself in capacity, and afterwards receiving

energy, intellectually perceives the intelligible; but it is one simple

energy. For the multitude of it is unical, and its energy is directed

to itself. But the other energy of intellect is directed to externals,

and to things which are able to participate of intellect. For these

intellect causes to be intellectual through itself, splendidly as it

were emitting the light of its own intelligence, and imparting it to

others. It is necessary, therefore, that the divine and demiurgic

intellect itself, should always indeed be united to the intelligible,

and that it should have the plenitude and self-sufficiency of demiurgic

intelligence eternally established according to a union exempt from

wholes; to which, as it appears to me, Timæus also looking says,

that the father of the universe abides in his accustomed manner,

and withdraws himself to his own place of survey, delivering the

fabrication of mortal natures to the mundane Gods. For so far as he is

exempt from the beings posterior to himself and is uncoordinated with

the more partial multitude of Gods, so far he is converted to himself,

and surveys and intellectually perceives the natures prior to himself,

according to one uniform union. But in consequence of the more ruling

and leading Gods being extended towards him, he emits from himself

secondary energies, to all the partial orders.

Timæus, therefore, fashions through words, these powers and efficacious

energies which proceed from the whole and one fabrication to the

demiurgic multitude of Gods. For words are the images of intellections;

because indeed they evolve that which is contracted in intelligibles,

but lead forth that which is impartible into a partible hypostasis.

They likewise transfer that which abides in itself into habitude to

another thing. And it is evident that the reasons which are impelled

from nature, are certain natural [powers], and render that which

receives them physical. But the reasons which are generated from soul,

are indeed vivific, but render the inanimate nature which participates

of them [animated] and moved from itself, through the power of soul,

as Socrates says in the Phædrus, and communicate to it the resemblance

of self-motion. And the reasons which are generated from intellect,

illuminating the natures posterior to it, distribute all intellectual

goods to their recipients, being the suppliers of true knowledge,

of purity and a more simple life. After the same manner also the

demiurgic words produce in the junior Gods, whole, impartible, and

united measures of exempt fabrication, and fill their essences with

demiurgic providence. They likewise render them second demiurgi, and

emulous of their father. For he indeed gives subsistence to the whole

plenitudes of the world. But they, imitating him, fabricate all partial

natures in conjunction with wholes. And he produces the essence of

perpetual natures. But they fashioning mortal natures according to one

generation-producing circle, likewise transmute these. And as the one

demiurgus governs the whole periods of the universe, thus also the many

demiurgi convolve the divisible circles of the natures that are borne

along[265] in generation. If, therefore, we assert these things rightly

concerning the words proceeding from the demiurgus to the multitude of

mundane Gods, and they are efficacious, fabricative, and convertive of

their recipients to a union with him, and are also perfective of the

beneficent reasons which they contain, we shall no longer seem to speak

paradoxically, if we say that these words extend to the Gods in the

world the participation of all the powers that are firmly established

in the father, and of the causes prior to, and subsisting after him.

And as he convolving the end of the intellectual Gods, is the plenitude

of all things, so likewise the demiurgic words proceeding from him,

produce in the junior Gods the peculiarities, as I may say, of all

the divine genera that are above the world, through which they are

suspended from all the orders prior to them; just I think as the whole

of this world [is suspended from the mundane Gods who[266]] fabricate

all mortal natures, and impart to different things a different power,

and an efflux of divine powers.

What, therefore, in short, is it which Plato indicates the Gods derive

through these words from the first demiurgus, and the all-perfect

fabrication? In the first place, indeed, they derive this, that they

are Gods of Gods. For the vocal address proceeding to them from the

father, is the supplier of divine power, and is allotted an efficacious

presence in its participant, as we before observed. But in the next

place, these words impart to them an indissoluble power. The demiurgus

of wholes, however, comprehends in himself the cause of dissolution, in

order that they may indeed be essentially indissoluble, but according

to the cause of binding, not indissoluble. In the third place,

therefore, the demiurgus produces in them from on high, through these

words, a renovated immortality. For the assertion that they are neither

immortal, nor shall be subject to the fatality of death, establishes

them in this form of immortality, which the fable in the Politicus

denominates renovated. In addition to this also, the words testify

that they derive from the father a power perfective of wholes. For

if the world is imperfect without the subsistence of mortal animals,

it is doubtless necessary that those who preside over the generation

of them should be the causes of perfection to the universe. And in

the last place, these words impart to the junior Gods a paternal and

generative empire derived from the exempt and intellectual cause of

wholes; and insert in them the proximate powers of regeneration. For

through these words, the junior Gods again receive in themselves the

natures that are corrupted, fabricate parts from wholes, and again

effect the dissolution of parts into their wholes. And universally the

words of the demiurgus subject the perpetually-generated course of

nature, to the fabrication of the junior Gods. In short, therefore,

the demiurgus fills the junior Gods with divine union, fills them with

a firm establishment, and fills them with a perpetuity adapted to their

nature. But he pours into them the all-various causes of perfective

powers, of vivific rivers, and demiurgic measures. Hence also, the many

demiurgi refer the fabrication of particulars to the one and whole

providence of the father, and the principles of demiurgic works which

they received from him, to his efficacious production. And all of them

indeed are filled with all powers, because all of them participate of

the demiurgic words which proceed into them from the father. But some

of them are more characterized by one peculiarity than another.

And some of them indeed are the suppliers of union to their progeny;

others, of indissoluble permanency; others, of perfection; and others,

of life. But others preside over regeneration, and being allotted in a

distributed manner in the universe, the powers which subsist unitedly

in the one demiurgus, they are subservient to the providence of the

father. And every thing which is generated by the many demiurgi, is in

a much greater degree produced by the one fabrication; which governs

mortal natures indeed, eternally, things that are moved, immoveably,

and partible natures impartibly. It is not however necessary that the

progeny of that one demiurgus should be suspended from the motion

of the junior Gods. For every where the one fabrication is more

comprehensive than that which is multiplied. And the more causal of

divine natures energize prior to their own offspring, and together

with them constitute the progeny that proceed from them. The first

[demiurgic] God, therefore, produces from and through himself the

divine genera[267] of the universe, according to his beneficent will.

But he governs mortal natures through the junior Gods, generating

indeed these also from himself, but other Gods producing them as

it were with their own hands. For he says, “these being generated

_through_ me will become equal to the Gods.” The cause, therefore,

_through which_, is to be attributed to the junior Gods; but the

cause _from which_, even in the production of mortal natures is

to be referred to the whole demiurgus. For always the first of those

things that are constituted, produce in conjunction with their monad

the generation of secondary natures. And all things indeed proceed

_from_ that monad, but some things immediately; and _through_

it, but some things through other media receive the providence that

emanates from it. For these middle genera of causes are allotted the

providential inspection of secondary natures from the first effective

monad.

CHAPTER XIX.

Concerning the words, therefore, in the Timæus, which the demiurgus

delivers to the Gods in the world, thus much may suffice at present.

But after these, it is fit to survey the second measures of total

demiurgic providence, which the demiurgus extends from himself to

the many and divisible souls. For having constituted these, divided

them equal in number to divine animals, and disseminated them about

the world, he inserts in them fabricative boundaries, defines the

whole periods of them, inscribes in them the laws of Fate, proposes

the apparent measures of their generation-producing life, legally

institutes, and adorns in a becoming manner all the rewards of virtue,

and the works of vice, intellectually comprehends in one the end of

every period, and co-arranges with a view to this the whole polity of

partial souls. All[268] souls, therefore, of an immortal condition,

being allotted a progression from the demiurgus, are filled from him

with an united and intellectual providence. Because, however, progeny

which are suspended from their causes participate of the perfective

efficacy which proceeds from them, divine souls, indeed, primarily

subsisting from thence, become auditors of the words of their father

immediately; but partial souls participate of the uniform providence

of the demiurgus secondarily, and with greater partibility. Hence also

the demiurgus, as a legislator, defining to these all the measures of

their life, he thus extends demiurgic words, unitedly comprehending

the divided nature of the whole of their life, convolving in sameness

without time their temporal mutability, and collecting uniformly,

according to one simplicity, the multiform and diversified nature of

the energy which exists about them. But to divine souls he immediately

unfolds the providence of himself, and exhorts them to join with him in

a providential inspection of the whole world, to fabricate, adorn and

dispose in conjunction with him, mortal natures, to govern generated

beings according to the measures of justice, and to lead and convolve

all things, following demiurgic providence. Very far therefore, are

those interpreters of Plato from according with the fabrication of the

universe, who admit that partial are the same with whole souls, and

who attribute the same essence to all souls; because all of them are

allotted their generation from one demiurgus.

For in the first place, the father in the course of his fabrication

adorning, and disposing in an orderly manner partial souls, poured

mingling, the remainder of the former mixture, says Timæus, and

produced the second and third genera. But in a progression of this

kind, the words effective of conversion which he extends to divine

souls, are intellectual, and demiurgic, and impart to them generative

powers, and perfective goods; but those which he extends to partial

souls, are the definite sources of generation, of the laws of Fate,

of justice, and all-various periods. If, therefore, every thing which

proceeds from the demiurgus is essentially imparted to souls, it is

indeed necessary that different measures of words should be the causes

of different powers; and that to some among the number of divisible

souls, the demiurgus should distribute a polity exempt from mundane

affairs, but to others a polity arranged under these souls, and

supernally governed by them. These things, however, may elsewhere be

more copiously demonstrated.

CHAPTER XX.

After the demiurgic words therefore, again returning to the demiurgic

intellect, let us survey following Plato, who the demiurgus is, who

convolves the end itself of the intellectual triad to the beginning,

and after what manner it is fit to denominate him according to the

Grecian theology. Or rather, prior to this let us summarily show what

we may assume concerning him according to the narration of Timæus. For

we shall more easily learn those particulars, if we assent to these.

For directly, in the beginning of the theology concerning him, he is

celebrated as the fabricator and father of the world. And he is neither

called fabricator alone, nor father and fabricator, but at one and

the same time manifestly possessing both peculiarities, he is rather

characterized by the fabricative, than by the paternal cause. But he

is denominated the demiurgus of wholes, according to his goodness,

unenvying and exuberant will, and his power which is able to adorn

and arrange all things, and even such as are of a disorderly nature.

He is however particularly unfolded to us as the supplier of beauty,

symmetry and order, and as the best of causes; and this because he is

allotted the uniform, and first effective power of the whole demiurgic

series. But he gives subsistence to intellect and soul, and at the

same time to all the life in the world; since he fabricated the whole

world an animal animated, and endued with intellect. Being likewise

full of every intelligible, and extending himself to intelligible and

all-perfect animal and conjoining this to himself through similitude,

he fabricates the sensible universe only-begotten, in the same manner

as the separate paradigm [animal itself] transcending wholes, unitedly

constitutes the intelligible universe.

Moreover, he is likewise the fabricator of bodies, and the perfector

of works, binding all things by the most excellent analogies, and

co-adapting their powers, bulks, and numbers by the most beautiful

bonds. Farther still, he constituted the universe a whole from wholes,

and perfect from perfect parts, that it might be free from old age and

disease, and might contain in itself all the genera of the elements.

He likewise adorned it with the first figure, and with the most simple

and most comprehensive of all figures. Besides these things, he is also

the cause of self-sufficiency to the universe, and of a circulation

into itself, in order that suffering all things from, and effecting

all things in itself, it might not be in want of any thing externally

situated. And he is indeed the supplier of intellectual motion, and

of a life which is evolved according to time, and which effects[269]

a mutation always according to the same, and similarly, and about the

same things. Farther still, he is the father of soul, and of all the

genera in soul, of the division in it, and all the harmonic reasons it

contains, constituting it in the world, as a self-moved and immortal

lyre; and he is also the divider of the one, and the seven circles in

it, and in short, is the maker and fabricator of figure and morphe.[270]

In addition to these things likewise, he generates from himself the

whole of time, according to the imitation of eternity, together with

all the measures of time, and the Gods that unfold these measures into

light. But he especially constitutes the whole sun, enkindling its

light from his own intellectual essence, in order that possessing a

transcendency exempt from the other Gods it might be the king of the

universe. Moreover, he fabricates[271] all the multitudes of mundane

Gods and dæmons, and all celestial and sublunary natures, in order

that he may evince this only-begotten and self-sufficient God [the

world] to be the image of the intelligible and all-perfect God; fixing

the earth indeed, as a firm seat or Vesta, in it, but distributing

by lot the other elements to divine souls and dæmons. Besides all

this likewise, he converts to himself the genera of Gods that have

proceeded from him, and fills all things with undefiled generation,

with perpetual life, demiurgic perfection, and generative abundance. He

also constitutes divisible souls together with their vehicles, divides

them about their leading Gods, arranges different souls under different

Gods, unfolds to them the laws of Fate, measures their descents into

generation, establishes rewards to their contests in their periodic

revolutions, and institutes, as I may say, the whole of their polity in

the world.

But after all these things, he introduces a boundary to the providence

of wholes, and returning to his own place of survey, delivering to the

junior Gods the superintendence of mortal natures, and abiding in his

own accustomed manner, is the paradigm to the demiurgi in the world

of providential attention to beings of a second order. And as in the

fabrication of wholes the paradigm is intelligible animal, so in the

arrangement of partial natures, the paradigm is intellectual animal,

in which all forms shine forth in a divided manner, according to their

own nature. For Timæus says, “the children understanding the order of

their father, were obedient to it,” and he abiding, and paternally,

and eternally producing all things, they adorn and arrange the mortal

genera demiurgically, and according to time. Hence the providence of

the demiurgus presents itself to the view, extending from on high as

far as to the production of these, and what is here said by Plato,

is as it were a hymn to the demiurgus and father of this universe,

celebrating his productions, and the benefits which he confers on the

world.

And it is requisite that being persuaded by what is here clearly

written, we should investigate all the other enquiries about the

demiurgus. My meaning is, that we should investigate what we

mentioned a little before, who the demiurgus is, and how we ought

to denominate him according to the sentiments of the Greeks; and on

what account, Timæus neither delivers the name of him, nor unfolds

to us who he is, but says, “that it is difficult to discover him,

and that when discovered, it is impossible to speak of him to all

men.” Now therefore, I think, from what has been already said, it is

evident even to those who are but in a small degree intelligent, that

according to the decision of Plato, it is the great Jupiter, who is

now celebrated by us as the demiurgus. For if, as we have observed,

the kingdom of Saturn is the summit of the whole intellectual triad,

and the intelligible transcendency of intellectuals, but the maternal

and vivific fountain of Rhea, is the middle centre, and the receiving

bosom of the generative power in Saturn, it is manifest to every one,

that the mighty Jupiter is allotted the end of this triad. For from

the before-mentioned causes, one of which indeed is paternal, but the

other generative, he is the God having a paternal subsistence, who

is said to reign, receiving the intellectual dominion of his father.

If, therefore, it is necessary that the demiurgus should convolve the

end of this intellectual triad, as was before demonstrated, and to

effect this, is the province of the royal power of Jupiter, we must

evidently acknowledge that the Jovian empire is the same as that of the

demiurgus, and that Jupiter is the demiurgus celebrated in the Timæus.

CHAPTER XXI.

If, however, it be necessary to consider this as worthy of further

discussion, and to demonstrate that the theology in the Timæus

about the demiurgus, accords with what is elsewhere written by

Plato concerning this God, let us in the first place assume what is

delivered in the Critias, because this dialogue proximately follows

the Timæus, and is composed according to an analogy to it, delivering

the hypostasis of the same things in images, the primary paradigms of

which Timæus celebrates through the fabrication of the world. Here,

therefore, Plato, (that I may derive what I say from the beginning)

relating the warlike preparations of the Athenians, in former times,

and the insolence and usurpation of the Atlantics, who were the progeny

of Neptune, but destroyed the divine seed, through the mixture of human

and mortal pursuits, and conducted themselves insolently to all men,

collects indeed the Gods to a consultation concerning them, in the same

manner as poets inspired by Phœbus, and forms a common assembly of

the Gods. But Jupiter is the author of the whole polity of them, and

converts the multitude of them to himself. And as in the Timæus the

demiurgus convolves all the mundane Gods to himself, so Jupiter in the

Critias providentially attending to the whole of things, collects the

Gods to himself.

In the next place, therefore, let us consider what Plato says

concerning this God, and how it accords with what was before said by

Timæus. “But Jupiter the God of Gods who reigns legitimately, and

who is able to perceive every thing of this kind, when he saw that

an equitable race was in a miserable condition, and was desirous of

punishing them, in order that by being chastized they might possess

more elegant manners, collected all the Gods into their most honourable

habitation, whence being seated as in the middle of the whole world, he

beholds all such things as participate of generation.” Here, directly

in the beginning, king Jupiter being celebrated as the God of Gods,

does it not accord with what is written in the Timæus, where he is said

to be the father and cause of all the mundane Gods? For what other

God is it who reigns over all the Gods, except the cause of their

subsistence and essence? Who is it also that calls the mundane deities,

Gods of Gods? Is it not him who binds to himself the principle of all

fabrication? If, therefore, he imparts to his progeny to be Gods of

Gods, in a much greater degree it pertains to him to be celebrated as

the God of all [the mundane] Gods. To which, therefore, of the Gods

prior to the world, does it particularly belong to punish offenders

except to him who defines to souls all their measures, unfolds to them

the laws of the universe, and legally institutes such things as are

fit concerning justice and injustice, in order that afterwards he may

not be accused of the vices of each of them? Moreover, to congregate

all the Gods into their most honourable habitation, from which the

whole of generation may be seen, and which possesses the middle of the

universe, is to attribute to him a providence exempt from multitude,

but extending equally to the whole world; which things indeed are

the illustrious goods of the demiurgic monad. For to convert all the

Gods to himself, and to survey the whole world pertains exemptly to

the demiurgus of the universe. For what else is multitude able to

participate proximately, except the monad from which it derives its

subsistence? And who can convert all the Gods in the world to himself,

but the fabricator of their essence, and of their allotment in the

universe?

CHAPTER XXII.

We must establish this, therefore, as one and the first argument in

proof of the thing investigated. But if you are willing, we will derive

a second argument from what is said by Socrates in the Cratylus,

in which he discusses the meaning of the names, from which he may

represent to us the essence of Jupiter. For he is not led to the nature

of this God from one name, as he is in the names of other Gods, such

as Saturn, Rhea, Neptune, and Pluto, but from two names which tend to

one thing, and which divisibly indicate the one and united essence of

Jupiter, he unfolds the power of this God, and the peculiarity of his

hyparxis. For the common rumour concerning him, denominates him in a

twofold respect. And at one time calling him (δια) _dia_, we worship

him in our prayers and hymns; but at another time we celebrate him

as (ζηνα) _zena_, a word derived from _life_. Being therefore at the

same time called (ζευς) _zeus_, and delighting in the appellation of

_dia_, he is similarly denominated from both names by the Greeks.

And these names manifest the essence and order which he is allotted

among divine natures. And neither of these names indeed, is by itself

sufficiently able to make known the peculiarity of the God; but when

conjoined with each other and forming a sentence, they have the power

of unfolding the truth concerning him.[272] How, therefore, from both

the names the power of this king is signified, and the precedaneous

order of his hypostasis in the Gods, we may hear Socrates himself

saying, “That the name of his father[273] who is called Jupiter is

beautifully posited; but that it is not easy to apprehend the meaning

of it, because in reality the name of Jupiter is as it were a sentence.

Dividing it however into two parts, some of us use one part, and some

another. For some indeed call him _zena_, but others _dia_. And these

parts collected into one evince the nature of the God, which we say a

name ought to effect. For there is not any other who is more the author

of life to us, and to all other things than he who is the ruler and

king of all things. It happens, therefore, that this God is rightly

denominated, _on account of_ whom _life_ is present to all living

beings. But it is divided into two parts, as if I should say that there

is one name from _dia_ and _zena_.” The mode, therefore, of collecting

the names into one, and of rendering the hyparxis of this God apparent

through both, is manifest to every one.

If, however, he is the supplier of life to all things, as he is said

to be, and is the ruler and king of all such things as are said to

live, to whom can we assert this peculiarity pertains, if we omit the

demiurgus? And is it not necessary, that according with what is said

in the Timæus, we should refer to him the principle of vivification.

For the demiurgus renders the whole world animated, endued with

intellect, and an animal, and constitutes the triple life which is in

it, one indeed being impartible and intellectual, another partible

and corporeal, and another between these, impartible and at the same

time partible. It is he likewise who conjoins each of the celestial

spheres to the circulations of the soul, inserts in each of the stars

a psychical and intellectual life, and produces in the sublunary

elements leading Gods and souls, and in addition to all these things,

constitutes the divisible genera of life, and imparts to the junior

Gods the principle of mortal animals. All things therefore in the world

are full of life, through the power of the demiurgus and father. And

this world is one animal, deriving its completion from containing all

animals, through the never-failing cause of the power by which it was

generated. And there is no other who is the supplier of life to all

things, and through whom all things live, some indeed more clearly,

but others more obscurely, than the demiurgus of wholes. For he also

is intellectual animal, in the same manner as the all-perfect paradigm

is intelligible animal. Hence likewise, these are conjoined to each

other. And the one indeed is paternally the cause of wholes; but the

other demiurgically. And as animal itself constitutes intelligibly, all

intelligible and sensible animals, according to one cause, thus also

the demiurgus fabricates intellectually according to a second order,

the animals in the world.

As animal itself likewise proximately subsists from intelligible life,

so the demiurgus is generated from intellectual life, and is the first

that is filled with the rivers of vivification. Hence he illuminates

all things with life, unfolding the depths of the animal-producing

deity, and calling forth the prolific power of the intellectual Gods.

If therefore, all things live through the demiurgic cause, they

also participate of soul and intellect, and, as I may say, of all

vivification, through the providence of this God. But he who pours the

rivers of life on all things in the world from himself, and is the

ruler and king of wholes, is the mighty Jupiter, as Socrates says in

the Cratylus, and evidently appears to be the same with the demiurgus.

And the divinely-inspired intellectual conception of Timæus concerning

the demiurgus, accords with the theology of Socrates about Jupiter. If

likewise each of them denominates the knowledge of this God difficult

to be apprehended, and one of them says that it is difficult to

discover him, and when discovered, that it is impossible to speak of

him to all men, but the other asserts that it is not easy to understand

the name of Jupiter, do they not in this respect accord with each

other in what they say concerning this God? Besides this also, the

composition of the names, and the coalition of the two names into one

hyparxis, appear in a remarkable degree to be adapted to the demiurgus.

For a biformed[274] essence, and generative power, are attributed

to him according to other theologists. For the duad sits with him,

according to which he generates all things; concerning which Timæus

also introduces him speaking to the demiurgi in the world, and saying,

“Imitating my power.” And through this he produces and vivifies all

things. Hence it is necessary through names also to consecrate the duad

to him according to ancient rumour. For he glitters with intellectual

sections, divides and collects wholes, and constitutes one indissoluble

order from many things. And this the power of the names indicates,

extending us from divided intellection, to one self-perfect and uniform

theory.

All these particulars therefore, clearly demonstrate to us that Plato

considers the demiurgus of wholes to be the same with Jupiter. For

he who alone is the cause of life to all things, and who is the king

of all things, is the demiurgus of the universe. And he who in a

remarkable manner rejoices in a duad of names, is he who arranges and

adorns the whole world. And it appears to me, as I have frequently

said, that in consequence of being allotted the end of the intellectual

triad, converting this to the beginning, and being full of the middle

fountains of life, but uniting himself to the watch-tower of his

father, and producing into himself the simplicity of an intelligible

subsistence, according to the peculiarity of first-effective causes,

he is also allotted a duad of names. And as he received his essence

from both [i.e. from Saturn and Rhea] and possesses indeed bound

from his father, but infinite power from the generative deity of his

mother, thus also he possesses one of the names from his father, and

from the uniform perfection which is in him; but the other from total

vivification. And through both, as he is allotted an essence, so

likewise an appellation. For it is obvious to every one, that the term

(δια) _dia[275] on account of which_, is a sign of a total essence.

“Let us declare, says Timæus, on account of what cause [the composing

artificer constituted generation and the universe]. He was good.” But

the name of life pertains of itself to the middle order of beings.

The demiurgus therefore obtains one of these names, viz. _dia_, from

the intellectual summit, and the paternal union. For according to the

participation of it, he is one,[276] bound, and intelligible. But he

obtains the other name from the middle order of intellectuals. For

there life, and the vivific bosoms are allotted their hypostasis. The

demiurgic intellect however, shining forth from both, participates also

of the names through composition. For we call him _dia_ and _zena_,

because life proceeds to all things on account of him, and to live

is inherent in all [vital natures] on account of him. And thus after

a manner the position of the names indicates the progression of the

demiurgus from both the precedaneous causes.

CHAPTER XXIII.

Again therefore, let us direct our attention to what is written in the

Philebus, and survey how, in what is there said, Socrates refers the

fabrication of the universe to Jupiter. For admitting that intellect

adorns and arranges all things, in the same manner as the wise men

prior to him, and that it governs the sun and moon, and all the

circulation [of the heavens] he demonstrates that the whole world

participates of soul, and intellectual inspection, and that we also

derive the participation of these from wholes; but that the universe is

not and was not from chance, and likewise the most divine of visible

natures, as many physiologists assert, while the natures which the

universe contains participate of soul and intellect. Having therefore,

as we have said, demonstrated these things, and shown that what the

whole world contains is greater and more perfect than what we contain,

and that wholes have a greater authority, and a more ruling essence

than partial natures, and having placed intellect over wholes, as that

which adorns and arranges the universe, and likewise assigned this

province to soul, through the inspection of intellect, (for intellect

is not present to the world without soul) he afterwards recurs to

imparticipable intellect, to the author of participated intellect and

soul, and the fabricator of the whole world, and he denominates and

celebrates this fabricator, who contains the causes of the plenitudes

in the world, as no other than Jupiter the great king and ruler of

wholes, conformably to the rumour of the Greeks. He likewise extends

about him all the providence of the world, and places in him the whole

cause of the arrangement and ornament of the universe.

It is better however, in the next place, to hear the words

themselves of Plato. He gives therefore to the world an intellectual

superintendance, and adds this to the before mentioned demonstrations,

that there is, as we have frequently observed, an abundance of infinity

in the world, and a sufficiency of bound, and that there is a certain

cause in them by no means vile and contemptible, which adorns and

co-arranges the years, the seasons, and the months, and which may

most justly be called wisdom and intellect. But again, because it is

necessary that participated intellect should govern the world through

soul as a medium, (for it is impossible that intellect should be

present to any thing without soul, as Timæus also asserts) hence it is

requisite that soul also should preside over the universe, and that

proximately having dominion over the natures it contains, it should

govern the world according to intellect. This therefore Socrates

having in the next place added, he subjoins as follows: “Moreover,

wisdom and intellect could never be without soul.” For how could the

impartible and eternal essence of intellect be immediately conjoined

with a corporeal nature? It is necessary therefore that intellect

should preside over wholes, that it may connect the order in the

world, well-being, and all things. For order and well-being are the

progeny of an intellectual essence. But it is necessary that soul

primarily participating of intellect, should illuminate body with the

light proceeding from thence, and fill all things with intellectual

arrangement. It must be admitted therefore, that the world is animated

and endued with intellect. Hence from this Socrates ascends to the

cause itself of the whole world, which produced intellect and soul, and

generated the total order [of the universe.]

“Hence, (Socrates adds) you may say that in the nature of Jupiter

there are a royal soul and a royal intellect through the power of

cause; and that in the other Gods there are other beautiful things,

whatever they are, by which their deities love to be distinguished,

and from which they delight in taking their respective denominations.”

One of these two things therefore is necessary, either that what is

here said is said concerning the world, or concerning the demiurgus

of wholes. For if the world is Jupiter, the participated intellect

in the world is royal, and the soul also is royal which governs the

universe, and arranges and adorns it according to intellect. And these

things are evidently present to the world through the power of the

cause by which it was constituted, and which rendered it a partaker

of intellect and animated. And thus Jupiter will be that which is

adorned and fabricated, and not the adorner and fabricator of all

things. If, however, it is necessary that the power of cause should

be comprehensive in an exempt manner of a royal intellect and a royal

soul, we must admit that the nature of Jupiter is in the demiurgic

order and power; and intellect and soul will be in him according

to cause, since he imparts both these to his progeny. Of these two

opinions therefore, every one may adopt that which he pleases, but

to me, when I consider what is here said, and every other assertion

of Plato concerning this God, it by no means appears to be necessary

to refer the nature of Jupiter to the whole world. For neither does

the only-begotten subsistence of the world accord with the kingdom of

Jupiter, since the Saturnian triad, and which distributes the dominion

of the father, is manifestly celebrated by Plato himself; nor can

that which is cause to all things, as it is said in the Cratylus,

refer[277] to the world. For the world is among the number of things

which participate of life from another. As I have said therefore, we

must leave this opinion, as by no means adapted to Plato, though it is

adopted by some of his interpreters. But considering cause to be the

same as Jupiter, we must say that soul and intellect are established

in him exemptly; and that Jupiter participates of both these, from

the Gods that are prior to him; of intellect indeed, from his father,

but of soul from the queen [Rhea] who is the deity of vivification.

For there the fountain of soul subsists, just as in Saturn, there

is intellect according to essence. For every where the intelligible

unically comprehends the intellect which is coordinate with it. And

thus much concerning these particulars.

CHAPTER XXIV.

In the next place, we may conjoin with this the mythological

conceptions in the Protagoras, and arrive at the same conclusion,

considering in common with the Timæus, how the opinions delivered to us

concerning the mighty Jupiter, through the Protagorean fable, accord

with the assertions about the demiurgus. The fable says, therefore,

that Prometheus adorning the human race, and providentially attending

to our rational life, that it may not perish by being merged in the

furies of earth, and the necessities of nature, as some one of the Gods

says, bound nature to the arts, extended these which are imitations

of intellect, as it were to sportive souls, and through these excited

our gnostic and dianoëtic power to the contemplation of forms. For

every artificial production is effective of form, and adorns the matter

which is the subject of it. The fable also adds, that Prometheus

providentially attending to the arts gave them to souls, and that he

received them from Vulcan and Minerva. For in these Gods the cause

of all arts is primarily comprehended; Vulcan primarily imparting the

fabricative power of them; but Minerva supernally illuminating their

gnostic and intellectual power. Not only however, is the invention

of arts necessary to souls in generation, but also a certain other

science, the political, which is more perfect than the arts, and which

is able to arrange and adorn them, and to lead souls through virtue to

a life according to intellect. But as Prometheus was unable to impart

this life to us, because the political science is primarily with the

mighty Jupiter, but it was not possible (says the fable) for Prometheus

to enter latently into the tower of Jupiter, (for the guards of Jupiter

are terrible, defending him exempt from all partial causes,)--hence

Jupiter sent the messenger Hermes to men, who brought with him prudence

and shame, and in short the political science. Jupiter also ordered

Hermes to impart similarly to all men these virtues, and to distribute

to all souls the knowledge of things just, beautiful, and good, but not

in a divided manner, as different arts are distributed to different

persons. And some men indeed are judges of these things; but others are

ignorant either of all, or of some of the arts.

In what is here said, therefore, Plato primarily refers to Jupiter

the paradigm of the political science, as is evident from the words

themselves. But he produces the progression of this science, and the

communication and participation of the Hermaical series, and extends

its essential presence, which we participate in common, to all souls.

For to distribute to all of them, is to insert in souls essentially a

science of this kind. These things, therefore, being laid down, let us

consider to whom we must say the political science especially pertains,

and who it is that primarily established a polity in the universe, that

formed divine to govern mortal natures, divided wholes from parts,

and produced self-motive and intellectual natures more ancient than

those that are deprived of the presence of intellect. Is it not the

demiurgus, who is the cause to us of all these goods, who governs the

whole world according to rectitude, binds it by the best analogies,

establishes every polity in it, possesses and comprehends the laws of

Fate, and extends the sacred laws of Adrastia, as far as to the last of

things, and arranges and adorns by justice all celestial and sublunary

natures? For he who introduces partial souls into the universe as into

their habitation, and imparts to them a total polity which is the best

of all polities, and is governed by the most excellent laws, is he who

denominates these laws the laws of Fate, who defines the measures of

Justice, and legally institutes all things, as Timæus says. Is it not

therefore superfluous to endeavour to prove that he who possesses the

first paradigm of the political science, is according to Plato the

demiurgus?

If, however, these things are true, and according to the fable in

the Protagoras it must be admitted that the political science first

subsists in Jupiter, it is evident from what has been said, that the

demiurgus of the universe is Jupiter. For to what other cause can we

grant the primary form of the political science to belong, than to

that which arranges and adorns the universe? If the polity in the

heavens is the first and most perfect of all polities, as Socrates in

the Republic says it is. Who likewise is he that produces all things,

and co-arranges them when produced to each other, in order to the

elegant disposition of the universe? If, therefore, the first and most

perfect demiurgus of the universe is political, but the political

science first subsists with Jupiter, being established with him on

a sacred foundation, proceeds from thence to all secondary natures,

and adorns and arranges both wholes and parts according to intellect,

it is evidently necessary that the demiurgus of wholes should be the

same with Jupiter, and that there should be one hyparxis of both,

which administers every thing in the world according to rectitude,

and circularly leads every thing confused and disorderly into order.

For, says Timæus, it is not lawful for that which is best to effect

any thing else than that which is most beautiful. How therefore is it

possible that he who adorns and arranges wholes through Themis, and

together with her produces all things, should not essentially possess

in himself the whole of the political science?

How is it possible likewise that he should not be the first Jupiter,

who definitely imparts to all things that which is divine, and weaves

one polity from all things, but is exempt from all partial causes and

the Titanic genera, and is guarded by his own undefiled powers, beyond

the whole world? For the guards which surround him, obscurely signify

his immutable order, and the undeviating defence of fabrication,

through which being firmly established in himself, he pervades through

all things without impediment, and being present to all his progeny,

is according to supreme transcendency expanded above wholes. Moreover,

the citadel of Jupiter, according to the rumours of theologists,

is a symbol of intellectual circulation, and of the highest summit

of Olympus, which all the wise suspend from the intellectual watch

tower of Jupiter, to which he extends all the mundane Gods, imparting

to them from thence intellectual powers, divine light, and vivific

illuminations, and compressing all the profundities of the worlds by

one most simple circulation, through which the summit also of the

apparent worlds is denominated the period of sameness, and the most

prudent and uniform circulation, as Timæus says, expressing the unical

intellectual power of demiurgic conversion, and being allotted the same

transcendency with respect to all the sensible world that the supreme

summit of Jupiter possesses with respect to all the arrangement of

the firmaments. These things may also be assumed by us as subservient

to the proposed investigation, from the fabulous fictions in the

Protagoras.

CHAPTER XXV.

We may, however, approach still nearer to the truth, and assume in

the present discussion, the fable in the Politicus. For in this it

will appear that Plato in a remarkable manner considers the demiurgus

of the universe to be the same with Jupiter, and even as far as to

the very names asserts the same things as Timæus. The Elean guest,

therefore, as we have before observed, assigns [in this dialogue]

twofold circulations to the whole of this world, the one intellectual,

and which elevates souls but the other proceeding into nature, and

imparting things contrary to the former. And the one indeed, being

unapparent, and governed by divine providence, but the other apparent,

and convolved according to the order of Fate. He also places twofold

motive causes over these circulations. For every mutation and period

require a certain moving cause. And prior to the causes that move the

circulations, he asserts that there are as it were twofold ends of the

periods, and assigns first-effective causes of the motions, coordinate

to the moving causes, and to the circulations themselves which differ

from each other. Jupiter therefore moves, and circularly leads one

of the periods, whether you are willing to call it intellectual, or

providential, or in whatever other way you may denominate it, and

he also supplies the world with life, and imparts to it a renovated

immortality. But he preestablishes his father Saturn as the object of

desire to, and the end of the whole of this circulation. For he leads

back wholes, and converts them to himself.

Moreover, he extends happy souls to the watch-tower of his father,

viz. those souls whose corporeal nature is obliterated, and

whose circulation is to the incorporeal and the impartible. All

the generation-producing[278] symbols likewise of these souls

are amputated, and the form of their life is transferred to the

intellectual summit. For these souls are also said to be the nurselings

of Saturn, but to commit the government of themselves to Jupiter, and

through him to be extended to the intelligible, and the Saturnian

dominion. For the intelligible is nutriment, as it is said by the Gods

themselves. And as Socrates in the Phædrus elevates souls through

the circulation of the heaven to the supercelestial place, where

souls are nourished, survey true beings, and the unknown order of the

Gods, with the highest powers of themselves, and as he there says,

intellectually perceive with the heads of the charioteers;--thus also

the Elean guest circularly leads souls under Jupiter, to the Saturnian

watch-tower, and asserts that such as have ascended are nourished by

Saturn, and calls them the nurselings of the God. For every where

indeed, the intelligible is perfective of, and has the power of

filling an intellectual life, and the summit of intellectuals extends

perfection. These souls likewise participate of the natures that are

beyond, establish themselves in more elevated intellectuals, and ascend

as far as to the unknown order, but remote from _the good_, and

the one principle of all things. But the souls [that ascend through

the circulation of the heaven] are extended to the first intellect,

which is imparticipable, and the intelligible itself, and when they

are there, and have established their life in the occult order as in a

port, they ineffably participate of the union proceeding from _the

good_, and of the light of truth.

With respect however to what remains respecting the twofold periods,

as we have said, the world itself indeed moves itself, being moved

according to its own nature, and giving completion to the order of

Fate. But the first-effective cause of this motion of the world, and

of its life, is the God who illuminates it with the power of being

moved and of living, and is the mighty Jupiter. Hence also this

period is said to be Jovian, so far as Jupiter is the cause of this

apparent arrangement, just as Saturn is the cause of the intellectual

and unapparent arrangement. It is better, however, to hear Plato

himself discussing these things. That there are, therefore, twofold

circulations of the universe, and that the God who moves it is the

leader of the one, but of the other the world itself convolving itself,

Plato here teaches us. But as was just now said, and which is the

only thing that remains, the universe is at one time co-governed by

another divine cause, again acquiring life, and receiving a renovated

immortality from the demiurgus; but at another time, when he lays aside

as it were the handle of his rudder, the world being left by itself,

moves for a time by itself, so as frequently to proceed in an inverted

order.

Again, however, that one of the periods, viz. the apparent, is Jovian,

but that the other is referred to the kingdom of Saturn, Plato

himself determines in what follows, subjoining these words, after the

celebration of that life, and of the undefiled polity of the souls

that are there, which is liberated from all corporeal pains, and the

servitude about matter: “You have heard, Socrates, what was the life

of men under Saturn; but you yourself have seen what the condition of

the present life is, which is said to be under Jupiter.” And moreover,

that of these two circulations, (since the apparent is under Jupiter)

Jupiter is the cause and maker of it, is obvious to every one, and

that again Jupiter is the power that moves the unapparent circulation,

which is Saturnian, may be demonstrated from what is written. For it

is necessary that these two Gods should either rule over each of these

circulations, or that one of them should rule over the unapparent, but

the other over the present circulation. If, however, Jupiter moves the

universe according to this period, the world can no longer be said to

convolve itself, and to govern every thing it contains. Nor will it be

true neither that the whole is convolved by divinity with twofold and

contrary circulations, nor again, that two certain Gods convolve it

whose decisions are contrary to each other. For if Saturn indeed moves

it according to one circulation, but Jupiter moves it according to a

period contrary to that of Saturn, two Gods will move it according to

contrary circumvolutions. If, however, these things are impossible, it

is indeed manifest to every one that both the divine causes preside

over the circulation according to the Saturnian convolution; Saturn

indeed as the supplier of an intellectual life; but Jupiter, as

elevating all things to the Saturnian empire, and establishing them in

his own intelligible. And thus that period may be called Saturnian,

in consequence of Saturn imparting the first effective cause of the

whole [of an intellectual] life. But according to this more physical

circulation, and which is known to every one, Fate and connate desire

move the universe.

Jupiter, however, is the cause of this motion exemptly, who gives Fate

and an adscititious life to the world. These things, therefore, being

demonstrated by us, let us consider what the particulars are which

are asserted of the God who moves the world according to the other

period. And they are these; “that the world indeed at another time is

conjointly governed by another divine cause, again acquiring life, and

receiving a renovated immortality from the demiurgus.” It is obvious,

therefore, to every one, that the Elean guest says, that the God who

moves the universe according to the Saturnian period, supplies it with

life, and imparts to it a renovated immortality, and that he clearly

calls him the demiurgus. Hence, if it is Jupiter who conjointly governs

that period, as has been demonstrated, he will be the demiurgus of the

world, and the supplier of immortality. And what occasion is there to

say much on the subject? For if the same God is the cause of life, and

is denominated the demiurgus, again the Cratylus will present itself to

us, and Jupiter according to this will be the same with the demiurgus.

For life accedes to all things from Jupiter, as it is asserted in that

dialogue. Moreover, in what follows, as Timæus calls the cause of

the circulation of Fate, demiurgus and father, after the same manner

the Elean guest denominates this cause, and also calls it the maker.

“For the world,” says he, “revolves, remembering the doctrine of the

demiurgus and father.” Properly, therefore, do we denominate the whole

of this period Jovian, because the world moves and convolves itself,

according to the doctrine of Jupiter, and the order imparted to it

from him. Again, therefore, Jupiter is demiurgus and father. And here

also the Elean guest preserves the same order of the divine names as

Timæus. For he does not[279] call him father and demiurgus, but on the

contrary, in the same manner as Timæus, demiurgus and father; because

the demiurgic peculiarity in him is more manifest than the paternal

deity. These things, however, have been copiously investigated before;

and it has been shown in what respect the demiurgic is different from

the paternal genus, how they are complicated with each other,[280]

where the paternal subsists essentially, but the demiurgic according

to cause, and where again, the demiurgic subsists essentially, but the

paternal, according to participation.

CHAPTER ΧΧVῚ.

It will remain, therefore, that we should make mention of what is

written in the Laws concerning Jupiter. For perhaps in them also it

will appear that Plato assigns the same order to the demiurgus and to

Jupiter. As the equalities, therefore, according to which polities are

adorned, are twofold, and the one polity indeed proposes the equal

according to number, and proceeds through things which differ from

each other according to an equal law; but the other embraces in all

things, the equality which is according to desert; and also, since

equality subsists according to ratio,--this being the case, each of

these equalities exists in the providence of the world. For the essence

of the soul, indeed, is primarily divided by its fabricator by the

equality according to ratio; but it is also consummately filled with

the remaining middles, and bound with them through the whole of itself.

The several bodies [of the world] likewise, participate of a certain

common essence, in the fabrication of things; and on this account

they are allotted the equality which is according to number. But all

things are arranged and adorned through the best of analogies, and

the demiurgus according to this inserts both in wholes and parts, an

indissoluble order in the universe, and an adaptation of them to each

other.

This equality, therefore, the Athenian guest exhorts his citizens

particularly to honour, in consequence of assimilating his city to

the universe. He also says that it is a thing of this kind, but that

it is not likewise easy for every one to perceive the most true and

excellent equality; for it is the judgment of Jupiter. What therefore

is the cause on account of which the Athenian guest asserts this

analogy to be the judgment of Jupiter? What other cause can we assign

than its contributing to the perfection of the world, and its power

and dominion in the fabrication of wholes? For that which gives

an orderly distinction to the genera of causes, contrives the most

beautiful bond of them, and weaves together one order from wholes, is

according to Timæus the power of this analogy. For it established soul

in the middle (of the universe) analogous to intellect and a corporeal

nature. For soul is the middle of an impartible and partible essence.

And by how much it surpasses a partible, by so much it falls short of

an impartible hypostasis. The power of this analogy, however, binds

the soul from double and triple ratios, and connects the whole of it

proceeding from and at the same time returning to (its principles,)

by the primary and self-motive boundaries of equality. It likewise

constitutes the corporeal series from the four first genera. And it

adapts indeed the extremes to each other through the middles, but

mingles the middles according to the peculiarity of the extremes. It

reduces, however, all things to one world, and one indissoluble order

connectedly comprehended in the universe. If, therefore, we acknowledge

that this equality has dominion in the whole fabrication of things,

the best of analogies is the judgment of the demiurgus, and according

to the decision of him who generated wholes it is allotted that great

dominion in the fabrication of the universe, which we have before shown

it to possess. Hence if the same analogy is the judgment of Jupiter,

as the Athenian guest says it is, it is obvious to every one that the

nature of Jupiter is demiurgic. For it is not any thing else which

judges of the dignity of this analogy than that which employs it in the

arrangement of wholes. And to this the legislator establishing himself

analogous, binds and in a particular manner adorns the city which is

assimilated to the universe, by this analogy.

CHAPTER XXVII.

From these things, therefore, and from all that has been previously

said, we confidently assert, following Plato and paternal rumours,

that Jupiter is the demiurgus of the universe; and we may collect

into one, the scattered opinions of the ancients on this subject;

of whom, some, indeed, refer the paradigm of the world, and the

demiurgic cause to the same order; but others divide these from each

other. And some place all-perfect animal prior to the demiurgus; but

others afford an hypostasis to it after the demiurgus. For if the

demiurgus is, as has been said, the great Jupiter, and the paradigm

proposed to the demiurgus in order to the generation of the world, is

all-perfect animal, these are at the same time united to each other,

and are allotted an essential separation. And animal itself, indeed,

intelligibly comprehends in itself the whole Jovian series; but Jupiter

the demiurgus of the universe intellectually pre-establishes in himself

the nature of animal itself. For animal itself is the supplier of

life to all things, and all things primarily live on account of it,

and Jupiter being the cause of life, possesses the paradigm and the

generative principle of the essence of all animals. Justly, therefore,

does Timæus, in Plato, having called the intelligible paradigm animal,

conjoin the demiurgic intellect to the first intelligible animal; and

through the all-perfect union of the demiurgus and father with it, he

also arranges and adorns this universe. For Jupiter binding to himself

the fabrication of the universe, and being an intellectual animal,

is united to intelligible animal, and being allotted a progression

analogous to it, constitutes all things intellectually, which proceed

from animal itself intelligibly.

For, as we have said, the intelligible hypostases being triple, and

one indeed, being allotted its hyparxis according to existence and

the one being; but another according to intelligible life, and the

middle centre of the intelligible breadth, where eternity, all life,

and intelligible life subsist, as Plotinus somewhere says; and another

according to intelligible multitude, the first plenitude of life, and

the all-perfect paradigm of wholes,--this being the case, the three

kingdoms of the intellectual Gods are divided analogous to the three

intelligible hypostases. And one indeed, the mighty Saturn, being

allotted an hyparxis according to the summit of intellectuals, and

having a paternal transcendency, possesses a dominion analogous to

the summit of the intelligible Gods, and the occult order. And as in

that order, all things are uniformly, and are ineffably, and without

separation united, thus also this God again converts to himself, and

conceals in himself the natures that have proceeded from him, imitating

the occult of the first summit. But again, the order which comprehends

the middle genera of wholes, and is filled indeed, from the generative

power of Saturn, but fills from itself the whole fabrication with

vivific rivers, has the same order in intellectuals which eternity has

in intelligibles, and the uniform cause of the life which is there. And

as eternity proximately generates intelligible animal, which is also

denominated eternal, through the participation of eternity, thus also

the middle bosom of the intellectual Gods, unfolds the demiurgus of

the universe, and the vivific fountain of wholes. But the third king,

viz. the fabricator and at the same time father, is indeed coordinate

to the remainder of the intelligible triad, viz. to all-perfect animal.

And as that is an animal, so likewise is Jupiter. And Jupiter indeed

is intelligibly in all-perfect animal; but all-perfect animal is

intellectually in Jupiter. The extremities likewise of the intelligible

and intellectual Gods are united to each other; and in them, separation

is co-existent with union. And one of them, indeed, is exempt from

fabrication; but the other is converted to the intelligible, is filled

from thence with total goods, and is allotted a paternal transcendency

through the participation of it. The maker, therefore, and father

of the universe, who has firmly established in himself the uniform

strength and power of all fabrication, who possesses and comprehends

the primary cause of the generation of wholes, and who stably fixes

in himself all things, and again produces them from himself in an

undefiled manner, being allotted such an order as this among the

intellectual fathers, is celebrated, as I may say, through the whole

of the Timæus, in which dialogue, his prolific and paternal power is

unfolded, and his providence which pervades from on high as far as

to the extremities of the universe. He is also frequently celebrated

by Plato in other dialogues, so far as it is possible to celebrate

his uniform and united power,[281] and which through transcendency is

exempt from wholes.

CHAPTER XXVIII.

If however some one recollecting what is said in the beginning of the

Timæus about him, viz. that it is difficult to discover him, and when

found, impossible to speak of him to all men, should enquire in the

first place, why since the Grecian theology ascribes such a name to

the demiurgus, as we have before mentioned, Timæus says that he is

ineffable, and established above all the indication which subsists

in words. In the next place, if he should inquire why intelligible

animal which is arranged above the demiurgus is both denominated, and

is made known by many signs, but the demiurgus who has established

his kingdom in an order secondary to that of all-perfect animal, and

is an intellectual God, (all-perfect animal receiving an intelligible

transcendency) is left by Timæus ineffable, as we have said, and

unknown, perhaps we also, following Plato, may be able to dissolve

all such doubts. For every order of the Gods originates from a monad,

and presides over its proper series according to the first-effective

cause. And such things indeed as are nearer to this principle are more

total than those that are more remote from it. But more total natures

are manifestly seen to be less[282] distant from the monad, and conjoin

things which are diminished according to essence to the natures that

are prior to them. Every order of the Gods likewise is a whole united

to itself through the whole, is allotted one indissoluble connexion,

both in wholes and parts, and through the monad which collects every

order into one, it is converted about itself, is suspended from this,

and is wholly convolved according to it.

If, therefore, we assert these things truly, in each order a monad

is allotted a transcendency with respect to multitude, analogous to

_the good_. And as the unical cause of whole goods, and which is

incomprehensible by all things, is exempt from all things, constitutes

all things about itself, generates them from itself, and hastily

withdraws the unions of all things to its own ineffable superunion,

thus also the uniform and generative principle of every coordinate

multitude, connects, guards and perfects the whole series of itself,

imparts good to it from itself, and fills it with order and harmony. It

is likewise that to its own progeny, which _the good_ is to all

beings, and is the object of desire to all the natures that originate

from itself. Thus, therefore, the union of the intelligible father

subsists prior to the whole paternal order; the one wholeness of the

Synoches is prior to the connective order; and the first effective

cause of life, to the vivific order.

Hence also, of every demiurgic series, which is suspended from the

triad of the sons of Saturn, the monad which proximately fabricates

wholes, and is established above this triad, comprehends in itself

all the demiurgic Gods, converts them to itself, and is of a boniform

nature. The one fountain likewise of all the demiurgic numbers,

subsists, as I may say, with respect to all this order analogous to

_the one_, and to the one principle of all things. Timæus therefore,

indicating these things to us, asserts directly in the beginning of the

generation of the world, that this monad which proximately fabricates

wholes, is difficult to be known, and is indescribable, as having the

same ratio as the ineffable and unknown cause of all beings. Whence

likewise, I think, he calls the demiurgus the best of causes, and the

father of this universe, as being allotted the highest order among the

demiurgi, and convolving to himself, and producing from himself all

the effective principles. _That_ one however, Parmenides demonstrates

to be perfectly unknown and ineffable; but Timæus says that it is

difficult to discover the maker and father of the world, and impossible

to speak of him to all men; which assertion falls short of the cause

that flies from all knowledge, and all language, and appears to verge

to the nature of things known and effable. For when he says that

it is impossible to speak of him to all men, he does not leave him

entirely ineffable and unknown. And the assertion that it is difficult

to discover him, is not the sign of a peculiarity perfectly unknown.

For because the demiurgus has established a kingdom analogous to _the

good_, but in secondary and manifold orders of it, he participates

indeed of the signs of _the good_, but is allotted the participation

in conjunction with an appropriate peculiarity, and a communion with

beings adapted to him. And as he is good, but not _the good itself_, so

likewise he is difficult to be known by the natures posterior to him,

but is not unknown. He is also celebrated in mystic language, but is

not perfectly ineffable. You may see however, the order of things, and

the remission in them proceeding in a downward progression. For _the

good_ indeed, is exempt from all silence, and all language. But the

genus of the intelligible Gods rejoices in silence, and is delighted

with ineffable[283] symbols. Hence also, Socrates in the Phædrus, calls

the vision of the intelligible monads the most holy of initiations, as

being involved in silence, and perceived intellectually in an arcane

manner. But the vision of intellectuals is indeed effable, yet is not

effable and known to all men, but is known with difficulty. For through

diminution with respect to the intelligible, it proceeds from silence

and a transcendency which is to be apprehended by intelligence alone,

into the order of things which are now effable.

If however, this be the case, all-perfect animal is much more ineffable

and unknown than the demiurgic monad. For it is at once the monad of

every paradigmatic order, and is intelligible, but not intellectual.

How therefore, do we endeavour to denominate, and as it were unfold

it, but thus magnificently celebrate the demiurgic cause? And how do

we class this cause in the same rank with things ineffable? For this

will not be acting conformably to Plato, who arranges animal itself

beyond the demiurgus; but this will be giving an hypostasis to it in a

secondary order of Gods, where it will be ranked, and will be effable

and known more than the demiurgic monad. To which may be added, that to

denominate that all-perfect animal most beautiful, but the demiurgus

the best of causes, gives indeed the same analogy to these causes with

respect to each other, as there is of _the good_ with respect

to the beautiful. And as _the good_ is prior to the beautiful,

(for the first beauty, as Socrates says in the Philebus, is in the

vestibules of _the good_) so likewise the best[284] is prior to

the most beautiful, and the demiurgus is prior to all-perfect animal.

For the best indeed, remarkably participates of _the good_, but

the most beautiful, of beauty.

CHAPTER XXIX.

In addition to these things therefore, it must also be asserted by us,

that the most beautiful and the best, are simply indeed related to

each other according to order, as _the good_ is to the beautiful.

For the series of the whole of goodness is expanded above all the

progression and arrangement of the beautiful. Every where, therefore,

the best is prior to the most beautiful. And the one, indeed, with

reference to an inferior order, will be the best, but the other with

reference to a more excellent order, will be the most beautiful. I say

for instance, that the most beautiful, as in intelligibles, will have

this peculiarity; but the best as in intellectuals. And if the most

beautiful, in supermundane natures, is a thing of this kind, the best

will be said to be best as with reference to the Gods in the world.

Hence, if the best of causes is the leader of the demiurgic series, and

according to it is allotted a transcendency of this kind, but the most

beautiful of intelligible animals preestablishes the illustrious power

of beauty in a higher order, by what contrivance can it on this account

be shown that intelligible and all-perfect animal is subordinate to the

intellectual cause? And that the demiurgus is converted to that which

is posterior to himself? Or how can it be said that animal itself is

visible to him, and all-perfect animal, and that which is comprehensive

of all intelligibles, if it is made to be comprehended by another?

For thus the demiurgus will be more comprehensive than animal itself,

if the former indeed being characterized according to the best, is

expanded above the paradigm, but the latter being denominated as most

beautiful is secondary to the demiurgic cause.

Moreover, as that all-perfect and intelligible animal is particularly

considered by Timæus according to a formal nature, and not according

to the union which is in it, and an hypostasis which is above all

forms,[285] he very properly grants that animal itself may be known

and manifested by words, but considers the demiurgus as in a certain

respect ineffable, and superior to knowledge. For both indeed, I mean

the demiurgus and animal itself, participate of union, and prior to a

formal essence, are contained in _the one_. And if you assume the

unities which are in them, you must admit the unity of the paradigm to

be intelligible, but the demiurgic unity to be intellectual, and that

an intelligible hyparxis is nearer to the first one, which is unknown

and incomprehensible by all things, than an intellectual hyparxis. But

if you are willing to survey the forms of the paradigm by themselves,

according to which it is said to be the paradigm of every thing in

the world, and the goodness and union of the demiurgus, the former

will appear to you to be known and effable; but the demiurgic cause

will be seen to participate of the unknown and ineffable peculiarity

of the Gods. For again, Timæus was in a remarkable degree in want of

the demiurgus and father, as the producing cause of wholes, and the

generator of the world. But to generate, to produce and provide are

the peculiarities of Gods, so far as they are Gods. Hence also Timæus

denominates the peculiarity of the demiurgus according to which he

is a God, the cause of the generation of the universe, and the most

proper principle of the arrangement of wholes. But he denominates the

peculiarity of the paradigm to be that which comprehends the first

forms, according to which the world also is invested with forms. For

it is the image of the paradigm, but the effect of the demiurgus. It

belongs, therefore, to the paradigm to be the first of forms, but to

the demiurgus to be the best of causes, according to his goodness, and

the hyparxis of essence. For, as we have said, to generate, to give

subsistence to, and to provide for other things, especially pertain to

the Gods, and not to the natures which are primarily suspended[286]

from them; but the latter are allotted through the former an abundance

prolific of secondary natures. It appears to me that Socrates in the

Republic indicating these things, does not say that the sun is the

cause of generation, till he had declared him to be the progeny of the

superessential principle of all things; just as Timæus does not begin

the fabrication of the universe, till he had celebrated the goodness of

the demiurgus of wholes. For each [i.e. the demiurgus and the sun] is a

producing cause according to _the good_, the former indeed of the

universe, but the latter of a generated nature; but not according to

the intellect which is in them, or life, or any other form of essence.

For these through the participation of _the good_ constitute the

natures posterior to themselves. And thus through these things we have

answered the before-mentioned doubts.

CHAPTER XXX.

Of the problems pertaining to total fabrication, it now remains

for me to relate what my opinion is respecting the Crater, and the

genera that are mingled in it. For these also Timæus co-arranges with

the demiurgic monad, in the generation of the soul. The demiurgus,

therefore, mingles the elements of the hypostasis of souls; but the

middle genera of being are mingled. The much-celebrated Crater,

however, receives this mixture, and generates souls in conjunction with

the demiurgus. Hence, in the first place, the genera of being must be

admitted to be twofold. And it must be granted indeed, that some of

them give completion to total hypostases, but others, to such as are

partial; and that the hyparxes of first effective and united causes,

are established in the intelligible Gods. For there essence subsists

primarily in the summit of intelligibles, and motion and permanency

are in the middle centre. For intelligible eternity abides in one,

and at once both abides and is the occult cause of all life. Hence,

Plotinus also calls eternity life which is one and total: and again,

in another part of his works he calls it intelligible life. But the

third from him, Theodorus, denominates it permanency. And both these

opinions harmonize with each other; because permanency also is in

eternity, (for according to Timæus, eternity abides in one) and motion.

For eternity is intelligible life, and that which participates of it

is intelligible animal. Moreover, sameness and difference, are in the

extremity of intelligibles. For whence does multitude originate, but

from difference? And whence is the communion of parts with wholes, and

the hyparxis of things which are divided in each other derived but

from sameness? For that one participates of being, and being of _the

one_. All the parts likewise of the one being pervade through each

other in an unconfused manner; for at one and the same time sameness

and difference are there occultly. And the whole intelligible breadth

is allotted its hypostasis according to the first and most uniform

genera. As essence likewise presents itself to the view in conjunction

with _the one_, according to the first triad, so motion and

permanency shine forth in the second, and sameness and difference in

the third triad. And all things are essentially in the intelligible;

just as life and intellect are there intelligibly. For since all beings

proceed from intelligibles, all things preexist there according to

cause. And motion and permanency are there essentially, and sameness

and difference uniformly.

Again, in the middle genera of the intelligible and intellectual

hypostases, the same things subsist secondarily and vitally. In the

summit of them indeed, essence subsists. For Socrates in the Phædrus

speaking about this order, characterizes the whole of it from essence.

For the truly-existing essence which is without colour, without figure,

and without contact, subsists after this manner. But in the middle

centre there are motion and permanency. For there the circulation of

the heaven subsists, as the same Socrates says; being established

indeed undeviatingly, in one form of intelligence; but being moved

in, and about itself; or rather being motion and eternal life. But

in the extremity of this order, sameness and difference are vitally

established. Hence it is converted to the beginning according to the

nature of sameness, is divided uniformly, proceeds into more numbers,

and generates from itself more partial monads.

Again, in the third orders, the highest of the intellectual Gods

possesses all things according to essence, and is the intelligible

itself and true being in intellectuals, again recalling the separation

which is in himself into undivided union. But the middle order

subsists according to motion and at the same time permanency. For

it is a vivific deity, abiding and at the same time proceeding,

being established with purity, and vivifying all things by prolific

powers. And the third progression subsists according to sameness,

together with difference. For this separates itself from the fathers,

and is conjoined to them through intellectual conversion. And it

binds, indeed, at once the natures posterior to itself, to each

other, according to the common powers of forms, and at the same time

separates them by intellectual sections. But in this order, all genera

and species first shine forth to the view; because it is especially

characterized according to difference, being allotted the end of all

the total hypostases. From this likewise it proceeds to all things,

viz. to participated intellect, the multiform orders of souls, and

the whole of a corporeal nature. For, in short, it constitutes

triple genera of the natures posterior to itself; some indeed, being

impartible and the first; others being media between partible and

impartible natures; and others being divided about bodies. And through

these things it generates all the more partial genera of beings. That

we may therefore again return to what has been before said, the genera

must be admitted to subsist every where, yet not every where after

the same manner; but in the highest orders of divine natures indeed,

they subsist uniformly, without separation, and unitedly, where also

permanency participates of motion, and motion of permanency, and there

is one united progression of both. In the more partial orders, however,

it must be admitted that the same things subsist in a divided manner,

and together with an appropriate remission. For since the first and

most total of forms are in the extremity of intelligibles, it is indeed

necessary that genera should have the beginning of their hypostasis

in intelligibles. And if the demiurgic cause is generative of all the

partial orders, it comprehends the first genera of the hypostasis of

them. As likewise the fountain of all forms subsists in this cause,

though there are intelligible forms, so the genera of being preexist

in it, though there are other whole genera prior to it. And the divine

Jamblichus somewhere rightly observes that the genera of being present

themselves to the view in the extremity of the intelligible Gods.

The present theology likewise, following things themselves, gives a

progression to these as well as forms supernally, from the intelligible

Gods. For such things as subsist according to cause, occultly, and

without separation in the first essences [i.e. in intelligibles] these

subsist in a divided and partible manner, and according to the nature

of each, in intellectuals. For from hence, all the divisible orders of

beings are filled both with these genera, and with formal hyparxes. And

on this account, the demiurgus also is said to comprehend all genera,

and to have the fountain of forms, because he generates all the partial

rivers [of life] and imparts to them from himself by illumination all

the measures of subsistence. Hence triple genera of all beings proceed

from the demiurgus, some indeed being impartible, others partible,[287]

and others subsisting between these, being more united indeed than the

partible, but more separated than the impartible genera; but subsisting

according to the middle of both, and connectedly containing the one

bond of beings. And the demiurgus indeed produces the intellectual

essence, through the first and impartible genera; but the corporeal

essence through the third and partible genera; and the psychical

hypostasis which is in the middle of these, through the middle genera

in beings. Moreover, he generates every intellectual and impartible

nature from himself, and fills them with total generative power. But he

constitutes the psychical essence, in conjunction with the Crater; and

the corporeal essence, in conjunction with total Nature.

CHAPTER XXXI.

That in this arrangement likewise we follow Timæus, any one may

learn from the following considerations: The demiurgus producing the

intellect of the universe, himself produces it from his own essence

alone, unfolding it at once according to one union, in consequence of

constituting it eternally, and no mention whatever is here made of

the Crater. But the demiurgus in arranging and adorning soul prior

to body, mingles the genera, and energizes in conjunction with the

Crater. And in fashioning the body of the universe, and describing the

heaven, he fabricates it in conjunction with Necessity. For the nature

of the universe, says Timæus, was generated mingled from intellect

and necessity. And neither does he here assume the Crater in order to

the arrangement of bodies. But it has been abundantly shown by us

elsewhere, that Plato calls physical production, a production through

necessity, and does not, as some suppose, consider necessity to be

the same with matter. It is evident, therefore, that the demiurgus

produces the generation of bodies together with total Nature, mingles

the partible genera in the first Nature, and thus produces bodies from

intellect and necessity. For bodies receive[288] from intellect indeed,

good and union; but from necessity a progression which terminates in

interval and division. He arranges and adorns, however, the self-motive

essence of souls, in conjunction with the Crater. And neither

intellect, nor bodies, require a cause of this kind. The demiurgus

indeed is the common source of the triple genera. But the Crater is

the peculiar cause of souls, and is co-arranged with the demiurgus and

filled from him, but fills souls. And receiving from thence indeed the

powers of prolific abundance, it pours them on souls according to the

measures of their respective essences. To some of them likewise it

orderly distributes the summits of the genera [of being], to others

the middle progressions of the genera, and to others, the terminations

of them. Hence the Crater is indeed essentially vivific, since souls

also are certain lives, but it is the first-effective cause of souls,

according to the peculiarity of hyparxis, and is the uniform and

all-perfect monad, not of every life, but of that which is psychical.

For from this Crater the soul of the universe subsists, and likewise

the second and third genera of partible souls, and of those souls that

are allotted a progression between these.

The whole number, therefore, of the psychical order proceeds from

the Crater, and is divided according to the prolific powers which

it contains. Hence the Crater is said to be the cause of souls, the

receptacle of their fabrication, and the generative monad of them, and

the like. For it is said to be so rightly, and conformably to the mind

of Plato. If, however, the Crater is co-arranged with the demiurgus,

and equally constitutes with him the genera of souls, it is indeed

necessary that this Crater should be fontal, in the same manner as the

whole demiurgus. Hence the Crater is the fountain of souls, but is

united to the demiurgic monad. And on this account, Socrates also in

the Philebus says, that in Jupiter there is a royal soul, and a royal

intellect. For that which we at present denominate fontal, he calls

royal; though the name of fountain when applied to souls is well known

to Plato. For Socrates, in the Phædrus, says, that the self-motive

nature is the fountain and principle of motion to such other things as

are moved.

And you see that as a twofold divine monad prior to souls is delivered

by theologists, the one being indeed fontal, but the other of a

primary ruling nature, Plato likewise gives to the progeny of these

twofold appellations, assuming one name from the more total, but the

other from the more partial monad. For the self-motive nature, is a

fountain indeed, as being the offspring of the fontal soul, but it is a

principle, as participating of the primary ruling soul. If therefore,

the name of fountain, and also of principle is assigned by Plato to

souls, what occasion is there to wonder if we denominate the exempt

monads of them, fountains and principles? Or rather from these things

that is demonstrated. For whence is a ruling power imparted to all

souls except from the ruling monad? For that which similarly extends to

all souls, is necessarily imparted to them from one and the same cause.

If therefore, some one should say it is imparted by the demiurgus, so

far as he is the demiurgus, it is necessary that in a similar manner it

should be inherent in all other things which proceed from the demiurgic

monad. But if it proceeds from the definite and separate cause of

souls, that cause must be denominated the first fountain and principle

of them.

Moreover, that of these two names, the ruling is more allied to

souls than the fontal, as being nearer to them according to order,

Plato manifests in the same dialogue. For calling the self-motive

nature the fountain and at the same time principle of the motion of

the whole of things, he nevertheless frames his demonstration of its

unbegotten subsistence from principle alone. For, says he, principle

is unbegotten. For it is necessary that every thing which is generated

should be generated from a principle. If therefore, demonstrations are

from things proximate to the things demonstrated, it is necessary that

principle should be more proximate to souls than fountain. Farther

still, if every thing which is generated is generated from a principle,

as Plato says, but souls are in a certain respect generated, as Timæus

says, there is also a precedaneous principle of souls. And as they

are the principles of things which are generated according to time,

so after another manner principle subsists prior to souls, which are

generated. And as they are unbegotten according to the generation of

bodies, thus also the principle of souls is exempt from all generation.

Through these things therefore, it is demonstrated by us, that the

Crater is the fountain of souls, that after the fountain there is a

primary ruling monad of them, and that this monad is more proximate to

souls than the fountain, but is established above them, as being their

prolific cause. And all these particulars we have demonstrated from the

words of Plato.

CHAPTER XXXII.

Again therefore, let us return to the things proposed, and teach in a

greater degree the lovers of the contemplation of truth, concerning

this Crater. For the whole vivific deity having established in the

middle of the intellectual kings the prolific cause of divine natures,

and according to her highest, most intellectual and all-perfect

powers, being occultly united to the first father, but according to

more partial and secondary causes from them, being conjoined to the

demiurgus, and establishing one conspiration together with him of the

generation of the partial orders, Timæus mystically mentions those more

ancient powers of the Goddess, and which abide in the first father. But

with respect to those powers that are co-arranged with the demiurgus,

and adorn together with him the natures in the universe, some of these

he delivers more clearly but the whole of others through indication.

For the secondary monads themselves of the Goddess are triple, as the

wise assert, one of them being the fountain of souls, the second,

being the fountain of the virtues, but the third being the fountain of

Nature which is suspended from the back of the Goddess. The demiurgus

therefore, also assumes these three hypostases to his own prolific

production. And the Crater indeed, as we have said, is the fountain of

souls, unically containing the whole and perfect number of them.[289]

And as the demiurgus is allotted a paternal cause with respect to

the psychical generation, so the Crater is prolific, and is allotted

the ratio and order of a mother. For such things as Jupiter produces

paternally in souls, the fountain of souls produces maternally and

generatively.

Virtue however, energizes by itself, and adorns and perfects wholes.

And on this account, the universe having participated of soul,

immediately also participates of virtue. “For the demiurgus, says

Timæus, having placed soul in the middle, extended it through the

universe, and besides this surrounded the body of it externally

with soul as with a veil, and causing circle to revolve in circle,

constituted heaven one, alone and solitary, but through _virtue_

able to converse with itself, and being in want of no other thing, but

sufficiently known and friendly itself to itself.” At one and the same

time therefore the world is animated, lives through the whole of its

life according to virtue, and possesses from the virtues as its highest

end, friendship with itself, and an all-perfect knowledge of itself.

For it is itself sufficiently known and friendly to itself through

virtue.

Moreover, nature also is consubsistent with the generation of body.

For the demiurgus generates body through necessity, and fashions it

together with its proper life. And on this account, shortly after,

having constituted partial souls, he shows to them the nature of the

universe, and the laws of Fate. For in consequence of possessing the

cause of total Nature and Fate, he also exhibits these to souls. For

the demiurgus is not converted to things posterior to himself, but

primarily contains in himself the things which are exhibited, and

unfolds to souls the powers of himself. Hence, the paradigm of all

Nature, and the one cause of the laws of Fate pre-subsist in him.

For the fountain of Nature, is called the first Fate by the Gods

themselves. “You should not look upon Nature, for the name of it is

fatal.” Hence also, Timæus says, that souls at one and the same time

see the laws of Fate, and the nature of the universe, viz. they see

as it were mundane Fate, and the powers of it. And the Elean guest

in the Politicus, denominates the motive cause of the more physical

circulation of the universe, Fate. For he says that “Fate and connate

desire convolve the world.” And the same person likewise clearly

acknowledges that the world possesses this power from the demiurgus and

father. For he says that all the apparent arrangement and circulation

are derived from Jupiter. It is demonstrated therefore, that according

to these three causes of the vivific Goddess which are co-arranged with

the demiurgus, the world is perfected by him, viz. according to the

fontal Crater, the fountain of the virtues, and the first-effective

cause of nature.

It is likewise manifest that again in these things Plato does not

refuse to employ the name of fountain. For in the Laws he calls the

power of prudence which is essentially inherent in souls, and which is

productive of the virtues in us, the fountain of intelligence. And he

also says, that two other fountains are imparted to us by nature, viz.

pleasure and pain. As, therefore, we before demonstrated that souls

are called the fountains of motions, on account of the one fountain of

them, of which they participate, thus also when Plato calls the first

progeny of Nature fountains, it is obvious to every one, that he will

permit the exempt cause itself of them to be denominated a fountain.

After the same manner, likewise, since he magnificently celebrates the

essential power of virtue in us, as the fountain of intelligence, he

will not be compelled to hear a name which does not at all pertain to

his philosophy, if some one should be willing to denominate, the first

monad of the virtues, a fountain. But where shall we have the name of

fountain posited by him in the intellectual Gods? In the Cratylus,

therefore, he says that Tethys is the occult name of a fountain, and he

calls Saturn himself and the queen Rhea fluxions. For these divinities

are rivers of the intelligible fountains, and proceeding from fountains

placed above them, they fill all the natures posterior to themselves

with the prolific rivers of life. And the Crater itself likewise is

fontal. The Gods, therefore, also denominate the first-effective

causes of partial natures, fontal Craters. These things, however, we

shall more fully investigate elsewhere. Let it be considered also,

that we have here sufficiently examined the particulars concerning the

demiurgic monad, according to the narration of Plato.

CHAPTER XXXIII.

In the next place, let us survey those causes and leaders of

uncontaminated purity, and see if Plato any where appears to remind

us of this order of Gods, and of the inflexible power proceeding from

them to all the divine genera. For the first-effective triad of the

immutable order, is united to the triad of the intellectual kings and

the progressions of the former are co-divided with the monads of the

latter. And the summit of the triad, and as it were, the flower of the

inflexible guard of wholes is united to the first intellectual king.

But the middle centre of the triad, is in a kindred manner conjoined to

the second intellectual king, proceeds together with him, and subsists

about him. And the extremity[290] of the whole triad is connected with

the third intellectual king, is converted with him to the principle

[of the intellectual order,] and together with him is convolved to the

one union of the father of all the intellectual Gods. And after this

manner, indeed, the three unpolluted guardians of the intellectual

fathers, are monadically divided. But together with this division they

have also an hypostasis united to each other. All of them, likewise,

are in a certain respect in each of the fathers, and all of them

energize about all. And after a certain manner indeed according to

their proper hypostasis, they are divided from the fathers; but after

another manner they are impartibly assumed with them, and at one and

the same time they are allotted an equally-dignified order with the

fathers, and appear to possess an essence subordinate to them.