Such, therefore, being their nature, they preserve, indeed, the

whole progressions of the fathers undefiled, but supply them with

inflexibility in their powers, and immutability in their energies. They

are suspended, however, from total purity. And if some of the ancients

have in any of their writings surveyed in intellect that which always

subsists with invariable sameness, which receives nothing into itself

from subordinate natures, and is not mingled with things inferior,

they celebrate all such goods as these, as pervading to intellect,

and other natures, from these Gods. For the oration in the Banquet

of Plato, celebrates in a remarkable manner the immiscibility of the

divine essence with secondary natures; and that which transcends the

whole of things in purity and immutable power, arrives to the Gods

through the guardian cause. And as the intellectual fathers, are the

suppliers of prolific production, both to all other things, and to the

inflexible Gods, thus also, the undefiled Gods, impart the power of

purity, both to the fathers, and to the other divine orders. At one and

the same time, therefore, the three unpolluted Gods subsist with the

three intellectual kings, are the guardians of the fathers themselves,

establish about them an immutable guard, and firmly fix themselves in

them. Hence also, the Athenian guest, as he arranges and adorns his

polity through the best analogy, through which the demiurgus binds and

constitutes the whole number [of the elements,] so likewise he appoints

a guard to all the inhabitants of the region, that nothing, as much as

possible, may be without defence; imitating in this the intellectual

Gods themselves who guard all things by the undefiled leaders. And it

appears to me that on this account he calls the rulers [of his polity]

guardians of the laws, or [simply] guardians, because the inflexible

guardians are consubsistent with the intellectual leaders of the whole

worlds.

CHAPTER XXXIV.

These arguments, however, will be more remote from that divine triad,

and are referred to it from ultimate images. But perhaps omitting

these, we may abound with greater conceptions, and more conducive to

the investigation of the thing proposed, and speculating together

with Plato the divine genera, we may discover how he also celebrates

this order of Gods, and constitutes them together with the three

kings that are now discussed, just as by other theologists also, we

are mystically instructed in the truth concerning them. In the fable

therefore of Protagoras, Plato indicating to us the exempt watch-tower

of Jupiter, and the transcendency of his essence which is unmingled

with all secondary natures, through which he is inaccessible and

unrevealed to the partible genera of Gods, refers the cause of this to

his[291] immutable guard, and the defensive order by which he[292] is

surrounded. For on account of this, all the demiurgic powers indeed are

firmly established in themselves. But all the forms [that are in him]

are according to supreme transcendency exempt from secondary natures.

And in short, the demiurgic intellect [through this order] abides after

its accustomed manner. For the fable says that the guards of Jupiter

are terrible to all things. And on this account such [partible] genera

of Gods (one of which also Prometheus is) cannot be immediately

conjoined with the undefiled and Olympian powers of the demiurgus. If,

therefore, Socrates himself in the form of a fable clearly delivers

to us the guard about the demiurgus, is it not through these things

evident that the guardian genus is consubsistent with the intellectual

Gods? For as the Oracles say, that the demiurgic order is surrounded

with a burning guard, thus also Plato says that guards stand round

it, and defend inflexibly the summit of it exempt from all secondary

natures.

But in the Cratylus, Socrates unfolding through the truth which is

expressed in names, who Saturn is, demonstrates indeed his[293]

peculiar hyparxis, according to which he subsists as the leader of the

total intellectual orders. He likewise unfolds to us the monad of the

unpolluted order, which is united with Saturn. For Saturn, as he says

in that dialogue, is a pure intellect. For, he adds, the _koron_

(το κορον) of him, does not signify his being a boy, but the purity,

and incorruptible nature of intellect. After an admirable manner

therefore, the fabricator of these divine names, has at one and the

same time conjoined the Saturnian peculiarity, and the first monad of

the unpolluted triad. For the union of the first father with the first

of the unpolluted Gods, is transcendent, and hence this inflexible God

is called _silent_ by the Gods, is said to accord with intellect,

and to be known by souls according to intellect alone; because he

subsists in the first intellect according to one union with it. Saturn

therefore, as being the first intellect, is defined according to its

proper order, but as a pure and incorruptible intellect, he has the

undefiled conjoined in himself. And on this account, he is the king of

all the intellectual Gods. For as intellect he gives subsistence to all

the intellectual Gods, and as a pure intellect, he guards the total

orders of them. The two fathers therefore, [Saturn and Jupiter] are

shown by the words of Plato to be co-arranged with the immutable Gods,

according to union indeed, the first, but according to separation the

third.

If you are willing however, to survey the one inflexible guard of them

with respect to each other, according to which the third father is

stably in the first, as being the intellect of him, and energizing

about him, again direct your attention to the bonds in the Cratylus, of

which indeed, partible lives, and the lives deprived of intellect, and

which are stupidly astonished about matter, are unable to participate.

But a divine intellect itself, and the souls which are conjoined to it,

participate of these bonds according to an order adapted to them. For

the Saturnian bonds, appear indeed to bind the mighty Saturn himself,

but in reality, they connect about him in an undefiled manner the

natures that throw the bonds around him. For a bond is the symbol of

the connective order of the Gods, since every thing which is bound is

connected by a bond. Again therefore from these things, the guardian

good which extends from the connective Gods to the intellectual kings

is apparent, since it unites, and collects them into one. For a bond

guards that which is connected by it. But the immutable Gods inflexibly

preserve their own appropriate orders. For the guardianship of these

Gods is twofold; the one indeed, being primary and uniform, and

suspended from the triad of the connective Gods; but the other being

co-existent with the intellectual kings, and defending them from a

tendency to all secondary natures. For all the intellectual fathers

ride on the unpolluted Gods, and are established above wholes, through

their inflexible, undeviating, and immutable power.

If however, it be not only necessary that these two fathers should

participate of this guardian order, but that the middle vivific deity

of them should be allotted a monad of the immutable Gods coordinate

to herself, it is indeed necessary that the first [guardianship] of

the unpolluted leaders in the intellectual fathers, should be triadic,

and should have the same perfect number with the three intellectual

Gods. It is likewise necessary that the first of these leaders should

be stably united to the first [of the intellectual kings]; but that

the second should in a certain respect be separated from the second of

these kings, together with a union with him. And that the third should

now be entirely separated from the third king. And thus the unpolluted

proceeds conformably to the paternal order, and is after the same

manner with it triadically divided. The first of the unpolluted Gods

likewise guards the occult nature of Saturn, and the first-effective

monad which transcends wholes, and establishes perfectly in him the

causes that proceed from, and again return to him. But the second,

preserves the generative power of the queen Rhea, pure from matter,

and undefiled, and sustains from the incursions of secondary natures

her progression to all things, on which she pours the rivers of life.

And the third preserves the whole fabrication of things established

above the fabrications, and firmly abiding in itself. It likewise

guards it so as to be inflexible, one, and all-perfect with respect to

the subjects of its providential case, and expanded above all partial

production.

CHAPTER XXXV.

Let us now then from this indefinite and common doctrine about these

Gods, adduce the Grecian rumour concerning it, as delivered to us by

Plato, and demonstrate that he as far as to the very names follows the

theologists of the Greeks, just as in the mystic theory of the three

kings, and the narration of the unpolluted Gods, he does not depart

from their interpretation. For who that is in the smallest degree

acquainted with the divine wisdom of the Greeks, does not know that in

their arcane mysteries, and other concerns respecting the Gods, the

order of the Curetes, is in a remarkable manner celebrated by them, as

presiding over the undefiled peculiarity, as the leader of the goddess

[Rhea,] and as binding in itself the guardianship of wholes? These

Gods therefore, are said to guard the queen Rhea, and the demiurgus of

wholes, and proceeding as far as to the causes of partible vivification

and fabrication, to preserve the Proserpine and Bacchus which are

among these causes, exempt from secondary natures, just as here [i.e.

in the intellectual order], they defend the vivifications of total

life, and the first-effective monads of all-perfect fabrication. Not

only Orpheus therefore, and the theologists prior to Plato knew this

Curetic order, and knowing, venerated it, but the Athenian guest also

in the Laws celebrates it. For he says, that the armed sports of the

Curetes in Crete, are the principal paradigms of all elegant motion.

And now, neither is he satisfied with having mentioned this Curetic

order, but he also adds the one unity of the Curetes, viz. our mistress

Minerva, from which the mystic doctrine also of theologists prior

to him, suspends the whole progression of the Curetes. He likewise,

surrounds them above with the symbols of Minerva, as presiding over

an ever-flourishing life, and vigorous intellection; but beneath, he

manifestly arranges them under the providence of Minerva. For the

first Curetes indeed, as being the attendants of the intelligible and

occult Goddess, are satisfied with the signs that proceed from thence;

but those in the second and third orders, are suspended from the

intellectual Minerval monad.

What then is it, that the Athenian guest says concerning this

monad, which converts to itself in an undefiled manner the Curetic

progressions? “The _core_ (κορη) i.e. virgin, and mistress

that is with us, being delighted with the discipline of dancing,

did not think it proper to play with empty hands; but being adorned

with an all-perfect panoply, she thus gave perfection to dancing.”

Through these things therefore, the Athenian guest clearly shows the

alliance of the Curetic triad to the Minerval monad. For as that

triad is said to sport in armour, so he says that the Goddess who is

the leader of them [i.e. of their progression] being adorned with an

all-perfect panoply, is the source to them of elegant motion. And as

he denominates that triad Curetic, from purity, so likewise he calls

this goddess _Core_, as being the cause of undefiled power itself.

For _koron_ (το κορον) as Socrates[294] says in the Cratylus,

signifies the pure and incorruptible. Whence also the Curetes are

allotted their appellation, as presiding over the undefiled purity

of the Gods. And the monad of them is particularly celebrated as a

mistress and as Core [a virgin] she being the supplier of an inflexible

and flourishing dominion to the Gods. The word _koron_ therefore,

as we have said, is a symbol of purity, of which these Gods are the

primary leaders, and according to which[295] they are participated

by others. But their being armed, is a symbol of the guardian power

according to which they connect wholes, guard them exempt from

secondary natures, and preserve them established in themselves. For

what other benefit do men derive from arms except that of defence?

For these are in a particular manner the safeguard of cities. Hence

fables also ascribing to the unpolluted Gods an unconquerable strength,

give to them an armed apparatus. Hence adorning the one unity of them

with an all-perfect panoply, they establish it at the summit of the

progression of these Gods. For the all-perfect precedes things which

are divided according to parts, and the panoply exists prior to the

partible distribution of guardian powers. And it appears to me that

through these particulars Plato again asserts the same things as were

afterwards revealed by the Gods. For what they denominate _every kind

of armour_, this Plato celebrates as adorned with an _all-perfect

panoply_. [For the Gods say,] “Armed with every kind of armour, he

resembles the Goddess.” For the all-perfect in the habit of Pyrrhich

arms, and the undefiled in power, pertain, according to Plato, to the

Minerval monad; but according to the narration of the Oracles they

pertain to that which is furnished with every kind of arms.

Farther still, rythm and dancing are a mystic sign of this deity,

because the Curetes contain the undefiled power of a divine life;

because they preserve the whole progressions of it always arranged

according to one divine boundary; and because they sustain these

progressions from the incursions of matter. For the formless, the

indefinite, and the privation of rythm, are the peculiarities of

matter. Hence, the immaterial, the definite, and the undefiled, are

endued with rythm, are orderly, and intellectual. For on this account,

the heavens also are said to form a perpetual dance, and all the

celestial orbs participate of rythmical and harmonious motion, being

filled with this power supernally from the unpolluted Gods. For because

they are moved in a circle they express intellect, and the intellectual

circulation. But because they are moved harmonically, and according

to the first and best rhythms, they participate of the peculiarity

of the guardian Gods. Moreover, the triad of the unpolluted leaders

is suspended from the summit of the intellectual Gods. And that it

proceeds from this summit, Plato himself teaches us, by placing the

first cause of purity in Saturn the king of all the intellectual

hebdomad. For _purity_ (το κορον) is there primarily, as he informs us

in the Cratylus, and the first-effective cause of purity, preexists

unically in Saturn. For on this account also, the Minerval monad, is

called _Core_ (a virgin) and the Curetic triad is after this manner

celebrated, being suspended from the purity in the intellectual father.

CHAPTER XXXVI.

Concerning the undefiled leaders, thus much we have had to say,

according to the narration of Plato. The monad therefore, now remains,

which closes the number of all the intellectual hebdomad, and is the

first and uniform cause of all division, which must in the next place

be discussed by us. The sections therefore, of the intellectual Gods

which are celebrated by all the wise in divine concerns among the

Greeks, and which obscurely signify the separations in those Gods,

are effected in them through the seventh monad, which is the cause of

division, and according to which they separate themselves from the

Gods that are placed above them, proceeding into another order, are

allotted a union exempt from subordinate natures, and by themselves

have a definite order, and a progression bounded according to number.

Plato however, allows indeed poets that ate inspired by Phœbus, to

signify things of this kind obscurely and mystically; but he excludes

the multitude from hearing these things, because they believe without

examination in the fabulous veils of truth. And this is what Socrates

reprobates in Euthyphron, who was thus affected in consequence of

being ignorant of divine concerns. According to the divinely-inspired

intellect of Plato therefore, transferring all such particulars to

the truth concerning wholes, and unfolding the concealed theory which

they contain, we shall procure for ourselves the genuine worship of a

divine nature. For Socrates himself in the Cratylus, unfolds to us the

Saturnian bonds, and their mystic meaning, and in a remarkable manner

demonstrates that the visions of those ancient and illustrious men do

not fall off from the truth.

After the same manner therefore, he will permit his friends to assume

intellectual sections, and the power which is productive of these,

according to divinely-inspired conceptions, and will suffer them to

survey these together with bonds in the intellectual Gods. Farther

still, the fable in the Gorgias, in a clearer manner separates the

empire of Jupiter from the Saturnian kingdom, and calls the former

the second from, and more recent than the latter. What is the cause,

therefore, which separates these paternal monads? What intellectual

power produced the intellectual empire from that which is exempt from

it? For it is necessary that there should be with the Gods themselves

the first-effective fountain of division, through which Jupiter also

separates himself from the monad his father, Saturn from the kingdom of

the Heaven, and the natures posterior to Jupiter, proceeding into an

inferior order, are separated from his all-perfect monad.

Moreover, the demiurgus himself in the production of the genera

posterior to himself, at one and the same time is the cause to them of

union, and the source of their all-various divisions. For fabricating

the soul one whole, he separates it into parts, and all-various

powers. And in the Timæus where the demiurgus is said to do this,

Plato himself does not refuse to call these separations, and essential

divisions, _sections_. He likewise cuts off parts from thence,

places them in that which is between these, and again separates parts

from the whole, and thus the mixture from which he had cut off these

parts, was now wholly consumed. Is it therefore any longer wonderful

that the framers of fables should denominate the divisions of the

intellectual leaders, sections, since even Timæus himself who does

not devise fables, but indicates the essential progression of souls

into multitude, uses as a sign the word section? And does not also

Plato in the greatest degree accord with the highest of theologists,

when he delivers to us the demiurgus glittering with intellectual

sections? As therefore the demiurgus, when producing the essence of

souls, constitutes it according to true being, when generating life,

he generates it according to the life which is in real beings, and

produces the intellect which is in souls according to the intellect

which is in himself,--thus also when cutting the essence of the soul

from itself, and separating it, he energizes according to the sections

and separations which are in the intellectual order, and according to

the one and intellectual cause of them. According to Plato, therefore,

there is a first monad of the total divisions in intellectuals,

and together with the twofold triads, I mean the paternal and the

undefiled, it gives completion to the whole intellectual hebdomad. And

we, following Plato, and other theologists, concede the same things.

CHAPTER XXXVII.

Let us now, however, return to the beginning, and demonstrate that

Parmenides delivers the same things concerning this intellectual

hebdomad, and that he produces this hebdomadic _aiōn_ (_eternity_)

and the peculiarity of the Gods which is intellectual alone, in

continuity with the triple orders of the intelligible, and at the

same time intellectual Gods. And, in the first place, let us survey

what he says concerning the father of the intellectual Gods, and the

undefiled power which is co-arranged with him. For after the threefold

figure, and the order of the Gods which perfects all things, that which

is in itself[296] and in another, becomes apparent. These things,

however, are demonstrated to be signs of the intellectual summit of

the intellectual monads. For the first father of the Gods in this

order, at one and the same time is allotted a paternal transcendency

with respect to those posterior to him, and is the intellect of the

first intelligibles. For every imparticipable intellect is said to

be the intellect of the natures prior to itself, and towards them,

from whom it is produced, it has an intellectual conversion, and in

them as first-effective causes it establishes itself. Whence also the

demiurgic intellect is the intellect of the natures above itself, and

proximately indeed of its own father, from which likewise it proceeds,

but eminently of the intelligible unities beyond [Saturn].

The first king, therefore, in intellectuals, is both an intellectual

father, and a paternal intellect. He is, however, the intellectual

father indeed of the Gods that proceed from himself; but he is

the paternal intellect of the intelligibles prior to himself. For

he is indeed intellectual essentially; but he has an intelligible

transcendency in intellectuals; because he is also established

analogous to the unknown order of the intelligible, and at the same

time, intellectual Gods, and to the occult order of the intelligible

triads. And as they are expanded above the triadic hypostases of the

Gods posterior to themselves, thus also the father of intellectuals, is

a father expanded above the whole intellectual hebdomad, in consequence

of being a paternal intellect. And analogously to the above-mentioned

orders of Gods, he establishes himself in them, and is filled from

them with paternal and intelligible union. On this account also, he is

occult, shuts in himself the prolific powers of himself, and producing

from himself total causes, he again establishes them in, and converts

them to himself.

These things, therefore, Parmenides also indicating, magnificently

celebrates this order by these twofold signs, and characterizes the

first king and father of the intellectual[297] Gods through these

peculiarities. For he is in himself, and in another. For so far indeed

as he is a total intellect, his energy is directed to himself, but so

far as he is in the intelligibles prior to himself, he establishes

in another the all-perfect intelligence of himself. For, indeed,

this subsistence in another, is more excellent than the subsistence

of a thing in itself; since, as Parmenides himself concludes, the

subsistence of Saturn in another, pertains to him according to whole,

but the subsistence of him in himself, according to parts. Where,

therefore, does _the another_ pre-exist? And to what order of

the Gods prior to Saturn does it belong? Or is not this also divinely

unfolded by our preceptor? For he says that this _another_,

remarkably pertains to that order, according to which the power of

difference first shines forth, being the progeny of intelligible

and paternal power. Hence in the first triad _the another_ was

occultly, so far as power also had there an occult subsistence; but it

particularly shines forth in the first order of the intelligible, and

at the same time, intellectual Gods. For there the first difference,

the feminine nature of the Gods, and the paternal and unvocal power

subsist.

[Saturn therefore] who is the first of the intellectual fathers being

intelligible, so far as he is a whole, establishes himself in the

intelligible triads prior to himself, from which also he is filled

with united and occult goods. And on this account he is said to be in

another. With respect to those triads indeed, _the another_ is

occultly and according to cause in the intelligible [i.e. in the first

triad] of intelligibles; but according to essence in the intelligible

of the intelligible, and at the same time, intellectual Gods. All

intelligibles therefore are united; the intelligible indeed of the

intelligible and intellectual Gods being united to the intelligible of

the intelligibles prior[298] to intellectuals; but the intelligible of

intellectuals, to both. And the subsistence indeed in another, adheres

to the difference which is according to unical number. But unical

number is suspended from the occult union of the one being; on which

account also it is unical.

Farther still, we also say, that there is a twofold conversion in those

orders, the one indeed being towards themselves, but the other towards

the causes of them, (for it neither was nor will be lawful for divine

natures, to convert themselves in any respect to natures posterior to

themselves). And the intelligible Gods generate all things stably; but

the intelligible and intellectual Gods who illuminate imparticipable

life, impart the original cause of progression to all things; and the

intellectual Gods arrange and adorn wholes according to conversion.

Hence, it is indeed necessary that the summit of intellectuals which

pours forth from itself the whole and all-perfect form of conversion,

should be characterized by both the convertive symbols, and should

be at one and the same time converted to itself, and to the natures

prior to itself. Hence, because indeed, it is converted to itself,

it is _in itself_; but because it is converted to the intelligible

orders beyond itself, it is _in another_. For the _another_ is more

excellent than the whole intellectual order. As, therefore, the summit

of intelligibles primarily subsists according to the intelligible

peculiarity itself, and is firmly established above wholes; and as

the summit of intelligibles and intellectuals primarily unfolds the

peculiarity of this order, subsisting according to divine diversity,

and being to all things the cause of all-various progressions;--thus

also the intelligible deity of intellectuals, exhibits from himself

according to union the twofold forms of conversion, being indeed _in

another_ according to the more excellent form of conversion, but _in

himself_ according to the less excellent form. For to be converted to

himself is inferior to the conversion to more excellent natures.

Again, therefore, the subsistence _in another_, is the illustrious

prerogative of the intelligible and paternal peculiarity, For _the

another_ is intelligible, and difference was the power proceeding from

the intelligible fathers, and from the natures firmly established in

them. Hence, that which is comprehended in this power, and is filled

from it, is paternal and intelligible. But the subsistence of a thing

_in itself_ is the proper sign of the unpolluted monad. For as we

have before observed, the summits of the two intellectual triads

are conjoined. And the monad of the guardian triad has eternally

established itself in the paternal monad, and again establishes in, and

converts to itself the natures which have proceeded from itself. And

the first intellectual father is indeed father on account of himself,

but on account of the unpolluted [monad,] he comprehends in himself the

genera of himself, stably recalls them [when they have proceeded from

him] to himself, and in his own allness[299] contains the intelligible

multitudes of intellectuals in unproceeding[300] union with their monad.

The first leader, therefore, of the guardian order subsists in

conjunction with the father. And the father indeed comprehends the

unpolluted cause, but is comprehended by the first intelligibles.

And as he is intelligibly established in them, so likewise he has

established in himself, and constituted about himself, the one summit

of the inflexible Gods. In the Parmenides, therefore, also the same God

appears to us to be a pure intellect. Because, indeed, he is intellect,

being extended to the intelligible place of survey, and on this account

being _in another_, so far as he is wholly established in it. But

again, because he is pure and immaterial, being converted to himself,

and shutting _in himself_ all his own powers. For the parts of

this wholeness, are more partial powers, which hasten indeed to a

progression from the father, but are on all sides established and

comprehended by the wholeness. And the wholeness itself is a deity,

connectedly containing in itself intelligible parts, being parturient

indeed with intellectual multitude, generating all things stably, and

again embosoming and collecting to itself its progeny, and as the more

tragical fables say, absorbing and depositing them in itself. For the

progeny of it are twofold; some indeed, being, as it were, analyzed

into it; but others being divided from it. And some abiding in it

through the first unpolluted monad; but others proceeding according

to the prolific cause of the intellectual Gods, surmounting the union

of the father, and being the primary leaders of another order, and

of the arrangement and ornament of secondary natures. The first

order therefore of the intellectual Gods, is thus delivered to us by

Parmenides.

CHAPTER XXXVIII.

The second order however, after this, is that which comprehends the

middle genera of wholes, is the cause to all things of progression

and prolific power, and is in continuity with the first order of the

intellectual Gods. What else therefore than life is every where in

continuity with the intelligible and true being? For it is the medium

between intellect and the intelligible, conjoining intellect to the

intelligible, and expressing the intelligible power which collects

together _the one_ and being. As the intelligible therefore is to _the

one_ and hyparxis, so is life to power, and intellect to being. And as

in intelligibles, _the one_ is the object of desire, but being aspires

after the participation of _the one_, and power collects being to the

participation of _the one_, and _the one_ to a communion with being,

(for _the one_ here is not imparticipable, and exempt from all power)

so likewise the intelligible is the object of desire to intellect,

but intellect is filled with it. And life binds indeed intellect to

the intelligible, but unfolds the intelligible to intellect. Whence

also, I think, those who are wise in all divine concerns, call _the

one_ and hyparxis intelligible. But that which is primarily being,

they call[301] the first intellect, conformably to this analogy.

Life therefore, is the medium between being and intellect, in the

same manner as power subsists between _the one_ and being. And all

these, viz. the intelligible, life, and intellect are primarily in

intelligibles; but secondarily in intelligibles and intellectuals; and

according to a third diminution, in intellectuals. In intelligibles

however, being is according to essence; for there intellect is

primarily according to cause. But in intellectuals, intellect indeed,

is according to essence; but the natures prior to intellect, are

according to participation. Since therefore, life is surveyed in a

threefold respect, in intelligibles indeed according to cause; but

in intelligibles and intellectuals, according to hyparxis; and an

intellectuals,[302] according to participation, it is indeed necessary

that the life which is in the intellectual order, should both be life,

and participate of the causes generative of life prior of itself.

_The one_ therefore of the intellectual Gods which is arranged in the

middle, is not motion, but that which is moved. For prior to this, it

has been demonstrated by Plato, that all life is motion. For soul is

self-motive because it is self-vital. And intellect is on this account

moved, because it has the most excellent life. The first vivific cause,

therefore, of the intellectual Gods, is primarily allotted motion.

If, however, it was the first-effective and highest life, it would be

requisite to denominate it motion, and not that which is moved. But

since it is life as in intellectuals, but is filled from exempt life,

it is at the same time motion, and that which is moved. Very properly,

therefore, does Parmenides demonstrate that _the one_ in this order is

moved, because it proceeds from the causes of all life that are placed

above it, and is analogous to the middle centre of intelligibles, and

to the middle triad of intelligibles and intellectuals. Hence also,

Socrates in the Phædrus calls this middle triad Heaven; for the whole

of it is life and motion. But that which is moved, is the middle in

intellectuals, as being filled from it, [i.e. from the life in the

middle triad of intelligibles and intellectuals;] since eternity

also, which is arranged according to the intelligible wholeness, is

all-perfect life, and all life, according to Plotinus. There, however,

the middle is life according to cause; but in intellectuals, it is life

according to participation; and in the order between these, it is life

according to essence, proceeding indeed from intelligible life, (as

Parmenides also manifests, characterizing both according to wholeness,

though the wholeness in intelligibles is different from that which

is in intelligibles and intellectuals, as we have before observed,)

but producing after this, intellectual life. For that which is moved,

is indeed entirely allied to the circulation of the Heaven, and to

intellectual and intelligible life.

Moreover, the permanency which is coordinate with this motion, is not

one certain genus of being, as neither is motion. For beings indeed

are naturally adapted to participate of the genera of being; but the

superessential goods of the Gods, are expanded above the order of

beings. If, therefore, Parmenides here, assuming _the one itself_

by itself, surveys in this motion and permanency, he evidently does

net attribute the elements of being to the Gods, but assigns to them

peculiarities appropriate, all-perfect, and transcending wholes. And

thus asserting that _the one_ is moved and stands still, according

to motion, indeed, he delivers the vivific hyparxis of the Gods, the

generative fountain of wholes, and the leading cause of all things. But

according to permanency, he delivers the unpolluted monad coordinated

with motion, and which connectedly-contains the middle centres of the

guardian triad. For as the summit of the guardian triad, is united to

the first father, according to the first hypostasis, thus also the

deity who contains the middle bond of the unpolluted leaders, is by

a congeniality of nature consubsistent with the motive cause of all

the Gods, which moves wholes, and is primarily moved from itself.

And through this deity, the prolific power of this Goddess [Rhea] is

firmly established in herself. Producing likewise, and multiplying

all things, she is [through this deity] exempt from wholes, and

inflexibly exists prior to her progeny. With respect, therefore, to

motion here and permanency, the former indeed is the fountain of

the life and generative power that proceeds to all things; but the

latter,[303] establishes the whole vivific fountain in itself, but

is from thence filled with the prolific rivers of life. Parmenides,

therefore, delivering to us these things, and the progression of them,

demonstrates that that which is moved is generated from that which

is in another, but that which stands still, from that which is in

itself. For the first monad of the paternal triad constitutes the

natures posterior to it. And after the same manner, the highest of the

unpolluted triad, and which is intelligible as in this triad, imparts

at one and the same time the middle and last monad of the triad. On

this account, also, motion here is better than permanency. For as a

subsistence in another is according to cause more ancient than the

subsistence of a thing in itself, so likewise that which is moved, is

causally more ancient than that which is permanent. For the unpolluted

Gods, are in power subordinate to the fathers, and are comprehended in

them.

CHAPTER XXXIX.

The third, therefore, to the Saviour, as they say, and let us direct

our attention to the demiurgic monad, unfolding itself into light

together with the coordinate Gods it contains. In the first place,

then, here also the communion of _the one_ with other things is

apparent, and we must no longer consider _the one_ alone by itself, but

according to its habitude towards other things. Because, therefore, the

demiurgic order produces wholes from itself, and arranges and adorns

a corporeal nature, it also generates all the second and ministrant

causes of the Gods. For what occasion is there to say that the term

_other things_, is a sign of a corporeal condition of being, since

formerly the Pythagoreans thought fit to characterize an incorporeal

nature by _the one_, but indicated to us the nature which is divisible

about body, through the term _others_? In the second place, the number

of the conclusions [in this part of the Parmenides] is doubled. For

_the one_ is no longer demonstrated to be alone same, or different,

as it is to be in itself, and in another, or to be moved, and stand

still, but it is demonstrated to be the same with itself, and different

from itself,[304] and to be different from other things, and the same

with other things. But this twice appeared to us before to be entirely

adapted to the demiurgic monad, both according to other theologists,

and to Socrates in the Cratylus, who says that the demiurgic name is

composed from two words. In the third place, therefore, the multitude

of causes is here separated, and all the monads of the Gods present

themselves to the view, according to the demiurgic progression. For the

demiurgic order is apparent, the prolific power coordinate with it, the

undefiled monad the cause of exempt providence, and the distributive

fountain of wholes; and together with these, as I may say, all the

orders about the demiurgus are apparent, according to which he produces

and preserves all things, and being exempt from the things produced, is

firmly established in himself, and separates his own kingdom, from the

united empire of his father.

How, therefore, and through what particulars do these things become

apparent? We reply, that _the same with itself_ (for this Parmenides

first demonstrates) represents to us about the nature of _the one_,

the monadic and paternal peculiarity, according to which the demiurgus

also subsists. Hence, likewise, _the one_ is said to be the same

with itself. For _the another_ is in the demiurgus according to the

transcendency of different causes; but _the same_, appears to be a sign

of his proper, viz. of his paternal, hyparxis. For being one, and the

exempt father and demiurgus of wholes, he establishes his proper union

in himself. And in this one, Parmenides in a remarkable manner shows

the uniform, and that which is allied to bound. But _the same with

other things_, is the singular good of prolific power, and of a cause

proceeding to, and pervading through all things without impediment.

For the demiurgus is present to all things which he produces, and is

in all things the same, which he arranges and adorns, pre-establishing

in himself the generative essence of wholes. If, therefore, we rightly

assert these things, bound and infinity subsist in him demiurgically.

And the one indeed is in the sameness which is separate from other

things, but the other is in the power which generates other things.

For every where power is prolific of secondary natures. But the

principle which subsists according to bound, is the supplier of an

united and stable hypostasis.

Moreover, _the different from other things_, manifests his undefiled

purity, and his transcendency which is exempt from all secondary

natures. For the first intellect was on this account pure and

incorruptible, as Socrates says in the Cratylus, because it is

established above coordination or communion[305] with all sensible

natures. For as some one of the Gods says, he does not incline his

power to matter, but is at once exempt from all fabrication. But the

demiurgic intellect receiving from thence total power, and a royal

dominion, adorns indeed sensibles, and constitutes the whole of a

corporeal nature. Together however, with prolific abundance, and the

providential attention to secondary natures, he transcends his progeny,

and abides in his own accustomed manner, as Timæus says, through the

inflexible guard which subsists with him, and the power imparted to

him from it, which is uncontaminated with other participants. Hence,

through the never-failing supply of good, and providential energies,

and the generation of subordinate natures, he is _the same with

them_. For he is participated by them, and fills his progeny with his

own providential care. But through his purity, undefiled power, and

inflexible energies, he is separate from wholes, is disjoined from

them, and is imparticipable by other things. And as the first king

of intellectuals is allotted his non-inclination to matter, through

the guard which is united to him, and through the undefiled monad;

and as the vivific goddess possesses her stable and inflexible power

from the second cause of the guardian Gods; thus also the demiurgic

intellect preserves a transcendency exempt from other things, and a

union separated from multitude, through the third monad of the leaders

of purity. For the cause of separate providence is a guard coordinate

with the demiurgus, who hastens to produce[306] all things, and to

pervade through all things. But the guard which is the supplier of

stable power, is coordinate with the vivific deity, who is moved to

the generation of wholes. And with the intellect that is multiplied

according to intellectual conceptions [i.e. with Saturn,] the guard

is coordinate, that imparts an undefiled union of the conversion of

all his energies to himself. The monad, therefore, remains, which is

arranged as the seventh of these intellectual monads, which is present

with, and energizes with all of them, but particularly unfolds itself

into light in the demiurgic order, and which Parmenides also producing

for us together with the whole demiurgus, defines it in _difference_,

in the same manner as he does the undefiled cause in the demiurgus.

He says however, that this difference separates the demiurgic monad

itself from itself. For we have before observed that this order is the

supplier of separation to all the Gods. As therefore, the demiurgus

is the same with himself, through the paternal union, after the same

manner he is separated from himself and his father through this

difference. Whence therefore, does he derive this power? From being

in himself, says Parmenides, and in another. For these were indeed

unitedly in the first father, but separately in the third. Separation

therefore, pre-existed there according to cause; but in the demiurgus

it shines forth, and unfolds the power of itself.

That the cause however of division, is in a certain respect in

the first father, Parmenides manifests in the first hypothesis,

when he says, “that every thing which is in itself is in a certain

respect a duad, and is separated from itself.” There however, the

duad is occultly; but here it subsists more clearly, where also all

intellectual multitude shines forth to the view. For difference is

the progeny of the firmly-abiding duad which is there. This therefore

separates the demiurgic intellect from the Gods prior to it, and

divides the monads in it from each other. For if so far as it is in

another, it is united to the intelligible of itself, but so far as it

is in itself it is separated from it, because it proceeds according

to each order of its own intelligible,--if this be the case, it is

necessary that this difference should be the cause to it of separation

from its father. All the intellectual monads therefore, have appeared

to us to subsist coordinately with each other. And the subsistence

indeed, _in another_ is the sign of the father. But the subsistence _in

itself_, is the sign of the first unpolluted monad. Again, _motion_

is the sign of vivific goodness; but _permanency_ of the inflexible

power conjoined with motion. And _sameness with itself, and with

another_, is the sign of the demiurgic peculiarity; but the being

_different from other things_, is the sign of the guard about the

demiurgus. And in the last place, _the being different from itself_,

is the sign of the seventh intellectual monad, which is according to

cause indeed, and occultly in the first father, but is allotted its

hypostasis more clearly in the demiurgus. Parmenides likewise appears

to me, when dividing the signs of fabrication, to have unfolded in

the middles themselves, the peculiarities of the undefiled monad,

and of the dividing monad, so far as they also are in a certain

respect comprehended in the fabrication. For he shows in the first

of the conclusions that _the one_ is _the same with itself_; in the

second, that it is _different from itself_; in the third, that it is

_different from other things_; and in the fourth that it is _the same

with other things_. For he co-arranges indeed, the dividing power with

the paternal union; but connects with a transcendency separate from

secondary natures, the providential cause of them. For in the Gods, it

is necessary that union should exist prior to separation, and a purity

unmingled with secondary natures, prior to a providential inspection

of them; through which likewise, being every where, they are no where,

being present with all things, they are exempt from all things, and

being all things, they are not any of their progeny.

END OF VOL. I.

FOOTNOTES:

[1] P. 139.

[2] i.e. The highest order of intelligibles.

[3] Viz. the present and other works of Proclus, together with those

of Plotinus, Porphyry, Jamblichus, Syrianus, Ammonius, Damascius,

Olympiodorus, and Simplicius.

[4] Ενα ιδοις αν εν πασα γῃ ομοφωνον νομον και λογον, οτι θεος εις

παντων βασιλευς και πατηρ, και θεοι πολλοι, θεου παιδες, συναρχοντες

θεῳ. Ταυτα και ο ελλην λεγει, και ο βαρβαρος λεγει, και ο ηπειρωτης

και ο θαλαττιος, και ο σοφος και ο ασοφος. Κᾳν επι του ωκεανου ελθῃς

τ εις ηϊονας, κᾳκει θεοι, τοις μεν ανισχοντες αγχου μαλα, τοις δε

καταδυομενοι. Dissert. I. Edit. Princ.

[5] In his commentary on the second book of Aristotle’s treatise On the

Heavens.

[6] See Gaffarel’s Unheard-of Curiosities, p. 391.

[7] Apud Cyril.

[8] What these are will be shortly explained, when we come to speak of

the Apostle Paul.

[9] Synesius does not here speak conformably to the Chaldean

theologists, from whom he has derived these appellations. For the

ζωναιοι and the αζωνοι, are according to them Gods, the former being

the divinities of the stars, and the latter forming that order of Gods

which is called by Proclus in the sixth book of this work απολυτος,

_liberated_. Both these orders therefore, are superior to the

angelic series. This unscientific manner however of calling both the

highest and lowest divine powers by the common name of angels, is

not peculiar to Synesius and the Jews, but to all the fathers of the

church, and all the Christian divines that succeeded them.

[10] Dr. Gregory, in the 70th proposition of, the first book of his

Elements of Astronomy, says of Kepler, “That his archetypal ratios,

geometrical concinnities, and harmonic proportions, show such a force

of genius as is not to be found in any of the writers of physical

astronomy before him. So that Jeremiah Horrox, a very competent judge

of these matters, though a little averse to Kepler, in the beginning of

his astronomical studies, after having in vain tried others, entirely

falling in with Kepler’s doctrine and physical reasons, thus addresses

his reader: _Kepler is a person whom I may justly admire above all

mortals beside: I may call him great, divine, or even something more;

since Kepler is to be valued above the whole tribe of philosophers.

Him alone let the bards sing of.--Him alone let the philosophers read;

being satisfied of this, that he who has Kepler has all things._”

I quote this passage, not from the justness of the encomium it

contains; for it is extravagant, and by no means true; but that the

reader may see what an exalted opinion some of the greatest of the

moderns have had of the genius of Kepler.

[11] “Et primum quidem de anima totius universi etsi non repugno, nihil

tamen hoc libro IV. dicam. Videtur (si est talis aliqua) in centro

mundi, quod mihi sol est, residere, indeque in omnem ejus amplitudinem

commercio radiorum lucis, qui sint loco spirituum in corpore animali

propagari.”

[12] “Denique terræ globus tale corpus erit, quale est alicujus

animalis: quodque animali est sua anima, hoc erit telluri hæc, quam

quærimus, natura sublunaris.”

[13] “Videbam pleraque omnia, quæ ex corpore animantis provenientia,

testantur animam in illo inesse, provenire etiam ex telluris corpore.

Ut enim corpus in cutis superficie pilos, sic terra plantas arboresque

profert; inque iis ibi pediculi, hic crucæ, cicadæ, variaque insecta et

monstra marina nascuntur: et ut corpus lachrymas, blennam, auriumque

recrementa, est ubi et gummi ex faciei pustulis, sic tellus electrum,

bitumen: utque vesica urinam, sic montes flumina fundunt; et ut corpus

excrementum sulphurei odoris, crepitusque, qui etiam inflammari

possunt, sic terra sulphur, ignes subterraneos, tonitrua, fulgura:

utque in venis animantis generatur sanguis, et eum eo sudor, extra

corpus ejectus; sic in venis terræ, metalla et fossilia, vaporque

pluvius.”

[14] “Relucet igitur in anima telluris imago quædam circuli sodiaci

sensibilis, totinsque adeo firmamenti, vinculum sympathiæ rerum

cœlestium et terrestrium.”

[15] Proclus begins the sixth book of the following work with observing

that he has celebrated in the preceding book the hebdomadic _æon_ of

the intellectual Gods. The _æones_ therefore, though the cause of

them exists in the intelligible, properly belong to the intellectual

order; and the Demiurgus or artificer of the universe subsists at the

extremity of that order. But the demiurgus according to Orpheus, prior

to the fabrication of the world absorbed in himself Phanes the exemplar

of the universe. Hence he became full of ideas of which the forms in

the sensible universe are the images. And as all intellectual natures

are in each, it is evident that _things which are seen were generated

from the invisible æones_, conformably to the assertion of Paul.

[16] I refer the reader who is desirous of being fully convinced of

this to the notes accompanying my translation of that dialogue, in vol.

3 of my Plato.

[17] Ad Laurentium, c. 58.

[18] Here we see the _æones_ are acknowledged by Irenæus to be

beings of an order superior to angels.

[19] Ad Cap. 18. Matthæi.

[20] De Myst. p. 206.

[21] See my Collection of these Oracles in the old Monthly Magazine.

[22] The Synoches form the second triad of the intelligible, and at the

same time intellectual order of Gods.

[23] Παλιν τῃ εξ αυτου θεωσει, τῳ κατα δυναμιν εκαστου θεοειδει θεων

πολλων γιγνομενων, δοκει μεν ειναι και λεγεται του ενος θεου διακρισις

και πολλαπλασιασμοσ· εστι δε ουδεν ηττον ο αρχιθεος και υπερθεος

υπερουσιως, εις θεος, αμεριστος εν τοις μεριστοις, ηνωμενος εαυτῳ,

και τοις πολλοις αμιγης και απληθυντος. Και τουτο υπερφυως εννοησας ο

κοινος ημων και του καθηγεμονος επι την θειαν φωτοδοσιαν χειραγωγος,

ο πολυς τα θεια, το φως του κοσμου, τα δε φησιν ενθεαστικως εν τοις

ιεροις αυτου γραμμασι. Και γαρ ειπερ εισι λεγομενοι θεοι, ειτε εν

ουρανῳ, ειτε επι γης, κ.λ.----Και γαρ επι των θειων αι ενωσεις των

διακρισεων επικρατουσι και προκαταρχουσι, και ουδεν ηττον εστιν

ηνωμενα, και μετα την του ενος ανεκφοιτητον και ενιαιαν διακρισιν.

[24] Ταις πρωταις ουσιαις, αι μετα την ουσιοποιον αυτων θεαρχιαν

ιδρυμεναι, και οιον εν προθυροις αυτης τεταγμεναι, πασης εισιν αορετου

και ορατης υπερβεβηκυιαι γεγονυιας δυναμεως, ως οικειον οιητεον ειναι,

και κατα παν ομοειδη την ιεραρχιαν. De Cœlest. Hierarch. cap. 7.

[25] “Diogenes Laertius says of Pythagoras, _That he charged his

disciples not to give equal degrees of honour to the Gods and heroes_.

Herodotus (in Euterpe) says of the Greeks, _That they worshipped

Hercules two ways, one as an immortal deity and so they sacrificed

to him: and another as a Hero, and so they celebrated his memory_.

Isocrates (Encom. Helen.) distinguishes between the honours of heroes

and Gods, when he speaks of Menelaus and Helena. But the distinction

is no where more fully expressed than in the Greek inscription upon

the statue of Regilla, wife to Herodes Atticus, as Salmasius thinks,

which was set up in his temple at Triopium, and taken from the statue

itself by Sirmondus; where it is said, _That she had neither the

honour of a mortal, nor yet that which was proper to the Gods_: ουδε

ιερα θνητοῖς, αταρ ουδε θεοισιν ομοια. It seems by the inscription

of Herodes, and by the testament of Epicteta extant in Greek in the

_Collection_ of _Inscriptions_, that it was in the power of particular

families to keep festival days in honour of some of their own family,

and to give _heroical honours_ to them. In that noble inscription at

Venice, we find three days appointed every year to be kept, and a

_confraternity_ established for that purpose with the laws of it. The

first day to be observed in honour of the Muses, and sacrifices to be

offered to them as _deities_. The second and third days in honour of

the _heroes_ of the family; between which honour and that of deities,

they shewed the difference by the distance of time between them, and

the preference given to the other. But wherein soever the _difference_

lay, that there was a _distinction_ acknowledged among them appears by

this passage of Valerius in his excellent oration extant in Dionysius

Halicarnass. Antiq. Rom. lib. 11. p. 696. _I call_, says he, _the

Gods to witness, whose temples and altars our family has worshipped

with common sacrifices; and next after them, I call the Genii of our

ancestors, to whom we give_ δευτερας τιμας, _the second honours next to

the Gods_, as Celsus calls those τας προσηκουσας τιμας _the due honours

that belong to the lower dæmons_. From which we take notice, that the

Heathens did not confound all _degrees of divine worship_, giving

to the lowest object the same which they supposed to be due to the

_celestial deities_, or the _supreme God_. So that if the distinction

of divine worship will excuse from idolatry, the Heathens were not to

blame for it.” See Stillingfleet’s answer to a book entitled Catholics

no Idolaters, p. 510, 513, &c.

[26] Both Arnobius therefore and Minucius Felix were very unfortunate

in quoting this impostor to prove that the Gods of the ancients had

formerly been men. Vid. Arnob. lib. 4. Adversus Gentes, et Minucii

Felicis Octavo. p. 350. 8vo. Parisiis, 1605.

[27] Answer to Catholics no Idolaters Lond. 1676. p. 211.

[28] Arrian. de Exped. Alex. l. 4, et Curt. lib. 8.

[29] Vit. Artaxerx. Ælian. Var. hist. lib. 1. c. 21.

[30] Justin. lib. 6.

[31] Panegyr.

[32] Lib. 7.

[33] Lib. 6. Cap. 3.

[34] Καὶ κολασεως δε ειδος ειναι αθειαν ουκ απεικος. Τους γαρ γνοντας

θεους, και καταφρονησαντας, ευλογον εν ετερῳ βιῳ και της γνωσεως

στερεσθαι, και τους ταυτων βασιλιας ως θεους τιμησαντας, εδει την δικην

αυτων ποιησαι των θεων εκπεσειν. Cap. 18.

[35] Και χρη τον επι τας αρχας αναβαινοντα ζητειν, ει δυνατον ειναι τι

κρειττον της υποτεθεισης αρχης κᾳν ευρεθῃ, παλιν επ’ εκεινου ζητειν,

εως αν εις τας ακροτατας εννοιας ελθωμεν, ων ουκετι σεμνοτερας εχομεν·

και μη στησαι την ανωβασιν. Ουδε γαρ ευλαβητεον μη κενεμβατωμεν,

μειζονα τινα και υπερβαινοντα τας πρωτας αρχας περι αυτων εννοουντες.

Ου γαρ δυνατον τηλικουτον πηδημα πηδησαι τας ημετερας εννοιας, ως

παρισωθηναι τῃ αξιᾳ των πρωτων αρχων, ου λεγω και υπερπτηναι· μια

γαρ αυτη προς θεον ανατασις αριστη, και ως δυνατον απταιστος. Και

ων εννοουμεν αγαθων τα σεμνοτατα, και αγιωτατα, και πρωτουργα, και

ονοματα, και πραγματα αυτῳ ανατιθεντας ειδεναι βεβαιως, οτι μηδεν

ανατεθεικαμεν αξιον· αρκει δε ημιν εις συγγνωμην, το μηδεν εχειν

εκεινων υπερτερον. Simplic. in Epict. Enchir. p. 207. Lond. 1670. 8vo.

[36] Of the first principle, says Damascius (in M. S. περι αρχων)

the Egyptians said nothing, but celebrated it as a darkness beyond

all intellectual conception, a thrice unknown darkness, πρωτην αρχην

ανυμνηκασαν, σκοτος υπερ πασαν νοησιν, σκοτος αγνωστον, τρις τουτο

επιφημιζοντες.

[37] See chap. 15 and 16, of my translation of this excellent work.

[38] See Vol. 2 of my translation of his Dissertations, Dissertat. 38,

the title of which is, “Whether statues should be dedicated to the

Gods.”

[39] The philosopher Isidorus was a man of this description, as we

are informed by Damascius in the extracts from his life preserved by

Photius. For he says of him: ουτε τα αγαλματα προσκυνειν εθελων, αλλ’

ηδη επ’ αυτους τους θεους ιεμενος, εισω κρυπτομενους ουκ εν αδυτοις,

αλλ’ εν αυτῳ τῳ απορρητῳ, ο, τι ποτε εστι της παντελους αγνωσιας· πως

ουν επ’ αυτους ιετο τοιουτους οντας; ερωτι δεινῳ απορρητῳ και τουτῳ·

και τις δε αλλος η αγνωστος και ο ερως; και τινα τουτο φαμεν, ισασιν

οι πειραθεντες· ειπειν δε αδυνατον, καὶ νοησαι γε ουδεν μαλλον ραδιον.

i.e. “He was not willing to adore statues, but approached to the Gods

themselves, who are inwardly concealed not in adyta, but in the occult

itself, whatever it may be of all-perfect ignorance. How therefore to

them being such did he approach? Through vehement love, this also being

occult. And what else indeed, could conduct him to them than a love

which is also unknown? What my meaning is those who have experienced

this love know; but it is impossible to reveal it by words, and it is

no less difficult to understand what it is.”

[40] Instead of και δικης, I read και μετα δικης.

[41] i.e. Should be perfectly impartial.

[42] Instead of διπλοτατοις μοναδος as in the original, which is

nonsense, it is necessary to read, as in the above translation απλοτητι

της μοναδος.

[43] For 2 + 4 + 6 + 8 = 20; and 1 + 3 + 5 + 7 = 16; and 20 + 16 = 36.

[44] For τελος εχειν φιλοσοφιαν, it is necessary to read as in the

translation, τελος εχειν φιλοσοφιας.

[45] Meaning those divine bodies the celestial orbs, which in

consequence of participating a divine life from the incorporeal powers

from which they are suspended, may be very properly called _secondary

Gods_.

[46] Dr. Stillingfleet quotes this part of the extract, in his answer

to a book entitled Catholics no Idolaters, and calls Julian the devout

emperor.

[47] “Dio Chrysostome (says Dr. Stillingfleet in the before-cited work,

p. 414) at large debates the case about images, in his Olympic Oration;

wherein he first shows, that all men have a natural apprehension of one

supreme God the father of all things; and that this God was represented

by the statue made by Phidias of Jupiter Olympius, for so he said παρ’

ῳ νυν εσμεν, _before whom we now are_; and then describes him to

be the king, ruler, and father of all, both Gods and men. This image

he calls the most blessed, the most excellent, the most beautiful, the

most beloved image of God. He says there are four ways of coming to the

knowledge of God, by nature, by the instructions of the poets, by the

laws, and by images; but neither poets, nor lawgivers, nor artificers

were the best interpreters of the deity, but only the philosophers

who both understood and explained the divine nature most truly and

perfectly. After this, he supposes Phidias to be called to account

for making such an image of God, as unworthy of him; when Iphitus,

Lycurgus, and the old Eleans, made none at all of him, as being out of

the power of man to express his nature. To this Phidias replies, that

no man can express mind and understanding by figures, or colours, and

therefore they are forced to fly to that in which the soul inhabits,

and from thence they attribute the seat of wisdom and reason to God,

having nothing better to represent him by. And by that means joining

power and art together, they endeavour by something which may be seen

and painted, to represent that which is invisible and inexpressible.

But it may be said, we had better then have no image or representation

of him at all. No, says he; for mankind doth not love to worship God

at a distance, but to come near and feel him, and with assurance to

sacrifice to him and crown him. Like children newly weaned from their

parents, who put out their hands towards them in their dreams as if

they were still present; so do men out of the sense of God’s goodness

and their relation to him, love to have him represented as present

with them, and so to converse with him. Thence have come all the

representations of God among the barbarous nations, in mountains, and

trees, and stones.”

The same conceptions also about statues are entertained by the

Brachmans in Benares on the Ganges. For Monsieur Bernier when he was

at their university, and was discoursing with one of the most learned

men among them, proposed to him the question about the adoration of

their idols, and reproaching him with it as a thing very unreasonable,

received from him this remarkable answer: “We have indeed in our

temples many different statues, as those of Brahma, Mahaden, Genick,

and Gavani, who are some of the chief and most perfect Deutas (or

Deities); and we have also many others of less perfection, to whom we

pay great honour, prostrating ourselves before them, and presenting

them flowers, rice, oyles, saffron, and the like, with much ceremony.

But we do not believe these statues to be Brahma or Bechen, &c.

themselves, but only their images and representations, and we only give

them that honour on account of the beings they represent. They are in

our temples, because it is necessary in order to pray well, to have

something before our eyes that may fix the mind. And when we pray, it

is not the statue we pray to, but he that is represented by it.” The

Brahmans have also another way of defending their worship of statues,

of which the same author gives the following account: “That God, or

that sovereign being whom they call Achar (immutable) has produced or

drawn out of his own substance, not only souls, but also whatever is

material and corporeal in the universe, so that all things in the world

are but one and the same thing with God himself, as all numbers are but

one and the same unity repeated.” Bernier Memoires, tome 3. p. 171. 178.

From this latter extract it appears that the Brachmans as well as the

ancient Egyptians, believe that the supreme principle is all things.

According to the best of the Platonists likewise, this principle is

_all things prior to all_. For by being _the one_, it is _all things_

after the most _simple_ manner, i.e. so as to transcend all multitude.

[48] See its Homilies, tome 2. p. 46.

[49] Tome 2. p. 54.

[50] p. 49.

[51] The ineffable principle of things, as is demonstrated in the

Elements of Theology in this work, is beyond self-subsistence. Hence

the first ineffable evolution from him consists of self-subsistent

natures. As we therefore are only the dregs of the rational nature,

many media are necessary to conjoin us with a principle so immensely

exalted above us. And these media are the golden chain of powers that

have deified summits, or that have the ineffable united with the

effable.

[52] Σχεδον γαρ ως εμοι δοκει, ουκ εστι τουτων προς τους πολλους

καταγελαστοτερα ακουσματα, ου δ’ αυ προς τους ευφυεις θαυμαστοτερα τε

καὶ ενθουσιαστικωτερα. Epist. 2.

[53] Plato means by this, that he has never written perspicuously about

_intelligibles_ or _true beings_, the proper objects of intellect.

[54] This light is a thing of a very different kind from that which

is produced by the evidence arising from truths perceptible by the

multitude, as those who have experienced it well know.

[55] Τοσονδε γε μην περι παντων εχω φραζειυ των γεγραφοτων και

γραψαντων, οσοι φασιν ειδεναι περι ων εγω σπουδαζω, ειτ’ εμου

ακηκοοτες, ειτ’ αλλων, ειθ’ ως ευροντες αυτοι, τουτους ουκ εστι κατα

γε την εμην δοξαν περι του πραγματος επαϊειν ουδεν. ουκ ουν εμον γε

περι αυτων εστι συγγραμμα, ουδε μη ποτε γεγηται· ρητον γαρ ουδαμως

εστιν, ως αλλα μαθηματα, αλλ’ εκ πολλης συνουσιας γιγνομενης περι το

πραγμα αυτο, και του συζην, εξαιφνης οιον απο πυρος πηδησαντος (lege

πηδησαν) εξαφθεν φως, εν τῃ ψυχῃ γενομενον αυτο εαυτο ηδη τρεφει.----Ει

δε μοι εφαινετο γραπτεα θ’ ικανως ειναι προς τους πολλους και ρητα,

τι τουτου καλλιον επεπρακτ’ αν ημιν εν τῳ βιῳ, η τοις τε ανθρωποισι

μεγα οφελος γραψαι, και την φυσιν εις φως τοις πασι προσαγαγειν; αλλ’

ουτε ανθρωποις ηγουμαι την επιχειρησιν περι αυτων λεγομενην αγαθον, ει

μη τισιν ολιγοις, οποσοι δυνατοι ανευρειν αυτοι δια μικρας ενδειξεως·

των τε δη αλλων, τους μεν καταφρονησεως ουκ ορθως εμπλησειεν αν ουδαμῃ

εμμελους, τους δε υψηλης και χαυνης ελπιδος, ως σεμν’ αττα μεμαθηκοτας.

[56] See the sixth book of the Republic of Plato.

[57] This Olympiodorus is not the same with the philosopher of that

name whose learned commentaries on certain dialogues of Plato are

extant in manuscript; as in these, not only Proclus, but Damascius who

flourished after Proclus is celebrated.

[58] This truly great man appears to have been the first who thoroughly

penetrated the profundity contained in the writings of the more

ancient philosophers, contemporary with and prior to Plato, and to

have demonstrated the admirable agreement of their doctrines with each

other. Unfortunately but few of his works are extant.

[59] Socrates in the Phædo of Plato, Orphically calls the multitude

thyrsus-bearers as living Titannically. For the thyrsus, says

Olympiodorus, (in MS. comment in Phæd.) is a symbol of material and

partible fabrication, on account of its divulsed continuity, whence

also it is a Titannic plant. “For it is extended, says he, before

Bacchus, instead of his paternal sceptre, and through this they

call him into a partial nature. He adds, “Besides the Titans are

thyrsus-bearers; and Prometheus concealed fire in a reed, whether

by this we are to understand that he draws down celestial light

into generation, or impels soul into body, or calls forth divine

illumination, the whole of which is ungenerated, into generation.”

[60] Alluding to the beautiful description given of Ulysses in the

third book of the Iliad, v. 22. which is thus elegantly paraphrased by

Pope.

But when he speaks what elocution flows!

Soft as the fleeces of descending snows

The copious accents fall with easy art;

Melting they fall and sink into the heart.

[61] Nicephorus in his commentary on Synesius de Insomniis, p. 362.

informs us that the Hecatic orb is a golden sphere, which has a

sapphire stone inclosed in its middle part, and through its whole

extremity characters, and various figures. He adds, that turning this

sphere round, the Chaldeans perform invocations which they call Iyngæ.

Thus too, according to Suidas, the magician Julian of Chaldæa, and

Arnuphis the Egyptian brought down showers of rain, by a magical power.

And by an artifice of this kind, Empedocles was accustomed to restrain

the fury of the winds; on which account he was called αλεξανεμος, _an

expeller of wind_.

[62] This signifies that the divine splendor which is the cause of the

prophetic energy, would leave the earth, in consequence of the then

existing inaptitude of persons, places, and instruments, to receive it.

[63] No opinion is more celebrated, than that of the metempsychosis of

Pythagoras; but perhaps no doctrine is more generally mistaken. By most

of the present day it is exploded as ridiculous; and the few who retain

some veneration for its founder, endeavour to destroy the literal,

and to confine it to an allegorical meaning. By some of the ancients

this mutation was limited to similar bodies; so that they conceived

the human soul might transmigrate into various human bodies, but not

into those of brutes. And this was the opinion of Hierocles, as may

be seen in his Commentary on the Golden Verses. But why may not the

human soul become connected with subordinate, as well as with superior

lives, by a tendency of inclination? Do not similars love to be united;

and is there not in all kinds of life something similar and common?

Hence when the affections of the soul verge to a baser nature, while

connected with a human body, these affections, on the dissolution of

such a body, become enveloped as it were, in a brutal nature, and the

rational eye, in this case, clouded with perturbations, is oppressed by

the irrational energies of the brute, and surveys nothing but the dark

phantasms of a degraded imagination. But this doctrine is vindicated by

Proclus with his usual acuteness, in his admirable Commentaries on the

Timæus, lib. 5. p. 329, as follows: “It is usual, says he, to enquire

how human souls can descend into brute animals. And some indeed, think

that there are certain similitudes of men to brutes, which they call

savage lives: for they by no means think it possible that the rational

essence can become the soul of a savage animal. On the contrary, others

allow it may be sent into brutes, because all souls are of one and the

same kind; so that they may become wolves and panthers, and ichneumons.

But true reason indeed, asserts that the human soul may be lodged in

brutes, yet in such a manner, as that it may obtain its own proper

life, and that the degraded soul may, as it were, be carried above

it, and be bound to the baser nature by a propensity and similitude

of affection. And that this is the only mode of insinuation, we have

proved by a multitude of arguments, in our Commentaries on the Phædrus.

If however, it be requisite to take notice, that this is the opinion of

Plato, we add that in his Republic he says, that the soul of Thersites

assumed an ape, but not the body of an ape: and in the Phædrus, that

the soul descends into a savage life, but not into a savage body. For

life is conjoined with its proper soul. And in this place he says it is

changed into a brutal nature. For a brutal nature is not a brutal body,

but a brutal life.”

[64] Proclus at the end of the first book of this work says, “that

divine names will be accurately discussed by him, when he comes to

speak of partial powers.” This, however, is not done by him in any one

of the six books that are extant; which shows that another book is

wanting.

[65] Ποιει α κρινεις ειναι καλα, κᾳν ποιων μελλης αδοξησειν· φαυλος γαρ

κριτης καλου πραγματος οχλος. Demophilus.

[66] The 12th chapter is not marked in the original; but it begins

conformably to my translation.

[67] The 15th chapter also is not marked in the original; and is

comprehended in my translation in the 14th chapter. Perhaps it should

begin at the words, “If therefore the Gods produce all things,” in p.

49.

[68] Such is the title of this chapter in the Greek, which is obviously

erroneous. For the proper title is, “What that is which unites us to

_the good_; and that it is divine faith.” What is said indeed in

the Greek to be the contents of this, belong to the preceding chapter.

[69] For εν φαιδρῳ it is necessary to read εν φαιδωνι.

[70] In the Greek το μονοειδες _the uniform_, but it should evidently

be το νοητον, _the intelligible_.

[71] For υποθεσεως I read υποστασεως.

[72] These four chapters are comprehended in one in my translation, as

they are not marked in the Greek; and I had not divided them, when this

work was sent to the press, as I have done the chapters of the other

books, in which there is a similar defect in the original.

[73] The fifth and sixth chapters are comprehended in the second

chapter in my translation.

[74] For ουσιαι it is necessary to read αιτιαι.

[75] The seventh and eighth chapters form the third in my translation.

[76] For εν, it is necessary to read ον.

[77] And the ninth and tenth are the fourth and fifth chapters in my

translation.

[78] This is the sixth chapter in my translation.

[79] It appears from this account of the contents of the twelfth

chapter, that a considerable part of it is wanting in the original;

because nothing is said in it about the manner in which the second

triad proceeds analogous to the first.

[80] For πλατωνος, it is necessary to read παντος.

[81] The contents of chapter thirty-seven in the original erroneously

form the conclusion of the contents of chapter thirty-six. And instead

of ως την ακροτητα, it is therefore necessary to read πως την ακροτητα.

Hence what are marked as κεφ. λζ, κεφ. λη, and κεφ. λθ, should be

marked κεφ. λη, κεφ. λθ, and κεφ. μ’. It will be found also that

chapter forty is wanting.

[82] Meaning Plato.

[83] Meaning his preceptor Syrianus.

[84] The word μονον is omitted in the original.

[85] Instead of νοησις μετα λογου, it is necessary to read, νοησει μετα

λογου.

[86] Hyparxis, is the summit of any nature, or blossom, as it were, of

its essence.

[87] Wherever this word occurs in this translation, it signifies that

which is characterized by unity.

[88] i.e. Of the nature of _the one_.

[89] i.e. The discursive energy of reason, or the power of the soul

that reasons scientifically.

[90] i.e. The object of opinion.

[91] i.e. Evil dæmons.

[92] εν τιμαιῳ is omitted in the Greek.

[93] For οικειαις it is necessary to read οικειας.

[94] τριαδος is omitted in the original.

[95] των θεων, is omitted in the original.

[96] For μυθικων, it is necessary to read, τα μεν ηθικων.

[97] For επιστολας it is necessary to read επιβολας.

[98] For μονον αρμοστεον, it is necessary to read ειδος αναρμοστεον.

[99] τελος is omitted in the original.

[100] For διαιτης, I read διατριβης.

[101] For πραξεων, it is necessary to read ταξεων.

[102] For εχοντων, it is necessary to read εχομενων.

[103] For αποστασεως, it is necessary to read υποστασεως.

[104] For ανομοιοτητα, it is necessary to read ομοιοτητα.

[105] Instead of οτε ως τα ολα, read ουτε ως τα ενυλα.

[106] For αρχῃ δευτερα, it is necessary to read αρχειοτερα.

[107] For αξων read αζων.

[108] For και της εναδος, read, και απο της εναδος.

[109] For και ο νου, ενοειδη μια και η ψυχη, read, και ο νους ενοειδης,

και η ψυχη μια.

[110] For αιων ενεργειᾳ, read, αει ων ενεργειᾳ.

[111] The sense requires that θειου should be here supplied.

[112] Instead of ομοιου μη κατα δυναμιν, it is necessary to read και

κατα δυναμιν τῳ παντι ομοιον, as both the sense of the whole sentence

and the version of Portus require.

[113] It seems requisite to supply here the word υπερκοσμιων as in the

translation.

[114] For δευτερον read δευτερα.

[115] It is necessary here to supply the words, εκ των νοερων θεων.

[116] και is omitted in the original.

[117] For απῃωρηται it is requisite to read, παρῃρηνται.

[118] For αυτου it is necessary to read αυτων.

[119] For αλλων it is necessary to read ολων.

[120] For εμβαινοντα read εκβαινοντα.

[121] It is necessary here to supply the word αιτιον.

[122] For παρασκευαζοντα it is requisite to read περισκιαζοντα.

[123] For το it is necessary to read τῃ.

[124] ουχ is omitted in the original.

[125] After απλουν in the original, it is requisite to insert ειναι και.

[126] δυνατον is erroneously printed instead of αγαθον.

[127] Instead of μονιμῳ it is necessary to read γονιμῳ.

[128] For γεννησεως it is requisite to read γνωσεως.

[129] The same emendation is necessary here as above.

[130] Instead of προς αυτον it is requisite to read πρωτιστοις.

[131] For το ον it is necessary to read τῳ οντι.

[132] For γευσεσθε read τευξεσθε.

[133] πατρικον is omitted in the original.

[134] και is omitted in the original.

[135] For ουσιαν it is necessary to read αιτιαν.

[136] For ουτος it is necessary to read αυτος.

[137] Ουχ is omitted in the original.

[138] Instead of το ον it is necessary to read το εν.

[139] The εν in the original which immediately precedes ουχ εν seems to

be superfluous, and is therefore omitted in the translation.

[140] The words ασωματος εστι are omitted in the original.

[141] For essence and _the one_ being two things will participate

of the many, i.e. of the first many, or two.

[142] For ον it is necessary to read εν.

[143] viz. which are multitude only without any participation of _the

one_.

[144] For εξῃρηται it is necessary to read εξηρτηται. The punctuation

also of the text in this place, must be altered agreeably to the

translation.

[145] For αυτο το εν is necessary to read αυτο το ον.

[146] This sentence is very erroneous in the original, as will be

evident from comparing it with the above translation.

[147] For εν it is necessary to read ον.

[148] Here also ον must be substituted for εν.

[149] For παντα παροντα, I read παντα τα οντα.

[150] For και here, it is necessary to read αλλα.

[151] For σοφως, it is necessary to read σαφως.

[152] In the original μη is wanting after ει.

[153] For πραξιν, it is necessary to read ταξιν.

[154] For της απλοτητος, I read την απλοτητα.

[155] For του θεου, it is necessary to read των θεων.

[156] For αιτιον it is necessary to read αιτιου.

[157] For δι’ ου, it is necessary to read δι’ ο; since the former

denotes the _instrumental_, but the latter the _final_ cause.

[158] For αδυνατων, it is necessary to read αδυτων. For the occult

and invisible order of Night and Phanes is called by Orpheus the

_adytum_. So that by the _first adyta_, Proclus means the

highest order of intelligibles.

[159] For των θεων, it is necessary to read τοις θεοις.

[160] For αιτιαν, it is necessary to read αιτιᾳ.

[161] For αναλυσεως it is necessary to read αναλογιας.

[162] For εν it is necessary to read ον.

[163] For παροντος it appears requisite to read παραγοντος.

[164] Here also for εν it is necessary to read ον.

[165] For ανομοιων it is necessary to read ομοιων.

[166] οντως is omitted in the original.

[167] Instead of τα μεν γαρ πλειονων αιτια, και των παντων αιτιων κατα

την δυναμιν των προ αυτων ποικιλωτερων κατα την ουσιαν εστιν, it is

necessary to read τα μεν γαρ πλειονων αιτια, και των παντων αιτιον κατα

δυναμιν μιμουνται, τα δε των ελασσονων των προ αυτων ποικιλωτερα κατα

την ουσιαν εστιν.

[168] For αυτοειδεσιν it is requisite to read αυγοειδεσιν.

[169] In the original here, about a line and a half is so defective,

that not being able to supply the deficiency, I have not attempted to

translate it.

[170] Instead of ζωης here it is necessary to read ψυχης.

[171] For εντονοις it is necessary to read εν τορνοις.

[172] For αυτοις read αυτης.

[173] For αιτιων it is necessary to read αιτιας.

[174] For τινος it is necessary to read τινες.

[175] For εξηρηται it is necessary to read εξηρτηται.

[176] Here also it is necessary for εξηρηται to read εξηρτηται.

[177] μενειν is omitted in the original.

[178] For εσχατων it is necessary to read εσχατως.

[179] The word γεννητικης is omitted in the original.

[180] τριτον is omitted in the original.

[181] For πληθος in the original it is necessary to read ειδος.

[182] The punctuation in the latter part of this sentence in the

original is erroneous: for instead of και την εν εκεινῃ του πληθους

ωδινα δυναμει γενομενη, το πληθος απεικασατο, it should be και την εν

εκεινῃ του πληθους ωδινα δυναμει γενομενη το πληθος, απεικασατο.

[183] For πρωτου here, it is necessary to read εσχατου. For in this

place, Proclus is speaking of body.

[184] For αλογων it is necessary to read αναλογων.

[185] The words των μετα in the original immediately before το νοητον

θεων γενος, are to be rejected as superfluous.

[186] εκφαινει is omitted in the original.

[187] For εκεινοις, it is necessary to read εκεινης.

[188] viz. Intelligible life, or life itself, or the first life.

[189] For Φαιδρῳ it is necessary to read Φαιδωνι.

[190] It is here necessary to supply αλλ’ ουδε κατα τον νουν τον νοῃτον.

[191] ο χρονος is omitted in the original.

[192] Instead of αϊδιοτητα, it is necessary to read ιδιοτητα.

[193] ζωης is omitted in the original.

[194] Instead of προ του περατος, and προ της απειριας, it is necessary

to read προς του περατος, and προς της απειριας.

[195] For νοητοις it is necessary to read νοεροις.

[196] For δευτερα it is necessary to read δευτερως.

[197] Instead of το πραγμα τῳ ονοματι, it is necessary to read το ονομα

τῳ πραγματι.

[198] For νοερας here it is necessary to read νοητας.

[199] It is requisite here to supply το εν.

[200] For αυτο το ενεργειν it is necessary to read αυτῳ τῳ ενεργειν.

[201] For προσχοντες it is necessary to read προεχοντες.

[202] In the original εν ον, but the true reading is evidently εν alone.

[203] Instead of οντος it is necessary to read ενος.

[204] It is necessary to correct the text here, and to read as follows:

τι ουν; των μοριων εκατερον τουτων του ενος οντος το, τε εν και το ον

αρα απολειπεσθον, ἢ το εν. κ. τ. λ.

[205] Instead of απειριας, it is necessary to read αποριας.

[206] It seems requisite to supply the word αιτιον after the words το

εν νοητον ειδος.

[207] Instead of τα καθ’ ενωσιν, it is requisite to read παντα καθ’

ενωσιν, and then the end of this book will be complete, and not

defective as the Latin translator Portus imagined it was.

[208] For αυτης it is necessary to read αυτων.

[209] It is necessary to supply in this place in the original, νοεροι

θεοι.

[210] In the original, after και νουν in this sentence, it is necessary

to supply νοητως και νοερως, το δε νοερον. And after νοερως, it is also

requisite to supply και νοητως, as in the above translation.

[211] For τελειοτατοι it is necessary to read τελειοτητος.

[212] After την υπουρανιαν αψιδα, it is obviously necessary to add και

τον υπερουρανιον τοπον.

[213] The sentence that immediately follows this in the original, is

so defective, as to be perfectly unintelligible. I have not therefore,

attempted to translate it.

[214] “The word τελετη or _initiation_,” says Hermeas, in his

MS. Commentary on the Phædrus, “was so denominated from rendering

the soul perfect. The soul therefore was once perfect. But here it

is divided, and is not able to energize wholly by itself.” He adds:

“But it is necessary to know that _telete_, _muesis_, and

_epopteia_, τελετη, μυησις, and εποπτεια, differ from each other.

_Telete_, therefore, is analogous to that which is preparatory

to purifications. But _muesis_, which is so called from closing

the eyes, is more divine. For to close the eyes in initiation is no

longer to receive by sense those divine mysteries, but with the pure

soul itself. And εποπτεια _epopteia_ is to be established in, and

become a spectator of the mysteries.”

[215] φυσει is omitted in the original.

[216] Instead of ως εν τοις πρωτιστοις νοητοις νοερος, it is necessary

to read ως εν τοις πρωτιστοις νοεροις νοητος.

[217] For αυτην, it is necessary to read αυτοις.

[218] δε is omitted in the original, which the sense evidently requires

to be inserted.

[219] For ενωσεως it is necessary to read νοησεως.

[220] Here also it is requisite to adopt the same reading as before, p.

252.

[221] Instead of κατα την προσηκουσαν εκεινῃ, it seems requisite to

read κατα την προσηκουσαν αξιαν, ωσπερ εκεινη, as in the translation.

[222] For εικων I read αιτιων.

[223] i.e. Perfection proceeding every where.

[224] For κηρυγματι, it is requisite to read κηρυγμα τι.

[225] For _νοητων_, it is necessary to read _νοερων_.

[226] For συνεχον, it is necessary to read συνεχομενον.

[227] For των ολων it is necessary to read την ολην.

[228] i.e. That which connectedly contains.

[229] For εκατερον I read εκατερα, in order that it may agree with

αψις.

[230] Viz. as forming the celestial profundity.

[231] For δυναμεων it is necessary to read δυναμεως.

[232] For πρωτην it is necessary to read τριτην.

[233] For γονιμου it is necessary to read μονιμου.

[234] For εκεινη it is necessary to read συνεκτικη.

[235] For λογον it is necessary to read λογων.

[236] It is here necessary to supply και την ουσιαν του ενος.

[237] Instead of ἢ μεθεξις, I read ἡ μεθεξις.

[238] It appears to me that the word προαγει is wanting in the

original, and I have therefore supplied it in the translation.

[239] It is requisite to supply in this place εν τῃ ακροτητι ταυτῃ.

[240] For νοερων, it is necessary to read νοητων.

[241] For υπουρανια, it seems to be necessary that we should read

ουρανια.

[242] In the original αριθμος is omitted.

[243] το αρτιοπερισσον is omitted in the original.

[244] Instead of πανταχου γαρ τα πρωτιστα των υφισταμενων, την ιδιαν

εχει μορφην, it is necessary to read πανταχου γαρ τα πρωτιστα των

υφειμενων, των προϋφισταμενων, την ιδιαν εχει μορφην.

[245] Instead of αλληλοις, I read αλλοις.

[246] Instead of απαγων ημας απο των νοητων επι την αισθητην φυσιν, it

is necessary to read επαγων ημας επι των νοητων απο της αισθητης φυσεως.

[247] Every perpetually circulating body is called by Plato, a divine

generated nature.

[248] εν τῃ ενεργειᾳ is omitted in the original.

[249] For αϊδιοτητος, it is necessary to read ιδιοτητος.

[250] το μικτον is omitted in the original.

[251] For περιοδου it is necessary to read προοδου.

[252] After και it is necessary to supply τα μεν ενουται και.

[253] For νοερων, it is necessary to read νοητων.

[254] It appears from the version of Portus, that the words ο μεν κατα

την νοητην δυναμιν των νοερων are omitted in the original. Indeed, the

sense requires that they should be inserted.

[255] For πρωτην, it is necessary to read πρωτως. It was also requisite

to alter the punctuation in the preceding sentence.

[256] For το γαρ it is necessary to read εκεινος γαρ.

[257] For εκειναις, it is necessary to read εκεινοις.

[258] For εμφανους it is necessary to read αφανους.

[259] For υπερουρανιαν in this place, it is necessary to read

υπουρανιαν.

[260] For [Greek: ακμαιος], it is necessary to read [Greek: ακμαιοις].

[261] [Greek: απο] is omitted in the original.

[262] For εξηρηται, it appears to me that we should read εκει ειρηται.

[263] ολικως is omitted in the original.

[264] For νοερως, it is necessary to read νοητως.

[265] For φυρομενων read φερομενων.

[266] There is evidently something wanting in the original in this

part; and as it appears to me after καθαπερ (οιμαι) και ο συμπας ουτοσι

κοσμος, it is requisite to supply the words εις τους εγκοσμιους θεους

ανηρτηται, οι.

[267] It appears from the version of Portus that the words θεια γενη

are omitted in the original.

[268] For πασι, it is necessary to read πασαι.

[269] For ποιουμενον, it is necessary to read ποιουμενης.

[270] Morphe pertains to the colour, figure, and magnitude of

superficies.

[271] For δημιουργου, it is necessary to read δημιουργει.

[272] For αυτων it seems necessary to read αυτου.

[273] i.e. Of the father of Tantalus.

[274] For δυσειδες, it is necessary to read δυοειδες.

[275] In the original διο, but it is evidently necessary to read δια.

[276] For ενεστι, it is necessary to read εν εστι.

[277] For διαφερει, it is necessary to read αναφερει.

[278] For τελεσιουργα it is necessary to read γενεσιουργα.

[279] For και γαρ it is necessary to read ου γαρ.

[280] For εν αλλοις, it is requisite to read εν αλληλοις.

[281] δυναμιν is omitted in the original.

[282] For πλεον it is evidently necessary to read ηττον.

[283] For αριστοις, it is necessary to read αρρητοις.

[284] For αρρητον, it is necessary to read αριστον.

[285] Instead of του παντος, it is doubtless necessary to read τα

παντα. For the demiurgus also has an hypostasis which is above the

forms of the universe.

[286] For εξηρημενοις, it is necessary to read εξηρτημενοις.

[287] The words τα δε μεριστα are omitted in the original, but

evidently ought to be inserted.

[288] For δεχομεθα, it is necessary to read δεχομενα.

[289] For αυτου, it is necessary to read αυτων.

[290] το εσχατον is omitted in the original.

[291] For αυτων, it is necessary to read αυτου.

[292] The same emendation is here also necessary, as above.

[293] For αυτης, it is requisite to read αυτου.

[294] Κρατης is erroneously printed in the original for Σωκρατης.

[295] For καθ’ εν it is necessary to read καθ’ ην.

[296] For εν αυτῳ, it is necessary to read εν εαυτῳ.

[297] For νοητων, it is obviously necessary to read νοερων.

[298] For πρωτων, it is necessary to read προ των.

[299] For εαυτοτητι read παντοτητι.

[300] For εκφοιτητα read ανεκφοιτητα.

[301] For αναλυοντες, it is necessary to read ανακαλουντες.

[302] In the original, after εν δε τοις νοητοις και νοεροις, it is

necessary to supply καθ’ υπαρξιν, εν δε τοις νοεροις, κ. τ. λ.

[303] In the original ἡ δε is omitted.

[304] After αλλα in the original it is necessary to supply the words

και ταυτον εαυτῳ, καὶ ετερον εαυτου.

[305] For κοινωνιαν, it is necessary to read κοινωνιας.

[306] The word παραγειν is omitted in the original, but ought doubtless

to be inserted.

Transcriber’s Notes:

1. Obvious printers’, punctuation and spelling errors have been

corrected silently.

2. Some hyphenated and non-hyphenated versions of the same words have

been retained as in the original.

3. Italics are shown as _xxx_.