The first order therefore of intelligibles and intellectuals is thus

surveyed by Parmenides. But after this the order which possesses the

middle place of intelligibles and intellectuals, and which a little

before we called connective, presents itself to the view. It is

however denominated in a threefold respect, viz. one, many, whole,

parts, finite, infinite. For since the separation of unities and

beings from number, extends to it, _the one_ and being, which we have

said difference divides, become wholes. But the things proceeding

from these, are the parts of these. And wholeness indeed connectedly

contains parts, but these are contained by their wholeness, in one

way indeed, by _the one_, but in another by being. For there indeed,

I mean in the summit of the intellectual Gods, unity was the cause

of multitude, at the same time being exempt from multitude, and

generative of the many. But here unity is coarranged with multitude.

Hence also it is a whole which has reference to many unities as to

parts. Since however, the connective order is triple, one division

of it being intelligible, another intelligible and intellectual, and

another intellectual, the first monad indeed subsists according to

_the one_ and the many; but the second, according to whole and parts;

and the third, according to the finite and the infinite. For where

the first triad ends, there the second has its beginning. Hence, in

the triad prior to this, Parmenides infers that _the one_ is many.

And in this triad, he concludes the same thing together with what

remains. There however, _the one_ was generative of infinites; but

here _the one_ is comprehensive of many, the whole of parts, and the

finite of infinites. Hence, there indeed, unity is exempt from the

many; but here it is coarranged with multitude. Hence also, the first

coarrangement generates whole together with parts; but the subsistence

of whole and parts produces the finite and at the same time infinite.

For these are successive to each other, viz. _the one_, the whole, the

finite, and the things which are as it were in an opposite arrangement

to these, the many, parts, infinites. And _the one_ itself is indeed

the principle of the rest. But whole has now a habitude with respect

to parts, and a representation of the duad, and proceeds into a

coarrangement with reference to the parts. The finite however, is now

multitude, participating of bound and _the one_, and is as it were

a triad. For it is neither bound alone, as the monad, nor infinite

alone, as the duad, but it participates of bound, which is primarily a

triad. Every thing finite therefore, is a whole, but not every whole

is finite. For the infinite is a whole, whether it is multitude, or

magnitude. And every whole indeed, is one, but not every one is a

whole. For that which is without habitude to multitude is not a whole.

_The one_ therefore, is beyond whole; but whole is beyond the finite.

After the same manner also, infinite parts are said to be the parts of

that which is finite. For the infinite of itself has no subsistence;

by which also it is evident that the infinite is not in quantity in

energy,[248] but in capacity. All parts however are not infinite. For

according to bound they are characterized by one of the parts. And

again, parts indeed are many, but the many are not entirely parts. The

many therefore, are prior to parts: and parts are prior to infinites.

Hence, as the many are to _the one_, so are parts to whole, and so are

infinites to the finite. And these three connectedly-containing monads,

give completion to the middle order of intelligibles and intellectuals.

For unity indeed, is the supplier of stable and intelligible connection

to all the secondary orders. But wholeness connects the progressions of

divine natures, and produces one habitude of the orderly distribution

of wholes. And the finite monad imparts by illumination to the

conversions of second natures, connection with the natures prior to

them. And one of these indeed is analogous to the one being, on which

account also it is intelligible. But another is analogous to the third

order, in which there was _the one_, and the duad which generates

infinite multitude. Such is the connective triad, which Parmenides

exhibits to us through these things. _The one_ therefore, is one and

many, whole and parts, finite and infinite multitude. Let no one

however, be disturbed that Plato calls _the one_ or being infinite

multitude. For he calls _the one_ and being when they have proceeded

and are divided, infinite in multitude. For all multitude indeed, is

referred to the intelligible infinity. But divided multitude, and which

has proceeded perfectly, is most signally infinite.

Since therefore, all the primary causes of intellectuals are in this

triad, and all things are disseminated in its bosoms, the first

Synocheus indeed, comprehends these causes as multitude, being himself

an intelligible unity, and the flower as it were of the triad. But the

second comprehends indeed secondarily these causes, but co-arranged

and co-multiplied with them. And the third, together with all-perfect

division, connects the multitude comprehended in himself. Each of them

also is connective, but one as bounding, another as giving completion

to a whole, and another as uniting. Plato therefore made, and makes

as he proceeds his demonstrations of _the one_. For the whole theory

is concerning _the one_. But it is evident that being is co-divided

with _the one_. For universally, it has been before observed, that

every deity proceeding thence is participable, and that every portion

of being participates of deity. It is necessary however, not to stop

in _the one_ alone, but to consider the same peculiarity[249] as

imparted to being in a secondary degree, since Plato also produces

_the one itself_ by itself according to the differences of the divine

orders; which occasions me to wonder at those who think that all the

conclusions of the second hypothesis are concerning intellect, and

do not perceive that Plato omitting being surveys _the one itself_

by itself, as proceeding and generated, and receiving different

peculiarities. For how in discoursing concerning intellect could he

omit being, according to which intellect has its subsistence, power,

and energy. For _the one_ is beyond the nature of intellect; but

being gives hyparxis to intellect, and intellect is nothing else than

being. This opinion however of these men may be confuted by many other

arguments. But if the three connective Gods are divided after the

above-mentioned manner, and the intelligible connective deity is one

many, but the intelligible and at the same time intellectual deity is

whole and parts, and the intellectual is finite and infinite, each of

them is very properly called _much_. For each of the Synoches according

to his own peculiarity is a multitude. For the first about the many,

receives many Synoches of a more partial nature. The second receives

these according to parts. And the third, according to infinites.

If therefore, there are certain partial Gods who are allotted this

peculiarity, they are comprehended in this first triad.

CHAPTER XXXVI.

Moreover, it is easy for every one to see how these things accord with

what is written in the Phædrus. For the connective one accords with

the back of the heaven that comprehends these. For _the one_ and the

back are the same, comprehending according to one simplicity the whole

circulation. But whole is the same with the profundity of the heaven,

and with as it were the bulk of it. For the celestial profundity is

a whole extended from the back as far as to the arch. And end is the

same with the arch. This therefore, is evident beyond every thing,

and each of the other conclusions, is to be referred to the same

conceptions. Hence from what has been said, it may be collected, that

these three things pertain in a remarkable degree to the Synoches, viz.

_the one_, whole, and the end [or the finite]. For what is so able to

connect multitude as _the one_ which is co-arranged with it? What is

so connectedly-comprehensive of parts as whole? And how is it possible

that the end [or bound,] should not be the cause of binding together

things which are borne along to infinity. It terminates therefore,

their progression, and brings back their dispersed section to the one

essence of connection. And thus much concerning the connective triad.

CHAPTER XXXVII.

But the third, as they say, to the saviour, and let us also following

Plato in what remains celebrate the perfective order of the Gods.

Because, therefore, the end of the connective order was the finite, [or

the bounded] the perfective order has extremes. For the end [or bound]

is the extremity. There however indeed _the one_ was said to be

the finite, but here it is said to have an extremity, as receiving

according to participation that which has the power of terminating

many things. And there indeed, _the one_ was end or bound, which

also connectedly contains the infinite; but here having an extremity,

it will also have a middle and beginning, and will be perfect. For

that which receives its completion from all these, is perfect. Here,

therefore, the perfection which consists of parts is apparent. For the

consummation of the parts, produces the perfect. Moreover, because

such a one as this has a middle and extremes, it will have the figure

of a circumference, or it will be rectilinear, or it will be mixed

[from the right and circular line]. For all these require a middle

and extremes; some indeed with simplicity, but others with connexion.

Three peculiarities, therefore, again present themselves to our view;

the first, indeed, being that which we said was to have extremes; the

second, being according to the perfect; and the third, according to

figure. And there are also three perfective leaders of wholes; one

indeed being intelligible; another, intelligible and intellectual; and

the third, intellectual.

The intelligible leader, therefore, is said to have extremes, as being

directly arranged under the end of the connective Gods, and in the

boundaries of himself intelligibly comprehending all the intellectual

orders. But the intelligible and intellectual leader, is defined

according to the perfect, comprehending in himself the beginnings,

middles, and ends of beings, and giving completion to the middle bond

of the whole perfective triad. And the intellectual leader proceeds

according to triadic figure, being the cause of bound and divine

perfection; and imparting termination to things indefinite, but

intellectual perfection to things imperfect. And this triad indeed is

produced according to the connective triad. For the _end_ in them

is the cause of the possession of the _extremity_. But it is also

produced from itself. For that which has extremes, having become a

whole, constitutes the perfect through end [or bound]. But the perfect

comprehending beginnings, middles and ends, unfolds figure. And thus

the perfective triad proceeds supernally, as far as to the last of

things, pervading to all things, and perfecting both whole and partial

causes.

CHAPTER XXXVIII.

And do you not see how each of the triads conjoins the summit of

itself with the ends placed above it? For the one many was the end of

the collective and unknown triad; and the same is the beginning of

the connective triad. The end of the connective triad was the finite;

and this again is the beginning of the perfective triad. For to have

extremes manifests that which consists of ends or bounds. And thus

the whole middle order is connected with and united to itself, and

is truly the bond of total orders, itself establishing an admirable

communion with itself, but conjoining intellectuals to intelligibles,

and convolving them to one impartible union; above indeed, having the

intelligible and unknown triad, but in the middle producing the triad

which is connective of progressions, and at the end, the convertive

empire, through which it proximately converts the intellectual to the

intelligible Gods.

For on what account does intellect look to itself, and is in itself?

Is it not because it is on all sides finite or bounded, converges to

itself, and convolves its appropriate energies about itself? But why

is it perfect, and full of intellectual goods? Is it not because it

first participates of the perfection [of the above mentioned] leaders,

and subsists according to them, possessing a self-perfect essence and

intellectual perception? After what manner likewise, is it said to

be a sphere, both by Plato, and other theologists? Is it not because

it is the first participant of figure, and is intellectually figured

according to it? All conversion, therefore, all perfection, and

every intellectual figure, accede to the intellectual Gods, from the

perfective triad. For the intelligible leader of perfection, gives

perfection to the ends and summits and hyparxes of wholes. But the

intelligible and intellectual leader terminates their progressions

which extend from on high as far as to the last of things. And the

intellectual leader comprehends in his own perfection, the conversions

of all the Gods, and bounds and perfects through figures their

progressions to infinity.

CHAPTER XXXIX.

Looking therefore to this division, we may be able to survey causally

many things which are to be found among other theologists. For why

is one of the deities of the unknown triad carried in the first of

the worlds, but another in the middle breadth, and another in the

extremity? It is because the first of these was uniform, but the second

proceeded according to difference, and the third, according to the

infinite number of beings. But why of the three connective Gods, is

the first empyrean, the second etherial, and the third material? It

is because the first indeed subsists according to _the one_, and

connectedly contains the one world. But the second subsists according

to whole, and divides the etherial world. And the third according to

the finite, and rules over material infinity. But why again, are the

Teletarchs co-divided with the Synoches? Because the first having

extremes governs like a charioteer the wing of fire. But the middle

comprehending beginnings, ends and middles, perfects ether, which is

also itself triple. And the third, which comprehends according to one

union, the orbicular, the rectilinear, and the mixed[250] figure,

perfects unfigured and formless matter; giving form indeed (μορφωσας)

to the inerratic sphere, and the first matter, by the orbicular; but

to the planetary sphere, and the second matter, by the mixed figure.

For the spiral is there. And it gives form to the sublunary region,

and the last matter by the rectilinear. For the motions according to a

right line are in this region. Hence, the first triad is uniformly the

cause of the division of the worlds. But the second has a more abundant

representation of section, and of progression into parts; yet does not

exhibit to us the multitude of the worlds. And the third unfolds the

seven worlds, and the monad together with two triads. So great is the

divine conception of Plato, that from these things we may survey the

causes of what after his time became apparent.

For this, indeed, from what has been said appears to be very admirable,

that according to each of the triads, the middle is characteristic of

the whole triad. Thus for instance, in the unknown triad, difference

is established as the middle between _the one_ and being. But in

the connective triad whole is the characteristic, which is the middle

of _the one_, and the finite. And in the perfective triad, the

perfect is the characteristic, which is itself established as the

middle of that which has extremes, and of figure. For difference is

the feminine itself, and the prolific nature of the Gods. And whole

is itself the form of connected comprehension, binding together many

parts. And the perfect is itself the good of perfection, possessing a

beginning, middle, and end, and conjoining the end to the beginning,

according to the peculiarity of conversion. Being also nothing else

than a perfect governor it is the cause of the peculiarity of these

Gods subsisting every where according to the middle centres. Hence the

whole order of the intelligible, and at the same time, intellectual

Gods, may be surveyed as having its subsistence in the middle. For the

intelligible Gods, indeed, are especially defined according to hyparxes

and summits; on which account also, they are called fathers, and unical

Gods. For _the one_ and father are in them the same. But the

intellectual Gods are defined according to ends or extremities; and on

this account, all of them are denominated intellects and intellectual.

The intelligible, and at the same time, intellectual Gods, however,

being middles, especially present themselves to the view according to

the middles of the triads.

Farther still, this also may be considered in common about all these

triads, that each according to the end proceeds to infinity. For the

end of the first triad is number; of the second, the infinite in

multitude; and of the third, the rectilinear, which itself participates

of the nature of the infinite. And of this the cause is, that each of

the triads according to its extremity is carried as in a vehicle in the

material worlds, and comprehends according to one cause the infinity

of the natures that are generated in them. In addition, likewise,

to what has been said, we may survey the order of the triads, from

the ends that are in them. For the end of the first triad is number:

but of the second, the finite and the infinite; and of the third,

the orbicular, the mixed figure, and the rectilinear. It is evident,

therefore, that the first triad is monadic; but the second dyadic; and

the third triadic. And the first of these indeed is analogous to the

one being; but the second to the intelligible whole; and the third,

to the all-perfect whole. But that these have this order with respect

to each other, has been before observed. In short, therefore, every

intelligible, and at the same time intellectual triad, is according to

its summit indeed conjoined to the intelligible; but according to its

middle, unfolds its proper power; and according to its termination,

comprehends the infinity of secondary natures. And here we shall end

the doctrine concerning the intelligible and intellectual Gods.

BOOK V.

CHAPTER I.

In the next place, let us survey another order of Gods, which is called

intellectual, being indeed conjoined to the orders prior to it, but

terminating the total progressions of the Gods, converting them to

their principle, and producing one circle of the primarily-efficient

and all-perfect orders. Let us also extend the intellect that is in us

to the imparticipable and divine intellect, and distinguish the orders

and diminutions of essence that are in it, according to the narration

of Plato.

This intellectual hypostasis therefore of the Gods, is suspended indeed

from more ancient causes, and is filled from them with total goodness

and self-sufficiency. But after these causes, it establishes an

illustrious empire over all secondary natures, binding to its dominion

all the partial progressions of the Gods. And it is denominated

indeed intellectual, because it generates an impartible and divine

intellect. But it is filled from intelligibles, not as from those

intelligibles which are co-arranged with intellect, nor as with

those which are alone divided from intellect by the conception of

the mind, but as establishing in itself unically all multitudes, and

occultly containing the evolutions of the Gods into light, and the

hyparxes of intelligibles. It is likewise allotted the total intellect

of intellectuals, the variety of beings, and the multiform orders of

divine natures; and it convolves the end of the whole progression[251]

[of the Gods] to the one intelligible principle. For intellectuals are

converted to intelligibles. And some intellectuals indeed are united

and[252] firmly established prior to the divided Gods; but others are

multiplied and through conversion are conjoined to primarily-efficient

causes. The intellectual Gods however proceed from all the Gods prior

to them, receiving indeed unions from _the one_ that is prior to

intelligibles; but essences from intelligibles; and being allotted

lives all-perfect, connective and generative of divine natures,

from the intelligible and at the same time intellectual Gods; but

the intellectual peculiarity from themselves. They likewise convert

to themselves all the divided orders, but establish themselves in

intelligibles, existing wholly through the whole, pure and unknown

knowledges, and fervid lives. Besides these things also, they are

all-perfect essences, producing all secondary natures through

subsisting from themselves, and being neither diminished by their

progression, nor receiving an addition by their progeny; but through

their own never-failing and infinite powers, being the fathers, causes,

and leaders of all things. Nor are they co-divided with their progeny,

nor do they depart from themselves in their progressions; but at once,

and according to union they govern total multitudes, and all orders,

and convolve them to the intelligible, and to occult good.

Whether therefore I may speak of life, it is not proper to think

that it is such a life as we surveyed a little before. For that

was imparticipable, but this is participated. And that indeed, was

generative, but this is vivific. But it is not immanifest that these

differ from each other. For the vivific cause indeed, is also evidently

generative; but the generative cause is not entirely vivific. For

it imparts figure to things unfigured, bound to things indefinite,

and perfection to things imperfect. Or whether I may denominate the

cause in intellectuals intelligible, it must not immediately be

conceived to be such an intelligible, as that of which we have before

spoken. For that was imparticipable, and prior to intellectuals,

itself pre-existing by itself, and exempt from wholes; not being

denominated intelligible, as the plenitude of intellect, but as the

prior-cause of it, and the object of desire and love to it, subsisting

uniformly uncoordinated with it. The intelligible however which is

now the subject of consideration, is participated, and co-arranged

with intellect, is multiform, and contains in itself the divided

causes of all things. Or whether we may call the Gods in this order

fathers and fabricators, it must be admitted that this paternal and

fabricative characteristic, is different from the hyparxis of the

intelligible[253] fathers. For they indeed were generative of whole

essences; but these pre-exist as the causes of divisible emanations,

and of definite productions of form. And they indeed contained in

themselves powers fabricative of the divine progressions; but these

separate from themselves prolific causes, and are not conjoined to them

according to union, but according to a communion subordinate to union.

For the marriages which are celebrated by fables, and the concordant

conjunction of divine natures, are in the intellectual Gods. But the

demiurgic being mingled with the vivific effluxions, every genus of the

Gods is unfolded into light, both the supermundane, and the mundane.

This, however, will be hereafter discussed.

CHAPTER II.

Since however, we have, in short, surveyed the peculiarity of the

intellectual Gods, it remains that we should deliver an appropriate

theory concerning the division of them. For the intellectual order is

not one and indivisible, but is allotted progressions more various than

those of the more elevated genera. There will therefore be here also

three fathers, who divide the whole intellectual essence; one indeed,

being arranged according to the intelligible, but another according

to life, and another according to intellect. They also imitate the

intelligible fathers, who divide the intelligible breadth in a

threefold manner, and who are allotted a difference of this kind with

respect to each other. For one of these intellectual fathers proceeds

analogous to the first [intelligible] father, and is intelligible. But

another proceeds analogous to the second [intelligible] father, and

binds to himself the whole of intellectual life. And another proceeds

analogous to the third father, and closes the whole intellectual, in

the same manner as he closes the intelligible order.

But these fathers being three, and the first indeed, abiding in

himself, but the second proceeding and vivifying all things, and

the third glittering with fabricative productions, it is evidently

necessary, that other triple Gods should be conjoined with them; of

which, one indeed will be the source to the first intellectual God, of

stable purity; but another, of undefiled progression, to the second

God; and another of exempt fabrication, to the third. For in the Gods

prior to these, the undefiled deities were according to cause, through

union without separation, and a sameness collective of powers which

are not in want of the communion of these. But in the intellectual

Gods, where there is an all-perfect separation, as in total orders,

and a greater habitude to secondary natures, unpolluted deity or

power is necessary, which has the ratio of sameness, and undeviating

subsistence, to the paternal cause, and which is co-divided with

the fathers, so that each of the undefiled Gods is conjoined with a

peculiar father.

These two triads therefore have presented themselves to our view, one

indeed, of the intellectual fathers, but the other of the undefiled

Gods. There is however, besides these two, a third other triadic

monad, which is the cause of separation to intellectuals, and which

subsists together with the above mentioned triads. For the fathers

indeed are the suppliers of all essence; but the inflexible Gods, of

sameness. But it is evidently fit that there should be also the cause

of separation, and that this should be one and at the same time triple,

separating the intellectual Gods from the above mentioned orders, from

themselves, and from inferior natures. For why are they the leaders

of another order, if they are not divided from the first orders? Why

are they multiplied, and why do they differ from each other in their

kingdoms, unless they are separated? Why also do they transcend the

partial [Gods] unless they are also separated from these? The cause of

separation therefore, will be for us one and a triple monad. But the

paternal and undefiled causes will be each of them a uniform triad. And

what is most paradoxical of all, the separative cause is more monadic;

but the paternal and also the undefiled cause, are each of them more

triadic. For the separative monad indeed, is the cause of separation to

the other monads; but the others are the sources of communion and union

to it. Hence each of these, being separated, becomes triadic; but the

separative monad is monadic, in consequence of being united by these.

For all intellectuals pervade through each other, and are in each

other, according to a certain admirable communion, imitating the union

of intelligibles, through being present and mingled with each other.

The sphere also which is there, is the intellectual order, energizing

in and about itself, and proceeding into itself hebdomatically, being

a monad and a hebdomad, the image, if it be lawful so to speak, of

the all-perfect intelligible monad, and unfolding its occult union,

through progression and separation. This first progression therefore of

the intellectual Gods, which is separated by us into a heptad, we have

perfectly celebrated.

Other secondary seven hebdomads, however, are to be considered under

this, which produce as far as to the last of things, the monads of

this heptad. For each monad is the leader of an intellectual hebdomad

conjoined with it, and extends this hebdomad from on high, from the

summit of Olympus, as far as to the last, and terrestrial orders. I

say, for instance, the first paternal monad, indeed, constitutes seven

such monads. But the second again constitutes seven vivific monads.

And the third, seven demiurgic monads. Each likewise of the undefiled

monads constitutes a number equal to that produced by the fathers. And

the monad of separation constitutes seven [separative monads]. For all

these causes proceed in conjunction with each other. And as the first

triad of the fathers subsists together with the undefiled triad, and

the divisive monad, after the same manner also, the second triads are

allotted seven coordinate undefiled triads, and separative monads.

Whence, therefore, does so great a number of intellectual Gods present

itself to our view? It is evident, indeed, from what has been said.

For the first hebdomad, indeed, the cause of the second hebdomads,

and which has the relation of a monad to them, and which a little

before we denominated an intellectual sphere, subsists according to

the intelligible breadth, imitating the paternal nature of it through

the paternal triad; but the eternity of its power, through undefiled

sameness; and the multitude shining forth in its extremities, through

the monad which is divisive of wholes. The remaining hebdomads,

however, which are derived from this, proceed according to the

intelligible and intellectual genera. For each monad, conformably to

the summits of those genera, constitutes a monad co-arranged with the

multitude proceeding from it; since every summit is uniform [i.e. has

the form of the one,] as we have before demonstrated. But according to

the middle and third progressions of those genera, each monad generates

two triads. For the separation of them was apparent in the middle and

ultimate progressions, as we have before observed. As, therefore, the

intelligible, and at the same time, intellectual genera, produced

the intelligible breadth, which is of a unical nature, into a triadic

multitude, after the same manner also the intellectual monads call

forth the intelligible, and at the same time intellectual triads,

into intellectual hebdomads. And they constitute indeed the monads

which are coarranged with the hebdomads, according to the summits of

the triads; but the two triads, according to the second and third

decrements of those triads. Hence every hebdomad has the first monad

indeed intelligible; but the second after this, and which is triadic,

intelligible and intellectual; and the third triad, which is the next

in order, intellectual. All these likewise subsist as in intellectuals.

For they are characterized according to the peculiarity of the

constitutive monad.

In short, the intellectual powers proceed according to the intelligible

orders; but they constitute these seven hebdomads according to

the first intellectual orders. For it is indeed necessary that

exempt causes should be assimilated to the intelligible Gods; but

that co-arranged causes, and which proceed every where, should be

assimilated to the intelligible, and at the same time, intellectual

Gods; since these also are the first that divide the worlds

triadically, and pervade as far as to the last of things, connectedly

containing and perfecting all things. But the intelligible Gods contain

the causes of wholes uniformly, and occultly. You may also say, that

the intelligible Gods produce all things uniformly; for numbers subsist

in them monadically. But the intelligible and intellectual Gods produce

all things triadically. For the monads in these are divided according

to number. And what the monad was in the former, that number is in the

latter. And the intellectual Gods produce all things hebdomadically.

For they evolve the intelligible, and at the same time, intellectual

triads, into intellectual hebdomads, and expand their contracted

powers into intellectual variety; since they define multitude itself

and variety by numbers which are nearest to the monad. For the numbers

of the partial are different from the numbers of the total orders in

the Gods. And the whole of this intellectual number is indeed more

expanded than the natures prior to it, and is divided into more various

progressions, yet it does not desert its alliance with the monad.

For hebdomadic multitude has an abundant affinity with the nature

of the monad; since it is measured according to it, and primarily

subsists from it. And the Pythagoreans, when they denominate the heptad

_light according to intellect_, evidently admit its hyparxis to

be intellectual, and on this account suspended from the monad. For

_the unical_, which light manifests, is inherent from this in all

the divine numbers. And thus much concerning the division of these

intellectual Gods.

CHAPTER III.

It follows in the next place, that we should adapt the theory of

Plato to this order, and show that he does not dissent from any of

the theological dogmas concerning it. Since, therefore, we have

demonstrated, that the celestial order, which we find in the Cratylus

perfectly celebrated, possesses the middle bond of the intellectual,

and at the same time, intelligible Gods, but that under this another

order of Gods is immediately arranged, as Socrates shows in the

Phædrus, called the subcelestial arch, and which we have considered as

not divided from the heaven,--this being the case, what order is it

which divides itself from the kingdom of the heaven, but is the leader

of the intellectual order of the Gods, and is primarily the supplier of

intellect, according to the doctrine of Plato, as Socrates says in the

Cratylus, except that which the mighty Saturn comprehends? For he calls

this God the first and most pure intellect. This God, therefore, is the

summit of a divine intellect, and, as he says, the purest part of it;

separating himself indeed from the celestial order, but reigning over

all the intellectual Gods; because he is full of intellect, but of a

pure intellect, and is a God extended to the summit of the intellectual

hypostasis. Hence also, he is the father of the mighty Jupiter, and is

simply father. For he who is the father of the father of all things,

is evidently allotted in a much greater degree the paternal dignity.

Saturn, therefore, is the first intellect; but the mighty Jupiter is

also an intellect, containing, as Socrates says in the Philebus, a

royal soul, and a royal intellect.

And these Gods are two intellects, and intellectual fathers; the

one, indeed, being intellectual; but the other intelligible, in

intellectuals. For the Saturnian bonds which Socrates mentions in

the Cratylus, are unific of the intelligence of Jupiter about the

intelligible of his father, and fill the Jovian intellect with the

all-perfect intelligence of the Saturnian intellect. And this I think

is likewise evident from the analogy of souls to Pluto. For as he binds

souls about himself, filling them with wisdom and intelligence, thus

also Saturn being the object of desire and love to Jupiter, contains

him in himself by indissoluble bonds. And these things Socrates

indicates in the Cratylus, jesting, and at the same time being serious

in what he says. The object of desire therefore, and the intelligible

to Jupiter, is Saturn. But the mighty Jupiter himself is a divine

and demiurgic intellect. Hence, it is necessary that there should be

a third other intellectual cause, generative of life. For Jupiter

indeed is the cause of life, as Socrates says, but intellectually and

secondarily. But we say that life is every where arranged prior to

intellect. Hence, we must say that the queen Rhea, being the mother of

Jupiter, but subordinate to the father Saturn, gives completion to this

middle, existing as a vivific world, and establishing in herself the

causes of the whole of life. These three paternal orders, therefore,

have appeared to us in intellectuals: one of them indeed subsisting

according to the intelligible power of intellectuals;[254] but another

according to divine and intellectual life; and another according to

intellectual intellect. For we celebrate the middle deity, herself by

herself, as the mother of the demiurgus, and of wholes. When, however,

we survey her together with the extremes, we denominate her a paternal

cause, as being comprehended in the fathers; and as generating some

things together with Saturn, but others in conjunction with Jupiter.

Moreover, Plato following Orpheus, calls the inflexible and undefiled

triad of the intellectual Gods Curetic, as is evident from what the

Athenian guest says in the Laws, celebrating the armed sports of the

Curetes, and their rhythmical dance. For Orpheus represents the Curetes

who are three, as the guards of Jupiter. And the sacred laws of the

Cretans, and all the Grecian theology, refer a pure and undefiled life

and energy to this order. For το κορον _to koron_, indicates

nothing else than the pure and incorruptible. Hence, we have before

said, that the mighty Saturn, as being essentially united to the cause

of undefiled purity, is a pure intellect. The paternal Gods therefore

are three, and the undefiled Gods also are three. Hence it remains that

we should survey the seventh monad.

If, therefore, we consider the fabulous exections, both the Saturnian

and the Celestial, of which Plato makes mention, and thinks that such

like narrations should always be concealed in silence, that the arcane

truth of them should be surveyed, and that they are indicative of

mystic conceptions, because these things are not fit for young men

to hear,--[if we consider these] we may obtain from them what the

separative deity is, who accomplishes the divisions, and segregates

the Saturnian genera indeed from the Celestial, and the Jovian from

the Saturnian, and who separates the whole intellectual order from the

natures prior and posterior to it, disjoins the different causes in it

from each other, and always imparts to secondary natures, secondary

measures of dominion. And let not any one be disturbed, or oppose me on

hearing these things. How therefore does Plato reject exections, bonds,

and the tragical apparatus of fables? For he thinks that all such

particulars will be condemned by the multitude and the stupid, through

ignorance of the arcana they contain; but that they will exhibit to

the wise certain admirable opinions. Hence, he indeed does not admit

such a mode of fiction, but thinks it proper to be persuaded by the

ancients who were the offspring of the Gods, and to investigate their

arcane conceptions. As therefore he rejects the Saturnian fables, when

they are narrated to Euthypron, and the auditors of the Republic, yet

at the same time admits them in the Cratylus, placing about the mighty

Saturn and Pluto, other secondary bonds,--thus also, I think he forbids

exections to be introduced to those who know only the apparent meaning

of what is said, and does not admit that there is illegal conduct in

the Gods, and nefarious aggressions of children against their parents,

but he opposes, and confutes as much as possible such like opinions.

He assents however to their being narrated to those who are able

to penetrate into the mystic truth, and investigate the concealed

meaning of fables, and admits the separation of wholes, whether

[mythologists] are willing to denominate them exections for the purpose

of concealment, or in whatever other way they may think fit to call

them. For bonds and exections are symbols of communion and separation,

and each is the progeny of the same divine mythology. Nor is there any

occasion to wonder, if from these things we endeavour to confirm the

opinion of Plato; but it is requisite to know how the philosophy of

Plato admits all such particulars, and how it rejects them, and in what

manner he apprehends they may be the causes of the greatest evils, and

of an impious life to those that hear them. The seven intellectual Gods

therefore, will through these conceptions appear to have been thought

worthy of being mentioned by Plato.

CHAPTER IV.

It is, however, I think, necessary syllogistically to collect the

progression of them according to hebdomads, from images. The demiurgus

therefore, [in the Timæus] fabricates the soul of the universe an image

of all the divine orders, in the same manner as he fabricates this

sensible world an image of intelligibles. And in the first[255] place

indeed, he constitutes the whole essence of the soul, and afterwards

divides it into numbers, binds it by harmonies, and adorns it with

figures, I mean the rectilinear and the circular. After this also, he

divides it into one circle and seven circles. Whence therefore, are

this monad and hebdomad derived, except from the intellectual Gods?

For figure, number, and true being, are prior to them. And as in

the fabrication of the soul, after the subsistence of the psychical

figure, the division of the circles according to the monad and hebdomad

follows, thus also in the Gods, after intellectual and intelligible

figure, the intellectual breadth, and that sphere of the Gods succeed.

The multitude therefore of the seven hebdomads subsist from the divine

intellectual hebdomad entering into itself. And on this account, the

demiurgus thus divides the circles in the soul, because he, and every

intellectual order, produce an intellectual hebdomad from each monad.

I do not however assert, and now contend, that the seven circles are

allotted an hyparxis similar to the seven Gods that proceed from

the demiurgus, but that the demiurgus dividing the soul according

to circles, introduces number to the sections from the intellectual

Gods, I mean the monadic and the hebdomadic number. For the monad

indeed subsists according to the circle of sameness, but the division,

according to the circle of difference. Shortly after however, it will

appear that same and different belong to the demiurgic order.

Farther still, after the division of the circles, the demiurgus assumes

some things which are symbols of the assimilative, and others which

are symbols of the liberated Gods, and through these, he refers the

soul to these orders of the Gods. If therefore figure is prior to

the intellectual Gods, but the similar and dissimilar are posterior

to them, it is evidently necessary that the monadic and at the same

time hebdomadic, should be referred to this order, and that the

progression from the monad to the hebdomad should pertain to this

order. Each therefore of the seven intellectual Gods, is the leader of

an intellectual hebdomad, as we may learn from images. There however

indeed, the hebdomad is one, and allied to itself. But in souls, the

circles differ from each other, according to the divine peculiarities.

For they receive number in such a manner as to preserve the proper

nature which they are allotted, connectedly containing mundane

natures, and convolving the apparent by their own circles. And thus

much concerning these particulars, which afford arguments that are not

obscure of the arrangement of them by Plato.

CHAPTER V.

Again however, making another beginning, let us speak about each

[of the intellectual Gods,] as much as is sufficient to the present

theology. Let Saturn therefore, the first king of the intellectual

Gods, be now celebrated by us, who according to Socrates in the

Cratylus illuminates the pure and incorruptible nature of intellect,

and establishing his own all-perfect power in his own summit of

intellectuals, abides in, and at the same time proceeds from his

father [Heaven]. He likewise divides the intellectual government

from the connective, and establishes the transcendency of the other

intellectual Gods in connexion with his own; but comprehends in himself

the intelligible of the demiurgic intellect, and the plenitude of

beings. Hence the Saturnian bonds, mystically, and obscurely signify

the comprehension of this intelligible, and a union with it. For the

intelligible is comprehended in intellect.

As therefore, the intelligible is indeed exempt from intellect, but

intellect is said to comprehend it, thus also Jupiter is said to bind

his father. And in placing bonds about his father, he at the same

time binds himself [to him]. For a bond is the comprehension of the

things that are bound. But the truth is as follows: Saturn is indeed

an all-perfect intellect; and the mighty Jupiter is likewise an

intellect. Each therefore being an intellect, each is also evidently

an intelligible. For every intellect is converted to itself; but

being converted to it energizes towards itself. Energizing however

towards itself, and not towards externals, it is intelligible and

at the same time intellectual; being indeed intellectual, so far

as it intellectually perceives, but intelligible, so far as it is

intellectually perceived. Hence also the Jovian intellect is to itself

intellect, and to itself intelligible. And in a similar manner the

Saturnian intellect is to itself intelligible, and to itself intellect.

But Jupiter indeed is more intellect, and Saturn is more intelligible.

For the latter is established according to the intellectual summit, but

the former according to the intellectual end. And the one indeed is the

object of desire, but the other desires. And the one fills, but the

other is filled.

Saturn therefore being intellect and intelligible, Jupiter also is

in the second place intellect and intelligible. The intellectual

however of Saturn is intelligible; but the intelligible of Jupiter is

intellectual. Jupiter therefore, being at the same time intellectual

and intelligible, intellectually perceives and comprehends himself,

and binds the intelligible in himself. But binding this in himself, he

is said to bind the intelligible prior to himself, and to comprehend

it on all sides. For entering into himself, he proceeds into the

intelligible prior to himself, and by the intelligible which is in

himself, intellectually perceives that which is prior to himself. And

thus the intelligible is not external to intellect. For every intellect

possesses that which is in itself without any difference with respect

to itself. But again, it intellectually perceives in itself that which

is prior to itself. For every thing which is external to intellect, is

foreign and adventitious, and pertains to an inferior nature. But that

which is pre-established in the order of cause, and which preexists

as the object of desire, is in the desiring natures themselves. For

being converted to, and verging to themselves, they discover the causes

of themselves, and all more ancient natures. And by how much more

perfect and uniform the conversion of the desiring natures is about the

objects of desire, by so much the more are they present with their own

desirables. Hence every intellect, by intellectually perceiving itself,

intellectually perceives likewise, all the natures prior to itself.

And by how much the more it is united to itself, in a so much greater

degree it is established in the intelligibles prior to itself. For the

cause of any being, and which is the source of essence or of perfection

to it, is not external to that being; but that which is subordinate

to any being, is external to it, and is not the intelligible. On this

account also, each of the divine natures is unconverted to that which

is inferior to itself, but is converted to itself, and through itself

reverts to that which is more excellent. And the intelligible indeed

is not inferior to any intellect; but every intellect energizing

towards itself, and comprehending the intelligibles prior to itself,

intellectually perceives them.

Some intelligibles likewise are such as are conjoined with intellect.

But others are such as are proximately participated by it. And others

are such as it sees more remotely, and which are more exempt from its

nature. On this account, the demiurgic intellect is indeed at the

same time intelligible and intellect, but has the intelligible of

his father, which he binds as the fable says. He sees however animal

itself, which is, according to Timæus, the most beautiful of all

intelligibles. And if the illustrious Amelius, forming such conceptions

as these, said that intellect is threefold, one being that which _is_,

another that which _has_, and another that which _sees_, he rightly

apprehends the conception of Plato, according to my opinion. For it

is necessary that the second intellect should not only _have_ the

intelligible, but that it should _be_ and _have_ the intelligible; that

it should be indeed the intelligible coordinate with itself, but _have_

the intelligible prior to itself, so far as it participates of it. And

it is necessary that the third intellect should _see_ the intelligible,

and should also _be_ and _have_ it; that it should _see_ indeed the

first intelligible; but _have_ that which is proximately beyond itself;

and that it should _be_ the intelligible which is in itself, and which

is conjoined with its own intelligence, and should be inseparable from

it.

If therefore, as we said from the beginning, Jupiter intellectually

perceives his father Saturn, Saturn is indeed intelligible, but Jupiter

is intellect; being one intelligible himself, but participating of

another. Hence also Plato does not simply call Saturn intellect, but

a pure and incorruptible intellect. For he[256] in the intellectual

is intelligible. Since however, he is not simply intelligible, but as

in intellectuals, he is intellect, and is himself paternally so, being

both father and intellect, and having the paternal intellectually.

In intelligibles therefore, intellect is also father; but in

intellectuals father is intellect. Hence Saturn is a pure, immaterial

and perfect intellect, established above fabrication in the order of

the desirable. But possessing such a peculiarity as this, he is full

of all intelligibles intellectually, is as it were exuberant with

intellections, and establishes twofold genera of Gods, some indeed in

himself, but others posterior to himself. And he leads forth, indeed,

the prolific powers of his father Heaven as far as to the last of

things; but fills the demiurgic order with generative goods.

CHAPTER VI.

Saturn however is the only one of the Gods who is said both to

receive and give the royal dignity with a certain necessity, and as

it were violence, cutting off the genitals of his father, and being

himself castrated by the mighty Jupiter. For he bounds the kingdom

of his father, and is bounded by the God posterior to himself. He is

also filled from the natures placed above him, but fills the whole

fabrication [of the universe] with prolific perfection. But separating

himself from his father, he is exempt from his progeny. Being however

one all-perfect intellect, he contains in himself the multitude of

total intelligibles. And as he deifies the intellectual summit, he

illuminates all things with intelligible light.

CHAPTER VII.

Very properly therefore, has this universe twofold lives, periods,

and convolutions; the one being Saturnian, but the other Jovian, as

the fable in the Politicus says. And according to one of the periods

indeed, it produces all goods spontaneously, and possesses an innoxious

and unwearied life. But according to the other it participates of

material error, and a very mutable nature. For the life in the world

being twofold, the one unapparent, and more intellectual, but the other

more physical and apparent, and the one being defined according to

providence, but the other proceeding in a disorderly manner according

to fate;--this being the case, the second life indeed, which is

multiform, and perfected through nature, is suspended from the Jovian

order; but the more simple, intellectual, and unapparent life, is

suspended from the Saturnian order. And these things the Elean guest

clearly teaches, calling one of the circulations Jovian, but the

other, Saturnian; though Jupiter also is the cause of the unapparent

life of the universe, is the supplier of intellect, and the leader of

intellectual perfection; but he elevates all things to the kingdom of

Saturn, and being a leader in conjunction with his father, constitutes

the whole mundane intellect. And if it be requisite to speak the truth

clearly, each of the periods indeed, I mean the apparent, and the

unapparent, participates of both these Gods; but the one indeed is more

Saturnian, and the other is perfected under the kingdom of Jupiter.

That the mighty Saturn therefore is allotted a kingdom different from

that of the Gods prior to him, the Elean guest clearly manifests

in what he asserts prior to the fable. For he says, “We have heard

from many respecting the kingdom of which Saturn was the founder.”

According to this wise man therefore, Saturn is one of the royal Gods.

Hence also he presides over a kingdom different from that of his

father. And while his father connectedly contains the middle centres

of the intelligible and intellectual Gods, he is the leader of the

intellectual orders and supplies all intellectual life, first indeed,

to the Gods, but secondarily to the natures more excellent than ours,

and in the last place to partial souls, when they are able to be

extended to the Saturnian place of survey. For this universe, and all

the mundane Gods, always possess this twofold life, and imitate the

Saturnian intelligence indeed through unapparent and intellectual

energy, but the demiurgic intellect of Jupiter, through a providential

attention to secondary natures, and in short, through the visible

fabrication. But partial souls at one time energize intellectually, and

consecrate themselves to Saturn, but at another time after a Jovian

manner, and pay a providential attention to secondary natures, without

restraint. When however they revolve analogous to those[257] deities

[Saturn and Jupiter] they intellectually perceive intelligibles, and

dispose sensibles in an orderly manner, and live both these lives,

in the same manner as the Gods and the more excellent genera. For

their periods are twofold; one being intellectual, but the other

providential. Their paradigms also are twofold; the Saturnian intellect

being the paradigm of the one, but the Jovian intellect of the other.

For the mighty Jupiter himself has a twofold energy, containing indeed

intelligibles in intellect, but adorning sensibles by demiurgic

production.

Since however the circulations are twofold, not only in wholes, but

also in partial souls, the Elean guest says that in the Saturnian

period, the generation of these souls is not from each other, as in

men which are the objects of sensible inspection, nor as the first

man with us is alone earth-begotten, so in partial souls one first

soul is the offspring of man, but all of them are earth-begotten. For

they are elevated from ultimate and terrestrial bodies, and embrace

an unapparent,[258] relinquishing a sensible life. He also says that

neither do they verge to old age, and change from being younger to

becoming older; but on the contrary, they are rendered more vigorous,

proceed intellectually in a way contrary to generation, and as it were,

divest themselves of the variety of life with which in descending they

became invested. Hence likewise all the symbols which are adapted to

youth are present with these souls, when they pass into this condition,

such as a privation of hair, and a smoothness of the cheek instead of

hoariness and beards. For they lay aside every thing which adheres

to them from generation. But being situated there with Saturn, and

living the life which is there, he says that there are abundance

of fruits from trees, and many other [vegetable] substances, which

the earth spontaneously produces. Being likewise naked, and without

coverlets, they are for the most part fed in the open air; for they

have a temperament of the seasons which is always the same. But they

make use of soft beds, grass in abundance being produced for them from

the earth. Souls therefore derive these and such like goods from this

mighty God, in the Saturnian period. For they are thence filled indeed

with vivific goods, and gather intellectual fruits from wholes; but do

not procure for themselves perfection and blessedness, from partial

energies. For doxastic nutriment indeed has divisible and material

conceptions; but intellectual nutriment has pure, impartible, and

native conceptions, which the spontaneous obscurely signifies.

The production from the earth also signifies the prolific intellect

of the Gods, which imparts to souls by illumination perfection and

self-sufficiency. For on account of the exuberant abundance of good,

they are able to impart an influx of it, according to the measure

of felicity adapted to them. Hence, they are neither covered with

garments, as when they proceeded into generation, nor have they

superabundant additions of life, but they are purified themselves

by themselves from all composition and variety, and extending their

intellect to total good, they participate of it from the intellectual

father, being guarded by the intellectual Gods, and receiving from them

the measures of a happy life. They likewise pass through the whole of

their existence with facility, lead a sleepless and pure life, being

established in the generative powers of intelligibles; and being filled

with intellectual goods, and nourished with immaterial and divine

forms, they are said to live a life under Saturn.

CHAPTER VIII.

Because, therefore, this God is the leader of all intellectual life,

and every intellect as well that which is imparticipable, as that

which is participable proceeds from this cause, hence it belongs to

this mighty God to feed in a distributed manner, and to nourish souls.

For because indeed he is intelligible in intellectuals, he nourishes

souls, and souls are called the nurselings of Saturn. But because he

does not fill them with first, and unical intelligibles, but with those

that are multiplied by his own cause of separation, he is said to feed

them distributedly, and as it were in a divided manner. And do you not

see how through these things, this God appears to be coordinate to the

first triad of the intelligible and intellectual Gods? For as Socrates,

in the Phædrus, says, that souls are nourished in the supercelestial

place, and in the intelligible meadow, so the Elean guest asserts that

the souls that are fed under Saturn, are filled with intelligible

goods. And it is not at all wonderful if souls are perfected by

both these; intellectually indeed, under the kingdom of Saturn; but

intelligibly under the order of the first intellectual Gods. For

this God himself is nourished by that order. And on this account he

is allotted a leading and primary transcendency in intellectuals,

because they are filled from that order [through him] with occult and

unapparent powers. And he is that among the intellectual fathers, which

the order of the first intellectual Gods is in the intelligible and at

the same time intellectual orders. Hence the intelligible every where

becomes nutriment to ascending souls, but the connexion with it is

effected through the second and third Gods.

As therefore, the demiurgic order elevates souls to the Saturnian

place of survey, thus also the Saturnian order elevates them to the

subcelestial[259] arch. For having made many and blessed discursive

energies in the kingdom of Saturn, they are again extended from hence

to the perfective, and from thence to the celestial triad, from

which contemplating the supercelestial place, they are now ineffably

conjoined with the supreme goods of intelligibles. And after this

manner the second orders always connect souls with the orders prior to

them. Hence also, the theurgic art imitating the unapparent periods

of souls, arranges initiations in the mysteries of the second Gods,

prior to the more sublime mysteries. And through these, it causes us

to pass to the intelligible place of survey. These things, therefore,

Plato indicates concerning the Saturnian life, and the polity of souls

under Saturn, not in the Politicus only, but also in the discourses of

the Athenian guest. For in the fourth book of the Laws he celebrates

the life under Saturn, obscurely signifying the undefiled nature, the

facility, plenitude, and self-sufficiency of that energy, through

fabulous fictions.

CHAPTER IX.

If, however, it be requisite from these things, and from all the mystic

discipline concerning this God, to consider and discuss the orders

which he constitutes in wholes, in the first place, we must direct our

attention to the three kings mentioned in the Gorgias, who distributing

the kingdom of Saturn were produced by him, as being allotted in a

divided manner a uniform and impartible dominion, and over whom he

places the divine law, which is the cause of distribution according

to intellect, both to the Gods themselves, and to all the natures

posterior to the Gods. In the second place, we must consider the rulers

and kings mentioned in the Laws, who are said to preside over the

different allotments of souls, and who are not men, but dæmons of a

more divine and excellent genus, who distribute to souls the measures

of good, cut off their generation-producing lives, restrain their

disorderly lation, retain them in the intelligible, and comprehend

them in the kingdom of Saturn. In the third place, therefore, we must

direct our attention to the dæmon Gods, who preside over the parts of

the world, and the herds [of souls] that are in it, as the Elean guest

says in the Politicus, and who at one time come into contact with the

objects of their government, and distribute to them intellectual, and

all unapparent goods, but at another time withdraw themselves from the

physical life of the world, recur to their own place of survey, and

imitate the exempt transcendency of the demiurgus and father of the

universe.

But after these things, we must survey the twofold circulations of

the mundane Gods, viz. the Saturnian and the Jovian; for these Gods

always have each of these, as the fable says in the Politicus. For it

is evident that the mutation of the stars and the sun takes place in

each of the revolutions. This period, therefore, being twofold, it is

obvious to every one that the periods are full of Saturnian goods,

and participate of the Saturnian series. And not only the mundane

Gods, but likewise all the more excellent genera that follow the Gods,

energize according to both these energies, and revolve according to the

twofold circulations, through which souls also sometimes participate

of an intellectual life, and proceed in this path, exchanging for

sense intellect as the leader of their motion and circulation. Saturn,

therefore, extends his kingdom supernally from the first Gods, as

far as to partial souls, perfects all things, and fills them with

intellectual goods, distributing to different natures different

measures of good. For on account of this, law also subsists with him,

as Socrates says in the Gorgias: “This law therefore was in the time

of Saturn, and always was, and now is, among the Gods.” For law is the

distribution of intellect; but this God is the first, most pure, and

incorruptible intellect.

If, however, this God is the primary leader of all division, and is the

origin of intellectual separation, it is necessary on this account,

that law should be with him, which distinguishes the orders of beings,

divides the intellectual genera, and separates all forms according to a

well-ordered progression; but imparts to all things by illumination the

measure of hyparxis, connecting the order which is in them, preserving

the boundaries of divine distribution immutable, and possessing the

same dignity in the kingdom of Saturn, and in intellectuals, as

Adrastia in the supercelestial place, and in the intelligible, and at

the same time, intellectual orders. For from each of them an immutable

guard, and the progression of order to all things are generated.

But they differ from each other, because law indeed divides the one

into multitude, defines the measures of intellectual subsistence,

and distributes to every thing an appropriate good, producing the

different measures of beings from the one [Saturnian] intellect. But

Adrastia abiding in the intelligible, guards all things uniformly, and

preserves total order in a firm undeviating manner, exempt from all

division. Law, therefore, is a certain God which divides divine forms,

and definitely imparts to every thing that which is adapted to it

according to the plenitude proceeding from one uniform cause; and it is

also co-existent with the Saturnian order, in which the separations of

beings, and the all-perfect progression of forms first subsist. Hence

the demiurgus likewise looking to this conducts all things according to

law, and constitutes mundane providence an image of the union of the

father; but fate and the fatal laws, an image of the division according

to law. Souls, therefore, live according to law; in the Jovian period

indeed being governed conformably to the laws of Fate; but in the

Saturnian period living according to divine law they are subservient

to the multitude [of divine forms] and are extended to the one cause

of all; and ascending to the intelligible place of survey, they are

subjected to the sacred law of Adrastia. For this law extends from on

high as far as to the last of things, and defines to souls the measures

of whole periods, as Socrates says in the Phædrus. Who therefore this

greatest God is, and what the goods are of which he is the cause to

souls, and prior to these, to Gods and dæmons, the leaders of souls,

let it, from these things be manifest.

CHAPTER X.

Since however, theologists assert that an exemption from old age

pertains to this order, as the Barbarians say, and Orpheus the

theologist of the Greeks, (for he mystically says that the hairs of

the face of Saturn are always black, and never become hoary) I admire

the divinely-inspired intellect of Plato which unfolds the same things

concerning this God to those who proceed in his steps. For he says that

souls in the Saturnian period abandon old age, but return to youth, and

remove from themselves hoariness, but have black hair. For he says that

the white hairs of the more elderly become black; but the cheeks of

those that have beards being rendered smooth, they are restored to the

past season [of youth.] These things indeed are asserted by the Elean

guest; similar to which are the assertions of Orpheus concerning this

God.

---- under Saturnian Jove

Men liv’d immortal; moist and fragrant hair

From the pure chin then sprouted, nor was mix’d

With the white flower that marks infirm old age;

But in its stead, a florid down appear’d.

In these verses he delivers the similitude of Saturnian souls to this

God. For he says that they remove from the view the old age which they

had acquired from generation and abandon material imbecility; and that

they exert the juvenile and vigorous life of intellect. For it is no

otherwise lawful for them to be assimilated to the God who is exempt

from old age, than through intellectual puberty, and undefiled power.

But the cause of this is, that king Saturn himself is the source of

the unallured Gods, and the inflexible triad. Hence he is, as Socrates

says, a pure intellect. For he is at the same time the intellect of the

undefiled order, ranking as a summit, and riding as in a vehicle in

the flourishing and vigorous[260] Gods that govern wholes. The souls

also which are sent to him, wonderfully advance, in conjunction with

intellectual energy, in vigour, and in a power undeviating, and free

from any tendency to matter. Partial souls therefore, when they change

their periods, at one time proceed to a more juvenile, and at another,

to a more aged condition. But whole souls always live according to

both these periods, and are conversant with Saturn according to

the unapparent period, but govern the universe in conjunction with

Jupiter, according to visible providence, at once receiving an increase

according to both these periods, and becoming at one and the same time

both older and younger. And this is what Parmenides indicates when

he says, that _the one_ proceeding according to time becomes at

once younger and older. These things however, will hereafter be more

manifest.

CHAPTER XI.

Having therefore brought to an end the information concerning the king

of the intellectual Gods, it evidently follows that we should in the

next place celebrate the queen Rhea. For both Plato and Orpheus assert

that she is the mother of the demiurgus of wholes, but a divinity

posterior to Saturn. Thus therefore, we must speak concerning her.

The stable and united cause of all intellectuals, and the principal

and original monad, abiding in herself, unfolding into light all

intellectual multitude, and again convolving it into herself, and

embosoming her progeny, and the causes of wholes that emerge from her,

analysing as it were after division the natures that are divided, and

being paternally allotted the highest kingdom in intellectuals,--this

being the case, the vivific Rhea proceeds as the second from her proper

principle, being allotted a maternal order in the whole paternal

orders, and producing the demiurgus of wholes, prior to other Gods,

and the immutable guard of the Gods. For this Goddess is the middle

centre of the paternal intellectual triad, and the receiving bosom of

the generative power which is in Saturn, calling forth indeed, to the

generation of wholes, the causes which abide in him, but unfolding

definitely all the genera of the Gods. And being filled indeed from the

father prior to her with intelligible and prolific power, but filling

the demiurgus and father subsisting from her, with vivific abundance.

Whence also the demiurgus is the cause of life to all things, as

containing in himself the plenitude of intellectual life, and extending

to all things the prolific cause of his mother. For as the middle

Goddess multiplies the uniform powers of Saturn, and produces and

causes them to preside over secondary natures, so the third father, at

one and the same time unfolds, divides, and produces as far as to the

last of things, the all-perfect abundance of the Saturnian monad, and

the dyadic generation of the mother Rhea, so as not to leave the most

material and disorderly part of the universe destitute of the power of

Saturn.

This Goddess therefore, being the middle of the two fathers, one of

which collects, but the other divides intellectual multitude, and the

one through transcendency desiring to abide and to be established in

himself, but the other hastening to produce, generate and fabricate all

things, she educes indeed into herself, the demiurgic causes of wholes,

but imparts her own proper power to secondary natures, in unenvying

abundance. Hence also Plato assimilates her prolific exuberance to

streams, as Socrates says in the Cratylus, evinces that this Goddess is

a certain flux, and in what he asserts of her obscurely shows nothing

else than her fontal nature, and a power unically comprehensive of the

divisible rivers of life. For the first-effective flux is fontal; which

also Socrates indicating in this Goddess, shortly after clearly says

that the name of Tethys is the name of a fountain. Why therefore, is

it any longer necessary to doubt about these things, and to say where

does Plato make mention of fontal Gods? For he himself denominates the

causes of the subsistence of all the Gods, fontal fluxions. And besides

this, if he admits that the mundane soul is the fountain and principle

of life, because it proceeds both from an impartible and partible

vivification, how is it possible that he should not in a much greater

degree and more truly call the Goddess who comprehends in herself all

life, fontal?

Concerning names however, it is not, I think, at all proper to contend,

but we should survey the orders themselves of the first effective Gods,

and see how Plato following theologists copiously unfolds them to us,

celebrating after the Saturnian monad the kingdom of Rhea, constituting

from these the demiurgus of wholes, and all the multitude of Gods

which is woven together with him. For this Goddess binding together

the breadth of intellectuals, and embosoming total life, emits all the

intellectual powers in herself of the rivers of life; and by the summit

of herself indeed, is conjoined to the first father, and together with

him generates wholes, and the genera of Gods that abide in him; but

by her extremity is connascent with fabrication, and according to a

kindred conjunction with fabrication, constitutes all the orders of

Gods that are prior to the world, and that are in the world. Hence

there also the causes of the demiurgi of wholes primarily subsist, and

the more partial genera of life: and the union and total deity of all

these, is at once exempt from the plenitudes of herself, and is at once

co-arranged with them.

Thus therefore, she is both uniform and multiform, one and simple,

though being self-perfect, she is a vivific world, proceeding from on

high as far as to the last of things, and as far as to the extremities

of the universe, giving subsistence to the vivific powers of the

breadth of life. Hence also Plato refers the vivific cause of wholes to

this Goddess, and through the last gifts of this divinity, indicates

her total energy; which primarily indeed fills the whole demiurgus

with intellectual and prolific power, but secondarily perfects all the

genera of the Gods with the intellectual fruits of herself. According

to a third order also, her total energy nourishes the souls that are

the attendants of the Gods, with the rivers of divine perfection. And

in the last orders, it imparts to mortal animals the gift of nature.

This therefore is, I think, more known than every thing to those who

admit that things divine are beyond the works of nature.

That however, which it is more fit the lovers of the contemplation

of truth should consider, I say, is this, that Plato divides Ceres

from[261] the whole vivific deity, and co-arranges her, at one time

with Proserpine, at another with Juno, and at another with the progeny

of Jupiter, as we may learn in the Cratylus. In which dialogue indeed,

he co-arranges Rhea with Saturn, but connects a certain common

investigation and theory about Ceres, Jupiter, and Juno. In the Laws

likewise celebrating the legislative Goddesses, he refers the whole

of a legitimate life to the union of Ceres and Proserpine; since

according to Orpheus this middle Goddess being conjoined with Saturn

by her summit, is called Rhea; but producing Jupiter, and together

with Jupiter unfolding the whole and partial orders of the Gods, she

is called Ceres. And all the order of middle life is comprehensive of

the other Titanidæ, and likewise of Ceres. For it pre-established this

monad as a middle collective of all the orders in it, both those that

are occult, and those that are divided about the generative powers of

the Goddess. Each of these powers, however, are triple. And this monad

indeed conjoins the superior triad to Saturn, but weaves the inferior,

together with the demiurgic order. It also evinces that the Cerealian

monad being the middle, is co-arranged with, and is at the same time

exempt from the demiurgus of wholes. For in conjunction with the whole

order it constitutes, and together with Jupiter generates Proserpine.

And thus we have celebrated the primogenial Goddess who is the middle

of the fathers.

CHAPTER XII.

Now however, after this Goddess, the demiurgus of wholes is in the

third place to be celebrated, according to the order which he is

allotted in the intellectual Gods, peculiarly unfolding for this

purpose all the truth concerning him. And in the first place, we must

remember that it is necessary the peculiarity of this third father

should be demiurgic; and thus in the next place, following Plato, we

must direct our attention to other particulars [respecting this God].

The first of the intellectual Gods therefore, who is parturient with

multitude, who is the leader and source of all separation, and who

separates himself from the uniform and first Gods, but generates the

divided principles of wholes,--this God again converts his progeny to

himself, and weaves together these parts with his own sameness, and

exhibits himself as one intelligible world in intellectuals, bringing

forth in himself, and retaining with himself his own offspring. But

the second of the intellectual deities, is the vivific Goddess, who

brings forth indeed in conjunction with the first intellectual God,

occult multitude, (for she is conjoined to him according to supreme

transcendency) but cannot endure to remain in this mode of generating,

and in collecting the separation of wholes into unseparated union.

Hence she separates the third intellect from the [first] father; but

produces the multitude of the Gods, and of intellectual reasons,

and fills the demiurgus with generative power. If, therefore, the

first intellectual God is parturient with the generation of wholes;

but the prolific vivification of the intellectual orders causes

this generation to shine forth;--it is evident that the intellect

of the intellectual fathers, according to his own order, produces

and adorns all things, and calls forth indeed, the occult nature

of his father, into separation and progression, but prepares total

vivification to send forth the rivers of itself, as far as to the

last of things. For it is every where the peculiarity of intellect to

divide and unfold multitude, the plenitudes of life, and the unions

of intelligibles. Intelligible intellect however contains multitude

uniformly, or according to the form of one; for multitude preexists

in the intelligible according to cause. But the intelligible, and at

the same time, intellectual intellect, has indeed secondary measures

of union, but is exempt from all perfect separation, abiding in the

first principles of wholes. And intellectual intellect is the source

of all division, and of the subsistence of partial natures; since it

preestablishes in itself all the multitude of forms, and this not

tetradically only, as intelligible intellect, but it possesses one

all-perfect intellectual cause of all forms. It is necessary therefore

that the whole demiurgic principles should pertain to this intellect,

that all the demiurgic Gods should proceed from this one third father,

and that this should be the demiurgus of wholes. For as the first of

paradigms co-subsists in intelligible intellect, and in the third

triad and the first father, so likewise we must place the first

demiurgic monad in intellectual intellect, and the third father of the

intellectual Gods. For on this account also the demiurgic is conjoined

with the paradigmatic cause, according to the analogy which each is

allotted among the fathers; one indeed in intelligibles, but the other

in intellectuals. For one is the boundary of the intelligible, but the

other of the intellectual order. But this is evident from what has been

before said.

Farther still, fabrication being fourfold, and one indeed adorning

wholes totally, another adorning wholes but partially, another adorning

parts, but totally, and another weaving parts together with wholes,

partially,--this being the case, it is evident that the cause of wholes

which is the cause of them uniformly and indivisibly, is the most

ancient of all the causes. It is necessary however, that this cause

should either be prior to, or in, or posterior to the intellectual

Gods. Where therefore shall we place it? For all the parts which are

constituted by intellectuals are more partial than the one and total

fabrication. For the division of wholes into three, and the leaders of

divisible production, present themselves to the view in these orders.

The natures therefore, that are prior to intellectuals, are defined

according to other peculiarities of the Gods, as was before shown, and

in short, they subsist according to union, and are expanded above the

separation of intellectual forms.

CHAPTER XIII.

It remains therefore that the one demiurgus of wholes must be arranged

in intellectuals. But if indeed, he is the first father, he will be

intelligible, will contain his progeny in himself, and will be the

collector of separation. How therefore, does he divide the worlds?

How does he generate the multitudes of mundane natures? How does he

speak to all the junior demiurgi at once? For the first father is

uncoordinated with the whole number of mundane natures, and also

converts his first progeny to himself, flying as it were from multitude

to union, and hastily withdrawing himself from all-various separation

into intelligible transcendency. But if the one demiurgus of wholes is

the vivific order, all things indeed, will be full of life, on account

of the whole demiurgus. And the cause of souls, according to a probable

reason will here become apparent subsisting prior to multitude. But

how will he convert all things to himself? How is he called demiurgus

and father? For the vivific deity, herself by herself, has a maternal

dignity among the Gods, and is the supplier of progression to all

things. But to produce forms, and to convert, are the illustrious

and peculiar good of intellect. Neither therefore, is the demiurgus

of wholes in the supermundane order. For all the natures there are

partial, and either partially preside over wholes, or comprehend the

productions of parts totally. Nor is he in intelligibles. For all the

Gods there are fathers; and no one there is called[262] demiurgus and

father. But the divine orders antecedently comprehend all things in

a manner perfectly occult and unical. Nor is he in the intelligible

and at the same time intellectual order. For to collect, connect, and

perfect multitudes, is not the province of the demiurgic peculiarity.

For this is the source of separation, and the production of forms,

glittering with intellectual sections. But the intelligible and at

the same time intellectual Gods, extend intellectual multitudes to

the union of intelligibles. Nor again, is it possible to admit that

the demiurgic cause is in the first or second order of intellectuals.

For the summit of intellectuals is imparticipable by mundane natures,

and is rather proposed to them in the order of the desirable; but is

not productive of them. Hence, all the Gods in the world are elevated

to the Saturnian place of survey; but proceed from another secondary

principle, and through it are converted and conjoined to the exempt

kingdom. And the middle centre being vivific, is not defined according

to the paternal characteristic. For the generative very much differs

from the paternal, and the vivific from the demiurgic genus; so far,

I think, as the principles of the whole orders, I mean bound and

infinity, differ from each other. For the demiurgic and paternal order

is referred to bound; but all vivific and generative power, to infinity.

CHAPTER XIV.

I wonder therefore, at those interpreters of Plato, who do not make

one fabrication but many, who assert that there are three demiurgi of

wholes, and pass at one time to the second, and at another to the third

demiurgus; and who divide what is said in the Timæus, and think fit

to refer some of the assertions to one, but others to another cause.

For that there is a demiurgic triad, and another multitude of Gods

characterized according to the producing cause, I also admit, and think

it will be granted by Plato. It is necessary however in each order

prior to the triad, and prior to every multitude, that there should

be a preexistent monad. For all the orders of the Gods originate from

a monad; because each of the whole orders is assimilated to the whole

progression of the Gods. As therefore the subsistence of the Gods has

the cause of its generation from the imparticipable one, thus also

it is necessary that the perfect orders in the Gods, should have a

preexistent monad, and a first-effective principle. According to the

same reasoning, all the vivific progressions are suspended from one

vivification, and the demiurgic orders are extended to one fabrication.

And it is not proper that there should be multitude without the monad.

For there will neither be co-arrangement, nor a division of multitude

according to intellect, unless the one and whole preexist. For on this

account prior to all the divine progressions, the order of wholeness

subsists, in order that it may comprehend parts, and may define them

in, and about itself.

How therefore neglecting whole in fabrication, can we survey demiurgi

divided according to parts? Though Plato himself thinks with respect to

the paradigm of the universe, that the world should not be assimilated

to any thing which naturally subsists in the form of a part, but to

all perfect animal; and on this account he demonstrates that the world

is only-begotten, because its paradigm is one. For if it were not one,

but many paradigms, again it would be necessary that there should be

another animal about it, of which it would be a part, and it would be

more right to assert that the world is no longer similar to the many

paradigms, but to that which comprehends them. For it is necessary

that the one paradigm should precede the many, in the same manner as

the one good subsists prior to participated goods, and that the whole

world should be the image of one paradigm prior to many. For whether

it is alone the image of many paradigms, whence will the world be one

and a whole? And how is it possible it should not be more dishonourable

than its parts? For these indeed, are assimilated to intelligibles,

but the whole world is similar to no one of real beings. Or whether

all the world subsists from a certain intelligible paradigm, if indeed

there are many paradigms of one world, these also will be similar to

each other, if they are the causes of the same image. It is necessary

therefore, that sameness should be communicated to these from one form;

or again, the world will be more venerable than its paradigms according

to union. But if the paradigm is one, after the same manner also the

demiurgic cause is one. For as there is one image from one paradigm,

thus also the progeny being one, derives its subsistence from one

demiurgus and father. For it is necessary that the paradigmatic cause

should either be the same with the demiurgus, and should be established

in him, or that it should be prior to the demiurgus, as we say it is,

or that it should be posterior to the demiurgus, as some think proper

to assert.

If however, the paradigm and the demiurgus are the same, the demiurgus

will be one according to Plato. For the paradigm is only-begotten, as

he demonstrates. But if the demiurgus exists prior to the paradigm,

which it is not lawful to assert, but the paradigm is one, much more

will the demiurgus be one. For the causes which are more elevated are

allotted a more uniform hypostasis; since also the first cause of

wholes is one. And if the paradigmatic cause has indeed the first order

in beings, but the demiurgic cause the second order, and this universe

the last order, being the resemblance of the former, and the progeny

of the latter, how is it possible since the extremes are monadic, the

middle multitude should be without the monad? For it is necessary

that the paradigm being intelligible, should impart by illumination a

greater degree of union to the universe than the demiurgic cause. And

as the paradigm being only-begotten, comprehends in itself the first

paradigms, after the same manner it is necessary that the demiurgic

monad should be comprehensive of many demiurgi. For if the world

derives its only-begotten subsistence from the paradigm, but through

the demiurgus, the demiurgus also is indeed entirely one.

Farther still, I think that those who are the patrons of this opinion

should direct their attention to that assertion of Socrates, that it

is every where fit the many should be comprehended in the one. For on

account of this we admit the hypothesis of forms [or ideas], and prior

to other things we preestablish intellectual monads. How therefore

are intellectual forms extended to one principle, and how do each of

them proceed from one demiurgic cause, but the whole demiurgic form

is multiplied, and divided prior to the indivisible monad? For it

is necessary that as all equals, whether they are intellectual, or

psychical, or sensible, should be suspended from one first equality,

all beautiful things, from beauty itself, and the many every where,

from primary beings, thus also it is necessary that the multitude of

demiurgi should be suspended from one fabrication, and should subsist

about one demiurgic monad. For how can it be lawful to leave the one in

forms rather than in the Gods? For forms indeed, have their hypostasis

mingled with multitude; but the Gods are defined according to union

itself. If therefore all the multitudes of forms are the progeny of

monads, much more are the orders of the Gods allotted peculiarities

which originate from monads, and which through monads are inherent in

multitudes. But if this be the case, it is necessary that the whole

demiurgus should subsist prior to the multitude of demiurgi, and that

the three demiurgi should distribute the one cause of the generation of

the universe.

Again therefore we assert from the beginning that it is necessary

the demiurgic principle should either be one, or many, or one, and

many. But if indeed, it is one alone, and the multitude in the world,

and the different order which it contains subsist similarly from one

demiurgic principle, how are mortal and immortal natures the progeny

of the same cause without a medium? For all the natures that proceed

from the one fabrication are immortal. But if the demiurgic principle

is many only, whence is the common form of hyparxis communicated to the

multitude, if it does not originate from one? For as the final cause

is one, viz. _the good_, as the paradigmatic cause is one, viz.

animal itself, and as the world is a generated one, thus also after

the same manner, the demiurgic cause is one. But if there are one and

many demiurgic principles, whether does the one principle belong to

partial or to total genera? If however, it belongs indeed to partial

genera, how is it extended to the first and intelligible paradigm?

For the supermundane genera subsist about the intellectual Gods, and

according to intellectual paradigms. For being partial, they entirely

assimilate the natures posterior to themselves to intellectuals,

co-ordinately to themselves. Or how will it any longer preserve the

union of total fabrication which produces wholes totally? For a thing

of this kind pertains to no partial nature; but it belongs to a

partial principle, to produce parts either totally[263] or partially,

as we before observed. But if the demiurgic principle belongs to the

total orders, it is necessary that it should either be intelligible

or intellectual, or intelligible and intellectual. If however, it

is of an intelligible nature, how is it divisive of wholes? How is

it co-arranged with mundane natures? How is it said to fashion the

universe? How from the genera of being does it produce soul, and the

natures posterior to soul? For [on this hypothesis] we must admit that

all these are in intelligibles, viz. figure, the genera of being,

and these divided, the similar and the dissimilar, and other things

through which the demiurgic principle constitutes the whole world. But

if the demiurgic principle is of an intelligible and at the same time

intellectual nature, how does he produce participated intellect? How

does he separate the multiform orders of souls? How does he divide the

parts, or the circles that are in them? For that which is generative

of participated intellect, is imparticipable intellect. And that which

has the power of dividing multitude will not [on this hypothesis]

differ from that which connects the total genera of the Gods. And in

short, the demiurgus of wholes, is called by Timæus intellect, and is

frequently said to see, to discover, and to reason, but he is no where

denominated by him intelligible and at the same time intellectual. For

the intelligible and at the same time intellectual Gods, divide all

things triadically. But the demiurgus, at one time indeed, divides the

world into five parts, and at another divides the circles of the soul

into hebdomads, that he may generate either the celestial spheres, or

the seven parts of the soul. We must say therefore, that he is entirely

secondary to the intelligible and at the same time intellectual Gods,

and he is the cause of secondary goods to the world. But we must refer

to those Gods the cause of united forms and reasons. That the demiurgic

intellect however, is an intellectual God, is I think through these

things sufficiently apparent at present.

CHAPTER XV.

But Plato appears to me to have indicated the peculiarity of this

God in a remarkable manner, by calling him intellect, and asserting

that he sees intelligibles, but admitting that they are visible to

him according to nature. For that which is truly intellect, and

which establishes itself according to this hyparxis, is intellectual

intellect. For intelligible intellect also, is indeed simply

intelligible, and is of that allotment; but is said to be intellect,

as being the cause of every intellectual nature. And the intellect of

the intelligible and at the same time intellectual Gods, has not its

own nature unmingled with the intelligible. But intellectual intellect

alone, is peculiarly intellect, being allotted the intellectual itself

in intellectuals; just as the most principal of intelligibles, is

primarily, the first, and the highest intelligible, which we denominate

the one being, and that which is occultly being. This therefore is

that which is simply intelligible. But that which is simply intellect

is intellectual intellect. For the intelligible indeed possesses

the summit, but intellect the end of wholes. And the intermediate

natures partly pertain to the intelligible, and partly to intellect,

and the intellectual nature. And the intelligibles indeed, that are

primarily so, possess intellect according to cause; but the first of

intellectuals have the intelligible according to participation; and

the natures that are collective of these, conjoin the intelligible

and intellectual peculiarity together. Since, therefore, Timæus also

calls the demiurgus intellect indefinitely, and neither denominates him

life, nor intelligible, in consequence of his peculiarity being alone

intellectual, it is certainly necessary that he should be established

at the end of the intellectual Gods.

For there intellect is intellect itself, and is not such an intellect

as the Saturnian is. For Saturn also is intellect, but he is a pure

and incorruptible intellect, which manifests his supreme empire in

intellectuals, transcending the whole intellectual Gods. But the

demiurgus is simply intellect. As therefore, the simply intelligible

is the first of intelligibles, so that which is simply intellect, is

the last of intellectuals. For all things are in each of the orders.

For in intelligibles life and intellect preexist; and in the breadth

of life, there are similarly life and intellect. And in intellectuals

there is each of the rest. But in intelligibles indeed, being is

according to essence, but life and intellect are according to cause.

In intellectuals, intellect indeed is according to essence, but being

and life are according to participation. And in the intermediate

natures, intellect is according to cause, but being is according to

participation, and life according to essence. As therefore, that

which is most vital in life is the middle, and as that which is

especially intelligible is the summit in being, so in intellectuals,

the extremity is that which is most intellectual. Hence if there

is a certain intellect which is simply intellect, and a perceiving

intellect, this is intellectual intellect, which Plato denominating the

demiurgus unfolds to us the most manifest order, which it is allotted

in intellectuals. On this account also, prior to all other things,

the demiurgus constitutes participated intellect, as Timæus says. For

placing intellect in soul, and soul in body, he fashioned the universe.

Energizing therefore, according to his own essence, and producing by

his very being, he constituted the intellect of the universe prior to

all other things. For every participated proceeds from imparticipable

intellect. Hence, as if Plato had said, that the generative cause

which gives subsistence to participated intelligible, is that which

is primarily being, so since the demiurgus first produces intellect

from himself, he will be imparticipable and intellectual intellect.

From these things therefore, it is evident what the hyparxis of the

demiurgus and father is, and what order it is allotted in intellectuals

according to Timæus.

CHAPTER XVI.

Let us however after another manner syllogistically collect the

peculiarity of the demiurgus, receiving from the Timæus the principles

of the arguments on this subject. This therefore is known to every one,

that Timæus calls the whole demiurgus fabricator and father, in the

beginning of what he says concerning him. For he says, “It is difficult

to discover the fabricator and father of this universe, and when found,

it is impossible to speak of him to all men.” Hence, he does not think

fit to call him either father alone, or fabricator alone, nor again

connecting the two, father and fabricator, but on the contrary, he

places the fabricative prior to the paternal. Now therefore, we must

show in the first place, in what respect fabricator and father differ

from each other; and in the next place, in addition to this, who the

fabricator alone is, and who father and fabricator is, and how the

fabricative and at the same time paternal peculiarity, is considered by

Plato as adapted to the demiurgus.

If therefore, we divide all things into the Gods, and the progeny

of the Gods, and this is the same thing as to divide them into

superessential monads, and the progressions of beings, father indeed

will be generative of the Gods and superessential unities; but

fabricator will give subsistence to essences and beings. For again,

according to this reason Timæus says, that the natures which are

generated by the demiurgus are equal to the Gods; for the demiurgus

is not only fabricator, but also father; but that those which are

produced by the junior Gods, are allotted a mortal nature. For these

Gods are alone producers and fabricators of things which participate

of existence alone, and not of the superessential peculiarity.

Hence through that by which they suffer a diminution with respect

to the demiurgic monad, through this they are not allotted a power

generative of things equal to the Gods. And through that by which the

intellectual demiurgus is expanded above the junior Gods, through this

he binds to himself the generations of all mundane natures.

But if again, we divide beings into the total and partial, father

indeed, will appear to us to be the hypostatic cause of wholes, but

fabricator of partial natures. For the former is the cause exemptly

of things that are generated; but the latter proximately. And the

former, produces indeed by his very being, energy giving perfection to

his hyparxis; but the latter produces by energizing, his hypostasis

being fixed according to energy. If also we again separately divide

the generations of perpetual and mortal natures, we must refer the

generation of perpetual natures to the paternal cause, but the

generation of mortal natures to the fabricative cause. For the

fabricator indeed produces that which is generated from non-being to

being. For the Elean guest defines the effective art to be this. But

the father constitutes things posterior to himself consubsistent with

himself. For he is father by his very being, and has the power of

generating united with himself. Each therefore, I mean the paternal

and the effective or fabricative, is assimilated to the principle of

bound. And the former indeed is the cause of union, but the latter of

the production of forms. And the former is the cause of wholes, but

the latter of an extension as far as to parts. And the one indeed,

is the primary leader of simple, but the other of composite natures.

Again however, in these the generative cause, and the cause which is

productive of life, are opposed to each other; because the paternal

cause indeed is connascent with generative powers, but the effective

with vivific powers. And as the paternal and the effective causes

pertain to the coordination of bound, so every thing prolific and

vivific, pertains to vivification, and the first infinity.

These things, however, being thus divided by us, it is evident that

the paternal indeed, is itself by itself primarily in the intelligible

Gods. For they are the fathers of wholes, being fixed according to

supreme intelligible union. And on this account, Plato also calls the

first God father, from the natures which are proximately established

after him, transferring to him the appellation of father. For every

where indeed, it is usual with Plato to introduce names to the

ineffable from secondary causes, and the causes which are posterior to

it. But at one time indeed, he introduces the names from all beings,

and at another from the first beings. For it neither was nor is lawful

to refer names to him who is exempt from all beings, from subordinate

natures, and which are placed in an order very remote from him. If

therefore, all beings participate of the paternal peculiarity, we must

say that Plato gives this name to _the one_ from all beings; for there

is not among all beings such a cause as this. Hence it is evident that

Plato introduces to _the one_ an appellation of this kind, from that

which is the first and highest in the Gods. The intelligible Gods,

however, are more ancient than all the divine orders, and subsist

immediately after _the one_. The paternal cause therefore of beings is

in the intelligible Gods, and the intelligible Gods are the fathers

of all the divine genera, being established in the highest essences,

and occultly producing wholes. And the first God indeed, is beyond the

appellation of father, as he is likewise beyond all other names; and

he is neither properly called _the good_, or _the one_, through his

ineffable and unknown transcendency. But the intelligible Gods are

primarily superessential unities and goodnesses, and are the exempt

fathers of beings.

The paternal peculiarity, therefore, originates supernally from the

first intelligible triad; but the fabricative first presents itself

to the view in the third triad. For that which generates all forms,

and adorns all things with forms is the third triad of intelligibles.

For there, as we have said, all-perfect animal subsists, which is

comprehensive of the first and intelligible paradigms. Here therefore,

the effective also or fabricative at the same time subsists. For

animal itself constitutes the Gods, and produces the forms of all

beings. Hence it is allotted the paternal peculiarity, according to the

divine cause, but according to the formal cause, it unfolds into light

the effective principle of wholes. But again, on the contrary, the

effective and at the same time paternal peculiarity, is allotted its

hypostasis in the demiurgic monad. Hence also the demiurgus of wholes

is the hypostatic cause of Gods. In a particular manner however, he

fabricates the world, energizing with forms and demiurgic reasons. For

he constitutes intellect, souls and bodies, adorning all things with

forms, some indeed with first, others with middle, and others with last

forms.

Do you not see, therefore, how the end of intelligibles indeed, was

paternal and at the same time effective; but the end of intellectuals

is effective and at the same time paternal. There however, the paternal

peculiarity is more predominant; but here the effective. For in both

indeed, both causes preexist; nevertheless in the paradigm [i.e. in

animal itself] the paternal is more prevalent, but in the demiurgus the

effective. For the former produces by his very being; but the latter

by energizing. And in the former indeed, fabrication [or effective

energy] is essential; but in the latter essence is effective. Forms

also are with both; but in the former intelligibly, and in the latter

intellectually. From these things therefore, it is evident, that the

demiurgic cause subsists analogous to the paradigmatic cause; and that

it has the same order with respect to intellectuals, as that has with

respect to intelligibles. And on this account Timæus also says that

the demiurgus of wholes was extended to that paradigm. For he says,

“Whatever ideas intellect perceived by the dianoëtic energy in animal

itself, such and so many he conceived it necessary for the universe

to contain.” And together with this analogy, there is a diminution of

the intellectual with reference to the intelligible. For the latter is

more united; but the former is more separated. And the one indeed is

pre-established in the order of the desirable; but the other is moved

about the desirable. And the one fills with paternal power; but the

other absorbs as it were and embosoms the whole prolific abundance of

the desirable. And after this manner, the demiurgus of the universe

is all-perfect, receiving whole intelligible powers, from all-perfect

animal. For the universe is threefold; one indeed being intelligibly

[all]; another intellectually; and another sensibly. For the world

is perfect, from perfect natures, as Timæus says. And animal itself

is perfect according to all things, as the same Timæus asserts. The

demiurgus likewise, being the best of causes is all-perfect.