From the end of the intelligible order however, the summit of

intellectuals possesses its unknown peculiarity. For so far as it

conjoins itself to the first intelligibles, and is filled with their

unical, ineffable, and paternal hyparxis, so far also it exists in an

unknown manner prior to intellectuals. Hence it is incomprehensible

by the natures posterior to it; but it is known by those prior to

it, being super-expanded into a continued union with them.[217] It

likewise knows the natures prior to itself intelligibly; but this

does not at all differ from uniform and ineffable knowledge. For

intelligible knowledge is the union, cause, summit, and unknown and

occult hyparxis of all knowledge. Since therefore, the one and united

triad is, if it be lawful so to speak, the intellectual image of the

unknown union of intelligibles, and presides over the same uniform and

unknown power in intellectuals, as its own cause does, hence Plato

mystically unfolds it through negations. For every where that which is

highest, and that which is unknown, are analogous to the unical God.

As therefore, we are taught to celebrate this God through negations,

after the same manner we endeavour to unfold negatively the uniform

and unknown summits of secondary orders. And in short, since Socrates

in the Phædrus makes the ascent as far as to the supercelestial place,

arranging it analogous to the first, as in this order, and in the

ascent of souls, he celebrates it by negations. For in the Timæus,

Plato contends that the one demiurgus through whom every demiurgic

genus of Gods subsists, is ineffable and unknown; and every where that

which is highest has this transcendency with respect to secondary

natures. For it imitates the cause which is at once unically exempt

from all beings. We celebrate this cause however, through negations

alone, as existing prior to all things; but we unfold the summits

which proceed analogous to it, affirmatively and at the same time

negatively. As participating indeed, the natures prior to themselves,

we celebrate them affirmatively. For Plato calls the supercelestial

place essence which truly is, the plain of truth, the meadow, and the

intelligible place of survey of the Gods, and he does not only call it

without colour, without figure, and without contact, thus mingling

affirmations with negations. For this order is a medium between the

intelligible Gods and the first intellectual divine orders, containing

the bond of both. And it guards indeed intellectually, according to

a uniform and unknown transcendency, but transmits the plenitudes of

intelligibles as far as to the last of things. It likewise elevates

all things at once, according to one common union, as far as to

the intelligible father, and generates and produces them as far us

to matter. Being therefore established between the unical and the

multiplied Gods, it is unfolded, negatively indeed, through the unknown

manner in which it transcends secondary natures, but affirmatively

through its participation of the first natures. For the first demiurgus

is called in the Timæus fabricator and father, and good, and all such

names, so far as he participates of preexistent causes; but so far

as he is the monad of all fabrication, Plato leaves him unknown and

ineffable, exempt from all the fabricators of things. For he says, “it

is difficult to discover him, and when found, it is impossible to speak

of him to all men.” Thus therefore Plato unfolds the supercelestial

place, affirmatively indeed, as being filled from the first causes, at

one time indeed calling it essence which truly is, at another the plain

of truth, and at another, something else of this kind; but[218] so far

as it transcends the intellectual Gods, and so far as it is supreme

and unical, he celebrates it negatively, in the same manner as the

principle which is exempt from all things.

CHAPTER XII.

It follows therefore, in the next place, that we should consider what

the negations are, and from what orders they are generated. In the

Parmenides then, the negations of _the one_ are produced from all the

divine orders, because _the one_ is the cause of all of them. And

every thing divine according to the hyparxis of itself participates

of the first principle; and _the one_ in consequence of transcending

these is in a much greater degree exempt from the natures posterior to

these. For from these all things proceed; since they receive partibly

the peculiarities of these. This however is evident from the other

hypotheses, in which the same conclusions are again circulated, at one

time being connected together negatively, and at another affirmatively.

For what is there which could be able to subsist, unless it was

antecedently comprehended according to cause in wholes? But in the

Phædrus, the things which are denied of the intelligible summit of all

intellectuals are the natures which are proximately established after

this summit, viz. the sacred genera, the connective, the perfective,

and the paternal of what are properly called intellectuals. For this

summit being exempt from these, it also transcends all the intellectual

Gods. For what every genus of the Gods is to _the one_, that the three

orders posterior to this summit, are to it. Plato therefore denominates

the celestial order which connectedly contains wholes, and illuminates

them with intelligible light, colour; because likewise the apparent

beauty of this sensible heaven is resplendent with all various colours,

and with light. Hence he calls that heaven intellectual colour, and

light. For the light proceeding from _the good_ is [in the orders]

above [the heaven] unknown and occult, abiding in the adyta of the

Gods; but it shines forth in this. order, and from being unapparent

becomes manifest. Hence it is assimilated to: colour the offspring of

light.

Farther still, if the heaven is sight beholding the things above,

the intelligible of it may very properly be called colour which is

conjoined with the sight. The cause therefore of the intelligibles in

the heaven is without colour, but is exempt from them; for sensible

colour is the offspring of the solar light. But Plato denominates the

order which proximately subsists after the celestial order, and which

we have called the subcelestial arch, figure. For the arch itself is

the name of a figure. And in short, in this order, Parmenides also

places intellectual figure. But Plato first attributes contact to

the summit of intellectuals, as is evident from the conclusions of

the Parmenides. For in the first hypothesis taking away figure from

_the one_, he uses this as a medium, viz. that _the one_ does not

touch itself. “But _the one_,” says he, “does not touch itself.” And

the conclusion is evident. Here therefore contact first subsists,

and subsists according to cause. For of those things of which the

demiurgus is proximately the cause, the father who is prior to him

is paradigmatically the cause. In this order therefore, contact is

the paradigm of the liberated Gods. Hence these three orders are

successive, viz. colour, figure, and contact. And from these the

supercelestial place is essentially exempt. Hence it is without

colour, without figure, and without contact. Nor does it transcend

these three privatively, but according to causal excellence. For it

imparts to colour from intelligibles the participation of light; on

figure it confers by illumination intellectual bound; and in contact

it supernally inserts union and continuity, and perfects all things

by its power, things which are touched indeed, through union, those

that are figured, through the participation of bound, and those that

are coloured, through the illumination of light. But it draws upward,

and allures to itself every thing ineffably, and through intelligible

impressions, and fills every thing with unical goods.

If therefore, we assert these things rightly, we must not admit the

interpretation of those who are busily occupied in sensible colours,

and contacts, and figures, and who assert that the supercelestial place

is exempt from these. For these are trifling, and by no means adapted

to that place. For even nature, not only that which exists as a whole,

but that also which is partial, is exempt from sensible colours, from

apparent figures, and from corporeal contact. What therefore is there

venerable in this, if it is also present to natures themselves? But it

is necessary to extend colours, and figures, and contacts, from on high

as far as to the last of things, and to evince that the supercelestial

place, is similarly exempt from all these. For soul also and intellect

participate of figure; and contact is frequently in incorporeal

natures, according to the communion of first with secondary beings, and

it is usual to call these communications contacts, and to denominate

the touchings of intellectual perceptions adhesions. We should not

therefore be carried from things first to things last, nor compare the

highest order of intellectuals with the last of beings, above which

both soul and nature are established. For in so doing we shall err, and

shall not attend to Plato, who exclaims that it is boldness to assert

these things concerning it. For where is the boldness, and what the

unknown power transcending our conceptions, in contemplating the truth

of sensible colours, figures, and contacts. For an hypostasis of this

kind is known by physiologists, and not by the sons of theologists.

Such therefore is the power possessed by the negations through which

Plato celebrates the supercelestial place.

CHAPTER XIII.

Again then, let us in the next place survey the affirmations, how

they exist according to the participation of the first intelligibles

themselves. The supercelestial place therefore, is said to be essence

which truly is, because it participates of that which is primarily

being. For to be, and truly to be are present to all things, as the

progeny of the intelligible essence. For as _the one_ is from

the first principle which is prior to intelligibles, so the nature

of being is from intelligibles. For there the one being subsists, as

Parmenides a little before taught us. But the supercelestial place

is beheld by the governor of the soul, because it is allotted an

intelligible transcendency with respect to the other intellectual Gods.

Hence the intelligible good of it is rendered manifest from its being

known by intellect. This intelligible therefore, in the same manner

as that which is truly being, arrives to it from the unical Gods. For

they are primarily and imparticipably intelligibles, and the first

efficient causes of all intelligibles. These things also concur with

each other, viz. that which is truly being, and the intelligible. For

every intelligible is truly being, and every thing which is truly

being is intelligible. For intellect is intelligible according to

the being which is in it; but according to its gnostic power it is

intellect. Hence also every intellect is the supplier of knowledge; but

every intelligible is the supplier of essence. For that which each is

primarily, it imparts by illumination to the secondary orders.

CHAPTER XIV.

In the third place therefore, the genus of true science is said to be

established about the supercelestial place. For these two things ascend

to the contemplation of that essence, viz. intellect the governor of

the soul (but this is a partial intellect established indeed above

souls, and elevating them to their paternal port) and true science

which is the perfection of the soul. This therefore energizes about

that place, as transitively revolving in harmonic measures about being.

But intellect contemplates it, as employing simple intellection.

Farther still, the science which is in us is one thing, but that

which is in the supercelestial place another. And the former indeed

is true, but the latter is truth itself. What therefore is it, and

whence does it subsist? It is indeed a deity which is the fountain of

all intellectual knowledge, and the first efficient cause of undefiled

and stable intelligence.[219] But it shines forth in the first triad

of intellectuals, because this is perfective of all other things

and likewise of divine souls. For these ascending to this uniform

power of all knowledge, perfect their own knowledge. For each of the

undefiled souls, says Socrates, revolving together with Jupiter and the

heaven, surveys justice, temperance and science. Hence, these three

fountains are there, being intelligible deities, and the fountains

of the intellectual virtues, and not being, as some think they are,

intellectual forms. For Plato is accustomed to characterize these by

the term itself, as for instance science itself and justice itself;

and this Socrates says somewhere in the Phædo. But here when he says

justice herself, temperance herself, and science herself, he appears

to unfold to us certain self-perfect and intelligible deities, which

have a triadic subsistence. And of these science indeed is the monad;

but temperance has the second order; and justice the third. And science

indeed is the supplier of undefiled, firm and immutable intelligence;

but temperance imparts to all the Gods the cause of conversion to

themselves; and justice imparts to them the cause of the distribution

of the whole of good according to desert. And through science indeed,

each of the Gods intellectually perceives the natures prior to himself,

and is filled with intelligible intelligence;[220] but through

temperance he is converted to himself, and enjoys a second union, and

a good coordinate to the conversion to himself; and through justice

he rules over the natures posterior to himself, in a silent path, as

they say, measures their desert, and supplies a distribution adapted

to each. These three fountains therefore contain all the energies of

the Gods. And science indeed proceeds analogous to the first triad of

intelligibles. And as that triad imparts essence to all things, so this

illuminates the Gods with knowledge. But temperance proceeds analogous

to the second triad of intelligibles. For temperance imitates the

connective and measuring power of that triad; since it measures the

energies of the Gods, and converts each of them to itself. And justice

proceeds analogous to the third triad of intelligibles. For it also

separates secondary natures according to appropriate desert,[221] in

the same manner as that triad separates them intelligibly by the first

paradigms.

CHAPTER XV.

After these things therefore, we may survey another triad preexisting

in this place, which also Socrates celebrates, viz. the plain of

truth, the meadow, and the nutriment of the Gods. The plain of truth

therefore, is intellectually expanded to intelligible light, and is

splendid with the illuminations that proceed from thence. For as _the

one_ emits by illumination intelligible light, so the intelligible

imparts to secondary natures a participation productive of essence. But

the meadow is the prolific power of life, and of all-various reasons,

is the comprehension of the first efficient causes of life, and is the

cause of the variety, and generation of forms. For the meadows also

which are here are productive of all-various forms and reasons, and

bear water which is the symbol of vivification. And the nourishing

cause of the Gods, is a certain intelligible union, comprehending in

itself the whole perfection of the Gods, and filling the Gods with acme

and power, in order that they may bestow a providential attention to

secondary natures, and may possess an immutable intellectual perception

of such natures as are first. Above however, the Gods participate of

these uniformly; but in a divided manner in their progressions.

With respect to the nutriment likewise, one kind is called by Plato

ambrosia, but the other nectar. “For the charioteer,” says he,

“stopping the horses at the manger, places before them ambrosia, and

afterwards gives them nectar to drink.” The charioteer therefore, being

nourished with intelligibles, unically participates of the perfection

which is imparted through illumination by the Gods. But the horses

participate of this divisibly; first indeed of ambrosia, and afterwards

of nectar. For it is necessary that from ambrosia, they should stably

and undeviatingly abide in more excellent natures; but that through

nectar they should immutably provide for secondary natures. For they

say that ambrosia is solid, but nectar liquid nutriment; which Plato

also indicates when he says that the charioteer places before the

horses ambrosia and afterwards gives them nectar to drink. Hence the

nutriment of nectar manifests the unrestrained and indissoluble nature

of providence, and its proceeding to all things in an unpolluted

manner. But the nutriment of ambrosia manifests stability, and a

firm settlement in more excellent natures. From both these however,

it is evident that the Gods both abide and proceed to all things,

and that neither their undeviating nature, and which is without

conversion to subordinate beings, is unprolific, nor their prolific

power and progression is unstable; but abiding they proceed, and being

established in the divinities prior to themselves, they provide for

secondary natures without being contaminated. Nectar and ambrosia

therefore, are the perfections of the Gods, so far as they are Gods;

but other things are the perfections of intellect, nature, and bodies.

Hence Plato having assumed these in souls, calls the souls [which are

nourished with these,] Gods. For so far as they also participate of the

Gods, so far they are filled with nectar and ambrosia. These however

in their progressions have a bipartite division; the one indeed,

being the supplier to the Gods of stable and firm perfection; but the

other, of undeviating providence, of liberated administration, and of

an unenvying and abundant communication of good, according to the two

principles of the whole of things, which preside over a distribution of

this kind. For it must be admitted that ambrosia is indeed analogous to

bound, but nectar to infinity. Hence the one is as it were humid, and

not bounded from itself; but the other is as it were solid, and has a

boundary from itself. Nectar therefore is prolific, and is perfective

of the secondary presence of the Gods, and is the cause of power, of

a vigour which provides for the whole of things, and of infinite and

never-failing supply. But ambrosia is stable perfection, is similar

to bound, is the cause to the Gods of an establishment in themselves,

and is the supplier of firm and undeviating intellection. Prior to

both these however, is the one fountain of perfection, and seat to all

the Gods, which Plato calls nutriment, and the banquet, and delicious

food, as unically perfecting indeed the divided multitude of the Gods,

but converting all things to itself through divine intelligence.

For δαις [the banquet] indeed manifests the divided distribution of

divine nutriment; but θοινη [delicious food] the united conversion of

the whole of things to it. For it is the intellectual perception of

the Gods, so far as they are Gods. But nutriment connectedly contains

both these powers, being the plenitude of intelligible goods, and the

uniform perfection of divine self-sufficiency.

CHAPTER XVI.

Concerning these things therefore, thus much may suffice as to the

present theory. But it follows that we should discuss the division

of the supercelestial place into three parts. For the intelligible

summit of intellectuals is, as we have before observed, a triad.

Immediately therefore, according to the first conception of this place,

Plato unfolds its triadic nature, assuming indeed, three negatives,

the uncoloured, the unfigured, and the untangible. Having likewise

established three divinities in it, viz. science, temperance, and

justice, our preceptor and leader [Syrianus] thinks fit to divide this

triad into three monads, and also demonstrates this conformably to

the Orphic theologies. If, however, it be requisite to discover the

definite peculiarities of these three Goddesses, from what has been

already laid down, we must understand, that the plain of truth, the

meadow, and the nourishing cause of the Gods are posited there. To

nourish therefore is the province of intelligible perfection. Hence

the elevating impulse is given to the wing of the soul, and also

intellectual perfection, according to the nourishment which flows from

thence into the soul. But the peculiarity of the meadow, is to possess

a power generative of reasons and forms; and of the causes[222] of the

production of animals. Hence also souls are fed about the meadow; and

the pabulum (νομη) is indeed nutriment, but in a divided manner.

The plain however of truth is the expansion and manifestation of

intelligible light, the evolution of inward reasons, and perfection

proceeding every where. This therefore[223] is the peculiarity of

the third monad. But fecundity is the peculiarity of the second; and

intelligible plenitude of the first. For all the supercelestial place

is indeed illuminated with the light of truth. Hence all the natures

that are contained in it are called true. And Socrates says, “that

whatever soul attending on divinity has beheld any thing of reality

shall be free from damage, till another period takes place.” For every

thing in that place is truly being and intelligible, and is full of

divine union. In the first monads however [i.e. in the plain of truth

and the meadow,] this intelligible light subsists contractedly, and

is occultly established as it were in the adyta; but in the third

monad [viz. in the nourishing cause of the Gods] it shines forth,

and is co-expanded, and is co-divided with the multitude of powers.

We may therefore from these things survey the differences of the

three monads, in a manner conformable to the Platonic hypotheses.

But if indeed science pertains to the first monad, temperance to the

second, and justice to the third, from these things also the triad

will be perfectly apparent. And does not science which is stable, and

the uniform intelligence of wholes, and which at the same time is

consubsistent with intelligibles, pertain to the power which is united

to the intelligible father, and which does not proceed, nor separate

its union from the deity of that father? but does not the genus of

justice pertain to the power which is divided, which separates the

intellectual genera, leads the intelligible multitude into order, and

imparts by illumination distribution according to desert? And does not

the genus of temperance pertain to the power which is the medium of

both these, which is converted to itself, and possesses the common bond

of this triad? For the harmonic, and a communication with the extremes

according to reason, are the illustrious good of this middle power.

That we may not therefore be prolix, what has been said being

sufficient to remind us of the meaning of Plato, those three deities

are celebrated by us, which dividing the supercelestial place, are

indeed all of them intelligible as in intellectuals, and are likewise

summits, and collective of all things into one intelligible union.

One of these however is so stably; another generatively; and another

convertively, possessing a primary effective power in intellectuals.

For one of them indeed, unites the monads of all the Gods and collects

them about the intelligible; but another effects this about the

progressions of the Gods; and another about their conversions. All of

them however at the same time collect into one the whole of an hyparxis

which always abides, proceeds, and returns. Hence also Plato elevates

the Gods that are distributed in the world, to this one place, and

converts them energizing about this as collective of the whole orders

of the Gods to the participation of intelligibles. These monads,

therefore, educe intelligible forms, fill them with the participation

of divine union, and again recall the natures that have proceeded, and

conjoin them to intelligibles. Concerning this whole triad however,

what has been said may suffice.

CHAPTER XVII.

It remains therefore, that we should pass to the discussion of

Adrastia, Socrates indicating that she possesses her kingdom in this

place. For that which defines the measures of a blameless life to

souls from the vision of these intelligible goods, is certainly there

allotted its first evolution into light. For the elevating cause,

being secondary to the objects of desire, may be able to raise

both itself and other things to the supercelestial place, through

conversion. But that which defines and measures the fruits of the

vision of the intelligible to souls, since it has its hyparxis in the

intelligible, imparts by illumination beatitude to them from thence. It

is established therefore, as I have said, in that place. But it rules

over all the divine laws uniformly, from on high, as far as to the last

of things. It likewise binds to the one sacred law of itself, all the

sacred laws, viz. the intellectual, the supermundane, and the mundane.

Whether therefore, there are certain Saturnian laws, as Socrates in the

Gorgies indicates there are, when he says, “The law therefore which was

in the time of Saturn is now also among the Gods;” or whether there are

Jovian laws, as the Athenian guest asserts there are, when he says,

“But justice follows Jupiter, which is the avenger of those that desert

the divine law;” or whether there are fatal laws, as Timæus teaches

there are, when he says, “That the demiurgus announced to souls the

laws of fate;”--of all these the sacred law of Adrastia is connective

according to one intelligible simplicity, and at the same time imparts

existence to all of them, and the measures of power. And if it be

requisite to relate my own opinion, the inevitable guardian power of

this triad, and the immutable comprehension of order pervading every

where, presubsist in this goddess. For these three deities not only

unfold and collect all things, but they are also guardians according

to the Oracle of the works of the father, and of one intelligible

intellect.

This guardian power therefore, the sacred law of Adrastia indicates,

which nothing is able to escape. For with respect to the laws of Fate,

not only the Gods are superior to them, but also partial souls, when

they live according to intellect, and give themselves up to the light

of providence. And the Saturnian Gods are essentially exempt from the

Jovian laws, and the connective and perfective Gods from the Saturnian

laws; but all things are obedient to the sacred law of Adrastia, and

all the distributions of the Gods, and all measures and guardianships

subsist on account of this. By Orpheus also, she is said to guard the

demiurgus of the universe, and receiving brazen drumsticks, and a drum

made from the skin of a goat, to produce so loud a sound as to convert

all the Gods to herself. And Socrates imitating this fabulous sound

which extends a certain proclamation[224] to all things, in a similar

manner produces the sacred law of Adrastia to all souls. For he says,

“This is the sacred law of Adrastia, that whatever soul has perceived

any thing of truth, shall be free from harm till another period,” all

but expressing the Orphic sound through this proclamation, and uttering

this as a certain hymn of Adrastia. For in the first place indeed, he

calls it θεσμος, _a sacred law_, and not νομος, _a law_, as

he does the Saturnian and Jovian laws. For θεσμος is connected with

deity, and pertains more to intelligibles [than to the intellectuals];

but νομος indicating intellectual distribution, is adapted to the

intellectual fathers. And in the second place, he speaks of it in the

singular and not in the plural number, as Timæus does of the fatal

laws. In the third place therefore, he extends it to all the genera of

souls, and evinces that it is the common measure of their happy and

blessed life, and the true guard of those souls that are able to abide

on high free from all passivity. For such is the meaning of the words,

“And the soul that is able to do this always, shall always be free from

harm.” This sacred law therefore, comprehends all the undefiled life

of divine souls, and the temporal blessedness of partial souls. And it

guards the former indeed intelligibly, but measures the latter by the

vision of intelligible goods. And thus much concerning Adrastia.

CHAPTER XVIII.

With respect to what remains therefore, we shall summarily say, that

the supercelestial place is the first triad of the intelligible and

at the same time intellectual Gods, possessing three peculiarities,

the unfolding into light, the collective, and the defensive. It

likewise comprehends all these intelligibly, and in an unknown manner,

conjoining indeed intellectuals to intelligibles, but calling forth the

prolific powers of intelligibles, receiving in itself the plenitude of

forms from the intelligible paradigms, and producing its own meadow

from the fontal summit which is there. But from the one intellect

it gives subsistence to the three virtues, perfects all itself by

intelligible impressions, and in its ineffable bosoms receives the

whole of intelligible light. At one and the same time also it abides in

the occult nature of the intelligible Gods, and proceeds intelligibly

from thence, shines forth to the view of intellectuals, and converts

and draws upward by ineffable powers all the images of its proper union

which it has disseminated in every thing. To this place likewise it is

necessary that we should mystically approach, leaving in the earth all

the generation-producing life, and the corporeal nature, with which on

coming hither we were surrounded as with a wall, but exciting alone

the summit of the soul to the participation of total truth, and the

plenitude of intelligible nutriment.

CHAPTER XIX.

After this intelligible and unknown triad however, which presides

over all the intellectual[225] genera, let us survey the triad which

connectedly contains the bond of them, intelligibly and at the same

time intellectually. For it is necessary that prior to intellect and

the intellectual Gods, the cause of connectedly containing should be

in these Gods; and that this being established in the middle of the

intelligible and intellectual order, should extend to all the divine

multitudes, all the genera of beings, and all the divisions of the

world. For what is it which primarily connects things? If, as some say,

the nature of spirit and local motion, body itself which is connective

of other things will require connexion. For every body according to

its own composition is dissipable and divisible; which also the Elean

guest indicating to those who make corporeal principles, says that the

essence which is so much celebrated by them, is broken and dissipated.

Body therefore, is not naturally adapted to be connective of other

things, nor even if a power of this kind pertained to bodies, would

spirit be able to afford us this power, because it is always defluous

and dissipated, and diffusing itself beyond that which bounds it.

But if we suppose that habits and connective forms which are divided

about bodies illuminate their subjects with connexion, it is perfectly

necessary that they should effect this by being present with them; but

how will these habits and forms connect themselves? For it is difficult

to devise how this can be effected. For these being distributed about

material bulks, and divided together with their subjects, require

a boundary and connexion. But they are not naturally adapted to be

bounded or connected from themselves; because they have not an essence

self-begotten and self-subsistent. That however, which neither produces

nor perfects itself, cannot connect itself. And moreover, every habit,

and every material form is alter-motive, and depends on another more

ancient cause, and on this account is inseparable from subjects, not

being able to verge to itself.

But if abandoning these, we should assert that souls which are

incorporeal and self-begotten, are the first efficient causes of

connexion, where shall we place the partible and at the same time

impartible nature of souls, that which is mixed from the partible

and impartible, that which participates of the genera of being,

and that which is divided into harmonic reasons? For souls indeed,

connect bodies and natures, because they participate of an impartible

peculiarity; but they are in want of another connective nature which

may impart the first principle of mixture to the genera, and of

connexion to divided reasons. For the self-motive nature of souls

being transitive, and extended to time, requires that which may

connect its one life, and may render it total and indivisible. For

the whole which is connective of parts, exists prior to parts; since

the whole which consists of parts receives connexion introduced from

something different from itself. But if proceeding with the reasoning

power beyond souls, we survey intellect, whether the intellect which

is participated, or if you are willing, that which is imparticipable

and divine, and in short, if we survey at once the intellectual genus

of the Gods, if this is primarily connective of beings, we shall

find also in this all-various multitude, divisions of genera, and as

Socrates says, many and blessed visions, and discussive energies. For

the separation of divine natures, and the variety of forms, present

themselves to the view in intellectuals, and also fabulous sections and

generative powers. How therefore, can that which connects be primarily

here, where the divisive genus shines forth? And how is it possible

that intellectual multitude should not refer to another more ancient

cause the participation of its proper connexion? For intellectual

multitude is that which is primarily connected (since it is that which

is primarily divided, and that which requires connexion is divisible,

but the indivisible itself is beyond the connective hyparxis), but

it is not that which primarily connects. For every thing which is

connected, is connected by another thing which primarily possesses

the power of connexion. It is evident therefore, from what has been

said, that the connective order of beings is established prior to the

intellectual Gods.

The intelligible indeed, and occult hyparxis, is the supplier of

union to all things, as proximately subsisting after _the one_,

and being indivisible and uniform. But connexion is the contraction

of multitude into impartible communion; on which account it subsists

as secondary to intelligibles. For the medium which was there was

intelligible, and the united primarily-efficient cause of connexion.

The connective however, of intelligibles and intellectuals, imitates

the unific power of intelligibles. For there the three triadic

monads were the unions of wholes; one of them indeed according to

transcendency; another according to the middle centre; and another

according to conversion. But in the intelligible and at the same time

intellectual orders, these three triads are the second after those

unions, and are connascent with multitude. Hence one of these triads

is collective; another is connective of multitude; and another is

of a perfective nature. For that which is collected, that which is

connected,[226] and that which is perfected, is multitude. Whether

therefore it is intellectual, or supermundane, or mundane, or any other

multitude, it is collected, connected, and perfected through these

three triads. And when collected indeed, it is elevated to the union of

intelligibles, and is firmly established in them. When it is connected,

it abides impartible and undissipated in its progeny. And when it is

perfected, it receives completion from its proper parts or powers.

Since however, it is necessary that beings abiding, proceeding and

returning should enjoy this triple providence, there are indeed three

preexistent collective monads, three connective, and three perfective

monads. And we do not say this, that on account of the good of

secondary natures, first natures are thus divided, and preside over so

many orders and powers; but they indeed are always the primary causes

of good to things subordinate, while we from inferior natures recur

to the causes of wholes. The intelligible therefore, and intellectual

triads, perfect things triadically, and always connect and collect them

into union. But the intelligible monads generate without separation

and unically, their permanencies, progressions and conversions. With

respect to other things however, we have partly spoken, and shall again

partly speak concerning them.

CHAPTER XX.

Let us therefore speak at present concerning the connective triad.

This then, Socrates, in the Phædrus, calls the celestial circulation.

Because indeed, it possesses the middle centre of imparticipable

life, and is that which is most vital itself of life, he calls it

circulation, as comprehending circularly, and on all sides all other

lives, and divine intellections. For on account of this, souls also

which are elevated to it, are perfected according to intellection, and

are conjoined with intelligible spectacles. The circulation of the

heaven, however, is always established after the same manner. For it is

an eternal, whole, one, and united intelligence. But the circulation

of souls is effected through time, subsists in a more partial manner,

and is not an at-once-collected comprehension of intelligibles.

Souls, therefore, are carried round in a circle, and are restored

to their pristine state, the celestial circulation always remaining

the same. Because, however, it gives completion to the bond of the

intelligible and intellectual Gods, and connects all the orders in

their abiding, proceeding, and returning, Socrates calls it celestial.

For Timæus says, that this [sensible] heaven also, compresses on

all sides the elements that are under it, and that on this account,

no place is left for a vacuum. As, therefore, the apparent heaven

is connective of all things that are under it, and is the cause

of continuity, coherence and sympathy, (for the intervention of a

vacuum would interrupt the continuity of things, and the subversion

of this continuity would destroy the sympathy of bodies) thus also

that intellectual heaven, binds all the multitudes of beings into an

impartible communion, illuminating each with an appropriate portion of

connexion. For intellect participates of the connective cause in one

way, the nature of soul in another, and a corporeal state of being in

another. For through the highest participation of connexion, intellect

is impartible; but through second measures of participation, soul

is partible and impartible, according to one mixture; and through

an ultimate diminution, bodies possessing a partible hypostasis, at

the same time remain connected, and do not in consequence of being

dissipated perish, but enjoy their own division and imbecility.

The whole of the connective triad therefore, is denominated heaven

according to the hyparxes of itself; but the breadth of life which is

spread under it is called circulation. For in things apparent to sense,

the period of the heavens is motion, and is as it were the life of

body.

CHAPTER XXI.

If however it be requisite to discover the triadic nature of it from

what has been laid down, we must employ the mode of analogy. Since

therefore Plato himself calls the back of the heaven one thing,

and its profundity another, it is evident that the celestial arch

is the third thing; for the arch which is under this, he directly

calls subcelestial. But as we say that the supercelestial place is

established above the back of the heaven, so likewise we must grant

that the subcelestial is different from the celestial arch. For the

heaven is bounded, supernally indeed by the back, but beneath by the

arch. And it is comprehended indeed by the supercelestial place, but

it comprehends the subcelestial arch. It is evident therefore from

these things, that the heaven presents itself to our view as triadic,

according to its back indeed, connectedly containing all things in

one simplicity; but according to its arch bounding the whole triad;

and according to its profundity, itself proceeding into itself, and

constituting the middle breadth of connexion and coherence. The back

however, of the whole celestial order, is an intelligible deity, being

perhaps allotted from hence this appellation. But it is intelligible

as in the connective triad, externally compressing, and connectedly

comprehending all the kingdom of the heaven. It likewise imparts

to all the Gods by illumination a uniform and simple comprehension

of secondary natures, and is supernally filled with intelligible

union. Hence also, divine souls being led through all the celestial

profundity, stand indeed on the back of the heaven, but the circulation

carries them round as they stand; and thus they survey what is called

the supercelestial place. The station therefore, is the establishment

of souls in the intelligible watch tower of the heaven, extending to

souls sameness, undefiled power, and undeviating intellection. But the

circumduction is the participation of a life full of vigour, and the

most acute energy. And the common presence of both these, comprehends

the prolific energy, the quiet motion, and the stable intellection of

intelligibles. But the celestial profundity, is the one continuity of

the whole triad, and the middle deity which conjoins the whole[227]

celestial order, proceeding indeed from the intelligible comprehension,

but ending in the celestial arch, which defines the boundary of the

whole of the heaven. There is therefore, one union and connexion of all

this triad, and an indissoluble progression from the back as far as

to the arch, through this middle deity which is connascent with both

the extremes, and which unfolds indeed the connective multitude, but

on each side is bounded by the extremes; one of which comprehends it

supernally, but the other from beneath bounds its progression.

The celestial arch therefore remains, which is the boundary beneath

of the triad, and this is also the case with the intellect which is

in it, being filled indeed by life, but united by the intelligible,

and converting all the triad to its principle. For the arch also is

similar to the back of the heaven, though according to interval it

is less. Through subjection therefore it is diminished; but through

similitude it is converted to the celestial summit. And this is the

celestial intellect which is the proximate _sunocheus_[228] of

the subcelestial arch. Hence each[229] arch is called the intellectual

boundary of the intelligible and intellectual Gods. The whole

connective triad therefore, is allotted such a division as this; the

back (το νωτον) according to the intelligible (κατα το νοητον); the

profundity according to life; and the arch according to intellect. But

the whole of it is one and continued, because that which connects all

other things, ought much more to be connective of itself. For each

peculiarity of the Gods begins its energy from itself; the peculiarity

indeed, which is collective, fixing itself collectively in the highest

union; that which is convertive of wholes, converting itself to the

principle; and that which is undefiled preserving itself prior to other

things pure from matter. Hence the connective peculiarity also, prior

to its participants, connects itself intelligibly and intellectually,

and through this connexion the nature of the heaven is asserted to be

one and continued. For all the triad converges to itself, and preserves

its proper wholeness united, and most similar to itself according to

nature. And the arch indeed, proximately connects all intellectuals,

and compresses them on all sides. But prior to this, the celestial

profundity itself, which also comprehends the arch, binds together

the whole orders. And prior to these, the celestial back uniformly

comprehends according to one ambit of simplicity, all the celestial

kingdom itself, and all things that are contained under it, and binds

them to themselves, by connective power and hyparxis. For in the

things also that are apparent to sense, the concave circumference of

the heavens, proximately compresses the elements, and does not suffer

them in their indefinite motions on all sides, to be dissipated and

blown away. And still prior to these, the celestial bulk strongly

compresses and impels all things to the middle, and leaves no void

place. But there is one comprehension of all these, viz. the back of

the heavens, which is the cause to the heavens of similitude, and to

the elements of contact with the heavens. For the smooth and equable

nature of the back of the heavens as Timæus says, makes the whole of

heaven similar to itself; and always the natures which comprehend

are connective of the natures that are comprehended. It is necessary

therefore from things that are apparent, to transfer the similitude to

the father of the intellectual Gods, Heaven, and to survey how he is

both one and triple, supernally indeed, and beneath, possessing the

intelligible and intellect; but according to the middle possessing

life, which being the cause of progressions and intervals, and

generative powers, we have properly arranged according to interval

under the celestial profundity;[230] since Plato himself also calls the

summit the back. “For those,” says he, “that are called immortals, when

proceeding beyond the heaven they arrive at the summit, stand on the

back of the heaven.” He calls therefore, the summit of the celestial

order, and beyond, the back of the heaven; which things are in a

remarkable manner the prerogatives of the first of the Synoches. For

connectedly containing all things in the one summit of his hyparxis,

according to the Oracle, he wholly exists beyond, and is united to the

supercelestial place, and to the ineffable power of it, being enclosed

on all sides by it, and shutting himself in the uniform comprehension

of intelligibles. For what difference is there between saying that the

first of the Synoches is shut in the intelligible place of survey, and

evincing that it is proximately comprehended by the supercelestial

place, which was intelligible, but expanded in intellectuals? If

however, that which is beyond is the first, the summit is evidently

coarranged with the rest, and is exempt from them. But if the first is

a thing of this kind, being established according to the intelligible

summit, and imparting by illumination to the other Gods, contact with

the intelligible, and with the paternal port, it is indeed necessary

that there should be a middle and an extremity, the one according to

the celestial profundity, but the other according to the termination

of the whole circulation. If however the circulation of the whole of

the heaven is one and continued, the peculiarity of this order must

be assigned as the cause of this. For being connective of the whole

orders of the Gods, and prior to other things of itself, and being

as it were the centre and bond of the divine genera, it in the first

place binds and connects itself, and extends itself to one life. The

heaven therefore is one and at the same time triple, and proceeds into

three monads, being both unapparent and apparent, and that which is

between these, and imitating the intelligible Gods who subside into

intelligible triads.

CHAPTER XXII.

If you are willing however from what is written in the Cratylus,

to see the peculiarity of this order, in the first place, let this

be considered by you as an argument of the _Synoche_ established

in the middle, that a twofold habitude of it is delivered, one,

towards intelligibles, but the other towards intellectuals. For it

is said to see the things above, and to generate a pure intellect.

Hence, of intelligibles it is the intelligence, but of intellectuals

the intelligible. For the cause of intellect subsists prior to

an intellectual cause, and that which is at once both these,

especially gives completion to the middle order of intelligibles and

intellectuals. For the collective deity, perceiving intelligibles, or

rather being united to them, does not primarily give subsistence to a

divine intellect. And the perfective deity, producing together with the

middle divinity intellectuals, proximately perceives intellectually the

celestial order, and not the intelligibles prior to the heaven. But

the middle divinity alone, occupying the intelligible and intellectual

centre, equally indeed extends to both, but perceiving intelligibles

intellectually, it is the cause of intellectuals intelligibly.

Since however, habitude to its causes precedes the power[231] in it

which is generative of intellectuals, Socrates beginning from this

habitude, delivers also a second power as suspended from it. But sight

directed to things above is very properly assigned the appellation of

_celestial_, as _seeing the things above_. This therefore, perfectly

defines for us a habitude more ancient than the connectedly-containing

order, jointly assuming it to be intellectual as with reference to

intelligibles, and sight as with reference to the objects of sight,

though it intellectually perceives itself, and is intelligible in

itself. But the intelligible of it, as with reference to that which is

primarily intelligible, is allotted an intellectual order. What follows

however, unfolds the habitude of this middle to intellectuals. (For

Socrates adds,) “Whence also, O Hermogenes, those who are conversant

with things on high say that Heaven generates a pure intellect, and

that this name is properly assigned to it.” The order therefore,

of the Heaven is expanded as a middle in the middle intellectual

and intelligible Gods, comprehending at once the intelligible and

intellectual in one impartible connexion, subsisting similarly with

respect to each of these, and being equally distant from the first

intellectuals, and the unical intelligibles. Hence it is said to

perceive intellectually the things above, and thus to produce (a pure)

intellect.

Assuming this therefore, in the first place from what has been laid

down, in the next place we should attend to this, that the celestial

order being triple, and the whole of it intellectually perceiving

intelligibles, and producing intellectuals, the first monad indeed

in an eminent manner intellectually perceives intelligibles. For it

mingles itself with intelligibles, knows intelligible intellect,

is united to the natures prior to itself, and is impartible as in

impartibles, super-expanding itself towards intelligible simplicity.

But the third monad is especially generative of intellectuals; since

it is the intellect of the whole connective triad. And with the Orphic

theologists also, Heaven the father of Saturn is the third. But the

middle monad produces together with the third the intellectual order of

the Gods; but is conjoined together with the first to intelligibles,

and is filled indeed with intelligible union from the first, but fills

the third[232] with prolific powers. Do you not see therefore, how

Plato through the peculiarity of the extremes, unfolds to us the whole

celestial order? Conjoining indeed, the intelligible hyparxis of it

to intelligibles; but its intellectual hyparxis to intellectuals; and

affording us the means of collecting its hyparxis which is the middle

of both these, and which proceeds according to a common peculiarity.

For if you likewise wish to assume this from what has been said,

the celestial light is conjoined to the light of intelligibles. For

sight is nothing else than light. The middle order therefore, by its

own light, and by the divine summit of itself is conjoined to the

first natures; but by an intellectual nature, and the boundary of the

whole triad, it generates intellect, and all the unpolluted deity of

intellectuals. For it does not produce intellect by itself, but in

conjunction with purity. For this Socrates himself asserts: “Whence

also, they say, that a pure intellect is generated by it.” Hence the

celestial order is the first-efficient cause of the intellectual

hyparxis, and of undefiled power. If however it is necessary that

purity should not be inherent in intellect from accident, it is the

deity of those beings that are exempt from secondary natures, and is

the supplier of immutable power, which the mighty Heaven producing in

conjunction with intellect, is at the same time the efficient cause

of the Gods who are the sources of purity, and of the intellectual

fathers. These indications therefore of the truth concerning the

connective Gods, may also be assumed from the Cratylus.

CHAPTER XXIII.

It remains therefore that in conformity to what is written in the

Phædrus, we should survey the subcelestial arch, and the peculiarity

of the Gods that are there. Before however we begin the doctrine

concerning it, I wish to premise thus much, that some of the most

celebrated of the interpreters prior to us, conceiving that this

subcelestial arch is a divine order arranged under the heaven, have

thought fit to rank it immediately after the first God, calling the

first God Heaven. But others have arranged both the heaven, and the

subcelestial arch in the breadth of intelligibles. For the Asinæan

philosopher indeed [Theodorus] being persuaded by Plotinus, calls

that which proximately proceeds from the ineffable, the subcelestial

arch, as in his treatise concerning names he philosophizes about

these things. But the great Iamblichus conceiving the mighty heaven

to be a certain order of the intelligible Gods, (and in one place he

considers it to be the same with the demiurgus,) asserts that the order

proximately established under the heaven, and as it were begirding

it, is the subcelestial arch. And these things he has written in his

Commentaries on the Phædrus. Let no one therefore think that we make

any innovation concerning the theology of this order, and that we

are the first who divide the subcelestial arch from the heaven; but

that we are principally persuaded by Plato, who distinguishes these

three orders, the supercelestial place, the celestial circulation,

and the subcelestial arch; and that after Plato, we are persuaded by

those who investigate his theory in a divinely-inspired manner, viz.

by Iamblichus and Theodorus. For why is it necessary to speak of our

leader [Syrianus,] who was truly a Bacchus, [i.e. one agitated with

divine fury,] and who in a remarkable manner was full of deity about

Plato, and caused as far as to us the admirable nature of the Platonic

theory, and the astonishment with which it is attended, to shine forth?

He therefore in his treatise on the concord [of Orpheus, Pythagoras,

and Plato, has most perfectly unfolded the peculiarity of this order,

the subcelestial arch.] The two above-mentioned wise men, however,

differ very much from each other in their theory. For Theodorus, in

calling the first cause Heaven, does not any longer permit Heaven to

be sight perceiving the things above, as Socrates in the Cratylus

etymologizes it to be. For the first God neither sees, nor is sight,

nor is inferior to any thing. Neither therefore does Theodorus admit

this explanation of the name, nor does he celebrate the supercelestial

place, as Socrates does under the influence of divine inspiration. For

there is neither any place, nor intelligible of _the one_, nor

any multitude of forms, nor does the genus of souls ascend beyond the

first God; since there is not any thing beyond him. But the divine

Iamblichus, as he supposes that Heaven subsists indefinitely after

the first cause, and as he has not delivered the peculiarity of its

hyparxis, he is indeed pure from the above-mentioned doubts, but he

should teach us what the celestial order is, how it subsists, and what

genus of Gods prior to the demiurgus gives completion to it. He however

who has perfected every thing [on this subject,] and has confirmed all

that he has said by invincible arguments, is our preceptor [Syrianus,]

who has surveyed all the orders between the first God, and the kingdom

of the heaven, and who has intellectually beheld the peculiarity of

this order, and has delivered to us his mystics the accurate truth

concerning it. In this way therefore, our fathers and grandfathers

differ from each other; but all of them in common distinguish the

subcelestial arch from the celestial circulation.

CHAPTER XXIV.

This therefore must also be supposed by us, and likewise in addition to

this, that this order of Gods (the subcelestial arch,) is proximately

arranged under the heaven. Hence, since the heaven being one and

triple, is allotted the connective order, but the supercelestial place

is allotted the highest order of the intelligible and at the same time

intellectual Gods, it is undoubtedly necessary that the subcelestial

arch should terminate the middle progression of the Gods, should

close this whole order, and convert it to its principle, and that it

should receive an order which is secondary indeed to the heaven, but

which it convolves to the highest union, and should be connascently

conjoined with the middle genera, but exist prior to intellectuals.

For these indeed separate their kingdom from the celestial power; but

the subcelestial arch is united to the heaven, and is comprehended

by the celestial order. Whence also it is denominated subcelestial.

As it is conjoined therefore, to the celestial circulation, and

subsists proximately from it, it converts all secondary natures to

intelligibles, and perfects them according to the intellectual place

of survey. For since the intellectual Gods are generated according to

conversion, and are convolved to themselves according to one spherical

union, it is necessary that the perfective empire should be proximately

established above them.

Hence, I am led to wonder at those who are ignorant of this divine

order, and do not maintain the whole fountain of perfection; but some

of them betake themselves to _entelechias_, of whom we admit thus much

alone, that they also conjoin the perfect with the form of connexion.

They are ignorant therefore, of the perfection which is separate from

subjects, willingly embrace the resemblances of true perfections, and

are conversant with these. Others again assign soul as the cause of

perfection, who are ignorant that they do not vindicate to themselves

a perfection preexisting in eternity, and who begin from the life

which energizes according to time, and possesses its perfection in

periods. It is necessary, however, that a perfection the whole of

which subsists at once, should be prior to that which is divided, and

that stable perfection should be prior to that which is moved. For

the motion itself which is according to time, is indigent of end, and

of the desirable, and is evolved about it according to parts. In the

third place, after these, others recur to intellect, and suppose the

first perfection to be intellectual. For intellect indeed, is energy

and intellectual perfection; but it aspires after divine perfection,

subsists about it, and is converted to itself through it. It is

necessary therefore, that the cause of conversion should exist prior

to the intellectual genera which are converted to divine perfection,

and that the leader of the perfection which is one, should be expanded

above the natures which are perfected.

Deservedly therefore, does the subcelestial arch prior to all

intellectual natures, preestablish an order of Gods convertive and

perfective of all the secondary divine genera. And on this account,

Plato elevates the Gods and dæmons that follow Jupiter, to this arch,

and through this to the heaven, and the supercelestial place. For when

they proceed to the banquet, and delicious food, they ascend to the

subcelestial arch. Hence through this they are perfected, participate

of the circulation of the heaven, and are extended to the intelligible.

For the intelligible is that which nourishes and fills all things. The

perfective therefore is established under the connective order. And

it perfects indeed all the natures that ascend to the intelligible,

dilates souls to the reception of divine goods, and illuminates

intellectual light. But comprehending in the bosoms of itself, the

second genera of the Gods, it establishes all things in the connective

circulation of wholes.

Through these things therefore, Socrates also shortly after says,

that the souls that are elevated together with the twelve Gods, to

intelligible beauty, are initiated [viz. rendered perfect] in the most

blessed of the mysteries, and through this initiation, receive the

mysteries with a pure soul, and become established in, and spectators

of things ineffable. Hence the initiation of the Gods is there; the

first mysteries are there. Nor is it at all wonderful, if Plato also

tolerates us in calling the Gods [of this order] _Teletarchs_, since

he says, that the souls that are there are _initiated_, the Gods

themselves indeed initiating them. But how is it possible otherwise

to denominate those who are the primary sources of _telete_ or

_initiation_, than _Teletarchs_? For I indeed, perceiving so great an

energy even as far as to the names themselves, do not see how they can

be called differently. Initiation however, being one and triple, (for

the perfective are co-divided with the connective Gods,) Plato calls

the one union of it the subcelestial arch, in the same manner as he

calls the connective order Heaven. But the depth which is in it is

indicated by his admitting that there is in it an extreme subjection,

and a steep path to the summit of the arch. As therefore, in the

order prior to this, we thought it proper to arrange the intelligible

according to the summit, the vital according to the profundity, and

the intellectual according to the extremity, which defines the whole

celestial circulation, so likewise in this perfective order, we must

consider the intelligible of the arch as its summit, denominating

it after the same manner as the back of the heaven, because these

are coordinate to each other; but we must consider the profundity as

coordinate to life, through which souls proceed to the summit; and the

extremity which closes the whole arch, as coordinate to intellect.

CHAPTER XXV.

This whole order however, which is united to the order prior to it,

we must analogously divide. For the perfective Gods are spread under

all the connective triad. And one of these indeed, is the supplier

to the Gods of stable[233] perfection, establishing all the Gods in,

and uniting them to themselves. But another is the primary source

of a perfection generative of wholes, exciting things which precede

according to essence, to the providence of secondary natures. And a

third is the leader of conversion to causes, convolving every thing

which has proceeded, to its proper principle. For through this triad

every thing which is perfect is self-sufficient, and subsists in

itself; every thing which generates, is perfect, and generates full

of vigour; and every thing which aspires after its proper principle,

is conjoined to it, through its own perfection. Whether therefore,

you assume the power of nature which is perfective of things that are

generated, or the perfect number of the restitutions of the soul to its

pristine state, or the perfection of intellect which is established

according to energy in one, all these are suspended from the one

perfection of the Gods, and being referred to it, some are allotted a

greater, but others a less portion of a perfect hyparxis; and every

perfection proceeds from thence. But in short, perfection is triple;

one indeed being prior to parts, such as is the perfection of the Gods.

For this has its subsistence in unity, preexisting self-perfectly,

prior to all multitude. For such indeed is _the one_ of the Gods,

not being such as _the one_ of souls, or of bodies; since these

indeed are in a kindred manner conjoined with multitude, and are

co-mingled with essences. But the unities of the Gods are self-perfect,

and subsist prior to essences, generating multitudes, and not being

generated together with them. But another perfection is that which

consists of parts, and which derives its completion through parts, such

as is the perfection of the world; for it possesses the all-perfect

from its plenitudes. And a third other perfection, is that which is in

parts. But thus also each part of the world is perfect. For as this

universe is a whole consisting of wholes, so likewise it is perfect

from the perfect parts that are in it, according to Timæus. And in

short, perfection is divided after the same manner as wholeness; for,

as Timæus says, they are conjoined with each other.

Hence also the perfective genus is connascent with the connective,

and the perfective monad is arranged under all the connective genera.

And as the wholeness of the heaven which connectedly contains parts

is triple, so likewise perfection is triple. And if it be requisite

to deliver my own opinion, all the perfections are derived from all

the leaders; but the perfection which is prior to parts, pertains in a

greater degree to the first leader; that which consists of parts, to

the middle; and that which is in a part, to the third leader. But prior

to this triad, is the intelligible triad, which is uniform perfection,

and an all-perfect hyparxis, and which Timæus also denominates perfect

according to all things. There, however, the three perfections

pre-existed unitedly, or rather, there was one fountain of every

perfection. As therefore the connective[234] triad, is the evolution of

the intelligible connexion, and the collective triad of the unific, and

that which is the first in intelligibles, so likewise the perfective

triad is the image of the all-perfect triad. For the intelligible and

intellectual proceed analogous to the intelligible triads. Perfection

therefore is triple, prior to parts, from parts, in a part. According

to another mode also, perfection is stable, generative, convertive.

And according to another conception, there is one perfection of

intellectual and impartible essences, another of psychical essences,

and another of the natures which are divisible about bodies. Very

properly therefore, there are three leaders of perfection prior to

the intellectual Gods, who constitute one order under the celestial

circulation, who elevate through themselves all secondary natures

to the intelligible, perfect them by intelligible light, convert and

conjoin them to the kingdom of the heaven, impart an unsluggish energy

to the natures that are perfected, and are the guardians of their

undefiled perfection.

CHAPTER XXVI.

Such are the conceptions which may be assumed from Plato concerning

the third triad of the intelligible, and at the same time intellectual

orders, which at one time he denominates the subcelestial arch,

possessing a summit, middle, and extremity, but at another a blessed

mystery, and of all mysteries the most ancient and august, through

which he elevates souls and conjoins them to the mystic plenitude

of intelligibles. For this triad opens the celestial paths, being

established under the celestial circulation, and exhibits the

self-splendid appearances of the Gods, which are both entire and firm,

and expand to the mystic inspection of intelligible spectacles, as

Socrates says in the Phædrus. For _telete_ precedes _muesis_, and

_muesis_, _epopteia_. Hence we are initiated [_teleioumetha_] in

ascending, by the perfective Gods. But we view with closed eyes [i.e.

with the pure soul itself, _muoumetha_] entire and stable appearances,

through the connective Gods, with whom there is the intellectual

wholeness, and the firm establishment of souls. And we become fixed in,

and spectators of [_epopteuomen_] the intelligible watch tower, through

the Gods who are the collectors of wholes. We speak indeed of all these

things as with reference to the intelligible, but we obtain a different

thing according to a different order. For the perfective Gods initiate

us in the intelligible through themselves. And the collective monads

are through themselves the leaders of the inspection of intelligibles.

And there are indeed many steps of ascent, but all of them extend

to the paternal port, and the paternal initiation, in which may the

teletarchs, who are the leaders of all good, likewise establish us,

illuminating us not by words, but by deeds. May they also think us

worthy of being filled with intelligible beauty under the mighty

Jupiter, and perfectly free us from those evils about generation with

which we are now surrounded as with a wall. May they likewise impart

to us by illumination this most beautiful fruit of the present theory,

which, following the divine Plato, we have sufficiently delivered to

those who love the contemplation of truth.

CHAPTER XXVII.

Let us now therefore again follow Parmenides in another way, who

after the intelligible triads generates the intelligible, and at

the same time, intellectual orders, and unfolds the continued

progression of divine natures, through successive conclusions. For

the connexion of the words, and their dependence on each other,

imitates the indissoluble order of things, which always conjoins

middles to extremes, and proceeds through middle genera to the last

progressions of beings. This therefore we must survey prior to the

several intellectual conceptions, how the intelligible, and at the

same time, intellectual triads, proceed analogous to the intelligible

triads, that we may comprehend by a reasoning process the well-arranged

order of things. There were three intelligible triads therefore, viz.

the one being, whole, and infinite multitude. And three intelligible,

and at the same time, intellectual triads, have also presented

themselves to our view, viz. number, whole, and the perfect. Hence

from the one being, number is derived; from the intelligible whole,

the whole that is in these; and from infinite multitude, the perfect.

For the infinite which is there was all-powerful, and all-perfect,

comprehending indeed all things, but being itself incomprehensible. To

the all-powerful therefore and all-perfect, the perfect is analogous,

possessing a perfection which is intellectual, and secondary to the

first effective and intelligible perfection. The whole also which

is both intelligible and intellectual is allied to the intelligible

whole, but it differs from it, so far as the latter possesses wholeness

according to the one union of the one being; but _the one_ of the

former appears to be itself by itself a whole, consisting of unical

parts; and being appears to consist of many beings. These wholenesses

therefore, being divided, differ from the wholeness which precedes

according to union and is intelligible. For the wholenesses of this

whole are parts of the intelligible wholeness.

In the third place therefore, we must consider number as analogous

to the one being. For the one being is there indeed occultly,

intelligibly, and paternally; but here in conjunction with difference

it generates number, which constitutes the separation of forms and

reasons.[235] For difference itself first shines forth in this order,

being power indeed, and the duad in intelligibles; but here it is

maternal, and a prolific fountain. For there power was collective of

_the one_, and the one being; on which account also it was ineffable,

as existing occultly in _the one_ and in hyparxis. But here difference

separates indeed being and _the one_. After this likewise, it

multiplies _the one_ proceeding generatively, and calls forth being

into second and third progressions; breaking indeed being into many

beings, and dividing _the one_ into more partial unities. But according

to each of these completing the decrements, the wholes remaining. Very

properly therefore does Plato make the negations of _the one_ from

this. For here the many subsist, through difference which divides being

and _the one_; since the whole also which is denied of _the one_, is

intellectual and not intelligible. The negation therefore says that

_the one_ is not a whole, so that the affirmation is, _the one_ is

a whole. This whole however is intellectual and not intelligible.

Parmenides also denies the many as follows: “_The one_ is not many;”

but the opposite to this is, _the one_ is many. The multitude of

intelligibles, however, does not make _the one_ to be many, but

causes the one being to be many. And in short, every intelligible is

characterized by the one being. For in the intelligible being and _the

one_ are complicated, and are connascent with each other; and being is

most unical. But when each of these proceeds into multitude, they are

separated from each other, and evince a greater difference with respect

to each other. Each of these also is divided into multitude through

the prolific nature of difference. From these things therefore, it is

evident that the intelligible and intellectual orders, being analogous

to the intelligible orders, proceed in conjunction with diminution.

CHAPTER XXVIII.

After this however, let us discuss each of them, beginning according

to nature. First, therefore, the intelligible, and at the same

time, intellectual number presents itself to our view; and which is

connected with multitude. For every number is multitude. But with

respect to multitude, one kind subsists unitedly, and another kind

with separation. Number, however, is separate multitude; for there

is difference in it. For in the intelligible there was power, and

not difference, and this power generated multitude, and conjoined it

to the monads. Number therefore is in continuity with intelligible

multitude; and this is necessary. For the monad was there, and also

the duad; since whole also was there, and was always monadic; and

becoming to be two, has no cessation. Hence the monad and the duad

were there, which are the first and exempt principles of numbers.

And in these multitude was unitedly; since the monad which is the

fountain of numbers, and the duad possess all multitude according to

cause; the former paternally, but the latter maternally. And on this

account intelligible multitude is not yet number, but is intelligibly

established in the uniform principles, I mean the monad and the duad;

generatively indeed, in the duad, but paternally in the monad. For

the third God was father and mother; since if animal itself is in it,

it is also necessary that the cause of the male and the female should

there primarily preexist. For these are in animals. Hence according

to Timæus, and according to Parmenides, the maternal and the paternal

cause are there. And in these, intelligible animals, and intelligible

multitudes are comprehended. From these first principles also number

together with difference proceed, and they generate the monads and the

duads which are in number, and all numbers. For both the generative and

the paternal subsist in these in a feminine manner.

All the monads likewise of this triad are paternal. Hence prior to

other things they participate of the monadic cause, but according to

the power of difference. For there indeed, I mean in the intelligible,

the maternal was paternally; but here the paternal subsists maternally;

just as there, the intellectual subsists intelligibly, but here the

intelligible, intellectually. From that order therefore, the first

number subsists proximately, but being generated analogous to the

first triad of intelligibles, it also evidently proceeds from it.

Hence also, Parmenides beginning his discourse about number, reminds

us of the first hypothesis through which he generates the one being,

asserting that _the one_ participates of essence, and essence of _the

one_, in consequence of _this_ subsisting according to _that_ triad.

And this very properly. For being intelligible and intellectual, so

far indeed, as it is allotted an intelligible order in intellectuals,

it proceeds from the summit of intelligibles, but so far as it

precedes the intellectual orders, it proceeds from the intellectual

of intelligibles. In that intelligible triad, however, _the one_ was

of being, and being of _the one_, through the ineffable and occult

union of these two, and their subsistence in each other. But in the

intelligible and at the same time intellectual triad, difference

presenting itself to the view, which is the image of the concealed and

ineffable power in the first triad of intelligibles, and luminously

exerting its own energy, separates _the one_ from being, and being

from _the one_, leads each into divided multitude, and thus generates

total number. For number, as we have frequently said, is divided and

not united multitude, and subsists from the principles according to a

second progression, but is not occultly established in the principles.

Hence also, it is simply different from multitude. And in intelligibles

indeed, there is multitude; but in intellectuals number. For there

indeed, number is according to cause; but here multitude is according

to participation. For there indeed, division subsists intelligibly;

but here union has an intellectual subsistence. If therefore number

proceeds from these, and is allotted such an order, Parmenides very

properly especially mentions these triads, asserting that _the one_

participates of essence, and essence of _the one_,[236] and that

through these the many become apparent. For one of these indeed, is

the illustrious property of the first triad, but the other, of the

third triad. And in the first triad indeed, participation[237] was the

presubsistence of the union of _the one_ and being; but in the third

triad many intelligibles present themselves to the view, Plato all but

proclaiming that the most splendid of intelligibles subsists according

to intelligible multitude, though multitude is there occult, and

uniformly. For according to each order of divine natures, multitude is

appropriately generated in the extremities.

CHAPTER XXIX.

The intelligible number therefore of the intellectual genera, proceeds

from these, and through these. And it possesses indeed properties

incomprehensible by human reasonings, but which are divided into two

first effective powers, viz. the power generative of wholes, and the

power which collects into union all progressions. For according to

the monad indeed, it collects intellectual multitude, and conjoins it

to intelligibles; but according to the duad it produces multitude,

and separates it according to difference. And according to the odd

number indeed, it collects the many orders into indivisible union; but

according to the even number, it prolifically produces into light all

the genera of the Gods. For being established as the middle of the

intelligible and intellectual Gods, and giving completion to the one

bond of them, it is carried in its summit indeed, in intellectuals

as in a vehicle, but being united to intelligibles, it evolves

intelligible multitude, and calls forth its occult and unical nature

into separation, and prolific generation. It also collects that which

is intellectual into union and impartible communion. And not this

only, but generating all things as far as to the last of things,

according to the incomprehensible cause of the duad and the nature of

the even number, it again unites the proceeding natures and convolves

them according to the monad, and the sameness of the odd number.

Through unity indeed, and the duad, it produces,[238] collects and

binds all things intelligibly, occultly, and in an unknown manner to

the intelligible, and effects this even in the last matter and the

vestigies of forms which it contains. But through the even and odd

number it constitutes the two coordinations, viz. the vivific and the

immutable, the prolific and the effective, all the impartible genera

of fabricating and animal-producing powers, those powers that preside

over a partible life, or partible production, the more intellectual and

singular mundane natures, and which belong to the better coordination,

and those natures that are more irrational and multiplied, and which

give completion to the subordinate series. And again, through this

divided generation we may see that each of the proceeding natures, is

united and at the same time multiplied, is indivisible and divided

in its causes, and through diminution is separated from them. And we

attribute indeed things that are more excellent and more simple to

the nature of the odd number, but things that are less excellent

and more various, to the nature of the even number. For every where

indeed, the odd number is the leader of impartible, simple, and unical

goods; but the even number is the cause of divided, various, and

generative progressions. And thus we may see all the orders of beings

woven together according to divine number which is most ancient,

intellectual, and exempt from all the dinumerated genera. For it

is necessary that number should exist prior to the things that are

numbered, and that prior to things which are separated there should be

the cause of all separation, according to which the genera of the Gods

are divided, and are distinguished in an orderly manner by appropriate

numbers.

If therefore in intellectuals there are divisions, contacts, and

separations of the proceeding natures, and likewise communications of

coordinate natures, it is necessary that number should be prior to

intellectuals, which divides and collects all things intelligibly by

the powers of itself. And if all things subsist occultly, intelligibly,

in an unknown manner and exemptly in this summit,[239] there is a

number of them, and a peculiarity unical and without separation. Number

therefore subsists according to the middle bond of intelligibles and

intellectuals, being indeed expanded above intellectuals through

intelligible goods, but subordinate to intelligibles through

intellectual separations. And it is assimilated indeed to intelligibles

according to the power which is collective of many things into union,

but to intellectuals according to the power which is generative of the

many from _the one_. But from this highest place of survey of

the intellectual Gods, it constitutes the first intellectual numbers

themselves which have the nature of forms, are universal, and preside

over the whole of generation and production. It likewise constitutes

the second numbers, which are supermundane, and vivific, and measure

the Gods that are in the world. But it constitutes as the third

numbers, these celestial governors of the perpetual circulations, and

who convolve all the orbs according to the intellectual causes of

them. And it constitutes as the last numbers those powers that in the

sublunary region connect and bound the infinity and unstable nature of

matter by forms, and numbers and reasons, through which both the wholes

and parts of all mortal natures are variegated with proper numbers. But

it every where connects the precedaneous and more perfect genera of

the Gods by the odd number, but the subordinate and secondary genera,

by the even number. Thus for instance, in the intellectual orders, it

produces the female and the prolific according to the even number,

but the male and the paternal according to the odd number. But in the

supermundane orders, it characterizes similitude and the immutable

according to the odd number, but dissimilitude and a progression

into secondary natures, according to the even number. For thus the

Athenian guest also, orders that in sacred worship odd things should be

distributed to the celestial, but even to the terrestrial powers. And

according to each of these genera that which is of a more ruling nature

must be referred to the odd number, but that which is subordinate, to

the even number.

The nature of number, therefore, pervades from on high, as far as

to the last of things, adorning all things, and connecting them by

appropriate forms. For how could a perfect number comprehend the period

of the whole world, as the Muses in Plato assert that it does? Or how

could numbers, some of which are productive of fertility, and others

of sterility, comprehend the descents of souls? Or how could some

of them define the ascents of souls in less, but others in greater

periods, as Socrates says in the Phædrus, where he delivers to us

restitutions consisting of three thousand and ten thousand years? Or

how could time itself which is unically comprehensive of the psychical

measures, proceed according to number, as Timæus says it does, unless

divine number exists prior to all these, which imparts to all things

a principal cause of order according to numbers? Since all things

therefore subsist through numbers and forms, numbers are allotted

a progression from the intellectual summit. But forms have their

generation from intelligible[240] forms. For forms subsist primarily

in the third triad of intelligibles. But numbers are primarily in the

first triad of intellectuals; since also in the effects of these, every

number indeed is form, but not every form is number.

If, however, it be requisite clearly to unfold the truth, numbers are

also prior to forms. For there are indeed superessential numbers, but

there are not superessential forms. And according to this reasoning

every form is number, as also the Pythagoreans said. For Timæus being

a Pythagorean, not only asserts that there are intelligible forms, but

also intelligible numbers; for he says that the intelligible forms are

four. There however, number is intelligibly, and monadically according

to cause. For intelligible animal is a monad, occultly containing the

whole of number. But in the summit of intellectuals, number subsists

separately, evolving the number which preexists in the monad according

to cause and uniformly. For there is a difference, I think, between

saying multitude in its cause, and multitude from its cause, and

between saying united, and saying separated multitude. And the one

indeed is prior to number, but the other is number. So that according

to Timæus there are intelligible numbers together with forms, and prior

to forms. And according to Parmenides, number is after multitude. For

Timæus calls uniform and occult multitude the number of forms. But

since number is primarily in the Gods, but forms participate of the

divine unities, he denominates the first ideas four. For monad and

triad, were primarily indeed in the Gods themselves, but secondarily in

intellectuals; and superessentially indeed in the former, but formally

in the latter. In intelligibles therefore, multitude was unically; but

in intellectuals it subsists separately. But where there is separation

there also there is number, as we have frequently observed. Hence

likewise all the genera of the Gods are from hence generated. And they

are divided, the paternal indeed and generative, among intelligibles

and intellectuals; but the demiurgic and vivific, among intellectuals.

And the genera indeed, that bind through similitude, are divided among

supermundane natures; but those that are both exempt and distributed,

are divided among the liberated Gods. And the celestial[241] and

sublunary genera, are divided among the mundane Gods. And in short, all

the coordinations of beings receive their distinction and separation

from this order. From these things therefore, it is evident what the

peculiarities are which intelligible and at the same time intellectual

number possesses, and of what it is the cause to the Gods.

CHAPTER XXX.

In the next place, we must likewise assert that the first number[242]

is of a feminine nature. For in this, difference first shines forth,

separating _the one_ from being, and dividing _the one_ into many

unities, and being into many beings. What therefore is the difference

which is the cause of these things to the Gods? For if we should call

it a genus of being, in the first place indeed, how is it prior to

being? For separating being and _the one_, it is arranged between both

of them. But existing as a middle, it calls forth indeed _the one_ into

generations, but it fills being with generative cause. If therefore,

it is prior to being, how will it be one certain genus of being? And

in the second place, after this, _the different_ which is a genus

of being, is every where essential, and is by no means inherent in

superessential natures. But difference itself is primarily present with

the unities themselves, and separates and produces many unities from

one. How therefore, can superessential difference ever come to be the

same with the difference which gives completion to essences?

In the third place, _that different_ [which is a genus of being,]

presents itself to the view in intellectuals, according to the

demiurgic order. But difference itself is the intelligible summit of

intellectuals. And the former indeed, subsists together with sameness;

but the latter has by itself a subsistence in the intelligibles of

intellectuals. To which also may be added, that in what follows,

Plato as he proceeds makes mention of difference, and generates it

in conjunction with sameness. How therefore, does he effect the same

conclusion twice? For he does not employ such a repetition as this in

any one of the other conclusions. For whole, which he seems to assume

twice, is not the same whole, viz. the intellectual is not the same

with the intelligible; but these, as we have said, differ from each

other. For how could he unfold to us the different progressions of

divine natures, if he collected the same conclusions? According to all

these conceptions, therefore, we must separate the difference which is

generative of numbers from the genus of beings.

But if difference itself is not the nature of the different, but a

power generative of beings, it will be collective of being and _the

one_. For every where power is allotted an hyparxis of this kind. For

through power _the one_ participates of being, and being of _the one_.

Power therefore was the cause, not of division, but of communion, of

contact without separation, and of the habitude of _the one_ to being,

and of being to _the one_. Hence it is necessary that it should neither

be arranged according to intelligible power, nor according to the

intellectual difference of beings; but that being the middle of both,

it should subsist analogous to intelligible power, but should generate

in the extremities of intellectuals the portion of _the different_.

What else therefore is it than the feminine nature of the Gods? Hence

also it imitates intelligible power, and is prolific of many unities,

and of many beings. And how could it otherwise separate number from

itself, and the forms and powers of number, unless it was the cause of

the divine progressions in a feminine manner. Multitude therefore is

paternally in intelligibles, but maternally in intellectuals. Hence, in

the former indeed, it subsists monadically, but in the latter according

to number. Very properly therefore, in the second genera of the Gods

also, union is derived from the male, but separation from the female

divinities. And bound indeed proceeds from the males, but infinity from

the females. For the male is analogous to bound, but the female to

infinity. The female, however, differs from infinite power, so far as

power indeed, is united to the father, and is in him; but the female is

divided from the paternal cause. For power is not only in the female

divinities, but is also prior to them, since the intelligible powers

are in the male divinities, according to Timæus, who says that the

power of the demiurgus is the cause of the generation of perpetual

natures. For [the demiurgus says to the junior Gods] “imitating my

power, produce and generate animals.” Power therefore, is prior to the

male and the female, and is in both, and posterior to both. For it

pervades through all beings, and every being participates of power,

as the Elean guest says. For power is every where. But the female

participates in a greater degree of its peculiarity, and the male

of union according to bound. That the first number therefore, which

presents itself to the view from intelligibles, is of a feminine

nature, is through these things evident.

CHAPTER XXXI.

It remains then, that we should speak concerning the triadic division

of it, following Parmenides. These three things therefore, have

appeared to us from the beginning, according to the separation of _the

one_ from being, viz. _the one_, difference, and being; difference not

being the same either with _the one_ or being. For though _the one_

and being were in intelligibles, yet difference first subsists here.

Since however power above [i.e. in intelligibles] was collective, but

here is the separator of the extremes, there are not only three monads,

but also three duads, viz. _the one_ in conjunction with difference,

difference in conjunction with being, and _the one_ in conjunction

with being. For difference also is the cause of a separation of this

kind, not preserving the union of the one being with genuine purity.

There are therefore three monads, and three duads. But these likewise

may become three triads, when we begin, at one time from _the one_, at

another time from being, and at another from difference. Hence this

triad subsists monadically, and triadically. But this is the same thing

as to assert that difference and the first feminine nature generates

in itself, monads, duads, and triads. For the divided assumption,

generates for us different monads; but the conjoined assumption, duads,

and triads, some indeed being vanquished by _the one_, others by

difference, and others by being. And thus far the first deity presents

itself to the view, being prolific of the first numbers; according to

_the one_ indeed, of unical numbers, but according to difference of

generative, and according to being, of essential numbers.

Since however, from this deity which is intelligible, that which is

posterior to it proceeds, it is evidently necessary that the monad,

duad, and triad, should severally have prolific power. These powers

therefore, Parmenides calls once, twice, thrice. For each of these

is a power which is the cause of the above-mentioned essences that

produce either separately, or connectedly. For there with respect

to the generations of them, some of them are entirely peculiar, but

others are common to secondary natures. The progeny therefore of

these are, the oddly-odd, the evenly-even and the evenly-odd.[243]

And of these, the oddly-odd indeed, as we have before observed, is

collective into union of the divine progressions. But the evenly-even

is generative of wholes, and proceeds as far as to the last of things.

The evenly-odd however, is mixed, having its subsistence from both the

even and the odd. Hence we must establish the first as analogous to

bound, but the second as analogous to power, and the third as analogous

to being. And you may see, how indeed in the first order all things

had a primary subsistence, viz. monad, duad, triad; but how in this

order, all things are secondarily and subordinately. And the mixture

which is the triad, subsisted there indeed in one way, but here the

evenly-odd subsists in another way. For there the extremes were odd,

because they were intelligible; but here the even is more abundant,

and the intelligible summit only is odd. For the middle of the triad

is analogous to power. And there indeed, is the monad, which has all

the forms of odd numbers according to cause, and the duad is there,

which is occultly all the forms of even numbers, and also the triad,

which is number primarily. But here both the odd and the even number

now subsist in a twofold respect, in one place in an unmingled,

and in another in a mingled manner. All things therefore, are here

prolifically, but there, paternally and intelligibly. But _that_

monad does not proceed from intelligibles, but subsists in them in

unproceeding union. Hence, after these, and from these, we may survey

the whole of number subsisting according to a third progression.

“For these things,” says Parmenides, “preexisting, no number will be

absent.” Every number therefore, is generated through these in the

third monad, and both _the one_ and being become many, difference

separating each of them. And every part indeed of being participates of

_the one_; but every unity is carried as in a vehicle in a certain

portion of being. Each of these however, is multiplied, intellectually

separated, divided into minute parts, and proceeds to infinity. For as

in intelligibles, we attribute infinite multitude to the third triad,

so here, in this triad we assign infinite number to the third part of

the triad. For in short every where, the infinite is the extremity,

as proceeding in an all-perfect manner, and comprehending indeed all

secondary natures, but being itself participated by none of them. In

the first monad therefore, there were powers, but intelligibly. In the

second, there were progressions and generations, but both intelligibly

and intellectually. And in the third, there was all-powerful number,

unfolding the whole of itself into light; and which also Parmenides

denominates infinite. It is likewise especially manifest that it is not

proper to transfer this infinity to quantity. For how can there be an

infinite number, since infinity is hostile to the nature of number? And

how are the parts of _the one_ equal to the minute parts of being?

For in infinites there is not the equal. But this indeed has been

thought worthy of attention by those who were prior to us.

CHAPTER XXXII.

The division therefore into three, having been demonstrated by us, we

shall briefly observe, that _the one_ appears to be many according to

this order, _the one itself_ proceeding into a multitude of unities,

and being in a similar manner becoming generated in conjunction with

_the one_. For those three monads are the intelligible comprehensions

of all orders, and they at once preside over all the progressions

from intelligibles, produce all of them in an exempt manner, and

collect them to the intelligible causes. Since however, Plotinus

admits that number is prior to animal itself, and says that the first

being produces from itself number, and that this is established as a

medium between the one being, and animal itself, but is the basis and

place of beings, it is worth while to speak likewise concisely about

this. For if he says that animal itself has intelligible and occult

number, as comprehended in the monad, he speaks rightly, and accords

with Plato. But if he says that animal itself comprehends number, now

separated, or which has a multiform subsistence, and is the progeny of

difference, intelligible multitude is not a thing of this kind. For

there indeed, _the one_ is being, and being is _the one_. Hence animal

itself is according to all things perfect. But in number, _the one_ is

separated from being, and being from _the one_, and each of the parts

is no longer an intelligible whole, as an animal itself. For that is a

whole of wholes; and every where _the one_ was with being in the parts

of it, and animal itself was only-begotten. But number proceeded after

the twofold coordinations, I mean the monad and duad, the odd and the

even number. How therefore, can we place in animal itself the first

number? If however, some one should say that number exists there, it is

according to cause and intelligibly. But it is intellectually separated

by difference. And farther still, in addition to these things, if

animal itself is surveyed by some one in the demiurgic order, and he

denominates it the plenitude of forms, and the intelligible of the

demiurgic intellect, it will thus have intellectual number, as being

arranged near the intellectual end. But if he should call intelligible

animal number, in this case there will be separation and difference

in the Gods, whom we have asserted to be established above the whole

of things, according to supreme union. For all section and division

originate from the intellectual Gods; since here difference proceeds,

adorning things in conjunction with _the one_ and being. How therefore,

does the division of the unities into minute parts, or the multiform

nature of beings pertain to intelligibles? And how can the multitude

of all forms accord with the first animal itself? For the tetrad was

there, divided by the monad and triad, a division of this kind being

adapted to the third order of intelligible forms. For as the one being

is a monad, but eternity is a monad and duad, (for to be is conjoined

with the ever) so animal itself is a monad and triad. Since however, it

comprehends in itself the cause of all number, Timæus denominates it

the tetrad which is comprehensive of the four first-effective causes.

For the tetrad itself preexists as the fountain of all the production

of forms. But in intelligibles the monad, duad and triad subsist

unically; but in intellectuals in a divided manner.

Difference therefore necessarily generates all these for us with

separation. For every where, the first of subordinate natures have the

peculiar form of the natures that exist prior to them.[244] Hence,

the first multitudes proceed indeed from _the one_, but they

are unical, without separation, and without number, imitating the

one principle of the whole of things. Very properly therefore, does

Parmenides constitute multitude in intelligibles, according to the end

[of the intelligible order]; but number in intellectuals according to

the beginning [of the intelligible and at the same time intellectual

order.] And these are conjoined with each other. Parmenides also

pre-establishes unical and intelligible multitude, as the cause

of intellectual numbers. And Timæus shows that animal itself is

only-begotten, because it was monadically the cause of the whole of

things, and not dyadically, nor according to divine difference. That

number however, is the first thing in intellectuals, we have abundantly

shown.

CHAPTER XXXIII.

But Parmenides begins to speak about it as follows: “Proceed therefore,

and still farther consider this. What? We have said that _the one_

participates of essence, so far as it is being. We have said so. And

on this account the one being appears to be many.” But he completes

his discourse about the first monad thus: “Are not three things odd,

and two even? How should they not?” And about the second monad, as

follows: “Hence there will be the evenly-even, and the oddly-odd, and

the oddly-even, and the evenly-odd.” But he completes his discourse

about the third and all the succeeding triad, as follows: “The one

being therefore, is not only many, but it is likewise necessary that

_the one_ which is distributed by being should be many. Entirely

so.” The first triad, therefore, of the intelligible, and at the same

time, intellectual Gods, is through these things unfolded to us by

Plato, and which possesses indeed, according to the first monad the

first powers of numbers, I mean the odd and the even, and is completed

through these principles which were in intelligibles occultly, viz.

monad, duad, triad. But according to the second monad it possesses

the second powers of numbers which subsist from these [i.e. from the

first powers]. For the section of the forms of the even number, is

allotted a second order. And the oddly-odd is subordinate to the first

odd numbers. But according to the third monad, it possesses the more

partial causes of divine numbers. Hence also, a separation into minute

parts, infinity, all-perfect division, and unical and essential number

are here; receiving indeed, the unical and the essential from unity

and being, but the separation of number from difference. For every

where difference is in the three monads, but it particularly unfolds

the multitudes of numbers, according to the third monad, generates

more partial Gods, and divides being in conjunction with the Gods. For

neither is deity in these imparticipable, because unity is not separate

from being, nor is essence destitute of deity, because neither is being

deprived of _the one_.

Since however, all things are in each of the monads, but unically

and intelligibly in the first, generatively, and according to the

peculiarity of difference in the second, and intellectually, and

according to being in the third;--this being the case, Plato when

unfolding to us the first monad, very properly begins from the monad,

and proceeds as far as to the triad; but when teaching about the

second, he begins from evenly-even numbers, and proceeds as far as

to those that are evenly-odd, both which belong to the nature of the

even number. And when he adds the third monad, he begins from being,

and recurs through difference to _the one_. For having shown that

being participates of number, he from hence leads us round to unical

number, employing the mode of conversion in the conception of this

monad.

CHAPTER XXXIV.

If, however, it be requisite to survey the unknown peculiarity

of divine numbers, and how the first order of intelligibles and

intellectuals, and number which subsists according to this order, is

the most ancient of all numbers, in the first place, we should consider

the infinity mentioned by Parmenides, and see whether he does not say

that intelligible multitude is infinite on account of this number,

in consequence of its being unknown and incomprehensible by partial

conceptions. For the all-perfect, and all-powerful peculiarity of

divine numbers is exempt from the comprehension of partible natures,

[such as ours]. They are therefore unknown, and on this account are

said to be inexplicable, and not to be investigated. For number also

in the last of things, and multitude, together with the known have

likewise the unknown. And we are not able to comprehend the progression

of every number in consequence of being vanquished by infinity.

The incomprehensibility therefore, of this power which is unknown

according to a discursive energy, is comprehended according to cause,

in intelligible numbers and multitudes. For there would not be a thing

of this kind in the last of numbers, unless the unknown pre-existed in

intelligible numbers, and unless the former were ultimate imitations of

the exempt incomprehensibility of the latter.

In the second place, after this, we may also add, that unical numbers

are likewise of themselves unknown. For they are more ancient than

beings, more single than forms, and being generative of, exist prior to

the forms which we call intelligible. But the most venerable of divine

operations manifest this, since they employ numbers, as possessing an

ineffable efficacy, and through these effect the greatest, and most

arcane of works. And prior to these nature ineffably, according to

sympathy, imparts different powers to different[245] things, to some

solar, but to others lunar powers, and renders the productions of these

concordant with numbers. For in these monadic numbers also, the forms

of numbers, such as the triad, the pentad, and the heptad, are one

thing, but the unions of the forms another thing. For each of these

forms is both one, and multitude. Hence form is unknown according to

the highest union.

If therefore, monadic number participates of a certain unknown power,

much more must the first number possess this peculiarity unically

exempt from the whole of things. And besides this, we may also assume

the anagogic power of numbers, not only because they define the periods

of the physical restitutions, circumscribing our indefinite lation by

appropriate measures, perfecting us according to these measures, and

conjoining us to our first causes, but because likewise, number in a

remarkable manner possesses a certain power of attracting to truth,

as Socrates says in the Republic, leading us to intelligibles from a

sensible nature.[246] As therefore, the last number is allotted this

peculiarity, what ought we to say about the first number? Is it not

this, that it unfolds intelligible light, especially persuades to an

establishment in intelligibles, and through its own order announces to

us the uniform power of principles? If therefore, we rightly assert

these things, we shall in a greater degree admire Timæus, who having

placed time over the perfections of souls, and the whole world, through

which it would become more similar to animal itself says, that time

proceeds according to number, and by number measures the existence of

total souls. And as in intellectuals, number is established above the

celestial circulation, collecting and causing it to be one, thus also

in sensibles Timæus says, that time being number measures the celestial

periods, and comprehends in itself the first causes of the perfection

of the periods. If also, Socrates in the Republic, in the speech of

the Muses, speaks about the one and entire period of the universe,

which he says a perfect number comprehends, does it not through these

things appear that divine number is perfective of wholes, and restores

them to their pristine state, and that it measures all periods? The

power likewise of collecting things imperfect to the perfect, accedes

to all things from number, which elevates souls from things apparent

to those that are unapparent, illuminates the whole world with the

perfection of motion, and defines to all things measures, and the order

of periods. But if not only a perfect number contains the period of a

divine generated[247] nature, but another second number after this is

the lord of better and worse generations, as the same Socrates says,

number will not only restore things to their pristine state, but will

also be of a generative nature. And it is evident that these things

subsist in a divided manner, according to the second and third periods

of numbers; but at once, and contractedly in the first of numbers. The

first number therefore, is generative, mensurative, and perfective of

generated natures.

CHAPTER XXXV.