written in the Timæus concerning the three intelligible triads,
conformably to what is said of them in the Philebus, surveying in each
bound, infinity, and that which is mixed. If you are willing also, we
will show from what is scattered in the Sophista, that Plato had the
same conception as we have concerning the first principles. The Elean
guest therefore, in that dialogue, doubting against the assertion of
Parmenides that the universe is one, unfolding intelligible multitude,
and showing how it is suspended from _the one_, at first indeed, he
argues from the one being [or being characterized by the one] and
reminds us that this is passive to _the one_, and participates of _the
one_, but is not _the one itself_, nor that which is primarily one.
But afterwards, he produces the conception of the distinction between
the imparticipable one and being, from whole. For if the one being is
a whole, as Parmenides testifies, but that which is a whole has parts,
and that which has parts, is not _the one itself_, the one being will
not be the same as _the one_. In the third place therefore, he argues
from the all-perfect. For that which is perfectly divided, and is
connective of many parts, can never have the same subsistence as that
which is entirety one. And having proceeded thus far he shows that
what is void of multitude, is in its own nature exempt from the one
being, proceeding in the demonstration of this through three arguments.
And at one time indeed, he begins from the one being, at another time
from whole, and at another from all. It is better however to hear the
words themselves of Plato. That _the one_ therefore, is not the same
with the one being, he proves through the following words. “But what
with respect to those who assert that the universe is one? Must we not
enquire to the utmost of our power what they say being is? Certainly.
To this question therefore they may answer: Do you say there is one
thing alone? We do say so. Or will they not speak in this manner? They
will. What then, do you call being any thing? Yes. Do you call it _the
one_, employing two names respecting the same thing? Or how do you say?
What will be their answer after this O guest?” Through this therefore,
Plato separating _the one_ and being from each other, and showing that
the conception of _the one_ is different from that of being, and that
these are not the same with each other, evinces that the most proper
and primary one is exempt from the one being. For the one being does
not abide purely in an hyparxis void of multitude and possessing the
form of one. But _the one itself_ is exempt from every addition. For by
whatever you may add to it, you will diminish its supreme and ineffable
union. Hence it is necessary to arrange _the one_ prior to the one
being, and to suspend the one being from that which is one alone. For
if _the one_ and the one being were the same, and it made no difference
to say one and being (since if they differed, _the one_ would again
be changed from the one being,) if therefore _the one_ differs in no
respect from the one being, all things will be one, and there will not
be multitude in beings, nor will it be possible to denominate things,
lest there should be two things, the thing and the name. For being
exempt from all multitude, and all division, there will neither be a
name of any thing, nor any discourse about it, but the name will appear
to be the same with the thing. And neither will a name be the name of a
thing, but a name will be the name of a name, if a thing is the same
with a name, and a name is the same with a thing,[197] and a thing will
be the thing of a thing. For all things will exist about a thing the
same as about a name, through the union of the thing and the name. If
therefore, these things are absurd, and _the one_ is, and also being,
and being participates of _the one_, _the one_ and the one being are
not the same.
But that whole also is not the same with _the one_, Plato afterwards
demonstrates [in the same dialogue,] beginning as follows: “What then?
Will they say that whole is different from the one being, or that it
is the same with it? Undoubtedly they will and do say so. If therefore
whole is, as Parmenides says, “that which is every where similar to
the bulk of a perfect sphere, entirely possessing equal powers from
the middle; for nothing is greater or more stable than this:”--if
this be the case, it is necessary that being should have a middle and
extremities. And having these, there is every necessity that it should
have parts. Or how shall we say? Just so. Nothing however hinders but
that when it is divided, it may have the passion of _the one_ in all
its parts, and that thus the all and whole may be one. Undoubtedly.
But is it not impossible that that which suffers these things should
be _the one_? Why? Because according to right reason, that which is
truly one should be said to be entirely without parts. It must indeed
necessarily be so. But such a thing as we have just now mentioned, in
consequence of consisting of many parts would not accord with _the
one_.” Through these things therefore, the Elean guest arguing from
wholeness after the one being, and also from the division of the parts
of wholeness, demonstrates that the all is not one. For if whole is in
beings, as Parmenides in his verses testifies it is, all things will
not be _the one_. For _the one_ is impartible; but whole possesses
parts. Whole therefore is not _the one itself_. For that transcends all
things and wholeness; but whole is passive to _the one_. Hence also it
is denominated whole; for it is not _the one itself_. Hence all things
are not one void of separation and multiplication.
Moreover, the all is comprehensive of many parts. For whole indeed,
consists at first of two parts; but the all possesses a multitude of
parts, and participating of wholeness at the same time is all, as
being perfectly distributed into parts. This therefore is not _the
one itself_, but is passive to _the one_. For _the one itself_ is
impartible. But it is impartible in such a manner as to be exempt from
all parts. Hence the all is not the same with _the one_. We therefore,
have divided whole and the all, but Plato conjoins them, when he says:
“Nothing however hinders but that when it is divided, it may have
the passion of the one in all its parts, and that thus the all and
whole may be one.” At the same time however, they are divided after
the above mentioned manner. From these three arguments therefore, the
Elean guest separates _the one_ from the participants of _the one_,
and doubts against those who assert all things to be one, viz. the
one being, whole and the all; of which the all indeed participates of
whole, and is a self-perfect multitude, consisting of many parts; but
whole participates of being. For being is not whole, as Parmenides
testifies. These therefore, having such an order as this, is it not
necessary that the arguments of Plato should be made conformably to the
three intelligible[198] triads? For it was requisite, since Parmenides
defined the one being in intelligibles, that Plato should from thence
derive his demonstrations of the distinction between _the one_ prior
to intelligibles, and the one which is in intelligibles. For the
doubts against Parmenides, evince in many places that the one which is
participated derives its subsistence from the imparticipable union.
_The one_[199] therefore is not in these triads, but the one being and
whole. But with respect to the all, it is evident that it is in the
extremity of the intelligible order. For that which is in every respect
perfect, and all intelligible multitude, have their subsistence in that
extremity. But whole is in the middle centre, and in the bond of the
intelligible breadth. For whole is adapted to have a subsistence prior
to the all; since the all is a whole, but whole is not necessarily all.
For the all is divided multitude; but that which contains multitude in
itself, and which is not yet separated is whole. And this especially
pertains to eternity. For eternity is the measure of all intelligible
multitude, just as whole is the coherence and union of the all. But
the one being is in the first triad. For _the one_ is especially the
peculiarity of this triad, as Timæus also has demonstrated. And being
which is occultly and intelligibly being, and which is the cause of
essence to all other things, primarily shines forth there. Again
therefore, following the Elean guest, three triads present themselves
to our view; the first indeed according to the one being; the second
according to whole; and the third according to the all. To which also
the demiurgus of the universe looking, adorns the sensible universe,
defining the visible nature with reference to that intelligible all;
but time with reference to the intelligible wholeness. On which account
also time is continued. And as the intelligible whole comprehends
two parts, but contains the parts in one boundary, after the same
manner, time also is bounded by _the now_, but by its twofold parts is
infinite. These things therefore, we shall shortly after more fully
discuss when we speak concerning the Parmenides. For the conceptions of
the Elean guest are the _proteleia_ of the mysteries of the Parmenides.
Before however we turn to the Parmenides, let us discuss, if it is
agreeable to you, the three triads from the beginning, collecting the
conception of Plato from his assertions that are scattered in many
places.
CHAPTER XXI.
There are three triads therefore, as we have frequently observed, and
they are divided after this manner into bound, infinity, and that
which is mixed. Hence there are triple intelligible bounds, triple
infinities, and triple mixtures. But of every intelligible triad, the
bound in each is denominated father; the infinite, power; and that
which is mixed, intellect. And let not any one apprehend that these
names are foreign from the philosophy of Plato. For it will appear
that he uses these appellations in the before mentioned triads more
than any one. For he denominates the first God father and lord in his
Epistles. It is evident however, that as the first God surpasses even
the paternal order, the first paternal is in the intelligible Gods. For
these are they that are most eminently allied to _the one_, and
that intelligibly unfold his ineffable and unknown union. If therefore
the first God is denominated one and father from the natures that
proximately proceed from him,--if this be the case, as the intelligible
Gods are primarily unities, so likewise they are primarily fathers.
For Plato gives names to the ineffable in a twofold respect, either
from the summits of beings, or from all beings. For through these the
transcendency of the one is known. Moreover, the Elean guest calls
being that which is powerful and power. The first power therefore
exists prior to being, and is united to the father; but it particularly
accords with being, which also it fills. Hence being as participating
of power is denominated powerful; but as united to it, and producing
all beings according to it, it is called power. If however both
Plato himself, and his most genuine disciples, frequently call all
[true] beings intellect (on which account, in many places they make
three principles, _the good_, intellect and soul, denominating
every [true] being intellect) you will also have the third in these
intellect. But it is necessary not to be ignorant of the difference.
For with respect to intellect, one kind is intellect as with
reference to hyparxis. For when we denominate the unity in each triad
intelligible, as the object of desire to being, and as filling being,
then we call that which ranks as the third in the triad intellect. For
it is intelligible as essence and intellect, but not as the intellect
of essence, but of father and deity. For every participated deity is
intelligible, as being the plenitude of its participant. But another
kind is intellect which is the intellect of essence; according to
which we say that the being of the third triad, is the intellect
of that which is primarily being. For this is essential intellect,
being allotted its own essence by energizing.[200] For all things are
essentially in it, and both the more simple genera, and the primary
paradigms; for it is intelligible intellect. But the third kind is
intellectual intellect, which subsists analogous to intelligible
intellect, is conjoined with it, and is filled from it, possessing
intellectually those things which are in the other intelligibly. And
in short, it is necessary every where that such things as are first
according to each series, should have the form of the things that are
prior to them. Hence also they are called things first, and possess
a certain transcendency of essence towards coordinate natures. Since
therefore, that which is prior to intelligibles is God, the first
intelligibles are Gods and unities. And since the intelligible is
essential, the first intellects are essences. Since also intellect
is every where according to its own nature intellectual, the first
souls are intellectual. Because likewise, souls are the plenitudes
of life, the first of bodies are most vital. And because the bodies
that are perpetual are moved in a circle, the summits of material
bodies are moved in conjunction with those bodies that are perpetual.
This therefore is the cause why the unities are frequently called
intelligibles, and beings intelligible intellects.
That Plato however knew this triad, I mean father, power and intellect,
we shall learn by looking to the demiurgic order. For in this the triad
is most remarkably apparent. Hence, on account of its union with the
intelligible, it is filled with this triad, and possesses these things
in a more divided manner than animal itself, or intelligible eternity.
Immediately therefore, in the beginning of the fabrication in the
Timæus, the demiurgus calls himself father, “Of which works I am the
demiurgus and _father_.” But shortly after he unfolds his power,
“Imitating my _power_ in your generation.” This therefore is also
wonderful, that he has delivered to us the most theological conception
concerning power. For in the first place indeed, he calls it the
power of the father, when he says, “Of which works I am the demiurgus
and father,” and that the power is his, [is evident from the words,]
“Imitating my power:” so that according to Plato power is of the
father. And in the next place, he ascribes to this power a peculiarity
generative of the whole of things; for this is evident from the words
“In your generation.” Power therefore is the cause of generation and
of the progression of beings. And in the last place, he delivers the
intellectual peculiarity of the demiurgus. “Having thus spoke, again
into the former crater in which he had tempered the soul of the
universe, he poured mingling the remainder of the former mixture.” For
to pour, to mingle, mixture, and to be productive of soul, pertain to
intellect. Though what necessity is there for asserting these things,
since prior to this he calls the demiurgus intellect. “Whatever
ideas therefore _intellect_ perceived by the dianoëtic energy
in animal itself, such and so many he conceived it necessary for
this universe to contain.” Hence the demiurgus is father, and power
and intellect. And he possesses these things as much as possible on
account of intelligibles. For he is a God as father, on account of
them. He is also power, and the generator of wholes, and knows beings
intellectually, on account of them. For in them intelligible knowledge
first subsists. Much more therefore are father, power and intellect in
intelligibles; from which also the demiurgus being filled, participates
of this triad. For Plato assumes each of these analogously. For as
the paternal triad in intelligibles gives subsistence to intelligible
eternity, so the demiurgus makes those works to be indissoluble of
which he is the father. And as in intelligibles, eternity proceeding
according to all power generates intelligible animal itself, so the
demiurgic power gives subsistence to mundane animals that are perpetual
and divine, and imparts to the junior Gods another power which is
generative of mortal animals. That any one therefore may assume these
names from Plato is evident from what has been said.
Since however, being has an hypostasis triply in intelligibles, one is
primarily being and prior to the eternal; but another is secondarily
being, and the first eternity; and another is being ultimately, and is
intelligible and eternal intellect. And here indeed there is being, but
there eternity, and there intellect. And eternity is more comprehensive
than intellect; but being than eternity. For every intellect is
eternal, but not every thing eternal is intellect. For soul according
to its essence is eternal, and every thing which participates of
eternity, participates also by a much greater priority of being. For
with perpetuity of existence, existence is entirely consubsistent.
But that which participates of existence is not universally eternally
being. For bodies also participate in a certain respect of the nature
of existence, but they are not eternal. Intellect therefore constitutes
an intellectual essence only, so far as it is intellect; since so
far as it is also life and being it constitutes all things. But
eternity constitutes both the intellectual and psychical essence. For
the mixture [in the second triad] was intelligible life. But being
constitutes the intellectual, the psychical, and the corporeal life.
For matter also is being [most obscurely,] and is capacity indeed,
but formless being, and non-being, falling off from the participation
of being. If, however, some one should say that it is being in power
or capacity, yet it has this power from being. For capacity is the
forerunning participation of energy. And thus much concerning these
things.
But what sufficient argument of division does Socrates afford us in
the Phædrus, concerning these intelligible triads? And how from what
is delivered by him may we recur to the conception of the hypostasis
of the most principal Gods? Socrates therefore in that dialogue, being
inspired by the Nymphs, celebrates every thing divine as beautiful,
wise and good, and says that by these the soul is nourished. But if
every thing divine is a thing of this kind, this is the case with the
intelligible by a much greater priority. And all these indeed are
every where, but in the first triad, the good principally subsists;
in the second the wise; and in the third the beautiful. For in this
there is the most beautiful of intelligibles. But in the second triad
truth and the first intelligence subsist. And in the first there is the
commensurate, which we say is the same as the good. But Socrates in
the Philebus says that the element of the good is the desirable, the
sufficient, and the perfect. The desirable therefore pertains indeed
to bound; for it is the union and goodness of all the triad, and the
triad converges about it. But the sufficient pertains to infinity. For
sufficiency is a power capable of pervading to all things, and of being
present to all things without impediment. And the perfect pertains
to that which is mixed. For this is that which is primarily triadic;
since every mixture has its coalition from the triad. The elements
therefore of the good unfold to us the first triad; and the elements of
intelligible wisdom, the second triad. But every thing wise is full of
being, is generative of truth, and is convertive of imperfect natures
to their perfection. The full therefore pertains to the second bound;
for this is uniformly filled with the participation of the natures
prior to itself. For the full is every where adapted to bound, just
as that which cannot be filled is adapted to the infinite. But the
prolific pertains to the second power, and to infinity. For that which
does not abide in the fulness of itself, but is prolific and generative
of other things, is especially indicative of divine infinity. And the
convertive pertains to that which is mixed. For this as being allotted
the end of the triad, converts every thing imperfect to the full, and
unites itself prior to other things to the bound of the whole triad.
CHAPTER XXII.
Moreover, the elements of beauty are the peculiarities of the third
triad of intelligibles. But these are, as we have before observed,
the lovely, the delicate, and the splendid. The lovely therefore,
being arranged analogous to the desirable, pertains to bound. But the
delicate being coordinate to the sufficient, pertains to the infinite
power which is in the beautiful. And the splendid is of an intellectual
peculiarity. For this is the beautiful of beauty; is that which
illuminates all things, and astonishes those that are able to behold
it. And as apparent beauty shining most manifestly, is seen through
the clearest of the senses (for the objects of this sense have many
differences according to Aristotle, and this sense pervades farther
than the rest) so likewise intelligible beauty appears to the intellect
of the soul shining intelligibly. Far it is an intelligible form.
And on this account the splendor of beauty is apparent to intellect.
Splendid beauty therefore, as Socrates calls it, shines forth at the
extremity of the intelligible order. For this is the most splendid of
intelligibles, is intelligible intellect, and is that which emits the
intelligible light, that when it appeared astonished the intellectual
Gods, and made them admire their father, as Orpheus says. Such
therefore is the preparation to the science of the intelligible Gods
which may from these things be assumed. And now it will appear how
beauty is indeed occultly in the end of the first intelligible triad,
but subsists in the third triad so as to have manifestly proceeded
into light. For in the former it subsists according to one form only;
but in the latter it subsists triadically. It is also evident how
each of the triads is at one and the same time a monad and a triad.
For the first triad being characterized according to _the good_,
derives its completion from the three elements of _the good_. But
the second being characterized by the wise is contained in the triad
of wisdom. And the third subsisting according to the beautiful, is
all-perfect through the triad of beauty. If however the beautiful is
occultly in the first triad, and shines forth triadically in the third,
it is evident that intelligible intellect loves the first triad, and
has love conjoined with its beauty. And this is the intelligible love
of the first beauty. From these therefore, intellectual love proceeds,
together with faith and truth, as we have before observed. For the
three intelligible monads, the good, the wise and the beautiful,
constitute three powers which lead upwards all other things, and prior
to other things the intellectual Gods. Concerning these things however,
we shall speak hereafter.
CHAPTER XXIII.
Let us now then direct our attention to the theory of the Parmenides.
But I wish again to remind the reader of what we have before
demonstrated. It has been shown therefore, that it is necessary to
divide the second hypothesis into the whole progressions of the one
being; and that this hypothesis is nothing else than the generation and
progression of the Gods, proceeding supernally from the supreme union
of intelligibles as far as to a deified essence. For the discussion is
not, as some say it is, in the first hypothesis, concerning God and
the Gods. For it was not lawful to Parmenides to conjoin multitude
with _the one_, and _the one_ with multitude. For the first God is
perfectly exempt from the whole of things. But in the first hypothesis
essence, and even _the one itself_, are taken away from the first
God. That such an ablation, however, as this is not adapted to the
other Gods is evident to every one. Moreover, neither does Parmenides
in the first hypothesis speak about the intelligible Gods, as they
say he does; for they assert that the negations are of these Gods,
because they are conjoined with _the one_, and in simplicity and
union precede[201] all the divine genera. For how can the similar or
the dissimilar, or contact and the privation of contact, and all the
other particulars which are denied of _the one_, be inherent in the
intelligible Gods? They appear indeed to me to be right in asserting
that the things which are taken away are similitudes of the Gods;
but they do not speak rightly when they say that all of them are
similitudes of the intelligible Gods. To which it may be added, in
opposition to this assertion, that the discussion is again concerning
the intelligible Gods in the second hypothesis. For the things which
are denied in the first, are affirmed in the second hypothesis. This
therefore, as I have said, is demonstrated that the conclusions with
reference to each other have the order of prior and posterior, of
causes and effects. It is necessary therefore, that proceeding from the
beginning, we should adapt the first conclusions to the first orders,
the middle conclusions to the middle orders, and the last conclusions
to the last orders, and should demonstrate that as many questions are
asked, as there are progressions of the divine orders. And in the
first place, we must deliver the doctrine of Parmenides concerning
the intelligible Gods, of whom we have proposed to speak; since Plato
speaks about these in many places, partly indicating, and partly
clearly unfolding his meaning.
It is necessary however, that we should collect into one the elaborate
and synoptical theory about each order, since it would not be proper
now to repeat the exposition which we have given in our commentaries on
that dialogue. But assuming each of the conclusions itself by itself,
I will endeavour to refer it to an appropriate order of the Gods,
following in so doing the divine inspirations of our leader [Syrianus].
For we also through his assistance have with a divine head pursued
these sacred paths about the theory of the Parmenides, being agitated
with a divine fury, and wakened as from a profound sleep to this arcane
mystic discipline. And thus much concerning the mode of the whole of
the conclusions. But from hence I shall pass to the narration of the
things proposed.
The first and imparticipable one therefore, which preexists beyond the
whole of things, and not only beyond the unities that participate,
but also those that are participated, is celebrated through the first
hypothesis, being demonstrated to be the cause of all things ineffably,
but not being defined itself in any one of all things, nor having any
power or peculiarity of a kindred nature with the other Gods. But after
this [imparticipable one,] that which is alone superessential and
surpassing, and unmingled with all hyparxis, is a unity participated
by being, and constituting about itself the first essence, and by the
addition of this participation becoming more redundant than that which
is primarily one. This however is a superessential hyparxis, and the
hyparxis of the first intelligible triad. As there are therefore these
two things in the first triad, viz. _the one_ and being, and the former
generates, but the latter is generated, and the former perfects, but
the latter is perfected, it is necessary that the middle of both should
be power, through which and together with which _the one_ constitutes
and is perfective of being. For the progression of being from _the
one_, and its conversion to _the one_, is through power. For what else
conjoins being to _the one_, or causes _the one_ to be participated by
being except power? For it is the progression of _the one_, and its
extension to being. Hence, in all the divine genera powers precede
progressions and generations. This triad therefore, _the one_, power
and being, is the summit of intelligibles. The first of these indeed
producing; the third being produced; and the second being suspended
from _the one_, but coalescing with being.
CHAPTER XXIV.
This triad therefore, Parmenides delivers immediately in the beginning
of the second hypothesis, adjoining to _the one_ the most simple
participation of essence. But he calls it the one being, and says
that being participates of _the one_, and _the one_ of being. The
participation however of these is different. For _the one_[202] indeed
so participates of being, as illuminating and filling, and deifying
being; but being so participates of _the one_, as suspended from _the
one_, and deified by it. But the habitude which is the middle of both,
is not with them void of essence. For neither is the habitude which is
among sensibles in no respect being, and much more is this the case
with the habitude which is there. But this habitude is biformed. For
it is of _the one_, and is connascent with being. For it is the motion
of _the one_, and its progression into being. Parmenides delivers this
triad, beginning what he says about it as follows: “See therefore from
the beginning if _the one_ is. Is it possible then for it to be, and
yet not to participate of essence? It is not possible.” But he ends
speaking about it in the following words: “Will therefore that which
is said be any thing else than this, that _the one_ participates of
essence, when it is summarily asserted by any one that _the one_ is?
It will not.” This therefore is the first intelligible triad, the
one, being, and the habitude of both, through which being is of _the
one_ and _the one_ of being, in a manner perfectly admirable; Plato
indicating through these things, that the father is the father of
intellect, and that intellect is the intellect of the father, and that
power is concealed between the extremes. For deity is the father of
the triad, and being is the intellect of this deity. Yet it is not
intellect in the same way as we are accustomed to call the intellect
of essence. For every such intellect stands still and is moved, as the
Elean guest says. But that which is primarily being, neither stands
still, nor is moved, as he also teaches. The first triad therefore is
called one being; since power is here occultly. For the triad does not
proceed from itself; but subsists without separation and uniformly,
being primarily defined according to divine union. Hence, this is the
first participation of essence, which participates of _the one_ through
power as the middle, which collects together and separates both _the
one_ and being. And it is superessential indeed, but is conjoined with
essence. We must never think therefore that all power is the progeny
of essence. For the powers of the Gods are superessential, and are
consubsistent with the unities themselves of the Gods. And through
this power the Gods are generative of beings. Rightly therefore, does
poetry every where assert that the Gods are able to do all things. For
essential powers indeed are not capable of effecting all things; since
they are not constitutive of superessential natures. The first triad
therefore, is through these things unfolded to us by Parmenides.
CHAPTER XXV.
But immediately after this, the second triad is allotted a progression,
which Parmenides characterizes by intelligible wholeness, as we
have shown in the Sophista. For the first triad being uniform, and
possessing all things intelligibly and occultly, viz. hyparxis, power
and being, so that power which is the cause of division, subsisting
between _the one_ and being, is concealed, and becomes apparent
through the communion of the extremes with each other,--the second
triad proceeds, being characterized by the first intelligible power,
and having the monads in itself distinguished from each other. For
all things being united and without distinction in the first triad,
distinction and separation shine forth in this triad. Being also and
power are more divided from each other. And that which consists of
these is no longer one being [or being characterized by _the one_,] but
is a whole, so that it has _the one_ and being in itself as parts. For
above indeed [i.e. in the first triad] all things are prior to parts
and wholeness. But in this triad there are both parts and a whole,
power unfolding itself into light. For as there is separation here,
there are parts and the whole consisting of these. The second triad
therefore is called intelligible wholeness. But the parts of it, _the
one_ and being, I call the extremes. And power being here the middle,
connects _the one_ and being, and does not cause them to be one, in
the same manner as in the first triad. Since also it is the middle of
both, through its communion indeed with being, it renders _the one_ one
being; but through its communion with _the one_, it perfectly causes
being to be one. And thus the one being consists of two parts, viz. of
being which is characterised by _the one_, and of _the one_ which is
characterized by being, as Parmenides himself says. He begins therefore
to speak about this triad as follows: “Again therefore, let us say if
_the one_ is what will happen. Consider then if it is not necessary
that this hypothesis should signify _the one_ to be a thing of such a
kind as to have parts?” But he ends in the following words: “That which
is one therefore is a whole, and has a part.”
Through these things therefore Parmenides defines the second order
of intelligibles to be a wholeness. For as existence is derived to
all things from the first triad, so whole from the second, and an
all-perfect division from the third. This however will be considered
by us hereafter. Wholeness therefore is triple, being either prior to
parts, or consisting of parts, or subsisting in a part, according to
the doctrine of Plato. For in the Politicus indeed, he calls genus
a whole, but species a part, not that genus derives its completion
from species, but exists prior to it. And in the Timæus he says that
the world is a whole of wholes. And all the world indeed derives its
completion from parts that are wholes; but each of the parts is a
whole, not as the universe is, but partially. Wholeness therefore,
being triple as we have said, according to Plato, the unity, and the
intelligible and occult cause of these is now delivered, unically
comprehending and constituting three wholenesses; according to the
hyparxis indeed of itself, the wholeness prior to parts; but according
to its power, the wholeness which is from parts; and according to its
being the wholeness which is in a part. For _the one_ is prior to
all multitude; but power communicates in a certain respect with both
the extremes, and comprehends in itself the peculiarities of them; and
being in a certain respect participates of _the one_. Hence the
first of the wholenesses, or that which is prior to parts is derived
from a unical hyparxis. For it is a monad, and is itself constitutive
of parts, and of the multitude which is in them. But the second
wholeness is from power. For it derives its completion from parts, just
as in the power which is collective of the one and being, the extremes
in a certain respect shine forth to the view. And the third wholeness
is from being. For being is a part, and is the progeny both of power
and _the one_,[203] and possesses each of these partially. After
the intelligible therefore, three wholenesses are divided according
to the different orders of beings. But the intelligible wholeness
comprehends the three unically, and is the intelligibly connective
monad of this triad, every way extending the powers of itself from the
middle of the intelligible and occult order.
CHAPTER XXVI.
Immediately after this triad we may see another proceeding, in which
all intelligible multitude shines forth, and which Parmenides indeed
constitutes a wholeness, but a wholeness consisting of many parts. For
after the occult union of the first triad, and the dyadic separation
of the second, the progression of the third is generated, which has
indeed its subsistence from parts, but the parts are many, with
the multitude of which the triad prior to it is parturient. For in
this triad there is a unity, and power, and being. But _the one_ is
multiplied, and also being and power. And thus all the triad indeed is
a wholeness; but each of its extremes, viz. _the one_ and being, as it
is multitude conjoined through collective power, is again divided and
multiplied. For this power conjoining unical multitude to the multitude
of beings, of some of these it causes each through progression to be
being characterized by _the one_, but of others each according to
participation to be _the one_ characterized by being. For here indeed
there are two parts of the wholeness, _the one_ and being; but _the
one_ participates of being, for it is conjoined with it; and being
participates of _the one_. _The one_ of being therefore, is again
divided, so that _the one_ and being generate a second unity conjoined
with the part of being. But being participating of _the one_, is again
separated into being and _the one_. For it generates a more partial
being suspended from a more partial unity. And being consists of more
partial deified beings, and is a more specific monad. The cause however
of this progression is power. For power is effective of two things,
and is the operator of multitude. For _the one_ indeed calls forth
into multitude, but being converts to the participation of the divine
unities. Whence therefore does Parmenides begin to teach us concerning
this triad? And where does he conclude his discourse about it? The
beginning, therefore, of what he says on this subject is as follows:
“What then? Can each of these parts of the one being, viz. _the one_
and being, desert each other, so that _the one_ shall not be a part of
being, or being shall not be a part of _the one_? It cannot be.[204]”
But he ends thus: “Will not, therefore, the one being after this manner
be an infinite multitude? It seems so.”
In the first place, therefore, it is proper to understand the manner
of the progression of the divine genera; and that conformably to the
intelligible monad, which we arrange according to _the one_ being,
the duad posterior to it which we call a wholeness [proceeds.] But we
say that it consists of two parts which are separated by power, and
that intelligible multitude presents itself to the view from the monad
and the duad. For when all things are said to be parts of the one
being, viz. secondary things, and such as become apparent through the
separating cause of power, then Parmenides delivers the union which
pervades from the monad to the third triad. But when power separating
and conjoining the unities and beings, gives completion to multitude,
then the participation of the duad becomes perfectly apparent, as I
think Parmenides demonstrates when he says, “so that it is necessary
two things should always be generated, and that there should never be
one thing (only.)” This triad, therefore, proceeds according to both
the preexistent triads, flowing according to the Oracle, and proceeding
to all intelligible multitude. For infinite multitude is indicative of
this flux, and of the incomprehensible nature of power. Hence, in the
first place, I have said that the hypostasis of this triad is through
these things demonstrated to be suspended from the triads prior to it.
And in the next place, I say, that this triad, according to Parmenides,
is primogenial. For this first imparts the power of being generated;
and Parmenides calls the multitude which is in it _in generation_,
[i.e. _becoming to be_, or rising into _existence_.] For he says: “And
the part will be _generated_ from two parts at least.” And again:
“Whatever part is _generated_, will always have these parts.” And in
what follows: “So that it is necessary it should always be _generated_
two things, and should never be one.” Does not he, therefore, who
frequently uses the word generation in teaching concerning the
progression of the intelligible multitude, proclaim that the natures
prior to this order are more united to each other? But this order
proceeds to a greater extent, unfolds the occult nature of the triads
prior to itself, and is primogenial, unfolding in itself prolific power.
In addition to these things also, it is necessary to consider the
infinity of multitude, not as those think fit to speak, who assume
the infinite in quantity, but since in the principles of the whole of
things, there are bound and infinity, the former being the cause of the
union, but the latter of the separation of multitude, Parmenides calls
the first and intelligible multitude infinite, because all multitude
indeed, according to its own nature, is infinite, as being the progeny
of the first infinity. All intelligible multitude, however, is a thing
of this king. For it is the first multitude, and multitude itself.
But multitude itself is the first progeny of intelligible infinity.
Intelligible multitude, therefore, is on this account infinite, as
unfolding into light the first infinity, and this infinity is the same
with the all-perfect. For that which has proceeded to the all, and as
far as it is requisite an intelligible nature should proceed, through
the power which is generative of the whole of things, is infinite.
For it cannot be comprehended by any other thing. But intelligible
multitude is comprehensive of all intelligible multitude. For if indeed
that which is primarily infinite, was infinite according to quantity,
it would be requisite to admit that the intelligible is infinite
multitude of this kind. Since, however, the intelligible is infinite
power, it is necessary that the participant of the primarily infinite,
should cause infinity to shine forth according to the power which is
comprehensive of all prior natures. And if it be requisite to relate my
own opinion, as that which is primarily one is primarily bound, so that
which is primarily multitude is infinite multitude. For it receives the
whole power of infinity, and producing all unities, and all beings,
as far as to the most individual natures, it possesses never-failing
power. It is, therefore, more total than all multitude, and is an
incomprehensible infinite. Hence unfolding into light all multitude,
it bounds and measures it by infinite power, and through wholeness
introduces bound to all things. These things, therefore, may be assumed
from Parmenides concerning the third intelligible triad.
CHAPTER XXVII.
Let us in the next place speak in common about all the intelligible
triads. With respect to the first triad, therefore, which is occult,
and is allotted the intelligible summit in intelligibles, Plato at
one time proceeding from the union which is in it, and its exempt
transcendency with respect to the other triads, denominates it one, as
in the Timæus. For eternity, says he, abides in one. But reason evinces
that this one is the first triad of intelligibles. But at another time
proceeding from the extremities which are in it, viz. that which is
participated, and that which participates, he calls it the one being,
considering the power which is comprehended in these as ineffable, in
consequence of its subsisting uniformly and occultly. And at another
time, he unfolds the whole of it, according to the monads which are in
it, bound, infinity, and that which is mixed; bound indeed indicating
its divine hyparxis, infinity its generative power, and that which is
mixed, the essence proceeding from this power. Plato, therefore, as I
have said, teaches us through these names the first intelligible triad;
at one time indeed through one name, but at another through two names,
and at another again through three names, unfolding it to our view. For
there is a triad in it, according to which the whole is characterized;
and a duad according to which the extremes communicate with each other;
and a monad which exhibits the ineffable, occult, and unical nature of
the first, through its own monads.
But the second triad after this, Plato denominates in the Timæus
indeed, eternity; but in the Parmenides the first wholeness. How these,
however, are allotted the same peculiarity we may learn by considering
that every thing eternal is indeed a whole; viz. if it is perfectly
eternal, and has the whole of its essence and energy at once present.
For every intellect is a thing of this kind, perfectly establishing at
once in itself, the whole of intellectual perception. It likewise does
not possess one part of being, but is deprived of another part, nor
does it partially participate of energy, but it summarily comprehends
the whole of being, and the whole of intelligence. If, however, in its
energies it proceeded according to time, but had an eternal essence, it
would be allotted the whole of the latter, and this always stably the
same, but would possess the former variably, so as to exert different
energies at different times. Eternity, therefore, is every where the
cause of wholeness to the natures to which it is primarily present. But
whole also is every where comprehensive of perpetuity. For no whole
abandons either its essence or its proper perfection; but that which
is primarily corrupted and vitiated is a partial nature. For on this
account also the whole world is perpetual, viz. because it is a whole,
and this is likewise the case with all that the heavens contain, and
with each of the elements. For every where wholeness is connective of
subjects. Hence eternity is consubsistent with wholeness, and whole
and eternity are the same. Each also is a measure, the one of things
eternal, and of all perpetual natures, but the other of parts and of
all multitude. Since, however, there are three wholenesses, one indeed
being prior to parts, another subsisting from parts, and another in
a part,--through the wholeness which is prior to parts, eternity
measures those unities of divine natures which are exempt from beings;
but through the wholeness which derives its subsistence from parts,
it measures the unities that are coordinate with beings; and through
the wholeness which is in a part, it measures all beings and whole
essences. For these wholenesses being parts of the divine unities, they
possess partibly what preexists unically in the unities. And, moreover,
eternity is nothing else than the ever shining forth from the unity
which is connected with being. But whole consists of two parts, viz. of
_the one_ and being, power existing as the collector of the parts.
According to both these conceptions, therefore, the duad pertaining to
the middle intelligible triad, unfolds the uniform an occult hypostasis
of the first triad.
Moreover, in the Timæus, Plato calls the third triad of intelligibles,
animal itself, intelligible, all-perfect, and only-begotten. But in
the Parmenides he denominates it infinite multitude, and a wholeness
comprehensive of many parts. And in the Sophista he perpetually calls
it the intelligible distributed into many beings. All these assertions,
therefore, are the progeny of one science, and tend to one intelligible
truth. For when Timæus calls this triad intelligible animal, he also
asserts it to be all-perfect, and comprehensive of intelligible
animals as its parts, both according to one and according to parts.
Hence animal itself is according to this a whole, comprehensive of
intelligible animals as its parts. And Parmenides, when he shows
that the one being is all-perfect multitude, demonstrates that it is
consubsistent with this order. For the infinite will be all-powerful
and all-perfect, as we have before observed, comprehending in itself
an intelligible multitude of parts, which also it generates; some of
these being more total, but others more partial, and as Timæus says,
both according to one, and according to genera. Farther still, as he
calls animal itself eternal and only-begotten, so Parmenides first
attributes the ever and to be generated, to infinite multitude, when
he says, “And thus, according to the same reasoning, whatever part is
generated will always possess these two parts: for _the one_ will
always contain being, and being _the one_; so that two things will
necessarily always be generated, and no part will ever be one.”
Who, therefore, so clearly reminds us of eternal animal, and the
primogenial triad, as Parmenides, first assuming in this order
generation and the ever, and so continually using each of these? The
same thing, therefore, is both an all-perfect animal, and all-powerful
intelligible multitude. For the first infinity being power, and every
intelligible subsisting according to it, and receiving from it a
division into parts, I think it proper to call it all-powerful; thus
avoiding the appellation of the infinite, which disturbs the multitude.
That, however, which in these things is both difficult to understand,
and for which Plato especially deserves to be admired, we must not
omit, but demonstrate to the genuine lovers of truth. For intelligible
animal comprehends four intelligible ideas, according to which it not
only constitutes the genera of Gods, but also the more excellent kind
of beings after the Gods, and also mortal animals themselves; for
generating it extends the idea of air-wandering, the idea of aquatic,
and the idea of terrestrial animals, from the Gods as far as to mortal
animals. Since animal itself, therefore, comprehends four ideas,
and through the same paradigms produces totally divine, dæmoniacal
and mortal animals, this deservedly produces a doubt in those who
love the contemplation of truth, how, the causes being the same, and
the same primary paradigms preexisting, some of the natures which
are constituted are Gods, others dæmons, and others mortal animals.
For all these being generated with reference to one form, how is it
possible they should not have the same form and nature; since it is
requisite that one idea should every where be generative of things
that have a similar form? For on this account we admit the hypothesis
of ideas, in order that the intelligible genus of Gods may possess
and contain prior to multitude monads productive of similar natures.
This doubt,[205] therefore, being so difficult, some one may solve it
logically by saying, that all things which subsist according to one
form are not synonimous, and that they do not similarly participate of
their common cause, but some things primarily, and others ultimately.
For each form is the leader of a certain series, beginning supernally,
and subsiding as far as to the last of things. For according to
the oracle, all things begin supernally to extend their admirable
rays to the downward place. Hence it will not be wonderful that the
same idea should pre-exist as the cause of Gods, dæmons, and mortal
animals, producing all things totally, and delivering the more partial
separation of things to the demiurgic order, in the same manner as
this order delivers the production of individuals to the junior Gods.
For intelligibles are the causes of whole series; but intellectuals
of divisions according to common genera. Supermundane forms are the
causes of specific differences; but mundane of things which are now
individuals. For they are causes which are moved, and are the leaders
of mutation to their progeny.
If however it be requisite to survey the thing itself by itself, and
how one intelligible form is the cause[206] of Gods, and dæmons and
mortals, Parmenides alone is able to satisfy us about the parts which
are contained in the intelligible multitude. For he characterizes some
things according to being, but others according to _the one_. For the
one being, indeed, is absorbed by _the one_, but being which is one is
rather absorbed by being, and the one being, and being which is one,
contain in themselves each of the intelligible animals. According to
the one being, therefore, Parmenides constitutes the divine genera,
together with an appropriate peculiarity. But according to being which
is one, he constitutes the genera posterior to the Gods. And according
to the one being indeed of being which is one, he constitutes the
genera of dæmons, but according to being which is one, the mortal
genera. And again, according to the one being of the one being, he
constitutes the first and highest genera of the Gods; but according
to the being which is one of it, the second genera, and which have an
angelic order. And thus all things are full of Gods, angels, dæmons,
animals, and mortal natures. And you see how the medium is preserved
of the more excellent genera. For being which is one is the angelic
boundary of the one being which produces the Gods. But the one being
is the dæmoniacal summit of being which is one, and which adorns
secondary natures. As to the unions, however, of secondary natures,
it is not immanifest that they approximate to multitude, and to the
progression of the natures placed above them. Nor must you wonder if
being which is one is the cause of angels, but the one being of dæmons.
For in one place, being which is one is a part of the one being, but
in another the one being is a part of being which is one. And here,
indeed, the union is essential, but there essence has the form of
_the one_. For the summit of being which is one is a thing of this
kind. Deservedly, therefore, is intelligible multitude all-powerful,
and intelligible animal all-perfect, as being at once the cause of
all things, and this as far as to the last of things, Plato all but
exclaiming, [in the words of the Chaldæan Oracle,] “Thence a fiery
whirlwind sweeping along, obscures the flower of fire, leaping at the
same time into the cavities of the worlds.” For the divine unities
proceeding gradually, generate the multitude of all mundane natures.
This triad, therefore, is the fountain and cause of all things: and
from it all the life, and all the progression of the Gods, and the
genera superior to us, and of mortal animals subsist. For it produces
totally and uniformly all things, and binds to itself the whole
principles of the divisible rivers of vivification, and the production
of forms.
CHAPTER XXVIII.
Again, therefore, let us recur from the divided theory of intelligibles
to the all-perfect and one science of them, and let us say to
ourselves, that this intelligible genus of the Gods is unically exempt
from all the other divine orders, and is neither called intelligible
as known by a partial intellect, nor as comprehended by intelligence
in conjunction with reason, nor yet as preexisting in all-perfect
intellect. For it transcends both total and partial intelligibles,
and exists prior to all intellectual objects, being an imparticipable
and divine intelligible. Hence, also, it is allotted the same
transcendency with respect to all the intelligible orders, as _the
one_ with respect to every genus of the Gods. For this intelligible
is imparticipable, and supernally fills the divine and intellectual
orders. For if every intellect is intelligible to itself, it possesses
this property through the intelligible Gods. For plenitude is derived
to all things from thence. And thus the intelligible is at the same
time exempt from intellect, existing itself by itself; and at the same
time the intelligible is not external to intellect. For there is an
intelligible which is conjoined with intellect; the coordinate being
derived from that which is exempt, the participated from that which is
imparticipable, that which is inherent from that which is preexistent,
and that which is multiplied from that which is uniform. Intelligible
simplicity, therefore, must not be defined to be such as that which we
are accustomed to assert of intelligibles. For in these _the one_
becomes equal to multitude, and separation to the uniform sameness of
essence. But intelligible simplicity is uniform, without separation
and occult, excelling every divisible form of life, and intellectual
multitude. Hence I do not place intelligible simplicity in the order
of idea. For this form is partial, and is subordinate to intelligible
union. But I consider it as the hyparxis of divine natures, and as
generative of the whole of the good which is distributed to all divine
natures, and in which the Gods themselves subsist. For the goodness
of the Gods, is neither form nor habit, but the plenitude of divine
self-sufficiency and divine power, according to which the Gods fill
all things with good. In a much greater degree, therefore, are the
intelligible Gods, because they are united to _the good_, wholly
full of superessential goodness, and being established in this, they
contain in it the supreme hyparxis of themselves. Very properly,
therefore, do we say that the intelligible Gods unfold the ineffable
principle of all things, and his admirable transcendency and union;
subsisting themselves indeed occultly, but comprehending multitude
uniformly and unically; reigning over the whole of things exemptly, and
being uncoordinated with all the other Gods. For as _the good_
illuminates all things with superessential light, and exhibits the Gods
who are the fathers of all things, so likewise the intelligible genus
of Gods, according to a similitude to the good, imparts from itself to
all the secondary Gods, intelligible plenitude. Hence, according to
each distribution of the Gods, there is an appropriate intelligible
multitude, just as a monad analogous to _the good_ exists prior
to each of the divine orders. And this monad indeed is the preexistent
leader of union to secondary natures. But intelligible multitude is
the preexistent source of beauty, self-sufficiency, power, essence,
and all intelligible goods. For the Gods antecedently and intelligibly
comprehend all intellectual natures, and contain in themselves all[207]
things according to supreme union.
BOOK IV.
CHAPTER I.
Let the discussion, therefore, of the intelligible Gods, unfolding the
mystic doctrine of Plato concerning them be here terminated by us.
But it entirely follows in the next place, that we should consider
after the same manner the narration concerning the intellectual
Gods. Since, however, of intellectuals some are both intelligible
and intellectual, viz. such as according to the Oracle perceiving
intellectually are at the same time intellectually perceived; but
others are intellectual only;--this being the case, beginning from
those that are intellectual and at the same time intelligible, we will
in the first place determine what pertains to them in common, from
which we shall render the doctrine concerning each order of them more
perspicuous. Again, therefore, let us recal to our memory those things
which we a little before demonstrated, viz. that there are three total
monads which are entirely beyond the Gods that are divided according
to parts, viz. essence, life and intellect. And these prior to the
partial participate of the superessential unities. Essence, however, is
exempt from the rest. Life is allotted the middle order. But intellect
converts the end of this triad to the beginning. And all these are
indeed intelligibly in essence; but intelligibly and intellectually
in life; and intellectually in intellect. And as secondary natures
always participate of the natures placed above them, but these prior
to participation presubsist themselves by themselves; and as in
each order there are these three things, the cause of abiding, the
cause of proceeding, and the cause of conversion, though intellect
is more formalized according to conversion, but life according to
progression, and essence according to permanency;--this being the
case, it is certainly necessary that the first intellectual Gods
being essentialized according to life should conjoin imparticipable
intellect, and the intelligible genus of Gods, and that they should
uniformly connect the various progressions of secondary, but
unfold and expand the stable hyparxis of precedaneous causes. For
imparticipable life is a thing of this kind, circumscribing that which
is primarily being and intellect, and participating indeed of being,
but participated by intellect. But this is the same thing as to assert
that intelligence is filled indeed from the intelligible, but fills
intellect from itself. For being is the intelligible, but life is
intelligence. And being indeed is characterized according to a divine
hyparxis; but life according to power; and intellect according to
intelligible intellect. For as being is to hyparxis, so is intellect
to being. And as intelligible power is to each of the extremes, so is
life to the intelligible and to intellect. And as power is generated
from the one and hyparxis, but constitutes in conjunction with _the
one_ the nature of being, so life proceeds indeed from being, and
gives subsistence to a power different from that which is in being.
As also _the one itself_ which exists prior to being, imparts to
being from itself a second unity, so likewise life being allotted an
hypostasis prior to intellect, generates intellectual life. For true
being and the intelligible which precede the rest, supply both life
and intellect with union. Imparticipable life, therefore, but which
participates of the intelligible monads is the second after being, is
generative of imparticipable intellect, and giving completion to this
medium, and containing the bond of intelligibles and intellectuals,
is illuminated by Gods who are allotted a union secondary to the
occult subsistence of intelligibles, but preceding according to cause
the separation of intellectual natures. For the unical, indivisible,
simple, and primary nature of intelligibles, subsides, through
the medium of these Gods into multitude and separation, and the
inexplicable evolution of the divine orders. Whence also, I think, the
Gods who connectedly contain life which is infinite, being the middle
of the intelligible and intellectual Gods, and carried in the divisions
of themselves as in a vehicle, are called intelligible and at the same
time intellectual; being filled indeed, from the first intelligibles,
but filling the intellectual Gods. For we call the intelligible Gods
intelligible, not as coordinate with intellect. For the intelligible
which is in intellect is one thing, and that which produces the
intellectual Gods another: and we denominate the Gods that subsist
according to life intelligible and at the same time intellectual, not
as giving completion to intellect, nor as being established according
to intellectual intelligence, and imparting to intellect the power
of intellectual perception, but to the intelligible the power of
being intellectually perceived, but we give them this appellation, as
deriving their subsistence from the intelligible monads, but generating
all the intellectual hebdomads. And because they are illuminated indeed
with intelligible life, but subsist prior to intellectuals, according
to a generative cause, we think fit to denominate them in common,
connecting their names from the extremes, in the same manner as they
also are allotted a peculiarity collective of wholes in the divine
orders.
It is evident, therefore, that they subsist according to this medium,
and that they are proximate to the intelligible Gods, who are both
monadic and triadic. For the intelligible triads, with reference indeed
to the highest union and which is exempt from all things, are triads;
but with reference to the divided essence of triads, they are monads,
unfolding into light from themselves total triads. Since intelligibles,
therefore, in their triadic progression, do not depart from a unical
hyparxis, the intelligible and at the same time intellectual Gods
subsist triadically, exhibiting in themselves the separation of the
monads, and through divine difference, proceeding into multitude, and
a variety of powers and essences. For the natures which subsist more
remote from the one principle [of all things,] are more multiplied
than the natures which are prior to them;[208] and are diminished
indeed in powers, and the comprehensions of secondary natures, but
are divided into more numbers, and such as are more distant from
the monad. They likewise relinquish the union which is the cause of
primarily efficient natures, and variety is assumed by them in exchange
for the occult hyparxis of those primary essences. According to this
reasoning, therefore, the intelligible and intellectual separation is
greater than the separation which is only intelligible. And of these
again, the partial orders are allotted a much greater division, so as
to unfold to us a multitude of Gods which cannot be comprehended in the
numbers within the decad. Their peculiarities also are indescribable,
and inexplicable by our conceptions, and are manifest only to the
Gods themselves, and to the causes of them. Such, therefore, are the
intelligible and intellectual Gods, and such is the peculiarity which
they are allotted, a peculiarity connective of extremes, and which
unfolds into light precedaneous, but converts secondary natures.
For they intellectually perceive the Gods prior to them, but are
objects of intellection to the Gods posterior to them. Hence also
Timæus establishes all-perfect animal to be the most beautiful of
intelligibles, because there are intelligibles posterior to it, which
it surpasses in beauty, as being superior to them, and because it is
the boundary of the first intelligibles, the natures posterior to it
subsisting intellectually. According to this reasoning, therefore, the
first intellectual Gods are also intelligible; and we do not, deriving
these things from a foreign source, ascribe them to Plato, but they are
asserted by us in consequence of receiving auxiliaries from him. This,
however, will be more manifest through what follows.
CHAPTER II.
In the next place, therefore, we shall discuss the manner in which the
Gods who illuminate the breadth of imparticipable life proceed from
the intelligible Gods. Since then the intelligible Gods establish in
themselves uniformly things multiplied, occultly such as are divided,
and according to a certain admirable transcendency of simplicity, the
various genera of beings,--hence the first intellectual Gods,[209]
unfolding their indistinct union, and the unknown nature of their
hypostasis, and being filled through intelligible power and essential
life with the prolific abundance of wholes, are allotted a kingdom
which ranks as the second after them. And they always indeed produce,
perfect, and connect themselves, but receive from the intelligible
Gods an occult generation; from intelligible power indeed, receiving
a peculiarity generative of all things; but from intelligible life
which preexists according to cause in the intelligible, receiving the
nature which is spread under them. For life is primarily indeed in
intelligibles; but secondarily in intelligibles and intellectuals; and
in a third degree in intellectuals; existing indeed according to cause
in the first, but according to essence in the second, and according
to participation in the last of these. The first intellectual,
therefore, proceed from the intelligible Gods, multiplying indeed
their union, and their unical powers, unfolding their occult hyparxis,
and through prolific, connective, and perfective causes assimilating
themselves to the essential, entire, and all-perfect transcendencies
of intelligibles. For in intelligibles there were three primarily
effective powers; one indeed constituting the essence of wholes;
another measuring things which are multiplied; and another being
productive of the forms of all generated natures.
And conformably to these, the intelligible and intellectual powers
subsist; one indeed, by its very essence producing the life of
secondary natures, according to a certain intelligible comprehension;
but another being connective of every thing which is divided, and
imparting by illumination the intelligible measure to those natures
that relinquish the one union [of all things;] and another supplying
all things with figure, and form and perfection. The intelligible
and intellectual orders of the Gods, therefore, are generated
according to all the intelligible causes. From power indeed, being
allotted the peculiarity of progression; but from life receiving the
portion of being which is suspended from them. For life is conjoined
with power; since life is of itself infinite, all motion having
infinity consubsistent with its nature, and the power of infinity, is
generative of the whole of things. But from the triadic hypostasis of
intelligibles, they receive a distribution into first, middle and last.
For it is necessary that all things should be detained by a triadic
progression, and that this should be the case prior to all [other]
things with the intelligible and at the same time intellectual genera
of Gods. For because they subsist as the middle of wholes, and give
completion to the bond of the first orders, according to their summit
indeed, they are assimilated to intelligibles, but according to their
extremity, to intellectuals. And they are partly indeed intelligible,
and partly intellectual. For every where the progressions of the divine
genera are effected through continued similitude. And the first of
subordinate are united to the ends of preexistent causes. As however,
the first and the last in the middle of wholes are both intelligible
and intellectual, it is necessary there should be a connective medium
of these, according to which medium the peculiarity of these Gods
is principally apparent. For that which is intelligible and at the
same time intellectual, in one part indeed is more abundant than, but
in another equally communicates with both these. From these things,
therefore, the continuity of the progression of the divine orders
appears to be admirable. For the extremity of intelligibles indeed was
intellectual, yet as in intelligibles. But the summit of intelligibles
and at the same time intellectuals, is intelligible indeed, yet it
possesses this peculiarity vitally. And again, the end of intelligibles
and at the same time intellectuals, is intellectual, but it is vitally
so. But the beginning of intellectuals, is intelligible, and presides
over the intellectual Gods, yet it has the intelligible intellectually.
And thus all the divine genera are allotted an indissoluble connexion
and communion, an admirable friendship, and well-ordered diminution,
and a transcendency, partly coordinate and partly exempt. That which
proceeds too, is always in continuity with its producing cause; and
secondary natures together with a firm establishment in their causes,
make a progression from them. There is likewise one series and
alliance of all things; secondary natures always subsisting from those
prior to them, through similitude. After what manner, therefore, the
intelligible and at the same time intellectual Gods, unfold themselves
into light from the intelligible Gods, may through these things be
recollected.
CHAPTER III.
In the next place, let us show how they are divided in their
progressions, and what difference the triads of these Gods are allotted
with respect to the intelligible triads. These Gods, therefore,
are also divided triply, after the above mentioned manner; being
conjoined indeed to the intelligible, through their summit; but to the
intellectual through their end; and through the middle bond of the
extremes, being allotted the peculiarity of each equally, and extending
to both the intelligible and intellectual genera of Gods, as the centre
of these twofold orders, uniformly containing the communion of wholes.
They are likewise divided triply, because in these all things, viz.
essence, life, and intellect, are vitally, in the same manner as they
are intelligibly in the Gods prior to them, and intellectually in the
Gods that derive their subsistence from these. And essence indeed is
the intelligible of life; but life is the middle and at the same time
the peculiarity of this order; and intellect is the extremity, and that
which is proximately carried in intellectuals as in a vehicle. All
things therefore subsisting in these Gods, there will be a division of
them into first, middle, and last genera. And in the third place, they
are divided triply, because it is necessary that life should abide,
proceed, and be converted to its principles; since of beings, the first
triad was said to establish all things, and prior to other things
the second triad. Eternity, therefore, abides stably in the first
triad. But the triad posterior to this, is the supplier to wholes [and
therefore to all things,] of progression, motion, and life according
to energy. And the third triad is the supplier of conversion to the
one, and of perfection which convolves all secondary natures to their
principles. Hence it is necessary that the intelligible and at the
same time intellectual Gods, should primarily participate of these
three powers, and should abide indeed in the summit of themselves; but
proceeding from thence, and extending themselves to all things, should
again be converted to the intelligible place of survey, and conjoin to
the beginning of their generation the end of their whole progression.
The intelligible and at the same time intellectual Gods therefore
are, as I have said, triply divided. And essence indeed is that which
ranks as first in them, but life is the middle, and intellect the
extremity of them. Since however, each of these three is perfect, and
participates of the intelligible monads, I mean of the essence which is
there, of intelligible life, and of intelligible intellect, they are
tripled according to the participation of primarily efficient causes.
And the intelligible of life indeed possesses essence, intellect,
and life intelligibly; but the intelligible and intellectual of it,
possesses essence, life and intellect, intelligibly and at the same
time intellectually; and the intellectual of it possesses these
intellectually and intelligibly.[210] And every where indeed, there is
a triad in each of the sections, but in conjunction with an appropriate
peculiarity. Hence three intelligible and at the same time intellectual
triads present themselves to our view, which are indeed illuminated by
the divine unities, but each of them contains an all-various multitude.
For since in intelligibles, there was an all-powerful and all-perfect
multitude, how is it possible that this multitude should not in a much
greater degree, be evolved and multiplied, in the Gods secondary to the
intelligible order, according to the prolific cause of them? Each triad
therefore comprehends in itself a multitude of powers, and a variety
of forms, producing intelligible multitude into energy, and unfolding
into light the generative infinity of intelligibles. And we indeed,
being impelled from the participants, discover the peculiarity of the
participated superessential Gods. But according to the order of things,
the intelligible and intellectual monads generate about themselves
essences, and all lives, and the intellectual genera. And through
these, they unfold the unknown transcendency of themselves, preserving
by itself the preexistent cause of the whole of things. There are
however, as we have said, three intelligible triads. And there are also
three triads posterior to these, which appear to be tripled from them,
according to their prolific perfection.
But it is necessary that the peculiarity of the intelligible, and
also of the intelligible and at the same time intellectual triad,
should be defined according to another mode. For in the intelligible
order indeed, each triad had only the third part of being; for it
consisted of bound, and infinity, and from both these. But this was
essence indeed in the first triad, intelligible life in the second,
and intelligible intellect in the third. The natures however prior to
these were unities and superessential powers, which give completion
to the whole triads. But in the intelligible and at the same time
intellectual order, each triad has essence, life and intellect;
one indeed intelligibly and at the same time intellectually, but
more intelligibly, so far as it is in continuity with the first
intelligibles; but another intellectually and intelligibly, but more
intellectually, because it is proximately carried in intellectuals;
and another according to an equal part, as it comprehends in itself
both the peculiarities. Hence the first triad, that we may speak of
each, was in intelligibles, bound, infinity, and essence; for essence
was that which was primarily mixed. But here the first triad is
essence, life and intellect, with appropriate unities. For essence is
suspended from the first deity [of this triad,] life from the second,
and intellect from the third. And these three superessential monads,
unfold the monads of the first triad. But again, the second triad after
this, was in the intelligible order, a superessential unity, power, and
intelligible and occult life. Here however, essence, life and intellect
are all vital, and are suspended from the Gods who contain the one bond
of the whole of this order. For as the first unities were allotted a
power unific of the middle genera, so the second unities after them,
exhibit the connective peculiarity of primarily efficient causes. After
these therefore, succeeds the third triad, which in the intelligible
order indeed was unity, power, and intelligible intellect; but here it
consists of three superessential Gods, who close the termination of
the intelligible and at the same time intellectual Gods, and begird
all things intellectually, I mean essence, life and intellect. They
are likewise the suppliers of divine perfection,[211] imitating the
all-perfect intelligible triad, just as the connectedly containing Gods
imitate the intelligible measure, and the Gods prior to these, the
generative cause of intelligibles. The three intelligible therefore,
and at the same time intellectual triads, are thus generated, and are
allotted such a difference as this, with respect to the intelligible
triads.
CHAPTER IV.
Again however, returning to Plato, let us accord with him, and exhibit
the science which preexists with him concerning each of these triads.
And in the first place, let us assume what is written in the Phædrus,
and survey from the words themselves of Socrates, how he unfolds to
us the whole of the orderly distinction of these triads, and the
differences which it contains. In the Phædrus therefore, there are said
to be twelve leaders who preside over the whole [of mundane concerns,]
and who conduct all the mundane Gods, and all the herds of dæmons,
and convert them to the intelligible nature. It is also said that
Jupiter is the leader of all these twelve Gods, that he drives a winged
chariot, adorns and takes care of all things, and brings all the army
of Gods that follow him, first indeed to the place of survey within the
heaven, and to the blessed spectacles, and discursive energies of the
intelligibles which are there. But in the next place Jupiter brings
them to the subcelestial arch which proximately begirds the heaven,
and is contained in it, and after this to the heaven itself, and the
back of heaven; where also divine souls stand, and being borne along
together with the heaven, survey all the essence that is beyond it.
Socrates further adds, that prior to the heaven there is what is called
the supercelestial place, in which true and real essence, the plain
of truth, the kingdom of Adrastia, and the divine choir of virtues
subsist, and that souls being nourished through the intellection of
these monads, are happily affected, following [in their contemplation]
the circulation of the heaven.
These things therefore, are asserted in the Phædrus, Socrates being
clearly inspired by divinity, and discussing mystic concerns. It
is necessary however, prior to other things, to consider what the
heaven is of which Socrates speaks, and in what order of beings it
is established. For having discovered this, we may also survey the
subcelestial arch, and the supercelestial place.[212] For each of these
is assumed according to habitude towards the heaven; the one indeed
being primarily placed above it, but the other being primarily arranged
under it.
CHAPTER V.
What therefore is the heaven to which Jupiter leads the Gods? For
if we should say that it is the sensible heaven, as certain other
persons say it is, it will be necessary that the more excellent genera
should be converted to things naturally subordinate to themselves.
For if Jupiter the mighty leader in the heaven proceeds to this
sensible heaven, and leads to it all the Gods that follow him, he will
have a conversion to things subordinate, and posterior to himself.
And together with Jupiter, this will also be the case with all the
leaders, and the Gods and dæmons suspended from these; though the same
Socrates in the Phædrus says, that even a partial soul when perfected
is conversant with sublime concerns, and governs the whole world.
How is it possible therefore, that the leaders of whole souls should
be converted to the sensible heaven, and exchange the intelligible
place of survey for an inferior allotment, when through these souls
they preside over the universe, in order that they may illuminate
mundane natures with a liberated and unrestrained power? In addition
to these things also, what are the blessed intellections of the Gods
within this sensible heaven, and what are the evolutions of all the
knowledge of sensibles?[213] For in short the Gods know sensibles,
not by a conversion to them, but by containing in themselves the
causes of them. Hence intellectually perceiving themselves, they know
sensibles causally, and rule over them, not by looking to them, and
verging to the subjects of their government, but by converting through
love inferior natures to themselves. Neither therefore, is it lawful
for the Gods who adorn the whole of heaven, and think it worthy their
providential care, to be ever situated under the circulation of this
heaven; nor is there any blessedness in the contemplation of the things
which exist under it; nor are the souls that are converted to this
contemplation among the number of those that are happy, and that fellow
the Gods, but they rank among those that exchange intelligible for
doxastic nutriment, such as Socrates says, the souls are that are lame,
that have broken their wings, and are in a merged condition. Since
therefore passions of this kind belong to partial souls, and these not
such as are happy, how can we refer a conversion to the sensible heaven
to the ruling and leading Gods?
Farther still, Socrates says that souls standing on the back of the
heaven, are carried round by the circumvolution itself of the heaven;
but Timæus, and the Athenian guest say, that souls lead every thing in
the heavens by their own motions, externally cover bodies with their
motions, and living their own life through the whole of time, impart
to bodies secondarily efficient powers of motion. How therefore do
these things accord with those who make this heaven to be sensible?
For souls do not contemplate and dance round intelligibles, through
the circulation of the heavens; but through the unapparent convolution
of souls, bodies revolve in a circle, and about these perform their
circulations. If therefore any one should say that the sensible heaven
circumvolves souls, and that it is divided according to the back,
the profundity, and the subcelestial arch, many absurdities must
necessarily be admitted.
But if some one should say that the heaven is intelligible, to which
Jupiter is the leader, but all the Gods, and together with these,
dæmons follow him, he will unfold the divinely-inspired narrations of
Plato consentaneously to the nature of things, and will follow the
most celebrated of his interpreters. For Plotinus and Jamblichus are
of opinion that this heaven is a certain intelligible. And prior to
these, Plato himself in the Cratylus following the Orphic theogonies
calls the father indeed of Jupiter, Saturn, but of Saturn, Heaven. And
he evinces that Jupiter is the demiurgus of the whole of things through
the names [by which he is called,] investigating for this purpose the
truth concerning them. But he shows that Saturn is connective of a
divine intellect; and that Heaven is the intelligence, or intellectual
perception of the first intelligibles. For sight, says he, looking
to the things above, is Heaven. Hence Heaven subsists prior to every
divine intellect, with which the mighty Saturn is replete; but it
intellectually perceives the things above, and such as are beyond the
celestial order. The mighty Heaven therefore, is allotted a kingdom
which is between the intelligible and intellectual orders. For the
circulation mentioned in the Phædrus is intelligence, through which
all the Gods and souls obtain the contemplation of intelligibles.
But intelligence is a medium between intellect and the intelligible.
It must be said therefore, that the whole of heaven is established
according to this medium, and that it contains the one bond of the
divine orders, being the father indeed of the intellectual genus, but
being generated from the kings prior to it, which also it is said to
see. But on one side of it the supercelestial place, and on the other
the subcelestial arch must be arranged.
CHAPTER VI.
Again therefore, if indeed the supercelestial place is the
imparticipable and occult genus of the intelligible Gods, how can we
establish so great a divine multitude there, and this accompanied with
separation, viz. truth, science, justice, temperance, the meadow,
and Adrastia? For neither do the fountains of the virtues, nor the
separation and variety of forms, pertain to the intelligible Gods.
For the first and most unical of forms extend the demiurgic intellect
of wholes to the intelligible paradigm, and the comprehension of
forms which is there. But Socrates in the Phædrus says that a partial
intellect contemplates the supercelestial place. For this intellect
is the governor of the soul, as it is well said by the philosophers
prior to us. If therefore, it be necessary from this analogy to
investigate the difference of intelligibles, as the demiurgic intellect
indeed, is imparticipable, but a partial intellect is participable,
so with respect to the intelligible, one indeed which is the first
paradigm of the demiurgus, pertains to the first intelligibles, but
another which is the first paradigm of a partial intellect pertains
to the second intelligibles, which are indeed intelligibles, but are
allotted an intelligible transcendency, as subsisting at the summit of
intellectuals. But if the supercelestial place is beyond the celestial
circulation, but is inferior to those intelligible triads, because it
is more expanded; for it is the plain of truth, and is not unknown, is
divided according to a multitude of forms, and possesses a variety of
powers, and the meadow which is there nourishes souls, and is visible
to them, the first intelligibles illuminating souls with ineffable
union, but not being known by them through intelligence;--if this be
the case, it is certainly necessary that the supercelestial place
should subsist between the intelligible nature, and the celestial
circulation. If Plato himself also admits that essence which truly is,
exists in this place, how is it possible that he should not also admit
it to be intelligible, and to participate of the first intelligibles?
For because indeed it is essence it is intelligible; but because it
truly is, it participates of being.
Moreover, possessing in itself a multitude of intelligibles, it will
not be arranged according to the first triad; for the one being is
there, and not the multitude of beings. But possessing a various life
which the meadow indicates, it is subordinate to the second triad; for
intelligible life is one, and without separation. And again, since
it shines forth to the view with divided forms, all-various orders,
and prolific powers, it falls short of the all-perfect triad [in
intelligibles]. If therefore it is the second to these in dignity and
power, but is established above the celestial order, it is intelligible
indeed, but is the summit of the intellectual Gods. On this account
also, nutriment is derived to souls from thence. For the intelligible
is nutriment, since the first intelligibles also, viz. the beautiful,
the wise and the good, are said to nourish souls. For by these, says
Socrates, the wing of the soul is nourished; but by the contraries
to these it is corrupted and destroyed. These things however, are
indeed effected by the first intelligibles exemptly, and through union
and silence. But the supercelestial place is said to nourish through
intelligence and energy, and to fill the happy choir of souls with
intelligible light, and the prolific rivers of life.
CHAPTER VII.
After the supercelestial place however and the heaven itself, is
the subcelestial arch, which it is obvious to every one ought to
be arranged under the heaven, and not in the heaven. For it is not
called by Plato the celestial, but the subcelestial arch. That it
is also proximately situated under the celestial circulation, is
evident from what is written concerning it. But if it be necessary
to make the subcelestial arch being such, the same with the summit
of intellectuals, and not with the end of the intelligible and
intellectual Gods, it will be now necessary to contemplate what
remains. For the summit of intellectuals separates itself from the
kingdom of the heaven, but the subcelestial arch is on all sides
comprehended by it. And the former indeed constitutes the whole of
intellect, intellectual multitude, and as Socrates says, the blessed
discursive energies of the Gods; but the latter only bounds the
celestial series, and supplies the Gods with the means of ascending
to the heaven. For when the Gods are elevated to the banquet, and
the delicious food, and are filled with intelligible goods, then
they proceed ascending, to the subcelestial arch, and through it
are raised to the celestial circulation. Hence, if you say that the
subcelestial arch is perfective of the Gods, and converts them to
the whole of the heaven, and the supercelestial place, you will not
wander from the meaning of Plato. For the Gods are indeed nourished
by the intelligible, by the meadow, and by the divine forms, which
the place above the heaven comprehends; but they are filled with this
nutriment through the subcelestial arch. For through this they also
participate of the celestial circulation. Hence they are converted
indeed, through the subcelestial arch; but they receive a vigorous
intellectual perception from the celestial order; and they are filled
with intelligible goods from the supercelestial place. It is evident
therefore, that the supercelestial place is allotted an intelligible
summit; but the circulation of the heaven, the middle breadth; and
the arch, the intelligible extremity. For all things are in it. And
intellect indeed is convertive, but the intelligible is the object
of desire. But divine intelligence gives completion to the middle,
perfecting indeed the conversions of divine natures, and binding them
to such as are first, but unfolding the tendencies to intelligibles,
and filling secondary natures with precedaneous goods. I think however,
that through these things we have sufficiently reminded the reader of
the order of these three.
CHAPTER VIII.
Perhaps however, some one may ask us, why we here characterize the
whole progression of the intelligible and at the same time intellectual
Gods, according to the middle, and why we call one of the extremes
supercelestial, but the other subcelestial, from their habitude to
the middle, indicating the exempt transcendency of the one, but the
proximate and connected diminution of the other. Perhaps therefore,
we may concisely answer such a one, that this whole genus of the
intelligible and at the same time intellectual Gods, binds together
both the extremes, being to the one the cause of conversion, but to
the other of becoming unfolded into light, and being present with
secondary natures. As therefore, we denominate all the intelligible
Gods paternal and unical, characterizing them from the summit, and as
we say that they are the boundaries of the whole of things, viz. those
that are effective of essence, those that are the causes of perpetuity,
and those that are the sources of the production of forms, after the
same manner we unfold these middle Gods as the leaders of all bonds,
from the middle which is in them. For the whole of this middle order
is vivific, connective and perfective. But the summit of it indeed,
unfolds the impressions of intelligibles, and their ineffable union.
The termination of it converts intellectuals, and conjoins them to
intelligibles. And the middle collects into, and fixes in itself as in
a centre the whole genera of the Gods. For to the extremes also through
reference to the middle we attribute the habitude of transcendency and
diminution, calling the one above, but the other under the middle.
CHAPTER IX.
Through these things therefore, we may concisely answer him, as I have
said, who doubts concerning these names. Here however, it is fit that
we should admire the divine science of Plato, because he has narrated
the mode of the ascent of the whole of things to the intelligible
conformably to the highest of initiators. For in the first place, he
elevates souls and the Gods themselves to _the fountains_, through
the liberated leaders. For the blessed and most abundant spectacles
and discursive energies are particularly in these fountains, in which
also theurgists place all their hope of salvation. They are therefore
blessed through the unpolluted monads; but they are most abundant
through the cause of divine difference; and they are spectacles and
discursive energies, through the intellectual and paternal powers. But
in the second place, Plato elevates souls and Gods from the fountains,
and through the fountains to the leaders of perfection. For after
many and divided intellections the good of the perfective Gods shines
forth, being supernally expanded from the intellectual Gods themselves,
and illuminating us, and prior to our souls, whole souls, and prior
to these, the Gods themselves. But from the perfective Gods Plato
elevates souls and Gods to the divinities, who are connective of all
the intellectual orders. For the perfective Gods are suspended from
these divinities, subsist together with them, and are comprehended by
them. Such also is the communion and union of these Gods, that some of
the most celebrated [interpreters of Plato] have supposed that there is
an all-perfect and indivisible sameness among them, in consequence of
not being able to apprehend by a reasoning process the separation which
is in them. For here also, it may appear to some one that Plato calls
the extremity of the celestial circulation, the arch. This however
is not the case. For he does not denominate the arch celestial, but
subcelestial. As therefore, the supercelestial is essentially exempt
from the heaven, thus also the subcelestial is inferior to the kingdom
of the heaven. For the former indeed is indicative of transcendency,
but the latter of a proximately-arranged diminution.
After this circulation however, which is connective of the whole of
things, Plato elevates souls and the Gods to the supercelestial place,
and the intelligible union of intellectuals, where also the Gods
abiding, are nourished, are in a happy condition, and are filled with
ineffable and unical goods. For with theurgists also, the ascent to
the ineffable and intelligible powers which are the summits of all
intellectuals, is through the connective Gods. In what manner however,
the Gods are here conjoined to the first intelligibles, Plato no
longer unfolds through words; for the contact with them is ineffable,
and through ineffables, as he also teaches in what he says about them
in the Phædrus. And through this order, the mystic union with the
intelligible and first-producing causes is effected. With us therefore,
there is also the same mode of conjunction. And through this, the
mode of theurgic ascent is more credible. For as wholes ascend to
exempt principles, through the natures proximately placed above them,
thus also parts imitating the ascent of wholes, one conjoined through
middle steps of ascent, with the most simple and ineffable causes.
For what Plato has delivered in this dialogue concerning whole souls,
he afterwards unfolds concerning ours. And in the first place indeed,
he conjoins them with the liberated Gods. Afterwards, through these
he elevates them to the perfective Gods. Afterwards, through these,
to the connective Gods, and in a similar manner, as far as to the
intelligible Gods. Socrates therefore, narrating the mode of ascent
to intelligible beauty, and how following the Gods, prior to bodies
and generation, we were partakers of that blessed spectacle, says:
“For it was then lawful to see splendid beauty, when we obtained
together with that happy choir, this blessed vision and spectacle, we
indeed following Jupiter, but others in conjunction with some other
God, perceiving, and being initiated in those mysteries, which it
is lawful to call the most blessed of mysteries.” How then were we
once conjoined with intelligible beauty? Through being initiated,
says he, in the most blessed of mysteries. What else therefore, does
this assert, than that we were conjoined with the perfective leaders,
and were initiated by them, in order to our being replenished with
beauty? Of what goods therefore, is the initiation the procurer?
“Which orgies,” says he, “were celebrated by us, when we were entire
and impassive, and were initiated in, and became spectators of entire,
simple, and quietly stable visions.” The _entire_ therefore, is derived
to souls from the celestial circulation. For this contains, and is
connective of all the divine genera, and also of our souls. Every
thing however, which in the whole contains parts, comprehends also
that which is divided, and collects that which is various into union
and simplicity. But the entire, quietly stable, and simple visions,
are unfolded to souls supernally from the supercelestial place,
through the connectedly-containing Gods. For the mystic impressions
of intelligibles, shine forth in that place, and also the unknown
and ineffable beauty of characters. For _muesis_ and _epopteia_[214]
are symbols of ineffable silence, and of union with mystic natures
through intelligible visions. And that which is the most admirable of
all is this, that as theurgists order the whole body to be buried,
except the head, in the most mystic of initiations, Plato also has
anticipated this, being moved by the Gods themselves. “For being pure,”
says he, “and liberated from this surrounding vestment, which we now
denominate body, we obtained this most blessed _muesis_ and _epopteia_,
being full of intelligible light.” For the pure splendor [which he
mentions] symbolically unfolds to us intelligible light. Hence, when
we are situated in the intelligible, we shall have a life perfectly
liberated from the body. But elevating the head of the charioteer to
the place beyond the heaven, we shall be filled with the mysteries
which are there, and with intelligible silence. It also appears to
me that Plato sufficiently unfolds the three elevating causes, love,
truth, and faith, to those who do not negligently read what he has
written. For what besides love conjoins with beauty? Where is the plain
of truth, except in this place? And what else than faith is the cause
of this ineffable _muesis_? For _muesis_ in short, is neither through
intelligence nor judgment, but through the unical silence imparted by
faith, which is better than every gnostic energy, and which establishes
both whole souls and ours, in the ineffable and unknown nature[215] of
the Gods. These things however, have proceeded to this length from my
sympathy about such like concerns.
CHAPTER X.
But again returning to the proposed theology, let us unfold the
conceptions which Plato indicates to us concerning each order of the
intelligible and at the same time intellectual Gods. The supercelestial
place therefore is intelligible. Hence also Plato says that it is
essence which truly is, and that it is visible to the intellect of
the soul. It is likewise the one comprehension and union of the
intellectual Gods. For it is not intelligible after such a manner as
animal itself, nor as the first eternity, nor as that which is itself
primarily the one being. For as these are primarily intelligibles, they
are exempt from all other intelligibles, and presubsist by themselves.
But the supercelestial place, is proximately established above the
celestial circulation, and of this is the intelligible; yet it is not
simply intelligible. And that we assert these things rightly, Socrates
also testifies, imparting the intellection of this intelligible to
souls likewise, through the heaven. For in this period, according to
which they are carried round together with the circulation of the
heaven, they behold indeed justice, they behold temperance, and they
also behold science, and each of the beings which have a true and real
existence; so that if the supercelestial place is intelligible, and
real being, yet it is intelligible, as being above the heaven. The
first intelligibles however, are intelligible according to their own
essence, and according to the exempt and first efficient cause of all
intellectual natures. For the mighty Saturn likewise, though he is an
intellectual God, and the fulness of intellect, is intelligible as with
reference to the demiurgus; for he is the summit of the intellectual
triad. Thus therefore, the place also which is above the heaven, is
allotted an intelligible transcendency with respect to the celestial
circulation, and is intelligible as in the first intellectuals.[216]
Hence also it subsists analogous to the first triad of intelligibles.
That triad however, was simply intelligible. For the intelligible which
is in intelligibles, at once exists prior to all second and third
intelligibles. But the supercelestial place is not simply intelligible;
for it is the summit of intellectuals, and not of intelligibles. Hence
Plato calls the first triad of intelligibles the one being; but he
denominates the supercelestial place, truly-existing essence. For the
former indeed, antecedes all beings in an admirable simplicity, and in
the occult unity of being. For that being is the intelligible itself,
and is not in one respect intelligible, but in another intellectual,
nor is it that which is passive to [viz. participates of] being;
but it is the seat, and the most ancient monad of being. This order
however, [viz. the supercelestial place] falls short of the union of
that triad; and participates of being, but is not simply being. Hence
also Plato calls it essence, and essence which truly is, as receiving
this intelligible and essential according to the essence of that which
is primarily being. And the first triad indeed of intelligibles was
paternal; for it subsists according to divine union and bound, and
is the occult, and highest boundary of all intelligibles. But the
supercelestial place is maternal, subsisting according to infinity,
and the power of infinity. For this order is feminine and prolific,
and produces all things by intelligible powers. Hence also, Plato
calls it a place, as being the receptacle of the paternal causes, and
bringing forth, and producing the generative powers of the Gods into
the hypostasis of secondary natures. For having denominated matter
also a place, he calls it the mother and nurse of the reasons [i.e. of
the productive principles], which proceed into it from being, and the
paternal cause.
According to this analogy, therefore, Plato thus denominates the
supercelestial place, as feminine, and as being the cause of those
things maternally, of which the intelligible father is the cause
paternally. Matter however receives forms alone; but the mother
and nurse of the Gods, not only receives, but also constitutes and
generates secondary natures, together with the father. Nor does this
generative deity produce from herself into an external place, her
progeny, and separate them from her own comprehension, in the same
manner as the natures which generate here, deliver their offspring
into light external to themselves; but she generates, comprehends and
establishes all things in herself. Hence also she is the place of
them, as being a seat which on all sides contains them, and as by her
prolific, and primarily efficient powers, preoccupying and containing
in herself, all the progressions, multitude and variety of secondary
natures. For all beings subsist in the Gods, and are comprehended and
saved by them. For where can they recede from the Gods, and from the
comprehension which is in them? And how, if they depart from them, can
they remain even for the smallest portion of time? In a particular
manner however the powers which are generative of divine natures, are
said to comprehend their progeny, so far as they are the proximate
causes of them, and constitute their essence with a more abundant
division, and a more particular providence. For paternal causes produce
secondary natures uniformly, exemptly, and without coordination, and
comprehend, but unically their own progeny. And in simplicity indeed,
they preoccupy the variety of them; but in union their multitude. It
is evident therefore, from what has been said, that the supercelestial
place is intelligible, and after what manner it is intelligible. In
addition to these things also it is evident, how it is feminine; for
place is adapted to the generative Gods through the above-mentioned
causes. And the meadow is the fountain of a vivific nature, as will be
shortly demonstrated. Socrates likewise assumes all the divine natures
that are in this place, to be of this kind, [viz. to be of the feminine
genus] I mean science herself, justice herself, temperance herself,
truth herself, and Adrastia; which may especially be considered as a
certain indication, that Plato particularly attributes the feminine to
this order, and not only other theologists.
CHAPTER XI.
What therefore is the cause through which Plato in the first place
celebrates this deity negatively, analogous to _the one_? And
what are the negations? For he denominates it, without colour, without
figure, and without contact. And he takes away from it these three
hyparxes, colour, figure, and contact. I say therefore, that this order
being the summit of the intellectual Gods, is unknown and ineffable,
according to its peculiarity, and is [only] to be known through
intelligible impressions. For being the summit of intellectuals, it
conjoins itself with intelligibles. For how could intellectuals be
conjoined with intelligibles, unless they antecedently constituted
an intelligible transcendency of themselves? But what connexion and
communion could be surveyed of the whole orders of things, unless the
extremities of such as are first possessed a certain similitude to the
beginnings of such as are second? For on account of this similitude,
these are connascent with each other, and all things subsist according
to one series. As therefore, the end of intelligibles was intellectual,
so likewise the beginning of intellectuals is allotted an intelligible
hyparxis. And each of these indeed is intelligible; but the one is
intelligible simply; and the other is not intelligible without the
addition of the intellectual. These therefore, are consubsistent with
each other. And the one indeed, is the paternal cause of the whole of
things, so far as it is intelligible, and the intellectual which is in
it is extended intelligibly. But the other is generatively constitutive
of the same things, because it is intellectual, and intelligible good
presides in the intellectual genus. All things therefore, are from
both, exemptly indeed, from the intellectual of intelligibles, but
coordinately, from the intelligible of intellectuals. And both indeed,
rejoice in unknown hyparxes; and are alone, as Plato says, known by
intelligible, mystic, and ineffable impressions. Hence also he calls
the attempt boldness which endeavours to unfold the arcana concerning
them, and to explain by words their unknown union.