That which is the first of all things therefore, unfolds into light

all the Gods, divine souls, and the more excellent genera, and is

neither complicated with its progeny, nor multiplied about them;

but being perfectly exempt from them in an admirable simplicity,

and transcendency of union, it imparts to all things indifferently

progression and at the same time order in the progression. Parmenides

therefore beginning from the intelligible place of survey of the first

intellectual Gods, proceeds thus far, according to the measures of

generation, giving subsistence to the genera of the Gods, and to the

natures that are united to and follow the Gods,[159] and perpetually

evinces that _the one_ is ineffably exempt from all things. But

again, from hence he returns to the beginning, and imitating the

conversion of the whole of things, separates _the one_ from the

highest, viz. from the intelligible Gods. For thus especially we may

survey the transcendency of _the one_, and the immense difference of

its union from all other things, if we not only demonstrate that it

is established above the second or third progressions in the divine

orders, but also that it subsists prior to the intelligible unities

themselves, and this in a manner conformable to the simplicity of

their occult nature, and not through a variety of words, but through

intellectual projection alone. For intelligibles are naturally adapted

to be known by intellect. This therefore, Parmenides also evinces in

reality, relinquishing logical methods, but energizing according to

intellect, and asserting that _the one_ is above essence, and _being_

characterized by _the one_. For this assertion was not collected

from the preceding conclusions. For the discourse about the first

Gods themselves would be without demonstration, if it derived its

credibility from things subordinate. At the same time therefore,

Parmenides contends that all knowledge, and all the instruments

of knowledge, fall short of the transcendency of _the one_, and

beautifully end in the ineffable of that God who is beyond all things.

For after scientific energies, and intellectual projections, a union

with the unknown follows, to which also Parmenides referring the whole

of his discussion, concludes the first hypothesis, suspending indeed

all the divine genera from _the one_, but evincing that _the one_ is

unically exempt from all things, subsisting without the participation

of intelligibles and sensibles, and in an ineffable manner giving

subsistence to the participated monads. Hence also, _the one_ is said

to be beyond that one which is conjoined with essence, and at the same

time to be beyond every participated multitude of unities.

BOOK III.

CHAPTER I.

Such therefore is the theology with Plato concerning the first God,

as it appears to me, and so great is the transcendency which it is

allotted with respect to all other discussions of divine concerns; at

one and the same time venerably preserving the ineffable union of this

God exempt from the whole of things, uncircumscribed by all gnostic

comprehensions, and apart from all beings; and unfolding the anagogic

paths to him, perfecting that parturient desire which souls always

possess of the father, and progenitor of all things, and enkindling

that torch in them, by which they are especially conjoined with the

unknown transcendency of _the one_. But after this imparticipable,

ineffable, and truly superessential cause, which is separated from

all essence, power and energy, the discussion of the Gods immediately

follows. For to what other thing prior to the unities is it lawful to

be conjoined with _the one_, or what else can be more united to the

unical God than the multitude of Gods? Concerning these therefore,

we shall in the next place unfold the inartificial theory of Plato,

invoking the Gods themselves to enkindle in us the light of truth.

I wish however prior to entering on the particulars of this theory,

to convince the reader, and to make it evident to him through

demonstration, that there are necessarily as many orders of the Gods,

as the Parmenides of Plato unfolds to us in the second hypothesis.

This therefore is I think prior to all other things apparent to those

whose conceptions are not perverted, that every where, but especially

in the divine orders, second progressions, are completed through

the similitude of these to their proper principles. For nature and

intellect, and every generative cause, are naturally adapted to

produce and conjoin to themselves things similar, prior to such as are

dissimilar to themselves. For if it is necessary that the progression

of beings should be continued, and that no vacuum should intervene

either in incorporeal natures, or in bodies, it is necessary that every

thing which proceeds naturally should proceed through similitude. For

it is by no means lawful that the thing caused should be the same

with its cause; since a remission and deficiency of the union of

the producing cause generates secondary natures. For again, if that

which is second were the same as that which is first, each would be

similarly the same, and one would not be cause, but the other the thing

caused. If however, the one by its very being, or essentially, has an

exuberance of productive power, but the other falls short of the power

that produced it, these are naturally separated from each other, and

the generative cause precedes in excellence the thing generated, and

there is not a sameness of things which so greatly differ. But if that

which is second is not the same with that which is first, if indeed it

is different only, they will not be conjoined to each other, nor will

the one participate of the other. For contact and participation, are

indeed a communion of things conjoined, and a sympathy of participants

with the natures they participate. But if it is at the same time

the same with and different from that which is first, if indeed the

sameness is indigent, and vanquished by the power which is contrary

to it, _the one_ will no longer be the leader of the progression of

beings, nor will every generative cause subsist prior to things of

a secondary nature, in the order of the good. For _the one_ is not

the cause of division, but of friendship. And _the good_ converts

generated natures to their causes. But the conversion and friendship

of things secondary to such as are primary is through similitude, but

not through a dissimilar nature. If therefore _the one_ is the cause of

the whole of things, and if _the good_ is in an exempt manner desirable

to all things, it will every where give subsistence to the progeny of

precedaneous causes, through similitude, in order that progression may

be according to _the one_, and that the conversion of things which

have proceeded may be to _the good_. For without similitude there will

neither be the conversion of things to their proper principles, nor

the generation of effects. Let this therefore be considered as a thing

admitted in this place.

But the second thing besides this, and which is demonstrated

through this, is, that it is necessary every monad should produce

a number coordinate to itself, nature indeed a natural, but soul a

psychical, and intellect an intellectual number. For if every thing

generative generates similars prior to dissimilars, as has been before

demonstrated, every cause will certainly deliver its own form and

peculiarity to its own progeny, and before it gives subsistence to

far distant progressions, and things which are separated from its

nature, it will produce things essentially near to it, and conjoined

with it through similitude. Every monad therefore, gives subsistence

to a multitude indeed, as generating that which is second to itself,

and which divides the powers that presubsist occultly in itself. For

those things which are uniformly and contractedly in the monad, present

themselves to the view separately in the progeny of the monad. And

this indeed the wholeness of nature manifests, since it contains in

one the reasons, [i.e. productive principles] of all things both in

the heavens and in the sublunary region; but distributes the powers

of itself to the natures which are divided from it about bodies. For

the nature of earth, of fire, and of the moon, possesses from the

wholeness of nature its peculiarity and form, and energizes together

with this wholeness, and contains its own allottment. This also the

monad of the mathematical sciences and of numbers manifests. For this

being all things primarily, and spermatically producing in itself the

forms of numbers, distributes different powers to different externally

proceeding numbers. For it is not possible that what is generated,

should at once receive all the abundance of its generator. And it is

necessary that the prolific power of every thing that preexists in

the cause[160] itself should become apparent. The monad therefore

gives subsistence to a multitude about itself, and to number which

distributes the peculiarities that abide collectively in itself. Since

however, as was before observed, the similar is always more allied to

cause than the dissimilar, there will be one multitude of similars to

the monad, proceeding from the monad; and another of dissimilars. But

again, the multitude which is similar to the monad is that in a divided

manner which the monad is indivisibly. For if the monad possesses a

peculiar power and hyparxis, there will be the same form of hyparxis in

the multitude together with a remission with reference to the whole.

After this however, it is necessary to consider in the third place,

that of progressions, such as are nearer to their cause are indicative

of a greater multitude of things, and are at the same time in a

certain respect equal to their containing causes; but that such as are

more remote possess a less extended power of signification; and on

account of the diminution of their power, change and diminish at the

same time the amplitude of production. For if, of progressions, that

which subsists the first in order is more similar to its principle,

and that which gives subsistence to the greatest number is both with

respect to essence and power more similar to the generating principle

of all things, it is necessary that of secondary natures, such as

are nearer to the monad, and which receive dominion after it, should

give a greater extent to their productions; but that such things as

are more separated from their primary monad should neither pervade

in a similar manner through all things, nor extend their efficacious

energies to far distant progressions. And again, as similar to this, it

is necessary that the nature which gives subsistence to the greatest

number of effects, should be arranged next to the monad its principle;

and that the nature generative of a more numerous progeny, because it

is more similar to the supplying cause of all things than that which is

generative of a few, must be arranged nearer to the monad, according to

hyparxis. For if it is more remote, it will be more dissimilar to the

first principle; but if it is more dissimilar, it will neither possess

a power comprehending the power of similar natures, nor an energy

abundantly prolific. For an abundant cause is allied to the cause of

all. And universally, that which is generative of a more abundant, is

more naturally allied to its principle than that which is productive

of a less numerous progeny. For the production of fewer effects is a

defect of power; but a defect of power is a diminution of essence; and

a diminution of essence becomes redundant on account of dissimilitude

to its cause, and a departure from the first principle.

Again therefore, in addition to what has been said, we shall assert

this which possesses the most indubitable truth, that prior to the

causes which are participated, it is every where necessary that

imparticipable causes should have a prior subsistence in the whole

of things. For if it is necessary that a cause should have the same

relation to its progeny as _the one_ to all the nature of beings, and

that it should naturally possess this order towards things secondary;

but _the one_ is imparticipable, being similarly exempt from all

beings, as unically producing all things;--if this be the case, it is

requisite that every other cause which imitates the transcendency of

_the one_ with respect to all things, should be exempt from the natures

which are in secondary ranks, and which are participated by them. And

again, as equivalent to this, it is requisite that every imparticipable

and primary cause should establish monads of secondary natures similar

to itself, prior to such as are dissimilar. I say, for instance, it

is requisite that one soul should distribute many souls to different

natures; and one intellect participated intellects to many souls. For

thus the first exempt genus will every where have an order analogous

to _the one_. And secondary natures which participate kindred causes

will be analogous to these causes, and through the similitude of these

will be conjoined with their imparticipable principle. Hence prior

to the forms which are in other things, those are established which

subsist in themselves; exempt causes prior to such as are coordinate;

and imparticipable monads prior to such as are participable. And

consequently (as that which is demonstrated at the same time with this)

the exempt causes are generative of the coordinate, and imparticipable

natures extend participable monads to their progeny. And natures which

subsist from themselves produce the powers which are resident in other

things. These things therefore being discussed, let us consider how

each of the divine genera subsists through analogy,[161] and survey

following Plato himself, what are the first and most total orders of

the Gods. For having discovered and demonstrated this, we shall perhaps

be able to perceive the truth concerning these several orders.

It is necessary therefore, from the before-mentioned axioms, since

there is one unity the principle of the whole of things, and from which

every hyparxis derives its subsistence, that this unity should produce

from itself, prior to all other things, a multitude characterized

by unity, and a number most allied to its cause. For if every other

cause constitutes a progeny similar to itself prior to that which is

dissimilar, much more must _the one_ unfold into light after this

manner things posterior to itself, since it is beyond similitude,

and _the one itself_ must produce according to _union_ things which

primarily proceed from it. For how can _the one_ give subsistence to

its progeny except unically? For nature generates things secondary to

itself physically, soul psychically, and intellect intellectually.

_The one_ therefore is the cause of the whole of things according to

union, and the progression from _the one_ is uniform. But if that which

primarily produces all things is _the one_, and the progression from it

is unical, it is certainly necessary that the multitude thence produced

should be self-perfect unities, most allied to their producing cause.

Farther still, if every monad constitutes a number adapted to itself,

as was before demonstrated, by a much greater priority must _the one_

generate a number of this kind. For in the progression of things, that

which is produced is frequently dissimilar to its producing cause,

through the dominion of difference: for such are the last of things,

and which are far distant from their proper principles. But the first

number, and which is connascent with _the one_, is uniform, ineffable,

superessential, and perfectly similar to its cause. For in the first

causes, neither does difference intervening separate from the generator

the things begotten, and transfer them into another order, nor does

the motion of the cause effecting a remission of power, produce into

dissimilitude and indefiniteness the generation of the whole of things;

but the cause of all things being unically raised above all motion and

division, has established about itself a divine number, and has united

it to its own simplicity. _The one_ therefore prior to beings has given

subsistence to the unities of beings.

For again, according to another mode [of considering the subject] it

is necessary that primary beings should participate of the first cause

through their proximate unities. For secondary things are severally

conjoined to the natures prior to them through similars; bodies

indeed to the soul which ranks as a whole, through the several souls

[which they participate]; but souls to universal intellect through

intellectual monads; and first beings, through unical hyparxes to

_the one_. For being is in its own nature dissimilar to _the one_.

For essence and that which is in want of union externally derived,

are unadapted to be conjoined with that which is superessential, and

with the first union, and are far distant from it. But the unities of

beings, since they derive their subsistence from the imparticipable

unity, and which is exempt from the whole of things, are able to

conjoin beings to _the one_, and to convert them to themselves.

It appears therefore to me, that Parmenides demonstrating these

things through the second hypothesis, connects _the one_ with being,

surveys all things about _the one_, and evinces that this proceeding

nature, and which extends its progressions as far as to the last of

things is _the one_. For prior to true beings it was necessary to

constitute the unities; since it neither was nor is lawful, says

Timæus, for that which is the best of things to effect any thing else

than that which is most beautiful. But this is in a remarkable degree

most similar to that which is best. To _the one_ however, a unical

multitude is most similar; since the demiurgus of the universe also

being good, constituted all things similar to himself through goodness

itself. Much more therefore, does the fountain of all good produce

goodnesses naturally united to itself, and establish them in beings.

Hence there is one God, and many Gods, one unity and many unities

prior to beings, and one goodness, and many after the one goodness,

through which the demiurgic intellect is good, and every intellect

is divine, whether it be an intellectual or intelligible intellect.

And that which is primarily superessential is _the one_; and there

are many superessentials after _the one_. Whether therefore, is this

multitude of unities imparticipable in the same manner as _the one

itself_, or is it participated by beings, and is each unity of beings

the flower as it were of a certain being, and the summit and center of

it, about which each being[162] subsists? But if these unities also

are imparticipable, in what do they differ from _the one_? For each of

them is one, and primarily subsists from _the one_. Or in what being

more redundant than the first cause were they constituted by it? For

it is every where necessary that what is second being subordinate to

that which is prior to itself, should fall short of the union of its

producing[163] cause, and by the addition of a certain thing should

have a diminution of the monadic simplicity of the first. What addition

therefore, can we adduce, or what redundancy besides _the one_, if each

of these also is by itself one? For if each of them is one and many,

we shall appear to transfer to them the peculiarity of being. But if

each is one only, in the same manner as _the one itself_, why does this

rank as the cause which is exempt from all things, but each of these is

allotted a secondary dignity? Neither therefore shall we preserve the

transcendency of the first with reference to the things posterior to

it, nor can we admit that the unities proceeding from it are unconfused

either with respect to themselves, or to the one principle of them.

But neither shall we be persuaded by Parmenides who produces _the one_

together with being, and demonstrates that there are as many parts of

_the one_ as there are of being; that each being[164] also participates

of _the one_, but that _the one_ is every where consubsistent with

being; and in short, who asserts that the one of the second hypothesis

participates of being, and is participated by being, the participation

in each not being the same. For _the one_ indeed participates of being,

as not being primarily one, nor exempt from being, but as illuminating

truly-existing essence. But being participates of _the one_, as that

which is connected by it, and filled with divine union, and converted

to _the one itself_ which is imparticipable. For the participated

monads conjoin beings to _the one_ which is exempt from the whole of

things, in the same manner as participated intellects conjoin souls to

the intellect which ranks as a whole, and as participated souls conjoin

bodies to the soul which ranks as a whole. For it is not possible that

the dissimilar genera of secondary natures should be united without

media to the cause which is exempt from multitude; but it is necessary

that the contact should be effected through similars. For a similar

multitude, so far indeed as it is multitude, communicates with the

dissimilar; but so far as it is similar to the monad prior to itself,

it is conjoined with it. Being established therefore, in the middle of

both, it is united to the whole, and to _the one_ which is prior to

multitude. But it contains in itself remote progressions, and which are

of themselves dissimilar to _the one_. Through itself also, it converts

all things to that one, and thus all things are extended to the first

cause of the whole of things, dissimilars indeed through similars,[165]

but similars through themselves. For similitude itself by itself

conducts and binds the many to _the one_, and converts secondary

natures to the monads prior to them. For the very being of similars so

far as they are similars is derived from _the one_. Hence, it conjoins

multitude to that from which it is allotted its progression. And on

this account similitude is that which it is, causing many things to be

allied, to possess sympathy with themselves, and friendship with each

other and _the one_.

CHAPTER II.

If however it be requisite, not only by employing the intellectual

projections of Parmenides to unfold the multitude of Gods participated

by beings, but also concisely to demonstrate the theory of Socrates

about these particulars, we must recollect what is written in the

Republic, where he says that the light proceeding from _the good_ is

unific of intellect and of beings. For through these things _the good_

is demonstrated to be exempt from being and essence, in the same manner

as the sun is exempt from visible natures. But this light being in

intelligibles illuminates them, in the same manner as the solar-form

light which is in visible natures. For visible natures no otherwise

become apparent, and known to the sight, than through the light which

is ingenerated in them. All intelligibles therefore become boniform

through the participation of light, and through this light, every

true[166] being is most similar to _the good_. If, therefore, it makes

no difference to speak of this light, or of _the one_ (for this light

conjoins intelligibles, and causes them to be one, as deriving its

subsistence from _the one_) if this be the case, the deity proceeding

from the first is participable, and all the multitude of unities is

participable. And that indeed which is truly superessential is _the

one_. But each of the other Gods, according to his proper hyparxis, by

which he is a superessential God, is similar to the first; but they

are participated by essence and being. According to this reasoning

therefore, the Gods appear to us to be unities, and participable

unities, binding indeed all beings to themselves, but conjoining

through themselves to _the one_ which similarly transcends all things,

the natures posterior to themselves.

Since therefore each of the Gods is indeed a unity, but is participated

by some being, whether shall we say that the same being participates of

each of the unities or that the participants of some of the unities are

more, but of others less numerous? And if this be the case either the

participants of the superior unities must be more, but of the inferior

must be fewer in number, or vice versa. For it is necessary that there

should be an order of the unities, in the same manner as we see that

of numbers some are nearer to their principle, but others more remote

from it. And that some are more simple, but others more composite,

and exceed indeed in quantity, but suffer a diminution in power. But

it is well that we have mentioned numbers. For if it is necessary to

survey the order of the first monads with respect to each other, and

their progression about beings, from these as images, in these also the

monads which are nearer to _the one_ will be participated by things

which are more simple in essence, but those which are more remote

from it, will be participated by more composite essences. For thus

the participation will be according to the analogous; first monads

being always participated by the first beings, but second monads by

secondary beings. For again, if the first is exempt from all things,

and is imparticipable, but that which is connascent with the most

simple nature and _the one_ is more similar to the imparticipable than

that which is connascent with a more various and multiform nature, and

which has more powers suspended from it,--if this be the case, it is

perfectly obvious, that the unities which are nearer to _the one_ are

necessarily participated by the first and most simple essences; but

that those which are more remote are participated by more composite

essences, which are less in power, but are greater in number and

multitude. For in short, additions in these unities are ablations

of powers; and that which is nearer to _the one_, which surpasses

the whole of things by an admirable simplicity, is more uniform, and

is consubsistent with more total orders. And it happens according

to the ratio of power, that the simplicity of the first unities is

transcendent. For those things which are the causes of a greater number

of effects, imitate as much as possible the cause of all things, but

those which are the causes of fewer effects, have an essence more

various than the natures that are prior to them.[167] For this variety

distributes into minute parts and diminishes the power which abides

in one. Moreover, in participated souls also, such as are first and

most divine subsist in simple and perpetual bodies. Others again are

connected with bodies that are simple, but in conjunction with these

with material bodies also. And others are connected at one and the same

time with simple, material and composite bodies. For the celestial

souls indeed rule over simple bodies, and such as have an immaterial

and immutable subsistence. But the souls that govern the wholes of the

elements, are at the same time invested with ethereal garments, and at

the same time through these are carried in the wholes of the elements,

which as wholes indeed are perpetual and simple, but as material

receive generation and corruption, and composition from dissimilar

natures. And the souls that rank in the third order, are those which

proximately inspire with life their luciform[168] vehicles, but also

attract from the simple element material vestments, pour into these

a secondary life, and through these communicate with composite and

multiform bodies, and sustain through this participation another third

life.

If, however, you are willing to survey the intellectual orders, some

of these are arranged in the souls which rank as wholes, and in the

most divine of mundane souls, which also they govern in a becoming

manner. But others being arranged in the souls of the more excellent

genera, are proximately participated by the rulers that are in them;

and are participated secondarily by more partial essences. But again

they arrange third intellectual orders in partial souls. And according

as the power which they are allotted is diminished, in such proportion

is participation in them more various, and far more composite than the

participation of the natures that are prior to them. If, therefore,

this is the mode of participation in all beings, it is certainly

necessary that of the Gods also those that are nearer to _the

one_, should be carried in the more simple parts of being, but that

those which have proceeded to a greater distance should be carried in

the more composite parts of being. For the participations of second

genera are divided after this manner according to a similitude to them.

Again therefore, we may summarily say, that after the one principle

of the whole of things, the Gods present themselves to our view as

self-perfect monads, participated by beings.[169] How many orders

therefore there are of beings we shall afterwards unfold, and show

what beings are allotted a more simple, and what a more various

hyparxis. Of all beings then, the last is that which is corporeal.

For this derives its being, and all its perfection from another more

ancient cause, and is neither allotted simplicity nor composition,

nor perpetuity, nor incorruptibility from its own power. For no body

is either self-subsistent, or self-begotten; but every thing which

is so contracting in one, cause, and that which proceeds from cause,

is incorporeal and impartible. And in short, that which is the cause

of hyparxis to itself, imparts also to itself an infinite power of

existence. For never deserting itself, it will never cease to be, or

depart from its own subsistence. For every thing that is corrupted, is

corrupted through being separated from the power that supplied it with

being. But that which imparts being to itself, as it is not separated

from itself, is allotted through itself a perpetual essence. No body

however, since it is not the cause of perpetuity to itself, will be

perpetual. For every thing which is perpetual possesses an infinite

power. But body being finite is not the cause of infinite power. For

infinite power is incorporeal, because all power is incorporeal.

But this is evident, because greater powers are every where. But no

body is capable of being wholly every where. If therefore, no body

imparts to itself power, whether the power be infinite or finite, but

that which is self-subsistent imparts to itself the power of being,

and of existing perpetually, no body will be self-subsistent. Whence

therefore is being imparted to bodies, and what is it which is adapted

proximately to supply them with being? Must we not say that the cause

of being to bodies primarily is that which by being present renders

the nature of body more perfect than its kindred bodies [when they are

deprived of it?] This indeed is obvious to every one. For it is the

province of that which imparts perfection to connect also the essence

of secondary natures, since perfection itself is the perfection of

essence. What therefore is that of which bodies participating, are

said to be better than the bodies which do not participate of it? Is

it not evident that it is soul? For we say that animated bodies are

more perfect than such as are inanimate. Soul therefore is primarily

beyond bodies; and it must be admitted that all heaven and every thing

corporeal is the vehicle of soul. Hence, these two orders of beings

present themselves to our view; the one indeed being corporeal, but the

other which is above this, psychical.

With respect to soul itself however, whether is it the same with or

different from intellect? For as the body which participates of soul is

perfect, thus also the soul is perfect which participates of intellect.

And of the soul indeed, which is able to live according to reason,

all things do not participate: but of intellect and intellectual

illumination rational souls participate, and also such things as

partake of any kind of knowledge. And soul indeed energizes according

to time; but intellect comprehends in eternity both its essence,

and at the same time its stable energy. And not every soul indeed is

adapted to preserve immutably and without diminution the perfection

of itself; but every intellect is always perfect, and possesses a

never-failing power of its own blessedness. The intellectual genus

therefore is essentially beyond the psychical; since the former,

neither in whole nor in partial intellects, admits the entrance of the

nature of evil; but the latter being undefiled in whole souls, departs

in partial souls from its own proper blessedness. What therefore is

the first of beings? Shall we say intellect, or prior to this the

extent of life? For soul indeed is self-vital, supplying itself with

life; and intellect is the best and most perfect, and as we have said,

an eternal life. But the life of intellect is indeed in a certain

respect intellectual, and is mingled from the intellectual and vital

peculiarity. It is necessary however, that there should be life itself.

Whether therefore is life or intellect the more excellent thing? But

if gnostic beings only participate of intellect, but such beings as

are destitute of knowledge participate of life, (for we say that

plants live) it is certainly necessary that life should be arranged

above intellect, being the cause of a greater number of effects, and

imparting by illumination more gifts from itself than intellect. What

then? Is life the first of beings? And is _to live_ the same

thing _as to be_? But this is impossible. For if life is that

which is primarily being, and to be vital is the same thing as to have

being, and there is the same definition of both life and being, every

thing which participates of life would also participate of being, and

every thing which participates of existence would likewise participate

of life. For if each is the same thing all things would similarly

participate of being and life. All vital natures indeed have essence

and being; but there are many beings that are destitute of life. Being

therefore subsists prior to the first life. For that which is more

universal, and the cause of a greater number of effects, is nearer to

_the one_, as has been before demonstrated. Soul therefore is

that which is primarily established above bodies; but intellect is

beyond soul;[170] life is more ancient than intellect; and being which

is primarily being is established above all these. Every thing also

which participates of soul, by a much greater priority participates of

intellect; but not every thing which enjoys intellectual efficiency,

is also adapted to participate of soul. For of soul rational animals

only participate; since we say that the rational soul is truly soul.

For Plato in the Republic says, that the work of soul is to reason and

survey beings. And every soul [i.e. every rational soul] is immortal,

as it is written in the Phædrus; the irrational soul being mortal,

according to the demiurgus in the Timæus. And in short, it is in many

places evident that Plato considers the rational soul to be truly

soul, but others to be the images of souls, so far as these also are

intellectual and vital, and together with whole souls produce the lives

that are distributed about bodies. Of intellect however, we not only

admit that rational animals participate, but also such other animals as

possess a gnostic power; I mean such as possess the phantasy, memory

and sense; since Socrates also in the Philebus refers all such animals

to the intellectual series. For taking away intellect from the life

which is according to pleasure, he likewise takes away not only the

rational life, but every gnostic power of the irrational life. For all

knowledge is the progeny of intellect, in the same manner as all reason

is an image of soul.

Moreover, all things which participate of intellect, by a much greater

priority participate of life, some things indeed more obscurely, but

others more manifestly. But all living beings do not participate of

intellectual power, since plants indeed are animals, as Timæus says,

but they neither participate of sense, or phantasy; unless some one

should say that they have a co-sensation of what is pleasing and

painful. And in short, the orectic powers every where are lives, and

the images of the whole of life, and the last productions of life;

but they are of themselves destitute of intellect and without any

participation of the gnostic power. Hence also, they are of themselves

indefinite, and deprived of all knowledge.

Again therefore, all animals indeed receive a portion of being, and

different animals a different portion, according to their respective

natures; but all beings are not similarly able to participate of

life; since we say that qualities and all passions, and the last of

bodies, receive the ultimate effective energy of being, but we do

not also say that they participate of life. Being therefore is more

ancient than life; life than intellect; and intellect than soul. For

it is necessary that the causes of a greater number of effects being

more ancient and according to order more principal, should preside

over causes which are able to produce and adorn fewer effects. Very

properly therefore, does Plato in the Timæus give subsistence to

soul from intellect, as being secondary to it according to its own

nature. But in the Laws he says that intellect is moved similarly to

a sphere fashioned by a wheel.[171] For that which is moved, is moved

by participating of life, and is nothing else than real life about

motion. And in the Sophista he exempts being from all the total genera

of things, and from motion. For being, says he, according to its own

nature, neither stands still, nor is moved. But that which neither

stands still nor is moved, is beyond eternal life.

These four causes therefore being prior to a corporeal subsistence,

viz. essence, life, intellect and soul, soul indeed participates of

all the causes prior to itself, being allotted reason from its own

peculiarity, but intellect, life and being, from more ancient causes.

Hence it gives subsistence to things posterior to itself in a fourfold

manner. For according to its being indeed, it produces all things as

far as to bodies; according to its life, all things which are said to

live, even as far as to plants; according to its intellect, all things

which possess a gnostic power, even as far as to the most irrational

natures; and according to its reason, the first of the natures that

are able to participate of it.[172] But intellect being established

beyond soul, and existing as the plenitude of life and being, adorns

all things in a threefold manner, imparting indeed by illumination

the power of the intellectual peculiarity to all gnostic beings, but

supplying the participation of life to a still greater number, and of

being to all those to whom primary being imparts itself. But life being

arranged above intellect, presubsists as the cause of the same things

in a twofold respect, vivifying secondary natures indeed, together with

intellect, and filling from itself with the rivers of life, such things

as are naturally adapted to live, but together with being supernally

producing essence in all things. But being itself which is primarily

being generates all things by its very existence, all lives, and

intellects and souls, and is uniformly present to all things, and is

exempt from the whole of things according to one cause which gives

subsistence to all things. Hence it is the most similar of all things

to _the one_, and unites the comprehension of beings in itself to

the first principle of the whole of things, through which all beings,

and non-being, wholes and parts, forms and the privations of forms

subsist, which privations do not necessarily participate of being, but

it is entirely necessary that they should participate of _the one_.

These things as it appears to me persuaded the Elean guest in the

Sophista, when discussing that which is perfectly being, to admit that

not only being is there, but also life, intellect and soul. For if true

and real being is venerable and honorable, intellect is there in the

first place, says he. For it is not lawful for that which is of itself

venerable and immaterial to be without intellect. But if intellect is

in that which is perfectly being, intellect will entirely be moved.

For it is not possible for intellect ever to subsist, either without

motion or permanency. But if intellect is moved and stands still, there

are in being both life and motion. Hence, from what has been said,

three things become apparent, viz. being, life and intellect. Moreover,

soul also in the next place is discovered through these things. For

it is necessary, says he, that life and intellect which before were

by themselves, should also be in soul. For every soul is a plenitude

of life and intellect, participating of both, which the Elean guest

indicating adds, “Shall we say that both these are inherent in it, but

yet it does not possess these in soul?” For to _possess_, as some

one says in a certain place, is secondary to _existing_. And soul

indeed participates of each of these according to the peculiarity of

itself; but it mingles the rational form of its own hyparxis, with the

intellectual vivific power. But both intellect and life subsist prior

to soul, the former as being moved and standing still at one and the

same time, and the latter as being motion and permanency. These four

monads also, soul, intellect, life and being are not only mentioned by

Plato here, but in many other places. And as in soul all things subsist

according to participation, so in intellect the things which are prior

to it subsist, and in life that which is prior to life. For we say that

life exists, or has a being. Or how could it be said to be arranged in

being unless it participated of being? We likewise say that intellect

is and lives. For it is moved, and is a portion of being. Hence it is

the third of the more comprehensive monads. Prior however to beings

which are participated, it is every where necessary that imparticipable

causes should subsist, as was before demonstrated, conformably to

the similitude of beings to _the one_. Being therefore which

is primarily being, is imparticipable; but life first participates

of being, yet is imparticipable, being exempt from intellect. And

intellect is filled indeed from being and life; but is imparticipable

in souls, and in the natures posterior to itself. Intellect also

presides over soul, imparting to it by illumination the participation

of life and being; but being imparticipable subsists prior to bodies.

The last order of beings therefore is that to which bodies are annexed;

celestial bodies indeed primarily, but sublunary bodies with the

addition of material [vestments.] This therefore is the progression of

beings, through life, intellect and soul, ending in a corporeal nature.

If, however, it is necessary that the superessential unities of the

Gods which derive their subsistence from the imparticipable cause[173]

of all things should be participated, some of them indeed, by the

first orders in beings, others by the middle, and others by the

last orders, as was before demonstrated, it is evident that some

of them deify the imparticipable portion of being, but that others

illuminate life, others intellect, others soul, and others bodies.

And of the last unities indeed, not only bodies participate, but

likewise soul, intellect, life and essence. For intellect in itself is

a plenitude of life and being. But from the unities which are above

this world intellect is suspended, and the psychical power, which

preexists in intellect. From the unities above these, imparticipable

and intellectual intellect is suspended. From those that are beyond

these, the first and imparticipable life is suspended. And from the

highest unities, the first being itself, and which is the most divine

of beings, is suspended. Hence Parmenides beginning from the one

being, produces from thence the whole orders of the Gods. These things

therefore being previously determined by us, let us speak concerning

the divine dialogues, beginning from on high, and producing from _the

one_ the whole orders of the Gods. Let us also, following Plato, in

the first place demonstrate the several orders from other dialogues, by

arguments which cannot be confuted. Afterwards, let us thus conjoin and

assimilate the conclusions of Parmenides to the divine progressions,

adapting the first conclusions to the first, but the last to the last

progressions.

CHAPTER III.

Again therefore, the mystic doctrine concerning _the one_ must be

resumed by us, in order that proceeding from the first principle, we

may celebrate the second and third principles of the whole of things.

Of all beings therefore, and of the Gods that produce beings, one

exempt and imparticipable cause preexists,--a cause ineffable indeed

by all language, and unknown by all knowledge and incomprehensible,

unfolding all things into light from itself, subsisting ineffably

prior to, and converting all things to itself, but existing as the

best end of all things. This cause therefore, which is truly exempt

from all causes, and which gives subsistence unically to all the

unities of divine natures, and to all the genera of beings, and their

progressions, Socrates in the Republic calls _the good_, and through

its analogy to the sun reveals its admirable and unknown transcendency

with respect to all intelligibles. But again, Parmenides denominates it

_the one_. And through negations demonstrates the exempt and ineffable

hyparxis of this one which is the cause of the whole of things. But

the discourse in the epistle to Dionysius proceeding through enigmas,

celebrates it as that about which all things subsist, and as the cause

of all beautiful things. In the Philebus however, Socrates celebrates

it as that which gives subsistence to the whole of things, because it

is the cause of all deity. For all the Gods derive their existence as

Gods from the first God. Whether therefore, it be lawful to denominate

it the fountain of deity, or the kingdom of beings, or the unity

of all unities, or the goodness which is generative of truth, or an

hyparxis exempt from all these things, and beyond all causes, both

the paternal and the generative, let it be honored by us in silence,

and prior to silence by union, and of the mystic end may it impart by

illumination a portion adapted to our souls.

But let us survey with intellect the biformed principles proceeding

from and posterior to it. For what else is it necessary to arrange

after the union of the whole theory, than the duad of principles?

What[174] the two principles therefore are of the divine orders after

the first principle, we shall in the next place survey. For conformably

to the theology of our ancestors, Plato also establishes two principles

after _the one_. In the Philebus therefore, Socrates says, that God

gives subsistence to bound and infinity, and through these mingling all

beings, has produced them, the nature of beings, according to Philolaus

subsisting from the connexion of things bounded, and things infinite.

If, therefore, all beings subsist from these, it is evident that they

themselves have a subsistence prior to beings. And if secondary natures

participate of these mingled together, these will subsist unmingled

prior to the whole of things. For the progression of the divine orders

originates, not from things coordinated and which exist in others,

but from things exempt, and which are established in themselves. As

therefore _the one_ is prior to things united, and as that which is

passive to the one, has a second order after the imparticipable union,

thus also the two principles of beings, prior to the participation of

and commixture with beings, are themselves by themselves the causes of

the whole of things. For it is necessary that bound should be prior

to things bounded, and infinity prior to infinites, according to the

similitude to _the one_ of things which proceed from it. For again,

if we should produce beings immediately after _the one_, we shall no

where find the peculiarity of _the one_ subsisting purely. For neither

is being the same with _the one_, but it participates of _the one_,

nor in reality is that which is the first _the one_; for, as has been

frequently said, it is better than _the one_. Where therefore is that

which is most properly and entirely one? Hence there is a certain one

prior to being, which gives subsistence to being, and is primarily the

cause of it; since that which is prior to it is beyond union, and is a

cause without habitude with respect to all things, and imparticipable,

being exempt from all things. If however this one is the cause of

being, and constitutes it, there will be a power in it generative of

being. For every thing which produces, produces according to its own

power, which is allotted a subsistence between that which produces

and the things produced, and is of the one the progression and as it

were extension, but of the other is the pre-arranged generative cause.

For being which is produced from these, and which is not _the one

itself_, but uniform, possesses its progression indeed from _the one_,

through the power which produces and unfolds it into light from _the

one_; but its occult union from the hyparxis of _the one_. This one

therefore which subsists prior to power, and first presubsists from the

imparticipable and unknown cause of the whole of things, Socrates in

the Philebus calls _bound_, but he denominates the power of it which is

generative of being, _infinity_. But he thus speaks in that dialogue,

“God we said has exhibited the bound, and also the infinite of beings.”

The first therefore and unical God, is without any addition denominated

by him God; because each of the second Gods is participated by being,

and has being suspended from its nature. But the first indeed, as

being exempt[175] from the whole of beings, is God, defined according

to the ineffable itself, the unical alone, and superessential. But

the bound and the infinite of beings, unfold into light that unknown

and imparticipable cause; bound indeed, being the cause of stable,

uniform, and connective deity; but the infinite being the cause of

power proceeding to all things and capable of being multiplied, and in

short, being the leader of every generative distribution. For all union

and wholeness, and communion of beings, and all the divine measures,

are suspended[176] from the first bound. But all division, prolific

production, and progression into multitude, derive their subsistence

from this most principal infinity. Hence, when we say that each of

the divine orders abides[177] and at the same time proceeds, we must

confess that it stably abides indeed, according to bound, but proceeds

according to infinity, and that at one and the same time it has unity

and multitude, and we must suspend the former from the principle of

bound, but the latter from that of infinity. And in short, of all

the opposition in the divine genera, we must refer that which is the

more excellent to bound, but that which is subordinate to infinity.

For from these two principles all things have their progression into

being, even as far as to the last of things. For eternity itself

participates at once of bound and infinity; so far indeed, as it is

the intelligible measure, it participates of bound; but so far as it

is the cause of a never-failing power of existing, it participates of

infinity. And intellect, so far indeed as it is uniform, and whole,

and so far as it is connective of paradigmatical measures, so far it

is the progeny of bound. But again, so far as it produces all things

eternally, and subsists conformably to the whole of eternity, supplying

all things with existence at once, and always possessing its own power

undiminished, so far it is the progeny of infinity. And soul indeed, in

consequence of measuring its own life, by restitutions and periods, and

introducing a boundary to its own motions, is referred to the cause of

bound; but in consequence of having no cessation of motions, but making

the end of one period the beginning of the whole of a second vital

circulation, it is referred to the order of infinity. The whole of this

heaven also, according to the wholeness of itself, its connexion, the

order of its periods, and the measures of its restitutions, is bounded.

But according to its prolific powers, its various evolutions, and the

never-failing revolutions of its orbs, it participates of infinity.

Moreover, the whole of generation, in consequence of all its forms

being bounded, and always permanent after the same manner, and in

consequence of its own circle which imitates the celestial circulation,

is similar to bound. But again, in consequence of the variety of the

particulars of which it consists, their unceasing mutation, and the

intervention of the more and the less in the participations of forms,

it is the image of infinity. And in addition to these things, every

natural production, according to its form indeed, is similar to

bound, but according to its matter, resembles infinity. For these are

suspended in the last place[178] from the two principles posterior

to _the one_, and as far as to these the progression of their

productive power extends. Each of these also is one, but form is

the measure and boundary of matter, and is in a greater degree one.

Matter however is all things in capacity, so far as it derives its

subsistence from the first power. There, however, power is generative

of all things. But the power of matter is imperfect, and is indigent

of the hypostasis which is generative[179] of all things according to

energy. Very properly therefore is it said by Socrates that all beings

are from bound and infinity, and that these two intelligible principles

primarily derive their subsistence from God. For that which congregates

both of them, and perfects them, and unfolds itself into light through

all beings is _the one_ prior to the duad. And union indeed is

derived to all things through that which is first; but the division of

the two orders of things is generated from these primary causes, and

through these is extended to the unknown and ineffable principle. Let

it therefore be manifest through these things, what the two principles

of beings are, which become proximately apparent from _the one_,

according to the theology of Plato.

CHAPTER IX.

In the next place let us show what the third[180] thing is which

presents itself to the view from these principles. It is every where

therefore called that which is mixed, as deriving its subsistence

from bound and infinity. But if bound is the bound of beings, and the

infinite is the infinite of beings, and beings are the things which

have a subsistence from both these, as Socrates himself clearly

teaches us, it is evident that the first of things mingled, is the

first of beings. This, however, is nothing else than that which is

highest in beings, which is being itself, and nothing else than being.

My meaning is, that this is evident through those things by which we

demonstrate that what is primarily being, is comprehensive of all

things intelligibly, and of life and intellect. For we say that life

is triadic vitally, and intellect intellectually; and also that these

three things being life and intellect are every where. But all things

presubsist primarily and essentially in being. For there essence, life

and intellect subsist, and the summit of beings. Life however is the

middle centre of being, which is denominated and is intelligible life.

But intellect is the boundary of being, and is intelligible intellect.

For in the intelligible there is intellect, and in intellect the

intelligible. There however intellect subsists intelligibly, but in

intellect, the intelligible subsists intellectually.

And essence indeed is that which is stable in being, and which is woven

together with the first principles, and does not depart from _the one_.

But life is that which proceeds from the principles, and is connascent

with infinite power. And intellect is that which converts itself to

the principles, conjoins the end with the beginning, and produces one

intelligible circle. The first of beings therefore is that which is

mingled from the first principles, and is triple, one thing which it

contains subsisting in it essentially, another vitally, and another

intellectually, but all things presubsisting in it essentially. I

mean however by the first of beings essence. For essence itself is

the summit of all beings, and is as it were the monad of the whole

of things. In all things therefore, essence is the first. And in

each thing that which is essential is the most ancient, as deriving

its subsistence from the Vesta of beings. For the intelligible is

especially this. Since intellect indeed is that which is gnostic, life

is intelligence, and being is intelligible. If however every being is

mingled, but essence is being itself, prior to all other things essence

is that which subsists as mingled from the two principles proceeding

from _the one_. Hence Socrates indicating how the mode of generation

in the two principles differs from that of the mixture says, “that

God has exhibited bound and infinity.” For they are unities deriving

their subsistence from _the one_, and as it were luminous patefactions

from the imparticipable and first union. But with respect to producing

a mixture, and mingling through the first principles, by how much _to

make_ is subordinate to _the unfolding into light_, and _generation_ to

_patefaction_, by so much is that which is mixed allotted a progression

from _the one_, inferior to that of the two principles.

That which is mixed therefore, is intelligible essence, and subsists

primarily from [the first] God, from whom infinity also and bound are

derived. But it subsists secondarily from the principles posterior to

the unical God, I mean from bound and infinity. For the fourth cause

which is effective of the mixture is again God himself; since if any

other cause should be admitted besides this, there will no longer be a

fourth cause, but a fifth will be introduced. For the first cause was

God, who unfolds into light the two principles. But after him are the

two principles bound and infinity. And the mixture is the fourth thing.

If therefore the cause of the mixture is different from the first

divine cause, this cause will be the fifth and not the fourth thing,

as Socrates says it is. Farther still, in addition to these things,

if we say that God is especially the supplier of union to beings, and

the mixture itself of the principles is a union into the hypostasis of

being, God is also certainly the cause of this primarily. Moreover,

Socrates in the Republic clearly evinces that _the good_ is the

cause of being and essence to intelligibles, in the same manner as

the sun is to visible natures. Is it not therefore necessary, if that

which is mixed is primarily being, to refer it to the first God, and to

say that it receives its progression from him? If also the demiurgus

in the Timæus, constitutes the essence of the soul itself by itself

from an impartible and a partible essence, which is the same thing as

to constitute it from bound and infinity; for the soul according to

bound is similar to the impartible, but according to infinity, to the

partible essence;--if therefore the demiurgus mingles the essence of

the soul from these, and again separately, from same and different,

and if from these being now preexistent, he constitutes the whole

soul, must we not much more say that the first God is the cause of the

first essence? That which is mixed therefore, proceeds, as we have

said, from the first God, and does not subsist from the principles

alone posterior to _the one_, but proceeds also from these, and

is triadic. And in the first place indeed, it participates from God

of ineffable union, and the whole of its subsistence. But from bound,

it receives hyparxis, and the uniform, and a stable peculiarity. And

from infinity, it receives power, and the occult power which is in

itself, of all things. For in short, since it is one and not one, the

one is inherent in it according to bound, but the non-one according to

infinity. The mixture however of both these, and its wholeness, are

derived from the first God. That which is mixed therefore, is a monad,

because it participates of _the one_; and it is biformed, so far

as it proceeds from the two principles; but it is a triad, so far as in

every mixture, these three things are necessary according to Socrates,

viz. beauty, truth, and symmetry. Concerning these things however, we

shall speak again.

In what manner, however, essence is that which is first mixed, we shall

now explain. For this is of all things the most difficult to discover,

viz. what that is which is primarily being, as the Elean guest also

somewhere says; for it is most dubious how being is not less than

non-being. In what manner therefore essence subsists from bound and

infinity must be shown. For if bound and infinity are superessential,

essence may appear to have its subsistence from non-essences. How

therefore can non-essences produce essence? Or is not this the

case in all other things which subsist through the mixture of each

other? For that which is produced from things mingled together, is

not the same with things that are not mingled. For neither is soul

the same with the genera, from which, being mingled together, the

father generated it, nor is a happy life the same with the life which

is according to intellect, or with the life which is according to

pleasure, nor is _the one_ in bodies the same with its elements.

Hence it is not wonderful, if that which is primarily being, though

it is neither bound nor infinity, subsists from both these, and is

mixed, superessential natures themselves not being assumed in the

mixture of it, but secondary progressions from them coalescing into

the subsistence of essence. Thus therefore being consists of these,

as participating of both, possessing indeed the uniform from bound,

but the generative, and in short, occult multitude from infinity.

For it is all things occultly, and on this account, is the cause of

all beings; which also the Elean guest indicating to us, calls being

the first power, as subsisting according to the participation of the

first power, and participating of hyparxis from bound, and of power

from infinity. Afterwards however, the Elean guest defines being to

be power, as prolific and generative of all things, and as being all

things uniformly. For power is every where the cause of prolific

progressions, and of all multitude; occult power indeed being the cause

of occult multitude; but the power which exists in energy, and which

unfolds itself into light, being the cause of all-perfect multitude.

Through this cause therefore, I think, that every being, and every

essence has connascent powers. For it participates of infinity, and

derives its hyparxis indeed from bound, but its power from infinity.

And being is nothing else than a monad of many powers, and a multiplied

hyparxis, and on this account being is one many. The many however

subsist occultly and without separation in the first natures; but with

separation in secondary natures. For by how much being is nearer to

_the one_, by so much the more does it conceal multitude, and is

defined according to union alone. It appears to me also that Plotinus

and his followers, frequently indicating these things, produce being

from form and intelligible matter, arranging form[181] as analogous

to _the one_, and to hyparxis, but power as analogous to matter.

And if indeed they say this, they speak rightly. But if they ascribe a

certain formless and indefinite nature to an intelligible essence, they

appear to me to wander from the conceptions of Plato on this subject.

For the infinite is not the matter of bound, but the power of it, nor

is bound the form of the infinite, but the hyparxis of it. But being

consists of both these, as not only standing in _the one_, but

receiving a multitude of unities and powers which are mingled into one

essence.

CHAPTER X.

That therefore which is primarily being is through these things

denominated by Plato that which is mixed. And through the similitude

of it, generation also is mingled from bound and infinity. And the

infinite indeed in this is imperfect power; but the bound in it is form

and the _morphe_ of this power. On this account we establish this power

to be matter, not possessing existence in energy, and requiring to be

bounded by something else. We no longer however say that it is lawful

to call the power of being matter, since it is generative of energies,

produces all beings from itself, and is prolific of the perfect powers

in beings. For the power of matter being imperfect dissimilarly

imitates the power of being; and becoming multitude in capacity, it

expresses the parturition of multitude in the power of being.[182]

Moreover, the form of matter imitates ultimately bound, since it gives

limits to matter, and terminates its infinity. But it is multiplied and

divided about it. It is also mingled with the privation of matter, and

represents the supreme union of the hyparxis of being, by its essence

always advancing to existence, and always tending to decay. For those

things which subsist in the first natures according to transcendency,

are in such as are last according to deficiency. For that also which is

primarily being is mixed, is exempt from the bound of infinite life,

and is the cause of it. But that which consists of the last[183] of

forms and the first matter, is in its own nature void of life; since

it possesses life in capacity. For there indeed generative causes

subsist prior to their progeny, and things perfect prior to such as

are imperfect. But here things in capacity are prior to such as are in

energy, and concauses are subject to the things which are produced

from them. This however, I think, happens naturally, because the gifts

of the first principles pervade as far as to the last of things, and

not only generate more perfect natures, but also such as have a more

imperfect subsistence. And on this account that which is mixed is the

cause of generation, and of the nature which is mingled here. The

bound and infinity however, which are prior to being, are not only the

causes of this nature, but also of the elements of it, of which that

which is mixed is not the cause, so far as it is mixed. For bound and

infinity are twofold. And one kind of these is exempt from the things

mingled, but another kind is assumed to the completion of the mixture.

For I think it is every where necessary that prior to things that

are mingled, there should be such as are unmingled, prior to things

imperfect, such as are perfect, prior to parts, wholes, and prior to

things that are in others, such as are in themselves; and this Socrates

persuades us to admit not in one thing only, but also in beauty and

symmetry, and in all forms. If therefore the second and third genera of

being and forms subsist prior to their participants, how can we assert

that bound and infinity which pervade through all beings have their

first subsistence as things mingled? It must be admitted therefore,

that they are unmingled and separate from being, and that being is

derived _from_ them, and at the same time consists _of_ them. It is

derived _from_ them indeed, because they have a prior subsistence; but

it consists _of_ them, because they subsist in being according to a

second progression.

The genera of being also are twofold; some of them indeed being

fabricative of beings, but others existing as the elements of the

nature of each being. For some of them indeed presubsist themselves

by themselves, as possessing a productive power; but others being

generated from these, constitute each particular being. Let no one

therefore any longer wonder, how Socrates indeed in the Philebus

establishes that which is mingled, prior to bound and infinity, but we

on the contrary evince that bound and infinity are exempt from that

which is mixed. For each is twofold, and the one indeed is prior to

being, but the other is in being; and the one is generative, but the

other is the element of the mixture. Of this kind also, are the bound

and infinity of the mixed life, each being the element of the whole of

felicity. Hence also each is indigent of each. And neither is intellect

by itself desirable, nor perfect pleasure. It is necessary however,

that the good should consist of all these, viz. of the desirable, the

sufficient, and the perfect. Bound itself therefore and infinity, which

are separate, subsist according to cause prior to that which is mixed.

But the bound and infinity which are mixed are more imperfect than the

mixture. Hence, from what has been said, it is evident what the things

are of which the mixture consists.

CHAPTER XI.

In the next place, we must speak of the triad, which is consubsistent

with this mixture. For every mixture, if it is rightly made, as

Socrates says, requires these three things, beauty, truth, and

symmetry. For neither will any thing base, if it is introduced into

the mixture, impart rectitude, since it will be the cause of error,

and of inordinate prerogative, nor if truth is at any time separated,

will it suffer the mixture to consist of things that are pure, and

which are in reality subdued, but it will fill the whole with an image

and with non-being. Nor without symmetry will there be a communion

of the elements, and an elegant association. Symmetry, therefore,

is necessary to the union of the things that are mingled, and to an

appropriate communion. But truth is necessary to purity. And beauty to

order; which also renders the whole lovely. For when each thing in the

mixture has a place adapted to itself, it renders both the elements,

and the arrangement resulting from them, beautiful. Here therefore, in

the first mixture, these three things are apparent, symmetry, truth,

and beauty. And symmetry indeed is the cause to the mixture, that being

is one; truth is the cause of the reality of its existence; and beauty

is the cause of its being intelligible. Hence it is intelligible and

truly being. That also which is primarily being is more uniform, and

intellect is conjoined to it, according to its familiarity with the

beautiful. But each participates of existence, because it is being

derived from being. That which is mixed however, is supreme among

beings, because it is united to _the good_. And it appears to me,

that the divine Iamblichus perceiving these three causes of being,

defines the intelligible in these three, viz. in symmetry, truth, and

beauty, and unfolds the intelligible Gods through these in the Platonic

theology. In what manner indeed, the intelligible breadth consists

of these, will be most evident as we proceed. Now however, from what

has been said, it is perfectly manifest why Socrates says that this

triad is found to be in the vestibules of the good. For that which

is primarily being participates of this triad through its union with

_the good_. For because indeed _the good_ is the measure of

all beings, the first being becomes itself commensurate. Because the

former is prior to being, the latter subsists truly and really. And

because the former is good and desirable, the latter presents itself

to the view as the beautiful itself. Here therefore, the first beauty

also subsists; and on this account _the one_ is not only the cause

of good, but likewise of beauty, as Plato says in his Epistles. Beauty

however subsists here occultly, since this order comprehends all things

uniformly, in consequence of subsisting primarily from the principles

[bound and infinity]. But where and how beauty is unfolded into light,

we shall shortly explain.

CHAPTER XII.

Such therefore, is the first triad of intelligibles, according to

Socrates in the Philebus, viz. bound, infinite, and that which is

mixed from these. And of these, bound indeed is a God proceeding

to the intelligible summit, from the imparticipable and first God,

measuring and defining all things, and giving subsistence to every

paternal, connective, and undefiled genus of Gods. But infinite is

the never-failing power of this God, unfolding into light all the

generative orders, and all infinity, both that which is prior to

essence, and that which is essential, and also that which proceeds as

far as to the last matter. And that which is mixed, is the first and

highest order of the Gods, comprehending all things occultly, deriving

its completion indeed through the intelligible connective triad, but

unically comprehending the cause of every being, and establishing its

summit in the first intelligibles, exempt from the whole of things.

CHAPTER XIII.

After this first triad subsisting from, and conjoined with _the one_,

we shall celebrate the second, proceeding from this, and deriving its

completion through things analogous[184] to the triad prior to it. For

in this also it is necessary that being should participate, and that

_the one_ should be participated, and likewise that this one which is

secondarily one, should be generative of that which is secondarily

being. For every where participated deity constitutes about itself that

which participates it. Thus whole souls render bodies consubsistent

with their causes: and partial souls generate, in conjunction with

the Gods, irrational souls. Much more therefore, do the Gods produce

in conjunction with _the one_ all things. Hence, as the first of the

unities generates the summit of being, so likewise the middle unity

constitutes the middle being. But every thing which generates, and

every thing which makes or produces, possesses a power prolific of

the things produced, according to which it produces, corroborates

and connects its progeny. Again therefore, there will be a second

triad unfolded into light analogously to the first. And one thing

indeed, is the summit of it, which we call one, deity, and hyparxis.

But another thing is the middle of it, which we call power. And

another thing is the extremity of it, which we say is that which is

secondarily being. This however is intelligible life. For all things

are in the intelligible, as was before demonstrated, viz. to be, to

live, and to energize intellectually. And the summit indeed, of the

intelligible order, is all things according to cause, and as we have

frequently said, occultly. But the middle of it, causes multitude to

shine forth, and proceeds from the union of being into manifest light.

And the extremity of it, is now all intelligible multitude, and the

order of intelligible forms. For forms have their subsistence at the

extremity of the intelligible order. For it is necessary that forms

should subsist first and become apparent in intellect. If therefore,

being abides exemptly in the first mixture, but now proceeds, and is

generated dyadically from the monad, there will be motion about it;

and if there is motion, it is also necessary that there should be

intelligible life. For every where motion is a certain life, since

some one calls even the motion of material bodies life. That which is

first therefore, in this second triad, may be called bound; that which

is second in it, infinity; and that which is the third, life. For the

second triad also is a God, possessing prolific power, and unfolding

into light from, and about itself, that which is secondarily being.

Here however also, the triad is analogous to the first triad.

But again, it is necessary to comprehend by reasoning the peculiarity

of this triad. For the first triad being all things, but intelligibly

and unically, and as I may say, speaking Platonically, according

to the form of bound, the second triad is indeed all things, but

vitally, and as I may say, following the philosopher, according to

the form of infinity, just as the third triad proceeds according to

the peculiarity of that which is mixed. For as in the progression

according to breadth, that which is mixed presents itself to the view

as the third, so likewise in the progression according to depth of

intelligibles, the third has the order of that which is mixed with

reference to the superior triads. The middle triad therefore, is

indeed all things, but is characterized by intelligible infinity. For

the three principles after the first, orderly distribute for us the

intelligible genus of the Gods. For bound indeed, unfolds into light

the first triad; but infinity the second; and that which is mixed, the

third. It is infinite power therefore, according to which the second

triad is characterized. For being the middle, it subsists according

to the middle of the first triad, being all things from all. For in

each triad, there is bound, infinity, and that which is mixed. But

the peculiarity of the monads being respectively different, evolves

the intelligible order of the Gods. The middle triad however, thus

subsisting, but I say thus, because it consists of all the things of

which the triad prior to it consists, yet it contains and connects the

middle of intelligibles according to infinite power, and is filled

indeed from a more elevated union, but fills the union posterior to

itself with the powers of being. And it is measured indeed, from thence

uniformly, but measures the third triad by the power of itself. And it

abides indeed, in the first triad stably, but it establishes in itself

the triad which is next in order. And in short, it binds to itself

the intelligible centre, and establishes one intelligible coherence;

causing indeed that which is occult and possesses the form of _the one_

in the first triad, to shine forth; but collecting the intelligible

multitude of the third triad, and comprehending it on all sides. The

being however, which gives completion to this triad is mixed, in the

same manner as the being of the triad prior to it, and receives the

peculiarity of life. For the infinity in this generates life.

It is likewise necessary that this triad should participate of the

three things, symmetry, truth, and beauty. That which is primarily

being however, principally subsists according to symmetry, which unites

it, and conjoins it to _the good_. But the second triad, principally

subsists according to truth. For because it participates of that which

is primarily being, it is being, and _truly_ being. And the third triad

principally subsists according to the beautiful. For there intelligible

multitude, order and beauty, first shine forth to the view. Hence this

being is the most beautiful of all intelligibles. This however will

be discussed hereafter. As there is a triad therefore, in each of

the mixtures, the first indeed, symmetry especially comprehends and

connects; the second truth, and the third beauty. And this induced

the divine Iamblichus to say, that Plato in these three defines the

whole of the intelligible [order]. For all are in each, but one of

these predominates more in one of the intelligible monads than in

another. Moreover, the third triad presents itself to the view after

this. For it is necessary that the extremity of being should also be

deified, and should participate of an intelligible unity. For beings

are not more in number than the unities, as Parmenides says, nor are

the unities more numerous than beings; but each progression of being

participates of _the one_; since this universe also, according to each

part of itself, is governed by soul and intellect. By a much greater

priority therefore, must the intelligible in its first, middle, and

last hypostases, participate of the intelligible Gods.

CHAPTER XIV.

As the first unity therefore, after the exempt cause of all things,

unfolds into light intelligible being, and the second unity,

intelligible life, thus also the third constitutes about itself,

intelligible intellect, and fills it with divine union, constituting

power as the medium between itself and being, through which it gives

completion to this being, and converts it to itself. In this therefore,

every intelligible multitude shines forth to the view. For the whole

of this being is intelligible intellect, life, and essence. And it is

neither all things according to cause, in the same manner as that which

is primarily being, nor does it cause all things to shine forth, as the

second being does, but it is as it were all things according to energy,

and openly. Hence also, it is the boundary of all intelligibles.

For since the progression of beings is accomplished according to

similitude, the first being is most similar to _the one_; the

second, is parturient with multitude, and is the origin of separation;

but the third, is now all-perfect, and unfolds into light in itself,

intelligible multitude and form.

Farther still, as the first triad abides occultly in bound, and fixes

in itself every thing that is stable in intelligibles; but the second

abides and at the same time proceeds; so the third, after progression

converts the intelligible end to the beginning, and convolves the

order to itself. For it is every where the province of intellect to

convert and converge to the intelligible. All these likewise are

uniform [i.e. have the form of one] and intelligible, viz. the abiding,

the proceeding, and the returning. For each of these is not asserted

after the same manner in intelligibles. And the intelligible genus of

Gods[185] is unical, simple, and occult, conjoining itself to _the

one itself_ which is prior to beings; and unfolds[186] into light

nothing else than the transcendency of _the one_. For these

three triads, mystically announce that unknown cause the first and

perfectly imparticipable God. The first of them indeed, announcing his

ineffable union; the second his transcendency, by which he surpasses

all powers; and the third, his all-perfect generation of beings. For

as they are able to comprehend the principle which surpasses both

the union and the powers of all beings, so they exhibit to secondary

natures, his[187] admirable transcendency; receiving indeed separately

the unical power and dominion of the first God; but unfolding into

light intelligibly the cause which is prior to intelligibles. For these

Gods though they are allotted a simplicity which is equally exempt

from all the divine orders, yet they fall short of the union of the

father. Of this triad therefore, which converts all intelligibles to

the first principle, and convolves the multitude apparent in itself

to the stable union of the whole of things, one thing is bound, and

unity and hyparxis; another, is infinity and power; and another is

that which is mixed, essence, life, and intelligible intellect. But

the whole triad subsists according to being, and is the intellect of

the first triad. For the first triad is an intelligible God primarily.

But the triad posterior to it is an intelligible and intellectual God.

And the third triad is an intellectual God. These three deities also,

and triadic monads, give completion to the intelligible genera. For

they are monads according to their deities; since all other things are

suspended from the Gods, and also powers and beings. But they are

triads according to a separate division. For bound, infinity, and that

which is mixed, have a threefold subsistence; but in one place indeed,

all things are according to bound; in another, all things are according

to infinity; and in another, all things are according to that which is

mixed. And in one place, that which is mixed is essence; in another,

it is intelligible life; and in another, intelligible intellect. In

this last therefore, forms subsist primarily. For the separation of

intelligibles, unfolds the order of forms; because form is being, but

is not simply being. Hence that which is primarily being, is being

itself, and is that which is being. But that which is the second being,

is power, proceeding indeed from the first being, and existing as it

were a duad generative of the multitude of beings, but not yet being

multitude. And that which is the third being, is itself the multitude

of beings; being there existing with separation. For being is the

exempt cause of those things which forms constitute divisibly. And of

the things of which being is productive collectively, of these, forms

are the cause in a way attended with separation. Because forms indeed,

are causes productive of separation in their effects, and also because

forms are called the paradigms of beings. Being however, is the cause

of all things posterior to itself, but is not the paradigm of them. For

paradigms are the causes of things which are separated according to

existence, and which have different characters of essence. After _the

one_ therefore which is prior to beings, that which is one-many

occultly, and the united subsists. On this account, it is that which

is divided into multitude, and which tends from the uniform to the

splendid. But the last of intelligibles, is that from which a certain

distribution into parts originates, and which is comprehensive of

intelligible multitude.

CHAPTER XV.

Socrates therefore, in the Philebus, affords us such like auxiliaries

to the theory of the intelligible triads. It is requisite however,

not only to abide in these conceptions, but also to demonstrate the

theology of Plato about these triads from other dialogues, and from

them to point out one truth adapted to the things themselves. We shall

assume therefore, what is written in the Timæus, and shall follow our

leader [Syrianus] who has unfolded to us the arcane mysteries of these

triads, and conjoin with the end of what has been said the beginning of

the following discussion. In the Timæus therefore, Plato investigating

what the paradigm of the whole world is, discovers that it is

comprehensive of all intelligible animals, that it is all-perfect, that

it is the most beautiful of intelligibles, that it is only-begotten,

and that it is the intelligible of the demiurgus. He likewise

denominates it animal itself, as being the intelligible paradigm of

every animal, and of that which is the object of sense. Hence it is

necessary that this animal itself, because it is all-perfect, and

the most beautiful of intelligibles, should be established in the

intelligible orders. For though there is intelligible animal in the

demiurgus, yet it is rather intellectual than intelligible, and is

not the most beautiful of all intelligibles, but is second to them

in beauty and power. For primary beauty is in the intelligible Gods.

In the demiurgus also, there are not only four forms of the things

contained in the world, but there is all the multitude of forms. For in

him the paradigms of individual forms presubsist. But animal itself is

_totally_ constitutive of all animals by the intelligible tetrad.

The demiurgus likewise is not like animal itself only-begotten among

beings, but subsists in conjunction with the vivific cause, together

with which he constitutes the second genera of being, mingling them in

the crater or bowl, in order to the generation of souls. For of the

things of which intelligible animal is effective and at the same time

generative, of these the demiurgus is allotted the cause in a divided

manner, in conjunction with the crater. Hence, as I have said, animal

itself is exempt from the demiurgus, and is, as Timæus every where

denominates it, intelligible.

Nevertheless, because forms are first separated in it, and because

it is all-perfect, it subsists in the third order of intelligibles.

For neither that which is primarily, nor that which is secondarily

being,[188] is all-perfect. For the former is beyond all separation;

but the latter generates indeed, and is parturient with intelligibles,

but is not yet the multitude of beings. If therefore neither of these

is multitude, how can either of them be all-perfect multitude? If

however all-perfect multitude shines forth in the third triad of

intelligibles, as was a little before demonstrated, but animal itself

is the first paradigm (for it is comprehensive of all intelligible

animals, is an only-begotten paradigm, and is not conjoined with

any other principle) it is necessary that animal itself should be

established according to this order. For either there will not be an

intelligible paradigm, (and in this case, how will sensibles be images

of intelligibles? or how will the intelligible Gods be the fathers of

the whole of things?) or if there is, it is the third in intelligibles.

For the natures which are prior to the triad in intelligibles, are not

all-perfect; since they are exempt from the division into multitude.

But the natures posterior to it are not only-begotten. For they proceed

together with others; the male indeed, with the female, and those

that are of a demiurgic together with those that are of a generative

characteristic. Nor are they the most beautiful of intelligibles; for

beauty is in the intelligible. But animal itself is all-perfect, and at

the same time only begotten. The first paradigm of beings therefore,

is arranged in the third triad of intelligibles. Moreover, animal

itself is eternal, as Timæus himself says. For says he, “the nature of

animal is eternal.” And again, in another place he asserts, “that the

paradigm is through all eternity being.” If therefore it is eternal, it

participates of eternity. And if that which participates is every where

secondary to that which is participated, animal itself is secondary to

eternity. And if it is through all eternity being, it is filled with

the whole power of eternity. If this however be the case, it subsists

proximately after eternity. For that which enjoys the whole of causes,

is arranged proximately after them.

CHAPTER XVI.

Moreover, if eternity has the same ratio to intelligible animal, which

time has to that which is sensible, but the universe proximately

participates of time (for time was generated together with the

universe) it is certainly necessary that animal itself should

primarily participate of eternity. Eternity therefore is beyond the

first paradigm. For eternity indeed measures the existence of animal

itself: but animal itself is measured and filled with perpetuity

from it. To which may be added, that we assert eternity to be the

cause of immortality to all things. Hence eternity is that which is

primarily immortal. For as that which is primarily being is the cause

of existence to all things, but that which is effective of form is

itself prior to other forms, so that which is the cause of perpetuity

and immortality, is itself primarily immortal. The dæmoniacal Aristotle

also rightly calls eternity immortal and divine, and that from whence

the existence and life of all things are suspended. If however it is

that which is primarily immortal, and not according to participation,

but is as it were immortality and perpetuity, it will be life,

possessing from itself the ever, and exuberantly scattering the power

of perpetuity, and extending it to other things, so far as each is

naturally adapted to receive it. For the immortal is in life, and

subsists together with life. Hence Socrates in the Phædo,[189] after

many and beautiful demonstrations of the psychical immortality, says,

“God therefore, my dear Cebes, and the form itself of life, are much

more immortal.” Hence, intelligible life, and the God who is connective

of this life, primarily possess the immortal, and are the fountain of

the whole of perpetuity. But this is eternity. Eternity therefore has

its subsistence in life, and will be established in the middle of the

intelligible order.

Farther still, it is necessary to assert that intelligible eternity is

one of these three things, viz. that it subsists either according to

being, or according to life, or according to intelligible intellect.

But being, as the Elean guest says, according to its own nature,

neither stands still, nor is moved. For if being is being to all

things, and essence is a thing of this kind, much more must this be

the case with intelligible essence and that which is primarily being.

For they are nothing else than essence only. But being unfolds motion

and permanency, and the other genera of beings, in the second and

third progressions of itself. The first being therefore, as we have

said, is at one and the same time exempt from motion and permanency.

But eternity according to Timæus _abides_ in one. Hence also

time imitates in its motion the intelligible permanency of eternity.

Eternity therefore does not subsist according to that which is

primarily being, nor yet according to intelligible intellect.[190] For

neither is soul time, which is moved through the whole of time. And

in short, in divine beings, that which is participated is every where

established above that which participates. But the eternal participates

of eternity, just as that which is temporal participates of time.

Eternity therefore is prior to intelligible intellect, and posterior

to being; so that it is established in the middle of the intelligible

breadth. And as animal itself is eternal, so likewise eternity is that

which is always being. For as animal itself participates of eternity,

so eternity participates of being, and is the cause of existence, of

perpetual life, and intellection, and measures the essences, powers and

energies of all things.

CHAPTER XVII.

Since, however, eternity subsists according to the middle centre of

intelligibles, and animal itself according to the extremity of them,

and the most splendid of that which is intelligible, what is that which

is the first of intelligibles, and how is it denominated by Timæus? He

says therefore of eternity, that while it abides in one, time proceeds

according to number; and that by motion it adumbrates the permanency of

eternity, but by number, its stable union. What therefore is that one,

in which Timæus says eternity abides? For it is necessary either to say

that it is the one of eternity, or _the one_ which transcends all

intelligibles, or the one of the first triad. But if indeed, we say

that it is the imparticipable one, how is it possible that any thing

can abide in that which is exempt from all things; and which neither

admits the habitude nor communion of secondary natures with itself? For

every thing which abides in any thing, is in a certain respect on all

sides comprehended by that in which we say it abides. It is however

perfectly impossible that the first one should either comprehend any

being, or be coarranged with beings. But if any one should suppose

that it is the one of eternity, in which Timæus says eternity abides,

in this case, eternity will be in itself. It is necessary however,

that it should abide in itself, by having its subsistence in abiding

in that which is prior to itself. For to abide in that which is prior

to, is better than the establishment of things in themselves, in the

same manner as it is more perfect than the collocation of better in

less excellent natures. If therefore eternity abides in itself, to what

shall we primarily assign permanency in that which is prior to itself?

For it is necessary that this being more divine, should have its

generation prior to that which is inferior to it. If therefore eternity

can neither abide in itself, nor in _the one_ which is prior to

beings, it is evident that abiding in one according to Timæus, _it is

established in the one of the first triad_, or rather in the whole

of that triad. For, as we have before observed, the first triad is the

cause of stability to all beings, in the same manner as the middle

triad is the cause of their progression, and the third triad of their

conversion to their principle.

CHAPTER XVIII.

Again therefore, three orders of intelligibles present themselves to

our view, according to the doctrine of Timæus, viz. animal itself,

eternity, and the one. And through this one, and the firm establishment

in it, eternity has fixed the intelligible kingdom. But through

eternity, animal itself defines the boundary of the intelligible Gods,

according to a perpetual and invariable sameness. And animal itself

indeed, having proceeded tetradically, is suspended from the duad

in eternity. For eternity is _the ever in conjunction with being_.

But the duad in eternity participates of the intelligible monad,

which Timæus on this account denominates one, as being the monad and

principle of all the intelligible breadth. Since otherwise indeed, he

very properly calls the first triad one, in consequence of its being

especially characterized according to bound, denominating it from

bound. But he calls the middle triad dyadically, eternity, connecting

the names; because this triad is defined according to intelligible

power. And he denominates the third triad animal itself, transferring

the appellation to the whole of it, from the extremity of the triad.

The first triad therefore is the union of all the intelligibles, being

in a certain respect coordinated with them. For the union is different

from this which is exempt from intelligibles and imparticipable. It

is also the supplier of stable power. For all things are established

on account of it. But eternity is primary being, and is that which is

primarily established. Hence, with respect to the permanency of the

whole of things, we say that the first triad is that _on account of

which_ this permanency is effected; but that the second triad is that

_by which_ it is produced. For the firm establishment of beings is

indeed _according_ to this second triad, but is _on account_ of the

first. But the second triad is the proximate measure of all beings,

and is coordinated with the things that are measured. There are also

at one and the same time in it, bound and infinity; bound indeed,

so far as it measures intelligibles; but infinity, so far as it is

the cause of perpetuity, and the ever. For according to the oracle,

eternity is the cause of never-failing life, of unwearied power,

and unsluggish energy. Nevertheless, eternity is more characterised

by infinity [than by bound.] For it comprehends in itself infinite

time. And time indeed has bound and infinity in a divided manner. For

according to its continuity, it is infinite; but according to the now

it is bounded. For the now is a bound. But eternity establishes bound

and infinity in the same. For it is a unity and power. And according

to the one indeed, it is bound; but according to power infinite; which

time[191] also demonstrates as from images; because the middle triad

[of intelligibles] has bound, infinity, and that which is mixed. For

whence is the bound of time derived except from eternal bound? For the

temporal bound also is impartible, in the same manner as the bound of

eternity is one. For the impartible is the image of _the one_. Whence

likewise is the infinity of the continuity of time derived except from

the power of the infinite? For the latter is a stable infinity, but

the former an infinity which is moved. And as the latter stands still

according to _the one_, so the former is moved according to number.

Since whence is the alliance of time with lives, except from the first

principle [of life, eternity?]. But time proceeds through all temporal

life.

Again, therefore, from these things it is evident, that eternity

subsists according to the middle of the intelligible Gods. For here

there is infinite life, and the cause of all life, intellectual,

psychical, and that which subsists partibly in bodies. But eternity is

the father and supplier of infinite life; since eternity is also the

cause of all immortality and perpetuity. And Plotinus, exhibiting, in

a most divinely inspired manner, the peculiarity[192] of eternity,

according to the theology of Plato, defines it to be infinite life,

at once unfolding into light the whole of itself, and its own being.

For establishing its life in the intelligible centre, and through the

one indeed measuring its being, and fixing it in that which is prior

to itself, but through power causing it to be infinite, it unfolds

indeed the uniform transcendency of the first triad, but defines

the termination of the Gods, and extends from the middle on all

sides, and to all the intelligible breadth. Moreover the third triad

is filled indeed with intelligible life,[193] and on this account

is an intelligible animal, and the first animal. For it primarily

participates of the whole nature of this life; but unfolds into light

in itself the first of forms, to which also the demiurgic intellect

extending itself, constitutes the whole world, and is itself the

intelligible universe, and the apparent world the sensible universe.

Hence also, Plato denominates animal itself all-perfect. Or rather,

if you are willing we will speak thus: that in this third triad,

there are bound, infinity, and that which is mixed, which we have

called intelligible intellect. Hence the whole triad is denominated

only-begotten from the father which is in it. For the cause of bound

imparts that which is uncoordinated with other things, and an exempt

transcendency. For that which comprehends, says Timæus, all such

animals as are intelligible, will not be the second with any other;

since again, it would be requisite that there should be another

animal about it. Hence that which comprehends in one all intelligible

animals is a whole. But every where whole is referred[194] to bound,

and parts to infinity. So that if on this account animal itself is

only-begotten, it will possess this peculiarity according to bound.

But again, it is denominated eternal according to the power of it. For

this power especially pertains to that which is eternal. For eternity

is infinite power abiding in one, and proceeding stably. Animal itself,

however, is all-perfect according to intellect. For that which unfolds

in itself all the intelligible separation of being, is intelligible

intellect. And that intellect, according to the decision of Plato,

will be all-perfect, which comprehends all intelligibles, and defines

the boundary of the intelligible order. The only-begotten, therefore,

the eternal, the all-perfect, bound, infinity, and that which is mixed,

manifest the nature of intelligible animal. On this account, Timæus

also, in these three conclusions, reminds us of the paradigm, viz. in

the conclusion which shews that the universe is only-begotten, and

again, in the generation of time, and in the all-perfect comprehension

of all animals.

If likewise Timæus says, that animal itself is the most beautiful of

all intelligibles, and that this has the third order in intelligibles,

it will not be wonderful. For it has been before asserted by us, that

every where the cause of the best mixture is the triad symmetry,

truth, and beauty. But beauty principally shines forth in the third

progression of being, and exhibits its luminous nature together with

intelligible forms, just as truth shines forth in the second, and

symmetry in the first progression of being. If, however, truth is

indeed the first, beauty the second, and symmetry the third, it is by

no means wonderful, that according to order, truth and beauty should

be prior to symmetry; but that symmetry being more apparent in the

first triad than the other two, should shine forth as the third in

the secondary progressions. For these three subsist occultly in the

first triad. And truth indeed, so far as it is intelligible knowledge,

is in the second triad; but beauty so far as it is the form of forms

is in the third triad. For that this triad subsists there first, is

evident from this, that truth is primarily in that which is especially

being, prior to knowledge. But beauty, which pervades as far as to

the last of beings, is necessarily in the first being, from which the

last of beings are derived. And the first symmetry is in that which is

primarily mixed. For every mixture requires symmetry, in order that

what is produced from it may be one certain thing. Though these three

things, therefore, presubsist there, for we assume, as acknowledged

universally, that symmetry is there, and the most beautiful of

intelligible animals, as Timæus says, yet at present we shall dismiss

the further consideration of them, as we have elsewhere precedaneously

discussed them, and have especially endeavoured to enforce what we

conceive to be the opinion of Plato concerning their order. For we

have spoken of these things in a treatise consisting of one book, in

which we demonstrate that truth is coordinate to the philosopher,

beauty to the lover, and symmetry to the musician; and that such as is

the order of these lives, such also is the relation of truth, beauty,

and symmetry to each other.

Animal itself, therefore, may with the greatest justice, be called most

beautiful, so far as it is eminently contained in intelligible beauty.

For beauty is wont to be carried in forms, and is as it were the form

of forms, unfolding that which is occult in _the good_, causing its

loveliness to shine forth, and attracting to its own splendor the

desire which is concealed about it. And to _the good_ indeed, all

things possess a silent and arcane tendency; but we are excited to the

beautiful with astonishment and motion. For the illumination from it,

and its efficacy, acutely pervade through every soul, and as being the

most similar of all things to _the good_, it converts every soul that

surveys it. The soul also, beholding that which is arcane shining forth

as it were to the view, rejoices in, and admires that which it sees,

and is astonished about it. And as in the most holy of the mysteries,

prior to the mystic spectacles, those that are initiated, are seized

with astonishment, so in intelligibles prior to the participation of

_the good_, beauty shining forth, astonishes those that behold it,

converts the soul to itself, and being established in the vestibules

[of _the good_] shows what that is which is in the adyta, and what the

transcendency is of occult good. Through these things therefore, let it

be apparent whence beauty originates, and how it first shines forth;

and also that animal itself is the most beautiful of all intelligibles.

CHAPTER XIX.

Since, however, Timæus says that the primary and intelligible

paradigms have their subsistence in intelligible animal, and that all

these are four, unfolding themselves first into light, according

to the all-perfect tetrad,--this being the case, in the first place

it deserves to be considered, that as species or _forms_ present

themselves to the view in the intelligible, it is necessary by a much

greater priority, that the _genera_ of beings should pre-subsist

in intelligibles. For it is not possible to admit that forms are

intelligible, but that genera are intellectual only. But as forms exist

intelligibly indeed, according to their first subsistence, but the

pleroma, or plenitude of them shines forth in the intellectual[195]

gods, and divides that which is total into more partial decrements,

produces the uniform into multitude, and expands that which is exempt

into coordinate causes, thus also the genera of being are occultly and

indivisibly in intelligibles, but are accompanied with separation in

intellectuals. And on this account the first triad indeed has essence

for that which is mixed; but the second has life, where there was

motion and permanency, life both abiding and proceeding; and in the

third there are sameness and difference. For the all-perfect multitude

indeed, is through intelligible difference, but the united and that

which is comprehensive in common of parts according to genera, and

according to one, is through intelligible sameness. And all these

subsist intelligibly, essentially, and uniformly in these triads.

In the first place therefore, this deserves to be inferred by those

who love to survey the nature of things, and it is also fit that

they should attribute coordinate genera to intelligible forms.

For it neither was nor will be lawful for genera to shine forth

secondarily[196] after forms. Hence much more must it be admitted that

genera subsist in the intelligible after the above-mentioned manner,

by those who admit that there are intelligible forms. In the next

place, in addition to these things we must survey how this tetrad of

forms subsists, and how it shines forth in intelligible intellect

analogous to the principles. For it is divided into a monad and triad.

For so far as the idea of the celestial gods is arranged prior to the

others, it is defined according to a divine cause. It appears however

to me that intelligible intellect returning to the principles of the

whole of things, according to the conversion of itself, it becomes the

plenitude of forms, and is all things intellectually and at the same

time intelligibly, comprehending in itself the causes of beings, and

being full of the ineffable and exempt cause of all things, constitutes

the monad of the gods; whence also, Plato I think calls it the idea of

the gods. But receiving the intellectual causes of the three principles

posterior to _the one_, it exhibits three ideas after this, one of

them indeed, being the cause of air-wandering and volant animals, this

cause proceeding analogous to bound. Hence also it constitutes gods

that are uniform, elevating, undefiled, united to the celestial gods,

and which receive measures second in dignity to theirs, and have the

same relation to those gods that govern generation co-ordinately, as

the celestial gods have to these, according to exempt transcendency.

But it exhibits the cause of the aquatic gods, coordinate with

generative and infinite power, and which produces gods that are the

suppliers of motion and prolific abundance, and that are the inspective

guardians of life; since also this water itself which is the object

of sense is under the dominion of effusion, infinite lation and

indefiniteness. Hence likewise it is attributed to vivific powers. And

intelligible intellect exhibits the precedaneous cause of terrestrial

and pedestrious gods, in a manner adapted to the nature of that which

is mixed. It also generates gods who contain the end of the whole of

things, who are stable, who subdue the formless nature of matter by

the last forms, and fix the seat of mundane natures in the one centre

of the universe. For deriving their subsistence from the first Vesta

as it were, or seat of beings, they stably define this mundane seat.

Thus therefore forms first unfold themselves into light in intelligible

intellect, possessing their progression and order according to the

first principles. It is necessary however, in addition to these things,

to infer this in the third place, following Timæus, that according

to this triad, the multitude of intelligible parts shines forth, and

the whole is divided into an all-perfect order of parts. For that,

says he, of which other intelligible animals both according to one,

and according to genera are parts, is the first and most beautiful

paradigm of the universe. But if other intelligible animals are parts

of this, it is evident that it is a whole, comprehending in itself

the multitude of intelligible parts, and that it is connective of all

intelligible parts. It must be inferred therefore that this triad is

the first cause of production and fabrication. For if it contains

the primary paradigms of things, it is evident that the orderly

distribution of secondary natures, originates from it. And if it is an

animal constitutive of all animals, every psychical extent, and all the

extent of bodies, have their progression from thence; and it will also

comprehend the intelligible causes of all the vivific and demiurgic

orders.

CHAPTER XX.