Farther still, in addition to these things we say that neither is it

possible for any thing to be touched, nor to be separate, if there

is nothing else besides _the one_. For how can things which have no

existence be separate, or come into contact with any thing? But neither

can _the one_ either be separate from itself, or touch itself. For it

would thus be passive to the being touched, and the being separate.

But _the one_ suffers no other thing besides itself. It is likewise

requisite that no one thing should either be equal or unequal to any

thing. For that which is equal to another thing, is said to be so with

reference to another thing. And the like may be said of that which is

unequal. Another thing, however, has no existence, if _the one_ alone

has a subsistence. But neither can _the one_ be equal or unequal to

itself. For if unequal, there will be one thing in it as greater, but

another as less; so that it will be two things and not one. And if _the

one_ is equal to itself, _the one_ will measure itself. This however

is impossible. For _the one_ will measure and be measured by itself,

so that it will not be _the one itself_. Neither therefore will there

be any equality or inequality in beings. If however these things are

impossible, neither can any being come into contact with another, and

be separate, nor be similar or dissimilar, nor be same or different,

nor again, stand still, or be moved, or in short be in any thing, or

have figure, or be a whole, or have parts, if _the one_ alone has

a subsistence which is void of multitude, and is without all these

things. Neither however, is it possible for the many alone to have a

subsistence, as was before demonstrated. And hence it is necessary that

every being should be both many and one.

If this however is the case, either _the many_ must participate of

_the one_, or _the one_ of _the many_, or both must participate of

each other, or neither of each other; but _the many_ indeed must be

separate, and _the one_ must also be separate, in order that _the many_

and _the one_ may subsist, as reason evinces. If, therefore, neither

_the one_ participates of _the many_, nor _the many_ of _the one_, the

same absurdities will ensue as we brought together in the hypothesis

of _the many_ alone having a subsistence. For again there will be _the

many_ separate from _the one_. For if _the one_ subsists by itself, and

_the many_ do not in any respect participate of _the one_, _the many_

will be infinitely infinite, they will be similar and dissimilar, same

and different, moved and stable, and there will neither be any number

nor any knowledge of _the many_. For the absence of _the one_ compels

all these consequences to be apparent in _the many_. It is impossible

therefore, that neither _the many_ should participate of _the one_, nor

_the one_ of _the many_.

If however, _the one_ participates of _the many_, and _the many_ of

_the one_, and both these are in each other, it is necessary that

there should be another nature besides these, which is neither one nor

many. For both these being mingled in each other, it is necessary that

there should be a cause of their mixture which conjoins _multitude_

to _the one_, and _the one_ to _multitude_. For it is necessary that

every thing that is mingled, should have a cause of the mixture. For in

short, if _the one_ and _multitude_ participate of each other, neither

_the one_ is the cause of essence to _multitude_, nor _multitude_

to _the one_, but a certain third thing is the cause of essence to

both, and which is prior to these. For what will that be which makes

this to be multitude, and that to be one? And what is the cause of

this communication and association with each other, _the one_ so far

as it is one never having any communication with _the many_? For

_the many_ so far as many, and _the one_ so far as one are different

from each other. And so far as neither is from neither, they have no

sympathy with each other. What therefore is it which collects these

into one, since they fly from and are unmingled with each other? For

being thus discordant with each other, they cannot desire each other,

or if they did their congress must be fortuitous. For if this should

happen to be the case, there was a time when these were separate from

each other, since now also they subsist together causally. It is

however impossible for _the many_ to subsist separate from _the one_.

The mixture therefore is not causal. But neither is the mixture from

_the many_, if neither _the one_ is the cause of _the many_, nor _the

many_ of _the one_. What therefore is this more excellent thing [which

is the cause of the mixture?] For it is either one, or not one. But

if indeed, it is _the one itself_, we must again inquire concerning

this, whether it participates of multitude or of nothing. For if

this participates, it is evident that some other thing prior to this,

will for the same reason present itself to the view, and this will be

the case to infinity. But if a thing of this kind is entirely void of

multitude, again that which was asserted at first will not be true,

viz. that _the many_ do not participate of _the one_, nor _the one_

of _the many_. I mean however that which is the most principal and

primarily one. But there is indeed a certain one in the many, and there

is also the imparticipable one, and which is simply one, and nothing

else. If however that which is prior to both, is _not[137] one_, it is

necessary that this _not one_ should be more excellent than _the one_.

All things however are, and are generated what they are, through _the

one_. And together with _the one_ indeed every being is preserved;

but separate from _the one_ proceeds to the corruption of itself. The

mixture also of _the one_ and _multitude_, which the non-one affords

to beings, is communion and union. _The one_[138] therefore, and that

which is _not one_,[139] are the cause of nothing else to beings than

of their being one. If however _the one_ is the cause of a thing of

this kind, that which is _not one_ will not be the cause of that which

is more excellent [than union.] But it is every where necessary that

what is more excellent should be the cause to beings of another more

excellent thing, according to its own power. For thus it will be more

excellent as being more good, and as the cause from its own nature

of a greater and more excellent good to those things to which a less

good is the cause of less goodness. From these things therefore it is

necessary, that _the many_ should participate of _the one_, that _the

one_ should be unmingled with _multitude_, and that nothing should be

better than _the one_, but that this should also be the cause of being

to _the many_. For every thing which is deprived of _the one_, flies

immediately into nothing, and to its own corruption. But that which is

not many, is not at one and the same time not many and nothing. For to

_the one_ that which is nothing, or not one, is opposed, and to _the

many_ that which is not many is opposed. If, therefore, _the one_ and

_the many_ are not the same, the not being many will not be the same

with nothing. From thus considering the affair therefore, it appears

that _the one_ is beyond multitude, and is the cause of being to _the

many_.

CHAPTER II.

It is necessary however, that discussing the same subject after another

manner, we should again see if we can in a certain respect follow what

has been said, and refer it to the same end. It is necessary therefore,

that there should either be one principle, or many principles; or

rather, we should begin from hence. And if there are many principles,

they must either possess sympathy with each other, or they must be

divulsed from each other, and they must be either finite or infinite.

But if there is one principle, this must either be not essence, or

essence. And if it is essence, this must either be corporeal or

incorporeal. And if incorporeal, it must either be separate from, or

inseparable from bodies. And if separate, it must either be moveable

or immoveable. But if it is not essence, it must either be inferior

to all essence, or participated by essence, or imparticipable. If

therefore there are many principles, and which have no sympathy with

each other, no being will originate from them [conjointly,] nor will

they be common to all things, but each will produce by itself. For what

communication can there be between things which are naturally foreign,

or what co-operation between things which are entirely of a different

kind? In addition also to these things, there will be _the many_ which

do not participate of _the one_. For if there is a certain one common

in all of them, they will not be perfectly separated essentially from

each other. If therefore they are different, and there is nothing which

is the same about them, they are alone many and by no means one. But if

there are many principles, and which possess sympathy with each other,

they will have something common, which leads all of them to sympathy,

and similarly unfolds all of them to the view. For we call those things

sympathetic, which happen to be passive to the same thing. But similars

are entirely similar from participating one form and one nature. If

however this be the case, it is necessary that that all [or universal]

which is every where, and in all the principles, should be of a more

principal nature than the many. This therefore gives them the power to

generate sympathy with each other, and affords them communion according

to nature.

Again, if there are indeed infinite principles, either the things which

proceed from them are infinite, and there will thus be the infinite

twice, or they are finite, and thus all the principles will not be

principles. For things finite in number, will entirely proceed from

finite principles. The principles therefore are in vain infinite. To

which may be added, that infinity makes both the principles to be

unknown, and the things which proceed from them. For the principles

being unknown, it is necessary that the things which proceed from them

should be unknown; since we then think that we know any thing when we

know the causes and the first principles of it. But if the principles

are finite, it is evident that there will be a certain number of them:

for we say that number is a definite multitude. If however, there is a

number of the principles, it is necessary that there should be a cause

of the whole number of them. For every number is from one; and this,

viz. _the one_ is the principle of numbers. This therefore will be

the principle of principles, and the cause of finite multitude, since

number itself is one, and the end in the many is one, and it bounds the

many by that which is one. But the principle being one, and this being

essence, it is necessary if this is admitted to be either corporeal or

incorporeal, that it must be acknowledged to be the principle of other

things.

If therefore, body is the cause of the generation of beings, it is

necessary indeed, that it should be divisible and have parts. For

every body is in its own nature divisible; since every magnitude is a

certain whole and that which is a whole consists of parts. These parts

therefore, (but I mean each of them) must either severally participate

a certain one, or not participate it. If therefore they do not

participate it, they will be many alone, and by no means one. Hence,

neither will that which consists from them be a whole. For there being

no one, that which consists of all of them will not be one. But if

each of the parts participates of something of this kind, and there is

something which is the same in all of them, a thing of this kind must

necessarily be incorporeal, and impartible according to its own nature.

For if this also is itself corporeal, it is either wholly in each of

the parts, or not wholly. If therefore, it is indeed wholly in each, it

will itself be separated from itself. For the parts in which it is are

separate from each other. But if it is not wholly in each of the parts,

this also will be divisible, and will have parts after the same manner

as the above mentioned parts; and there will again be the same inquiry

concerning these, viz. whether in these also there is something common,

or nothing; since if there is nothing common, we shall place _the many_

separate from _the one_.

Let us however consider the whole; for every body is a whole, and has

parts. What therefore will that be which is connective of the parts,

since they are many? For it is necessary to say either that the whole

is unific of the parts, or the parts of the whole, or that some third

thing prior to both, which is neither a whole, nor has any part,

connects and unites the whole with its parts, and the parts with the

whole. But if the whole indeed is connective of the parts, the whole

will be incorporeal and impartible. For if it is a body, this also

will be partible, and will be indigent of a nature which is capable of

connecting the parts; and this will be the case to infinity. But if the

parts are connective of the whole, how can _the many_ be connective of

_the one_; and things divided, of that which consists from them? For

on the contrary, it is necessary that _the one_ should have the power

of uniting _the many_, and not _the many_ of uniting _the one_. And if

that which connects both, is neither a whole nor has parts, it will

be perfectly impartible. But being impartible, it is also necessarily

without interval. For every thing which has interval has parts, and is

divisible. But being without interval it is incorporeal; for every body

possesses interval.

Farther still, it is necessary that the principle should be perpetual;

for every being is perpetual or corruptible. Hence it must be admitted

that the principle of beings is perpetual or corruptible. But if we

should grant that this may be corrupted, there will be no being

incorruptible. For the principle being destroyed, it will neither be

itself generated from any thing, nor will another thing be generated

from it. For it can neither be able to generate itself (since it is

not, if it is not perpetual) nor can another thing be able to generate

it, if it is the principle of all things. But if it is incorruptible,

it will have the power of not being corrupted, and this power will be

infinite, in order that it may exist to infinity through the whole

of time. For every finite power of existence pertains naturally

to that which is corruptible. But an infinite power pertains to

perpetual natures, the existence of which continues to infinity. This

infinite therefore, I mean the infinite according to power, is either

impartible or partible. But if it is partible indeed, there will be

the infinite in a finite body. For the principle is finite; since if

it were infinite, there will be nothing else besides itself. But if it

is impartible, the power of infinitely existing will be incorporeal.

And the principle of beings is incorporeal,[140] so far as it is this

power through which the subject of it always is. That it is impossible

therefore, the principle of beings can be corporeal is from these

things evident.

If however it is incorporeal, it must either be separate, or

inseparable from bodies. But if inseparable indeed, it will have

all its energies in bodies, and subsisting about them. For that is

inseparable from body which is not any where naturally adapted to

energize except in and with bodies. But if the principle is a thing

of this kind, it is evidently necessary that none of the things which

subsist according to it should be more powerful, or possess greater

authority than the principle of all beings. If however, nothing is more

excellent in bodies than the power which subsists in and energizes

about bodies, and a corporeal essence, there will not any where be

intellect and the power which energizes according to intellect. For

every such like motion [i.e. energy] proceeds from a power, which is

entirely in its energies independent of body. But it neither was, nor

is lawful for generated natures to surpass the power of their causes.

For every thing which is in the things begotten is from primary

natures, and the latter are the lords of the essence of the former.

If therefore, the principle of beings is able to generate intellect

and wisdom, how is it possible it should not generate it, on account

of and in itself? For one of two things is necessary, either that

intellectual perception pertains in no respect to beings, or that it is

inferior to them; and that if it exists it acts in bodies only. These

things however, it is impossible to assert. But if that which is the

first of beings, and which is the principle of all things is separate

from bodies, it is perfectly necessary to admit that it is either

immoveable or moved. And if indeed it is moved, there will be something

else prior to it, about which it is moved. For every thing which is

moved, is naturally adapted to be moved about something else which is

permanent. And farther still, besides this, it is moved through desire

of another thing. For it is necessary indeed that it should be moved

in consequence of desiring a certain thing; because motion itself by

itself is indefinite. But the end of it is that for the sake of which

it subsists. It desires however, either something else, or itself. But

every thing which desires itself is immoveable. For why should any

thing that is present with itself want to be in another thing? For of

things which are moved, the motion of that is less to which the good

is nearer, but the motion is greater of that to which the good is more

remote. But that which possesses good in itself, and for the sake of

which it subsists, will be immoveable and stable; since being always

in itself, it is in good. That however which is in itself is in same;

for each thing is the same with itself. But of that which is in itself

we say indeed that it stands still and is immoveable; while that which

is not immoveable, is not in itself but in another, is moved towards

another thing, and is perfectly indigent of good. If therefore the

principle of beings is moved, but every thing which is moved is moved

through the want of good, and towards another thing which is the object

of desire to it, there will be something else which is desirable to

the principle of beings besides itself, and about which possessing

a sameness of subsistence, we must say it is moved. This however is

impossible. For the principle is that for the sake of which all things

subsist, which all things desire, and which is indigent of nothing.

For if it were in want of something, it would be entirely subordinate

to that of which it is in want, and to which its energy is directed

as the object of desire. But if the principle is immoveable (for this

is what remains,) it is necessary that it should be one incorporeal

essence, possessing an eternal sameness of subsistence. After what

manner, however, does it possess _the one_? And how is it one essence?

For if essence and _the one_ are the same, it must be admitted that

the principle of beings is essence. But if essence is different from

_the one_, it must be granted that to be _the one_ is not the same

thing as to be essence. And if, indeed, essence is better than _the

one_, according to this it must be said to be with the principle. But

if _the one_ is better than essence and beyond it, _the one_ is also

the principle of essence. And if they are coordinate to each other, the

many will be prior to _the one_.[141] This, however, is impossible as

we have before demonstrated. It is evident, indeed, that essence is not

the same as _the one_. For it is not one and the same thing to say one,

and that essence is one; but the former is not yet a sentence, and the

latter is. To which may be added, that if essence and _the one_ are the

same, multitude will be the same as that which has no existence, and

which is not essence. This, however, is impossible. For in essence the

many are contained, and in that which is not essence is _the one_. But

if essence and _the one_ are not the same, they will not be coordinate

to each other; for if they were coordinate there will be some other

thing prior to them, if it is necessary that all things should subsist

from one principle. And if one of these is better than the other,

either _the one_ is prior to essence, or essence is prior to _the one_.

But if _the one_ indeed is prior to essence, this and not essence is

the principle of all things. For it is necessary that nothing should

be better than the principle. And if essence is prior to _the one_,

_the one_ will be passive to essence, and not essence to _the one_.

But if _the one_ is passive to essence, it is necessary that _the one_

and essence should be every thing, and that all such things as are one

should be essence, but not that all such things as are essence should

be one. There will, therefore, be a certain essence deprived of _the

one_. If, however, this be the case, it will be nothing. For that

which is deprived of _the one_ is nothing. Hence _the one_ is prior to

essence.

But if that which is first is something which is not essence, it is

absurd to assert that it is subordinate to essence. For the principle

is that which has the greatest power and the most absolute authority,

and is most sufficient to itself, and is not that which is most

ignoble, and indigent of the many. And, in short, it is necessary that

no secondary nature should be better than the principle; for it is

requisite that beings should not be governed badly. But if, indeed, the

principle has an order subordinate to the things which proceed from

it, and the things proceeding from it are better than it, all things

will be badly confounded, nor will the principle according to nature

be any thing else than something which is not the most excellent of

things, nor will things which proceed from the principle possess from

it a power of ruling over their principle. The principle of beings,

therefore, will indeed be fortuitous, and also the beings which are

its progeny. But this is impossible. For things which are fortuitous

(if to have a fortuitous subsistence is this, not to exist according

to intellect, nor with a view to a definite end) are disorderly,

infinite, and indefinite, and are all of them things which have a less

frequency of subsistence. But the principle is invariably principle,

and other things proceed from it. If however, that which is not essence

is better than all essence, it will either be participated by it, or

it will be entirely imparticipable. If, however, essence participates

of the principle, of what will it be the principle? And how will it be

the principle of all beings? For it is necessary that the principle of

beings should be no one of beings; since if it were any one of them,

it is necessarily not the principle of all beings. But every thing

which is participated by another thing is said to be that by which it

is participated, and in which it primarily is. The principle, however,

is separate, and belongs in a greater degree to itself than to other

things. Besides, every thing which is participated proceeds from

another more excellent cause; since that which is imparticipable is

better than that which is participable. It is not, however, possible

to conceive any thing better than that which is most excellent, and

which we call the principle. For it is not lawful to assert that things

secondary to the principle, and which proceed from it, are in any

respect better than their principle. The cause therefore of all beings

is above all essence, is separate from every essence, and is neither

essence, nor has essence as an addition to its nature. For such an

addition as this is a diminution of simplicity, and of that which is

one.

CHAPTER III.

See, therefore, the third argument after these, leading us to the same

conclusion with the former arguments. For it is necessary that the

cause of all beings should be that of which all beings participate, to

which they refer the subsistence of themselves, and which separates

itself from nothing that in any respect whatever is said to have

an existence. For this alone is the object of desire to beings,

which primarily, or in some other way, is itself the cause of their

subsistence. And it is necessary that every thing which is produced

with reference to, and on account of it, should have a certain habitude

with relation to it, and through this also, a similitude to it. For

every habitude of one thing towards another, is predicated in a twofold

respect, either from both participating of one thing, which affords

to the participants a communion with each other; or from one of them

participating of the other; of which, indeed, the one as being more

excellent, imparts something to that which is subordinate to itself;

but the other, as being inferior, is assimilated to the more excellent

nature, so far as it participates of it. Hence it is necessary, if all

sensible natures possess a habitude to that which is first, aspire

after, and subsist about it, either that there should be a certain

third thing the cause of the habitude, or that the principle should

impart to the natures posterior to itself, a tendency to itself, and

that desire, through which every thing is preserved, and exists.

Nothing else, however, is more excellent than that which is first.

Hence, the habitude of beings, their existence, and their tendency

to the first, are derived from thence. And all things participate of

the principle of themselves, if it is necessary that this which is

participated, should from thence become apparent in all beings, since

it is the principle of all things, and deserts no being whatever.

What, therefore, will this nature be, which is every where, and in all

beings? Is it life and motion? But there are indeed many things which

are deprived of these. Is, therefore, permanency every where, and in

all things? But neither is this true. For motion, so far as it is

motion, will not participate of permanency. Is much-honoured intellect,

therefore, so far as it is intellect, participated by all beings?

But this also is impossible. For all beings would have intellectual

perception, and no being would be deprived of intellect.

Shall we say, therefore, that being itself and essence are participated

by all things that in any respect whatever have a subsistence? But how

is this possible? For that which is in generation, or passing into

existence, is said to be, and is destitute of essence. Nor must we

wonder, if it also, since it ranks among beings, should now participate

of essence. For so far as it is in generation, it is not; but it ends

in existence and essence when it is now actually generated, and is no

longer rising into existence. All things, therefore, that have in any

respect whatever a subsistence, do not participate of essence. What

then will that be which is every where and by all things participated?

Let us consider every being, and see what that is to which all beings

are passive, and what it is which is common in all of them, as in

essence, sameness, difference, permanency, and motion. Can we say,

therefore, that each of these is any thing else than one thing, and

not only separately, but this is also the case with the things which

subsist from them; and in short, it is not possible in a certain

respect to speak otherwise of all things, than this, that all things,

and each thing is one. For if any thing should be deprived of _the

one_, though you should speak of parts, or of beings, immediately, that

which becomes destitute of _the one_, will be altogether nothing. Or

with what intention do we say that a thing which is not is perfectly

nothing, [or not even one thing] unless _the one_ is the last thing

which deserts beings? This it is, therefore, to become that which in

no respect is, and to be perfectly deprived of _the one_. For it is

possible for that which is not moved to be, and for that which has no

being to have an hyparxis; but that which is not even one thing, and

which is destitute of _the one itself_, will be entirely nothing. Hence

_the one_ is present with all beings; and though you should speak of

multitude itself, it is necessary that this also should participate

of _the one_; for if it does not become one thing, it is not possible

for it to subsist. And if even you divide the whole to infinity,

immediately nothing else than one occurs. For either that which is

divided does not subsist, or becoming to be, or subsisting something

else, it will be immediately one.[142] _The one_, therefore, which is

every where apparent, and is in all beings, and which deserts no being

whatever, is either derived from _the one_ which is simply one, or from

that which is more excellent than _the one_. For it is not possible

for _the one_ to be otherwise passive, [i.e. to be consubsistent with

something else] than from the first one, to which _the one_ is no

longer present, but which is _the one itself_, or nothing else than one.

Again, therefore, from another principle we may arrive at the same

conclusion, by speaking as follows: It is necessary either that the

causes of beings and things caused should proceed to infinity, and that

there should be nothing first or last in beings; or that there should

be no first, but that there should be the last of things, infinity

existing in one part only. Or on the contrary, it is necessary that

beings should proceed to infinity from a definite principle, or that

there should be a certain first and last, and a boundary of beings each

way. And if there are boundaries of beings, things either proceed from

each other, and the generation of beings is in a circle; or if they

are not from each other, either one of them is from another, or the

first indeed is one, but the last not one, or the contrary, or both are

one, or each is not one. If, therefore, first things, and the causes

of beings are infinite, each thing will consist of infinites. For that

which proceeds from a certain principle, must necessarily participate

of that principle from which it proceeds. But that which derives its

subsistence from many causes, will be in its own nature multiform,

as participating of many powers. And that which is produced from

infinites prior to itself, will have infinite peculiarities derived

from the principles, and adapted to itself. Every being, therefore,

being infinite, and consisting of infinites, will render all things

infinitely infinite, and there will neither be a knowledge of any

being, nor any evolution of powers. For the power of the infinite is

perfectly unknown, and incomprehensible, by those natures to whom it is

infinite.

But if things are infinite in a descending progression, whether is

each of them infinite always proceeding most downward, in the same

manner as we say all things do, or is each whole indeed finite, but

the beings which are produced from these are infinite? For if every

being according to the beginning of itself is definite, but according

to its end is infinite, there will neither be in parts nor in wholes,

a conversion of beings to their proper principle, nor will that which

is second in order ever have a subsistence so as to be assimilated to

the extremity of a preexistent order; though as we frequently say, the

summits of inferiors are conjoined with the boundaries of superiors.

For where there is no last, by what contrivance can such a similitude

of progression as this, and such a mutual coherence of beings be left,

according to which secondary things are always conjoined to the natures

prior to them? But if all things alone have an infinity of this kind,

each being bounded by that which is posterior to itself, wholes will be

subordinate to parts, and the parts of beings will be naturally more

perfect [than wholes.] For wholes, indeed, will be without conversion

to the principle prior to themselves; but parts will be converted to

it after their progression. By how much the more, however, every being

hastens to conjunction with that which is more perfect than itself, by

so much the more must it necessarily excel, as it appears to me. And

if this whole proceeding to infinity is not convolved to the summit

of itself, and circularly converted and perfected according to such a

conversion [it will not desire its proper good.] If, however, we admit

that there is an infinity both ways these things must necessarily

happen.

In addition to these things, also, there will be no common object of

desire to all beings, nor any union nor sympathy of them. For things

which are perfectly infinite have not that which is first in them; but

not having a first, we shall not be able to say what is the common

end of beings, and why some things are more excellent, but others

are allotted a subordinate nature. For we call one thing better and

another less excellent, from proximity to that which is best, just as

we define the more and the less hot from communion with that which

is hot in the first degree. And in short, we form a judgment of the

more and the less from a reference to that which is a maximum. It is

necessary, therefore, that the boundary in beings should be that which

is first and that which is last.

But if, indeed, these are from each other, the same thing will be

older and younger, cause and at the same time the thing caused, and

each thing will be first and last. For it makes no difference, whether

these are from each other, or the things which subsist between these.

For the extremes being indifferent, how is it possible that a mutation

according to essence should intervene? But if the one is from the

other, whether is the first derived from the last, as some say, who

generate things more excellent from things subordinate, and things more

perfect from such as are more imperfect? In this case, however, must

not that which is allotted the power of generating and producing the

perfect, by a much greater priority perfect and adorn itself by its

present power? And how is it possible that leaving itself to be of an

inferior allotment it should definitely assign a more excellent order

to another thing? For every thing aspires after its proper perfection,

and simply desires good; though not every thing is able to participate

of a thing of this kind. If, therefore, it has the power of producing

this most perfect thing, that which is last will energize on account

of itself prior to other things, and the whole of good, and all

perfection, will be first established in itself.

But if that which is last is produced from that which is first, and

the most imperfect from that which is most perfect, whether, is each

of them one, or is this one, but that not one? If, however, that which

is first, or that which is last, is not one, neither of them will be

first or last. For, as there will be multitude in each, each of them

will have the better and the worse; and neither will that which is

best be unmingled with that which is inferior to it, nor that which

is the most obscure of all things according to being, have so great a

subjection entirely deprived of a more perfect nature; but there will

be something more extreme than that which is last, and something more

perfect than that which is first. For every where, that which is best

if it receives another addition through that which is inferior will be

more perfect than that which does not abide in the best, [through not

receiving this very addition.] If, therefore, we rightly assert these

things, _the one_ is the principle of all things, and the last

of beings is one. For it is necessary, I think, that the end of the

progression of beings should be assimilated to the principle, and that

as far as to this, the power of the first should proceed.

Summarily, therefore, recapitulating what we have said, it is necessary

either that the first principle should be one, or that there should

be alone many[143] first principles, or one containing multitude in

itself, or many participating of one. But if there are many first

principles only, there will not be one thing from them. For what will

make one and a whole, if there are many principles, and there is

nothing which produces one? For it is certainly necessary that things

posterior to the principles should be assimilated to them. Either,

therefore, there will not be _the one_ in any being, or it will

not be from these principles; so that each of the things which in any

respect whatever have a subsistence will be divided multitude alone.

And again each of the parts of any being will be a thing of this kind,

and we shall in no way whatever stop, dividing into minute parts

essence and existence. For all things will be many, and _the one_

will be no where in the universality of things, nor will either wholes

or parts be apparent.

But if it is necessary, indeed, that there should be many principles,

and that they should participate of _the one_, _the one_ will be

coordinated in the many. Again, however, it is necessary, that the

uncoordinated should every where be more ancient than the coordinated,

and the exempt than the participated. For how is _the one_ in each of

the many except from one principle which co-arranges the multitude, and

converts it to itself according to the communion of _the one_? Again,

if the first one were multiplied, _the one_ will be passive; for at the

same time it will be one and not one, and will not be that which is one

[only.] It is necessary, however, in each genus of things, that there

should be that which is unmingled with an inferior nature, in order

that there may be that which is mingled, in the same manner as we say

respecting forms. For from the equal itself, things which are equal in

these sublunary realms, appear indeed as equal, though they are filled

with a contrary nature; and from that which is primarily being, that

which is mingled with non-being is derived, and which presents itself

to the view as being. And in short every where the simple unmingled

subsistence of each thing precedes those things which through remission

are mingled with the privations of themselves. _The one_ therefore is

by itself exempt from all multitude; and that which is one, and at

the same time not one, is not the first one, but is suspended[144]

from that which is primarily one; through the principle, indeed,

participating of _the one_, but through the diminution arising from

multitude, now manifestly exhibiting in itself the cause of separation.

CHAPTER IV.

That _the one_ therefore is the principle of all things, and the

first cause, and that all other things are posterior to _the one_, is

I think evident from what has been said. I am astonished however at

all the other interpreters of Plato, who admit the existence of the

intellectual kingdom, but do not venerate the ineffable transcendency

of _the one_, and its hyparxis which surpasses the whole of things.

I particularly, however, wonder that this should have been the case

with Origen, who was a partaker of the same erudition with Plotinus.

For Origen ends in intellect and the first being, but omits _the one_

which is beyond every intellect and every being. And if indeed he omits

it, as something which is better than all knowledge, language and

intellectual perception, we must say that he is neither discordant with

Plato, nor with the nature of things, But if he omits it because _the

one_ is perfectly unhyparctic, and without any subsistence, and because

intellect is the best of things, and that which is primarily being is

the same as that which is primarily one, we cannot assent to him in

asserting these things, nor will Plato admit him, and connumerate him

with his familiars. For I think that a dogma of this kind is remote

from the philosophy of Plato, and is full of Peripatetic innovation. If

you are willing, however, we will adduce some arguments against this

dogma, and against all others who are the patrons of this opinion, and

we will strenuously contend for the doctrine of Plato, and show that

according to him the first cause is beyond intellect, and is exempt

from all beings, as Plotinus and Porphyry, and all those who have

received the philosophy of these men, conceive him to assert.

We shall begin, therefore, from the Republic; for here Socrates clearly

shows that _the good_ is established above being, and the whole

intellectual order, following the analogy of the first goodness to the

sun. For if, as the sovereign sun is to generation, to every thing

visible, and to all visive natures according to the power generative

of light, so it is necessary _the good_ should be with reference

to intellect and intelligibles, according to a cause productive of

truth,--if this be the case, we must say that the sun is exempt at one

and the same time from visive and visible natures, and must admit that

_the good_ transcends the natures which are always intellective, and

also those which are eternally intelligible. It is better, however, to

hear the Platonic words themselves: “You may say that the sun not only

imparts the power of being seen to visible natures, but also that he

is the cause of their generation, increase, and nutriment, not being

himself generation. Certainly. We may say, therefore, that things which

are known, have not only this from _the good_ that they are known,

but likewise that their being and essence are thence derived, whilst

_the good itself_ is not essence, but beyond essence, transcending it

both in dignity and in power.” Through all these things, therefore,

it is evident how _the good_ and the first principle are defined by

Plato to be expanded above not only the intellectual, but also the

intelligible extent, and essence itself, according to union, in the

same manner as it is inferred the sun surpasses all visible natures,

and perfects and generates all things by his light. How, therefore,

following Plato, can we admit that intellect is the best of things,

and the cause of all things? How can we assert that being itself[145]

and essence are the same with the principle which is the leader of all

the divine progressions? For essence and intellect are said to subsist

primarily from _the good_, to have their hyparxis about _the good_,

to be filled with the light of truth proceeding from thence, and to

obtain the participation which is adapted to them from the union of

this light, which is more divine than intellect itself and essence,

as being primarily suspended from _the good_, and affording in beings

a similitude to that which is first. For the light which is emitted

from the sun causes every thing visible to be solar-form. And the

participation of the light of truth renders that which is intelligible

boniform and divine. Intellect, therefore, is a god through a light

which is more ancient than intellectual light and intellect itself,

and that which is intelligible and at the same time intellectual

participates of a divine hyparxis through a plenitude of this light

being appropriately imparted to it.[146] And in short, every divine

nature is that which it is said to be, on account of this light, and is

through it united to the cause of all beings. By no means, therefore,

is the first good to be considered as the same with intellect, nor

must it be admitted that the intelligible is more ancient than all the

hyparxis of the whole of things, since it is even subordinate to the

light proceeding from _the good_, and being perfected by this light,

is conjoined according to its own order with _the good itself_. For we

must not say that the intelligible is united to the first after the

same manner as the light [of truth;] but the latter through continuity

with _the good_ is established in it without a medium; while the

former, through this light, participates of a vicinity to _the good_;

since in sensibles also, the solar light is primarily connascent with

the circulation of the sun, ascends as far as to the centre of the

whole sphere, and subsists on all sides about it. But all sensible

natures through this obtain a similitude to the sun, each of them

according to its own nature being filled with solar-form illumination.

These things, therefore, will be sufficient to recall into the memory

of those who love the contemplation of truth, the conceptions of Plato

on this subject, and to evince that the order of intellect is secondary

to the exempt transcendency of _the one_.

If, however, it is requisite to evince the same thing through many

testimonies, let us survey what the Elean guest in the Sophista

determines concerning these things. He says, therefore, it is necessary

that the multitude of all beings, whether they are contraries or not,

should be suspended from the one being, [i.e. from being characterized

by the one;] but that the one being itself should be suspended from

_the one_. For when we call the hot or the cold, or permanency or

motion, being, we do not denominate each of these as the same with

being itself. For if permanency were being itself, motion would not

be being; or, if motion were such like being, permanency would not

participate of the appellation of being. But it is evident that being

accedes to permanency, to motion, and to every multitude of beings from

one thing which is primarily being. This very thing, therefore, which

is the cause of essence to all things, and which is participated by all

other things, is a participant of this one, and on this account, as it

is being alone, so also it is primarily being.[147] It is, however,

being itself indeed, and is not allotted _to be_, from participation;

but it is one according to participation, and on this account it is

passive to _the one_. But it is being[148] primarily. If, therefore,

Plato gives to _the one_ a subsistence beyond being, in the same manner

as that which is first in wholes is supposed by him to transcend

beings, how is it possible that being should not be posterior to _the

one_, since it participates of it, and on this account is denominated

one?

Moreover, Socrates in the Philebus clearly demonstrates the same

thing to those who are able to know wholes from parts, viz. that

intellect has not the same order as the first cause of all.

Investigating, therefore, the good of the human soul and its end, of

which participating in every respect sufficiently it will reap the

fruits of a felicity adapted to its nature, he in the first place

removes pleasure from an end of this kind, and after this intellect,

because neither is this replete with all the elements of _the

good_. If, therefore, the intellect which is in us is an image of

the first intellect, and the good of the whole of our life is not

to be defined according to this alone, is it not necessary that in

wholes also, the cause of good must be established above intellectual

perfection? For if that which is primarily good subsisted according

to total intellect, in us also and all other [intellectual natures,]

self-sufficiency and appropriate good would be present through the

participation of intellect. Our intellect, indeed, is disjoined from

_the good_, and is indigent, and on this account requires pleasure in

order to the attainment of human perfection. But a divine intellect

always participates of _the good_, and on this account is divine. For

it is boniform through the participation of good; but divine, as being

suspended from the first deity. It is the same reasoning, therefore,

which infers that _the good_ is exempt from the first intellect, and

which defines felicity to consist not in intelligence only, but in

the all-perfect presence of _the good_. For the intellectual form of

energy is itself by itself defective with respect to blessedness.

And why is it requisite to be prolix? For Parmenides teaches us most

clearly the difference of _the one_ from essence and being, and shows

that _the one_ is exempt from all other things and from essence; for

this he evinces of _the one_ at the end of the first hypothesis. But

how is it possible that the cause of essence, and which is exempt

from it through supreme transcendency, should not also be beyond the

intellectual order? For intellect is essence. But if in intellect

there is permanency and motion, and Parmenides demonstrates that _the

one_ transcends both these, does he not immediately bring us to the

ineffable cause of all things, which is prior to every intellect?

And if every intellect is converted to itself, and is in itself, but

_the one_ is demonstrated to be neither in itself, nor in another,

how can we any longer consider intellect as the same with the first

cause of all? In what respect, also, will _the one_ which is prior to

being differ from the one being, which is the subject of the second

hypothesis, if intellect is the best of things, and the first principle

of all? For the one being participates of _the one_; but that which

participates is secondary to that which is participated. That _the

one_, however, is according to Plato more ancient than intellect and

essence, is through what has been said recalled to our memory.

CHAPTER V.

In the next place, if _the one_ is neither intelligible nor

intellectual, nor in short participates of the power of being, let

us survey what will be the modes of leading us to it, and through

what intellectual conceptions Plato unfolds as far as he is able, to

his familiars, the ineffable and unknown transcendency of the first.

I say then, that at one time he unfolds it through analogy, and the

similitude of secondary natures; but at another time he demonstrates

its exempt transcendency, and its separation from the whole of things,

through negations. For in the Republic, indeed, he indicates the

ineffable peculiarity and hyparxis of _the good_, through analogy

to the sun; but in the Parmenides, he demonstrates the difference

of _the one_ with respect to all things posterior to it through

negations. But he appears to me through one of these modes to unfold

the progression from the first cause of all other things, and prior

to other things, of the divine orders. For on this account the first

cause is exempt from all the natures produced by it, because every

where cause is established above its effects; and on this account the

first is nothing of all things, because all things proceed from him.

For he is the principle of all things, both of beings, and at the same

time of non-beings. But again, according to the other of these modes,

he adumbrates the conversion to the first of the things which have

proceeded from it. For in each order of beings, through similitude

to it there is a monad analogous to _the good_, which has the same

relation to the whole series conjoined with it, that _the good_ has

to all the orders of the Gods. The cause, however, of this similitude

is entirely the conversion of the whole of things to _the good_.

These, therefore, proceed from thence and are converted to it. And the

progression indeed of all things demonstrates to us the ascent to the

first through negations; but the conversion of all things demonstrates

this to us through analogies. Let not, however, any one considering

these negations to be such things as privations despise such a mode

of discussion, nor defining the sameness in words analogously, and

words in habitudes, endeavour to calumniate this anagogic progression

to the first principle. For negations, as it appears to me, extend

a triple peculiarity in things. And at one time, indeed, being more

primogenial than affirmations, they are procreative and perfective

of the generation of them. But at another time, they are allotted an

order coordinate to affirmations, and negation is then in no respect

more venerable than affirmation. And again, at another time, they are

allotted an order subordinate to affirmations, and are nothing else

than the privations of them. For with respect to non-being itself, with

which there is also a negation of beings, at one time considering it as

beyond being, we say that it is the cause and the supplier of beings;

but at another time we evince that it is equivalent to being; just as

I think, the Elean guest demonstrates [in the Sophista] that non-being

is in no respect less, if it be lawful so to speak, than being; and at

another time we leave it as a privation of, and indigent of being. For

indeed, according to this mode, we call every generation, and matter

itself, non-being.

Analogies, however, are assumed for the purpose alone of indicating the

similitude of secondary natures to the first principle. And neither

any reason, nor habitude, nor communion of this principle with things

posterior to it, becomes apparent from these. For its exempt nature

is not of such a kind as is beheld in the second and third orders of

beings; but _the good_ transcends the whole of things in a much greater

degree than intellect surpasses the natures posterior to itself,

whether it be the demiurgic intellect, or the intellect of the whole

world, or some other intellect from among the number of those that are

called divine. Every intellect however, and every god, is allotted a

transcendency with respect to subordinate natures, and those things of

which it is the cause, inferior to that which the first principle has

to every being; for this principle similarly transcends all things,

and not some in a greater, but others in a less degree; since thus

we should introduce a greater and less habitude of it to secondary

natures. It is necessary, however, to preserve it without habitude

to all things, and similarly exempt from the whole of things. But of

other natures, some are indeed nearer, and others are more remote from

it. For each thing proceeds from it, since it produces all things

according to one cause. And different things are indeed converted to it

in a different manner, this principle in the mean time, receiving no

habitude or communion with things posterior to itself.

CHAPTER VI.

The mode of demonstration, therefore, pertaining to _the one_ is, as

we have said, twofold. For again, Plato delivers to us twofold names

of the ineffable cause. In the Republic indeed he calls it _the good_,

and demonstrates it to be the fountain of the truth which unites

intellect and intelligibles. But in the Parmenides, he denominates such

a principle as this _the one_, and shows that it gives subsistence to

the divine unities. Again therefore, of these names, the one is the

image of the progression of the whole of things, but the other of their

conversion. For because indeed all things derive their subsistence and

proceed from the first principle, on this account referring _the one_

to it, we demonstrate that it is the cause of all multitude and every

progression. For whence is multitude unfolded into light except from

_the one_? But because again the progressions from it are naturally

converted to it, and desire its ineffable and incomprehensible

hyparxis, we denominate it _the good_. For what else is that which

converts all things, and which is extended to all beings as the object

of desire, but _the good_? For all other things subsist distributedly,

and are to some beings honourable, but to others not. And every thing

which in any respect whatever is said to have a subsistence aspires

after some things, and avoids others. But _the good_ is the common

object of desire to all beings, and all things according to their

nature verge and are extended to this. The tendency however of desiring

natures is every where to the appropriate object of desire. _The good_

therefore converts, but _the one_ gives subsistence to all secondary

natures. Let not, however, any one suppose that the ineffable can on

this account be named, or that the cause of all union is doubled. For

here indeed we transfer to it names, looking to that which is posterior

to it, and to the progressions from, or the circular conversions to

it. Because, indeed, multitude subsists from it, we ascribe to it the

appellation of _the one_; but because all things even as far as to

things that have the most obscure existence, are converted to it, we

denominate it _the good_.

We endeavour therefore to know the unknown nature of the first

principle, through the things which proceed from, and are converted

to it; and we also attempt through the same things to give a name to

that which is ineffable. This principle, however, is neither known by

beings, nor is effable by any one of all things; but being exempt from

all knowledge, and all language, and subsisting as incomprehensible,

it produces from itself according to one cause all knowledge, every

thing that is known, all words, and whatever can be comprehended by

speech. But its unical nature, and which transcends all division,

shines forth to the view dyadically in the natures posterior to it,

or rather triadically. For all things abide in, proceed from, and are

converted to _the one_. For at one and the same time, they are united

to it, are in subjection to its union which is exempt from the whole of

things, and desire the participation of it. And union indeed imparts a

stable transcendency to all secondary natures, and which subsists in

unproceeding conjunction with the cause of them. But subjection defines

the progression of beings, and their separation from the imparticipable

and first unity. And desire perfects the conversion of the subsisting

natures, and their circular tendency to the ineffable. First natures

therefore, being always entirely united, [to the ineffable] some more

remotely, but others more proximately, and receiving through this union

their hyparxis, and their portion of good, we endeavour to manifest

through names the progression and conversion of the whole of things.

But with respect to their stable comprehension, if it be lawful so to

speak, in the first, and their union with the ineffable, this as being

incomprehensible, and not to be apprehended by knowledge, those who

were wise in divine concerns were unable to indicate it by words. But

as the ineffable is primarily concealed in inaccessible places, and

is exempt from all beings, thus also the union of all things with it

is occult, ineffable, and unknown to all beings. For every being is

united to it, neither by intellectual injection, [or projection] nor

the energy of essence; since things which are destitute of knowledge

are united to the first, and things deprived of all energy, participate

according to their order of a conjunction with it. That which is

unknown therefore in beings according to their union with the first,

we neither endeavour to know, nor to manifest by names, but being more

able to look to their progression and conversion, we ascribe indeed to

the first two names, which we derive as resemblances from secondary

natures. We also define two modes of ascent to the first, conjoining

that mode which is through analogy with the appellation of _the good_,

but that which is through negations with the appellation of _the one_;

which Plato also indicating, in the Republic indeed calls the first

_the good_, and at the same time makes a regression to it through

analogy; but in the Parmenides establishing it as _the one itself_, he

unfolds the transcendency of it which is exempt from beings, through

negative conclusions. According to both these modes therefore, the

first principle transcends both gnostic powers, and the parts of

speech; but all other things afford us the cause of knowledge and of

appellation. And the first principle indeed unically gives subsistence

to all the unions and hyparxes of secondary natures; but the things

posterior to this cause participate of it in a divided manner. These

also, as we have before observed, become multiplied by abiding,

proceeding and returning; but _the one_ is at once perfectly exempt

from all the prolific progressions, convertive powers, and uniform

hypostases in beings. What the modes therefore are of the doctrine

about the first, and through what names Plato endeavours to indicate

it, and whence the names and the modes of this indication which is

unknown to all things are derived, is, I think, through what has been

said sufficiently manifest.

CHAPTER VII.

If, however, it be requisite to survey each of the dogmas about it

which are scattered in the writings of Plato, and to reduce them to

one science of theology, let us consider, if you are willing, prior

to other things, what Socrates demonstrates in the 6th book of the

Republic, conformably to the before mentioned mode, and how through

analogy he teaches us the wonderful transcendency of _the good_ with

respect to all beings, and the summits of the whole of things. In the

first place therefore, he distinguishes beings from each other, and

establishing some of them to be intelligibles, but others sensibles,

he defines science by the knowledge of beings. But he conjoins sense

with sensibles, and giving a twofold division to all things, he places

one exempt monad over intelligible multitude, and a second monad over

sensible multitude, according to a similitude to the former monad. Of

these monads also, he shows that the one is generative of intelligible

light, but the other of sensible light. And he evinces that by the

intelligible light indeed, all intelligibles are deiform, and boniform,

according to participation from the first God; but that by the sensible

light, according to the perfection derived from the sun, all sensible

natures are solarform, and similar to their one monad. In addition also

to what has been said, he suspends the second monad from that which

reigns in the intelligible. And thus he extends all things, both the

first and the last of beings, I mean intelligibles and sensibles, to

_the good_. Such a mode of reduction to the first as this, appears

to me to be most excellent, and especially adapted to theology; viz.

to congregate all the Gods in the world into one union, and suspend

them from their proximate monad; but to refer the supermundane Gods

to the intellectual kingdom; to suspend the intellectual Gods from

intelligible union; and to refer the intelligible Gods themselves, and

all beings through these, to that which is first. For as the monad of

mundane natures is supermundane, as the monad of supermundane natures

is intellectual, and of intellectual natures intelligible, thus also

it is necessary that first intelligibles should be suspended from

the monad which is above intelligibles and perfected by it, and

being filled with deity, should illuminate secondary natures with

intelligible light. But it is necessary that intellectual natures which

derive the enjoyment of their being from intelligibles, but of good and

a uniform hyparxis from the first cause, should connect supermundane

natures by intellectual light. And that the genera of the Gods prior

to the world, through receiving a pure intellect from the intellectual

Gods, but intelligible light from the intelligible Gods, and a unical

light from the father of the whole of things, should send into this

apparent world the illumination of the light which they possess.

On this account, the sun being the summit of mundane natures, and

proceeding from the etherial profundities, imparts to visible natures

supernatural perfection, and causes these as much as possible to be

similar to the supercelestial worlds. These things therefore we shall

afterwards more abundantly discuss.

The present discourse, however, suspends all things after the above

mentioned manner from _the good_, and the first unity. For if indeed

the sun connects every thing sensible, but _the good_ produces and

perfects every thing intelligible, and of these, the second monad

[i.e. the sun] is denominated the offspring of _the good_, and on

this account causes that which is sensible to be splendid, and adorns

and fills it with good, because it imitates the primogenial cause of

itself,--if this be the case, all things will thus participate of

_the good_, and will be extended to this one principle, intelligibles

indeed, and the most divine of beings without a medium, but sensibles

through their monad [the sun.]

Again therefore, and after another manner, Plato narrates to us in

this extract from the Republic the analysis to the first principle.

For he suspends all the multitudes in the world from the intelligible

monads, as for instance, all beautiful things from the beautiful

itself, all good things from _the good_, and all equal things from the

equal itself. And again, he considers some things as intelligibles, but

others as sensibles; but the summits of them are uniformly established

in intelligibles. Again, from these intelligible forms he thinks fit to

ascend still higher, and venerating in a greater degree the goodness

which is beyond intelligibles, he apprehends that all intelligibles,

and the monads which they contain, subsist and are perfected through

it. For as we refer the sensible multitude to a monad uncoordinated

with sensibles, and we think that through this monad the multitude of

sensibles derives its subsistence, so it is necessary to refer the

intelligible multitude to another cause which is not connumerated with

intelligibles, and from which they are allotted their essence and their

divine hyparxis.

Let not, however, any one fancy that Plato admits there is the same

order of _the good_ in intelligible forms, as there is prior to

intelligibles. But the good indeed, which is coordinated with the

beautiful, must be considered as essential, and as one of the forms

which are in intelligibles. For the first good, which by conjoining the

article with the noun we are accustomed to call τἀγαθον or _the good_,

is admitted to be something superessential, and more excellent than all

beings both in dignity and power; since Socrates also, when discussing

the beautiful and the good, calls the one the beautiful itself and

the other the good itself, and thus says he we must denominate all

the things which we then very properly considered as many. Again,

particularly considering each thing as being one, we denominate each

thing that which it is, and thus Socrates leading us from sensible

things that are beautiful and good, and in short from things that

are participated, subsist in other things, and are multiplied, to

the superessential unities of intelligibles and the first essences,

from these again, he transfers us to the exempt cause of every thing

beautiful and good. For in forms, the beautiful itself is the leader

of many beautiful things, and the good itself of many goods, and each

form alone gives subsistence to things similar to itself. But the first

good is not only the cause of what is good, but similarly of things

beautiful, as Plato elsewhere says; and “all things are for its sake,

and it is the cause of every thing beautiful.”

For again, in addition to what has been said, the good which is in

forms is intelligible and known, as Socrates himself teaches; but

_the good_ prior to forms is beyond beings, and is established above

all knowledge. And the former is the source of essential perfection;

but the latter is the supplier of good to the Gods so far as they are

Gods, and is generative of goods which are prior to essences. We must

not therefore apprehend that when Socrates calls the first principle

_the good_, from the name of idea, that he directly calls it the

intelligible goodness; but though the first principle is superior to

all language and appellation, we permit Socrates to call it the cause

of every thing beautiful and good, transferring through the things

which are proximately filled by it, appellations to it. For this I

think Socrates indicating asserts in all that he says about _the good_,

that it is beyond knowledge and things that are known, and likewise

beyond essence and being, according to its analogy to the sun. And

after a certain admirable manner he presents us with an epitome of the

negations of _the one_ in the Parmenides. For the assertion that _the

good_ is neither truth, nor essence, nor intellect, nor science, at one

and the same time separates it from the superessential unities, and

every genus of the Gods, and from the intellectual and intelligible

orders, and from every psychical subsistence. But these are the first

things, and through the first hypothesis of the Parmenides, these are

taken away from the principle of the whole of things.

Moreover, neither when he celebrates _the good_ the leader of the

divine orders, as the most splendid of being, does he denominate

it _most splendid_ as participating of light. For the first light

proceeds from it to intelligibles and intellect, but he gives it this

appellation as the cause of the light which is every where diffused,

and as the fountain of every intelligible, or intellectual, or

mundane deity. For this light is nothing else than the participation

of a divine hyparxis. For as all things become boniform through

participating of _the good_, and are filled with the illumination

proceeding from thence, thus also the natures which are primarily

beings are deiform; and as it is said, intelligible and intellectual

essences become divine through the participation of deity. Looking

therefore to all that has been said, we shall preserve the exempt

transcendency of _the good_ with reference to all beings and the divine

orders. But again, in each order of beings, we must grant that there

is a monad analogous to it, not only in sensibles, as Plato says the

sun is, but likewise in supermundane natures, and in the genera of

Gods arranged from _the good_ prior to these. For it is evident that

the natures which are nearer to the first cause and which participate

of it in a greater degree, possess a greater similitude to it. And

as that is the cause of all beings, so these establish monads which

are the leaders of more partial orders. And Plato indeed arranges the

multitudes under the monads; but extends all the monads to the exempt

principle of the whole of things, and establishes them uniformly about

it. It is necessary therefore that the theological science should be

unfolded conformably to the divine orders, and that our conceptions

about it should be transcendent, and unmingled and unconnected with

other things. And we should survey indeed all secondary natures,

subsisting according to and perfected about it; but we should establish

it as transcending all the monads in beings, according to one excess

of simplicity, and as unically arranged prior to the whole orders

[of Gods.] For as the Gods themselves enact the order which is in

them, thus also it is necessary that the truth concerning them, the

precedaneous causes of beings, and the second and third progeny of

these should be definitely distinguished.

This, therefore, is the one truth concerning the first principle, and

which possesses one reason remarkably conformable to the Platonic

hypothesis, viz. that this principle subsists prior to the whole

orders in the Gods, that it gives subsistence to the boniform essence

of the Gods, that it is the fountain of superessential goodness, and

that all things posterior to it being extended towards it, are filled

with good, after an ineffable manner are united to it, and subsist

uniformly about it. For its unical nature is not unprolific, but it is

by so much the more generative of other things, as it pre-establishes

a union exempt from the things which have a subsistence. Nor does its

fecundity tend to multitude and division; but it abides with undefiled

purity concealed in inaccessible places. For in the natures also which

are posterior to it, we every where see that what is perfect desires

to generate, and that what is full hastens to impart to other things

its plenitude. In a much greater degree therefore it is necessary

that the nature which contains in one all perfections, and which is

not a certain good, but good itself, and super-full, (if it be lawful

so to speak) should be generative of the whole of things, and give

subsistence to them; producing all things by being exempt from all

things, and by being imparticipable, similarly generating the first and

the last of beings.

You must not, however, suppose that this generation and progression is

emitted in consequence of _the good_ either being moved, or multiplied,

or possessing a generative power, or energizing; since all these are

secondary to the singleness of the first. For whether _the good_ is

moved, it will not be _the good_; since _the good itself_, and which

is nothing else, if it were moved would depart from goodness. How,

therefore, can that which is the source of goodness to beings, produce

other things when deprived of good? Or whether _the good_ is multiplied

through imbecility, there will be a progression of the whole of things

through a diminution, but not through an abundance of goodness. For

that which in generating departs from its proper transcendency, hastens

to adorn inferior natures, not through prolific perfection, but through

a diminution and want of its own power. But if _the good_ produces all

things by employing power, there will be a diminution of goodness about

it. For it will be two things and not one, viz. it will be good and

power. And if indeed it is in want of power, that which is primarily

good will be indigent. But if to be _the good itself_ is sufficient

to the perfection of the things produced, and to the plenitude of all

things, why do we assume power as an addition? For additions in the

Gods are ablations of transcendent unions. Let _the good_ therefore

alone be prior to power, and prior to energy. For all energy is the

progeny of power. Neither, therefore, does _the good_ energizing give

subsistence to all things through energy, nor being in want of power

does it fill all things with powers, nor being multiplied do all things

participate of good, nor being moved do all beings[149] enjoy the first

principle. For _the good_ precedes all powers, and all energies, and

every multitude and motion; since each of these is referred to _the

good_ as to its end. _The good_ therefore is the most final of all

ends, and the centre of all desirable natures. All desirable natures,

indeed, impart an end to secondary beings; but that which presubsists

uncircumscribed by all things is the first good.

CHAPTER VIII.

After these things, however, let us direct our attention to the

conceptions about the first principle in the epistle [of Plato] to

Dionysius, and survey the manner in which he considers its ineffable

and immense transcendency. But perhaps some one may be indignant with

us for rashly drawing to our own hypotheses the assertions of Plato,

and may say that the three kings of which he speaks are all of them

intellectual Gods; but that Plato does not think fit to co-arrange or

connumerate _the good_ with secondary natures. For such a connumeration

ought not to be considered as adapted to the exempt transcendency of

_the good_ with respect to other things, nor in short, must it be said

that _the good_ contributes as the first with reference to another

second or third cause to the completion of a triad in conjunction with

other natures; but that it in a greater degree precedes every triad

and every number, than the intelligible precede the intellectual Gods.

How, therefore, can we connumerate with other kings _the good_ which

is at once exempt from all the divine numbers, and co-arrange one as

the first [king,] another as the second, and another as the third? Some

one may also adduce many other things, indicating the transcendency of

the first principle with respect to every thing divine. Such a one,

however, in thus interpreting the words of Plato will remarkably accord

with us who assert _the good_ to be imparticipable, to transcend all

the intelligible and intellectual genera, and to be established above

all the divine monads.

That Plato, indeed, admits the first God to be the king of all things,

and says that all things are for his sake, and that he is the cause of

all beautiful things, does not I think require much proof to those who

consider his words by themselves apart from their own conjectures, by

introducing which they violently endeavour to accord with Plato. But

that we do not assert these things connumerating [the first God with

secondary natures,] Plato himself manifests, neither calling the first

king the first, but alone the king of all things, nor asserting that

some things are about him, as he says that second things are about

that which is second, and third things about that which is third,

but[150] he says, in short, that all things are about him. And to the

other kings, indeed, he introduces number and a divided kingdom; but

to the king of all things he neither attributes a part of number, nor

a distribution of dominion opposite to that of the others. Such a mode

of words, therefore, neither connumerates the king of all things with

the other kings, nor co-arranges him as the leader of a triad with the

second and third power. For of a triadic division the first monad,

indeed, is the leader of first orders, and which are coordinate with

itself; but the second of second; and the third of third orders. If,

however, some one should apprehend that the first monad is the leader

of all things, so as to comprehend at once both second and third

allotments; yet the cause which subsists according to comprehension is

different from that which similarly pervades to all things. And to the

king of all things, indeed, all things are subject according to one

reason and one order; but to the first of the triad, things first are

subjected according to the same order; and it is necessary that things

second and third should be subservient according to their communion

with the remaining kings. Does not, therefore, what is here said by

Plato remarkably celebrate the exempt nature of the first cause,

and his uncoordination with the other kingdoms of the Gods? Since

he says that this cause similarly reigns over all things, that all

things subsist about him, and that for his sake essence and energy are

inherent in all things.

If also Socrates in the Republic clearly[151] teaches that the sun

reigns over the world analogous to _the good_, let no one dare to

accuse this analogy as connumerating _the good_ with the king of

mundane natures. For unless[152] together with the similitude of

secondary causes to the first principles, we think fit to preserve that

exempt dominion [of the first cause] it will be impossible for us to

evince that the supermundane kings have their allotment analogous to

the first cause, who subsists prior to the whole of things according

to one transcendency. But what occasion is there to be prolix? For

Plato indeed calls the first God king; but he does not think fit to

give the others the same appellation, not only in the beginning of

what he says about the first, but shortly after, he adds: “About the

king himself and the natures of which I have spoken there is nothing

of this kind.” The first God, therefore, alone is called king. But he

is called not only the king of things first, in the same manner as the

second of things second, and the third of things third, but as the

cause at once of all being and all beauty. Hence the first God precedes

the other causes in an exempt and uniform manner, and according to a

transcendency of the whole of things, and is neither celebrated by

Plato as co-ordinated with them, nor as the leader of a triad.

That these things, however, are asserted by Plato about the first God

we shall learn by recurring a little to the preceding words, which

are as follow: “You say, that I have not sufficiently demonstrated to

you the particulars respecting the first nature. I must speak to you,

therefore, in enigmas, that in case the letter should be intercepted,

either by land or sea, he who reads it may not understand this part of

its contents. All things are situated about the king of all; and all

things are for his sake; and he is the cause of every thing beautiful.”

In these words, therefore, Plato proposing to purify our conceptions

about the first principle through enigmas, celebrates the king of all

things, and refers to him the cause of the whole of things beautiful

and good. Who, therefore, is the king of all things, except the unical

God who is exempt from all things, who produces all things from

himself, and is the leader of all orders according to one cause? Who

is he that converts all ends to himself, and establishes them about

himself? For if you call him, for whose sake all things subsist, the

end of all ends, and the primogenial cause, you will not deviate from

the truth concerning him. Who is he that is the cause of all beautiful

things, shining upon them with divine light, and who encloses that

which is deformed and without measure, and the most obscure of all

things in the extremity of the universe?

If you are willing also from the words of Plato that follow the

preceding, we will show that to be the recipient neither of language

nor of knowledge is adapted to the first principle. For the words:

“This your inquiry concerning the cause of all beautiful things is

as of a nature endued with a certain quality,” are to be referred to

this principle. For it is not possible to apprehend it intellectually,

because it is unknown, nor to unfold it, because it is uncircumscribed;

but whatever you may say of it, you will speak as of a _certain thing_;

and you will speak indeed _about_ it, but you will not speak _it_.

For speaking of the things of which it is the cause, we are unable to

say, or to apprehend through intelligence what it is. Here therefore,

the addition of quality, and the busy energy of the soul, remove it

from the goodness which is exempt from all things, by the redundancy

of its conceptions about it. This likewise draws the soul down to

kindred, connate, and multiform intelligibles, and prevents her from

receiving that which is characterized by unity, and is occult in the

participation of _the good_. And it is not only proper that the human

soul should be purified from things coordinate with itself in the union

and communion with that which is first, and that for this purpose it

should leave all the multitude of itself behind, and exciting its own

hyparxis, approach with closed eyes, as it is said, to the king of

all things, and participate of his light, as much as this is lawful

for it to accomplish; but intellect also, which is prior to us, and

all divine natures, by their highest unions, superessential torches,

and first hyparxes are united to that which is first, and always

participate of its exuberant fulness; and this not so far as they are

that which they are, but so far as they are exempt from things allied

to themselves, and converge to the one principle of all. For the cause

of all disseminated in all things impressions of his own all-perfect

transcendency, and through these establishes all things about himself,

and being exempt from the whole of things, is ineffably present to all

things. Every thing therefore, entering into the ineffable of its own

nature, finds there the symbol of the father of all. All things too

naturally venerate him, and are united to him, through an appropriate

mystic impression, divesting themselves of their own nature, and

hastening to become his impression alone, and to participate him alone,

through the desire of his unknown nature, and of the fountain of

good. Hence, when they have run upwards as far as to this cause, they

become tranquil, and are liberated from the parturitions and the desire

which all things naturally possess of goodness unknown, ineffable,

imparticipable, and transcendently full. But that what is here said is

concerning the first God, and that Plato in these conceptions leaves

him uncoordinated with and exempt from the other causes, has been, I

think, sufficiently evinced.

CHAPTER IX.

Let us in the next place consider each of the dogmas, and adapt them

to our conceptions concerning cause, that from these we may comprehend

by a reasoning process, the scope of the whole of Plato’s theology.

Let then one truth concerning the first principle be especially that

which celebrates his ineffable, simple, and all-transcending nature;

which establishes all things about him, but does not assert that he

generates or produces any thing, or that he presubsists as the end of

things posterior to himself. For such a form of words neither adds any

thing to the unknown, who is exempt from all things, nor multiplies

him who is established above all union, nor refers the habitude and

communion of things secondary to him who is perfectly imparticipable.

Nor in short, does it announce that it teaches any thing about him, or

concerning his nature, but about the second and third natures which

subsist after him.

Such then being this indication of the first God, and such the manner

in which it venerates the ineffable, the second to this is that which

converts all the desires of things to him, and celebrates him as the

object of desire to and common end of all things, according to one

cause which precedes all other causes. For the last of things subsists

only for the sake of something else, but the first is that only for

the sake of which all other things subsist: and all the intermediate

natures participate of these two peculiarities. Hence they genuinely

adhere to the natures which surpass them, as objects of desire, but

impart the perfection of desires to subordinate beings.

The third speculation of the principle of things is far inferior to

the preceding, considering him as giving subsistence to all beautiful

things. For to celebrate him as the supplier of good, and as end

preceding the two orders of things, is not very remote from the

narration which says, that all causes are posterior to him, and derive

their subsistence from him, as well those which are paternal, and the

sources of good, as those that are the suppliers of prolific powers.

But to ascribe to him a producing and generative cause, is still more

remote from the all-perfect union of the first. For as it cannot be

known or discussed by language, by secondary natures, it must not be

said that it is the cause, or that it is generative of beings, but we

should celebrate in silence this ineffable nature, and this perfectly

causeless cause which is prior to all causes. If, however, as we

endeavour to ascribe to him _the good_ and _the one_, we in like manner

attribute to him _cause_, and that which is _final_ or _paternal_,

we must pardon the parturition of the soul about this ineffable

principle, aspiring to perceive him with the eye of intellect, and

to speak about him; but, at the same time, the exempt transcendency

of _the one_ which is immense, must be considered as surpassing an

indication of this kind. From these things therefore, we may receive

the sacred conceptions of Plato, and an order[153] adapted to things

themselves. And we may say that the first part of this sentence

sufficiently indicates the simplicity,[154] transcendency, and in

short the uncoordination with all things of the king of all. For the

assertion that all things subsist about him, unfolds the hyparxis of

things second, but leaves that which is beyond all things without any

connexion with things posterior to it. But the second part celebrates

the cause of all the Gods[155] as prearranged in the order of _end_.

For that which is the highest of all causes, is immediately conjoined

with that which is prior to cause; but of this kind is the final cause,

and that for the sake of which all things subsist. This part therefore

is posterior to the other, and is woven together with the order of

things, and the progression of the Platonic doctrine.

Again, the third part asserts him to be productive of all beautiful

things, and thus adds to him a species of cause[156] inferior to the

final. Whence also Plotinus, I think, does not hesitate to call the

first God the fountain of the beautiful. It is necessary therefore

to attribute that which is best to the best of all things, that he

may be the cause of all, and in reality prior to cause. But this is

_the good_. This too, which is an admirable circumstance, may be seen

in the words of Plato, that the first of these three divine dogmas,

neither presumes to say any thing about _the good_, and this ineffable

nature, nor does it permit us to refer any species of cause to it. But

the second dogma leaves indeed _the good_ ineffable, as it is fit it

should, but from the habitude of things posterior to it, enables us to

collect the final cause: for it does not refuse to call it that for the

sake of which all things subsist. But when it asserts that all things

are for the sake of _the good_, it excites in us the conception of

the communion and co-ordination of that which is the object of desire

with the desiring natures. And the third dogma evinces that _the good_

is the cause of all beautiful things. But this is to say something

concerning it, and to add to the simplicity of the first cause, and

not to abide in the conceptions of the end, but to conjoin with it the

producing principle of things second. And it appears to me that Plato

here indicates the natures which are proximately unfolded into light

after the first. For it is not possible to say any thing concerning

it except at one time being impelled to this from all things, and at

another from the best of things: for it is the cause of hyparxis to all

things, and unfolds its own separate union through the peculiarities of

these. We ascribe to it therefore _the one_ and _the good_, from the

donation which pervades to all things from it. For of those things of

which all participate, we say there is no other cause than that which

is established prior to all these. But _the about_ which (το περι ο,)

the _on account of which_ (το δι’ ο[157]), and _the from which_ (το

αφ’ ου,) particularly subsist in the intelligible Gods: and from these

they are ascribed to the first God. For whence can we suppose the

unical Gods derive their peculiarities, except from that which is prior

to them? To this summit of intelligibles therefore the term _about_

is adapted, because all the divine orders occultly proceed about this

summit which is arranged prior to them. But the term _on account of

which_ pertains to the middle order of intelligibles: for all things

subsist for the sake of eternity and an hyparxis perfectly entire. And

the term _from which_ is adapted to the extremity of intelligibles:

for this first produces all things, and adorns them uniformly. These

things, therefore, we shall indeed make more known in the doctrine

which will shortly follow concerning the intelligible Gods.

CHAPTER X.

In the next place, let us finish the discussion concerning the first

God, with the theory of Parmenides, and unfold the mystic conceptions

of the first hypothesis as far as pertains to the present purpose. For

we shall refer the reader for the most perfect interpretation of them

to our commentaries on that dialogue. In the first place therefore,

it is requisite to determine this concerning the first hypothesis,

that it comprehends as many conclusions negatively, as the hypothesis

which follows it does affirmatively. For this latter demonstrates all

the orders proceeding from _the one_; but the former evinces that _the

one_ is exempt from all the divine genera. From both these hypotheses

however, it is obvious to every one how it is necessary that the cause

of the whole of things should transcend his productions. For because

_the one_ is the cause of all the Gods, he transcends all things. And

because he is exempt from them through transcendency, on this account

he gives to all things their hypostases. For through being expanded

above all things he causes all things to subsist. Since in the second

and third orders also of beings, causes which are entirely exempt from

their effects, more perfectly generate and connect their progeny than

those causes do which are coordinate with their effects. And _the one_

by ineffably producing all the divine orders, appears to be unically

established above all. For in the productions posterior to it, cause

is every where different from the things caused. And on this account

nature indeed being incorporeal, is a cause which transcends bodies;

but soul being perfectly perpetual, is the cause of things generated;

and intellect being immoveable is the cause of every thing that is

moved. If, therefore, according to each progression of beings effects

are denied of their causes, it is certainly necessary to take away all

things similarly from the cause of all.

In the second place, I think it is necessary that the order of the

negations should be defined by those who receive theology according to

the intention of Parmenides; and that it should be admitted that they

proceed indeed from the monads which subsist primarily in the divine

genera, and that Parmenides takes away from _the one_ all second and

third natures, according to an order adapted to each. For that which

transcends more principal causes must in a much greater degree subsist

prior to those that are subordinate. Parmenides, however, does not

begin his negations from the Gods that are united to the first: for

this genus is with difficulty distinguished from _the one_: because

being arranged naturally [immediately] after it, it is most unical and

occult, and transcendently similar to its producing cause. Parmenides

therefore beginning where prior to all other things division and

multitude are apparent, and proceeding regularly through all the second

orders as far as to the last of things, again returns to the beginning,

and shows how _the one_ differs from the Gods that are most similar to

it, and which primarily participate of it, according to one ineffable

cause.

In the third place, in addition to what has been said, I determine

concerning the mode of negations, that they are not privative of

their subjects, but generative of things which are as it were their

opposites. For because the first principle is not many, the many

proceed from it, and because it is not a whole, wholeness proceeds from

it, and in a similar manner in other things. And in thus determining, I

speak conformably to Plato, who thinks it proper to abide in negations,

and to add nothing to _the one_. For whatever you add, you diminish

_the one_, and afterwards evince that it is not _the one_, but that

which is passive to [or participates] _the one_. For it is thus not

one only, but in addition to this possesses something else also by

participation. This mode therefore of negations is exempt, unical,

primary, and is a departure from the whole of things, in an unknown

and ineffable transcendency of simplicity. It is likewise necessary,

having attributed such a mode as this to the first God, again to exempt

him from the negations also. For neither does any discourse, nor any

name belong to _the one_, says Parmenides. But if no discourse belongs

to it, it is evident that neither does negation pertain to it. For

all things are secondary to _the one_, things knowable and knowledge,

and the instruments of knowledge, and after a manner that which is

impossible presents itself at the end of the hypothesis. For if nothing

whatever can be said of _the one_, neither is this discussion itself

adapted to _the one_. Nor is it at all wonderful that the discourse

of those who wish to know the ineffable by words should terminate in

that which is impossible; since all knowledge when conjoined with an

object of knowledge which does not at all pertain to it loses its

power. For sense, if we should say that it pertained to that which

is the object of science would subvert itself; and this would be the

case with science and every kind of knowledge if we should say that

they belonged to that which is intelligible; so that language when

conversant with that which is ineffable, being subverted about itself,

has no cessation, and opposes itself.

CHAPTER XI.

Let us now therefore, if ever, abandon multiform knowledge, exterminate

from ourselves all the variety of life, and in perfect quiet approach

near to the cause of all things. For this purpose, let not only

opinion and phantasy be at rest, nor the passions alone which impede

our anagogic impulse to the first, be at peace; but let the air be

still, and the universe itself be still. And let all things extend us

with a tranquil power to communion with the ineffable. Let us also,

standing there, having transcended the intelligible (if we contain

any thing of this kind,) and with nearly closed eyes adoring as it

were the rising sun, since it is not lawful for any being whatever

intently to behold him--let us survey the sun whence the light of the

intelligible Gods proceeds, emerging, as the poets say, from the bosom

of the ocean; and again from this divine tranquillity descending into

intellect, and from intellect, employing the reasonings of the soul,

let us relate to ourselves what the natures are from which, in this

progression, we shall consider the first God as exempt. And let us as

it were celebrate him, not as establishing the earth and the heavens,

nor as giving subsistence to souls, and the generations of all animals;

for he produced these indeed, but among the last of things; but, prior

to these, let us celebrate him as unfolding into light the whole

intelligible and intellectual genus of Gods, together with all the

supermundane and mundane divinities--as the God of all Gods, the unity

of all unities, and beyond the first adyta,[158]--as more ineffable

than all silence, and more unknown than all essence,--as holy among

the holies, and concealed in the intelligible Gods. And again after

these things descending into a reasoning process from an intellectual

hymn, and employing the irreprehensible science of dialectic, let us,

following the contemplation of first causes, survey the manner in which

the first God is exempt from the whole of things. And let our descent

be as far as to this. But opinion and phantasy and sense, prevent us

indeed from partaking of the presence of the Gods, and draw us down

from Olympian goods to earth-born motions, Titannically divide the

intellect that is in us, and divulse us from an establishment in wholes

to the images of beings.

CHAPTER XII.

What therefore will be the first conception of the science proceeding

from intellect, and unfolding itself into light? What other can we

assert it to be than that which is the most simple and the most known

of all the conceptions contained in this science? What therefore is

this? “_The one_, says Parmenides, if it is _the one_ will not be

many.” For it is necessary that the many should participate of _the

one_; but _the one_ does not participate of _the one_, but is _the

one_ itself. Neither is that which is primarily one participable. For

it would not be purely one if mingled with the many, nor that which

is one, if it received the addition of that which is subordinate.

_The one_ therefore is exempt from the many. The many however subsist

primarily in the summit of the first intellectual Gods, and in

_the intelligible place of survey_, as we are taught in the second

hypothesis. _The one_, therefore, entirely transcends an order of this

kind, and is the cause of it. For the _not many_, is not privation, as

we have said, but the cause of the many. This, therefore, Parmenides

does not think it requisite to demonstrate, but as a thing most

manifest to every one, he first evinces this, through the opposition

as it were of the many to _the one_. But employing this he takes away

that which follows; and he takes away that which is posterior to this

by employing the conclusions prior to it, and this he always does,

after the same manner. And at one time indeed, he assumes the elements

of the demonstrations from proximate conclusions, but at another time

from those that are more remote. For after this intelligible order

of Gods, as we have said, he gives subsistence to that order which

connectedly contains and bounds the extent of them, from their exempt

cause. But this order is called by him in the second hypothesis parts

and a whole. These therefore he denies of _the one_ employing the many

for the purpose of distinguishing the subjects and _the one_. For, as

he says, that which is a whole and has parts is many; but _the one_ is

beyond the many. If, therefore, _the one_ transcends the intelligible

simplicity, but whole and that which has parts proceed from it in

order to become the bond of the whole of this distribution, is it not

necessary that _the one_ should neither be a whole, nor be indigent

of parts? And I think it is through this transcendency that _the one_

presubsists as the cause of this order of Gods, and that it produces

this order, but in an exempt manner.

In the third place after these, we may survey the order which is

allotted the boundary of the intellectual and at the same time

intelligible Gods, proceeding from _the one_, and may behold _the one_

perfectly expanded above it. For this order indeed subsists from the

second genera, and from the intellectual wholeness of the genera. But

_the one_, as has been demonstrated, is exempt according to cause from

this wholeness. _The one_ therefore has neither beginning, or middle,

or end, nor has it extremes, nor does it participate of any figure.

For through these Gods, the before mentioned order of Gods becomes

apparent. Whether therefore, there be a perfective summit, or what

is celebrated as the middle centre in these Gods, or a termination

converting the end of these divinities to their beginning, _the one_ is

similarly beyond every triple distribution. For _the one_ would have

parts, and would be many, if it participated of things of this kind.

But it has been demonstrated that _the one_ unically subsists prior to

the many, and to wholeness together with its parts, as the cause of

them. And you see how Parmenides indeed exhibits to us one negation

of the highest order, but two negations of the middle, and three of

the last order. Besides this also, he shows that _the one_ has no

extremity. But the infinite is a thing of this kind. And separately

from this he likewise shows that _the one_ is unreceptive of all

figures.

Again therefore, after these triple orders we must direct our attention

to the intellectual Gods subsisting from these, and receiving a

tripartite division, and must demonstrate that _the one_ transcends

these also. For such is _the one_, says Parmenides, since it is neither

in itself, nor in another. For if it were in another, it would be on

all sides comprehended by that in which it is, and would every where

touch that which comprehends it. But in this case, it would have a

figure, would consist of parts, and on this account would be many and

not one. And if it were in itself it would entirely comprehend itself

in itself. But comprehending and at the same time being comprehended,

it will be two, and will be no longer primarily one. The discourse

therefore proceeds to the same conclusion, and evinces that _the one_

will not be one, by the summit of the intellectual order, if any one

endeavours to mingle it with other things. Hence _the one_ being

perfectly exempt from this summit also, gives subsistence to it, this

summit at one and the same time participating of the third of the Gods

placed above it, but being produced from the second of these Gods, and

being perfected from the first, and entirely established in it.

Moreover, _the one_ likewise generates the second intellectual order,

being unmingled with it. For _the one_ neither stands still, nor

is moved. It participates therefore of neither of these; but being

similarly exempt from both, it at the same time transcends the middle

orders of the intellectual progression of the Gods. For if it were

moved, it would be moved in a twofold respect, viz. either according

to a change in quality, or local motion. But it is not possible that

_the one_ can be changed in quality; for being thus changed it will

be not one, and will fall off from a unical hyparxis. Nor can it be

locally moved. For it is impossible that it should be moved in a

circle, because it would have parts, viz. middle and extremes. And if

it changed one place for another it would be partible. For it would

be necessary that it should neither be wholly in that place to which

it is moved, nor in that whence it begins to be moved. For if it were

wholly in either of them, it would be immoveable, in consequence of

partly not yet being moved, and partly having now ceased its motion.

But if _the one_ stands still, it is certainly necessary that it should

abide in the same thing. But it has been demonstrated that _the one_

is no where. Hence it is neither in itself, nor in another thing. In

no respect therefore is _the one_ moved, or does it stand still, which

things [viz. motion and permanency] particularly belong to the middle

order of intellectuals, as will be evident from the second hypothesis.

For the first God produces this order also, being exempt from it.

In the third place, we may survey through what next follows, the last

order of intellectuals, proceeding from _the one_, and subordinate to

it. For in this order sameness and difference subsist unitedly. But at

the same time _the one_ subsists prior to both these. For different is

said to be different both from itself and from other things. And in a

similar manner same is the same with itself, and with other things.

But _the one_ is not indeed different from itself, because that which

is different from _the one_ will be not one. And it is not the same

with other things, lest becoming the same with them, it should latently

pass into their nature. Moreover, neither is _the one_ different from

other things. For it would be at the same time one, and would have as

an addition the power of difference. For so far as it is different it

will not be one; since difference is not _the one_. Hence being one

and different, it will be many and not _the one_. Nor is _the one_

the same with itself. For if _the one_ and the same differ only in

name, the many will not be in consequence of participating of sameness

with each other. For it is impossible that the many should become

one by participating of the many. But if _the one_ and sameness are

essentially different, that which is primarily one does not participate

of sameness, lest by receiving sameness in addition to _the one_, it

should become a passive one, and not that which is primarily one. If

however the extremity of intellectuals is characterized by this tetrad,

it is evident that _the one_ existing beyond this also supernally

unfolds it into light, and places over the wholes of the universe a

tetradic monad, the source of ornament to all secondary natures. For

from hence other things primarily receive a communication with _the

one_ which are also indeed produced and connectedly contained by _the

one_.

But after the intellectual Gods, the ineffable transcendency of _the

one_ arranges the extent of the supermundane divinities, _the one_ in

the mean time, being occultly exempt from its supermundane progeny. And

this extent indeed proximately subsists from the intellectual Gods, but

uniformly receives its hyparxis from the first God. This, therefore,

Parmenides produces through similitude and dissimilitude, from the

deity which encloses the boundary of the intellectual monads. For

the similar is that which is passive to sameness, in the same manner

as dissimilitude is that which is passive to difference. Parmenides

therefore demonstrates that _the one_ transcends according to one

simplicity such a peculiarity of the Gods also as this. For that which

is established above the power of same and different, in a much greater

degree transcends the genera which are allotted a subsistence according

to similitude and dissimilitude.

What therefore remains after this? Is it not evident that it is the

multitude of the mundane Gods? But this also is twofold, the one being

celestial, but the other sublunary. Of these, therefore, the genus

which revolves in the heavens, proceeds together with the equal, the

greater and the less. But in the sublunary genus the equal is allotted

a difference in multitude from the celestial equality, but the unequal

is again divided by the power of the more and the less. According to

another genus therefore of the divine orders, there will be a monad

and a duad, but above indeed, they are allied to _the one_ and to

sameness, and beneath to multitude, and the intellectual cause of

difference. Hence _the one_ transcends all these. For the equal indeed

every where consists of the same parts. By what contrivance therefore

is it possible that the nature which at one and the same time is exempt

from sameness, and the difference which is associated with it, should

participate of equality and inequality?

Besides all these divine orders therefore we must intellectually survey

the genera of deified souls, and which are distributed about the

Gods. For in each of the divine progressions and in the progressions

also of souls, the first genus presents itself to the view connascent

with the Gods; since both in the heavens, and in the sublunary region

divine souls receive the division of the Gods into the world, as the

Athenian Guest in a certain place demonstrates. The psychical extent

therefore, is characterized by time, and by a life according to time.

But the peculiarity of divine souls is shown by Parmenides to consist

in their being younger and at the same time older both than themselves

and other things. For revolving always according to the same time, and

conjoining the beginning with the end, as at one and the same time

proceeding to the end of the whole period they become younger, but

as at the same time circulating to the beginning of it, they become

older. All their ages however, perpetually preserve the same measures

of time. Again, there is sameness in them and difference, the former

indeed preserving equality, but the latter inequality, according to

time. _The one_ therefore subsists prior to divine souls, and generates

these also together with the Gods. We now therefore come to the end of

the whole distribution of more excellent natures; and the cause of all

intelligibles at once unfolds into light the genera that follow the

Gods, and that are triply divided by the three parts of time. But this

cause is demonstrated by the intellectual projections of Parmenides

to be also exempt from these. For that which is beyond all time and

the life which is according to time, can by no contrivance become

subservient to the more partial periods of time.