But if each of the spheres is an animal, and is always established

after the same manner, and gives completion to the universe, as

possessing life indeed, it will always primarily participate of soul,

but as preserving its own order immutable in the world, it will be

comprehended by intellect, and as one and a whole, and the leader and

ruler of its proper parts, it will be illuminated by divine union. Not

only the universe, therefore, but each also of its perpetual parts

is animated and endued with intellect, and as much as possible is

similar to the universe.[112] For each of these parts is a universe

with respect to its kindred multitude. In short, there is indeed one

corporeal-formed wholeness of the universe, but there are many others

under this, depending on this one; there is one soul of the universe,

and after this, other souls, together with this disposing in an orderly

manner the whole parts of the universe with undefiled purity; one

intellect, and an intellectual number under this, participated by

these souls; and one god who connectedly contains at once all mundane

and supermundane[113] natures, and a multitude of other gods, who

distribute intellectual essences, and the souls suspended from these,

and all the parts of the world. For it is not to be supposed that each

of the productions of nature is generative of things similar to itself,

but that wholes and the first of mundane beings should not in a much

greater degree extend in themselves the paradigm of a generation of

this kind. For the similar is more allied, and more naturally adapted

to the reason of cause than the dissimilar, in the same manner as the

same than the different, and bound than the infinite. These things,

however, we shall accurately survey in what follows. But we shall now

direct our attention to the second of the things demonstrated in the

Laws, viz. that the Gods providentially attend at once to wholes and

parts, and shall summarily discuss the irreprehensible conception of

Plato about the providence of the Gods.

CHAPTER XIV.

From what has been said, therefore, it is evident to every one, that

the Gods being the causes of all motion, some of them are essential and

vivific, according to a self-motive, self-vital, and self-energetic

power. But others of them are intellectual, and excite by their very

being all secondary[114] natures to the perfection of life, according

to the fountain and principle of all second and third progressions of

motion. And others are unical, or characterized by unity, deifying

by participation all the whole genera of themselves, according to a

primary, all-perfect, and unknown power of energy, and who are the

leaders of one kind of motion, but are not the principle of another.

But again others supply to secondary natures motion according to place

or quality, but are essentially the causes of motion to themselves. For

every thing which is the cause of essence to other things is much prior

to this the cause to itself of its own proper energies and perfection.

Farther still, that which is self-motive is again the principle of

motion, and being and life are imparted by soul to every thing in

the world, and not local motion only and the other kinds of motion,

but the progression into being is from soul, and by a much greater

priority from an intellectual essence, which binds to itself the life

of self-motive natures and precedes according to cause all temporal

energy. And in a still greater degree do motion, being, and life

proceed from a unical hyparxis, which connectedly contains intellect

and soul, is the source of total good, and proceeds as far as to the

last of things. For of life indeed, not all the parts of the world

are capable of participating, nor of intellect and a gnostic power;

but of _the one_ all things participate, as far as to matter itself,

both wholes and parts, things which subsist according to nature, and

the contraries to these; and there is not any thing which is deprived

of a cause of this kind, nor can any thing ever participate of being,

if it is deprived of _the one_. If, therefore, the Gods produce all

things, and contain all things, in the unknown comprehensions of

themselves, how is it possible there should not be a providence of all

things in these comprehensions, pervading supernally as far as to the

most partial natures? For it is every where fit that offspring should

enjoy the providential care of their causes. But all alter-motive are

the progeny of self-motive natures. And things which subsist in time,

either in the whole of time, or in a part of it, are the effects of

eternal natures; because that which always is, is the cause of that

which sometimes exists. And divine and unical genera, as they give

subsistence to all multiplied natures, precede them in existence.

In short, there is no essence, or multitude of powers, which is not

allotted its generation from _the one_. It is necessary, therefore,

that all these should be partakers of the providence of preceding

causes, being vivified indeed from the psychical gods, and circulating

according to temporal periods; and participating of sameness and at the

same time a stable condition of forms from the intellectual gods;[115]

but receiving into themselves the presence of union, of measure, and

of the distribution of good from the first Gods. It is necessary,

therefore, either that the Gods should know that a providential care

of their own offspring is natural to them, and should not only give

subsistence to secondary beings, and supply them with life, essence and

union, but also previously comprehend in themselves the primary cause

of the goods they contain, or, which it is not lawful to assert, that

being Gods, they are ignorant of what is proper and fit.

For what ignorance can there be of beautiful things, with those who are

the causes of beauty, or of things good, with those who are allotted

an hyparxis defined by the nature of _the good_? But if they are

ignorant, neither do souls govern the universe according to intellect,

nor are intellects carried in souls as in a vehicle, nor prior to

these do the unities of the Gods contractedly comprehend in themselves

all knowledge, which we have acknowledged they do through the former

demonstrations. If, therefore, they are not deprived of knowledge,

being the fathers, leaders and governors of every thing in the world,

and[116] to them as being such a providential care of the things

governed by, and following them, and generated by them, pertains,

whether shall we say that they knowing the law which is according

to nature, accomplish this law, or that through imbecility they are

deprived of a providential attention to their possessions or progeny,

for it is of no consequence as to the present discussion which of these

two appellations you are willing to adopt? For if through want of power

they neglect the superintendence of wholes, what is the cause of this

want of power? For they do not move things externally, nor are other

things indeed the causes of essence, but they assume the government of

the things they have produced, but they rule over all things as if from

the stern of a ship, themselves supplying being, themselves containing

the measures of life, and themselves distributing to things their

respective energies.

Whether also, are they unable to provide at once for all things, or

they do not leave each of the parts destitute of their providential

care? And if they are not curators of every thing in the world, whether

do they providentially superintend greater things, but neglect such as

are less? Or do they pay attention to the less, but neglect to take

care of the greater? For if we deprive them of a providential attention

to all things similarly, through the want of power, how, while we

attribute to them a greater thing, viz. the production of all things,

can we refuse to grant that which is naturally consequent to this, a

providential attention to their productions? For it is the province

of the power which produces a greater thing, to dispose in a becoming

manner that which is less. But if they are curators of less things, and

neglect such as are greater, how can this mode of providence be right?

For that which is more allied, and more similar to any thing, is more

appropriately and fitly disposed by nature to the participation of

the good which that thing confers on it. If, however, the Gods think

that the first of mundane natures deserve their providential care,

and that perfection of which they are the sources, but are unable

to extend their regard to the last of things, what is it which can

restrain the presence of the Gods from pervading to all things? What

is it which can impede their unenvying and exuberant energy? How can

those who are capable of effecting greater things, be unable to govern

such as are less? Or how can those who produce the essence even of the

smallest things, not be the lords of the perfection of them, through

a privation of power? For all these things are hostile to our natural

conceptions. It remains, therefore, that the Gods must know what is

fit and appropriate, and that they must possess a power adapted to the

perfection of their own nature, and to the government of the whole of

things. But if they know that which is according to nature, and this

to those who are the generating causes of all things is to take care

of all things, and an exuberance of power,--if this be the case, they

are not deprived of a providential attention of this kind. Whether,

also, together with what has been said, is there a will of providence

in them? Or is this alone wanting both to their knowledge and power?

And on this account are things deprived[117] of their providential

care? For if indeed knowing what is fit for themselves, and being able

to accomplish what they know, they are unwilling to provide for their

own offspring, they will be indigent of goodness, their unenvying

exuberance will perish, and we shall do nothing else than abolish

the hyparxis according to which they are essentialized. For the very

being of the Gods is defined by the good, and in this they have their

subsistence. But to provide for things of a subject nature, is to

confer on them a certain good. How, therefore, can we deprive the Gods

of providence, without at the same time depriving them of goodness?

And how if we subvert their goodness is it possible, that we should

not also ignorantly subvert their hyparxis which we established by

the former demonstrations? Hence it is necessary to admit as a thing

consequent to the very being of the Gods that they are good according

to every virtue. And again, it is consequent to this that they do not

withdraw themselves from a providential attention to secondary natures,

either through indolence, or imbecility, or ignorance. But to this I

think it is also consequent that there is with them the most excellent

knowledge, unpolluted power, and unenvying and exuberant will. From

which it appears that they provide for the whole of things, and omit

nothing which is requisite to the supply of good.

Let, however, no one think that the Gods extend such a providence about

secondary things, as is either of a busy or laborious nature, or that

this is the case with their exempt transcendency, which is established

remote from mortal difficulty. For their blessedness is not willing to

be defiled with the difficulty of administration, since even the life

of good men is accompanied with facility, and is void of molestation

and pain. But all labours and molestation arise from the impediments

of matter. If, however, it be requisite to define the mode of the

providence of the Gods, it must be admitted that it is spontaneous,

unpolluted, immaterial, and ineffable. For the Gods do not govern all

things either by investigating what is fit, or exploring the good of

every thing by ambiguous reasonings, or by looking externally, and

following their effects as men do in the providence which they exert

on their own affairs; but pre-assuming in themselves the measures of

the whole of things, and producing the essence of every thing from

themselves, and also looking to themselves, they lead and perfect all

things in a silent path, by their very being, and fill them with good.

Neither, likewise, do they produce in a manner similar to nature,

energizing only by their very being, unaccompanied with deliberate

choice, nor energizing in a manner similar to partial souls in

conjunction with will, are they deprived of production according to

essence; but they contract both these into one union, and they will

indeed such things as they are able to effect by their very being,

but by their very essence being capable of and producing all things,

they contain the cause of production in their unenvying and exuberant

will. By what busy energy, therefore, with what difficulty, or with

the punishment of what Ixion, is the providence either of whole souls,

or of intellectual essences, or of the Gods themselves accomplished,

unless it should be said, that to impart good in any respect is

laborious to the Gods? But that which is according to nature is not

laborious to any thing. For neither is it laborious to fire to impart

heat, nor to snow to refrigerate, nor in short to bodies to energize

according to their own proper powers. And prior to bodies, neither is

it laborious to natures to nourish, or generate, or increase. For these

are the works of natures. Nor again, prior to these, is it laborious to

souls. For these indeed produce many energies from deliberate choice,

many from their very being, and are the causes of many motions by alone

being present. So that if indeed the communication of good is according

to nature to the Gods, providence also is according to nature. And

these things we must say are accomplished by the Gods with facility,

and by their very being alone. But if these things are not according

to nature, neither will the Gods be naturally good. For the good is

the supplier of good; just as life is the source of another life, and

intellect is the source of intellectual illumination. And every thing

which has a primary subsistence in each nature is generative of that

which has a secondary subsistence.

That however, which is especially the illustrious prerogative of

the Platonic theology, I should say is this, that according to it,

neither is the exempt essence of the Gods converted to secondary

natures, through a providential care for things subordinate, nor is

their providential presence with all things diminished through their

transcending the whole of things with undefiled purity, but at the

same time it assigns to them a separate subsistence, and the being

unmingled with every subordinate nature, and also the being extended to

all things, and the taking care of and adorning their own progeny. For

the manner in which they pervade through all things is not corporeal,

as that of light is through the air, nor is it divisible about bodies,

in the same manner as in nature, nor converted to subordinate natures,

in the same manner as that of a partial soul, but it is separate

from body, and without conversion to it, is immaterial, unmingled,

unrestrained, uniform, primary and exempt. In short, such a mode of

the providence of the Gods as this, must at present be conceived. For

it is evident that it will be appropriate according to each order of

the Gods. For soul indeed, is said to provide for secondary natures in

one way, and intellect in another. But the providence of divinity who

is prior to intellect is exerted according to a transcendency both of

intellect and soul. And of the Gods themselves, the providence of the

sublunary is different from that of the celestial divinities. Of the

Gods also who are beyond the world, there are many orders, and the

mode of providence is different according to each.

CHAPTER XV.

The third problem after these we shall connect with the former, and

survey how we are to assume the unpervertible in the Gods, who perform

all things according to justice, and who do not in the smallest

degree subvert its boundary, or its undeviating rectitude, in their

providential attention to all other things, and in the mutations of

human affairs. I think therefore, that this is apparent to every one,

that every where that which governs according to nature, and pays all

possible attention to the felicity of the governed, after this manner

becomes the leader of that which it governs, and directs it to that

which is best. For neither has the pilot who rules over the sailors and

the ship any other precedaneous end than the safety of those that sail

in the ship, and of the ship itself, nor does the physician who is the

curator of the diseased, endeavour to do all things for the sake of any

thing else than the health of the subjects of his care, whether it be

requisite to cut them, or administer to them a purgative medicine. Nor

would the general of an army or a guardian say that they look to any

other end, than the one to the liberty of those that are guarded, and

the other to the liberty of the soldiers. Nor will any other to whom

it belongs to be the leader or curator of certain persons, endeavour

to subvert the good of those that follow him, which it is his business

to procure, and with a view to which he disposes in a becoming manner

every thing belonging to those whom he governs. If therefore we grant

that the Gods are the leaders of the whole of things, and that their

providence extends to all things, since they are good, and possess

every virtue, how is it possible they should neglect the felicity of

the objects of their providential care? Or how can they be inferior

to other leaders in the providence of subordinate natures? Since the

Gods indeed always look to that which is better, and establish this as

the end of all their government, but other leaders overlook the good

of men, and embrace vice rather than virtue, in consequence of being

perverted by the gifts of the depraved.

And universally, whether you are willing to call the Gods leaders, or

rulers, or guardians, or fathers, a divine nature will appear to be

in want of no one of such names. For all things that are venerable

and honorable subsist in them primarily. And on this account indeed,

here also some things are naturally more venerable and honorable

than others, because they exhibit an ultimate resemblance of the

Gods. But what occasion is there to speak further on this subject?

For I think that we hear from those who are wise in divine concerns

paternal, guardian, ruling and pæonian powers celebrated. How is

it possible therefore that the images of the Gods which subsist

according to nature, regarding the end which is adapted to them, should

providentially attend to the order of the things which they govern, but

that the Gods themselves with whom there is the whole of good, true and

real virtue, and a blameless life, should not direct their government

to the virtue and vice of men? And how can it be admitted, on this

supposition, that they exhibit virtue victorious in the universe,

and vice vanquished? Will they not also thus corrupt the measures

of justice by the worship paid to them by the depraved, subvert the

boundary of undeviating science, and cause the gifts of vice to appear

more honorable than the pursuits of virtue? For this mode of providence

is neither advantageous to these leaders, nor to those that follow

them. For to those who have become wicked, there will be no liberation

from guilt, since they will always endeavour to anticipate justice,

and pervert the measures of desert. But it will be necessary, which it

is not lawful to assert, that the Gods should regard as their final

end the vice of the subjects of their providence, neglect their true

salvation, and consequently be alone the causes of adumbrant good. This

universe also and the whole world will be filled with disorder and

incurable perturbation, depravity remaining in it, and being replete

with that discord which exists in badly governed cities. Though is it

not perfectly impossible that parts should be governed according to

nature in a greater degree than wholes, human than divine concerns, and

images than primary causes?

Hence if men properly attend to the welfare of men in governing them,

honoring some, but disgracing others, and every where giving a proper

direction to the works of vice by the measures of virtue, it is much

more necessary that the Gods should be the immutable governors of the

whole of things. For men are allotted this virtue through similitude

to the Gods. But if we acknowledge that men who corrupt the safety and

well-being of those whom they govern, imitate in a greater degree the

providence of the Gods, we shall ignorantly at one and the same time

entirely subvert the truth concerning the Gods, and the transcendency

of virtue. For this I think is evident to every one, that what is more

similar to the Gods is more happy than those things that are deprived

of them[118] through dissimilitude and diversity. So that if among

men indeed, the uncorrupted and undeviating form of providence is

honorable, it must undoubtedly be in a much greater degree honorable

with the Gods. But if with them, mortal gifts are more venerable

than the divine measures of justice, with men also earth-born gifts

will be more honorable than Olympian goods, and the blandishments

of vice than the works of virtue. With a view therefore to the most

perfect felicity, Plato in the Laws delivers to us through these

demonstrations, the hyparxis of the Gods, their providential care

extending to all things, and their immutable energy; which things,

indeed, are common to all the Gods, but are most principal and first

according to nature in the doctrine pertaining to them. For this triad

appears to pervade as far as to the most partial natures in the divine

orders, originating supernally from the occult genera of Gods. For

a uniform hyparxis, a power which providentially takes care of all

secondary natures, and an undeviating and immutable intellect, are in

all the Gods that are prior to and in the world.

CHAPTER XVI.

Again, from another principle we may be able to apprehend the

theological demonstrations in the Republic. For these are common to

all the divine orders, similarly extend to all the discussion about

the Gods, and unfold to us truth in uninterrupted connexion with what

has been before said. In the second book of the Republic therefore,

Socrates describes certain theological types for mythological poets,

and exhorts his pupils to purify themselves from those tragic

disciplines, which some do not refuse to introduce to a divine nature,

concealing in these as in veils the arcane mysteries concerning the

Gods. Socrates therefore, as I have said, narrating the types and laws

of divine fables, which afford this apparent meaning, and the inward

concealed scope, which regards as its end the beautiful and the natural

in the fictions about the Gods,--in the first place indeed, thinks

fit to evince, according to our unperverted conception about the Gods

and their goodness, that they are the suppliers of all good, but the

causes of no evil to any being at any time. In the second place, he

says that they are essentially immutable, and that they neither have

various forms, deceiving and fascinating, nor are the authors of the

greatest evil lying, in deeds or in words, or of error and folly. These

therefore being two laws, the former has two conclusions, viz. that

the Gods are not the causes of evils, and that they are the causes

of all good. The second law also in a similar manner has two other

conclusions; and these are, that every divine nature is immutable, and

is established pure from falsehood and artificial variety. All the

things demonstrated therefore, depend on these three common conceptions

about a divine nature, viz. on the conceptions about its goodness,

immutability and truth. For the first and ineffable fountain of good is

with the Gods; together with eternity, which is the cause of a power

that has an invariable sameness of subsistence; and the first intellect

which is beings themselves, and the truth which is in real beings.

CHAPTER XVII.

That therefore, which has the hyparxis of itself, and the whole of its

essence defined in the good, and which by its very being produces all

things, must necessarily be productive of every good, but of no evil.

For if there was any thing primarily good, which is not God, perhaps

some one might say that divinity is indeed a cause of good, but that

he does not impart to beings every good. If, however, not only every

God is good, but that which is primarily boniform and beneficent is

God, (for that which is primarily good will not be the second after the

Gods, because every where, things which have a secondary subsistence,

receive the peculiarity of their hyparxis from those that subsist

primarily)--this being the case, it is perfectly necessary that

divinity should be the cause of good, and of all such goods as proceed

into secondary descents, as far as to the last of things. For as the

power which is the cause of life, gives subsistence to all life, as the

power which is the cause of knowledge, produces all knowledge, as the

power which is the cause of beauty, produces every thing beautiful, as

well the beauty which is in words, as that which is in the phænomena,

and thus every primary cause produces all similars from itself and

binds to itself the one hypostasis of things which subsist according to

one form,--after the same manner I think the first and most principal

good, and uniform hyparxis, establishes in and about itself, the causes

and comprehensions of all goods at once. Nor is there any thing good

which does not possess this power from it, nor beneficent which being

converted to it, does not participate of this cause. For all goods are

from thence produced, perfected and preserved; and the one series and

order of universal good, depends on that fountain. Through the same

cause of hyparxis therefore, the Gods are the suppliers of all good,

and of no evil. For that which is primarily good, gives subsistence to

every good from itself, and is not the cause of an allotment contrary

to itself; since that which is productive of life, is not the cause of

the privation of life, and that which is the source of beauty is exempt

from the nature of that which is void of beauty and is deformed, and

from the causes of this. Hence, of that which primarily constitutes

good, it is not lawful to assert that it is the cause of contrary

progeny; but the nature of goods proceeds from thence undefiled,

unmingled and uniform.

And the divine cause indeed of goods is established eternally in

itself, extending to all secondary natures, an unenvying and exuberant

participation of good. Of its participants, however, some preserve the

participation with incorruptible purity, receiving their proper good

in undefiled bosoms, and thus through an abundance of power possess

inevitably an allotment of goods adapted to them. But those natures

which are arranged in the last of the whole of things, entirely indeed

enjoy according to their nature the goodness of the Gods; for it is not

possible that things perfectly destitute of good should either have a

being, or subsist at first; but receiving an efflux of this kind, they

neither preserve the gift which pervades to them, pure and unmingled,

nor do they retain their proper good stably, and with invariable

sameness, but becoming imbecil, partial and material, and filled with

the privation of vitality of their subject, they exhibit to order

indeed, the privation of order, to reason irrationality, and to virtue,

the contrary to it, vice. And with respect indeed to the natures which

rank as wholes,[119] each of these is exempt from a perversion of this

kind, things more perfect in them always having dominion according

to nature. But partial natures through a diminution of power always

diverging[120] into multitude, division and interval, obscure indeed

the participation of good, but substitute the contrary in the mixture

with good, and which is vanquished by the combination. For neither here

is it lawful for evil to subsist unmingled, and perfectly destitute of

good; but though some particular thing may be evil to a part, yet it

is entirely good to the whole and to the universe. For the universe is

always happy, and always consists of perfect parts, and which subsist

according to nature. But that which is preternatural is always evil to

partial natures, and deformity, privation of symmetry, perversion, and

a resemblance of subsistence are in these. For that which is corrupted,

is indeed corrupted to itself, and departs from its proper perfection,

but to the universe it is incorruptible and indestructible.

And every thing which is deprived of good, so far indeed as pertains to

itself, and its own subsistence, is deprived of it through imbecility

of nature; but it is good to the whole, and so far as it is a part of

the universe. For it is not possible that either a privation of life,

or deformity and immoderation, or in short privation can be inserted

in the universe; but its whole number is always perfect, being held

together by the goodness of wholes. And life is every where present,

together with existence, and the being perfect, so far as each thing

gives completion to the whole. Divinity therefore, as we have said,

is the cause[121] of good; but the shadowy subsistence of evil does

not subsist from power, but from the imbecility of the natures which

receive the illuminations of the Gods. Nor is evil in wholes, but

in partial natures, nor yet in all these. For the first of partial

natures and partial intellectual genera are eternally boniform. But the

media among these, and which energize according to time, connecting

the participation of the good with temporal mutation and motion, are

incapable of preserving the gift of the Gods immoveable, uniform and

simple; by their variety obscuring[122] the simplicity of this gift,

by their multiform its uniform nature, and by their commixture its

purity and incorruptibility. For they do not consist of incorruptible

first genera, nor have they a simple essence, nor uniform powers, but

such as are composed of the contraries to these, as Socrates somewhere

says in the Phædrus. And the last of partial natures and which are also

material, in a much greater degree pervert their proper good. For they

are mingled with a privation of life, and have a subsistence resembling

that of an image, since it is replete with much of non-entity, consists

of things hostile to each other, and of circumstances which are

mutable and dispersed through the whole of time, so that they never

cease to evince in every thing that they are given up to corruption,

privation of symmetry, deformity, and all-various mutations, being not

only extended in their energies, like the natures prior to them, but

being replete both in their powers and energies with that which is

preternatural, and with material imbecility. For things which become

situated in a foreign place, by co-introducing whole together with

form, rule over the subject nature; but again receding to that which is

partial, from their proper wholeness, and participating of partibility,

imbecility, war and the division which is the source of generation,

they are necessarily all-variously changed. Neither, therefore, is

every being perfectly good; for there would not be the corruption and

generation of bodies, nor the purification and punishment of souls.

Nor is there any evil in wholes: for the world would not be a blessed

god, if the most principal parts of which it consists were imperfect.

Nor are the Gods the causes of evils, in the same manner as they are

of goods; but evil originates from the imbecility of the recipients of

good, and a subsistence in the last of things. Nor is the evil which

has a shadowy subsistence in partial natures, unmingled with good. But

this participates of it in a certain respect, by its very existence

being detained by good. Nor in short, is it possible for evil which is

perfectly destitute of all good to have a subsistence. For evil itself

is even beyond that which in no respect whatever has an existence, just

as the good itself is beyond that which is perfectly being. Nor is the

evil which is in partial natures left in a disordered state, but even

this is made subservient to good purposes by the Gods, and on this

account justice purifies souls from depravity. But another order of

gods purifies from the depravity which is in bodies. All things however

are converted as much as possible to the goodness of the Gods. And

wholes indeed remain in their proper boundaries, and also the perfect

and beneficent genera of beings. But more partial and imperfect natures

are adorned and arranged in a becoming manner, become subservient to

the completion of wholes, are called upward to the beautiful, are

changed, and in every way enjoy the participation of the good, so far

as this can be accomplished by them.

For there cannot be a greater good to each of these, than what the

Gods impart according to measures to their progeny: but all things,

each separately, and all in common, receive such a portion of good, as

it is possible for them to participate. But if some things are filled

with greater, and others with less goods, the power of the recipients,

and the measures of the distribution must be assigned as the cause of

this. For different things are adapted to different beings according to

their nature. But the Gods always extend good, in the same manner as

the sun always emits light. For a different thing receives this light

differently according to its order, and receives the greatest portion

of light it is capable of receiving. For all things are led according

to justice, and good is not absent from any thing, but is present to

every thing, according to an appropriate boundary of participation.

And as the Athenian guest says, all things are in a good condition,

and are arranged by the Gods. Let no one therefore say, that there are

precedaneous productive principles of evil in nature, or intellectual

paradigms of evils, in the same manner as there are of goods, or that

there is a malific soul, or an evil-producing cause in the Gods, nor

let him introduce sedition and eternal war against the first good. For

all these are foreign from the science of Plato, and being more remote

from the truth wander into barbaric folly, and gigantic mythology. Nor

if certain persons speaking obscurely in arcane narrations, devise

things of this kind, shall we make any alteration in the apparent

apparatus of what they indicate. But the truth indeed of those things

is to be investigated, and in the mean time, the science of Plato must

be genuinely received in the pure bosoms of the soul, and must be

preserved undefiled and unmingled with contrary opinions.

CHAPTER XVIII.

In the next place, let us survey the immutability and simplicity of the

Gods, what the nature of each of them is, and how both these appear

to be adapted to the hyparxis of the Gods, according to the narration

of Plato. The Gods, therefore, are exempt from the whole of things.

But filling these, as we have said, with good, they are themselves

perfectly good; each of them according to his proper order possesses

that which is most excellent; and the whole genus of the Gods is at

once allotted predominance according to an exuberance of good. But here

again, we must oppose those who interpret in a divisible manner that

which is most excellent in the Gods, and who say, that if the first

cause is most excellent, that which is posterior to the first is not

so. For it is necessary, say they, that what is produced should be

inferior to that by which it is produced. And this indeed is rightly

asserted by them. For it is necessary in the Gods, to preserve the

order of causes unconfused, and to define separately their second and

third progressions. But together with a progression of this kind, and

with[123] the unfolding into light of things secondary from those that

are first, that which is most excellent must also be surveyed in each

of the Gods. For each of the Gods in his own characteristic peculiarity

is allotted a transcendency which is primary and perfectly good. One

of them indeed, that we may speak of something known, is allotted

this transcendency, and is most excellent as possessing a prophetic

power, another as demiurgic, but another as a perfector of works. And

Timæus indicating this to us, continually calls the first demiurgus

the best of causes. For the world, says he, is the most beautiful of

generated natures, and its artificer is the best of causes; though the

intelligible paradigm, and which is the most beautiful of intelligibles

is prior to the demiurgus. But this is most beautiful and at the same

time most excellent, as the demiurgic paradigm; and the maker and at

the same time father of the universe is most excellent, as a demiurgic

God. In the Republic also, Socrates speaking of the Gods, very properly

observes, that each of them being as much as possible most beautiful

and most excellent, remains always with a simplicity of subsistence

in his own form. For each of them being allotted that which is first

and the summit in his own series, does not depart from his own order,

but contains the blessedness and felicity of his own proper power.

And neither does he exchange his present for a worse order; for it

is not lawful for that which possesses all virtue to be changed into

a worse condition; nor does he pass into a better order. For where

can there be any thing better than that which is most excellent? But

this is present with each of the divinities according to his own

order, as we have said, and also with every genus of the Gods. It is

necessary therefore that every divine nature should be established

immutably, abiding in its own accustomed manner. Hence from these

things the self-sufficiency, undefiled purity, and invariable sameness

of subsistence of the Gods is apparent. For if they are not changed

to a more excellent condition of being, as possessing that which is

best in their own nature, they are sufficient to themselves, and are

not in want of any good. And if they are not at any time changed to

a worse condition, they remain undefiled, established in their own

transcendencies. If also they guard the perfection of themselves

immutably, they subsist always with invariable sameness. What the

self-sufficiency therefore of the Gods is, what their immutability, and

what their sameness of subsistence, we shall in the next place consider.

The world then is said to be self-sufficient, because its subsistence

is perfect from things perfect, and a whole from wholes; and because

it is filled with all appropriate goods from its generating father.

But a perfection and self-sufficiency of this kind is partible, and is

said to consist of many things coalescing in one, and is filled from

separate causes according to participation. The order of divine souls

also, is said to be self-sufficient, as being full of appropriate

virtues, and always preserving the measure of its own blessedness

without indigence. But here likewise the self-sufficiency is in want

of powers. For these souls have not their intellections directed

to the same intelligibles; but they energize according to time,

and obtain the complete perfection of their contemplation in whole

periods of time. The self-sufficiency therefore of divine souls, and

the whole perfection of their life is not at once present. Again,

the intellectual world is said to be self-sufficient, as having its

whole good established in eternity, comprehending at once its whole

blessedness, and being indigent of nothing, because all life and all

intelligence are present with it, and nothing is deficient, nor does it

desire any thing as absent. But this, indeed, is sufficient to itself

in its own order, yet it falls short of the self-sufficiency of the

Gods. For every intellect is boniform, yet is not goodness itself,

nor primarily good; but each of the Gods is a unity, hyparxis and

goodness. The peculiarity however of hyparxis changes the progression

of the goodness of each. For one divinity is a perfective goodness,

another is a goodness connective of the whole of things, and another

is a collective goodness. But each is simply a goodness sufficient

to itself. Or it may be said, that each is a goodness possessing

the self-sufficient and the all-perfect, neither according to

participation, nor illumination, but by being that very thing which it

is. For intellect is sufficient to itself by participation, and soul by

illumination, but this universe, according to a similitude to a divine

nature. The Gods themselves, however, are self-sufficient through

and by themselves, filling themselves, or rather subsisting as the

plenitudes of all good.

But with respect to the immutability of the Gods, of what kind shall we

say it is? Is it such as that of a [naturally] circulating body? For

neither is this adapted to receive any thing from inferior natures,

nor is it filled with the mutation arising from generation, and the

disorder which occurs in the sublunary regions. For the nature of the

celestial bodies is immaterial and immutable. But this indeed is great

and venerable, as in corporeal hypostases, yet it is inferior to the

nature of the Gods. For every body possesses both its being, and its

perpetual immutability from other precedaneous causes. But neither is

the impassive and the immutable in the Gods such as the immutability

of souls. For these communicate in a certain respect with bodies, and

are the media of an impartible essence, and of an essence divided

about bodies. Nor again is the immutability of intellectual essences

equivalent to that of the Gods. For intellect is immutable, impassive,

and unmingled with secondary natures, on account of its union with

the Gods. And so far indeed as it is uniform, it is a thing of this

kind; but so far as it is manifold, it has something which is more

excellent, and something which is subordinate, in itself. But the Gods

alone having established their unions according to this transcendency

of beings, are immutable dominations, are primary and impassive. For

there is nothing in them which is not one and hyparxis. But as fire

abolishes every thing which is foreign to it and of a contrary power,

as light expels all darkness, and as lightning proceeds through all

things without defilement, thus also the unities of the Gods unite

all multitude, and abolish every thing which tends to dispersion and

all-perfect division. But they deify every thing which participates

of them, receiving nothing from their participants, and do not[124]

diminish their own proper union by the participation.

Hence also the Gods being present every where, are similarly exempt

from all things, and containing all things are vanquished by no one of

the things they contain; but they are unmingled with all things and

undefiled. In the third place, this world indeed is said to subsist

with invariable sameness, so far as it is allotted an order in itself

which is always preserved indissoluble. At the same time however, since

it possesses a corporeal form, it is not destitute of mutation, as the

Elean guest observes. The psychical order likewise is said to obtain

an essence always established in sameness; and this is rightly said.

For it is entirely impassive according to essence; but it has energies

extended into time, and as Socrates says in the Phædrus, at different

times it understands different intelligibles, and in its progressions

about intellect comes into contact with different forms. Besides

these also, much-honored intellect is said both to subsist and to

understand with invariable and perpetual sameness, establishing at once

in eternity its essence, powers, and energies. Through the multitude

however of its intellections, and through the variety of intelligible

species and genera, there is not only an invariable sameness, but

also a difference of subsistence in intellect. For difference there

is consubsistent with sameness. And there is not only a wandering

of corporeal motions, and of the psychical periods, but likewise of

intellect itself, so far as it produces the intelligence of itself

into multitude; and evolves the intelligible. For soul indeed evolves

intellect, but intellect the intelligible, as Plotinus somewhere

rightly observes, when speaking of the intelligible subjections.

For such are the wanderings of intellect and which it is lawful for

it to make. If therefore we should say that a perpetual sameness of

subsistence is primarily in the Gods alone, and is especially inherent

in them, we shall not deviate from the truth, and we shall accord with

Plato, who says in the Politicus, that an eternally invariable sameness

of subsistence alone pertains to the most divine of all things. The

Gods, therefore, bind to themselves the causes of a sameness of

this kind, and guard with immutable sameness their proper hyparxis

established according to the unknown union of themselves. And such is

the immutability of the Gods, which is contained in self-sufficiency,

impassivity and sameness.

CHAPTER XIX.

In the next place, let us consider what power the simplicity of the

Gods possesses; for this Socrates adds in his discourse concerning a

divine nature, not admitting that which is various, and multiform, and

which appears different at different times, but referring to divinity

the uniform and the simple. Each of the divinities therefore, as he

says, remains simply in his own form. What then shall we conclude

respecting this simplicity? That it is not such as that which is

defined to be one in number. For a thing of this kind is composed of

many things, and abundantly mingled. But it appears to be simple so far

as it has distinctly a common form. Nor is it such as the simplicity

which is in many things according to an arranged species or genus. For

these are indeed more simple than the individuals in which they are

inherent, but are replete with variety, communicate with matter, and

receive the diversities of material natures. Nor is it such as the form

of nature. For nature is divided about bodies, verges to corporeal

masses, emits many powers about the composition subject to it, and

is indeed more simple than bodies, but has an essence mingled with

their variety. Nor is it such as the psychical simplicity. For soul

subsisting as a medium between an impartible essence, and an essence

which is divided about bodies, communicates with both the extremes. And

by that which is multiform indeed in its nature it is conjoined with

things subordinate, but its head is established on high, and according

to this it is especially divine, and allied to intellect.

Nor again is the simplicity of the Gods such as that of intellect.

For every intellect is impartible and uniform, but at the same time

it possesses multitude and progression; by which it is evident that

it has a habitude to secondary natures, to itself, and about itself.

It is also in itself, and is not only uniform, but also multiform,

and as it is said, is one many. It is therefore allotted an essence

subordinate to the first simplicity. But the Gods have their hyparxis

defined in one simplicity alone, being exempt indeed from all multitude

so far as they are gods, and transcending all division and interval,

or habitude to secondary natures, and all composition. And they indeed

are in inaccessible places, expanded above the whole of things, and

eternally ride on beings. But the illuminations proceeding from them to

secondary natures, being mingled in many places with their participants

which are composite and various, are filled with a peculiarity similar

to them. Let no one therefore wonder, if the Gods being essentialized

in one simplicity according to transcendency, various phantasms are

hurled forth before the presence of them; nor, if they being uniform

the appearances are multiform, as we have learnt in the most perfect

of the mysteries. For nature, and the demiurgic intellect extend

corporeal-formed images of things incorporeal, sensible images of

intelligible, and of things without interval, images endued with

interval. For Socrates also in the Phædrus indicating things of this

kind, and evincing that the mysteries into which souls without bodies

are initiated are most blessed, and truly perfect, says, that they

are initiated into entire, simple and immoveable visions, such souls

becoming situated there, and united with the Gods themselves, but not

meeting with the resemblances which are emitted from the Gods into

these sublunary realms. For these are more partial and composite, and

present themselves to the view attended with motion. But illuminated,

uniform, simple, and, as Socrates says, immoveable spectacles exhibit

themselves to the attendants of the Gods, and to souls that abandon

the abundant tumult of generation, and who ascend to divinity pure

and divested of the garments of mortality. And thus much is concluded

by us respecting the simplicity of the Gods. For it is necessary that

the nature which generates things multiform should be simple,[125] and

should precede what is generated, in the same manner as the uniform

precedes the multiplied. If, therefore, the Gods are the causes of

all composition, and produce from themselves the variety of beings,

it is certainly necessary that _the one_ of their nature which

is generative of the whole of things, should have its subsistence in

simplicity. For as incorporeal causes precede bodies, immoveable causes

things that are moved, and impartible causes all partible natures,

after the same manner uniform intellectual powers precede multiform

natures, unmingled powers, things that are mingled together, and simple

powers, things of a variegated nature.

CHAPTER XX.

In the next place, let us speak concerning the truth which is in

the Gods; for this in addition to what has been said is concluded

by Socrates, because a divine nature is without falsehood, and is

neither the cause of deception or ignorance to us, or to any other

beings. We must understand therefore, that divine truth is exempt

from the truth which consists in words, so far as this truth is

composite, and in a certain respect is mingled with its contrary, and

because its subsistence consists of things that are not true. For the

first parts do not admit of a truth of this kind, unless some one

being persuaded by what Socrates asserts in the Cratylus, should say

that these also are after another manner true. Divine truth also is

exempt from psychical truth, whether it is surveyed in opinions or

in sciences, so far as it is in a certain respect divisible, and is

not beings themselves, but is assimilated to and co-harmonized with

beings, and as being perfected in motion and mutation falls short of

the truth which is always firm, stable and of a principal nature.

Divine truth is likewise again exempt from intellectual truth, because

though this subsists according to essence, and is said to be and is,

beings themselves, through the power of sameness, yet again, through

difference, it is separated from the essence of them, and preserves

its peculiar hypostasis unconfused with respect to them. The truth

therefore of the Gods alone, is the undivided union and all-perfect

communion of them. And through this the ineffable knowledge of the

Gods, surpasses all knowledge, and all secondary forms of knowledge

participate of an appropriate perfection. But this knowledge alone of

the Gods contractedly comprehends these secondary forms of knowledge,

and all beings according to an ineffable union. And through this the

Gods know all things at once, wholes and parts, beings and non-beings,

things eternal and things temporal, not in the same manner as intellect

by the universal knows a part, and by being, non-being, but they know

every thing immediately, such things as are common, and such as are

particulars, though you should speak of the most absurd of all things,

though you should speak of the infinity of contingencies, or even of

matter itself.

If, however, you investigate the mode of the knowledge and truth of

the Gods, concerning all things that have a subsistence in any respect

whatever, it is ineffable and incomprehensible by the projecting

energies of the human intellect; but is alone known to the Gods

themselves. And I indeed admire those Platonists that attribute to

intellect the knowledge of all things, of individuals, of things

preternatural, and in short, of evils, and on this account establish

intellectual paradigms of these. But I much more admire those who

separate the intellectual peculiarity from divine union. For intellect

is the first fabrication and progeny of the Gods. These therefore

assign to intellect whole and first causes, and such as are according

to nature, and to the Gods a power which is capable of adorning and

generating all things. For _the one_ is every where, but whole

is not every where. And of _the one_ indeed matter participates

and every being; but of intellect and intellectual species and genera,

all things do not participate. All things therefore are alone from

the Gods, and real truth is with them who know all things unically.

For on this account also, in oracles the Gods similarly teach all

things, wholes and parts, things eternal, and such as are generated

through the whole of time. For being exempt from eternal beings,

and from those that exist in time, they contract in themselves the

knowledge of each and of all things, according to one united truth. If

therefore any falsehood occurs in the oracles of the Gods, we must not

say that a thing of this kind originates from the Gods, but from the

recipients, or the instruments, or the places, or the times. For all

these contribute to the participation of divine knowledge, and when

they are appropriately co-adapted to the Gods, they receive a pure

illumination of the truth which is established in them. But when they

are separated from the Gods through inaptitude, and become discordant

with them, then they obscure the truth which proceeds from them. What

kind of falsehood therefore can be said to be derived from the Gods,

who produce all the species of knowledge? What deception can there be

with those who establish in themselves the whole of truth? In the same

manner, as it appears to me, the Gods extend good to all things, but

always that which is willing and able receives the extended good, as

Socrates says in the Phædrus. And a divine nature indeed is causeless

of evil, but that which departs from it, and gravitates downward, is

elongated through itself; thus also, the Gods indeed are always the

suppliers of truth, but those natures are illuminated by them, who are

lawfully their participants. For the Elean wise man says, that the eye

of the soul in the multitude, is not strong enough to look to the truth.

The Athenian guest also celebrates this truth which subsists primarily

in the Gods; for he says that truth is the leader to the Gods of

every good, and likewise of every good to men. For as the truth which

is in souls conjoins them with intellect, and as intellectual truth

conducts all the intellectual orders to _the one_, thus also the

truth of the Gods unites the divine unities to the fountain of all

good, with which being conjoined, they are filled with all boniform

power. For every where the hyparxis of truth has a cause which is

collective of multitude into one; since in the Republic also, the light

proceeding from _the good_, and which conjoins intellect with the

intelligible, is denominated by Plato’s truth. This characteristic

property therefore, which unites and binds together the natures that

fill and the natures that are filled, according to all the orders of

the Gods, must be arranged as originating supernally and proceeding as

far as to the last of things.

CHAPTER XXI.

To us however discussing what pertains to every divine nature, what we

assert will be known from those commonly received truths adduced in

the Phædrus, and which we have before mentioned. Socrates therefore

says that every thing divine is beautiful, wise, and good,[126] and he

indicates that this triad pervades to all the progressions of the Gods.

What therefore is the goodness, what the wisdom, and what the beauty of

the Gods? With respect to the goodness of the Gods therefore, we have

before observed, that it preserves and gives subsistence to the whole

of things, that it every where exists as the summit, as that which

fills subordinate natures, and as pre-existing in every order analogous

to the first principle of the divine orders. For according to this all

the Gods are conjoined with the one cause of all things, and on account

of this primarily derive their subsistence as Gods. For in all beings

there is not any thing more perfect than the good, and the Gods. To

the most excellent of beings therefore, and which are in every respect

perfect, the best and most perfect of things is adapted.

CHAPTER XXII.

But in the Philebus, Plato delivers to us the three most principal

elements of _the good_, viz. the desirable, the sufficient, and

the perfect. For it is necessary that it should convert all things

to itself, and fill all things, and that it should be in no respect

deficient, and should not diminish its exuberance. Let no one therefore

conceive the desirable to be such as that which is frequently extended

in sensibles as the object of appetite. For such is apparent beauty.

Nor let him suppose it to be such as is indeed able to energize upon

and excite to itself the natures which are able to participate it,

but which at the same time may be apprehended by intelligence, and

is educed by us according to a projecting energy, and an adhesion of

the dianoetic power. For it is ineffable, and prior to all knowledge

extends to all beings. For all things desire _the good_, and

are converted to it. But if it be requisite summarily to unfold the

characteristic peculiarity of the desirable, as the supplier of

light proceeds by his rays into secondary natures, converts the eye

to himself, causes it to be solar-form, and to resemble himself,

and through a different similitude conjoins it with his own fulgid

splendour, thus also I think the desirable of the Gods allures and

draws upward all things to the Gods in an ineffable manner by its own

proper illuminations, being every where present to all things, and

not deserting any order whatever of beings. Since even matter itself

is said to be extended to this desirable, and through this desire is

filled with as many goods as it is able to participate. It is therefore

the centre of all beings, and all beings, and all the Gods have their

essences, powers and energies about this. And the extension and desire

of things towards this is inextinguishable. For all beings aspire after

this desirable which is unknown and incomprehensible. Not being able

therefore either to know or receive that which they desire, they dance

round it, and are parturient and as it were prophetic with respect

to it. But they have an unceasing and never-ending desire of its

unknown and ineffable nature, at the same time that they are unable to

embrace and embosom it. For being at once exempt from all things, it

is similarly present to and moves all things about itself, and is at

the same time by all of them incomprehensible. By this motion also and

this desire it preserves all things. But by its unknown transcendency

through which it surpasses the whole of things, it preserves its proper

union unmingled with secondary natures. Such therefore is the desirable.

But the sufficient is full of boniform power, proceeds to all things,

and extends to all beings the gifts of the Gods. For we conceive such a

sufficiency as this to be a power pervading and protending to the last

of things, extending the unenvying and exuberant will of the Gods, and

not abiding in itself, but unically comprehending the super-plenitude,

the never-failing, the infinite, and that which is generative of good

in the divine hyparxis. For the desirable being firmly established,

and surpassing the whole of things, and arranging all beings about

itself, the sufficient begins the progression and multiplication of all

good, calls forth that which is primary in the uniform hyparxis of the

desirable, by its own prolific[127] exuberance, and by the beneficent

replenishings which pervade to all things, and copiously produces and

imparts it to every being. It is owing to the sufficient therefore,

that the stability of divine natures, and that which proceeds from

its proper causes is full of goodness, and that, in short, all beings

are benefited, abiding in, proceeding from, and being united to their

principles, and essentially separated from them. Through this power

therefore, the intellectual genera give subsistence to natures similar

to themselves, souls desire to generate, and imitate the beings prior

to souls, natures deliver their productive principles into another

place, and all things possess, in short, the love of generation. For

the sufficiency of the goodness of the Gods, proceeding from this

goodness, is disseminated in all beings, and moves all things to the

unenvying communication of good; intellect indeed to the communication

of intellectual, but soul of psychical, and nature of natural good.

All things therefore abide through the desirable of goodness, and

generate and proceed into second and third generations through the

sufficient. But the third thing, the perfect, is convertive of the

whole of things, and circularly collects them to their causes;

and this is accomplished by divine, intellectual, psychical and

physical perfection. For all things participate of conversion,

since the infinity of progression is through this again recalled to

its principles; and the perfect is mingled from the desirable and

sufficient. For every thing of this kind is the object of desire, and

is generative of things similar to itself. Or in the works of nature

also, are not perfect things every where lovely and prolific through

the acme of their beauty? The desirable therefore establishes all

things, and comprehends them in itself. The sufficient excites them

into progressions and generations. And the perfect consummately leads

progressions to conversions and convolutions. But through these three

causes, the goodness of the Gods fixing the unical power and authority

of its proper hypostasis in this triad, is the primary and most

principal fountain and vestal seat of things which have any kind of

subsistence whatever.

CHAPTER XXIII.

After this, wisdom is allotted the second order, being the intelligence

of the Gods, or rather the hyparxis of their intelligence. For

intelligence indeed, is intellectual knowledge; but the wisdom of the

Gods is ineffable knowledge, which is united to the object of knowledge

and the intelligible union of the Gods. But it appears to me that Plato

especially surveyed this in the triad [of the beautiful, the wise and

the good,] as may be inferred from the conceptions scattered about it

in many places. I say then that Diotima in the Banquet is of opinion

that wisdom is full of that which is known, and that it neither seeks,

nor investigates, but possesses the intelligible. Hence, she says,

that no one of the Gods philosophizes, nor desires to become wise;

for a God is wise. Hence that which is philosophic is imperfect, and

indigent of truth; but that which is wise is full and unindigent, and

has every thing present which it wishes and desires nothing. But the

desirable and the appetible are proposed to the philosopher. Socrates,

however, in the Republic considers that which is generative of truth

and intellect, as affording an indication of wisdom, to our souls

indeed the ascent to divine plenitude being accomplished through

knowledge,[128] but to the Gods intellect being present from the

fulness of knowledge.[129] For the progression in them is not from

an imperfect habit to the perfect; but from a self-perfect hyparxis

a power prolific of inferior natures proceeds. But in the Theætetus

he indicates that the perfective of things imperfect, and that which

calls forth concealed intelligence in souls, pertain to wisdom. For he

says, it compels me to obstetrication, but prevents me from generating.

It is evident therefore, from these things, that the genus of wisdom

is triadic. Hence it is full of being and truth, is generative of

intellectual truth, and is perfective of intellectual natures that

are in energy, and itself possesses a stable power. We must admit

therefore, that these things pertain to the wisdom of the Gods. For

this wisdom is full indeed of divine goodness, generates divine truth,

and perfects all things posterior to itself.

CHAPTER XXIV.

In the next place let us consider the beautiful, what it is, and how

it primarily subsists in the Gods. It is said therefore to be boniform

beauty, and intelligible beauty, to be more ancient than intellectual

beauty, and to be beauty itself, and the cause of beauty to all beings;

and all such like epithets. And it is rightly said. But it is separate

not only from the beauty which is apparent in corporeal masses,

from the symmetry which is in these from psychical elegance, and

intellectual splendour, but also from the second and third progressions

in the Gods; and subsisting in the intelligible place of survey, it

proceeds from this to all the genera of the Gods, and illuminates

their superessential unities, and all the essences suspended from

these unities, as far as to the apparent vehicles of the Gods. As

therefore through the first goodness all the Gods are boniform, and

through intelligible wisdom they have a knowledge ineffable, and

established above intellect, thus also, I think, through the summit of

beauty, every thing divine is lovely. For from thence all the Gods

derive beauty, and being filled with it, fill the natures posterior to

themselves, exciting all things, agitating them with Bacchic fury about

the love of themselves, and pouring supernally on all things the divine

effluxion of beauty.

Such therefore, in short, is divine beauty, the supplier of divine

hilarity, familiarity and friendship. For through this the Gods are

united to and rejoice in each other, admire, and are delighted in

communicating with each other, and in their mutual replenishings,

and do not desert the order which they are always allotted in the

distributions of themselves. Plato also delivers three indications of

this beauty, in the Banquet indeed, denominating it the delicate; for

the perfect and that which is most blessed, accedes to the beautiful

through the participation of goodness. But he this speaks of it in that

dialogue: “That which is truly beautiful, is delicate, perfect and most

blessed.” One of the indications therefore of the beautiful, is a thing

of this kind, viz. the delicate. But we may assume another indication

of it from the Phædrus, viz. the splendid. For Plato attributing this

to the beautiful says: “It was then that we were permitted to see

splendid beauty shining upon us &c.” And afterwards he adds: “And

arriving hither we apprehended it shining most manifestly through the

clearest of the senses.” And at last he says: “But now beauty alone

has this allotment to be most splendid and most lovely.” These two

things therefore are to be assumed as indications of beauty. Another

indication of beauty is this, that it is the object of love, which now

also Plato appears to me to have called most lovely. And in many other

places he shows that the amatory fury is conversant with the beautiful,

defining, and in short, suspending love from the monad of beauty. “For

love, says he, is conversant with the beautiful.”

Because, therefore, beauty converts and moves all things to itself,

causes them to energize enthusiastically, and recalls them through

love, it is the object of love, being the leader of the whole amatory

series, walking on the extremities of its feet, and exciting all

things to itself through desire and astonishment. But again because it

extends to secondary natures plenitudes from itself, in conjunction

with hilarity and divine facility, alluring, enflaming, and elevating

all things, and pouring on them illuminations from on high, it is

delicate, and is said to be so by Plato. And because it bounds this

triad, and covers as with a veil the ineffable union of the Gods,

swims as it were on the light of forms, causes intelligible light

to shine forth, and announces the occult nature of goodness, it is

denominated splendid, lucid and manifest. For the goodness of the

Gods is supreme and most united; their wisdom is in a certain respect

now parturient with intelligible light, and the first forms; but

their beauty is established in the highest forms, is the luminous

precursor of divine light, and is the first thing that is apparent

to ascending souls, being more splendid and more lovely to the view

and to embrace than every luciferous essence, and when it appears is

received with astonishment. This triad therefore filling all things,

and proceeding through all things, it is certainly necessary that the

natures which are filled should be converted to and conjoined with

each of the three through kindred, and not through the same media.

For of different things that are filled by this triad there is a

different medium; and different powers are converted to a different

perfection of the Gods. I think therefore, it is manifest to every

one, and it is frequently asserted by Plato, that the cause which

congregates all secondary natures to divine beauty, which familiarizes

them to it and is the source of their being filled with it, and of

their derivation from thence, is nothing else than love, which always

conjoins according to the beautiful, secondary to the first[130] Gods,

and the more excellent genera, and the best of souls. But again, truth

is certainly the leader to, and establishes beings in, divine wisdom,

with which intellect being filled, possesses a knowledge of beings,

and souls participating of this energize intellectually. For the full

participation of true wisdom is effected through truth, since this

every where illuminates intellective natures, and conjoins them with

the objects of intellection, just as truth also is the first thing

that congregates intellect and the intelligible. To those however who

hasten to be conjoined with the good, knowledge and co-operation are no

longer requisite, but collocation, a firm establishment and quiet are

necessary.

CHAPTER XXV.

What therefore is it which unites us to the good? What is it which

causes in us a cessation of energy and motion? What is it which

establishes all divine natures in the first and ineffable unity

of goodness? And how does it come to pass that every thing being

established in that which is prior to itself according to the good

which is in itself, again establishes things posterior to itself

according to cause? It is, in short, the faith of the Gods, which

ineffably unites all the genera of the Gods, of dæmons, and of happy

souls to _the good_. For it is necessary to investigate _the

good_ neither gnostically, nor imperfectly, but giving ourselves

up to the divine light, and closing the eyes of the soul, after this

manner to become established in the unknown and occult unity of beings.

For such a kind of faith as this is more ancient than the gnostic

energy, not in us only, but with the Gods themselves, and according to

this all the Gods are united, and about one centre uniformly collect

the whole of their powers and progressions.

If however it be requisite to give a particular definition of this

faith, let no one suppose that it is such a kind of faith as that

which is conversant with the wandering about sensibles. For this

falls short of science, and much more of the truth of beings. But

the faith of the Gods surpasses all knowledge, and according to the

highest union conjoins secondary with first natures. Nor again, let

him conceive a faith of a similar species with the celebrated belief

in common conceptions; for we believe in common conceptions prior to

all reasoning. But the knowledge of these is divisible, and is by no

means equivalent to divine union; and the science of these is not only

posterior to faith, but also to intellectual simplicity. For intellect

is established beyond all science, both the first science, and that

which is posterior to it. Neither, therefore, must we say that the

energy according to intellect is similar to such a faith as this. For

intellectual energy is multiform, and is separated from the objects

of intellection through difference; and in short, it is intellectual

motion about the intelligible. But it is necessary that divine faith

should be uniform and quiet, being perfectly established in the port

of goodness. For neither is the beautiful, nor wisdom, nor any thing

else among beings, so credible and stable to all things, and so exempt

from all ambiguity, divisible apprehension and motion, as _the good_.

For through this intellect also embraces another union more ancient

than intellectual energy, and prior to energy. And soul considers the

variety of intellect and the splendour of forms as nothing with respect

to that transcendency of _the good_ by which it surpasses the whole of

things. And it dismisses indeed intellectual perception, running back

to its own hyparxis; but it always pursues, investigates, and aspires

after _the good_, hastens as it were to embosom it, and gives itself to

this alone among all things without hesitation. But why is it necessary

to speak of the soul? For these mortal animals, as Diotima somewhere

says, despise all other things, and even life itself and being, through

a desire of the nature of _the good_; and all things have this one

immoveable and ineffable tendency to _the good_; but they overlook,

consider as secondary, and despise the order of every thing else. This,

therefore, is the one secure port of all beings.

This also is especially the object of belief to all beings. And

through this the conjunction and union with it is denominated faith

by theologists, and not by them only, but by Plato likewise, (if I

may speak what appears to me to be the case) the alliance of this

faith with truth and love is proclaimed in the Laws. The multitude

therefore are ignorant, that he who has a conception of these things,

when discoursing about their contraries, infers the same thing with

respect to the deviations from this triad. Plato then clearly asserts

in the Laws that the lover of falsehood is not to be believed, and

that he who is not to be believed is void of friendship. Hence it is

necessary that the lover of truth should be worthy of belief, and that

he who is worthy of belief should be well adapted to friendship. From

these things therefore, we may survey divine truth, faith and love,

and comprehend by a reasoning process their stable communion with each

other. If, however, you are willing, prior to these things we will

recall to our memory that Plato denominates that virtue fidelity which

conciliates those that disagree, and subverts the greatest of wars, I

mean seditions in cities. For from these things faith appears to be the

cause of union, communion and quiet. And if there is such a power as

this in us, it is by a much greater priority in the Gods themselves.

For as Plato speaks of a certain divine temperance, justice and

science, how is it possible that faith which connectedly comprehends

the whole order of the virtues should not subsist with the Gods? In

short, there are these three things which replenish divine natures,

and which are the sources of plenitude to all the superior genera of

beings, viz. goodness, wisdom and beauty. And again, there are three

things which collect together the natures that are filled, being

secondary indeed to the former, but pervading to all the divine orders,

and these are faith, truth and love. But all things are saved through

these, and are conjoined to their primary causes; some things indeed,

through the amatory mania, others through divine philosophy, and

others through theurgic power, which is more excellent than all human

wisdom, and which comprehends prophetic good, the purifying powers of

perfective good, and in short, all such things as are the effects of

divine possession. Concerning these things therefore, we may perhaps

again speak more opportunely.

CHAPTER XXVI.

Again, let us, if you are willing, from other dialogues investigate

the common dogmas of Plato about divine natures. Whence therefore, and

what dogmas shall we assume, while we proceed in our search according

to nature? Are you willing that we should in the next place recall to

our memory what is written in the Phædo? Socrates therefore says in

the demonstrations of the immortality of the soul which are derived

from its similitude to divinity, that the essence which is superior

to the soul, (and to which the soul is naturally similar, and being

similar participates of an immortal allotment) is divine and immortal,

intelligible and uniform, indissoluble and possesses an invariable

sameness of subsistence; but that the essence which is inferior to

the soul, is entirely the contrary, to which also it pertains to be

corrupted and to be passive. For a thing of this kind is sensible

and multiform, and is dissoluble because it is a composite; and he

predicates among these all such things as pertain to a corporeal

subsistence. Let us therefore direct our attention to these common

dogmas, and examine after what manner each of them pertains to the Gods.

In the first place then what is that which we look to when we speak of

that which is said to be divine? From what has been said therefore,

it is evident that every God subsists according to the highest union

of beings. For to us ascending from bodies, the Gods have appeared to

be superessential unities, the generators, perfectors and measurers

of essences, and who bind all first essences to themselves. But that

which is divine, is not only hyparxis and _the one_ in each order

of being, but at the same time is that which participates and that

which is participated; of which the latter is a God, but the former is

divine. Whether however, prior to the participated unities, there is

something which is separate and participated will be evident in what

follows. But at present we shall define that which is divine to be a

thing of this kind, viz. being which participates of _the one_,

or _the one_ subsisting contractedly together with being. For we

assume all things in the Gods except _the one_, as suspended from

them and secondary, viz. essence, life and intellect. For the Gods do

not subsist in, but prior to these, and they produce and contain these

in themselves, but are not defined in them. But it is necessary not

to be ignorant that these are in reality thus distinguished from each

other. In many places, however, Plato magnificently celebrates the

participants of the Gods by the same names, and denominates them Gods.

For not only the Athenian guest in the Laws calls a divine soul a God,

but also Socrates in the Phædrus. For he says “that all the horses

and charioteers of the Gods are good and consist of things good;” and

afterwards still more clearly, “and this is the life of the Gods.”

But this is not yet wonderful. For is it not admirable that he should

denominate those beings Gods who are always conjoined with the Gods,

and who together with them give completion to one series? For in many

places he calls dæmons Gods, though they are essentially posterior

to, and subsist about the Gods. For in the Phædrus and Timæus, and in

other dialogues, you will find him extending the appellation of the

Gods even as far as to dæmons. But what is still more paradoxical than

these things, he does not refuse to call certain men Gods; for in the

Sophista he thus denominates the Elean guest.

From all that has been said therefore, this must be assumed, that

with respect to a God, one thing is simply a God, another according

to union, another according to participation, another according to

contact, and another according to similitude. For of superessential

natures indeed, each is primarily a God; of intellectual natures,

each is a God according to union; and of divine souls, each is a God

according to participation. But divine dæmons are Gods according

to contact with the Gods; and the souls of men are allotted this

appellation through similitude. Each of these however is, as we

have said, rather divine than a God. Since the Athenian guest calls

intellect itself divine; but that which is divine is posterior to the

first deity, in the same manner as that which is united is posterior

to _the one_, that which is intellectual, to intellect, and that

which is animated, to soul. And always those natures that are more

uniform and simple have the precedency; but the series of beings ends

in _the one itself_. Let this, therefore, be the definition and

distinction of that which is divine.

In the next place, let us survey the immortal. For with Plato there

are many orders of immortality, pervading from on high as far as to

the last of things; and the last echo, as it were, of immortality, is

in those visible natures that are perpetual; which the Elean guest,

in his discourse about the circulation of the universe, says, are

allotted from the father a renovated immortality. For every body is

allotted a being and a life dependent on another cause; but is not

itself naturally adapted to connect, or adorn, or preserve itself.

The immortality of partial souls is, I think, more manifest and

more perfect than this; which Plato evinces by many demonstrations

in the Phædo, and in the 10th book of the Republic. But I mean by

the immortality of partial souls, that which has a more principal

subsistence, as containing in itself the cause of eternal permanency.

We shall not, however, err if prior to both these we establish the

immortality of dæmons. For the genera of these through which they

subsist are incorruptible, and they neither verge to mortality, nor are

filled with the nature of things which are generated and corrupted. But

I infer that the immortality of divine souls is still more venerable

and essentially more transcendent than that of dæmons; which divine

souls we say are primarily self-motive, and are the fountains and

principles of the life divided about bodies, and through which bodies

obtain a renovated immortality. If, however, prior to these you

conceive the Gods themselves, and the immortality in them, and how in

the Banquet Diotima does not attribute an immortality of this kind

even to dæmons, but defines it to subsist in the Gods alone, such an

immortality as this will appear to you to be separate, and exempt from

the whole of things. For there eternity subsists, which is the fountain

of all immortality, and through it all things live and possess life,

some things indeed a perpetual life, but others a life dispersed into

non-being. In short, therefore, that which is divine is immortal so far

as it generates and comprehends in itself a perpetual life. For it is

immortal, not as participating of life, but as the supplier of a divine

life, and as deifying life itself, whether you are willing to call such

a life intelligible, or by any other name.

In the next place let us direct our attention to the intelligible. It

is denominated, therefore, in opposition to that which is sensible

and which is apprehended by opinion in conjunction with sense. For

the intelligible is first unfolded into light in the most principal

causes. For soul is indeed intelligible, is of this allotment, is

exempt from sensibles, and obtains an essence separated from them.

Prior to soul also intellect is intelligible, for we rather think it

fit to arrange soul in the middle, than to connumerate it with the

first essences. That likewise is denominated intelligible, which is

more ancient than intellect, which replenishes intelligence, and is

itself by itself perfective of it, and which Timæus arranges prior

to the demiurgic intellect and intellectual energy, in the order of

a paradigm. But beyond these is the divine intelligible, which is

defined according to union itself, and a divine hyparxis. For this is

intelligible as the object of desire to intellect, as perfecting and

comprehending intellect, and as the plenitude of being. In one way,

therefore, we must denominate the intelligible as the hyparxis of the

Gods; in another way as true being and the first essence; in another

way as intellect and all intellectual life; and in another way as soul

and the psychical order. It is likewise necessary not to fashion the

different natures of things conformably to names. Such, therefore, is

the order of this triad; so that what is divine indeed is unmingled

and ranks as the first; that which is immortal is the second; and that

which is intelligible the third. For the first of these is deified

being; the second is life subsisting according to the immortality of

the Gods; and the third is intellect, which is denominated intelligible

in consequence of being replete with union.

CHAPTER XXVII.

After this, it follows in the next place, that we should consider the

uniform, the indissoluble, and that which has an invariable sameness

of subsistence, from the same causes, and these as the precursors of,

and pervading through all the divine orders. For the uniform, indeed,

has the highest subsistence, is present with the divine monad, and

appears to be especially adapted to that which is primarily being,[131]

and in which also every participable genus of unities ends. For _the

one_ is prior to these, as will be evident as we proceed. But the

indissoluble is the second. For it comprehends and binds the extremes

according to divine union; since the dissoluble is such as it is

through the want of connexion and of a power which collects multitude

into one. And that which has an invariable sameness of subsistence is

eternal, and is full of the perpetuity of the Gods; from which also

the participation of immortality and eternal sameness is derived to

other things. The uniform, therefore, pertains to the same thing as the

divine; but the indissoluble to the same thing as the immortal; and

that which has an invariable sameness of subsistence we must refer to

the intelligible.

And do you not see how these are severally after a manner co-adapted

to each other? For the first of these, through the first unity which

is participated by being is, as it is fit it should be, uniform.

For if a God subsists according to _the one_, that which is divine

will doubtless be uniform. But that which through one cause of life

is immortal, is also similarly indissoluble. For life is the bond

of dissoluble natures; which also Timæus indicating to us, opposes

the dissoluble to the immortal: “for you are not immortal, says the

demiurgus, yet you shall never be dissolved, nor be subject[132] to

the fatality of death.” Every thing mortal, therefore, is dissoluble;

but the immortal is indissoluble. That, however, which has a renovated

immortality is for the same reason neither indissoluble, nor mortal.

For being in the middle of both it is neither of the extremes,

according to each opposition. But the third of these being established

according to the plenitude of whole intelligibles subsists at once

and is invariably the same. For the intelligible is the cause of

sameness and of eternal permanency; and intellect through this is

entirely eternal. These triads, therefore, proceed from the first and

most principal causes, in the same manner as we demonstrated of the

before-mentioned triads. But these things, indeed, we shall consider

hereafter.

These things, therefore, being discussed, let us direct our attention

to the unbegotten in divine natures, and unfold what we assert it

to be. For we say that all [true] being is without generation, and

Socrates demonstrates in the Phædrus, that souls are unbegotten. Prior

to these, also, the Gods themselves are established above generations

and a subsistence according to time. How, therefore, shall we define

the unbegotten when applied to a divine nature, and according to

what reason? Is it because divinity is exempt from all generation,

not only from that which subsists in the parts of time, such as we

assert the generation of material natures to be, nor from that only

which is extended into the whole of time, such as Timæus demonstrates

the generation of the celestial bodies to be, but also from the

psychical generation? Since Timæus denominates this to be unbegotten

according to time, but to be the best of generated natures. And in

short, a divine nature is exempt from all division and essential

separation. For the progression of the Gods is always according to a

union of secondary natures, which are uniformly established in the

natures prior to them, the things producing containing in themselves

the things produced. The indivisible, therefore, the unseparated and

the united are in reality unbegotten. So that if certain generations

of the Gods are spoken of by Plato in fabulous figments, as in the

fable of Diotima, the generation of Venus is celebrated, and of Love

at the birth of Venus, it is necessary not to be ignorant after what

manner things of this kind are asserted, and that they are composed

for the sake of symbolical indication; and that fables for the sake of

concealment call the ineffable unfolding into light through causes,

_generation_. For in the Orphic writings, indeed, the first cause

is on this account denominated Time; since again, for another reason,

it is thus denominated, in order that a subsistence according to cause

may be the same as a subsistence according to time. And the progression

of the Gods from the best of causes is properly denominated generation

according to time. To Plato, therefore, mythologizing, it is adapted

to devise things of this kind conformably to theologists; but when he

is discoursing dialectically, and investigating and unfolding divine

natures intellectually and not mystically, it is then adapted to him to

celebrate the unbegotten essence of the Gods. For the Gods primarily

establish in themselves the paradigm of non-generation. But an

intellectual nature is in a secondary degree unbegotten, and after this

the psychical essence. And in bodies there is an ultimate resemblance

of unbegotten power; which some posterior to Plato perceiving, have

indefinitely shown that the whole heaven is unbegotten. The Gods,

therefore, are unbegotten. But there is an order in them of first,

middle, and last progressions, and a transcendency and subjection of

powers. There are also in them uniform comprehensions of causes; but

multiform progenies of things caused. And all things, indeed, are

consubsistent in each other; but the mode of subsistence is various.

For some things as replenishing subsist prior to secondary natures;

but others, as being filled aspire after more perfect natures, and

participating of their power become generative of things posterior to

themselves, and perfective of their hyparxis.

CHAPTER XXVIII.

Looking to these things, therefore, we may unfold what is said of

paternal causes, and of the prolific powers of mothers in fables. For

every where, we may suppose that the cause of a more excellent and

more uniform nature is paternal;[133] but we may say that the cause

of a more subordinate and partial nature preexists in the order of a

mother. For with the Gods a father is analogous to the monad, and the

cause of bound; but a mother, to the duad, and to the infinite power

which is generative of beings. The paternal cause, however, is with

Plato uniform, and is established in a more elevated order than the

natures which proceed from it, and subsists prior to its progeny in

the allotment of the desirable. Again, the maternal cause has the form

of the duad; and at one time presents itself to the view in fables as

more excellent than its progeny, but at another time as essentially

subordinate to it; as in the Banquet, Plato calls Poverty the mother

of Love. And this is not only the case in fabulous figments, but also

in the philosophic theory of beings, as is evident in the Timæus. For

there Plato calls being the father, but matter the mother and nurse of

generation. The powers, therefore, which are prolific and perfective of

secondary natures, and the suppliers of life and causes of separation

are mothers, being established above the natures produced by them. But

the powers which receive the natures that proceed into light, which

multiply their energies, and extend even the subordinate allotment of

the progeny, are also themselves called mothers. Again, however, the

progeny of such like causes, at one time indeed, proceed according

to union from their proper principles, and are filled from both the

paternal and maternal cause; but at another time they contain the bond

of them, being arranged in the middle, conveying the gifts of the

fathers to the maternal bosoms, and converting the receptacles of them

to the completions of primary causes. But of the natures which subsist

from twofold preexisting principles, some are assimilated to the

paternal cause; and such like genera of Gods are productive, defensive,

and comprehensive. For to produce, to contain, and to defend, pertain

to the cause of bound. But others are assimilated to the maternal

cause, and are prolific, and vivific, and the suppliers of motion, of

the multiplication of powers, of variety and progressions. For all

these are the progeny of infinity and the first multitude.

CHAPTER XXIX.

Thus much therefore may suffice concerning the unbegotten hyparxis

of the Gods. It now remains, I think, to speak of divine names. For

Socrates in the Cratylus thinks fit to unfold in a remarkable degree

the rectitude of names in divine natures. And Parmenides indeed, in

the first hypothesis, as he denies of _the one_ every thing else

that is known, and all knowledge, so likewise he denies of it name and

language. But in the second hypothesis, besides all other things he

shows that this one may be spoken of and[134] that it has a name. In

short therefore, it must be admitted that the first, most principal and

truly divine names are established in the Gods themselves. But it must

be said that the second names, which are the imitations of the first,

and which subsist intellectually, are of a dæmoniacal allotment.

And again, we may say that those names which are the third from the

truth, which are logically devised, and which receive the ultimate

resemblance of divine natures, are unfolded by scientific men, at one

time energizing divinely, and at another intellectually, and generating

moving images of their inward spectacles. For as the demiurgic

intellect establishes resemblances about matter of the first forms

contained in himself, and produces temporal images of things eternal,

divisible images of things indivisible, and adumbrated images as it

were of true beings,--after the same manner I think the science that is

with us representing intellectual production, fabricates resemblances

of other things, and also of the Gods themselves, representing that

which is void of composition in them, through composition; that

which is simple, through variety; and that which is united, through

multitude; and thus fashioning names, ultimately exhibits images of

divine natures. For it generates every name as if it were a statue of

the Gods. And as the theurgic art through certain symbols calls forth

the exuberant and unenvying goodness of the Gods into the illumination

of artificial statues, thus also the intellectual science of divine

concerns, by the compositions and divisions of sounds, unfolds the

occult essence of the Gods. Very properly therefore, does Socrates

in the Philebus say, that on account of his reverence of the Gods,

he is agitated with the greatest fear respecting their names. For it

is necessary to venerate even the ultimate echos of the Gods, and

venerating these to become established in the first paradigms of

them. And thus much concerning divine names, which at present may be

sufficient for the purpose of understanding the theology of Plato. For

we shall accurately discuss them when we speak of partial powers.

BOOK II.

CHAPTER I.

The most proper beginning however of the theory proposed by us is that

from which we may be able to discover the first cause[135] of all

beings. For being impelled from this in a becoming manner, and having

our conceptions purified respecting it, we shall with greater facility

be able to distinguish other things. About these things therefore we

must speak from the beginning as follows: It is necessary that all

beings, and all the natures of beings should either be many only, there

being no one in them, neither in each, nor in all of them; or that they

should be one only, there being no multitude, but all things being

compelled into one and the same power of existence; or it is necessary

that they should be both one and many, and that being should be one in

order that neither multitude itself by itself may vanquish beings, nor

that we may be forced to bring together into the same thing all things

and their contraries at once. These things therefore being three, which

of them shall we chuse? And to which of the above mentioned assertions

shall we give our suffrage. It is necessary therefore severally to

discuss the absurdities which attend these positions, and thus to

survey after what manner the truth subsists.

If then beings are many, and in such a manner many, as we have

mentioned from the beginning, so that _the one_ is not any where to

be found, many absurdities will happen to be the result, or rather

all the nature of beings will at once from the first be destroyed, as

there will immediately be nothing which is capable of participating

_the one_. For it must be admitted that every being is either one

certain thing, or nothing. And that indeed which is a certain being, is

also one; but that which is not even one being, has not any existence

whatever. Hence, if many things have a subsistence, each of the many

is something or a certain one. But if each of them is nothing, or not

even one thing, neither is it possible for the many to exist; for the

many are many so far as each individual of the multitude exists. If,

therefore, the many alone have a subsistence, and _the one_ in no

respect is, neither will the many exist. For things which are in no

respect one have not any existence whatever. But if _the one_ is not,

by a much greater priority neither have the many an existence. For it

necessarily follows that none of the things from which the many consist

will have a subsistence.

Farther still, if the many alone have a subsistence (as has been said)

all things will be infinitely infinite; and if you receive any one

of the infinites whatever, this also will be immediately infinite.

And with respect to the things from which this consists and which are

infinite, each of these likewise will be infinite. For let something

of the many be assumed, which we say is not one, this therefore will

be multitude according to its own nature, since it belongs to beings,

but is not nothing. If however it is multitude, this also will consist

of many things, and will be many. And if you assume something of these

manys, this will immediately appear to you not to be one, but many.

There will likewise be immediately the same reasoning in these, and

in a similar manner each, (because we falsely speak of each) will

be multitude in energy. And each, as I may say, will be infinite,

or rather will be infinitely infinite. For there is nothing which

will not be something of this kind; since a part is many, and in a

similar manner the part of a part; and this to infinity. For multitude

proceeding will never stop, nor infinity, in consequence of being

deprived of the nature of _the one_. To make beings however, to be

infinitely infinite, is impossible both with respect to truth, and to

the thing proposed by us. For if being is infinitely infinite, being

can neither be known, nor discovered; since the infinite is entirely

incomprehensible and unknown. If also being is infinitely infinite,

there will be something more infinite than the infinite. But if that

something is more infinite, this will be less infinite. That, however,

which is less infinite; since it is not perfectly infinite, will

evidently be finite, so far as it falls short of the nature of the

infinite. If, therefore, there is something which is itself according

to multitude more infinite than that which is infinite in multitude

there will be something more than the infinite, and the infinite will

be less, yet not according to multitude. This however is impossible.

Hence there is not the infinitely infinite.

Again therefore, according to this hypothesis, the same things will be

according to the same, similar and dissimilar. For if all the manys

are not one, and each thing according to all things is not one, that

which is not one will evidently suffer the same passion in consequence

of the privation of _the one_. All things therefore being deprived of

_the one_, after the same manner, they will on this account subsist

similarly with respect to each other. But things which subsist

similarly, so far as they thus subsist, are evidently similar to each

other. Hence the many will be similar to each other, so far as they are

deprived of _the one_. They will likewise according to this privation

of _the one_ be perfectly dissimilar. For it is necessary that things

which are similar should suffer the same passion; so that things which

do not suffer any thing that is the same, will not be similar. But

things which suffer any thing that is the same, suffer also one thing.

Hence things which are deprived of every one, will not suffer any thing

that is the same. The many therefore will be similar and dissimilar

according to the same. But this is impossible. Hence it is impossible

for the many to exist which are in no respect one.

Moreover, the many will be the same with and different from each other

according to the same. For if all things are similarly deprived of _the

one_, so far indeed as all of them are similarly deprived they will be

the same according to this privation; since things which subsist after

the same manner according to habit are the same, and also things which

are after the same manner deprived according to privation. But so far

in short, as each of them is deprived of every one, so far the many

will be different from each other. For if _the one_ in the many is the

same, that which is in no respect one, will in no respect be the same.

The many therefore will be the same and not the same with each other.

But if they are the same and not the same it is evident that they are

different from each other. For that which is the same and not the same,

so far as it is not the same, is not the same, by nothing else than the

different. Farther still therefore, these many will be moveable and

immoveable, if _the one_ is not. For if each of them is not one, they

will be immoveable according to the privation of _the one_. For if that

which is not one should be changed, each of them would have _the one_;

since privations being changed, entirely lead into habits the things

that are changed. It is necessary however that what is not one should

remain immoveable according to the privation of _the one_, though

this very thing is itself impossible, viz. that the many should stand

still. For every thing which stands still is in something which is the

same, viz. it is either in the same form, or in the same place. But

every thing which is in the same, is in one thing which is the same.

For the same in which it is, is one thing. Every thing therefore which

stands still is in one thing. The many, however, do not participate

of _the one_. But it is perfectly impossible that things which do not

participate of _the one_, should be in one certain thing. And things

which are not in one thing cannot stand still, since things which

stand still are entirely in one and the same thing. It is impossible

therefore, that the many should stand still, and remain immoveable. It

has been demonstrated however, that the many must necessarily stand

immoveable. The same things therefore, and the same passion, (I mean

the privation of the habit of _the one_,) are moveable and immoveable.

For things immoveable, and things which stand still, so far as they are

unstable, so far they must necessarily appear to be moveable.

Moreover, there is no number of beings if _the one_ in no respect

is; but all things and each thing will be not one. For the particle

of number, the monad, is one, and every number itself is one. For if

there are five monads, there is also the pentad; and if three monads,

the triad. But the triad itself is a certain unity, and so is the

pentad. So that if there is no one, there will neither be any part, nor

the whole of numbers. For how can there be any number _the one_ not

existing? For _the one_ is the principle of numbers. But the principle

not existing, neither is it possible that the things which proceed from

this principle should exist. Hence _the one_ not existing, neither will

there be any number.

Again, therefore, neither will there be any knowledge of beings if

_the one_ is not. For it will not be possible either to speak or think

of any being. For each thing itself, and every thing of which we can

speak, and in which we impress the nature of _the one_, will have

no existence, because neither does _the one_ exist. Hence neither

will there be any discourse nor any knowledge. For discourse is one

thing consisting of many things, if it is perfect. And knowledge then

exists, when that which knows becomes one with that which is known.

But union not existing, there will at the same time be no knowledge

of things, and it will be impossible to speak about things which

we know. To which we may add, that the inexplicable in the several

infinites, will necessarily always fly from the bound of knowledge. For

immediately each apparent infinite which he who possesses knowledge

desires to understand, will escape the gnostic power hastening to come

into contact with, and adhere to it, since it is incapable either of

contact or adhesion. If, therefore, the many alone have an existence,

_the one_ having no subsistence whatever, so many absurdities, and a

still greater number must necessarily happen to those who adopt such an

hypothesis.

But if _the one_ which is _the one itself_ alone has a subsistence, and

there is nothing else (for if there were there would not only be one

but many things; since one and another thing are more than one, and are

not one thing only) if this be the case, there will neither be among

all things either whole, or that which has parts. For every thing which

has parts is many, and every whole has parts. But _the one_ is in no

respect many. Neither therefore will there be a whole, nor that which

has parts. Farther still, neither is it possible that there should

be a beginning, or end of any thing. For that which has a beginning,

a middle, and an end, is divisible. But _the one_ is not divisible,

because neither has it any parts. Hence, neither has it a beginning,

nor a middle, nor an end. Again, if _the one_ alone has a subsistence,

no being will have figure. For every thing which has figure is either

rectilinear or circular, or mixt from these. But if indeed it is

rectilinear, it will have for its parts, the middle, and the extremes.

If it is circular, there will be one thing in it as a middle, but other

things as extremes, to which the middle extends. And if it is mixed

from the right and circular line, it will consist of many things, and

will not be one.

Moreover, neither will any being be in itself, nor in another thing.

For that which is in another thing is different from that in which it

is. But _the one_ alone existing and nothing else (for it will by no

means be in another thing) there will be no being which is in another

thing. But that which is in itself will at the same time comprehend

and be comprehended; and in this, to comprehend will not be the same

thing as to be comprehended; nor will there be the same[136] definition

of both. There will therefore be two things, and no longer _the one_

alone. Again, neither will any being be moved. For being moved indeed,

it must necessarily be changed. But being changed it must be in

another thing. If _the one_ however alone has an existence, it is not

possible for any thing to appear to be in something else. Hence it is

not possible for any being to be changed. But every thing which stands

still is necessarily in the same thing. And that which is in the same

is in a certain same thing. The one however is in no same thing. For

that which is in a certain thing, is either in itself, or in something

else. But it has been demonstrated, that it is neither in itself,

nor in another. Hence neither is it in a certain same thing. Neither

therefore does any being stand still.

Moreover, it is impossible for any thing to be the same with, or

different from any thing. For if there is nothing besides _the one

itself_, there is not any thing which will be either the same with, or

different from another thing. For there will not be any other being.

And _the one itself_ will not be different from itself; for it would be

many and not one. Nor will it be the same with itself. For this thing

which is same is in another, and same is not _the one itself_. For _the

one_ is simply one, because it is not many. But that which is same is

the same with another thing. Again, neither is it possible for any

thing to be similar or dissimilar to any thing. For every thing similar

suffers a certain same passion; but every thing dissimilar a certain

different passion. _The one_, however, cannot suffer any thing, nor can

this be the case with any thing else besides _the one_; since nothing

else has any existence whatever, if _the one_ alone has a subsistence.