CHAPTER LI.

What Plato says in the Timæus about the name of the World,--with

the elucidations of Proclus.

_An explanation of certain terms which are unusual, or have

a meaning different from their common acceptation, and which

there was a necessity of introducing in the translation of this

work._

COMPOSITE, συνθετος. I have used the word composite instead of

_compounded_, because the latter rather denotes the mingling than the

contiguous union of one thing with another, which the former, through

its derivation from the Latin word _compositus_, solely denotes.

DEMIURGUS OF WHOLES, δημιουργος των ολων. The artificer of the universe

is thus denominated, because he produces the universe so far as it

is a _whole_, and likewise all the wholes it contains, by his own

immediate energy; other subordinate powers co-operating with him in the

production of parts. Hence he produces the universe _totally_ and _at

once_.

DESIRE, επιθυμια. Is an irrational appetite solely directed to external

objects, and to the gratification arising from the possession of them.

DIANOIA, διανοια, from whence _dianoetic_, is the discursive energy

of reason; (διεξοδικη του λογου ενεργεια) or according to its most

accurate signification, it is that power of the soul which reasons

scientifically, deriving the principles of its reasoning from

intellect, or the power which sees truth intuitively.

DOXASTIC, formed from δοξα, _opinion_, is the last of the gnostic

powers of the rational soul; and knows _that_ a thing is, but is

ignorant of the cause of it, or _why_ it is. The knowledge of the

διοτι, or _why_ a thing is, being the province of dianoia.

GUEST, ξενος. This word, in its more ample signification in the Greek,

denotes a _stranger_, but properly implies one who receives another,

or is himself received at an entertainment. In the dialogues of Plato

therefore, (and consequently in this work of Proclus when he cites

the dialogues in which this word occurs) wherever one of the speakers

is introduced as a ξενος, I have translated this word _guest_, as

being more conformable to the genius of Plato’s dialogues, which may

be justly called rich mental banquets, and consequently the speakers

in them may be considered as so many guests. Hence in the Timæus, the

persons of that dialogue are expressly spoken of as guests from having

been feasted with discourse.

HYPARXIS, υπαρξις. The first principle, or foundation as it were, of

the essence of a thing. Hence, also, it is the summit of essence.

IMPARTICIPABLE, αμεθεκτος. One thing is said to be imparticipable

with respect to another, to which it is superior, when it is not

consubsistent with it.

INTELLECTUAL PROJECTION. The immediate energy of intellect is thus

denominated, because it is an intuitive perception, or an immediate

darting forth, as it were, to its proper object, the intelligible.

MONAD, μονας, in divine natures is that which contains _distinct_, but

at the same time _profoundly-united_ multitude, and which produces a

multitude exquisitely allied to itself. But in the sensible universe,

the first monad is the world itself, which comprehends in itself

all the multitude of which it is the cause (in conjunction with the

cause of all). The second monad is the inerratic sphere. In the third

place, the spheres of the planets succeed, each of which is also a

monad, comprehending an appropriate multitude. And in the fourth and

last place are the spheres of the elements, which are in a similar

manner monads. All these monads likewise are denominated ολοτητες,

_wholenesses_, and have a perpetual subsistence.

PERMANENCY, στασις. The proper word for rest, in Greek, is ηρεμια.

And Simplicius justly observes, that not every στασις is ηρεμια, but

that only which is after motion. This word is employed by Plato in the

Sophista, to express one of the five genera of being, viz. _essence_,

_permanency_, (στασις), _motion_, _sameness_, and _difference_; in

which place it evidently does not signify rest.

PHANTASY, or _Imagination_, φαντασια, is, μορφωτικη νοησις, i.e. _a

figured intelligence_, because all the perceptions of this power are

_inward_, and not external, like those of sense, and are accompanied

with _figure_.

PSYCHICAL, ψυχικος, i.e. _pertaining to soul_, in the same manner as

φυσικος, _physical_, is _something pertaining to nature_.

REASON, λογος. This word in Platonic writers signifies either that

inward discursive energy called reasoning; or a certain productive and

seminal principle; or that which is indicative and definitive of a

thing. Hence λογοι or _reasons_ in the soul, are, gnostically producing

principles.

UNICAL, ενιαιος, that which is characterized by unity.

UNIFORM, ενοειδης. This word when it occurs in Proclus, and other

Platonic writers, signifies that which has the form of _the one_, and

not as in Johnson, that which keeps its tenour, or is similar to

itself.

PROCLUS,

THE PLATONIC SUCCESSOR,

ON

The Theology of Plato.

BOOK I.

CHAPTER I.

O Pericles, to me the dearest of friends, I am of opinion that the

whole philosophy of Plato was at first unfolded into light through

the beneficent will of superior natures, exhibiting the intellect

concealed in them, and the truth subsisting together with beings, to

souls conversant with generation (so far as it is lawful for them to

participate of such supernatural and mighty good); and again, that

afterwards having received its perfection, returning as it were into

itself, and becoming unapparent to many who professed to philosophize,

and who earnestly desired to engage in the investigation of true being,

it again advanced into light. But I particularly think that the mystic

doctrine respecting divine concerns, which is purely established on

a sacred foundation, and which perpetually subsists with the gods

themselves, became thence apparent to such as are capable of enjoying

it for a time, through one man,[82] whom I should not err in calling

the primary leader and hierophant of those true mysteries, into which

souls separated from terrestrial places are initiated, and of those

entire and stable visions, which those participate who genuinely

embrace a happy and blessed life. But this philosophy shone forth at

first from him so venerably and arcanely, as if established in sacred

temples, and within their adyta, and being unknown to many who have

entered into these holy places, in certain orderly periods of time,

proceeded as much as was possible for it into light, through certain

true priests, and who embraced a life corresponding to the tradition of

such mystic concerns. It appears likewise to me, that the whole place

became splendid, and that illuminations of divine spectacles every

where presented themselves to the view.

These interpreters of the _epopteia_ (or mystic speculations) of Plato,

who have unfolded to us all-sacred narrations of divine concerns,

and who were allotted a nature similar to their leader, I should

determine to be the Egyptian Plotinus, and those who received the

theory from him, I mean Amelius and Porphyry, together with those in

the third place who were produced like virile statues from these, viz.:

Jamblichus and Theodorus, and any others, who after these, following

this divine choir, have energized about the doctrines of Plato with a

divinely-inspired mind. From these, he[83] who, after the gods, has

been our leader to every thing beautiful and good, receiving in an

undefiled manner the most genuine and pure light of truth in the bosom

of his soul, made us a partaker of all the rest of Plato’s philosophy,

communicated to us that arcane information which he had received from

those more ancient than himself, and caused us, in conjunction with

him, to be divinely agitated about the mystic truth of divine concerns.

To this man, therefore, should we undertake to return thanks adequate

to the benefits which we have received from him; the whole of time

would not be sufficient. But if it is necessary, not only[84] that we

should have received from others the transcendant good of the Platonic

philosophy, but that we should leave to posterity monuments of those

blessed spectacles of which we have been spectators, and emulators

to the utmost of our ability, under a leader the most perfect of the

present time, and who arrived at the summit of philosophy; perhaps we

shall act properly in invoking the gods, that they will enkindle the

light of truth in our soul, and in supplicating the attendants and

ministers of better natures to direct our intellect and lead it to the

all-perfect, divine, and elevated, end of the Platonic theory. For

I think that every where he who participates in the least degree of

intelligence, will begin his undertakings from the Gods, and especially

in explications respecting the Gods: for we can no otherwise be able to

understand a divine nature than by being perfected through the light of

the Gods; nor divulge it to others unless governed by them, and exempt

from multiform opinions, and the variety which subsists in words,

preserving at the same time the interpretation of divine names. Knowing

therefore this, and complying with the exhortation of the Platonic

Timæus, we in the first place establish the Gods as leaders of the

doctrine respecting themselves. But may they in consequence of hearing

our prayers be propitious to us, and benignantly approaching, guide the

intellect of our soul, and lead it about the Vesta of Plato, and to

the arduous sublimities of this speculation; where, when arrived, we

shall receive all the truth concerning them, and shall obtain the best

end of our parturient conceptions of divine concerns, desiring to know

something respecting them, inquiring about them of others, and, at the

same time, as far as we are able, exploring them ourselves.

CHAPTER II.

And thus much by way of preface. But it is necessary that I should

unfold the mode of the proposed doctrine, what it is requisite to

expect it will be, and define the preparatives which a hearer of it

ought to possess; that being properly adapted, he may approach, not

to our discourses, but to the intellectually-elevated and deific

philosophy of Plato. For it is proper that convenient aptitudes of

auditors should be proposed according to the forms of discourses, just

as in the mysteries, those who are skilful in concerns of this kind,

previously prepare receptacles for the Gods, and neither always use the

same inanimate particulars, nor other animals, nor men, in order to

procure the presence of the divinities; but that alone out of each of

these which is naturally capable of participating divine illumination,

is by them introduced to the proposed mystic rites.

The present discourse, therefore, will first of all be divided by

me into three parts. In the beginning, considering all those common

conceptions concerning the Gods, which Plato summarily delivers,

together with the power and dignity every where of theological axioms;

but in the middle of this work, speculating the total orders of the

Gods, enumerating their peculiarities, defining their progressions

after the manner of Plato, and referring every thing to the hypotheses

of theologists; and, in the end, speaking concerning the Gods which are

in different places celebrated in the Platonic writings, whether they

are supermundane or mundane, and referring the theory respecting them

to the total genera of the divine orders.

In every part of this work, likewise, we shall prefer the clear,

distinct, and simple, to the contraries of these. And such things as

are delivered through symbols, we shall transfer to a clear doctrine

concerning them; but such as are delivered through images, we shall

transmit to their exemplars. Such things too as are written in a more

affirmative way, we shall examine by causal reasonings; but such as

are composed through demonstrations, we shall investigate; and besides

this, explain the mode of truth which they contain, and render it

known to the hearers. And of things enigmatically proposed, we shall

elsewhere discover perspicuity, not from foreign hypotheses, but from

the most genuine writings of Plato. But with respect to the things

which immediately occur to the hearers, of these we shall contemplate

the consent with things themselves. And from all these particulars,

one perfect form of the Platonic theology will present itself to our

view, together with its truth which pervades through the whole of

divine intellections, and the one intellect which generated all the

beauty of this theology, and the mystic evolution of this theory. Such,

therefore, as I have said, will be my present treatise.

But the auditor of the proposed dogmas is supposed to be adorned with

the moral virtues, and to be one who has bound by the reason of virtue

all the illiberal and inharmonious motions of the soul, and harmonized

them to the one form of intellectual prudence: for, as Socrates says,

it is not lawful for the pure to be touched by the impure. But every

vicious man is perfectly impure; and the contrary character is pure. He

must likewise have been exercised in all the logical methods, and have

contemplated many irreprehensible conceptions about analyses, and many

about divisions, the contraries to these, agreeably, as it appears to

me, to the exhortation of Parmenides to Socrates. For prior to such a

contest in arguments, the knowledge of the divine genera, and of the

truth established in them, is difficult and impervious. But in the

third place, he must not be unskilled in physics. For he who has been

conversant with the multiform opinions of physiologists, and has after

a manner explored in images the causes of beings, will more easily

advance to the nature of separate and primary essences. An auditor

therefore of the present work, as I have said, must not be ignorant of

the truth contained in the phenomena, nor unacquainted with the paths

of erudition, and the disciplines which they contain; for through these

we obtain a more immaterial knowledge of a divine essence. But all

these must be bound together in the leader intellect. Being likewise

a partaker of the dialectic of Plato, meditating those immaterial

energies which are separate from corporeal powers, and desiring to

contemplate by intelligence[85] in conjunction with reason [true]

beings, our auditor must genuinely apply himself to the interpretation

of divine and blessed dogmas, and fill his soul, according to the

Oracle, with profound love; since, as Plato somewhere observes, for the

apprehension of this theory, a better assistant than love cannot be

obtained.

He must likewise be exercised in the truth which pervades through all

things, and must excite his intelligible eye to real and perfect truth.

He must establish himself in a firm, immovable, and safe kind of

divine knowledge, and must be persuaded not to admire any thing else,

nor even to direct his attention to other things, but must hasten to

divine light with an intrepid reasoning energy, and with the power of

an unwearied life; and in short, must propose to himself such a kind

of energy and rest as it becomes him to possess who intends to be such

a coryphæus as Socrates describes in the Theætetus. Such then is the

magnitude of our hypothesis, and such the mode of the discourses about

it. Before, however, I enter on the narration of the things proposed,

I wish to speak about theology itself, its different modes, and what

theological forms Plato approves, and what he rejects; that these

being previously known, we may more easily learn in what follows, the

auxiliaries of the demonstrations themselves.

CHAPTER III.

All, therefore, that have ever touched upon theology, have called

things first, according to nature, Gods; and have said that the

theological science is conversant about these. And some, indeed, have

considered a corporeal essence, as that alone which has any existence,

and have placed in a secondary rank with respect to essence, all the

genera of incorporeal natures, considering the principles of things as

having a corporeal form, and evincing that the habit in us by which we

know these, is corporeal. But others, suspending indeed all bodies from

incorporeal natures, and defining the first hyparxis[86] to be in soul,

and the powers of soul, call (as it appears to me) the best of souls,

Gods; and denominate the science which proceeds as far as to these, and

which knows these, theology. But such as produce the multitude of souls

from another more ancient principle, and establish intellect as the

leader of wholes, these assert that the best end is a union of the soul

with intellect, and consider the intellectual form of life as the most

honourable of all things. They doubtless too consider theology, and

the discussion of intellectual essence, as one and the same. All these,

therefore, as I have said, call the first and most self-sufficient

principles of things, Gods, and the science respecting these, theology.

The divine narration however, of Plato alone, despises all corporeal

natures, with reference to principles. Because, indeed, every thing

divisible and endued with interval, is naturally unable either to

produce or preserve itself, but possesses its being, energy, and

passivity through soul, and the motions which soul contains. But Plato

demonstrates that the psychical essence [i.e. the essence pertaining

to soul] is more ancient than bodies, but is suspended from an

intellectual hypostasis. For every thing which is moved according to

time, though it may be self-moved, is indeed of a more ruling nature

than things moved by others, but is posterior to an eternal motion.

He shows, therefore, as we have said, that intellect is the father

and cause of bodies and souls, and that all things both subsist

and energize about it, which are allotted a life conversant with

transitions and evolutions.

Plato, however, proceeds to another principle entirely exempt from

intellect, more incorporeal and ineffable, and from which all things,

even though you should speak of such as are last, have necessarily a

subsistence. For all things are not naturally disposed to participate

of soul, but such things only as are allotted in themselves a more

clear or obscure life. Nor are all things able to enjoy intellect

and being, but such only as subsist according to form. But it is

necessary that the principle of all things should be participated by

all things, if it does not desert any thing, since it is the cause

of all things which in any respect are said to have a subsistence.

Plato having divinely discovered this first principle of wholes, which

is more excellent than intellect, and is concealed in inaccessible

recesses; and having exhibited these three causes and monads, and

evinced them to be above bodies, I mean soul, the first intellect,

and a union above intellect, produces from these as monads, their

proper numbers; one multitude indeed being uniform,[87] but the second

intellectual, and the third psychical. For every monad is the leader

of a multitude coordinate to itself. But as Plato connects bodies

with souls, so likewise he connects souls with intellectual forms, and

these again with the unities of beings. But he converts all things

to one imparticipable unity. And having run back as far as to this

unity, he considers himself as having obtained the highest end of the

theory of wholes; and that this is the truth respecting the Gods,

which is conversant with the unities of beings, and which delivers

their progressions and peculiarities, the contact of beings with them,

and the orders of forms which are suspended from these unical[88]

hypostases.

But he teaches us that the theory respecting intellect, and the

forms and the genera revolving about intellect, is posterior to the

science which is conversant with the Gods themselves. Likewise that

the intellectual theory apprehends intelligibles, and the forms

which are capable of being known by the soul through the projecting

energy of intellect; but that the theological science transcending

this, is conversant with arcane and ineffable hyparxes, and pursues

their separation from each other, and their unfolding into light from

one cause of all: whence, I am of opinion, that the intellectual

peculiarity of the soul is capable of apprehending intellectual forms,

and the difference which subsists in them, but that the summit, and,

as they say, flower of intellect and hyparxis, is conjoined with the

unities of beings, and through these, with the occult union of all

the divine unities. For as we contain many gnostic powers, through

this alone we are naturally capable of being conjoined with and

participating this occult union. For the genus of the Gods cannot be

apprehended by sense, because it is exempt from all bodies; nor by

opinion and dianoia,[89] for these are divisible and come into contact

with multiform concerns; nor by intelligence in conjunction with

reason, for knowledge of this kind belongs to true beings; but the

hyparxis of the Gods rides on beings, and is defined according to the

union itself of wholes. It remains, therefore, if it be admitted that a

divine nature can be in any respect known, that it must be apprehended

by the hyparxis of the soul, and through this, as far as it is

possible, be known. For we say that every where things similar can be

known by the similar; viz. the sensible by sense, the doxastic[90] by

opinion, the dianoetic by dianoia, and the intelligible by intellect.

So that the most unical nature must be known by _the one_, and the

ineffable by that which is ineffable.

Indeed, Socrates in the [First] Alcibiades rightly observes, that the

soul entering into herself will behold all other things, and deity

itself. For verging to her own union, and to the centre of all life,

laying aside multitude, and the variety of the all manifold powers

which she contains, she ascends to the highest watch-tower of beings.

And as in the most holy of the mysteries, they say, that the mystics at

first meet with the multiform, and many-shaped[91] genera, which are

hurled forth before the Gods, but on entering the interior parts of

the temple, unmoved, and guarded by the mystic rites, they genuinely

receive in their bosom divine illumination, and divested of their

garments, as they would say, participate of a divine nature;--the same

mode, as it appears to me, takes place in the speculation of wholes.

For the soul when looking at things posterior to herself, beholds the

shadows and images of beings, but when she converts herself to herself

she evolves her own essence, and the reasons which she contains. And

at first indeed, she only as it were beholds herself; but, when she

penetrates more profoundly into the knowledge of herself, she finds

in herself both intellect, and the orders of beings. When however,

she proceeds into her interior recesses, and into the adytum as it

were of the soul, she perceives with her eye closed, the genus of the

Gods, and the unities of beings. For all things are in us psychically,

and through this we are naturally capable of knowing all things, by

exciting the powers and the images of wholes which we contain.

And this is the best employment of our energy, to be extended to

a divine nature itself, having our powers at rest, to revolve

harmoniously round it, to excite all the multitude of the soul to this

union, and laying aside all such things as are posterior to _the

one_, to become seated and conjoined with that which is ineffable,

and beyond all things. For it is lawful for the soul to ascend, till

she terminates her flight in the principle of things; but arriving

thither, beholding the place which is there, descending thence, and

directing her course through beings; likewise, evolving the multitude

of forms, exploring their monads and their numbers, and apprehending

intellectually how each is suspended from its proper unity, then we

may consider her as possessing the most perfect science of divine

natures, perceiving in a uniform manner the progressions of the Gods

into beings, and the distinctions of beings about the Gods. Such then

according to Plato’s decision is our theologist; and theology is a

habit of this kind, which unfolds the hyparxis itself of the Gods,

separates and speculates their unknown and unical light from the

peculiarity of their participants, and announces it to such as are

worthy of this energy, which is both blessed and comprehends all things

at once.

CHAPTER IV.

After this all-perfect comprehension of the first theory, we must

deliver the modes according to which Plato teaches us mystic

conceptions of divine natures. For he appears not to have pursued every

where the same mode of doctrine about these; but sometimes according

to a deific energy, and at other times dialectically, he evolves the

truth concerning them. And sometimes he symbolically announces their

ineffable peculiarities, but at other times he recurs to them from

images, and discovers in them the primary causes of wholes. For in

the Phædrus being inspired by the Nymphs, and having exchanged human

intelligence for a better possession, fury, he unfolds with a divine

mouth many arcane dogmas concerning the intellectual Gods, and many

concerning the liberated rulers of the universe, who lead upwards the

multitude of mundane Gods to the monads which are intelligible and

separate from [mundane] wholes. But relating still more about those

Gods who are allotted the world, he celebrates their intellections, and

mundane fabrications, their unpolluted providence and government of

souls, and whatever else Socrates delivers entheastically [or according

to a divinely-inspired energy] in that dialogue, as he clearly

asserts, ascribing at the same time this fury to the deities of the

place.

But in the Sophista, dialectically contending about being, and the

separate hypostasis of _the one_ from beings, and doubting against

those more ancient than himself, he shows how all beings are suspended

from their cause, and the first being, but that being itself

participates of the unity which is exempt from the whole of things,

that it is a passive one, but not _the one_ itself, being subject to

and united to _the one_, but not being that which is primarily one.

In a similar manner too, in the Parmenides, he unfolds dialectically

the progressions of being from _the one_, and the transcendency of

_the one_, through the first hypotheses, and this, as he asserts in

that dialogue, according to the most perfect division of this method.

And again, in the Gorgias, he relates the fable concerning the three

demiurgi [or fabricators] and their demiurgic allotment, which indeed

is not only a fable, but a true narration. But in the Banquet, he

speaks concerning the union of Love. And in the Protagoras, about the

distribution of mortal animals from the Gods; in a symbolical manner

concealing the truth respecting divine natures, and as far as to mere

indication unfolding his mind to the most genuine of his hearers.

If likewise, you are willing that I should mention the doctrine

delivered through the mathematical disciplines, and the discussion of

divine concerns from ethical or physical discourses, of which many

may be contemplated in the Timæus, many in the dialogue called the

Politicus, and many may be seen scattered in other dialogues; here

likewise to you who are desirous of knowing divine concerns through

images, the method will be apparent. For all these shadow forth the

powers of things divine. The Politicus, for instance, the fabrication

in the heavens. But the figures of the five elements delivered in

geometrical proportions in the Timæus,[92] represent in images the

peculiarities of the Gods who ride on the parts of the universe. And

the divisions of the psychical essence in that dialogue shadow forth

the total orders of the Gods.

I omit to mention that Plato composes polities, assimilating them to

divine natures, and to the whole world, and adorns them from the powers

which it contains. All these therefore, through the similitude of

mortal to divine concerns, exhibit to us in images, the progressions,

orders, and fabrications of divine natures. And such are the modes of

theologic doctrine employed by Plato.

It is evident however, from what has been already said, that they are

necessarily so many in number. For those who treat of divine concerns

in an indicative manner, either speak symbolically and fabulously, or

through images. But of those who openly announce their conceptions,

some frame their discourses according to science, but others according

to inspiration from the Gods. And he who desires to signify divine

concerns through symbols is Orphic, and in short, accords with those

who write fables concerning the Gods. But he who does this through

images is Pythagoric. For the mathematical disciplines were invented

by the Pythagoreans, in order to a reminiscence of divine concerns,

at which, through these as images they endeavour to arrive. For they

refer both numbers and figures to the Gods, according to the testimony

of their historians. But the entheastic character, or he who is under

the influence of divine inspiration, unfolding the truth itself by

itself concerning the Gods, most perspicuously ranks among the highest

initiators. For these do not think proper to unfold the divine orders,

or their peculiarities to their familiars, through certain veils, but

announce their powers and their numbers, in consequence of being moved

by the Gods themselves. But the tradition of divine concerns according

to science, is the illustrious prerogative of the philosophy of Plato.

For Plato alone, as it appears to me, of all those who are known to us,

has attempted methodically to divide and reduce into order, the regular

progression of the divine genera, their mutual difference, the common

peculiarities of the total orders, and the distributed peculiarities in

each. But the truth of this will be evident when we frame precedaneous

demonstrations about the Parmenides, and all the divisions which it

contains.

At present we shall observe that Plato does not admit all the fabulous

figments of dramatic composition, but those only which have reference

to the beautiful and the good, and which are not discordant with a

divine essence. For that mythological mode which indicates divine

concerns through conjecture is ancient, concealing truth under a

multitude of veils, and proceeding in a manner similar to nature, which

extends sensible figments of intelligibles, material, of immaterial,

partible, of impartible natures, and images, and things which have

a false being, of things perfectly true. But Plato rejects the more

tragical mode of mythologizing of the ancient poets, who thought proper

to establish an arcane theology respecting the Gods, and on this

account devised wanderings, sections, battles, lacerations, rapes and

adulteries of the Gods, and many other such symbols of the truth about

divine natures, which this theology conceals; this mode he rejects,

and asserts that it is in every respect most foreign from erudition.

But he considers those mythological discourses about the Gods, as more

persuasive, and more adapted to truth and the philosophic habit, which

assert that a divine nature is the cause of all good, but of no evil,

and that it is void of all mutation, ever preserving its own order

immutable, and comprehending in itself the fountain of truth, but

never becoming the cause of any deception to others. For such types of

theology, Socrates delivers in the Republic.

All the fables therefore of Plato, guarding the truth in concealment,

have not even their externally apparent apparatus discordant with our

undisciplined and unperverted anticipation respecting the Gods. But

they bring with them an image of the mundane composition, in which

both the apparent beauty is worthy of divinity, and a beauty more

divine than this, is established in the unapparent lives and powers of

the Gods. This therefore, is one of the mythological modes respecting

divine concerns, which from the apparently unlawful, irrational, and

inordinate, passes into order and bound, and regards as its scope the

composition of the beautiful and good.

But there is another mode which he delivers in the Phædrus. And this

consists in every where preserving theological fables, unmixed with

physical narrations, and being careful in no respect to confound or

exchange theology, and the physical theory with each other. For, as a

divine essence is separate from the whole of nature, in like manner,

it is perfectly proper that discourses respecting the Gods should be

pure from physical disquisitions. For a mixture of this kind is, says

he, laborious: and to make physical passions the end of mythological

conjecture, is the employment of no very good man; such for instance,

as considering through his [pretended] wisdom, Chimæra, Gorgon, and

things of a similar kind, as the same with physical figments. Socrates,

in the Phædrus, reprobating this mode of mythologizing, represents

its patrons as saying under the figure of a fable, that Orithya

sporting with the wind Boreas, and being thrown down the rocks, means

nothing more, than that Orithya who was a mortal, was ravished by

Boreas through love. For it appears to me, that fabulous narrations

about the gods, should always have their concealed meaning more

venerable than the apparent. So that if certain persons introduce to

us physical hypotheses of Platonic fables, and such as are conversant

with sublunary affairs, we must say that they entirely wander from the

intention of the philosopher, and that those hypotheses alone, are

interpreters of the truth contained in these fables, which have for

their scope, a divine, immaterial, and separate hypostasis, and which

looking to this, make the compositions and analyses of the fables,

adapted[93] to our inherent anticipations of divine concerns.

CHAPTER V.

As we have therefore enumerated all these modes of the Platonic

theology, and have shown what compositions and analyses of fables are

adapted to the truth respecting the Gods, let us consider, in the next

place, whence, and from what dialogues principally, we think the dogmas

of Plato concerning the Gods may be collected, and by a speculation of

what types or forms we may be able to distinguish his genuine writings,

from those spurious compositions which are ascribed to him.

The truth then concerning the Gods pervades, as I may say, through all

the Platonic dialogues, and in all of them conceptions of the first

philosophy, venerable, clear, and supernatural, are disseminated,

in some indeed, more obscurely, but in others more conspicuously;

conceptions which excite those that are in any respect able to

participate of them, to the immaterial and separate essence of the

Gods. And, as in each part of the universe, and in nature herself, the

demiurgus of all that the world contains, established resemblances of

the unknown hyparxis of the Gods, that all things might be converted

to a divine nature, through their alliance with it, in like manner I

am of opinion, that the divine intellect of Plato weaves conceptions

about the Gods in all his writings, and leaves nothing deprived of the

mention of divinity, that from the whole of them, a reminiscence of

wholes may be obtained, and imparted to the genuine lovers of divine

concerns.

If however, it be requisite to lay before the reader those dialogues

out of many, which principally unfold to us the mystic discipline

about the gods, I should not err in ranking among this number, the

Phædo and Phædrus, the Banquet, and the Philebus, and together with

these, the Sophista and Politicus, the Cratylus and the Timæus. For

all these are full through the whole of themselves, as I may say, of

the divine science of Plato. But I should place in the second rank

after these, the fable in the Gorgias, and that in the Protagoras;

likewise the assertions about the providence of the Gods in the Laws,

and such things as are delivered about the Fates, or the mother of the

Fates, or the circulations of the universe, in the tenth book of the

Republic. Again, you may, if you please, place in the third rank those

Epistles, through which we may be able to arrive at the science about

divine natures. For in these, mention is made of the three kings; and

very many other divine dogmas worthy the Platonic theory are delivered.

It is necessary therefore, looking to these, to explore in these each

order of the Gods.

Thus from the Philebus, we may receive the science respecting the

one good, and the two first principles of things, together with the

triad[94] which is unfolded into light from these. For you will find

all these distinctly delivered to us by Plato in that dialogue. But

from the Timæus, you may obtain the theory about intelligibles, a

divine narration about the demiurgic monad: and the most full truth

about the mundane Gods. But from the Phædrus, [you may acquire a

scientific knowledge of] all the intelligible and intellectual genera,

and of the liberated orders of Gods, which are proximately established

above the celestial circulations. From the Politicus, you may obtain

the theory of the fabrication in the heavens, of the uneven periods

of the universe, and of the intellectual causes of those periods. But

from the Sophista, the whole sublunary generation, and the peculiarity

of the Gods who are allotted the sublunary region, and preside over

its generations and corruptions. But with respect to each of the Gods,

we may obtain many conceptions adapted to sacred concerns from the

Banquet, many from the Cratylus, and many from the Phædo. For in each

of these dialogues, more or less mention is made of divine names, from

which it is easy for those who are exercised in divine concerns to

discover by a reasoning process the peculiarities of each.

It is necessary however, to evince that each of the dogmas accords with

Platonic principles, and the mystic traditions of theologists. For all

the Grecian theology is the progeny of the mystic tradition of Orpheus;

Pythagoras first of all learning from Aglaophemus the orgies of the

Gods, but Plato in the second place receiving an all-perfect science

of the divinities from the Pythagoric and Orphic writings. For in the

Philebus referring the theory about the two species of principles

[bound and infinity] to the Pythagoreans, he calls them men dwelling

with the Gods, and truly blessed. Philolaus therefore, the Pythagorean,

has left us in writing many admirable conceptions about these

principles, celebrating their common progression into beings, and their

separate fabrication of things. But in the Timæus, Plato endeavouring

to teach us about the sublunary Gods, and their order, flies to

theologists, calls them the sons of the Gods, and makes them the

fathers of the truth about those divinities. And lastly, he delivers

the orders of the sublunary Gods proceeding from wholes, according to

the progression delivered by them of the intellectual kings. Again,

in the Cratylus he follows the traditions of theologists, respecting

the order of the divine processions. But in the Gorgias, he adopts the

Homeric dogma, respecting the triadic hypostasis of the demiurgi. And

in short, he every where discourses concerning the Gods agreeably to

the principles of theologists; rejecting indeed, the tragical part of

mythological fiction, but establishing first hypotheses in common with

the authors of fables.

CHAPTER VI.

Perhaps, however, some one may here object to us, that we do not in

a proper manner exhibit the every where dispersed theology of Plato,

and that we endeavour to heap together different particulars from

different dialogues, as if we were studious of collecting together many

things into one mixture, instead of deriving them all from one and the

same fountain. For if this were the case, we might refer different

dogmas to different treatises of Plato, but we shall by no means have

a precedaneous doctrine concerning the Gods, nor will there be any

dialogue which presents us with an all-perfect and entire procession

of the divine genera, and their coordination with each other. But we

shall be similar to those who endeavour to obtain a whole from parts,

through the want of a whole prior to parts, and to weave together the

perfect from things imperfect; when, on the contrary, the imperfect

ought to have the first cause of its generation in the perfect. For

the Timæus, for instance, will teach us the theory of the intelligible

genera; and the Phædrus appears to present us with a methodical account

of the first intellectual orders. But where will be the coordination

of intellectuals to intelligibles? And what will be the generation of

second from first natures? In short, after what manner the progression

of the divine orders takes place from the one principle of all things,

and how in the generations of the Gods, the orders between _the

one_, and all-perfect number, are filled up, we shall be unable to

evince.

Farther still, it may be said, where will be the venerableness of your

boasted science about divine natures? For it is absurd to call these

dogmas which are collected from many places Platonic; and which, as

you acknowledge, are introduced from foreign names to the philosophy

of Plato; nor are you able to evince one whole entire truth about

divine natures. Perhaps, indeed, they will say, certain persons,

junior to Plato, have delivered in their writings, and left to their

disciples, one perfect form of theology. You, therefore, are able

to produce one entire theory about nature from the Timæus; but from

the Republic, or Laws, the most beautiful dogmas about manners, and

which tend to one form of philosophy. Alone, therefore, neglecting the

treatise of Plato, which contains all the good of the first philosophy,

and which may be called the summit of the whole theory, you will be

deprived of the most perfect knowledge of beings, unless you are so

much infatuated, as to boast on account of fabulous fictions, though

an analysis of things of this kind abounds with much of the probable,

but not of the demonstrative. Besides, things of this kind are only

delivered adventitiously in the Platonic dialogues; as the fable in

the Protagoras, which is inserted for the sake of the politic science,

and the demonstrations respecting it. In like manner, the fable in the

Republic is inserted for the sake of justice; but in the Gorgias, for

the sake of temperance. For Plato combines fabulous narrations with

investigations of ethical dogmas, not for the sake of the fables, but

for the sake of the leading design, that we may not only exercise the

intellectual part of the soul, through contending reasons, but that

the divine part of the soul may more perfectly receive the knowledge

of beings, through its sympathy with more mystic concerns. For, from

other discourses, we appear similar to those who are compelled to the

reception of truth; but from fables we suffer in an ineffable manner,

and call forth our unperverted conceptions, venerating the mystic

information which they contain.

Hence, as it appears to me, Timæus with great propriety thinks it fit

that we should produce the divine genera, following the inventors of

fables as the sons of the Gods,[95] and subscribe to their always

generating secondary natures from such as are first, though they

should speak without demonstration. For this kind of discourse is

not demonstrative, but entheastic, and was invented by the ancients,

not through necessity, but for the sake of persuasion, not regarding

mere discipline, but sympathy with things themselves. But if you are

willing to speculate not only the causes of fables, but of other

theological dogmas, you will find that some of them are scattered in

the Platonic dialogues for the sake of ethical,[96] and others for the

sake of physical considerations. For in the Philebus, Plato discourses

concerning bound and the infinite, for the sake of pleasure and a life

according to intellect. For I think the latter are species of the

former. In the Timæus, the discourse about the intelligible Gods, is

assumed for the sake of the proposed physiology. On which account it

is every where necessary that images should be known from paradigms;

but that the paradigms of material things should be immaterial, of

sensibles, intelligible, and that the paradigms of physical forms

should be separate.

But again in the Phædrus, Plato celebrates the supercelestial place,

the subcelestial profundity, and every genus under this, for the sake

of amatory mania: the manner in which the reminiscence of souls takes

place, and the passage to these from hence. But every where, as I

may say, the leading end is either physical or political, while the

conceptions about divine natures take place, either for the sake of

invention or perfection. How, therefore, can such a theory as yours be

any longer venerable and supernatural, and worthy to be studied beyond

every thing, when it is neither able to evince the whole in itself, nor

the perfect, nor that which is precedaneous in the writings of Plato,

but is destitute of all these, is violent and not spontaneous, and does

not possess a genuine, but an adventitious order, as in a drama? And

such are the objections which may be urged against our design.

CHAPTER VII.

I, however, to an objection of this kind, shall make, a just and

perspicuous reply. I say then, that Plato every where discourses about

the Gods agreeably to ancient rumour, and to the nature of things. And

sometimes indeed, for the sake of the cause of the things proposed,

he reduces them to the principles of the dogmas; and thence, as from

a watch tower, contemplates the nature of the thing proposed. But

sometimes he establishes the theological science as the leading end.

For in the Phædrus his subject respects intelligible beauty, and the

participation of beauty pervading from thence through all things; and

in the Banquet it respects the amatory order.

But if it be necessary to survey in one Platonic dialogue, the

all-perfect, whole, and connected, extending as far as to the compleat

number of theology, I shall perhaps assert a paradox, and which

will alone be apparent to our familiars. We ought however to dare,

since we have entered on such like arguments, and affirm against our

opponents, that the Parmenides, and the mystic conceptions it contains,

will accomplish all you desire. For in this dialogue all the divine

genera proceed in order from the first cause, and evince their mutual

connexion and dependence on each other. And those which are highest

indeed, connate with _the one_, and of a primary nature, are

allotted a unical, occult and simple form of hyparxis; but such as

are last, are multiplied, are distributed into many parts, and are

exuberant in number, but inferior in power to such as are of a higher

order; and such as are middle, according to a convenient proportion,

are more composite than their causes, but more simple than their

proper progeny. And in short, all the axioms of the theologic science,

appear in perfection in this dialogue, and all the divine orders are

exhibited subsisting in connexion. So that this is nothing else than

the celebrated generation of the Gods, and the procession of every

kind of being from the ineffable and unknown cause of wholes. The

Parmenides, therefore, enkindles in the lovers of Plato, the whole and

perfect light of the theological science. But after this, the before

mentioned dialogues distribute parts of the mystic discipline about the

Gods, and all of them, as I may say, participate of divine wisdom, and

excite our spontaneous conceptions respecting a divine nature. And it

is necessary to refer all the parts of this mystic discipline to these

dialogues, and these again to the one and all-perfect theory of the

Parmenides. For thus, as it appears to me, we shall suspend the more

imperfect from the perfect, and parts from wholes, and shall exhibit

reasons assimilated to things, of which, according to the Platonic

Timæus, they are interpreters. Such then is our answer to the objection

which may be urged against us; and thus we refer the Platonic theory to

the Parmenides; just as the Timæus is acknowledged by all who are in

the least degree intelligent, to contain the whole science about nature.

CHAPTER VIII.

I appear, however, by these means, to have excited for myself a twofold

contest against those who attempt to investigate the writings of Plato;

and I see two sorts of persons, who will oppose what has been said.

One of these does not think proper to explore any other design in the

Parmenides, than exercise through opposite arguments, or to introduce

in this dialogue a croud of arcane and intellectual dogmas, which are

foreign from its intention. But the other sort, who are more venerable

than these, and lovers of forms assert, that one of the hypotheses is

about the first God, another about the second God, and the whole of an

intellectual nature, and a third, about the natures posterior to this,

whether they are the more excellent genera, or souls, or any other kind

of beings. For the investigation of these particulars does not pertain

to the present discourse.

These, therefore, distribute three of the hypotheses after this

manner. But they do not think proper to busy themselves about the

multitude of Gods, the intelligible, and the intellectual genera, the

supermundane and mundane natures, or to unfold all these by division,

or busily explore them. For according to them, though Plato in the

second hypothesis, treats about intellectual beings, yet the nature of

intellect is one, simple and indivisible. Against both these therefore,

must he contend, who entertains that opinion of the Parmenides, which

we have before mentioned. The contest however against these is not

equal. But those who make the Parmenides a logical exercise, are again

attacked by those who embrace the divine mode of interpretation. And

those who do not unfold the multitude of beings, and the orders of

divine natures, are indeed, as Homer says, in every respect venerable

and skilful men, but yet for the sake of the Platonic philosophy, we

must doubt against them, following in this our leader to the most holy

and mystic truth. It is proper likewise to relate as far as contributes

to our purpose, what appears to us to be the truth respecting the

hypotheses of the Parmenides; for thus perhaps by a reasoning process,

we may embrace the whole theology of Plato.

CHAPTER IX.

In the first place then, let us consider those, who draw down the

design of this dialogue from the truth of things to a logical exercise,

and see whether they can possibly accord with the writings of Plato.

It is therefore evident to every one, that Parmenides proposes to

himself to deliver in reality the dialectic method, and that with this

view he cursorily assumes it in a similar manner in each of the things

which have a real being, as, in sameness, difference, similitude,

dissimilitude, motion, and permanency, &c.; exhorting at the same

time, those who desire to discover the nature of each of these in an

orderly method, to this exercise, as to a great contest. He likewise

asserts that it was by no means an easy undertaking to him who was

so much advanced in years, assimilates himself to the Ibycean horse,

and presents us with every argument to prove that this method is a

serious undertaking, and not a contest consisting in mere words. How

therefore, is it possible, that we can refer to empty arguments those

conceptions[97] about which the great Parmenides, evincing that they

require much serious discussion, composed this discourse? How likewise

is it reasonable to suppose that an aged man would busy himself with

mere verbal contests, and that he who loved to speculate the truth of

things, would bestow so much study on this method,--he who considered

every thing else, as having no real existence, and who ascended to

the high watch-tower of being itself? Indeed, he who admits this must

suppose that Parmenides is satirized by Plato in this dialogue, by

thus representing him drawn down to juvenile contests, from the most

intellectual visions of the soul.

But if you are willing, let us consider in addition to the above, what

Parmenides promises, and on what subject engaging to speak, he entered

on this discussion. Was it not then about being according to his

doctrine, and the unity of all beings, to which extending himself, his

design was concealed from the vulgar, while he exhorts us to collect

the multitude of beings into one undivided union? If, therefore, this

is the one being, or that which is the highest, and which is perfectly

established above the reasons conversant with opinion, is it not absurd

to confound dogmas about intelligibles with doxastic arguments? For

indeed, such a form of discourse is not adapted to the hypothesis about

true beings, nor does the intellection of unapparent and separate

causes harmonize with dialectic exercises; but these differ from each

other, so far as intellect is established above opinion, as Timæus

informs us, and not Timæus only, but likewise the dæmoniacal Aristotle,

who, discoursing on a power of this kind, exhorts us to make our

investigations, neither about things perfectly unapparent to us, nor

about such as are more known.

It is far therefore from being the case, that Parmenides, who places

the science of beings above that which appears to be truth to those

who rank sense before intellect, should introduce doxastic knowledge

to an intellective nature, since a knowledge of this kind is dubious,

various, and unstable; or that he should speculate true being with this

doxastic wisdom, and inane discussion. For a various form of knowledge

does not harmonize[98] with that which is simple, nor the multiform

with the uniform, nor the doxastic with the intelligible.

But still further, nor must this be omitted, that such a mode of

discourse is perfectly foreign from the discussion of Parmenides. For

he discourses about all beings, and delivers the order of wholes, their

progression beginning from _the one_, and their conversion ending

in the one. But the argumentative method is very remote from scientific

theory. Does it not therefore appear, that Plato must have attributed

a discordant hypothesis to Parmenides, if it be said that he merely

regards an exercise through opposite arguments, and that for the sake

of the power employed in this exercise, he excites the whole of this

evolution of reasons? Indeed, it will be found that in all the other

dialogues, Plato attributes hypotheses to each of the philosophers

adapted to their peculiar tenets. Thus to Timæus, he assigns the

doctrine about nature; to Socrates, that of a republic; to the Elean

guest, that about being; and to the priestess Diotima, that respecting

love. Afterwards, each of the other dialogues confines itself to those

arguments which are adapted to the writings of the principal person

of the dialogue. But Parmenides alone will appear to us wise in his

poems, and in his diligent investigation of true being, but in the

Platonic scene, he will be the leader of a juvenile muse. This opinion,

therefore, accuses Plato of dissimilitude of imitation, though he

himself condemns the poets, for ascribing to the sons of the Gods a

love of money, and a life subject to the dominion of the passions. How,

therefore, can we refer a discussion of doxastic and empty arguments to

the leader of the truth of beings?

But if it be necessary that omitting a multitude of arguments, we

should make Plato himself a witness of the proposed discussion, we will

cite if you please what is written in the Theætetus and Sophista; for

from these dialogues what we assert will be apparent. In the Theætetus

then Socrates being excited by a young man to a confutation of those

who assert that being is immoveable, attacks among these an opinion

of this kind entertained by Parmenides, and at the same time assigns

the cause. “I blush,” says he, “for Parmenides, who is one of these,

more than for all the rest; for I, when very young, was conversant

with him when he was very elderly, and he appeared to me to possess a

certain profundity perfectly generous. I am afraid therefore, lest we

do not understand what has been asserted, and much more am I fearful

that we fall short of the meaning of Parmenides.” With great propriety

therefore do we assert, that the proposed discussion does not regard

a logical exercise, and make this the end of the whole, but that it

pertains to the science of the first principles of things. For how

could Socrates using a power of this kind, and neglecting the knowledge

of things, testify that the discourse of Parmenides possessed a depth

perfectly generous? And what venerableness can there be in adopting a

method which proceeds doxastically through opposite reasons, and in

undertaking such an invention of arguments?

Again, in the Sophista, exciting the Elean guest to a perspicuous

evolution of the things proposed by him, and evincing that he was now

accustomed to more profound discourses: “Inform me,” says he, “whether

it is your custom to give a prolix discussion of a subject which you

are able to demonstrate to any one by interrogations; I mean such

discussions as Parmenides himself formerly used, accompanied with

all-beautiful reasons, and of which I was an auditor when I was very

young, and he was very elderly?” What reason then can be assigned, why

we should not believe Socrates, when he asserts that the arguments of

Parmenides were all-beautiful, and possessed a generous profundity,

and why we should degrade the discussion of Parmenides, hurl it

from essence and being, and transfer it to a vulgar, trifling, and

empty contest, neither considering that discourses of this kind are

alone adapted to youth, nor regarding the hypothesis of _being_

characterized by _the one_, nor any thing else which opposes such

an opinion?

But I likewise think it is proper that the authors of this hypothesis,

should consider the power of dialectic, such as it is exhibited

by Socrates in the Republic;--how, as he says, it surrounds all

disciplines like a defensive enclosure, and elevates those that use it,

to _the good itself_, and the first unities, purifies the eye

of the soul, establishes it in true beings, and the one principle of

all things, and ends at last in that which is no longer hypothetical.

For if the power of this dialectic is so great, and the end of this

path so mighty, it is not proper to confound doxastic arguments, with

a method of this kind. For the former regards the opinions of men,

but the latter is called garrulity by the vulgar. And the one is

perfectly destitute of disciplinative science, but the other is the

defensive enclosure of such sciences, and the passage to it is through

these. Again, the doxastic method of reasoning has for its end[99]

the apparent, but the dialectic method endeavours to arrive at _the

one_ itself, always employing for this purpose steps of ascent, and

at last, beautifully ends in the nature of _the good_.

By no means therefore, is it fit that we should draw down to doxastic

arguments, a method which is established among the most accurate

sciences. For the merely logical method which presides over the

demonstrative phantasy, is of a secondary nature, and is alone

pleased with contentious discussions; but our dialectic, for the most

part, employs divisions and analyses as primary sciences, and as

imitating the progression of beings from _the one_, and their

conversion to it again. But it likewise sometimes uses definitions

and demonstrations, and prior to these the definitive method, and the

dividing method prior to this. On the contrary, the doxastic method

is deprived of the incontrovertible reasonings of demonstration. Is

it not, therefore, necessary that these powers must be separated from

each other, and that the discussion of Parmenides, which employs our

dialectic, must be free from the empty variety of mere argument, and

must fabricate its reasonings with a view to being itself, and not to

that which is apparent? And thus much may suffice in answer to those

who reprobate our hypotheses. For if all this cannot convince them,

we shall in vain endeavour to persuade them, and urge them to the

speculation of things.

CHAPTER Χ.

But a greater and more difficult contest remains for me, against

those lovers of the speculation of beings, who look to the science of

first causes, as the end proposed in the hypothesis of the Platonic

Parmenides; and this contest we will accomplish, if you please, by

numerous and more known arguments.

And in the first place, we shall define what that is, about which our

discourse against them will be employed; for this, I think, will render

the mystic doctrine of Plato concerning divine natures, apparent in

the highest degree. There are, therefore, nine hypotheses which are

discussed by Parmenides in this dialogue, as we have evinced in our

commentaries upon it. And the five precedaneous hypotheses suppose that

_the one_ has a subsistence, and through this hypothesis, that all

beings, the mediums of wholes, and the terminations of the progressions

of things, may be supposed to subsist. But the four hypotheses

which follow these, introduce _the one_, not having a subsistence,

according to the exhortation of the dialectic method, show that by

taking away _the one_, all beings, and such things as have an apparent

existence, must be entirely subverted, and propose to themselves the

confutation of this hypothesis. And some of the hypotheses evidently

conclude every thing according to reason, but others (if I may be

allowed the expression) perfectly evince things more impossible than

impossibilities; which circumstance some prior to us perceiving, as

it appears to me, necessarily to happen in these hypotheses, have

considered it as deserving discussion,[100] in their treatises on this

dialogue.

With respect to the first of the hypotheses therefore, almost all agree

in asserting, that Plato through this celebrates the superessential

principle of wholes, as ineffable, unknown, and above all being.

But all do not explain the hypothesis posterior to this after the

same manner. For the ancient Platonists, and those who participated

the philosophy of Plotinus assert that an intellectual nature

presents itself to the view in this hypothesis, subsisting from the

superessential principle of things, and endeavour to harmonize to the

one and all-perfect power of intellect, such conclusions as are the

result of this hypothesis. But that leader of ours to truth about

the Gods, and confabulator of Plato (that I may use the language of

Homer) who transferred what was indefinite in the theory of the more

ancient philosophers, to bound, and reduced the confusion of the

different orders to an intellectual distinction, in the writings which

he communicated to his associates;--this our leader, in his treatise

on the present subject, calls upon us to adopt a distinct division

of the conclusions, to transfer this division to the divine orders,

and to harmonize the first and most simple of the things exhibited to

the first of beings; but to adapt those in the middle rank to middle

natures, according to the order which they are allotted among beings;

and such as are last and multiform, to ultimate progressions. For

the nature of being is not one, simple, and indivisible; but as in

sensibles, the mighty heaven is one, yet it comprehends in itself a

multitude of bodies; and the monad connectedly contains multitude, but

in the multitude there is an order of progression; and of sensibles,

some are first, some middle, and some last; and prior to these, in

souls, from one soul a multitude of souls subsists, and of these,

some are placed in an order nearer, but others more remote from their

wholeness, and others again fill up the medium of the extremes;--in

like manner, it is doubtless necessary that among perfectly true

beings, such genera as are uniform and occult, should be established

in the one and first cause of wholes, but that others should proceed

into all multitude, and a whole number, and that others should contain

the bond of these, in a middle situation. It is likewise by no means

proper to harmonize the peculiarities of first natures with such as are

second, nor of those that possess a subject order, with such as are

more unical, but it is requisite that among these, some should have

powers different from others, and that there should be an order in

this progression of true beings, and an unfolding of second from first

natures.

In short, being which subsists according to, or is characterized

by _the one_, proceeds indeed from the unity prior to beings, but

generates the whole divine genus, viz. the intelligible, intellectual,

supermundane, and that which proceeds as far as to the mundane order.

But our preceptor likewise asserts, that each of the conclusions is

indicative of a divine peculiarity. And though all the conclusions

harmonize to all the progressions of _the one being_, or of being

characterized by _the one_, yet I am of opinion, it is by no means

wonderful, that some conclusions should more accord with some

hypotheses than with others. For such things as express the peculiarity

of certain orders, do not necessarily belong to all the Gods; but such

as belong to all, are doubtless by a much greater reason present with

each. If, therefore, we ascribe to Plato, an adventitious division

of the divine orders,[101] and do not clearly evince that, in other

dialogues, he celebrates the progressions of the Gods from on high

to the extremity of things, sometimes in fables respecting the soul,

and at other times, in other theological modes, we shall absurdly

attribute to him, such a division of being, and together with this,

of the progression of _the one_. But if we can evince from other

dialogues, that he (as will be manifest in the course of this work)

has celebrated all the kingdoms of the Gods, in a certain respect, is

it not impossible, that in the most mystic of all his works, he should

deliver through the first hypothesis, the exempt transcendency of _the

one_ with respect to all the genera of beings, to being itself, to a

psychical essence, to form, and to matter, but that he should make no

mention of the divine progressions, and their orderly separation? For

if it is proper to contemplate last things only, why do we touch on the

first principle before other things? Or if we think fit to unfold the

multitude of the proper hypotheses, why do we pass by the genus of the

Gods, and the divisions which it contains? Or if we unfold the natures

subsisting between the first and last of things, why do we leave

unknown the whole orders of those divine beings, which subsist between

_the one_, and natures that are in any respect deified? For all these

particulars evince, that the whole discourse is defective, with respect

to the science of things divine.

But still farther, Socrates, in the Philebus, calls upon those that

love the contemplation of beings, to use the dividing method, and

always to explore the monads of total orders, and the duads, triads,

or any other numbers proceeding from these. If this then is rightly

determined, it is doubtless necessary that the Parmenides, which

employs the whole dialectic method, and discourses about being which

is characterized by _the one_, should neither speculate multitude

about _the one_, nor remain in the one monad of beings, nor in short,

introduce to _the one_ which is above all beings, the whole multitude

of first beings immediately, but should unfold, as in the first

order, such beings as have an occult subsistence, and are allied to

_the one_; but as in the middle rank, those genera of the Gods which

subsist according to progression, and which are more divided than the

extremely united, but are allotted a union more perfect, than such as

have proceeded to the utmost; and should unfold as in the last rank,

such as subsist according to the last division of powers, and together

with these, such as have a deified essence. If, therefore, the first of

the hypotheses is about _the one_ which is above all multitude, it is

doubtless necessary that the hypothesis which follows this, should not

unfold being itself in an indefinite and indistinct manner, but should

deliver all the orders of beings. For the dividing method does not

admit, that we should introduce the whole of multitude at once to _the

one_, as Socrates teaches us in the Philebus.

Besides, we may evince the truth of what we assert from the very

method of the demonstrations. For the first of the conclusions become

immediately manifest from the least, most simple, most known, and as it

were common conceptions. But those which are next in order to these,

become apparent through a greater multitude of conceptions, and such

as are more various. And the last conclusions are entirely the most

composite. For he always uses the first conclusions, as subservient

to the demonstration of those that follow,[102] and presents us with

an intellectual paradigm of the order observed in geometry, or other

disciplines, in the connexion of these conclusions with each other.

If, therefore, discourses bring with them an image of the things of

which they are interpreters, and if, as are the evolutions from

demonstrations, such must the order necessarily be of the things

exhibited, it appears to me to be necessary, that such things as derive

their beginning from the most simple principles, must be in every

respect of a more primary nature, and must be arranged as conjoined

with _the one_; but that such as are always multiplied, and suspended

from various demonstrations, must have proceeded farther from the

subsistence[103] of _the one_.

For the demonstrations which have two conclusions, must necessarily

contain the conclusions prior to themselves; but those which contain

primary, spontaneous, and simple conceptions, are not necessarily

united with such as are more composite, which are exhibited through

more abundant media, and which are farther distant from the principle

of beings. It appears therefore, that some of the conclusions are

indicative of more divine orders, but others, of such as are more

subordinate; some, of more united, and others, of more multiplied

orders; and again, some, of more uniform, and others, of more multiform

progressions. For demonstrations are universally from causes,

and things first. If, therefore, first are the causes of second

conclusions, there is an order of causes, and things caused, in the

multitude of the conclusions. For, indeed, to confound all things, and

speculate them indefinitely in one, neither accords with the nature of

things, nor the science of Plato.

CHAPTER XI.

Again, therefore, let us discuss this affair in another way, and view

with the dianoëtic power, where any thing futile is delivered. For let

it be said, if you please, and we will first of all allow it, that the

conclusions of this second hypothesis are about true being. But as

this is multitude, and, not only one itself, like _the one_ prior to

beings; for being is that which is passive to _the one_, as the Elean

guest in the Sophista informs us; and as it is universally acknowledged

by our opponents, who establish that which is first as _the one_, but

intellect, as _one many_, soul, as _one and many_, and body, as _many

and one_:--as therefore, this has been asserted a thousand times, I

mean that in true being there is multitude together with union, whether

will they say that these things harmonize with the whole of being, but

not with its parts, or both with the whole and its parts? And again, we

ask them, whether they attribute all things to each part of being, or

whether they ascribe different things to different parts?

If, therefore, they are of opinion, that each particular should alone

harmonize with the whole of being, being will consist of non-beings,

that which is moved, of things immoveable, that which abides, of things

deprived of permanency, and universally, all things will consist of

their opposites, and we shall no longer agree with the discourse of

Parmenides, who says that the parts of _being characterized by the

one_, are in a certain respect wholes, and that each of them is one

and being, in a manner similar to the whole. But if we attribute all

things to each part, and there is nothing which we do not make all

things, how can the summit of being, and that which is most eminently

one, contain a wholeness, and an incomprehensible multitude of parts?

How can it at one and the same time contain the whole of number,

figure, motion and permanency, and in short all forms and genera? For

these differ from each other, and the hypothesis will assert things

impossible. For things near to, will be similarly multiplied with

things remote from _the one_, and that which is first, will not be

a less multitude than that which is last; nor again, will the last of

things be a less one than the first, and things in the middle will have

no difference with respect to division from the extremes.

As therefore, it is not proper to ascribe all this multitude of

conclusions to the whole alone, nor to consider all things in a

similar manner in all the parts of being, it remains that different

conclusions must harmonize with different things. It is necessary,

therefore, that either the enumeration of the conclusions should be

inordinate, or ordinate. But if they say they are inordinate, they

neither speak agreeably to the dialectic method, nor to the mode of

demonstrations, which always generate things secondary from such as

are first, nor to the science of Plato, which always accompanies the

order of things. But if they say the conclusions are regular, I think

it is entirely necessary, that they should either begin from things

first according to nature, or from things last. But if from things last

_being characterised by the one_ will be the last, and that which

is moved according to time, the first. This, however, is impossible.

For that which participates of time, must by a much greater priority

participate of first being. But that which participates of first being,

does not necessarily participate of time. First being, therefore, is

above time. If then Plato begins from first being, but ends in that

which participates of time, he proceeds supernally from the first to

the last parts of true being. Hence, the first conclusions are to be

referred to the first orders, the middle, for the same reason, to the

middle orders, and the last, as is evident, to such as are last. For it

is necessary, as our discourse has evinced, that different conclusions

should be assigned to different things, and that a distribution of this

kind should commence from such things as are highest.

But likewise, the order of the hypotheses, as it appears to me, is a

sufficient argument of the truth of our assertion. For with us _the

one_ which is exempt from all multitude, is allotted the first order,

and from this the evolution of all the arguments commences. But the

second order after this, is about true beings, and the unity which

these participate. And the third order in regular succession, is about

soul. Whether, therefore, is it about every soul or not? In answer to

this, we shall observe, that our leader Syrianus has beautifully shown,

that the discourse about whole souls is comprehended in the second

hypothesis. If, therefore, the order of these three hypotheses proceeds

according to the nature of things, it is evident that the second is

produced from the first, and the last from the second. For I would ask

those who are not entirely unskilled in discourses of this kind, what

can be more allied to _the one_, than being characterized by _the one_,

which the first of the conclusions of the second hypothesis unfolds?

Or what can be more allied to soul, than that which participates of

time, which subsists divisibly, and which is the last thing exhibited

in this hypothesis? For the life of partial as well as of total

souls is according to time. And first being is that which first

participates of _the one_, and through its connexion with being, has

a redundant hyparxis with respect to the imparticipable unity. But if

this hypothesis is the middle, and if we aptly harmonize the highest

conclusions with things highest, we should doubtless harmonize middles

with middles. For this hypothesis commencing from first being, proceeds

through all the genera posterior to it, till it ends in a nature

participating of time.

But, farther, from the common confession of those interpreters of

Plato, who were skilled in divine concerns, we can demonstrate the

same things as we have above asserted. For Plotinus, in his book _On

Numbers_, enquiring whether beings subsist prior to numbers, or

numbers prior to beings, clearly asserts that the first being subsists

prior to numbers, and that it generates the divine number. But if this

is rightly determined by him, and being is generative of the first

number, but number is produced by being, it is not proper to confound

the order of these genera, nor to collect them into one hypostasis,

nor, since Plato separately produces first being, and separately

number, to refer each of the conclusions to the same order. For it

is by no means lawful, that cause and the thing caused, should have

either the same power, or the same order: but these are distinct from

each other; and the science concerning them is likewise distinct, and

neither the nature, nor the definition of them is one and the same.

But, after Plotinus, Porphyry in his treatise _On Principles_, evinces

by many and beautiful arguments, that intellect is eternal, but that at

the same time, it contains in itself something prior to the eternal,

and through which it is conjoined with _the one_. For _the one_ is

above all eternity, but the eternal has a second, or rather third order

in intellect. For it appears to me to be necessary that eternity should

be established in the middle of that which is prior to the eternal, and

the eternal. But of this hereafter. At the same time, thus much may be

collected from what has been said, that intellect contains something

in itself better than the eternal. Admitting this, therefore, we ask

the father of this assertion, whether this something better than the

eternal is not only being characterized by _the one_, but is a whole

and parts, and all multitude, number and figure, that which is moved,

and that which is permanent; or whether we are to ascribe some of the

conclusions to it, but not others? For it is impossible that all these

can accord with a nature prior to eternity, since every intellectual

motion, and likewise permanency, are established in eternity. But if

we are to ascribe some of the conclusions to it, and not others, it

is evident that other orders in intellect are to be investigated, and

that each of the conclusions is to be referred to that order, to which

it appears particularly adapted. For intellect is not one in number,

and an atom, as it appeared to be to some of the ancients, but it

comprehends in itself the whole progression of first being.

But the third who makes for our purpose after these, is the divine

Jamblichus, who, in his treatise _Concerning the Gods_, accuses those

who place the genera of being in intelligibles, because the number

and variety of these is more remote from the one. But afterwards he

informs us where these ought to be placed. For they are produced in the

end of the intellectual order, by the Gods which there subsist. How

the genera of being, however, both are, and are not in intelligibles,

will be hereafter apparent. But if, according to his arrangement of

the divine orders, intelligibles are exempt from the genera of being,

much more are they exempt from similitude and dissimilitude, equality

and inequality. Each of the conclusions, therefore, ought not in a

similar manner to be accommodated to all things, so as to refer them

to the whole breadth of the intelligible, or intellectual order. Hence

from what the best of the interpreters have said, when philosophizing

according to their own doctrines, both the multitude of the divine

orders, and of the Platonic arguments, are to be considered as

proceeding according to an orderly distinction.

In addition, likewise, to what has been said, this also may be

asserted, that we cannot, on any other hypothesis, obtain a rational

solution of the many doubts which present themselves on this subject,

but shall ignorantly ascribe what is rash and vain to this treatise of

Plato. For in the first place, why are there only so many conclusions,

and neither more nor less? For there are fourteen conclusions. But

as there are so many, we cannot assign the reason of this, unless we

distribute them in conjunction with things themselves. In the second

place, neither shall we be able to find the cause of the order of the

conclusions with respect to each other, and how some have a prior,

and others a posterior establishment, according to the reason of

science, unless the order of the conclusions proceeds in conjunction

with the progression of beings. In the third place, why do some of the

conclusions become known from things proximately demonstrated, but

others from preceding demonstrations? For that _the one_ is a whole and

contains parts, is demonstrated from being, which is characterized by

_the one_; but its subsistence in itself and in another, is placed in

a proximate order, after the possession of figure, but is demonstrated

from whole and parts. Or why are some things often demonstrated, from

two of the particulars previously evinced, but others from one of them?

For we shall be ignorant of each of these, and shall neither be able

scientifically to speculate their number, nor their order, nor their

alliance to each other, unless following things themselves, we evince

that this whole hypothesis is a dialectic arrangement, proceeding from

on high through all the middle genera, as far as to the termination of

first being.

Again, if we should say, that all the conclusions demonstrate

syllogistically only, in what respect shall we differ from those,

who assert that the whole of this discussion consists of doxastic

arguments, and only regards a mere verbal contest? But if it is

not only syllogistic, but likewise demonstrative, it is doubtless

necessary, that the middle should be the cause of, and by nature prior

to the conclusion. As, therefore, we make the conclusions of the

preceding reasons, the media of those that follow, the things which the

arguments respect, must doubtless have a similar order as to being, and

their progeny must be the causes of things subject, and generative of

such as are secondary. But if this be admitted, how can we allow that

all of them have the same peculiarity and nature? For cause, and that

which is produced from cause, are separated from each other.

But this likewise will happen to those who assert that one nature is to

be explored in all the arguments, that they will by no means perceive

how in the three first conclusions, _the one_ remains unseparated from

being, but is first separated in the fourth conclusion. But in all the

following conclusions, _the one_ is explored considered as subsisting

itself by itself. Is it not therefore necessary, that these orders

must differ from each other? For that which is without separation,

in consequence of having an occult and undivided subsistence, is more

allied to _the one_, but that which is separated, has proceeded farther

from the first principle of things.

Again, if you are willing to consider the multitude of the arguments,

and the extent of the hypothesis, how much it differs from that which

follows it,--neither from this will it appear to you to be entirely

about one and an unseparated nature. For reasonings about divine

concerns, are contracted in the more principal causes, because in these

the occult is more abundant than the perspicuous, and the ineffable

than the known. But they become multiplied and evolved, by proceeding

to divine orders more proximate to our nature. For such things as

are more allied to that which is ineffable, unknown, and exempt in

inaccessible places, are allotted an hyparxis more foreign from verbal

enunciation. But such things as have proceeded farther, are both more

known to us, and more apparent to the phantasy, than such as have a

prior subsistence.

This, therefore, being abundantly proved, it is necessary that the

second hypothesis, should unfold all the divine orders, and should

proceed on high, from the most simple and unical to the whole

multitude, and all the number of divine natures, in which the order

of true being ends, which indeed is spread under the unities of the

Gods, and at the same time is divided in conjunction with their occult

and ineffable peculiarities. If, therefore, we are not deceived in

admitting this, it follows, that from this hypothesis, the continuity

of the divine orders, and the progression of second from first

natures, is to be assumed, together with the peculiarity of all the

divine genera. And indeed, what their communion is with each other,

and what their distinction proceeding according to measure, likewise,

the auxiliaries which may be found in other dialogues respecting the

truth of real beings, or the unities which they contain, are all to be

referred to this hypothesis. For, here we may contemplate the total

progressions of the Gods, and their all-perfect orders, according

to theological science. For as we have before shown that the whole

treatise of the Parmenides has reference to the truth of things, and

that it was not devised as a vain evolution of words, it is doubtless

necessary, that the nine hypotheses which it discusses, employing the

dialectic method, but speculating with divine science, should be

about things and certain natures, which are either middle or last. If,

therefore, Parmenides acknowledges that his whole discourse will be

about _the one_, and how it subsists with respect to itself, and

all other things, it is evident that the speculation of _the one_,

must commence from that which is highest, but end in that which is the

last of all things. For the hyparxis of _the one_ proceeds from on

high, as far as to the most obscure hypostasis of things.

CHAPTER XII.

As the first hypothesis, however, demonstrates by negations the

ineffable supereminence of the first principle of things, and evinces

that he is exempt from all essence and knowledge,--it is evident that

the hypothesis after this, as being proximate to it, must unfold the

whole order of the Gods. For Parmenides does not alone assume the

intellectual and essential peculiarity of the Gods, but likewise the

divine characteristic of their hyparxis through the whole of this

hypothesis. For what other _one_ can that be which is participated by

being, than that which is in every being divine, and through which all

things are conjoined with the imparticipable one? For as bodies through

their _life_ are conjoined with soul, and as souls through their

_intellective part_, are extended to total intellect, and the first

intelligence, in like manner true beings through _the one_ which they

contain are reduced to an exempt union, and subsist in unproceeding

union with this first cause.

But because this hypothesis commences from that which is _one being_,

or _being characterized by the one_, and establishes the summit of

intelligibles as the first after _the one_, but ends in an essence

which participates of time, and deduces divine souls to the extremities

of the divine orders, it is necessary that the third hypothesis should

demonstrate by various conclusions, the whole multitude of partial

souls, and the diversities which they contain. And thus far the

separate and incorporeal hypostasis proceeds.

After this follows that nature which is divisible about bodies,

and inseparable from matter, which the fourth hypothesis delivers

supernally suspended from the Gods. And the last hypothesis is the

procession of matter, whether considered as one, or as various,

which the fifth hypothesis demonstrates by negations, according to

its dissimilar similitude[104] to the first. But sometimes, indeed,

the negations are privations, and sometimes the exempt causes of all

the productions. And what is the most wonderful of all, the highest

negations are only enunciative, but some in a supereminent manner, and

others according to deficiency. But each of the negations consequent

to these is affirmative; the one paradigmatically, but the other

iconically, or after the manner of an image. But the middle corresponds

to the order of soul, for it is composed from affirmative and negative

conclusions. But it possesses negations coordinate to affirmations.

Nor is it alone multiplied, like material natures,[105] nor does it

possess an adventitious one; but _the one_ which it contains,

though it is still one, yet subsists in motion and multiplication, and

in its progressions is, as it were, absorbed by essence. And such are

the hypotheses which unfold all beings, both separable and inseparable,

together with the causes of wholes, as well exempt, as subsisting in

things themselves, according to the hyparxis of _the one_.

But there are four other hypotheses besides these, which by taking away

_the one_, evince that all things must be entirely subverted, both

beings and things in generation, and that no being can any longer have

any subsistence; and this, in order that he may demonstrate _the one_

to be the cause of being and preservation, that through it all things

participate of the nature of being, and that each has its hyparxis

suspended from _the one_. And in short, we syllogistically collect this

through all beings, that if _the one_ is, all things subsist as far as

to the last hypostasis, and if it is not, no being has any subsistence.

_The one_, therefore, is both the hypostatic and preservative cause of

all things; which Parmenides also himself collects at the end of the

dialogue. With respect, however, to the hypothesis of the Parmenides,

its division, and the speculation of its several parts, we have

sufficiently treated in our commentaries on that dialogue; so that

it would be superfluous to enter into a prolix discussion of these

particulars at present. But as from what has been said, it appears

whence we may assume the whole of theology, and from what dialogues we

may collect into one the theology distributed according to parts, we

shall in the next place treat about the common dogmas of Plato, which

are adapted to sacred concerns, and which extend to all the divine

orders, and shall evince that each of these is defined by him according

to the most perfect science. For things common are prior to such as are

peculiar, and are more known according to nature.

CHAPTER XIII.

In the first place, therefore, we shall assume the things which are

demonstrated in the Laws, and contemplate how they take the lead,

with respect to the truth about the Gods, and are the most ancient of

all the other mystic conceptions about a divine nature. Three things,

therefore, are asserted by Plato in these writings; that there are

Gods; that their providence extends to all things; and that they

administer all things according to justice, and suffer no perversion

from worse natures.

That these then obtain the first rank[106] among all theological

dogmas, is perfectly evident. For what can be of a more leading

nature, than the hyparxis of the Gods, or than boniform providence, or

immutable and undeviating power? Through which they produce secondary

natures uniformly, preserve themselves in an undefiled manner, and

convert them to themselves. But the Gods indeed govern other things,

but suffer nothing from subordinate natures, nor are changed with

the variety of the things to which their providence extends. We shall

learn, however, how these things are defined according to nature,

if we endeavour to embrace by a reasoning process the scientific

method of Plato about each of them; and prior to these, survey by

what irrefragable arguments he proves that there are Gods; and thus

afterwards consider such problems as are conjoined with this dogma.

Of all beings, therefore, it is necessary that some should move only,

but that others should be moved only, and that the natures situated

between these, should both move and be moved. And with respect to

these last it is necessary, either that they should move others being

themselves moved by others, or that they should be self-motive. These

four hypostases likewise, are necessarily placed in an orderly series,

one after another; that which is moved only and suffers, depending

on other primary causes; that which moves others, and is at the same

time moved, being prior to this; that which is self-motive, and

which is beyond that which both moves and is moved, beginning from

itself, and through its own motion imparting the representation of

being moved, to other things; and that which is immoveable, preceding

whatever participates either producing or passive motion. For every

thing self-motive, in consequence of possessing its perfection in a

transition and interval of life, depends on another more ancient cause,

which always subsists according to sameness, and in a similar manner,

and whose life is not in time, but in eternity. For time is an image of

eternity.

If, therefore, all things which are moved by themselves, are moved

according to time, but the eternal form of motion is above that which

is carried in time, the self-motive nature will be second in order, and

not the first of beings. But that which moves others, and is moved by

others, must necessarily be suspended from a self-motive nature: and

not this alone, but likewise every alter-motive fabrication, as the

Athenian guest demonstrates. For if all things, says he, should stand

still, unless self-motive natures had a subsistence among things, there

would be no such thing as that which is first moved. For that which

is immoveable, is by no means naturally adapted to be moved, nor will

there then be that which is first moved; but the alter-motive nature

is indigent of another moving power. The self-motive nature, therefore,

alone, as beginning from its own energy, will move both itself and

others in a secondary manner. For a thing of this kind imparts the

power of being moved to alter-motive natures, in the same manner as an

immoveable nature imparts a motive power to all beings. In the third

place, that which is moved only, must first of all be suspended from

things moved by another, but moving others. For it is necessary, both

that other things, and the series of things moved, which extends in an

orderly manner from on high to the last of things, should be filled

with their proper media.

All bodies, therefore, belong to those things which are naturally moved

only, and are passive. For they are productive of nothing, on account

of possessing an hypostasis endued with interval, and participating of

magnitude and bulk; since every thing productive and motive of others,

naturally produces and moves, by employing an incorporeal power.

But of incorporeal natures, some are divisible about bodies, but

others are exempt from such a division about the last of things. Those

incorporeals, therefore, which are divisible about the bulks of bodies,

whether they subsist in qualities, or in material forms, belong to the

number of things moved by another, but at the same time moving others.

For these, because they possess an incorporeal allotment, participate

of a motive power; but because they are divided about bodies, are

deprived of the power of verging to themselves, are divided together

with their subjects, and are full of sluggishness from these, they

are indigent of a motive nature which is not borne along in a foreign

seat, but possesses an hypostasis in itself. Where, therefore, shall

we obtain that which moves itself? For things extended into natures

possessing bulk and interval, or which are divided in these, and

subsist inseparably about them, must necessarily either be moved only,

or be motive through others. But it is necessary, as we have before

observed, that a self-motive nature should be prior to these, which is

perfectly established in itself, and not in others, and which fixes

its energies in itself, and not in things different from itself. There

is, therefore, another certain nature exempt from bodies, both in the

heavens and in these very mutable elements, from which bodies primarily

derive the power of being moved. Hence, if it be requisite to discover

what such an essence as this is, (rightly following Socrates, and

considering what the end of things is,) which by being present to

alter-motive natures, imparts to them a representation of self-motion,

to which of the above mentioned natures shall we ascribe the power of

things being moved from themselves? For all inanimate natures are alone

alter-motive, and whatever they suffer, they are adapted to suffer,

through a certain power externally moving and compelling. It remains,

therefore, that animated natures must possess this representation, and

that they are self-motive in a secondary degree, but that the soul

which is in them, primarily moves itself, and is moved by itself, and

that through a power derived from itself as it imparts life to bodies,

so likewise it extends to them from itself a representation of being

moved by themselves.

If, therefore, the self-motive essence is more ancient than

alter-motive natures, but soul is primarily self-motive, from which

the image of self-motion is imparted to bodies, soul will be beyond

bodies, and the motion of every body, will be the progeny of soul,

and of the motion it contains. Hence it is necessary that the whole

heaven and all the bodies it contains possessing various motions, and

being moved with these different motions, according to nature (for a

circulation is natural to every body of this kind) should have ruling

souls, which are essentially more ancient than bodies, and which are

moved in themselves, and supernally illuminate these with the power

of being moved. It is necessary, therefore, that these souls which

dispose in an orderly manner the whole world and the parts it contains,

and who impart to every thing corporeal which is of itself destitute

of life, the power of being moved, inspiring it, for this purpose,

with the cause of motion, should either move all things conformably to

reason, or after a contrary manner, which it is not lawful to assert.

But if indeed, this world and every thing in it which is disposed in

an orderly manner, and is moved equally and perpetually according to

nature, as is demonstrated, partly in the mathematical disciplines,

and partly in physical discussions, is suspended from an irrational

soul, which moving itself moves also other things, neither the order

of the periods, nor the motion which is bounded by one reason, nor the

position of bodies, nor any other of those things which are generated

according to nature, will have a stable cause, and which is able

to distribute every thing in an orderly manner, and according to an

invariable sameness of subsistence. For every thing irrational is

naturally adapted to be adorned by something different from itself,

and is indefinite and unadorned in its own nature. But to commit all

heaven to a thing of this kind, and a circulation revolving according

to reason, and with an invariable sameness, is by no means adapted,

either to the nature of things, or to our undisciplined conceptions. If

however, an intellectual soul, and which employs reason, governs all

things, and if every thing which is moved with a perpetual lation, is

governed by a soul of this kind, and there is no one of the wholes in

the universe destitute of soul (for no body is honorable if deprived

of such a power as this, as Theophrastus somewhere says) if this be

the case, whether does it possess this intellectual, perfect, and

beneficent power, according to participation, or according to essence?

For if, according to essence, it is necessary that every soul should be

of this kind, since each according to its own nature is self-motive.

But if, according to participation, there will be another intellect

subsisting in energy, more ancient than soul, which essentially

possesses intellection, and by its very being pre-assumes in itself the

uniform knowledge of wholes; since it is also necessary that the soul

which is essentialized according to reason, should possess that which

pertains to intellect through participation, and that the intellectual

nature should be twofold; the one subsisting primarily in a divine

intellect itself; but the other, which proceeds from this, subsisting

secondarily in soul. To which, you may add, if you please, the presence

of intellectual illumination in body. For whence is the whole of this

heaven either spherical or moved in a circle, and whence does it

revolve with a sameness of circulation according to one definite order?

For how could it always be allotted the same idea and power immutably

according to nature, if it did not participate of specific formation

according to intellect? For soul, indeed, is the supplier of motion;

but the cause of a firm establishment, and that which reduces the

unstable mutation of things that are moved, into sameness, and also a

life which is bounded by one reason, and a circulation which subsists

with invariable sameness, will evidently be superior to soul.

Body, therefore, and the whole of this sensible nature belong to

things which are alter-motive. But soul is self-motive, binding in

itself all corporeal motions; and prior to this is intellect which

is immoveable. Let no one, however, suppose that I assert this

immobility of intellect to resemble that which is sluggish, destitute

of life,[107] and without respiration, but that it is the leading cause

of all motion, and the fountain, if you are willing so to denominate

it, of all life, both of that which is converted to itself, and of that

which has its hypostasis in other things. Through these causes also,

the world is denominated by Timæus, an animal endued with soul and

intellect; being called by him an animal according to its own nature,

and the life pervading to it from soul, and which is distributed about

it, but animated or endued with soul, according to the presence of a

divine soul in it, and endued with intellect, according to intellectual

domination. For the supply of life, the government of soul, and the

participation of intellect connect and contain the whole of heaven.

If, however, this intellect is essentially intellect, since Timæus

indicating that the essence of intellect is the same with its

intellection, denominates it divine; for he says, that soul receiving

a divine intellect led an upright and wise life; if, therefore, this

be the case, it is necessary that the whole world should be suspended

from its divinity, and that motion indeed should be present to this

universe from soul, but that its perpetual permanency and sameness of

subsistence should be derived from intellect, and that its one union,

the conspiration in it and sympathy, and its all-perfect measure should

originate from that unity,[108] from which intellect is uniform, soul

is one,[109] every being is whole and perfect according to its own

nature, and every thing secondary together with perfection in its own

proper nature, participates of another more excellent peculiarity,

from an order which is always established above it. For that which is

corporeal being alter-motive, derives from soul the representation

of self-motive power, and is through it an animal. But soul being

self-motive participates of a life according to intellect, and

energizing according to time, possesses a never-ceasing energy, and

an ever-vigilant life from its proximity to intellect. And intellect

possessing its life in eternity, always subsisting essentially in

energy,[110] and fixing all its stable intellection at once in

intellect, is entirely deific through the cause prior to itself. For it

has twofold energies as Plotinus says, some as intellect, but others

as being inebriated with nectar. And elsewhere he observes, that this

intellect, by that which is prior to itself and is not intellect, is a

god; in the same manner as soul, by its summit which is above soul, is

intellect; and as body, by the power which is prior to body, is soul.

All things therefore, as we have said, are suspended from _the one_

through intellect and soul as media. And intellect indeed has the form

of unity; but soul has the form of intellect; and the body of the world

is vital. But every thing is conjoined with that which is prior to

itself. And of the natures posterior to these, one in a more proximate,

but the other in a more remote degree, enjoys that which is divine. And

divinity, indeed, is prior to intellect, being primarily carried in an

intellectual nature; but intellect is most divine, as being deified

prior to other things; and soul is divine, so far as it requires an

intellectual medium. But the body which participates of a soul of

this kind, so far as body indeed, is also itself divine; for the

illumination of divine[111] light pervades supernally as far as to the

last dependencies; yet it is not simply divine; but soul, by looking to

intellect, and living from itself, is primarily divine.

My reasoning is also the same about each of the whole spheres, and

about the bodies they contain. For all these imitate the whole heaven,

since these likewise have a perpetual allotment; and with respect to

the sublunary elements, they have not entirely an essential mutation,

but they abide in the universe according to their wholenesses, and

contain in themselves partial animals. For every wholeness has

posterior to itself more partial essences. As, therefore, in the

heavens, the number of the stars proceeds together with the whole

spheres, and as in the earth the multitude of partial terrestrial

animals subsists together with their wholeness, thus also it appears

to me to be necessary that in the wholes which have an intermediate

subsistence, each element should be filled up with appropriate numbers.

For how in the extremes can wholes which subsist prior to parts, be

arranged together with parts, unless there is the same analogy of them

in the intermediate natures?