Roberts issued the following Divisional Order:—
“The Lieutenant-General has received news from Khelat-i-Ghilzai, dated
the 18th instant. All was well with the garrison, and the neighbouring
country was still quiet. A letter has been received from Major-General
Phayre, C.B., dated Quetta, 12th August, in which he states that he is
marching with a large force of cavalry, artillery, and infantry, British
and native, and expects to reach Candahar not later than the 2nd of
September. Lieutenant-General Sir F. Roberts takes this opportunity of
thanking the troops under his command for the admirable manner in which
they have executed this march from Cabul hitherto. If the present rate
of marching be continued, Khelat-i-Ghilzai should be reached not later
than the 23rd, and Candahar not later than the 29th. By the latest
accounts the Afghan army under Ayub Khan is still at Candahar. The
Lieutenant-General hopes it may remain there, and that the honour of
relieving the British garrison may fall to the lot of the magnificent
troops now with him.”
At Panjak we heard from Mahomed Sadik, who met us in accordance with
previous arrangements, that Ayub Khan had written to Aslam Khan ordering
him to collect supplies, but all that the Tokhi Chiefs had done was to
raid upon a village the previous day and carry off two _maliks_ and a
quantity of grain. Native report also stated that Ayub’s men were
driving three mines into Candahar, but rocky ground had prevented them
from making much progress.
On August 21st we reached a camping-ground called Garjui, 3 miles short
of Tazi, our march being 18 miles. Shahjui, the northern limit of the
Candahar Province, was passed, and here again some little interest was
excited, as we could see the hill on the right where Sartorius won his
V.C., when Sahib Jan was defeated and killed. The country was very open
and water fairly plentiful. Camp was pitched on the right bank of the
Turnak. Captain Straton, with a small party of signallers, had gone on
ahead with the cavalry and climbed the Tazi Hill, whence he expected to
communicate by heliograph with Khelat-i-Ghilzai. Seeing a hill in the
distance, which seemed to answer to the description of the fortress, he
directed his light upon it, and within ten minutes came back an
answering flash. In half an hour General Roberts and Colonel Tanner had
exchanged messages, and then we learned of the disastrous sortie of the
16th and the death of General Brooke and the other brave fellows who
fell with him. Colonel Tanner informed us that he would send a company
of his regiment to Baba Kazai to encamp there and collect supplies for
us.
On August 22nd, reveillé sounded at 1 A.M., and we marched at 2.30, the
heat of the few previous days having been so great that night marching
was decided upon. The troops turned out with alacrity, but in the
half-darkness it was hard work to get all the baggage animals clear of
camp, particularly as the face of the country had quite changed, the
road passing over rolling hills which shut out the view on either hand.
All cultivation ceased except in the bed of the river, which lay in
places 200 or 300 feet below the road. Here and there were fields of
Indian-corn which promised rich crops in the future. After 17 miles we
reached Baba Kazai and found the company of Beluchis awaiting us with
piles of _bhoosa_ and corn ready to our hand. We pitched on the
hillside, within 200 yards of Turnak, and were busy all day exchanging
heliograms with Khelat-i-Ghilzai.
On the following day (August 23rd) the force marched again at 1 A.M.,
this being our fifteenth march from Beni Hissar. We covered 17 miles,
and were heartily glad to see the fortress of Khelat-i-Ghilzai rising
before us. As our force marched to its camping-ground to the south of
the solitary hill, great crowds of villagers lined the road and watched
with curiosity the appearance of regiment after regiment. The number of
Ghoorkas and Sikhs astonished them greatly, and they plainly respected
the composition of the army marching to the relief of Candahar. A letter
from Major Adam, Assistant Quartermaster-General with General Primrose,
was handed to General Roberts, and we learned more details of the
Deh-i-Khwaja sortie, and of the position in the city. The following are
the more interesting portions of Major Adams’s letter, which was dated
17th August:—
“Ayub’s forces, dislodged by our guns from their camp close to the
Ghoorka lines, have taken to the ground between Mir Bazaar and the
Argandab River, where they are sheltered by the high range of hills west
of this. He had two guns (an Armstrong and one of our 9-pounders
captured at Maiwand) on Picquet Hill. One was dismounted by our fire
yesterday. He has also a 6-pounder in an embrasure near the
Head-Quarters’ Garden; one in Deh-i-Khwaja 900 yards east of the Cabul
Gate, and a third in a garden 1,100 yards from the Shikarpur Gate. The
villages all round the walls are held, as is also a portion of our old
cantonment walls. Some of the regular regiments are cantoned in the
villages, which contain besides very large contingents of outsiders.
Yesterday morning, hoping to get into Deh-i-Khwaja to pull down the
loopholed walls facing the Cabul and Bur Durani Gates, we made a sortie
with 300 cavalry and 900 infantry drawn from the 7th Fusiliers, and 19th
and 28th Bombay Native Infantry. The village was found to be strongly
held, and honeycombed with loopholes. Our infantry managed to pull
through, but could not gain a hold upon the place, though the enemy’s
supports got a good ‘slating’ from our cavalry, and from our infantry
and artillery fire. We had to get back to the walls of the city under
heavy fire from the village walls: and our loss, in officers
particularly, was very heavy.... The enemy must, however, have seen that
we have some fighting power in us, and we heard that the regular
regiments under Ayub would not turn out to reinforce the village, so
that an effect had been produced, and the _morale_ of our troops here is
still good. The misfortune is they have so few officers to native
regiments: wearing helmets makes them a conspicuous mark, of which the
enemy fully avail themselves. Our supplies are abundant, with the
exception of mutton and _bhoosa_. Of the latter we have about ten days’
full ration, which we can make last fifteen, and good luck may produce
hidden stores in the town. We are in daily search, and get nearly
20,000lbs. per day.... The enemy here, I fancy, begin to think the game
is nearly up, and if they mean to assault, they must do so within a day
or two. We are very secure; the buildings round the walls have mostly
been cleared away, _abattis_ of trees, wire entanglements, _chevaux de
frise_, traverses, flank defences, blue lights, shells, small mines in
drains—all have been got ready; and if they do attack it will be at a
great loss of life to them. They say they have many ladders ready, but
as they will require at least from ten to fifteen men to carry them, and
most will have to be got over 600 yards of open ground, you can imagine
that their chances of success are very small. They ran away like hares
yesterday when our cavalry got them in the open, and also when our
sappers turned round and gave them a volley. Ayub’s position is well
chosen: his right flank cannot be turned, resting as it does on a high
hill that cannot be crossed, and his left is on the Argandab, while
along his front he has a number of orchards and canals which can only be
crossed at a few points. Artillery fire is required to cover any
infantry movement to attack his centre, and before that can be attempted
Picquet Hill must be taken. You will recognize how thoroughly he has
protected himself, and how powerless we are to attack until strongly
reinforced. We find it most difficult to get news. The whole place is
covered by groups of villages; and the ghazis are spread about in the
old cavalry lines and the cantonments. I only got a view of Ayub’s camp
the other day by going out at dark, getting on a hill before daybreak,
and waiting until daylight. Phillips, supporting with cavalry, had a
narrow escape. Thinking to capture two men on _yaboos_ I gave chase, but
they were too far ahead, and raised an alarm. Their artillery turned out
and opened fire, not at me, but at Phillips’ squadron. One shell burst
under his horse’s nose, and although Mayne and two orderlies were
standing by, the only damage done was the orderly’s horse shot.
Altogether there is no want of excitement.”
This letter shows the thorough nature of the investment of Candahar and
how helpless the garrison has become in the face of Ayub’s overwhelming
strength.
I have not energy enough to say much about Khelat-i-Ghilzai itself: the
character of the fortress is well known, and with the thermometer
registering 105° in tents, and a hot wind blowing, I find the task of
climbing up to the gates too much. Picture a hill rising out of a plain
some hundreds of feet, with a strong wall, loopholed and bastioned
encircling it near the top, and above all a huge rock springing out of
the middle of the enclosed space, and you have Khelat-i-Ghilzai. It
boasts a hot and a cold spring within the walls, and has other natural
features which might interest the geologist. Its barracks will
accommodate a sufficiently large garrison to man the walls, against
which no infantry assault could be successful, but there is a long,
flat-topped hill about 3,000 yards away from which artillery could
command the place and make the garrison very uncomfortable. The country
about is not at all attractive, barren rolling hills stretching away as
far as the eye can reach. We all pity the unlucky fellows who have had
to hold the place for so many months.
CAVALRY HEAD-QUARTERS, ROBAT, _27th August_.
To-day we have established heliographic communication with the Candahar
Garrison, and we have now in our camp Colonel St. John, Chief Political
Officer, Major Adam, A.Q.M.G., Major Leech, V.C., R.E., and Captain
Anderson, commanding the escort of Poona Horse. This morning, when the
garrison saw the first flash of Captain Straton’s mirror, they could
scarcely believe that it was the heliograph. We were three days in
advance of the time laid down by the wiseacres for our appearance.
To-day is the 19th from Beni Hissar, and although the infantry is one
march in rear, here we are with two regiments of cavalry exchanging
notes with officers of the lately besieged garrison, and coolly camping
within one march of Ayub’s camp on the Argandab. I do not wish to boast
of the work done by troops whose marches I have shared, and with whom is
all my sympathy; but it has been “grand going,” to use a hunting phrase,
and we hope the finish will be as good, for Ayub has _not_ fled,
although he has raised the siege of the city. Our troops are perhaps a
little tired with their hard work, but a day’s rest will give them new
strength, and this rest they can now take without anxiety, for Candahar
is safe, and there is every sign that the enemy will await our approach,
and defend the strong position they hold with great determination.
We have of late marched at 2.30 each morning, and consequently I have
seen but little of the country passed through. My general impression is,
that it is wild and bleak, the road following the course of the Turnak
River, which is not a very large stream at this time of the year. On
August 25th we marched to Jaldak, sixteen miles. As we were striking
camp at Khelat-i-Ghilzai, some bands of robbers tried to get past our
picquets near the river, the mist rising from the water covering their
movements. They plainly hoped to pick up a few stray mules with their
loads, as there is always great confusion when a large force has to move
off in the darkness, for the moon is now a very poor substitute for
daylight. The thieves, unfortunately for themselves, found that Ghoorkas
are unusually keen-sighted, and the result was that four Afghans were
killed before our rear-guard had left the fortress in rear. We watched
the shooting while our advance-brigade was waiting for orders to move,
and the reports which followed us were satisfactory. Nothing was lost,
although a _kahar_ who straggled had a narrow escape. He was enjoying a
peaceful “smoke” over the dying embers of his fire on the
camping-ground, when a small party of Afghans came upon him. He cried
out vigorously for help, and the Subadar of the 5th Ghoorkas, with a few
of his men, ran back from the rear-guard. For a moment the Afghans faced
them, but the Subadar cut one man down with his sword, and another being
shot the robbers decamped. This is the only occasion on which our men
have been troubled on picquet.
Yesterday (August 25th) we reached Tirandez, sixteen miles, a rather
troublesome march, as the road skirted a low range of hills on the
right, and was in places too narrow to admit of the troops marching in
open formation. At Tirandez, the General received letters from General
Primrose and Colonel St. John, in which it was stated that Ayub Khan had
become alarmed at the near approach of the Cabul Force, and had raised
the siege of the city on the 24th. Sir F. Roberts thereupon resolved to
put himself into direct communication with the garrison as quickly as
possible, and General Hugh Gough was ordered to hold two regiments of
cavalry in readiness to march to Robat, whence heliograms could be
exchanged with Candahar. Robat is thirty-four miles from Tirandez, and
about eighteen from Candahar. The 3rd Punjab Cavalry and the 3rd Bengal
Cavalry, who could muster the most available sabres, were told off by
General Gough, and at 1 A.M. they started from camp, their baggage
following on the wiry little ponies which serve as baggage animals. I
accompanied the cavalry, with the permission of the General. Sir F.
Roberts, with Colonel Chapman, Chief of the Staff, Major Hastings, and
Major Euan Smith, intended to ride with the cavalry, in order to meet
Colonel St. John, who, it was thought, might ride out from Candahar to
Robat. When, however, we reached Khel-i-Akhund, where the Beluchis were
encamped, word was sent to General Hugh Gough that Sir F. Roberts was so
weak from an attack of fever that he could not proceed further. The
cavalry were ordered to complete their march, Colonel Chapman alone of
the original party going on with them.
We rode quietly onwards, halting every seven or eight miles to give our
horses a feed in the fields of Indian-corn, and allow the baggage ponies
to close up in the rear. We did not know what might be in the front of
us—had not Ayub some thousands of Aimak horsemen, who were great at
surprises?—and we kept in as compact a body as possible, while our
advance-guard and scouts on the flanks were on the watch for any signs
of the enemy. But all was quiet, though a few unarmed men were met who
were believed to be returning from Ayub’s army to their homes. They
reported Candahar as no longer besieged, and added that all the villages
about it were quite deserted. This news was confirmed by a number of
men, well mounted and armed with rifles and swords, who had been sent
out by the Wali Shere Ali to meet our army. At about the twenty-seventh
mile we had our last halt at a running stream, where forage was
plentiful, and we then pushed on over a series of low stony hills until
the open desert plain lying north-east of Candahar was reached. The
range of hills on our left trended away to the south, but on the right
we could follow the line separating us from the Argandab, and could see
distinctly the high-rounded hill (called, I think, the “Brigade Major”)
which juts up on the eastern flank of the Baba Wali Kotal. “Ayub’s army
is behind that; let us hope he will stay there”—was the substance of our
talk for the first few minutes as we looked down from the last rolling
hill above the Robat villages; and then came inquiries as to the
position of Candahar. Some distance to the left of the “Brigade Major,”
and separated from it by a break in the range, rose a conical hill at
the foot of a higher ridge. Candahar was said to lie, in our line of
vision, directly beneath this hill. Captain Straton had brought with him
some of his mounted signallers, and at half-past eleven a light was
directed towards Candahar. We could not see the city, even with our
telescopes, as a thick haze hung over the country about it, and for a
quarter of an hour no answer was given. The first signal station was on
a low hillock to the left of the road, but Captain Straton took another
instrument to the slope of a rocky ridge on the right, whence also he
could communicate with the main body of our troops halted for the day at
Khel-i-Akhund. He had scarcely left the road than Sergeant Anderson,
with the first heliograph, saw a faint flash at Candahar. It was so weak
a glimmer that nothing could be made out, but in a few minutes we read a
message:—“Who are you?” The answer given was “General Gough and two
regiments of cavalry,” and then Captain Straton’s light was evidently
seen by the signallers in Candahar, who, puzzled by two flashes,
asked:—“Where are you?” After this, our first station was closed, and
the signallers with Captain Straton began sending messages from Colonel
Chapman to General Primrose. We learned that all was well with them in
Candahar, and that Colonel St. John would ride out to Robat in the
afternoon. The two cavalry regiments then moved down to Robat, and as
all their baggage had arrived at half-past twelve, camp was at once
pitched. This forced march of thirty-four miles was in itself quite a
little success, and that the baggage animals should be only an hour
behind the sowars proved that with proper management there need be no
difficulty in moving cavalry long distances, even when tents and all the
belongings of a regiment are brought on. The heat has been terrific all
day, and without tents we should have suffered much discomfort.
At four o’clock this afternoon, as Colonel St. John had not arrived,
Colonel Chapman started for the camp at Khel-i-Akhund with a small
escort. His day’s ride will be fifty-four miles, but his untiring energy
will carry him through, and it is important Sir Frederick Roberts should
have his Chief of the Staff with him owing to his own illness. About
five o’clock our videttes looking toward Candahar sent word that a body
of cavalry was coming across the plain; and the sowars, only too anxious
to have a brush with the enemy, raised a cry that the Afghan horsemen
were coming. We fully believed it to be merely Colonel St. John and his
escort, but the 3rd Bengal Cavalry were ordered to stand to their
horses, and we saddled up to be ready for an emergency. In half an hour
the cloud of dust which the videttes had seen resolved itself at first
into two horsemen, Colonel St. John and Major Leech, V.C., R.E., who
were soon shaking hands with General Gough and his Staff. They had
ridden ahead of Major Adam and the troop of Poona Horse under Captain
Anderson, which was acting as escort, and which our own party had hoped
was a detachment of Ayub’s cavalry. We made our guests as comfortable as
our limited camp equipage would permit, and then we listened to long
stories of the disaster at Maiwand, the terrible retreat back to
Candahar, the abandonment of cantonments, and the subsequent investment
of the city, with its leading incident of the sortie of the 16th inst.
So many serious charges could be framed on these stories, that until I
have had full time to examine quietly into the whole affair I will
refrain from mentioning them. The necessity for the assembling of a
court of inquiry as soon as we have re-established our military
supremacy is so great that both the Indian Government and the military
authorities will utterly fail in their duty, if they do not order such a
court to be formed. There can be no lack of evidence, and the blame
should fall on those primarily responsible for rendering possible such a
disaster as we have now come to retrieve, while the charges against
individuals and regiments should be investigated without fear of
consequences. I hope hereafter to tell the plain story of the action at
Maiwand and the retreat upon Candahar, as also to see what justification
there was for abandoning cantonments before General Burrows and the
Chief Political Officer had arrived. Serious reflections may have to be
cast. If we are successful in crushing Ayub, there may be a feeling that
ugly truths should be slurred over and everything made pleasant all
round, but this would be a fatal mistake. A repetition of the events of
the last month might seriously imperil our military prestige in the eyes
of Asiatic nations, and re-act dangerously upon our Indian Empire.
CANDAHAR, _31st August, Evening_.
We are at last “in touch” with the enemy, and while I am writing a sharp
interchange of shots is taking place between our picquets near the
Abasabad village and certain bloodthirsty Afghans who have been stirred
up by a reconnaissance made this afternoon. Ayub’s guns on the Baba Wali
Kotal are also booming out, and one or two shells have fallen into camp,
but have done no damage. Before describing our position here I may as
well bring to a close the story of Sir Frederick Roberts’s rapid march
to relieve the Candahar garrison.
On August 28th, the main body of the Cabul Force marched from
Khel-i-Akhund to Robat, a distance of twenty miles, all the sick and
footsore being left about ten miles short of Robat, in charge of Colonel
Tanner with the 2nd Beluchis. Our forced marching was now at an end;
Candahar was relieved, and as our spies reported that Ayub had no
intention of running away, there was no necessity for hurrying under the
walls of Candahar itself. On August 29th we enjoyed a halt while Colonel
Tanner brought in the sick, and on the 30th we quietly changed camp to
Momand, some eleven miles nearer the city. General Roberts’s
forced-marching may therefore be looked upon as ending with Robat, when
the extraordinary distance of 303 miles had been covered in twenty days.
I may be wrong in stating that such a march of 10,000 fighting men is
unprecedented, but there can only be one opinion as to the energy of the
General who could direct such a movement, and the endurance of the men
to carry it out. From Beni Hissar to Robat our marches (as marked by
head-quarters) were as follows:—
August 9th to Zahidabad 16 miles.
” 10th to Zerghun Shahr 14 ”
” 11th to Padkhao Barak 18 ”
” 12th to Amir Kila 11 ”
” 13th to Takia 12 ”
” 14th to Shashgao 17 ”
” 15th to Ghazni 13 ”
” 16th to Yergatta 20 ”
” 17th to Chardeh 12 ”
” 18th to Oba Karez 16 ”
” 19th to Mukur 15 ”
” 20th to Panjak 21 ”
” 21st to Garjui 18 ”
” 22nd to Bala Kazai 17 ”
” 23rd to Khelat-i-Ghilzai 17 ”
” 24th _Halt_.
” 25th to Jaldak 16 ”
” 26th to Tirandez 16 ”
” 27th to Khel-i-Akhund 14 ”
” 28th to Robat 20 ”
Thus, as I have said, in twenty days more than 300 miles have been
covered, giving an average (including one day’s halt) of fifteen miles
per day. I will leave it to military critics to decide as to the merits
of such a march. Our hospital returns at Robat show 68 Europeans, 448
sepoys, and 291 followers, to be under treatment: a small percentage out
of 18,000 men.
------------------------------------
CHAPTER III.
The Arrival at Candahar—Meeting of Sir F. Roberts and General
Primrose—The Entry into the City—Loyal Sirdars—Reconnaissance along
the Herat Road—Demonstrations in Force by the Afghans—Steadiness of
our Native Troops—The Battle of Candahar—The Enemy’s Position—Sir
Frederick Roberts’s Plan of Attack—Occupation of Gundigan by Ayub
Khan—Strength of the British Force—Storming of the Village of Mullah
Sahibdad by Macpherson’s Brigade—Bombardment of the Baba Wali
Kotal—General Baker’s Movement on the Left Flank—Difficult Nature of
the Ground—Death of Captain Frome and Colonel Brownlow, 72nd
Highlanders—A Charge by Ghazis—The Turning of the Pir Paimal
Ridge—Major White’s Gallantry—Bayonet Charge of the 92nd Highlanders
and Capture of Two Guns—Dispersion of the Afghan Array and Advance
upon Mazra—Capture of Ayub’s Camp and Thirty-three Guns—Description
of the Camp—Recovery of Small-Arm Ammunition—The Death of Captain
Straton and Lieutenant Maclaine—The Cavalry Pursuit—The Casualties
in the British Ranks.
CANDAHAR, _31st August, 1880, Evening_.
Our entry into Candahar has been made without any great parade, and with
rather a lack of enthusiasm on the part of the garrison we have
relieved. This morning our force left Momand and marched slowly towards
Candahar, where the leading regiments of Macpherson’s brigade piled arms
outside the Shikarpur Gate soon after 9 o’clock. Sir Frederick Roberts
was still so weak from fever brought on by exposure to the sun, that he
was carried in a dhoolie to within two or three miles of the city. Here
he managed to mount his horse, and, with General Ross and his Staff, to
ride forward. He was met some distance east of Deh-i-Khwaja by General
Primrose and his brigadiers, with their respective staffs, Colonel St.
John, and other officers of the garrison. There was much hand-shaking
and hasty introduction, and then the united party rode across the
cultivated ground and made for the southern face of the city.
Deh-i-Khwaja was passed with its doomed houses, and strong enclosures
half-hidden by trees, wherein so many men fell on the 16th, and then we
passed fatigue parties of Bombay sepoys at work clearing out the _karez_
on that side of the city. Outside the Shikarpur Gate was a crowd of
natives and soldiers, a rude sort of bazaar having been established, and
it was with some difficulty a way was made through the throng. It was
arranged that our troops were to halt outside this Gate and breakfast
quietly, prior to any movements which might afterwards be decided upon.
General Roberts and Staff rode into the city with the usual cavalry
escort, and here a rather ridiculous ceremony was gone through. We had
been much impressed by sand-bags on the parapet and in the flanking
bastions, wire entanglement and _abattis_ outside the walls, and other
signs of the late stern business on hand, when suddenly, as we rode
bravely up the broad streets towards the citadel, we came across the
Wali Shere Ali “and the rest of the royal family,” as they were
irrelevantly dubbed, drawn up on horseback on the right of the road.
They were clad in most gorgeous attire, so dazzling to the eye that in
the sunshine the effect was overpowering; while their helmets of velvet,
or whatever stuff they might be, were so bespiked, besilvered, and made
generally beautiful, that our poor _khaki_ headpieces sank into
insignificance. Their chargers were tail-down in the dirty drain
skirting the road, but when they were spurred forward and shook their
crests and curvetted in all proud wilfulness, one quite expected a
riding-master to step forward and cry “Houp-la!” for there never was a
better imitation of a circus pageant on a small scale. General Roberts
was politeness itself to the unlucky Wali, whose only anxiety, I hear,
is to retire to India on a pension, and the cavalcade went prancing up
the street to Char Soo, where the two main roads of Candahar bisect each
other. Here a turn to the left was taken along a sort of boulevard, and
then the Wali and suite plunged into a narrow by-path which led to the
Nawab’s house. Rooms were placed at General Roberts’s disposal therein,
but I am unable to say if any real circus does exist within the walls,
as no one under the rank of a first-class aide-de-camp was admitted.
It was not long before the first movement paving the way to an attack
upon Ayub Khan’s position was made. That position may be roughly
described as lying between the Argandab River and Candahar, from which
it is separated by a high range of hills, through which on the right is
a path leading over the Murcha Kotal (commanded on all sides), while the
Baba Wali Kotal gives direct access in front. This Kotal has now three
or four guns upon it, and our spies report the narrow road over it to
have been destroyed. To the south-west of this Kotal runs the Pir Paimal
Hill, a precipitous ridge protecting Ayoub’s right, but liable to be
turned as it ends abruptly in the plain. As this plain is covered with
orchards and walled enclosures, with scores of deep water-cuts and
channels running in every direction, any turning movement we may make
must have for its first object the clearing of the ground in front of
the south-west face of the ridge. Fortunately there is on the southern
face of Baba Wali Kotal and the Pir Paimal Ridge an inferior ridge,
quite detached from the main ranges, and with from 1,000 to 2,000 yards
of fairly open country intervening. This ridge has on the east a point
known as Picquet Hill, commanding the cantonments, while the portion to
the south-west is called Karez Hill from certain wells of pure
spring-water near its foot. It was thought our brigades could encamp
safely in rear of these, as they would be protected from shells thrown
from the Baba Wali Kotal, and accordingly General Ross directed
Macpherson’s Brigade, with the screw-guns and two of the C-2 Battery,
R.A., to push forward and occupy Picquet and Karez Hills. The troops
moved off from the Shikarpur Gate before noon, and in an hour Colonel
Chapman heliographed to General Roberts, who was still resting in
Candahar:—“Line of advance secured without opposition.” A few shots were
fired, but they were at long ranges, and it was found that the village
of Gundigan, in the heart of the orchards and enclosures, had not been
occupied by the enemy, which was a great point in our favour. The other
two brigades of infantry under Generals Baker and Macgregor were
accordingly ordered by General Ross to take up their positions under
Picquet and Karez Hills; and the relative position of our infantry is
now as follows:—In rear of Picquet Hill, and consequently nearest to
cantonments, General Baker’s Brigade; on his left General Macpherson’s
Brigade, sheltered by Karez Hill; and again to the extreme left, nearest
Gundigan and the Herat Road, General Macgregor’s troops, which are
partly in orchards.
Finding the enemy not in position in front of the Pir Paimal ridge,
Colonel Chapman thought a reconnaissance should be made to “draw” Ayub’s
army more from its shell, and this afternoon the 3rd Bengal Cavalry,
under command of Colonel Mackenzie, supported by the 15th Sikhs and two
mountain guns, moved out along the Herat Road to some low hills, whence
a view of the basin in rear of Pir Paimal and Baba Wali Kotal could be
obtained. General Hugh Gough and Colonel Chapman accompanied the
reconnoitring party in order to direct its movements. The cavalry met
with no opposition, and made their way for 3 or 4 miles without any
difficulty, but presently armed men were seen running from orchard to
orchard and from enclosure to enclosure, plainly hoping to get between
the reconnoitring party and our main body. Accordingly it was determined
to retire, and no sooner did the Afghans see the sowars get into motion
than they swarmed out from the rear of Pir Paimal and opened a hot fire
with Martinis and Sniders. But our cavalry were well in hand and retired
at a walk, the 15th Sikhs skirmishing out to protect them. The enemy
unmasked five guns about Pir Paimal and shelled our men with great
energy, but this did not hurry our movements. The cavalry completed its
retirement with only four casualties, and then the 15th Sikhs found they
had to bear an attack from some 5,000 men, who pressed them very
closely. Ayub’s regulars must have been amongst them, as bugle-calls
were sounded, and there was an attempt at regular formation now and then
when charges were made. The Sikhs behaved admirably, although crowds of
Afghans were at times within 50 yards of them. From the firing it seemed
as if Ayoub were about to risk a general action, the meaning of our
reconnaissance being misunderstood. General Macgregor turned out the 4th
Ghoorkas and some of the Rifles to cover the final retirement of the
15th Sikhs, and steady volley firing checked the onward movement of the
enemy. The Ghoorkas occupied the village of Chilzina and the near
heights, thus making our left flank secure. It was not, however, until
after six o’clock that the firing lulled, the rattle of musketry being
increased by the gunners on the Baba Wali Kotal firing over the breaks
in Picquet Hill upon the 1st and 2nd Brigades. The 15th Sikhs have had
one man killed and four or five wounded—a very slight loss indeed,
considering the heavy fire they were exposed to. The reconnaissance has
been a great success, for we have ascertained that Ayub is holding Pir
Paimal in strength, and has at least five guns in position there.
To-morrow we shall direct an attack on his right flank, and once Pir
Paimal is captured, we can take the Baba Wali Kotal in reverse. The
firing from that Kotal has only resulted in frightening a few mules,
most of the shells not bursting. Our picquets are likely to be kept well
awake by the sharp-shooters of Ayub, who are in the orchards skirting
the Herat Road.
CANDAHAR CANTONMENTS, _3rd September_.
The reconnaissance made on the afternoon of the 31st of August had
demonstrated that Ayub Khan had with him a large body of men anxious to
meet our force at the earliest opportunity. The picquets of the 60th
Rifles holding Karez Hill were fired into all night by small parties of
the enemy, who took shelter behind the rocks on the northern slope of
the hill, and among the orchards and enclosures below. From what we have
since heard there can be no doubt that the Afghan army were much elated
with the affair of the previous day, and did not at all understand that
our object had been merely to draw them a little from their position, so
as to feel our way cautiously before delivering a decisive attack. We
have been told that they looked upon our reconnaissance as an attempt to
force the left of their position by way of Pir Paimal, and consequently
made up their minds that, having failed in that quarter, we should next
turn our attention to the Baba Wali Kotal. I do not know whether I have
already explained quite clearly the relative positions of our own and
Ayub Khan’s army, and I will therefore once more sketch the ground on
which the action took place.
Taking the city of Candahar itself as a point from which the bearings
may be fixed, there lies to the north-west, at a distance of between two
and three miles, a range of hills which may be considered an offshoot
from the chief range trending away to the north and forming the eastern
boundary of the Argandab Valley. Due north of the city is a break in the
chief range known as the Murcha Kotal, which leads into the rich
Argandab Valley beyond. The hills to the south-west from this Kotal are
a good deal broken and are generally extremely precipitous. At some
pre-historic period there has been a great convulsion, in which the
range has been shattered and a series of half-isolated ridges and
detached hills formed. Thus, from the Murcha Kotal, in a south-westerly
direction, stretches a high ridge, then a slight dip, then a rounded
hill rising to a height of nearly 1,500 feet (known by the name of the
Brigade Major), with sides naturally scarped, then a rapid fall and a
break in the continuity of the ridge which allows a road to pass over
the range at a moderate incline. The Kotal thus formed is known as the
Baba Wali, and as the crow flies it lies exactly two miles and a half
from the north-west bastion of the city. To its eastern front are some
low rolling hills on which Ayub Khan usually stationed a cavalry
picquet. From the Baba Wali Kotal the ridge gradually rises again until
its highest peaks are 1,200 feet above the plain: it never loses its
precipitous character, and, looked at from Candahar, appears quite
inaccessible on its southern face. It stretches about a mile, always in
a south-westerly direction from the Kotal, and then ends abruptly in the
plain, there being a sheer fall of several hundred feet at its western
end. It is here that the gap occurs through which the road from Candahar
to Herat passes, and the canals from the Argandab are conducted which
supply water to the city and the neighbouring villages. Looking from
Candahar westwards, one sees on the right the precipitous ridge known as
the Pir Paimal Hill, and on the left another high ridge overlooking the
ruins of old Candahar. The intermediate space has in the background a
striking conical hill and various other disrupted masses thrown off from
the higher ridges. The foreground is simply a network of orchards,
gardens, and walled enclosures, between which and the city walls lie the
cantonments built by us forty years ago. Fortunately there also lies,
some 2,000 yards south of the Pir Paimal Ridge, a detached ridge which
would serve as a screen to any force making a demonstration against the
Kotal, or attempting a turning movement round by way of the Argandab
canals. The eastern part of this subsidiary ridge is known as Picquet
Hill, a picquet being generally posted upon it as a guard to the
cantonments and to watch the Kotal; while the remainder of the ridge is
called Karez Hill, from the springs found a little to the south of it.
Both these hills are within range of field-guns placed on the Kotal, but
troops encamped beneath them on the southern side are well sheltered.
The walled enclosures previously mentioned cluster very thickly on
either side of the Herat Road, and with the orchards give good cover to
the troops encamped about them. Such an encampment was formed by General
Roberts on the afternoon of the 31st August; the 3rd Brigade (General
Macgregor) being across the Herat Road and in rear of the westernmost
point of Karez Hill; the 1st Brigade (General Macpherson) coming next on
his right below the low line of rocks connecting the two hills, and the
2nd Brigade (General Baker) being half a mile in rear of Picquet Hill
and close to the western part of the cantonments. General Roberts had
taken up his head-quarters in Rahim Dil Khan’s house, formerly used as
the habitation of the Royal Engineers. This house was in rear of the 1st
and 2nd Brigades, and the enemy tried to get its range: but only one
blind shell was pitched within the walls of the garden. A telegraph
office was opened in one of the lower rooms, the wire being laid from
the Candahar citadel, to enable direct communication to be kept up with
the city. On the evening of the 31st the plan of attack was finally
decided upon, its main features being a heavy cannonade and
demonstration of infantry against the Baba Wali Kotal, whilst the 1st
and 2nd Brigades were to force the enemy’s right by way of Pir Paimal,
take the Kotal in reverse, and then storm Ayub’s “entrenched” camp at
Mazra, two miles or more up the Argandab Valley. The Bombay brigade of
cavalry were to watch the Murcha Kotal, while General Roberts’s cavalry,
under command of General Hugh Gough, were to cross the Argandab River
and cut off the enemy’s retreat westward. It may be as well, now, to
mention that the cavalry could not get direct to the river as was
expected; the village of Gundigan, which they had found deserted on the
previous day, and through which they had to pass, having been strongly
occupied by the enemy during the night. This village was in the midst of
the orchards lying westwards of Karez Hill, and it showed great
enterprise on the part of Ayub to occupy it after our reconnaissance had
been made.
The brigades told off to make the turning movement round the Pir Paimal
Ridge mustered the following strength (including officers) at roll-call
on the morning of the 1st:—
1st BRIGADE, COMMANDED BY GENERAL MACPHERSON.
9-8, Royal Artillery (six screw-guns) 218 officers and men.
92nd Highlanders 501 ” ”
2nd Ghoorkas 411 ” ”
23rd Pioneers 600 ” ”
24th Punjab Infantry 361 ” ”
——
Total strength 2,091
2nd BRIGADE, COMMANDED BY GENERAL BAKER.
No. 2 Mountain Battery (six guns) 200 officers and men.
72nd Highlanders 561 ” ”
2nd Sikhs 495 ” ”
3rd Sikhs 441 ” ”
5th Ghoorkas 477 ” ”
2nd Beluchis 444 ” ”
——
Total strength 2,618
The 3rd Brigade, commanded by General Macgregor, was held in reserve on
its own camping-ground. Its strength was as follows:—
3RD BRIGADE, COMMANDED BY GENERAL MACGREGOR.
11-9, Royal Artillery, Mountain Battery 126 officers and men.
(six guns)
2-60th Rifles 517 ” ”
4th Ghoorkas 516 ” ”
15th Sikhs 498 ” ”
25th Punjab Infantry 526 ” ”
———
Total strength 2,183
From the Candahar garrison the following troops were detailed by General
Primrose, and from this list and that which follows, the strength of the
garrison when relieved can be made out:—
────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────
Corps. British. Native.
────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────
Officers. Men.
────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────
Divisional Staff 6 — —
Cavalry Brigade Staff 3 — —
1st Brigade Staff 2 — —
2nd Brigade Staff 2 — —
E-B, Royal Horse Artillery 6 139 —
C-2, Royal Artillery 5 135 —
5-11, Royal Artillery 3 92 —
2-7th Fusiliers 13 376 —
66th Regiment 11 229 —
1st Grenadiers Native Infantry 3 — 152
4th Rifles Native Infantry 4 — 335
19th Native Infantry 6 — 508
28th Native Infantry 3 — 400
No. 2 Company Sappers 1 — 38
Poona Horse 4 — 125
3rd Scind Horse 4 — 410
3rd Bombay Light Cavalry 5 — 218
────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────
Total 81 971 2,186
────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────
The total strength of this force of Bombay troops amounted to a little
over 3,220, with fourteen guns, viz., four 40-pounders, four 9-pounder
Horse Artillery, and six 9-pounder field-guns.
There were left in garrison in the citadel and guarding the city the
following troops:—
2-7th Fusiliers—two officers, 182 men; 66th Regiment—two officers, 146
men; 1st Grenadiers—one officer, 152 men; and 30th Native Infantry
(Jacob’s Rifles)—three officers and 330 men; or a total of 768 officers
and men.
Our troops breakfasted at eight o’clock, and an hour later they were
ready for the hard day’s work before them. Sir F. Roberts moved his
head-quarters to Karez Hill, Rahim Dil Khan’s house being allotted for
the day to General Primrose and his Staff. Captain Straton had
established heliographic stations at various points, linking the force
together wherever it should move, the three chief stations being on
Karez Hill, the roof of Rahim Dil Khan’s house, and on a spur commanding
the Herat Road above the village of Chilzina, near old Candahar.
[Illustration:
SKETCH MAP
TO ILLUSTRATE THE ACTION
AT
KANDAHAR,
1ST SEPTEMBER 1880.
_Taken from the 1-inch Map of Kandahar_
_by Major Leach R.E., and Lieut. Longe, R.E._]
The enemy had been firing intermittently both from the Baba Wali Kotal
and the Gundigan direction from daybreak, and it looked as if they were
full of fight and not inclined to shirk joining issue with us. Our
original plan had to be somewhat modified owing to Ayub Khan or his
generalissimo, the Naib Hafizulla, having pushed their men round to the
southern face of the Pir Paimal Ridge. Gundigan had been occupied during
the night, and the order that Gough’s cavalry with the four guns of E-B,
R.H.A. (escorted by two companies of the 7th Fusiliers and four
companies of the 28th Bombay Native Infantry), should form up on the low
hill above the village could not be carried out. The movement was
attempted, but it was at once seen that the place must be cleared by our
infantry before cavalry could hope to get past. The movements of the
cavalry on our left, which were to have been simultaneous with those of
the two attacking brigades, were therefore delayed, General Gough having
to take his brigade some eight miles round before he could strike the
Argandab River. This was one forced modification of our plans, and a
second was that the village of Mullah Sahibdad, on a low mound between
Karez Hill and the Pir Paimal Ridge, had to be taken first by General
Macpherson’s Brigade, as some hundreds of Afghans had established
themselves in it after nightfall the previous day. But all this was
known long before General Roberts moved to Karez Hill, and preparations
were made accordingly. General Ross had command of the infantry attack,
and directed General Macpherson’s Brigade to move forward through the
gap between the Picquet and Karez Hills, clear the village of Mullah
Sahibdad in their left front, and then pass on under the Pir Paimal
Ridge, working their way between the canals along the lower slopes.
General Baker was ordered to take his brigade out to the left of Karez
Hill, skirmish through the orchards, clear Gundigan village, and all the
enclosures about it, and join hands with the 1st Brigade in the final
movement round the Pir Paimal Ridge. Macpherson’s Brigade was to be the
brigade of direction, as it was moving on an inner line, and would
probably first reach the Pir Paimal village on the northern slope of the
ridge, to capture which would ensure the Baba Wali Kotal being taken in
reverse. The action commenced soon after nine o’clock by our
demonstration against that Kotal. In Kalacha-i-Haidar, near our old
cavalry lines and some 2,200 yards from the Baba Wali Kotal,
Brigadier-General Burrows had in position four 40-pounder breech-loading
Armstrong guns, with four companies of the 7th Fusiliers, the 4th and
19th Bombay Infantry, and some Sappers. Six guns of C-2, R.A., were also
in position at the Childukhteran village, between Karez and the Picquet
Hills. Brigadier-General Daubeny, with four companies of the 66th Foot
and four companies of the 28th Bombay Infantry, was holding a line
between Chilzina on the left and Picquet Hill on the right; the latter
hill being crowned by two companies of the 1st Grenadiers. Further away
on the right Brigadier-General Nuttall was watching both the Baba Wali
and Murcha Kotals with the 3rd Scind Horse, 3rd Bombay Light Cavalry,
and the head-quarters of the Poona Horse. This made a good display of
force on our right, and at 9.15 A.M. precisely the 40-pounders began a
vigorous cannonade of the Baba Wali Kotal. The shells seemed to burst
with great accuracy, but the three guns of the enemy in position there
answered bravely enough, the shells showing that two breech-loading
Armstrong 9-pounders and one of our own Horse Artillery guns were
mounted in the Pass. There was much stir and excitement among such of
the enemy as could be seen on the hills, but this was greatly increased
when the guns of C-2 began shelling the village of Mullah Sahibdad.
Bullets from Martini and Snider rifles could be heard singing overhead,
as if the Afghan marksmen tried long shots in the direction of the
battery; but the enemy in the village kept well under cover, and when
six guns of the screw battery also opened upon the houses from just in
front of the Karez Hill, the shelling was so continuous that no one
dared show himself beyond the walls. Under cover of this fire General
Ross began the infantry movement. General Macpherson moved the 2nd
Ghoorkas and 92nd Highlanders out to the right and front of the village,
the 23rd Pioneers (who had furnished an escort to the screw-guns), and
the 24th Punjabees following the leading regiments as supports. At the
same time General Baker got his brigade into motion and entered the
orchards and enclosures which shut him out from Gundigan.
To follow the movements of General Macpherson’s Brigade first: the 92nd
and 2nd Ghoorkas had orders to “rush” the village without a halt, and
they carried out their orders to perfection. It was the turn of the
Ghoorkas to lead the brigade, and they were first out into the open,
skirmishing rapidly forward under Colonel Battye and going straight for
the southern front of the village. The 92nd under Colonel Parker worked
round to the right, never pausing and doing but little in the way of
returning the enemy’s fire, which now became very rapid, the Afghans
appearing on the roofs of the houses and lining every available wall.
C-2 and 6-8 batteries renewed their shelling over the heads of our men,
and this had a good moral effect, as the roofs of the houses were swept
by shrapnel. At half-past ten the village had been carried at the point
of the bayonet, the Ghoorkas, having the shortest distance to cover,
entering first from the Karez Hill side, while the 92nd rushed in from
the opposite side. A stubborn resistance was offered to their advance,
the 92nd losing several men killed and wounded; among the latter being
Lieutenants Menzies and Stewart. Lieutenant-Colonel Battye of the 2nd
Ghoorkas was slightly wounded on the right shoulder, but he continued to
lead his men. The village was full of ghazis, who sold their lives
dearly, many shutting themselves up in underground chambers and firing
upon our men as they passed. Some 200 Afghans were killed in this
village alone. Lieutenant Menzies had a narrow escape. After he had been
wounded he was placed in an empty room, for the sake of shade and
comfort, when a ghazi, hidden in an inner room, rushed out, cut down one
of the guard, and slashed Menzies over the head and back. The fanatic
was killed before he could do any further mischief. C-2 and 6-8
batteries advanced when the village had been taken, and were soon again
in action, firing at the lower slopes of the ridge and into such bodies
of Afghans as could be seen in the enclosures in front. So many men
remained hidden in the village that Lieutenant-Colonel Battye remained
with some of the Ghoorkas to clear them out; and two low hills north of
the village had also to be cleared by part of the brigade, as the enemy,
scattered about, occupied them in considerable numbers. But the main
advance could not be delayed for these considerations, and the 92nd and
two companies of the 2nd Ghoorkas (under Major Becher), with the 23rd
Pioneers and 24th Punjab Native Infantry in support, disregarding a few
shells from the Baba Wali Kotal, moved towards the south-western end of
the ridge above them. They soon became involved in dry water-cuts,
orchards, and enclosures, every yard of which had to be skirmished
through, while a smart fire was poured down upon them from the crest of
the ridge where the enemy mustered in force. General Macpherson told off
picked marksmen to keep down this fire from above, and their steady
shooting checked it to a great extent. Leaving Major White with the
leading companies of the 92nd and Major Becher with his Ghoorkas to
continue their hard fight round the corner of the ridge, I must turn now
to the 2nd Brigade, which had penetrated into the maze of walls, trees
and water-cuts on the left of General Macpherson’s line of advance.
General Baker, upon moving out to the left of the Karez Hill, had, in
his first line, the 72nd Highlanders, under Colonel Brownlow, and the
2nd Sikhs, the latter being on the right. In the next line, in immediate
support, were the 5th Ghoorkas (in rear of the 72nd), No. 2 Mountain
Battery, and the 3rd Sikhs (in rear of the 2nd Sikhs), with the 2nd
Beluchis in reserve and escorting the Field Hospital. I have indicated
the work which lay in front of the brigade, which had to work its way
through walled orchards and gardens, where it was difficult to keep
touch, and where at times the men could only see a few yards on either
hand. But the work was done splendidly, the order of the day being to
keep moving, and when once engaged to go steadily onward until the ridge
should be turned. The right wing of the 72nd Highlanders, under Major
Stockwell, carried orchard after orchard; but one check occurred where
Captain Frome’s company, resting for a moment in a dry watercourse, was
subjected to a terrible enfilading fire from a loopholed wall which the
2nd Sikhs were trying to turn on the right. Captain Frome and several
men were shot down, and just when the fire was hottest Colonel Brownlow
came up. He was on foot, and had just entered the watercourse, and was
ordering a rush forward to be made when he was struck in the neck by a
bullet and mortally wounded. He was dragged a little under cover, but
died in a few minutes. His second in command, Major Stockwell, hearing
of his death, hurried to the watercourse where Captain Frome’s men were
lying under such shelter as they could get, and forming them up round a
protecting elbow of the channel made a rush at the wall. Once under the
loopholes, the men were safe; and the defenders of the wall beginning to
waver, the Highlanders placed the muzzles of their rifles through the
loopholes from outside and poured a few volleys into the enclosure,
completely demoralizing such of the enemy as remained. From this
isolated struggle, which cost the 72nd so dear, an idea of the severity
of the fighting may be formed. The right wing of the 72nd and the 2nd
Sikhs were forced by the enemy’s tactics to cover so much ground to the
right that they left Gundigan on their left rear; but the left wing of
the Highlanders under Major Guinness, and the 5th Ghoorkas, under
Captain FitzHugh, cleared it with ease; so shaken were the men left to
defend it by seeing their fellows running from the orchards beyond.
General Baker’s right had cleared the densest part of the gardens a
short distance in advance of the 92nd on the right, but no sooner did
they come a little into the open than the masses of the enemy in front
tried to “rush” them; while three guns in position at the foot of a high
hill, Kharoti Ridge, north of the Pir Paimal Ridge, opened fire upon
them. Some of the ghazis actually charged into the ranks of the 2nd
Sikhs, but could make no impression. The 72nd, seeing a large body of
men preparing for a rush, fixed bayonets and charged out, completely
dispersing the armed mob in front of them. One ghazi, more resolute than
the rest, was shot by a sergeant at five yards’ distance. Captain Murray
had just given the word to charge, and had leaped out of a ditch with
his men, when he was struck in the shoulder by a bullet fired from the
ridge and severely wounded.
The 92nd Highlanders and Major Becher’s Ghoorkas were now in alignment
with the right of General Baker’s Brigade, and the time had come for the
final rush round the ridge. The enemy’s right rested on the northern
slope of Pir Paimal Ridge and extended across a basin (it can scarcely
be called a kotal) between that ridge and the high Kharoti hill to the
north already referred to. Behind the northern hill the large canals and
watercourses from the Argandab River run, the river itself being a few
hundred yards beyond the series of channels. It was in this basin that
Ayub’s army made its final stand. It had no real entrenchments to line,
but a deep water-cut 12 feet broad, with banks 2 or 3 feet high, and
with cultivated fields in front, served as an excellent defence. The
banks had been ingeniously loopholed for rifle-fire. There were two
camps of twenty or thirty tents each in rear of this channel. The first
was well away to General Baker’s left under the northern hill, and in it
were three guns; the second was in the middle of the basin and had two
guns in position. The village of Pir Paimal was on the slope some
distance to the left front of the second camp and right in the path of
Macpherson’s Brigade. The latter were moving in an inner circle close
under the ridge, while General Baker’s troops had to work well round to
the left so as to close with the guns under the northern hill and block
all escape from the basin in that direction.
The action from this point can best be understood by following the
movements of the 92nd Highlanders and 2nd Ghoorkas. They rounded the
south-western face of the Pir Paimal Ridge, and succeeded in capturing
the village of that name by a series of “rushes” and by turning the
walls on the right. Major White, with the leading companies of his
regiment, then found himself face to face with some thousands of men,
who seemed determined to make a final stand about their two guns in the
basin. The plan of our attack was for the two brigades to sweep steadily
up the basin in line; but General Macpherson saw that as he had advanced
so far, and there was a tendency among the enemy to surge forward in
overwhelming numbers, there was nothing for it but to continue his
advance. Whenever the 92nd and Ghoorkas halted and tried volley-firing
the enemy ceased to retire, and began skirmishing back to the places
from which they had been driven. The 23rd Pioneers had also worked up on
the left to aid the Highlanders, and Major White got his men together
for a charge. The enemy had tried, by turning the water into another and
a dry channel, to check our advance; but this was a complete mistake.
Our men were faint from thirst, and they welcomed the water as giving
new life and strength. Major White rode along the front of the
watercourse in which the Highlanders were lying under cover and called
out to them: “Highlanders, will you follow me if I give you a lead for
those guns?” There was but one answer—a ringing cheer, and the next
moment the men were rushing across the open ground led by the pipers,
playing the _Slogan_, while Major White rode serenely on in front
drawing upon himself a terrific fire. The guns were in rear of a
watercourse with high banks, and sheltered by this the Afghans fired
rapidly and well. A small building protected their right, and some 300
or 400 riflemen lying on the slopes of the Pir Paimal Hill poured in a
heavy cross-fire upon the 92nd. But the Highlanders were not to be
checked, and though upwards of forty men of the leading companies fell,
killed or wounded, they carried the guns at the point of the bayonet.
Major White leaped into the watercourse some yards ahead of his men, and
found that his horse could not climb up the steep bank. He therefore
remained quietly watching the enemy firing almost into his face, one
Afghan deliberately aiming at his head at a few yards’ distance. This
man and some ghazis were killed where they stood, Major White getting
his horse out of the ditch just as the Highlanders jumped into the
water. The artillerymen had deserted their guns some time before, and
had left both pieces double-shotted. A story, which is well found if it
be not true, is told of a Ghoorka who had attached himself all day to
the Highlanders. He managed to reach one of the guns first, and leaping
up on it he waved his cap and cried in Hindustani:—“This gun belongs to
_my_ regiment—2nd Ghoorkas! Prince of Wales’s!” Then he thrust his cap
down the muzzle, in order that there might be no dispute as to future
ownership. The brilliant charge of the 92nd, ably seconded by Major
Becher and his two companies of the 2nd Ghoorkas, with the 23rd Pioneers
rushing up in support, was one of the leading incidents of the day, the
rapidity of the whole affair being almost as startling to General
Roberts and General Ross as it must have been to the enemy.[48] The mass
of men, said variously to have numbered from 8,000 to 10,000, who had
gathered in the orchards and been driven into the basin and towards the
rear of the Baba Wali Kotal, were hopelessly broken by the steady wave
of men which swept them backward. General Baker’s brigade harried them
whenever they tried to cling to cover in the lower watercourses, and the
92nd were driven like a wedge between them and the slopes of the ridge,
smashing into their midst when they tried to rally at the two guns, and
utterly breaking what little cohesion they still possessed. The first
stream of the fugitives poured out from the orchards, and made for the
Argandab in the direction of Kokaran, many of them falling into the
hands of our cavalry; the next stream poured back into Ayub’s camp,
carrying the news of the defeat, and attracting to them the escort of
the guns on the Baba Wali Kotal. The last two shots fired by these guns
were in the direction of Karez Hill; the first, pitched three hundred
yards short of where General Roberts was sitting on the crest of the
ridge, did not burst, while the second went whizzing overhead far into
the gardens beyond. The screw-guns of 6-8 battery fired a few parting
rounds at the fugitives making for Mazra, and then Macpherson halted his
brigade and formed up his regiments at the foot of the northern slope of
the Pir Paimal Ridge. General Baker had called a halt some time before,
any serious firing directed against his fighting line having ceased when
the orchards had been cleared, and the line had swung round to make the
turning movement round the ridge. Nearly all the enemy, so far dealt
with, had been irregulars, and the bayonet charge of the 72nd had
checked whatever latent ghazi-ism there might be among them. During the
halt the fighting line of the 2nd Brigade was reformed as follows:—5th
Ghoorkas on the left, 3rd Sikhs in centre, and 2nd Beluchis on the
right. The 72nd and 2nd Sikhs, with Swinley’s Mountain Battery, were in
rear, replenishing their ammunition pouches. In this new order the 2nd
Brigade advanced at about 11·45, and as they came into the open between
the two ridges, a half battalion of the 3rd Sikhs, under Colonel Money,
moved off to the left to hold the point of the northern hill overlooking
the Argandab River. The three guns and the twenty or thirty deserted
tents in the advanced camp at the foot of this hill fell into the hands
of Colonel Money, whose later movements I will refer to presently. The
rest of the brigade changed direction to the right, and marched up the
basin, the 72nd taking the place of the 5th Ghoorkas in the first line.
Only stray shots were fired by ghazis, who had perched themselves on the
hills. The action was really at an end. General Ross had joined the
advanced infantry brigades, and General Roberts was also coming round
the ridge with General Macgregor’s reserve brigade. A spur running down
from the hill on the left flank of the Pir Paimal basin hid Mazra from
view; but as the leading troops of General Baker’s Brigade passed over
this spur, they saw a mile before them Ayub’s chief camp, with all the
tents standing in regular rows. Fugitives were rushing out of the camp,
and 200 or 300 cavalry were moving off among the trees beyond. The 72nd
Highlanders and 2nd Beluchis reached the camp a little before one
o’clock, the 3rd Sikhs (half battalion) close at their heels, while
General Macpherson also moved his brigade leisurely forward in the same
direction. The 72nd advanced a mile beyond Mazra village, and fired
dropping shots at such runaways as were still within range. But the
powers of flight of an Afghan are marvellous, and as no cavalry were at
hand most of the enemy made good their escape. Colonel Money, with his
half battalion of 3rd Sikhs, had found that beyond the point he was sent
to occupy was another hill, giving a more commanding position. He pushed
on with some 150 men to this point, and to his surprise looked straight
down over the village of Baba Wali into Mazra and the enemy’s camp. At
that time it was packed with men, and he sent back word to General Baker
asking for reinforcements, as he could not venture upon an attack with
his handful of Sikhs. It was too late for any regiments to be
re-directed, and Colonel Money had to watch with much chagrin the flight
of the Afghans led by a large number of cavalry, probably Kizilbashes.
However, he came upon five guns, including a 24-pounder howitzer, placed
on the slopes of the hill near Baba Wali village, so that his half
battalion held eight pieces in their possession. When General Roberts
and his Staff rode through Mazra in advance of Macgregor’s Brigade the
rout of Ayub’s army was complete, and nothing remained but the cavalry
pursuit. In four hours our force had scattered the hitherto victorious
Afghan army, driving them from a position they had chosen deliberately,
and with a full knowledge of our strength, and capturing their camp as
it stood, as well as thirty-one guns and two of our own Horse Artillery
9-pounders. No more brilliant ending of the rapid march from Cabul could
have been wished, and the vindication of our military prestige is now
full and complete. Lieutenant Maclaine was found to have been murdered
by his guards, and this incident has embittered every man’s hatred of
the Afghans. That the Afghans did not anticipate defeat is proved by the
appearance of their camp; not a tent was struck, not a saddle-bag
carried away; all the rude equipage of a half-barbarous army was left at
our mercy—the meat in the cooking pots, the bread half-kneaded in the
earthen vessels, the bazaar with its _ghee_-pots, dried fruits, flour
and corn—just as it had been deserted when the noise of battle rolled up
from Pir Paimal.
-----
Footnote 48:
Major White was recommended for the Victoria Cross for his gallantry
on this occasion.
-----
But to describe these matters more in detail: When our troops found
themselves in rear of the Baba Wali Kotal with the enemy’s deserted camp
lying before them, all opposition was at an end, and our work was to
collect the guns which had been abandoned on our approach, and to
examine the contents of Ayub’s tents. I had lingered to discuss the
fight with Captain Darvall, in command of a company of the 92nd
Highlanders, guarding the guns White had captured, so that the 1st and
2nd Brigades had passed on when I rode up the road to Mazra. General
Macgregor was following with the 3rd Brigade; but by this time we all
knew that the stories furnished by our spies, relating to an entrenched
camp and a defensive position, arranged on the principles of European
engineering, were fables. The 3rd Brigade were balked of their fight—for
the 60th Rifles and the regiments brigaded with them were to have
assisted in the final attack upon Mazra, if Ayub had taken up a second
position. Scattered on the open stony road and on the hill slopes were
bodies of men killed by our volleys when the Afghan retreat began. There
seemed few dead men, but the _nullahs_ and watercourses could have told
their own story; for within their sheltering banks were lying clusters
of white-clad peasants who had been foremost in the ranks all day. If
the cowardly regulars in Ayub’s army had fought side by side with these
men, our losses must have been much heavier; but they left the ghazi-led
mob to bear the brunt of the attack, and took to flight when the Pir
Paimal Ridge was turned. The most desperate spirits seemed to have been
killed, for in the pouches of several men whose rude waistbelts I
examined there was not a single cartridge left. The rifles of such as
were armed with Martinis, Sniders, or Enfields, were taken by our
soldiers as trophies; while matchlocks or _jhezails_ were broken to
pieces and cast away. One man killed was completely equipped in the
uniform of the 66th Regiment, and had with him a Martini rifle and
bayonet. A number of men, trying to preserve some form of order in their
retirement, were clad in _khaki_, and at a distance were actually
mistaken by one of our own officers for the 23rd Pioneers. As they got
out of range very quickly we could not secure one of their number as a
specimen. Of the 50 or 100 bodies which I myself passed at close
quarters, I only saw some three or four men in what might be called
uniform. These had on dark-coloured jackets, and turbans, surmounted by
small yellow _pompons_, such as were worn long ago in European armies.
There were also men shot down with stray portions of Indian uniform upon
them, but they were plainly peasants or villagers who had joined Ayub
after his great success. It is said that Maiwand was won for him by
ghazis, or by a mob of rudely-armed ryots led by those fanatics; and one
certainly saw much to confirm the idea that the strength of an Afghan
army lies in its irregulars. The defenders of the Mullah Sahibdad
village, the men who tried to “rush” the advanced companies of the 72nd
in the orchards, the mass which finally was broken up by the 92nd at the
two guns—all these were white-clothed peasants, each fighting for his
own band, and fighting right well too. They were seen to kneel down,
take deliberate aim at our ranks, and fire without any sign of hurry:
having fired they rose to their feet, retiring at a walk and re-loading
their muzzle-loaders coolly and calmly. It was these undrilled units in
Ayub’s force who gave us most trouble, and who were killed as they fell
back before our steady advance.
The bodies of the enemy’s killed ceased almost entirely as soon as the
spur running out from the northern hill above the Baba Wali village on
our left was passed. This spur had sheltered them from our bullets, and
the shrapnel from our 40-pounders would scarcely reach them beyond it.
The road to the Mazra camp, from this spur, was at first strewn with the
accoutrements which the Afghans had thrown away in their flight. Thus
packets of Martini and Snider cartridges were come upon, with stray
powder-flasks and ball-bags, the flight having become a rout as our
brigades pushed up the Pir Paimal basin. A few hundred yards nearer the
camp were the guns which had been withdrawn from the basin itself. They
had been left by the artillerymen just as they had come out of action:
here and there a bag of powder lay near the muzzle, as if a gunner more
stanch than his fellows had tried to load his piece for a farewell shot;
while the _caissons_ were full of live shell. The traces lay stretched
out along the road where they had been dropped when the horses were
taken out, and we could imagine the gunners mounting and riding off
before our cavalry pursuit began. We were delighted to see one of our
own Horse Artillery guns standing on the road none the worse for its
captivity, and word was sent back for a team to remove it to the rear.
The other 9-pounder lost at Maiwand was, as conjectured, in position on
the Baba Wali Kotal. More accoutrements and packets of ammunition were
found scattered near the first line of tents, and once within the camp
we could see how hasty had been the flight, and how little the enemy had
expected a crushing reverse in a few hours. Our reconnaissance of the
31st seems to have been fatal to them; they looked upon it as a first
success for their own arms, and had consequently made no preparations
for securing an orderly retreat. Their camp was pitched in a very
orderly way, the tents being arranged in streets with their front
looking towards Candahar. The rows of tents stretched away fully half a
mile in rear until the small village of Mazra was reached. Ayub’s tent,
one of the kind in which we usually hold durbars, and large enough to
have accommodated all the princes of the Barakzai family, was on the
right of the camp near the canal which carries water to Candahar. A
handsome carpet still covered half the floor, and when the Beluchis
first entered it there were, I believe, many evidences of recent
occupancy. Within a few yards of it was a small tent with a small
enclosure formed by upright canvas walls—the _zenana_, in fact, wherein
the Cabul ladies with Hashim Khan had lived. Ayub himself was said to
have had only one Kizilbash concubine with him. In this tent there was a
small circle of carpet round the central pole, the remainder having been
cut away, probably when the order to take to flight was given. Another
tent near Ayub’s had been used as a dispensary, and was full of native
drugs and of the hospital stores lost by General Burrows. Some of our
native doctors were busy in removing such medicines as were still of
value. Poor Maclaine’s tent was forty or fifty yards away on the bank of
the canal. In every one of the common tents it seemed that some ten or
twelve men had been tenants, and the strength of the regular regiments
must have been very considerable. Rude screens of branches and boughs of
trees had also been raised about the village, no doubt by the host of
irregulars swarming in the camp.
An examination of a few of the tents showed a vast amount of rubbish, in
the shape of clothes, bedding, cooking vessels, horse-gear, and
miscellaneous equipage, with valuable stores of English ammunition.
Dried figs, grapes, melons, flour, were scattered about, and in
saddle-bags and wallets were all kinds of “portable property” more or
less valueless. One bag which I saw ransacked by a _kahar_, contained a
packet of Persian books, carefully wrapped in half a dozen covers of
cloth; a store of raisins and a bag of flour; a silk pugree; a change of
white clothing; a bridle and stirrups; a purse with a score of
copper-pieces in it; a pistol and 100 Enfield cartridges. The ammunition
found in the tents must have amounted to many thousands of rounds. Each
man seemed to sleep with packets of Martini and Snider cartridges at his
side, while the packets made up for Enfields were in heaps in odd
corners. One large tent, which had evidently served as the magazine, was
filled to the roof with bags of powder and boxes of our breech-loading
cartridges. How many rounds we lost on July 27th I do not know, but we
have retaken large quantities, while some of our regiments filled up
their pouches while in the camp. Brass helmets, kettle-drums, some of
the band instruments lost by the 66th, bugles, gold and silver laced
coats, were among our loot, and some boxes of Cabuli rupees were also
found. But important above all were the thirty-one guns and our two
Royal Horse Artillery 9-pounders: the loss of these will break Ayub’s
prestige, for when he returns a fugitive to Herat the citizens’ first
question will be concerning the artillery he took with him to batter
down the walls of Candahar.
I returned to our camp behind Karez Hill by way of the Baba Wali Kotal,
and found Ayub’s guns still in position on the platform whence they had
fired upon us. He himself had viewed the capture of the village of
Mullah Sahibdad from this point. Here considerable engineering skill had
been shown; sloping roads had been cut, up which the guns could easily
be taken, and a natural line of rocks had been well utilized as a screen
for the pieces placed in position. There were no embrasures or gunpits,
but the guns were placed so that having been fired over a wall of rocks
4 or 5 feet broad they might then be withdrawn a few yards below,
reloaded and run up again to answer our fire. Our 40-pounders had of
course made no impression upon the rock, although the shells had pitched
upon the wall itself. The gunners could rest in perfect safety when not
firing, as a space had been cleared below the rocks and the hill sloped
sharply downwards. The narrow road over the Kotal was to the right of
the guns, with rocks overhanging it on either side; it had not been
interfered with, the enemy knowing that such a converging fire could be
brought to bear upon it that it could scarcely be forced. There was a
higher position above where the 9-pounders and the two Armstrongs were
posted, and here a 7-pounder mountain gun was found. There was splendid
cover for infantry lining the rocks, and this had been improved wherever
practicable. So strong indeed had the Kotal been made, and so clear of
all obstacles was the slope below—a natural glacis—that to have attacked
in this direction would have been to court heavy loss, if not a
disastrous repulse.
Two sad incidents marred the success of the day: the death of Captain
Straton and the murder of Lieutenant Maclaine, who had been a prisoner
in Ayub’s hands since the eventful 27th of July. Colonel Brownlow and
Captain Frome died gallantly in action, and though we sorrow for the
loss of these brave men, there is the consolation that they were at the
head of their regiments and in the fore-front of the battle. But Captain
Straton’s death occurred at a moment when all seemed over, when we had
but to count our losses and collect our spoils. When General Ross had
joined Macpherson’s Brigade, halted in rear of the Pir Paimal Ridge, the
shells from our 40-pounders were still coming over the Baba Wali Kotal,
endangering the safety of any troops pushing on towards Mazra. It was,
of course, all-important to stop this shelling of the Kotal, now
virtually in our hands, and the easiest way was to send a party of
signallers up the hillside to the right of the Kotal, whence the news of
our rapid success could be flashed down below. Captain Straton with two
mounted signallers was with the brigade, and he was ordered to establish
a station on the ridge above. But as there were a few ghazis lingering
about, two companies of the 24th P.N.I. were told off to skirmish well
in front of him, and clear the ground. Before they could move off,
Captain Straton, a man with no sense of personal danger, rode slowly up
the slope with his two signallers. He had not gone more than 50 or 60
yards from Generals Ross and Macpherson when a shot was heard, and
Captain Straton fell from his horse. A dark figure was then seen to rise
from a dip in the ground, fix a bayonet on his rifle and rush forward.
The two signallers, men of the 72nd Highlanders, had dismounted by this
time, and they fired at 40 yards’ distance, bringing the Afghan down.
His bayonet had passed through Captain Straton’s coat, but had not
touched the body. The man was bayonetted as he tried to rise. It was
discovered that he had already been severely wounded, and could not have
hoped to escape; he was not clad in the orthodox white of a true ghazi,
but had on a sort of blue uniform, which seemed to indicate that he was
a regular soldier, whose fanaticism had prompted him to shoot the first
officer who passed him. The bullet from his rifle had passed through
Straton’s heart. The decease of Captain Straton is a great loss to the
force; the perfect way in which he had controlled the signalling was
universally recognized. He never spared himself when hard work had to be
done, and the soldiers under him shared his enthusiasm. General Roberts
always relied implicitly on him, both on the march and in action, for he
knew that if it were possible for heliographing to be done Captain
Straton would have his men in position and his instruments at work. The
22nd Regiment have lost as good a soldier as ever wore sword, and there
is a gap in Sir Frederick Roberts’s Staff which he will find hard to
fill. The second incident is yet again on different lines, for the
murder of Lieutenant Maclaine is full of horror. As Sir Frederick
Roberts rode into Ayub’s camp word was brought by some native soldiers,
belonging to Jacob’s Rifles and the 1st Grenadiers, who had been
prisoners with Maclaine, that his body was lying near Ayub’s tent. Major
Euan Smith was sent down to test the truth of the story, and found the
sepoys had spoken only too truly. Poor Maclaine, with his throat cut
deeply across, was lying some short distance from the tent in which he
had been confined, about 40 yards from Ayub’s own tent. The story told
by the sepoys is that Ayub fled at eleven o’clock with the Cabul
sirdars, leaving his prisoners in charge of their guard, with no
instructions beyond a verbal order that they were not to be killed. Some
hour or more after this the guard rushed into the tents where Maclaine
and six other prisoners were kept, and ordered them all out, as they
were to be killed. One sepoy was shot through the head, and Maclaine was
seized by several Afghans, who threw him down and cut his throat. He was
weak and ill from sickness and bad food, and submitted to his fate
without a word. Immediately upon this there was a great shout that the
English were upon the camp, and the guard fled without touching the five
sepoys remaining. The bitterest rage is felt against Ayub, who might, by
confiding the officer to the Kizilbash cavalry, easily have ensured his
safety. For the future there can be no question of treating with a
prince who has thus followed the worst precedents of Afghan history. He
is held responsible for Maclaine’s assassination just as much as if he
had witnessed it, and our only regret is that the sirdar did not fall
under the sabres of our cavalry in the pursuit. Maclaine’s body was
carried into the Citadel and was buried with military honours yesterday
morning.
The cavalry pursuit resulted in some 400 of the enemy being killed,
while our casualties were trifling, only two officers, Lieutenant Baker,
of the 3rd Punjab Cavalry, and Lieutenant Chamberlain, of the Central
India Horse, being very slightly wounded: the former got a cut on the
hand and the latter had his sword-arm bruised a little by the point of a
_tulwar_. General Hugh Gough, with the 9th Lancers, 3rd Punjab Cavalry,
3rd Bengal Cavalry, and the Central India Horse, cut off groups of
fugitives who had crossed the Argandab and were making for Khakrez; but
no large masses of men were encountered. The delay in not being able to
cross the Kokaran ford until eleven o’clock, of course militated against
the pursuit being of the harassing kind it would otherwise have assumed.
Once the river had been forded the cavalry galloped along on three
parallel lines, the 9th Lancers forming the reserve. The 3rd Punjab
Cavalry killed over seventy men in one charge alone. General Nuttall,
with the 3rd Scind Horse and 3rd Bombay Light Cavalry, also pursued
during the afternoon, up the Argandab Valley to the east of the river,
killing 100 stragglers.[49]
-----
Footnote 49:
Six hundred and forty-nine bodies were afterwards buried on the
Candahar side of the Pir Paimal Ridge. The enemy’s total loss must
have been about 1,200 killed, and a large number wounded.
-----
Our losses so far as they have been ascertained were, on August 31st and
September 1st, as follows:—
─────────────────────────┬───────────────────────┬───────────
│ British. │ Native.
─────────────────────────┼───────────┬───────────┼───────────
│ Officers. │ Rank and │
│ │ File. │
─────────────────────────┼─────┬─────┼─────┬─────┼─────┬─────
│ K.│ W.│ K.│ W.│ K.│ W.
E-B, Royal Horse │ —│ —│ —│ 1│ —│ —
Artillery │ │ │ │ │ │
C-2, Royal Artillery │ —│ —│ —│ 2│ —│ —
6-8, Royal Artillery │ —│ —│ —│ 1│ —│ 2
Staff │ 1│ —│ —│ —│ —│ —
2-60th Rifles │ —│ —│ —│ 2│ —│ —
72nd Highlanders │ 2│ 2│ 7│ 20│ —│ —
92nd Highlanders │ —│ 2│ 14│ 66│ —│ —
3rd Bengal Cavalry │ —│ 1│ —│ —│ 1│ 1
3rd Punjab Cavalry │ —│ 1│ —│ —│ —│ 5
Central India Horse │ —│ 1│ —│ —│ —│ 5
2nd Ghoorkas │ —│ 1│ —│ —│ 10│ 19
23rd Pioneers │ —│ 1│ —│ —│ 2│ 12
24th Punjab Native │ —│ —│ —│ —│ 1│ 10
Infantry │ │ │ │ │ │
2nd Sikhs │ —│ 1│ —│ —│ 3│ 23
3rd Sikhs │ —│ —│ —│ —│ —│ 6
4th Ghoorkas │ —│ 1│ —│ —│ 1│ 5
5th Ghoorkas │ —│ —│ —│ —│ 1│ 2
15th Sikhs │ —│ —│ —│ —│ 2│ 4
25th Punjab Native │ —│ —│ —│ —│ —│ 2
Infantry │ │ │ │ │ │
3rd Scind Horse │ —│ —│ —│ —│ —│ 1
3rd Bombay Cavalry │ —│ —│ —│ —│ 1│ 1
2nd Beluchis │ —│ —│ —│ —│ —│ 1
─────────────────────────┼─────┼─────┼─────┼─────┼─────┼─────
Total │ 3│ 11│ 21│ 92│ 22│ 99
─────────────────────────┴─────┴─────┴─────┴─────┴─────┴─────
This gives a total of killed of all ranks, 46, wounded 202. Two
followers were killed and fifteen wounded; twenty horses and three mules
were killed; twenty-one horses and three mules wounded.
The list of officers killed and wounded is as follows:—
_Officers Killed._
Lieutenant-Colonel Brownlow, commanding 72nd Highlanders.
Captain Frome, 72nd Highlanders.
Captain Straton, 2-22nd Foot, Superintendent Army Signalling
_Officers Wounded._
Captain Murray, 72nd Highlanders.
Lieutenant and Adjutant Munro, 72nd Highlanders.
Lieutenant Menzies, 92nd Highlanders.
Lieutenant Stewart, 92nd Highlanders.
Major Willock, 3rd Bengal Cavalry.
Lieutenant Baker, 3rd Punjab Cavalry.
Lieutenant Chamberlain, Central India Horse.
Lieutenant-Colonel Battye, commanding 2nd Ghoorkas.
Lieutenant-Colonel Rowcroft, commanding 4th Ghoorkas.
Major Slater, 2nd Sikhs.
Lieutenant Chesney, 23rd Pioneers.
The wounds of the last eight officers are not severe.
The death of Colonel Brownlow is a terrible loss to the 72nd
Highlanders, and indeed to the army generally. Brave to a fault, he was
a model of coolness under fire, and always handled his men with judgment
and decision. He was marked for future distinction, his tried ability in
the field raising him far above his peers. His untimely death will be
felt most keenly by his own officers and men, to whom he had greatly
endeared himself.
----------------------------
CHAPTER IV.
Candahar during the Siege—Improvement of the Defences—Sketch Map showing
the Disposition of the Garrison—The Attitude of the Enemy—Their Plan
of Attack—Deb-i-Khwaja Village occupied in force by the Afghans—The
Sortie of August 16th—Determined Defence of the Village—Retirement
of the Troops—Death of General Brooke—The Sortie falsely called a
“Success”—Description of the Afghan Siege Works—Engineering Skill
shown by the Naib Hafizulla Parallels—The Training of Guns upon the
Shikarpur Gate—The Afghan Karez Trenches on the South—Attempt to
form Breaching Batteries—Explanation of the Engineering Skill shown.
CANDAHAR CANTONMENTS, _9th September, 1880_.
Sir Frederick Roberts’s troops were so soon pushed into action after
their arrival at Candahar, that the state of the city on the 31st August
and the evidence the enemy had left behind of their late uncomfortable
closeness to the walls, have been partly forgotten by many of us. When
we rode up on the morning of the 31st there was indeed every sign, both
within and without the walls, that an enemy had been at the gate.
Candahar rises out of the plain quite abruptly; its walls, with their
tower-like bastions, obtruding themselves upon one’s notice in rather an
unsympathetic way. They shut out from view everything that lies within
them, except the tomb of Ahmed Shah and the tower of observation in the
citadel. No point of 'vantage enables one to examine what the walls may
hide; not until the gates are passed does the character of the city
disclose itself. It has been too often described for me to venture to
sketch its two broad roads bisecting each other at right angles near the
centre of the city; its citadel guarded by a deep ditch; its high walls
of a breadth sufficient to make breaching a work of great difficulty
even to heavy artillery, and its narrow gates, guarded each by flanking
towers which stand out on either hand of the doorway as if the mud-work
of the walls had been cut through and folded back to admit of entrance
being given. It will be sufficient to say that the defences had been
strengthened during the siege by such contrivances as are usually
employed to check assaults upon walled towns, and that the gaps and
breaks in the bastions and parapet had been filled in with sand-bags,
which still remain in all the rough-and-ready state in which they were
hastily piled up. On August 31st our first view of Candahar was from
near Deh-i-Khwaja, the village against which the sortie of the 16th had
been directed. We did not, however, enter by the Cabul Gate, on the
eastern face, but by the Shikarpur Gate, facing southwards. It was here
that the outer defences had been made strongest, as the enemy’s attack
in force was expected from the group of villages lying to the south and
south-west, some of the walled vineyards and gardens of which were
within 300 yards of the south-west bastion, and less than a mile from
the Shikarpur Gate itself. The temporary bazaar outside this gate,
established for the benefit of our force marching in from Momand, was
formed amidst the _abattis_, wire entanglements, _chevaux-de-frise_, and
broken-down walls which cumbered the ground and would have impeded the
rush of an attacking force. The bastions and parapet bristled with
sand-bags, over which the sentries on guard looked down, no doubt with
hearty relief as our troops drew up and piled arms preparatory to
breakfast. And yet there was no enthusiasm shown at our approach; not a
band turned out to play us in, not a cheer was raised to welcome us.
Perhaps we had been so near for the last few days that the novelty of
being released from a dangerous situation had passed away from the minds
of the garrison; perhaps—and I am afraid this is the more likely
explanation—the prevailing tone among General Primrose’s troops was one
still of depression and want of “heart.”[50] The reaction had not set
in, and the disastrous defeat at Maiwand and the sad result of the
sortie, were still remembered with great vividness. There had been
undoubted demoralization existing within the walls during the siege,
caused by that unreasoning dread of an enemy which always arises after
defeat. How far the demoralization spread only commanding officers could
really know; but it was impossible that the remnants of a beaten brigade
could be brought once more into contact with the main body without
producing some ill-effect. Letters which reached us after we left
Khelat-i-Ghilzai spoke of the “long faces drawn,” and the depression of
which they were the too visible sign. And yet there were over 4,000
effective soldiers, British and native, under General Primrose’s orders.
One panic-stricken man may infect a hundred; one panic-stricken regiment
an army; and to judge by the stories told by soldiers of the garrison to
our own men of the Cabul force, there was a tendency to foster the
“ghazi scare,” and to nurse and nurture it until it grew to formidable
proportions. Thus our sowars told of the terrible Aimak horsemen who
feed their horses on raw meat and charged with such effect that no one
could withstand them; that our cavalry would wither away before the
flame and smoke breathed from their horses’ nostrils. Our sepoys, nearly
all Sikhs and Ghoorkas, were so self-confident that they made no secret
of their desire to meet the much-bepraised ghazi-_log_: they were warned
that they did not know what the local ghazis’ fighting powers were, and
there was what in Western life would be called “head-shaking” at our
rapid movement towards the Pir Paimal Ridge on the 31st. We seemed to
local wiseacres to be going right into the jaws of death, whereas our
firm belief was that we were rushing into the arms of victory. Our men
were impatient to wipe out the disgrace which had fallen on our arms.
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Footnote 50:
On August 3rd General Primrose informed Colonel St. John that, acting
under the advice of his brigadiers, he assumed chief political
authority.
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[Illustration:
SKELETON PLAN OF KANDAHAR.]