To revert to the appearance of the city when we formally relieved it:

The flanking bastions which stud the wall at regular intervals are

seventy in number. They are really circular towers with that part of the

circumference cut away which looks citywards. As they were in a wretched

state of repair as regarded their upper layers of sun-dried mud, there

was much to be done in building up a new parapet with sand-bags, and

their appearance is now most uncouth, each tower seeming “top-heavy” and

suffering from an excrescent growth which may yet be in its infancy. The

south-west bastion, overlooking the Shikarpur village wherein the enemy

were always swarming, was strengthened greatly by these means,

embrasures being left through which our 40-pounders could be trained to

the east, west, and south. A fantastic appearance was also given to the

main walls of the city by cutting down the parapet for 18 inches at

points equi-distant from the bastions, and placing upright sand-bags to

fill in the gap thus made. Ten riflemen were told off to man each of

these gaps, which were 10 feet in length. The necessity for thus

improving the parapet was due to the defective system of loopholing in

vogue among the Afghans. They pierce their walls with narrow slits,

through which it is impossible to see more than a few square yards of

ground below; and at night not an object can be seen from nine-tenths of

the loopholes. The effect of combined breech-loading fire would be

minimized if rifles had thus to be blindly fired into space; whereas by

giving men a chance of seeing over the wall and grouping the defenders

into tens at fixed points, their fire could be always well-aimed and

kept well under control. To repel, for instance, an attack of 5,000 or

6,000 men led by ghazis determined to scale the walls or die in the

attempt, fire from the ordinary loopholes would have been thrown away,

and only the cross-fire from the nearest bastions could have told; but

once the defenders could fire at almost any angle, through the ten-feet

gaps I have described, the ground in front of any given point could be

swept by continuous volleys. Inside the city one could not fail to be

struck with the open display of force made at every available point.

There was quite a crowd of European soldiers and Bombay sepoys filling

the Shikarpur Gate as General Roberts and his Staff entered the city,

and nearly every man seemed to have his bayonet fixed or sword drawn. No

doubt Candahar bears an ill-reputation for ghazi-ism, and there were

many discontented spirits within its walls even after the 18,000 Pathans

had been turned out; but the display of naked weapons certainly struck

us poor pilgrims from quieter Cabul as unusual and alarming. Our own

revolvers were comfortably reposing on our hips, while we found it was

the fashion to carry the pistol in the hand, or a drawn sword, or a

hog-spear, or a bayonet fixed on a long stick _à la ghazi_. In the Char

Soo, the covered, arched bit of bazaar, where the chief roads cut

through each other, were more men with drawn swords and fixed bayonets.

The guards at the gates, at the entrance to the citadel and elsewhere,

seemed of great strength; but without wishing to be rudely critical, one

could not help feeling that numbers were necessary where the sepoys were

of such poor physique. It is dangerous to say a word against the Bombay

regiments, as a swarm of eager defenders will start up at once to

justify them and to challenge comparison with the army of Northern

India. But I must humbly submit that the weedy under-grown sepoys of one

or more of the regiments now in Candahar are no more like soldiers than

a stage army is like those “cull’d and choice-drawn cavaliers” who won

Agincourt. I have not seen a regiment paraded, and I do not know the

distinctive dress of any particular regiment, but there the men were

before my eyes, and they were certainly sorry apologies for sepoys. The

appearance of the citadel was as warlike as that of the city we had

passed through, sand-bags and bags of flour, &c., being well to the fore

wherever there was a gate to be strengthened or a wall to be made more

imposing. The tower in the citadel upon which Captain Keyser, of the 7th

Fusiliers, had his chief heliograph station, was topped by a circular

wall of bags some five feet high, and from this point there was a good

view of all the surrounding country. The northern wall, with the Eedgah

Gate, looking towards Mazra, had its complement of the ever-repeating

sand-bags, and in the north-west corner bastion was the 40-pounder which

had shelled Picquet Hill and our cantonments, when Ayub rashly pitched

his tents within range.

It is difficult of course, after a lapse of time, to pick up the threads

of a story, especially when that story has for its moral indecision and

disaster; and therefore, in dealing with events before and during the

siege of Candahar, I have to guard against being led away by the hasty

criticism or loose talk of irresponsible persons. I would rather leave

such facts as I have gathered to speak for themselves than formulate

conclusions which must of necessity be based upon other men’s evidence.

Not having seen with my own eyes movements and actions which had most

serious results, I can only present them as they were pictured to me by

eye-witnesses. To make the story clearer, reasons must be given for

certain positive moves made by those holding authority among the

besieged garrison; the more general question of passive defence being

governed by other conditions, such as the _morale_ and strength of the

force at the Lieutenant-General’s disposal, the numbers and capacity of

the enemy, and their probable intentions.

Ayub Khan’s forces made their appearance about Candahar on the 7th of

August, ten days after the Maiwand defeat, and such was their confidence

at that time that they occupied part of our cantonments, and pitched

their camp well within range of our 40-pounders. They were soon aware of

their error, when shells began to burst even in the Surteep’s tent, and

they withdrew to a safer distance, and set to work in a less obtrusive

but more systematic way. Against the northern face of the city wall,

and, for the most part, against the western face also, they could do

nothing; there were no villages or enclosures to cover their movements.

To the north the plain is covered with graves, while on the west there

is a clear space at least one mile in breadth between the cantonments

and the Herat Gate. On the south-west were groups of enclosures with

high mud walls, twelve or eighteen inches thick, guarding the orchards

and vineyards of Shikarpur and Deh Haji villages which lay in rear of

them. These gave cover to their sharp-shooters, good positions for their

guns, and accommodation and food to any large body of men they might

mass within them. The deep water-channels of an open _karez_ were also

available as shelter-trenches and first parallels, if the Afghans so far

understood the art of war; and altogether the Shikarpur Gate and the

south-west corner bastion of the city wall were likely to be menaced.

How admirably the Naib Hafizulla, who was said to be the guiding spirit

of Ayub’s army, recognized the advantages of an approach from this

direction I will explain presently. There was open country (cultivated

fields lying fallow) facing the portion of the southern wall to the east

of the Shikarpur Gate; but there were many low walls in this direction

also. The eastern face, equally with the Shikarpur Gate and the

southwestern line of defence, might be looked upon as attracting an

attack, or at least a strong demonstration, owing to the nearness to the

Cabul Gate of the large village of Deh-i-Khwaja. The distance in a

direct line from the gate to the village walls was less than 1,000

yards, and the intermediate space was not, as on the western face, clear

of every obstacle, but was traversed by lands with low boundary walls

and by a water-channel running alongside the road leading from the city

through the village. Deh-i-Khwaja covers several acres of ground, and as

each house has an independent door, and is connected with its neighbour

by stout mud walls, the place presents no salient point to a storming

party where a position could be seized and made good. In the hands of

resolute men each house would become a miniature fort to be taken before

the next one could be approached. I suppose this fact was known to the

officers who were responsible for the attack ultimately made upon the

place. In addition to the cover offered by the low walls between the

village and the eastern wall, there was, a few yards outside the Cabul

Gate, a pile of buildings used as a _serai_. We could not of course

occupy these, and we had not had time to destroy them. They would have

formed the connecting link, and a very strong one, between Deh-i-Khwaja

and any party told off to assail the Cabul Gate.

The enemy in their over-confidence, or by wrongly estimating our

military power in Afghanistan, intended to reduce the garrison to

weakness by starvation, and then to assault two or more gates, the

irregulars led by ghazis being anxious to carry the city at the point of

the sword. To avoid such a complication as our army cutting its way out,

the villages on the south and Deh-i-Khwaja on the east were occupied in

force, and earthworks thrown up along the line of _karez_ near the

Shikarpur group of villages. Guns were mounted at several points from

which shells were pitched with fair accuracy into the citadel or burst

over particular bastions. One gun, said to be a 6-pounder, was placed in

Deh-i-Khwaja, an embrasure being formed by cutting through a mud wall

some twelve feet high, and piling up on either side earth and the

_débris_ of a house which these amateur engineers demolished. This gun

did little or no damage when it was fired at the Cabul Gate, but the

rifle fire from the walls of the village seriously annoyed such working

parties as were sent out by the garrison to destroy the low walls

bounding the roads through the fields. General Primrose at last ordered

that no more parties should go outside the gates, so that the cover

existing for an attacking force was left intact. Day by day it was

noticed that Deh-i-Khwaja was crowded with men, and suspicion became

rife that preparations were being made for forcing the Cabul Gate and

“rushing” the defences on that side by a swarm of irregulars. Now the

word “ghazi” carried dismay into the hearts of many of the garrison—as

it does still no doubt—and it became an open question whether it was not

time to break through the inaction which prevailed, and force a fight on

a small scale outside the walls. It was impossible to shell the place

effectually, as three of our 40-pounders were in position on the

north-west and southern bastions, and our 9-pounders over the Cabul and

Durani Gate could not hope to be of any great use against thick mud

walls and domed houses. The two mortars of the heavy battery might plump

shell into the midst of the houses, but they would not scare its

defenders away. The original plan of the sortie was, I believe,

conceived by Major Hills, Commanding Royal Engineers, who advised that a

party of cavalry should be sent out in the early morning by the Eedgah

Gate (facing north) and work round in rear of the village of Khairabad,

which should then be “rushed” by some 500 or 600 infantry. Khairabad was

within 400 yards of the northern walls of Deh-i-Khwaja, and the latter

village was to have been taken by an attack in rear, where it was

probably undefended. The 6-pounder gun was to be spiked, or brought away

if time allowed, and the loopholed walls fronting the city were to be

destroyed. There was nothing impossible in this plan, and the sortie, if

at all well managed, ought to have proved a success. But certain

modifications were made which spoiled all. On the morning of the 16th of

August, 300 sabres, under command of Brigadier-General Nuttall, swept

round in rear of the village, and, as was expected, the men in

Deh-i-Khwaja began to leave, seeing their retreat thus cut off. The

usual garrison which flocked in every morning and left at nightfall had

not arrived, and they would probably have known but little of the affair

until afterwards, if a fatal blunder had not been committed before the

infantry went out. This was a cannonade of half an hour’s duration, from

the 9-pounders and the two howitzers. General Brooke, commanding 600 men

chosen from the 7th Fusiliers, 19th and 28th Native Infantry, asked that

the village might be shelled before his troops went out. The unusual

noise aroused every armed man in the southern villages, and even those

further away on the east; and they poured out to see what was the

meaning of the cannonade. They soon learnt Deh-i-Khwaja was being

attacked, and they hastened to its assistance. In the meantime our

cavalry had a splendid chance at some 400 or 500 men on ground which

could not have been better for a charge. But General Nuttall considered

the time had not yet come to use his sowars, and he contented himself

with following the enemy, who were making for broken ground on the

south. Eventually a troop was ordered to charge, and they did good

execution; but the fugitives had then got cover and opened a smart fire

upon the cavalry, who had to draw off a little, particularly as more men

were pressing up from the Shikarpur villages. In the meantime the

half-hour’s cannonade had come to an end, and the infantry had moved

out; such men as still held the village were on the alert, and our

troops were met by a heavy fire from the long line of loopholed walls.

The attacking force was divided into three parties of about 200 men

each, General Brooke taking the centre party, whose object was to

penetrate the village by the road from the city, while the other parties

moved off to right and left. It was this central party which suffered

the heaviest loss. They rushed along the narrow road with a dry

watercourse of some depth on their left hand, passed the gun and got

into the village. But they were little better off than before; for every

wall was loopholed, every door blockaded. All they could do was to press

forward and watch for an opportunity of seizing one or more houses in

rear, whence they could work back, clearing the walls and courtyards, so

as to allow of the Sappers demolishing the outer wall facing the Cabul

Gate. To attempt street fighting was hopeless, as our men could see no

enemy; only the muzzles of rifles, many of them breech-loading, looked

down upon them. General Brooke forced his way right through the place,

and as the rear walls were not loopholed his party had a respite for the

time. He then moved along towards the north, but returned when he could

find no point which served to give him a chance of making his hold good.

The party to the left under Colonel Heathcote did not enter the village

but lined the walls in the fields, keeping up a heavy fire to draw off

the defenders’ attention. On the right, Trench of the 19th Bombay

Infantry had got possession of a large walled garden to the south of the

village, whence he drove such of the enemy as made a stand. The sortie

was being watched by General Primrose and the garrison from the walls;

but owing to a thick haze little could be seen of what was going

forward. The continuous firing showed the village had not been captured,

and swarms of irregulars could now and again be distinguished running

across the open country as if making for Deh-i-Khwaja. General Primrose

therefore ordered the troops engaged to be recalled, and directed the

artillery and infantry on the walls to cover the retirement. The orders

were passed on to General Brooke. The two parties under Colonel

Heathcote and Trench (killed about this time) began to fall back,

leaving the third batch of 200 men, still in the rear of the village,

quite unsupported. The cavalry also made for the Cabul Gate; the rifle

fire from the enemy, who were following them up, costing them many

horses. Our retirement was the signal for the advance of every Afghan

who had been held in check by the cavalry in the open. The garden

Trench’s party had held was occupied by them, and every wall in the

fields in the south-east was lined with their skirmishers. For General

Brooke to withdraw safely under such conditions was almost impossible.

He tried to make his way back by the road leading through the heart of

the village; but the fire from the loopholes was too terrible, and he

turned off to his left, coming out into the fields just where a few

walls gave cover to his men and enabled them to rally. In the confusion

which prevailed his party were mistaken for “ghazis,” and a 40-pounder

began to shell them. Fortunately the shells were too high, and did no

mischief. No supports were sent out to aid him, though appeals were made

to General Primrose to allow skirmishers to line the low walls outside

the Cabul Gate in a south-easterly direction.[51] General Brooke had

supported Lieutenant Cruickshank, R.E., severely wounded, and had

brought him out of the village. They rested behind a wall while a

handful of men were got together to cover their retreat towards the

walls, still a thousand yards away. But the fire from the loopholes was

too heavy, and as the General tried to cross to the shelter of another

wall he was shot down. A sergeant of the 7th Fusiliers with him was

killed, and two Bombay Sappers wounded, and then the two officers had to

be left to their fate. Their men were harassed by continuous fire at

almost point blank ranges, and the sortie ended by forty of our dead

being left on the ground, while twice that number of wounded were

received within the walls. The details of the killed and wounded,

officers and men, are given in the despatches. The total casualties were

about 200; and this short story of how the sortie was made and how

little it bore the character of a “success,” which I see it has always

been called by General Primrose, may help you to appreciate what

occurred. There is no charge against the soldiers; all are said to have

fought well and to have shown great steadiness; but the departure from

the original plan was fatal, and no supports being left for General

Brooke’s party to fall back upon, gave the enemy the chance of cutting

our men up in detail. There are other features of the sortie which I

have no doubt men who were in it can fill up. I have been through

Deh-i-Khwaja and over the ground outside, and I can fully appreciate how

General Brooke failed to make good his hold of the village.

-----

Footnote 51:

The withdrawal of the original supports before General Brooke’s party

had left the village was the fatal mistake of the day.

-----

CANDAHAR, _12th September_.

I have described the position taken up by Ayub Khan’s forces on the

eastern side of Candahar, and the sortie made on August 16th against the

Deh-i-Khwaja village. Major Hills, the Engineer officer commanding, had

warned General Primrose that he would not be responsible for the safety

of the city if Deh-i-Khwaja were left untouched, so high an estimate was

placed upon the capacity of the enemy. On the 17th the guns directed

against the city, more apparently for the purpose of annoying the

garrison than with any idea _then_ of systematic bombardment, were the

6-pounder in Deh-i-Khwaja, an Armstrong breech-loader, and one of our

Royal Horse Artillery 9-pounders on Picquet Hill, a 6-pounder in an

embrasure near the Head-Quarters’ Garden facing the western wall, and

another 6-pounder in a garden to the south-west, distant 1,100 yards

from the Shikarpur Gate, and somewhat nearer the south-west corner

bastion. The guns on Picquet Hill were answered by a 40-pounder in the

north-west bastion, and their fire was plainly meant to make the citadel

as uncomfortable as possible for the troops crowded within it. One of

these guns was silenced on the 16th, and was believed to have been

dismounted. The 6-pounder near the Head-Quarters’ Garden was fired at

uncertain intervals at the bastions on the western face, in the hope,

apparently, of injuring whatever men might be on duty on the wall. It

was on the south-west that the greatest pains were taken by Ayub’s

amateur “engineers,” and here the contour of the ground favoured them

immensely. The group of villages known to the garrison under the general

name of Shikarpur was protected by many walled gardens and vineyards,

which had in their front two deep _karez_ water-channels, then quite

dry, as the canals from the Argandab River and local springs had been

blocked so as to cut off the usual water supply of Candahar. The _karez_

in vogue in Southern Afghanistan is different to that we have been

accustomed to further north. Instead of an underground canal, with

openings at stated intervals, wherefrom the earth excavated is thrown up

in mounds, there is a deep open channel cut from six to twelve feet

deep, along the banks of which the earth and mud are thrown up so as to

form a formidable ditch. The stream at the bottom is of no great depth,

and courses along to lower levels very quietly, no rapid fall being

allowed. There are usually minor channels running out from the main

_karez_, unless the water has to be taken to a level several miles away

from the original spring. The Shikarpur gardens and villages afforded

ample cover for a large body of men, and the _karez_ channels in front

were seized upon as offering ready-made trenches in which to form

batteries and a line of breastworks for riflemen. The “works” raised by

the enemy still stand almost untouched, and a few days ago I went over

them with an engineer officer who was in Candahar during the siege. From

his explanation, and my own observations, I may be able to give a fair

idea of the engineering skill which some, at least, of Ayub’s officers

could boast. That nothing came of this attempt to raise batteries and

breastworks is due to the rapid advance of the relieving force from

Cabul, the enemy not having time to complete their lines, and being

forced to abandon the siege when it was yet in its infancy. In the

sixteen or seventeen days they were at work they made very creditable

progress; and, left undisturbed, they might have caused the garrison

much trouble and annoyance.

It is believed that the first plan of the Naib Hafizulla, who controlled

the Afghan army, was to raise a number of batteries to play upon the

Shikarpur Gate and that part of the wall lying between that gate and the

south-west bastion; riflemen were to be pushed as near the bastion as

possible, sheltered by protecting walls and ditches in the fields; and

then an assault was to be made by the fanatical irregulars led by their

ghazis. Scaling ladders were to be used, and, under cover of a terrific

fire directed upon the defenders of the southern wall, the grand attack

was to be delivered. There would probably have been other attacks made

from the south-east and east, and the ghazis were confident of success

after their victory over General Burrows’s Brigade. The affair of the

16th warned Hafizulla that it was dangerous to have guns exposed to a

sudden sortie, and in the Shikarpur direction he took every precaution

to guard against an attack from the garrison being successful. Every

enclosure had its walls loop-holed above and below, to give a double

line of fire, and along every ditch and water-channel clods of earth

were piled to form a low projecting parapet for the men lining them. The

ground is much broken and cut up in every direction, mounds of earth

being scattered at intervals where the cultivators had been compelled to

excavate deeply for the _karez_. Riding towards the outward belt of

walled vineyards and gardens—many of the latter containing trees of

large growth and thick foliage—we followed the narrow road leading from

the city; and at about 1,000 yards from the walls we came upon what our

engineers would call the trenches. These were the upper and lower

channels of the _karez_, quite dry, as I have before mentioned. The

channels were connected by narrow cuttings eight feet deep, in the most

approved manner, in exact imitation of the zig-zag way in which

parallels are pushed forward in civilized warfare. These cuttings were

not very numerous, it is true, but then the works had not been

completed. Instead of the men having to expose themselves by climbing up

and down the deep banks of the _karez_, openings were cut leading to the

enclosures and villages in rear. One bend of the _karez_ left the line

exposed to flanking fire from the walls of the city, and to negative

this traverses of earth and mud had been built up at every 20 feet. This

portion of the works was very skilfully done, the parapet in front, as

being exposed to shell-fire, being two or three feet thick. In rear of

these “trenches” were the batteries in their half-completed state. The

low mounds of earth I have spoken of were cut down, and a semicircular

space, open in rear, cleared away, the earth being banked up so as to

form a substantial parapet facing citywards. Two embrasures had been cut

through in each battery, branches of trees being used to strengthen them

and allow the earthwork to settle down into solid form. The parapet and

its protecting embankment were of sufficient strength to resist the

heaviest shell that could be thrown from our own guns. On looking

through the embrasures in one battery we found that one gun could be

trained upon the Shikarpur Gate and the other upon the south-west

bastion. Every thing was completed in this battery, and the marks of

wheels showed that a field gun had been in position. A little to the

right was a more pretentious battery, plainly meant for three or four

guns, judging from the size of the space cleared. The ground was sloped

gradually down to the fields in rear of these batteries, and cover could

be given to the horses and drivers belonging to the guns. The 6-pounder

which fired daily upon the walls had a snug corner to itself in a clump

of trees. The embrasure had been made very ingeniously. A bank of earth,

12 or 15 feet thick at its base, had been built up, with its right

resting on the trunk of a stout tree with long over-reaching branches.

One of these branches, which stretched out at right angles four feet

above the ground, had the earthwork piled above and below it, so that it

formed a strong support to the embankment. There were two embrasures,

one, as usual, pointing upon the Shikarpur Gate; and I believe the gun

was so hidden by the foliage of the trees that from the walls it was

difficult to detect the embrasures except by the flash of the gun. Some

of our shells had been, however, well pitched, the trunk of the tree

being barked and splintered. The gunners were quite safe, of course,

unless a shell actually burst in the embrasure itself, which was

extremely unlikely. Standing in rear of the earthwork one could

appreciate the security of the men who had held it, and with what

impunity they could bang away at our bastions. The line of _karez_ was

followed in a westerly direction, and all along its banks we traced the

low parapet formed of clods of earth. The walls of the enclosure had

their rows of loopholes, and when working parties were sent out from the

city three days after the raising of the siege, they found that good

cover existed to within 300 yards of the corner bastion. There was

always lively rifle-fire going on whenever any one showed on the parapet

of the city wall, but the Afghans outside had generally the best of the

position, as they were quite hidden from sight. A piece of open ground

in rear of the _karez_ between two enclosures was rather a dangerous

place for them to cross, although 1,000 yards from the walls. Marksmen

with Martinis fired volleys whenever they saw a group hurrying across,

and the bullets generally told. Many of the walls have been thrown down

by our working parties; and in one garden, full of large trees casting a

pleasant shade, is the Field Hospital of the garrison. Thence we passed

towards the Head-Quarters’ Garden (now occupied by General Phayre and

his Staff), and had a look at the embrasure whence a 6-pounder used to

fire into the city. The gun was placed on the steep bank of the main

_karez_, and was banked up to its muzzle, which was some ten feet above

the bottom of the water cut. There was broken ground in front,

intersected by irrigation channels, and in rear some low-walled

enclosures in which are now located a number of our transport animals.

Here my interesting journey came to an end, and I returned to quarters

in cantonments, favourably impressed with the rude evidences of the

enemy’s skill. It was at first believed that a European adventurer was

with Ayub Khan, from the admirable way in which his artillery was

handled and the dispositions made for investing Candahar; but this idea

is now exploded. It is more probable that there were in Herat men who

had seen service in the Turkish army in Asia Minor, or even north of the

Bosphorus, in the late war against Russia. These men could have picked

up some idea of entrenchments and be able to apply their knowledge under

the direction of the Naib, the only Afghan General who seems to know how

to handle his men. Others there may be who have learned a smattering of

the principles of civilized warfare in Persia or the Russian Khanates;

but in any case there was a decided improvement in their method to that

of the men we fought in and about Cabul.

------------------------------------

CHAPTER V.

An Account of the Defeat of General Burrows at Maiwand—The Disaffection

among the Wali’s Troops—Intrigues between Local Sirdars and Ayub

Khan—The Desertion of the Wali’s Infantry—General Burrows at

Girishk—His Orders—Ayub Khan’s Line of Advance from Farrah—The

Helmund River Fordable at all Points—The Routes from Girishk to

Candahar—Strategical Importance of Girishk—General Burrows’

Council of War on July 15th—Retirement of the Brigade upon

Khusk-i-Nakhud—Defective Cavalry Reconnaissances—Ayub Khan’s Advance

upon Maiwand—His Arrival at Sangbur—General Burrows’ Movement from

Khusk-i-Nakhud to intercept the Afghan Army—The Action at

Maiwand—Comparative Strength of the British and Afghan

Forces—General Burrows’ First Disposition of Attack—An Artillery

Duel—The effect upon the Brigade of acting on the Defensive—Advance

of the Afghan Irregulars—The Behaviour of Jacob’s Rifles on the

Left—Confusion among the Native Troops—Defeat and Rout of the

Brigade—Ineffectual Attempt to make the Cavalry Charge—The Retreat

to Candahar.

CANDAHAR, _13th September_.

From such sources as I have been able to draw upon, I have gained a

fairly exact idea of the circumstances attending General Burrows’ defeat

on the 27th of July, and I am now writing what, perhaps, is the first

unofficial account of the Maiwand disaster. Taking up the story from the

mutiny of the Wali’s troops on the 14th of July, it would seem that

though General Burrows succeeded on that occasion in recapturing the

6-pounder smooth-bore battery, there was not that severe punishment

inflicted upon the mutineers which would have been their just reward.

The disaffection in the Wali Shere Ali’s army was well known in the

British camp, and decisive measures might have been taken for disarming

the 2,000 infantry soldiers before they had fully made up their minds to

desert. But that indecision which was the ruling power in the Girishk

Brigade was all-powerful even in the early days of July; and there was,

perhaps, also the feeling in the political mind that it was too early to

acknowledge how mere a shadow the Wali’s authority was, and how

worthless was his so-called army. The fact that Nur Mahomed Khan, “the

Surteep,” had been wholly won over to Ayub’s side, must surely have been

known to the Wali, who was no doubt also tempted to throw over the

British. One of the Candahar regiments, even before it marched to the

Helmund, was greatly disaffected; but as the Wali had officered his

“army” from this particular regiment there was a disinclination to

disband it, as the other regiments might have given trouble. Thus the

Surteep was allowed full scope to work out his plans, and his subsequent

desertion followed in the natural order of things. His character as a

hospitable entertainer of British officers had won him some goodwill;

but there were those who suspected his loyalty to us, and were doubtful

of his relations with Ayub Khan. For months there must have been secret

correspondence between this man and the Herat leaders, who were no doubt

kept fully informed of all our movements, and furnished with exact

details of our local strength. That such a truly Afghan intrigue should

not have been detected, proves how small was the sympathy really felt

for us in Candahar, and the question arises was the Wali unacquainted

with the plot to seduce his army when the occasion served? If he were

not, he must indeed be an exception to the general rule, for Afghan

sirdars are so well versed in intrigue that they can usually detect

danger when our political officers believe all is going smoothly and

satisfactorily. But on July 14th the plot came to a head, and General

Burrows found himself left, with a weak brigade, alone on the Helmund.

Nominally, he had been supposed to act in support of the Wali’s army;

but this farce had come to an end, and his position was defined only too

clearly: he had to meet single-handed whatever force Ayub could muster.

Our late “allies” were in the ranks of the enemy; the Wali’s army had

ceased to exist; and the Surteep’s desertion would probably be followed

by the rising of the armed peasantry of Zamindawar and the surrounding

districts, for the Sirdar’s example could not fail to influence ignorant

men. If a chief of such importance had declared for Ayub, surely, it

would be argued, the British were in great straits. Now comes the moot

point as to what were General Burrows’ orders, and what expectation he

had of being reinforced from Candahar. Regarding the first, I believe I

am perfectly right in stating that he was ordered to “stop Ayub Khan and

disperse his troops if possible.” On the question of reinforcements I am

more doubtful; but I state pretty confidently that General Primrose had

decided that Candahar could not spare another regiment to strengthen the

Girishk Brigade, even under the altered conditions reported to him after

the mutiny. General Burrows was not relieved of his task of “stopping

Ayub,” and there must have been an over-weening confidence in the mind

of the General commanding at Candahar in respect to the fighting power

of the regiment with his absent Brigadier. That there was not the same

feeling among the officers of the brigade itself is now well known, and

one paragraph from the letter of an artillery officer, dated July 19th,

and published soon afterwards, is so true an estimate of the situation

that I cannot refrain from quoting it. He wrote:—

“We are now waiting for Ayub Khan, who is about 30 miles off, with

thirty-six guns and about 6,000 men. It will be a stiff fight if he

comes to the scratch, as this is a perfectly open country, and we are

only 1,500 infantry, 500 sabres, and six guns.”

[Illustration:

MAP TO ILLUSTRATE OPERATIONS ON THE HALMAND.

JULY 1880]

This forecast of a “stiff fight” proved only too true, but instead of

the 6,000 men referred to, our soldiers had to meet a host of irregulars

led by fanatical ghazis.

It devolved upon General Burrows to decide what course would be most

calculated to bar Ayub’s progress, and on July 15th he wisely called

together his commanding officers and held a small council of war. The

day was not wasted in idle discussion, as while opinions were being

exchanged our gunners were horsing and equipping the captured guns, the

teams of which had been used by the mutineers to aid them in their

flight. Many considerations had to be weighed in council. First, the

position of the enemy the brigade were bound to “stop and disperse if

possible.” Such information as Colonel St. John possessed favoured the

belief that the enemy’s cavalry under the Naib Hafizulla were still

distant 30 miles from the bank of the Helmund, and that the main body

with the guns was several marches in rear of this advanced party. Ayub’s

line of advance was along the main Herat Road, and he would probably

enter the Helmund Valley near the Khoja Baba Peak, a high point of the

range of hills which run parallel to the course of the river. This peak

is 30 miles in a bee-line from Girishk, and between it and the river is

an open plain, waterless, but otherwise quite easy for a force of all

arms to cross. There was this plain still between the brigade and Ayub’s

advanced cavalry, so that the two forces were scarcely “in touch,” more

particularly as it was imperatively laid down in instructions from the

Government of India that the Helmund River was not to be crossed under

any circumstances. General Burrows was to wait for the enemy to appear

before him, and his council of war had to decide at what point so to

wait. The Helmund is usually fordable at only four points: Sangin on the

south, Hyderabad, Girishk and Kalabist (at the junction with the

Argandab). From these fords four roads converge on Candahar: the

northern by way of the Malmund and Maiwand Passes, practicable for

wheeled artillery; the two central passing through Khusk-i-Nakhud, and

the southern route _viâ_ Balakhana and the Bund-i-Taimur. Of these four

routes, that most commonly used, on account of its directness, water and

other supplies, is the road passing through Khusk-i-Nakhud from Girishk.

Hence the value of Girishk as a strategical point at which to hold in

check an army advancing from the west upon Candahar. But that

strategical value had almost disappeared, as the Helmund, owing to an

exceptionally dry season, was everywhere fordable for men on foot, thus

allowing Ayub to cross it wherever he might choose and avoid Girishk.

Furthermore, when the question of supplies was entered into, it appeared

that the brigade had been quite dependent upon grain and forage

collected by the Wali and stored near the fort on the eastern bank of

the river. What supplies had existed on the 18th had either been carried

off or destroyed by the mutinous regiments, leaving Girishk practically

unable to provide longer for our troops. The necessity of at once

finding supplies made a move from Girishk unavoidable, and General

Burrows and his officers had determined what direction should be taken.

The opinion of the majority favoured a retirement to Asu Khan, whence

all the roads could be commanded and supports easily drawn from

Candahar. This, of course, took it for granted that Ayub Khan meant to

march direct upon Candahar and not turn off northwards for Ghazni and

Cabul; and the retirement was advocated also on the ground that the

brigade was not strong enough, unsupported, to meet the enemy in an open

fight. There was a bolder proposal to move northwards to Hyderabad,

retaining the Helmund as our advanced line, but this found little

support. Finally the middle course of a partial retirement was agreed

on, the brigade to fall back instantly upon Khusk-i-Nakhud. This would

place General Burrows upon the central road to Candahar, and therefore

commanding, to a certain extent, the northern and southern routes; the

force would also be only some 50 miles from head-quarters, whence it was

hoped new orders would be received, and possibly reinforcements. This

was the result of the little council of war held at Girishk, and it

seems to have been just and reasonable. To have stayed at Girishk was

almost impossible, as supplies were exhausted: to have moved to

Hyderabad would have involved serious risk if Ayub’s army were joined by

the people of the district; while to have fallen so far back as Asu Khan

before a shot had been fired would have seemed excessive timidity.

Khusk-i-Nakhud was an admirable point from which to watch Ayub’s passage

of the Helmund, and thence to ascertain his strength and probable

intentions.

On July 15th a night march was made, and on the morning of the 16th the

brigade encamped on their old ground at Khusk-i-Nakhud. On the following

days the troops moved two miles nearer to Mis Karez, and took up a

position which they occupied until the morning of the 27th. The stores

were placed in a small walled enclosure, and the baggage laagered up

ready for all emergencies. Spies, furnished by the Wali, were busy

during the next few days in bringing news of Ayub’s movements. Their

story was that the Afghan force was distributed in the dry river-bed

between the Girishk and Hyderabad fords; it made no signs of moving

eastwards, and the opinion began to prevail that Ghazni and not Candahar

was Ayub’s objective. Reconnaissances were made every day by General

Nuttall’s cavalry, but they were not of the kind to preserve touch with

an enemy. Thus a troop or so visited Garmao, Sangbur, and the

Bund-i-Taimar daily, as if for a constitutional ride, baited their

horses, looked around, and returned. Their movements were so beautifully

regular that every peasant knew at what time to expect them. Ayub’s

movements were never really watched at all, though sufficient cavalry

were with the brigade to have allowed of regular outpost work being

done, instead of a few hours’ visit daily to the same villages. It was

not until the 21st that Ayub’s cavalry pushed forward from the Helmund

and exchanged shots with our reconnoitring party at Sangbur. The next

day the village was found to be held by them, and news reached camp that

500 sowars were to seize Maiwand within twenty-four hours. There were

stores of grain lying in the fields about Maiwand, and fearing they

would fall into Ayub’s hands, General Burrows ordered a squadron of

cavalry to destroy the grain. They had only gone a few miles from

Khusk-i-Nakhud when they were fired upon by a large body of Afghan

cavalry, who were reconnoitring our position with some boldness. Our

cavalry scouts, deceived by the haze, reported that two regiments of

infantry were supporting the hostile cavalry, and the Horse Artillery

and some infantry were sent out from Khusk-i-Nakhud. It turned out to be

a myth; there were no Afghan infantry, and by this time their cavalry

were retiring in perfect safety. The guns certainly fired a round or two

after them, but our sowars missed their chance of a charge, scared by

the report that infantry were hidden under some low hills. Sangbur

contained no enemy on the 24th, but in the same neighbourhood on the

25th two of the Scind Horse were killed, the Afghan sowars being again

on the move. So late as the 26th it was believed all Ayub’s guns were at

Hyderabad, and that no movement in the direction of the Malmund Pass had

been made. The Afghan army was then believed to be about 12,000 strong,

counting regulars alone, while the number of ghazis and irregulars from

Zamindawar was said to be very large. Ayub’s advance could not be

exactly foreshadowed, but from his position at Hyderabad it was most

likely that he would try to reach Maiwand through Sangbur, as none of

his troops were reported to be on the longer route viâ the Malmund Pass.

The camp at Khusk-i-Nakhud was once more aroused on the afternoon of the

26th by positive news of a demonstration in the Maiwand direction, that

village having been occupied by 200 irregulars, while Garmao, five miles

away, was said to be held in strength by cavalry. The conclusion arrived

at upon this becoming known was that Ayub meant to occupy Maiwand by a

sudden move without joining battle with our troops, and that not

improbably he would thence try to slip away through the Maiwand Pass so

as to place himself between the brigade and Candahar.[52] Spies also led

General Burrows and Colonel St. John to believe that the main body must

be still a march in rear of the cavalry at Garmao.[53] In view of this,

it seemed important to seize Maiwand before it could be occupied in

force, more particularly as the brigade had been for some days drawing

its supplies from that village, and stores of grain still remained in

its neighbourhood which would fall into Ayub’s hands. The distance from

Khusk-i-Nakhud to Maiwand was twelve miles, and a rapid march to the

latter place might anticipate Ayub’s movements and enable the brigade to

clear Garmao of the Naib and his advanced cavalry. All this was of

course on the supposition that the main body of the Afghan army with the

thirty odd guns was well in rear of the cavalry—an unfortunate

supposition as it afterwards turned out, but one due to the wretched

information resulting from the cavalry “reconnaissances.”

-----

Footnote 52:

This, according to the statement of Ayub’s colonel of artillery (now a

prisoner in our hands), was really Ayub’s plan. He meant to reach

Sinjuri by forced marches.

Footnote 53:

In justice to Colonel St. John, I must say that I have since learned

that he reported later in the day, to General Burrows, that the

_whole_ of Ayub’s army was at Sangbur. This report was disregarded for

the following reason: A British officer of the 3rd Scind Horse stated

that he had visited Sangbur that day with a cavalry patrol, and that

only a few irregulars were found there. Colonel St. John’s information

was quite correct, as our prisoners told us after the battle of

Candahar. What village did the officer really reconnoitre?

-----

General Burrows, on the night of the 26th, issued orders for the whole

brigade, baggage and stores included, to march at daybreak on the

following morning. At such short notice the large quantity of reserve

supplies in the walled enclosures could not be got out in time, and it

was not until half-past six that the troops left Khusk-i-Nakhud. The

route taken was along the right bank of the Khusk-i-Nakhud river-bed,

then quite dry. There was a strip of cultivation near the bank, but

beyond, on either hand, lay arid, stony plains. The brigade halted at

eight o’clock at Mushak, to enable the baggage to close up. This

occupied half an hour, and then the march was continued, the next place

reached being Karezak. Here, for the first time, the unexpected news was

brought by our spies that the _whole_ of Ayub’s force was on the left

front, marching on Maiwand. The cavalry were sent out to reconnoitre,

and found large bodies of horsemen moving in the direction indicated;

but the haze and mirage prevented our sowars making any estimate of what

force was covered by the cavalry. This was about 10 o’clock, and yet

even with the aid of telescopes little could be seen of Ayub’s army.

Spies reported that the guns were there; but this news was looked upon

by the General with great mistrust, natives being so given to

exaggeration. General Burrows moved his troops at once rapidly towards

Maiwand, meaning to occupy one of the large walled enclosures wherein to

stow his 3,000 baggage animals and their loads, thus leaving the brigade

freedom of movement in attacking the Afghan army. It was too late.

Before the intervening village of Mundabad was gained, a large number of

white-clothed figures, irregulars who follow their _moollahs'_ dictation

and their ghazis’ lead, were seen pouring out from Maiwand itself. The

enemy’s cavalry ceased to retire, and along the slopes of the low hills

above Garmao could be distinguished masses of men in some sort of

organized formation. The haze still lay over the country, and it was

impossible to make out in detail the strength of the army thus suddenly

confronting the weak brigade. The ground on which the action which

followed was fought is thus described to me by an officer present:—“A

small stream, rising in the hills immediately north of Maiwand, formed

almost the only drainage line intersecting the barren waste in our

front. It ran successively past the villages of Mundabad, Karezak, and

Mushak, eventually disappearing in a _karez_. Between this stream and

the dry bed of the Khusk-i-Nakhud river the ground was level and

cultivated, dotted occasionally with high walled enclosures, but

generally open.” General Burrows had with him, approximately, 1,500

rifles, 550 sabres, and 12 guns, of which 6 formed the smooth-bore

battery, manned by one officer and 42 men of the 66th Foot. He resolved

to force the fighting; and four guns of the Horse Artillery Battery

(E-B) with the cavalry crossed the dry _nullah_ forming the bed of the

Khusk-i-Nakhud stream, followed by the 66th Foot, 1st Bombay Grenadiers,

and Jacob’s Rifles with the smooth-bore guns. The baggage crossed in

rear under an escort of two companies of infantry, a squadron of

cavalry, and two horse artillery guns. The _nullah_ having been crossed,

the troops advanced about a mile and formed up in line in the following

order:—66th Foot on extreme right, guns in the centre, with a wing of

Jacob’s Rifles and the Sappers as escort, Grenadiers on left, a wing of

Jacob’s Rifles in reserve behind the guns. The cavalry were at first on

the extreme left guarding the flank of the Grenadiers.

[Illustration:

SKETCH

OF

ACTION AT MAIWAND

27th JULY 1880.

_Drawn from a Sketch by Lieut. M. Talbot,

R.E. when the field was subsequently

visited in September._]

It was not until nearly noon that the action began. Lieutenant Maclaine

with two horse artillery guns and a small cavalry escort galloped out on

the extreme left, and got his guns into action at a range of 1,800

yards, firing shrapnel at the Afghan cavalry. General Burrows

disapproved of his boldness, and ordered the guns to retire, an order

which Lieutenant Maclaine was very loth to obey. However, the guns were

withdrawn, and by the time they had resumed their place in the line the

enemy’s strength had begun to be developed. Large numbers of irregulars,

led by the usual ghazis, were seen swarming over the low hills, and they

presently moved down upon the 66th, evidently meaning to turn the right

flank. To check this, General Burrows ordered his right to be thrown

back on the front extended, Ayub’s cavalry being on the move to the left

as if to carry out a flanking movement in that direction.[54]

Accordingly two companies of Jacob’s Rifles were sent to the extreme

left, while the remaining companies of that regiment and detachment of

the Bombay Sappers and Miners filled up the gap between the 66th on the

right, and the guns in the centre. Two guns were placed in position to

support the 66th on the right, the remaining ten between the Grenadiers

and the main body of Jacob’s Rifles. Every rifle was thus in the line of

attack, it not being possible to form any reserve worthy of the name for

such a small force. The cavalry (3rd Scind Horse and 3rd Bombay Light

Cavalry), under General Nuttall, formed up in rear of the left centre of

the line, where they remained during the action. Our guns began shelling

the enemy, whose artillery did not reply for quite half an hour,

confirming the idea that Ayub’s guns were far in rear. By half-past

twelve, however, this delusion was cleared away, for some five batteries

opened upon the brigade, and their shells fell with fair accuracy. The

effect of our own artillery fire could not be followed, as the haze

continued. Under cover of their thirty or more guns the irregulars

advanced to within 600 or 700 yards of the 66th; but the Martini fire

from the latter swept them down wherever they appeared; and so cowed

were they that, planting their standards, they sought cover in a dry

ravine, firing upon our men without doing much damage. Our infantry were

lying down under such cover as the ground afforded, and two of the

smoothbore guns were sent to the left to shell the Afghan cavalry. Then

came the fatal mistake in the action: instead of following the usual

tactics which our generals have found so successful all through the

war—taking the initiative and attacking with his infantry—General

Burrows entered into an artillery duel, which lasted for two hours. The

brigade had twelve guns (six of which were inferior smooth-bores, worked

by volunteers from the horse artillery, and infantry men trained during

the halt at Khusk-i-Nakhud) the Afghans had nearly three times that

number, and their gunners were unusually expert. “They soon got our

range,” says an officer present, “and shot and shell came crashing into

us.” Shrapnel, round-shot, and afterwards grape, were freely used by the

enemy; and while our infantry were fairly safe at first, the horses of

the cavalry and the gun-teams suffered severely. The latter had to be

renewed constantly; and it was evident that in a trial of strength with

artillery the brigade was greatly over-matched. Little did our men know

that the Herati regiments suffered so from their shell-fire that twice

they retired, and were quite ready to have fled at the first direct

attack. The enemy’s artillery fire was so well sustained that casualties

soon began to be reported all along the line. Harris, of the staff, and

Blackwood, commanding E-B Battery, were among the first hit; but

Blackwood, after having his wound dressed (he was hit in the thigh),

returned to his battery—a rare example of true bravery and endurance.

The want of water told heavily upon all our men, and the slackness

resulting therefrom was only too plain—men leaving the ranks to get

water from the _nullah_ in rear or from the water-carriers. Our three

regiments were still out of range of any musketry fire, except stray

shots from irregulars; but the artillery fire had a demoralizing effect

upon the sepoys. Jacob’s Rifles are said to have had nearly 100 men who

had never fired ball-cartridge, so that they could not be looked upon at

all as trained soldiers whose fire could be relied upon.

-----

Footnote 54:

Major-General Greaves, Adjutant-General in India, in his remarks upon

General Burrows’ despatch, points out how fatal it was to form up with

both flanks _en l’air_ before an enemy vastly superior in numbers.

-----

At about two o’clock the smooth-bore guns were reported as running short

of ammunition. Sixty rounds per gun had been made up since their

capture, and with these they went into action. There were no reserves to

fall back upon. Captain Slade had taken charge of these guns, but

returned to his own battery when they ceased to fire. There was nothing

for it but to order the four six-pounders and the two howitzers forming

the battery to retire and this movement was at once carried out. No

sooner did the enemy notice that half our guns were out of action than

they advanced along their whole line. Their batteries were brought

forward in the boldest manner, and some of their guns actually came into

action, on the right, from behind a depression in the ground only 800

yards from our infantry. Two or three thousand cavalry manœuvred on

the left flank of the brigade, trying to get well in rear; while on the

right a large number of mounted men and irregulars on foot, who had made

a wide detour, got into the villages, and were firing upon the baggage

escort. The 66th had still the ghazi-led mob in front of them in check,

steady volleys keeping the ground clear. At this time the casualties all

round must have been considerably over 100, while many horses had been

killed.

At about half-past two the two companies of Jacob’s Rifles on the

extreme left began to waver. Their two officers had been killed, and

their two native officers, who had kept them together for some time, had

also fallen; there were none of the enemy’s infantry near them, but the

artillery fire had demoralized them; and the last straw which broke the

back of their courage was the retirement of the smooth-bores out of

action. They thought such a move could only mean that all was over, and

they broke their ranks and fell back in utter confusion, breaking into

the ranks of the Grenadiers, who had up to that time been steady. Their

bad example was quickly imitated, and the Grenadiers likewise gave way.

The remaining companies of Jacob’s Rifles shared the panic, and with a

quickness that carried consternation into the heart of every European

officer, all the native infantry were surging upon the 66th. The

Grenadiers fought bravely and tried to form square but could only get

into a V shape with the apex towards the enemy: in the _mêlée_ they were

cut down literally “in hundreds.” The Sapper detachment under Lieutenant

Henn, with the guns, stood bravely to their post, but so small a party

could not hope to save the guns without immediate help. Lieutenant Henn

was killed after behaving most gallantly. The enemy saw their advantage,

and a rush of irregulars led by ghazis was made from the right front.

The guns fired canister into the mass; but it was useless, and Slade

limbered up and retired. Maclaine remained with two guns firing, until

the ghazis were actually at the muzzles, and these two guns had to be

left behind. The 66th were broken by the rush of sepoys upon them. The

confusion was hopeless, many of the sepoys being so cowed that they

allowed the Afghans to pull them backwards from among their comrades and

cut them down. No attempt to use the bayonet was made by the recruits

among Jacob’s Rifles, who scarcely seemed to know that they carried arms

wherewith to defend themselves. A cavalry charge was ordered; but the

men were out of hand, and though two squadrons rode out, they never

really charged. One of their officers had his horse shot, and the sowars

would not go on, but veered round and came back to add to the

disorganization of the infantry.[55] The 66th and the Grenadiers rallied

twice in walled enclosures and sold their lives dearly, but they were

outnumbered, and could not help to check the Afghan advance. Colonel

Galbraith was killed outside the first enclosure, and the 66th lost nine

other officers killed. Major Blackwood, commanding E-B Battery, was also

shot down, one of his subalterns (Lieutenant Osborne) having been killed

in the rush. By three o’clock the brigade had been routed, and the enemy

were in hot pursuit. Fortunately that pursuit lasted only two or three

miles, the enemy returning to Maiwand to loot General Burrows’ camp.

-----

Footnote 55:

Brigadier Nuttall commanding the cavalry says in his despatch: “I

ordered the cavalry to form line, and by a charge stem the rush of

ghazis on the infantry; but I bitterly regret to have to record that

although I was most ably seconded by the officers, only portions of

the 3rd Light Cavalry and 3rd Scind Horse formed up, and we charged,

but the men bearing away to the right and rear, the charge was not

delivered home, and was but of little effect. All subsequent attempts

made at this time by myself and the officers to induce the men to

rally and face the enemy failed. The men seemed totally demoralized by

the combined effects of the very heavy artillery fire which had,

during the action, killed and wounded 149 of the horses, and about

fourteen per cent. of the men engaged in the front. There was now

nothing left but to fall back on the rearguard, which had advanced a

short way towards us, but it was not till we reached the four guns

Royal Horse Artillery, brought out of action by Captain Slade, that

the men, through the exertions of the officers, staff and myself, were

formed up facing the enemy.”

-----

The following extract from a letter from an officer who was engaged in

the action may well close this sad record:—

“When I realized that we were defeated, and had to retreat some 50

miles to Candahar, my heart sank within me, and never shall I forget

the agonies of that fearful night march without water, hundreds of

poor wretches lying strewn about the road calling aloud for a drop of

water. It was agonizing, but one was obliged to steel his heart, as

nothing could be done, we all being in the same box. The order to

march on Maiwand from Khusk-i-Nakhud was only given at 10 P.M., on the

26th July, and the march commenced at 6.30 A.M. (on the 27th). We had

no idea that Ayub’s army was at Maiwand till we had marched half-way

there, and then we only half believed it: however, after going a few

miles further we sighted the enemy moving towards Maiwand. Our troops

seemed to consider that they would have it all their own way, and

advanced very boldly; but the demoralizing effect of thirty odd guns

and the being outnumbered, obliged them to retreat, and the retreat

became a rout. From prisoners lately taken we hear that we inflicted a

fearful loss on the enemy, and that if we could only have brought a

fresh regiment we could have won the day. Our heaviest losses were

during the retreat, as all the villagers on the line of route turned

against us. I was among the last to leave the field, and walked half

the way, having given up my pony to a wounded soldier. I was not fired

on by the villagers till within six miles of Candahar, when I, with

two sepoys and the wounded soldier, had to ascend a hill, and take

refuge behind a rock, where we remained a good while, till the country

was cleared by the cavalry under General Brooke, who had come out from

Candahar to meet us. I then continued my journey, and when arriving at

the village near the cantonments some 10 European and 15 native

soldiers had joined me. The native soldiers were utterly

demoralized,[56] and I could not get them to obey me. Some 100 or 150

Afghans were congregated on a little hillock commanding the road to

Candahar, and seeing the hesitation of my party they streamed down the

hill, yelling, and I was obliged to fall back and take up a position

on another hillock. Then the native soldiers came to me and expressed

their opinion that we ought to run for it. However, I abused them, and

made them lie down and point their guns towards the enemy, who at once

retreated to their former position. I felt perfect confidence in the

European portion of my party, and if I could have felt the same in the

native I would not have minded an attack from 150 half-armed Afghans.

When General Brooke returned with the rear-guard of the Girishk

column, he shelled the hills where the Afghans were collected, and we

marched peaceably into cantonments.”

-----

Footnote 56:

The 3rd Scind Horse only lost fourteen men killed and five wounded out

of 260 men: they had forty-nine horses killed and wounded. There were

thus always over 200 sabres available for a charge in this regiment

alone, but the men were out of hand.

-----

----------------------------

CONCLUSION.

I have not gone into the details of the movements of the Cabul-Candahar

force after the Battle of Candahar, as there was no further opposition,

and the military programme carried out was only of local importance. The

brigades were marched back to India as quickly as possible, with the

exception of the 9th Lancers and 6-8 R.A., which were left at Candahar.

The following letter, written in Candahar, will throw some light on the

strategy of the action on September 1st:—

CANDAHAR, _20th September_.

There is but one opinion here as to the unsoundness of the criticisms

upon General Roberts’s action of the 1st; it is that the critics have

jumped to conclusions on imperfect reports, having taken the first

meagre telegrams as their guide. By an incessant study of small-scale

maps they gained a superficial knowledge of the Argandab Valley, and

were fully convinced that the proper mode of directing the attack

would have been to throw an intercepting force 30 or 40 miles in rear

of Mazra, and then to have attacked Ayub from Candahar—no doubt by way

of the Pir Paimal village. They point their arguments by adding that

our cavalry pursuit was really inoperative, as only 400 of the

fugitives were killed, while the great mass escaped. Admitted that

after we had rolled them back from Pir Paimal the great majority got

off scot-free, this by no means proves that a weak brigade could have

cut off their retreat; for it seems to be forgotten that not one, but

many, roads were open to them, while the mountainous nature of the

country on the higher reaches of the Argandab was all in favour of

trained hill-men such as Afghans always are. Their cavalry and many

thousands of footmen made straight for the Khakrez Valley, knowing

well that once the range of hills, eight miles west and north-west of

the Argandab, was reached, they were quite safe. There was no

necessity at all for their retirement northwards up the Argandab—or

rather north-eastwards—and it is quite an open question if any brigade

we could have spared would have even seen many of the fugitives.

General Roberts’s first and greatest duty was to induce Ayub Khan to

give him battle, and not to cause a scare in his camp by premature

strategical movements, 30 or 40 miles up the Argandab Valley. It may

not be known, also, that when the infantry was encamped near

Shar-i-Safa, one march from Robat, on August 27th the news from

Candahar led us to believe that Ayub might possibly forsake Mazra and

try to escape in the Ghazni direction by way of the Argandab stream.

General Roberts at once recognized the necessity of barring any

movement _in force_ in this direction, and a column of about 2,000 men

was told off to march by way of Bori, and Dala, and block the road up

the Argandab. But when heliographic communication with Candahar was

opened up later in the day, and Colonel St. John’s reports showed that

Ayub was busy strengthening his position at Mazra, the order given for

the column to move out was at once countermanded. It was known that

the Afghan force was mainly composed of men from Zamindawar, Candahar,

and Herat—the Cabuli element being very small, and the Kizilbashes and

Kohistanis being already in treaty with Colonel St. John to desert at

short notice. The main body of real fighting men, therefore, would

seek safety in flight, after defeat, not northwards towards

Khelat-i-Ghilzai, but to the west and north-west, where the hills

offered them shelter until they could regain their homes. This line of

flight was really taken; but as our cavalry brigade under General Hugh

Gough could not reach the Kokaran Ford until Gundigan and the orchards

about had been cleared by General Baker’s Infantry Brigade, Ayub Khan

and his cavalry escort—leaving Mazra, it should be remembered, at

11.30 A.M.—had easily covered the seven or eight miles of ground

between the river and the slopes of the hills bounding the Khakrez

Valley on the south. Besides, the tactics of the fugitives were such

as to neutralize any pursuit or the action of any intercepting force:

hundreds took refuge in the villages, buried their arms, or hid them

securely away, and came out to greet our troops in the guise of

harmless peasants. If these had been slaughtered in cold blood the

cavalry would have returned with the report that not 300 or 400, but

1,300 or 1,400 of the enemy had been killed. I do not make this

statement on my own unsupported authority, but on the direct testimony

of cavalry officers engaged in the pursuit. Thus the 9th Lancers gave

chase to a large number of men evidently in full flight. On coming up

with them, the Lancers found these fugitives without arms, and though

there could be no reasonable doubt that they had hidden their weapons

some little time before, Lieutenant Colonel Bushman ordered his men to

spare their lives. The Lancers rode among them, and if any man had

been detected with a knife or pistol he would probably have paid the

forfeit of his life. In other instances small bands were hunted into

villages, and when the cavalry rode up men appeared holding little

children in their arms, and prayed for mercy. What was to be done to

an enemy resorting to such manœuvres? Our cavalry could not take

prisoners as they had to continue the pursuit: and these units of the

Mazra army were shown that mercy which they refused to our men

retreating from Maiwand!

Again, any intercepting force thrown into the Argandab Valley could

not hope to co-operate with the force attacking from Candahar; they

would have been a detached corps of observation, merely watching for

Afghans fleeing into their arms. First of all they must have been sent

completely away from our main body either at Shar-i-Safa or Robat in

order to cross the hills by the only available _kotal_ near Dala

(between 30 and 40 miles above the Baba Wali Kotal); for the Murcha

Kotal was held in force by Ayub. They could not approach to within 20

miles of Mazra, for a further advance would have been to court an

attack by overwhelming numbers, while General Roberts was marching

from Robat to Candahar. The safety of 2,000 men would have been

endangered, while the only object they could have gained would have

been the interception of a few hundred of Cabulis, who would probably

have taken to the precipitous hills and escaped in the night. The

Argandab Valley narrows greatly, 30 or 40 miles above Mazra, and

cavalry would have been worse than useless with the intercepting (?)

column. It cannot be urged with too much emphasis, that Ayub Khan’s

line of retreat, _if his army were defeated_, was in the Khakrez

direction, for his men, in their slack discipline, would make for

their own villages and not rush off at a tangent towards

Khelat-i-Ghilzai. All Afghan “armies,” so-called, and Ayub’s was

perhaps more worthy of respect than any we have yet met, have a power

of dispersion which is unrivalled. Organized pursuit against them is

almost impossible: unless every mountain path and torrent bed within

50 miles could be searched at once.

General Roberts has had more experience in Afghan warfare than any

other of our commanders; and his tactics were based on sounder

principles than those advocated by critics unversed altogether even in

the details of past actions. To say Pir Paimal could have been carried

with fewer troops than those engaged is to beg the whole question. The

action of Ahmed Khel proved that when fanaticism is at red-heat, 5,000

or 6,000 men may charge right into our ranks. Would it have been wise

to have dispensed with General Macgregor’s brigade (some 2,000 strong)

as a reserve in case of such another charge down from the Baba Wali

Kotal upon General Macpherson’s right flank? And yet General Macgregor

had about the number of men which would have been absorbed if the

much-talked of “intercepting column” had been waiting, 30 or 40 miles

up the Argandab Valley, ignorant of what was happening at Candahar. It

may be urged that there were 4,000 men of the Candahar garrison at

General Roberts’s disposal; but it would have been unwise to ask much

of a garrison still suffering from the shock of the terrible disaster

at Maiwand, and only half-realizing that they were no longer besieged

within the walls of Candahar. That I am not exaggerating the

depression prevailing in the Bombay Division, will be clear from the

fact that General Primrose, on the evening of the 31st August,

personally stopped a string of mules which were leaving the citadel

with bread and barley for the Bengal troops. Our reconnaissance was

returning, and there was certainly heavy rifle-fire beyond Karez hill,

while the enemy’s guns on Baba Wali Kotal were also adding to the din.

Our troops were holding Picquet Hill, and our camp was within 2,500

yards of the Eedgah Gate, out of which an officer in the Commissariat

Department was conducting the little convoy. Between that convoy and

“danger” were some 10,000 picked men, nearly all British, Sikhs, and

Ghoorkas; but the “risk” of allowing the bread and grain to be carried

a mile and a half was pronounced “too great” by General Primrose

himself. The Commissariat officer, knowing food was needed in camp,

managed to gain permission to take on the mules laden with bread, and

he saw nothing to disturb him on the road. The ground between the

north-western bastion and the nearest wall of cantonments (1,200 yards

away) is as bare as the Sahara, and it was not likely the enemy’s

cavalry picquet below the Baba Wali Kotal would have charged out a

couple of miles to capture the mules, even if they had seen them. The

story is told not to detract from General Primrose’s judgment and

ability, but to illustrate the unhealthy feeling and want of tone in

the garrison, in spite of the efforts of brave and resolute men to

wipe out the recollection of Maiwand and Deh-i-Khwaja from the minds

of their fellows.

I have tried to write without undue dogmatism: but I may have been

betrayed into laying too great a stress upon “probabilities,” viz.,

that the enemy’s line of retreat would be towards Khakrez and not up

the narrow Argandab Valley, and that Ayub’s irregulars might have

furnished a band of desperate men led by ghazis to make a

counter-attack from Baba Wali Kotal. I have carefully avoided any

reference to the entrenched camp of Ayub at Mazra, which our spies

assured us existed, and which General Macgregor’s Brigade, fresh and

untouched by fire, were intended to storm if Generals Macpherson and

Baker had been checked in their progress. I think these probabilities

were justified fully so far as the retreat is concerned, while the

knowledge that we had all our forces concentrated behind Karez and

Picquet Hills may have prevented the masses of men about the Baba Wali

Kotal (in the earlier part of the day) from making a counter-attack.

If there is one part which criticism may fairly seize upon, and which

our own Brigadiers would be the first to acknowledge, it is the want

of cavalry with General Ross when the 72nd and 2nd Sikhs on the one

hand, and the 92nd and 2nd Ghoorkas on the other, rolled back the

enemy at the turning-point of the Pir Paimal spur. The basin leading

towards Mazra and the open ground due west towards the Argandab was

covered with men in full flight, and 500 sabres could have swept into

them with terrific effect. It is, I believe, an axiom that no division

shall now go into action without one regiment of cavalry attached to

it, but all through the war we have brigaded all our cavalry, and on

several occasions the want of 500 troops to follow up _rapidly_ an

infantry attack has been severely felt. Witness in particular the

first action of Charasia, when the Afghans fled towards Indikee; and

the storming of the ridge leading up to the Takht-i-Shah Peak when the

open ground beyond Beni Hissar was black with fugitives. General Hugh

Gough and his splendid cavalry brigade of 1,600 sabres and lances did

all that men could do to gain the Kokaran Ford, and cut up such bodies

of men as they could overtake; but if one regiment had been spared

from that brigade to have followed up our infantry advance there would

have been rare work for the troops about Pir Paimal. The answer, of

course, to this is that the network of orchards and walled enclosures,

with intersecting channels, seemed to shut out cavalry from

participating in that part of the action; there was no one as usual to

tell us of the grand open ground when the ridge was turned.

------------------------------------------------------------------------

APPENDIX.

The following information is derived from trustworthy sources, and may

be of some interest:—

_Table of Heights above mean Sea-level._

Feet.

Cabul Plain 5,840

Luttabund Kotal 7,400

Kata Sung 5,000

Jugdulluck Kotal 5,200

Gundamak 4,500

Futtehabad 3,095

Jellalabad 1,950

_Table of Marches from Jumrood to Cabul._

The corrected road distances are:—

Miles.

Jumrood to Ali Musjid 8·30

Ali Musjid to Lundi Kotal 10·50

Lundi Kotal to Dakka 12·00

Dakka to Basaule 11·10

Basaule to Barikab 9·98

Barikab to Jellalabad 17·76

Jellalabad to Rosabad 12·88

Rosabad to Sufed Sang 16·12

Sufed Sang to Pezwan 12·75

Kotal

Pezwan Kotal to 10·50

Jugdulluck Fort

Jugdulluck Fort to Sei 10·00

Baba

Sei Baba to Luttabund 9·50

Luttabund to Butkhak 9·50

Butkhak to Bala Hissar 9·20

———

Total 160·09

TRANSPORT FOR THE INDIAN ARMY.

The transport arrangements have always been the great stumbling-block

when war has been declared in India, and in the hope that something will

be done to form a permanent establishment, I republish the following

letter, written in Sherpur on June 15th, 1880:—

_15th June._

Lieutenant-Colonel Low, of the 13th Bengal Lancers, Chief Director of

Transport with the Cabul Force, has suggested a plan for establishing a

permanent transport service, the details of which I will try to explain.

He advocates a system—the expense of which should be moderate in time of

peace, and not extravagant in time of war—which should admit of rapid

expansion when war breaks out, and, most important of all, which should

allow of the animals being employed for ordinary purposes of commerce in

peace time, yet always be ready to fall into their places when the State

requires them. Colonel Low takes an army of 36,000 of all arms with

fifteen days’ food as the unit to be treated, this being about the

strength of a force which is likely to be mobilized in case of war

breaking out, and he believes that under his system transport for such

an army could be raised, at any time, in a fortnight.

Taking the mule as the only transport animal in the “first line,” he

calculates that 70,000 mules (of which number 1,028 would be spare

animals) would be required for the 36,000 men, the estimate being as

follows:—

Mules.

7,000 British Infantry 15,435

1,500 ” Cavalry 6,036

2,800 Artillery and Engineers 11,267

4,000 Native Cavalry 9,900

21,000 ” Infantry 26,334

——————

Total 68,972

Spare animals 1,028

——————

Grand total 70,000

This calculation is made on the Cabul scale of baggage, and each animal

would have to carry two maunds only; allowance is made for forage and

grain also being carried. The 70,000 mules required would be located in

the three Presidencies, in the following proportion: Bengal, 35,000;

Bombay and Madras, 17,500 each. Regarding Northern India, it is

calculated that the N.-W. Provinces would furnish 9,750, Oudh 750 and

Rohilkund 2,000. The Punjab would be responsible for 27,500. The system

of maintenance would be the division of all the country into a certain

number of districts; as, for instance, the N.-W. Provinces into

thirteen, and the Punjab into twenty, each of which would have a fixed

number of mules ready for the State when occasion might arise. Colonel

Low’s explanation of the organization he would create is so clear, that

I will give his own words. He says:—“The districts would all have been

numbered off in the transport books, and I will suppose I am visiting

the Rawalpindi or No. 20 district. The first village I enter, might

have, perhaps, fifteen mules, nine of which were over three and under

fourteen years old. To the owners of these animals I would say:

‘Government will give you, through me, one rupee per month for each of

these animals. Government does not want them now and may never want them

at all. Keep them, therefore, and use them as you have been accustomed

to. All that Government asks is that you will agree to give the use of

the mules in time of war. You must bring them with their saddles, &c.,

arranging among yourselves that at least one man shall accompany every

three mules. On Government calling for the mules, you will receive war

rates of pay from that day till the animals are discharged, when they

will revert to peace rates of one rupee per month. This present

agreement is to last twelve months, after which notice of three months

on either side may end the bargain: the one proviso being that when

Government has called for the service of the mules, the notice cannot be

given until the mules are discharged. Meanwhile the mules must be

branded with the district mark ‘R 20;’ and here is Rs. 36, the first

quarter’s payment in advance.’” Colonel Low states that from his

personal knowledge, and from opinions expressed by native gentlemen, he

is convinced the people would eagerly accept such a system, as it is one

which they could easily understand, and is quite in keeping with their

customs and traditions.

Then comes the all-important question of cost. Regarding the permanent

establishment, Colonel Low suggests that a Director, who would have

control all over India, should be appointed with staff pay of Rs. 1,000

per month. His subordinates in Bengal would be two superintendents (Rs.

500 each), and four assistants (Rs. 150 to 200); in Bombay and Madras

just half this establishment. There would also be a number of native

officers, and non-commissioned officers, and five sowars would be told

off to each district. The staff in Bengal would cost Rs. 9,210 per month

(in peace time), in Bombaya and Madras Rs. 4,030 each, or a total of Rs.

17,270 for establishment. The premium to owners of Re. 1 per animal

would be Rs. 70,000, making a grand total of Rs. 87,270. When war broke

out, the staff would be available for instant service at their normal

pay, while the owner of each animal would receive his Rs. 12 per month,

in all Rs. 8,40,000, or a total expenditure on service of Rs. 8,57,270.

To put the matter in simpler form, Colonel Low remarks:—“If we suppose a

period of four years in which there was war for four months, the cost

would be:—

Rs.

44 months’ peace, at Rs. 87,270 per mensem 37,29,880

4 months’ war, at Rs. 8,57,270 per mensem 33,29,080

——————

Total 70,58,960

This is, in round numbers, £700,000;” and Colonel Low significantly

adds:—“This can no doubt be compared with transport expenses in the last

campaign”—an allusion, perhaps, to the enormous compensation we had to

pay to camel-owners for animals lost or killed. The second line of

transport in a campaign, Colonel Low considers, should be wheeled

carriages, a certain number of carts being always kept ready at stations

near the bases of supply, such as Multan, Rawalpindi, &c. With this

scheme, and no doubt several others before them, it will be strange if

the Government does not once for all make up its mind to an expenditure

in peace time upon transport service: it may seem, for the time being,

money wasted, but any one seeing the accounts of the present war cannot

help being convinced that a permanent transport would have saved the

country many lakhs of rupees.

THE END.

---------------------------------------------------------

Woodfall and Kinder, Printers, Milford Lane, Strand, London, W.C.

------------------------------------------------------------------------

------------------------------------------------------------------------

NOTES ON ILLUSTRATION AT p. 512

_1st Brigade_ 1 _3rd Brigade_ 4

_6 S.R.A._ _11-9 R.A._

_92nd Highlanders_ _2-60 Rifles_

_2nd Goorkhas_ _4th Goorkhas_

_23rd Pioneers_ _15th Sikhs_

_24th P.N.I._ _25th P.N.I._

_2nd Brigade_ 2 _Cavalry Brigade_

_No. 2 M.B._ _9th Lancers_

_72nd Highlanders_ _3rd B.C._

_5th Goorkhas_ _3rd R.C._

_2nd Sikhs_ _C.I.H._

_3rd Sikhs_

_2nd Biluchi_

_Bombay Troop_ 3 _Afghan Positions_

_6 Co. 7th Fusiliers_ _Gundimisila_

_4 Co. 66th Foot_ _Gundigan_

_6 Co. 28th N.I._ _Walled Gardens between G and G_

_4th N.I._ _Pir Paimal and Spur of Hill_

_19th N.I._ _Kharoti and Hill_

_2 Co. 1st N.I._

_Detachment S. and M._

_E.B., R.H.A._

_C-2 R.A._

_5-11 R.A._

_3rd I. Cavalry_

_3rd Sinde Horse_ _(Sd.) E.P. Leach, Captain & _

_Poona Horse_ _ Brevet-Major._

------------------------------------------------------------------------

NOTES ON ILLUSTRATION AT p. 532

DISPOSITION OF GUNS

GUNS. POSITION. OFFICERS COMDG.

FACE.

9-Pr. M.L.H. Gun C-2, R.A. N. E. Bastion ⎞

9-Pr. ditto ditto Durrance Gate ⎟ Major Greig R.A.

9-Pr. ditto ditto Cabul Gate ⎠

40-Pr. B.L.R. Gun S. E. Bastion ⎞ Capt. Hornsby

Comg.

6-Pr. S.B. Gun Shikapoor Gate ⎟ 5-11 R.A.

40-Pr. B.L.R. Gun ⎞ S. W. Bastion ⎠

9-Pr. M.L.R. Gun E-B., R.H.A. ⎟

9-Pr. ditto ditto ⎠ Herat Gate ⎞

9-Pr. ditto C-2 R.A. Topkhana Gate ⎟ Capt. Slade R.A.

40-Pr. B.L.R. Gun ⎞ N.W. Bastion ⎠

9-Pr. M.L.R. Gun E-B., R.H.A. ⎟

9-Pr. ditto ditto ⎠ Eedgah Gate

40-Pr. B.L.R. Gun S. W. Bastion of

Citadel.

Eedgah Gate Front, 400 men under the command of Brigadier-General

Burrows, Lieutenant-Colonel Nimmo, 28th N.I., commanding Eedgah Gate.

After 16th August, Colonel Edwardes, 2nd N.I., took command of Front

under Brigadier-General Burrows, with Major Singleton, 28th N.I.

commanding the Gate.

Length of Front 1,178 yards.

Cabul Gate Front, 500 men under Brigadier-General Nuttall, with Colonel

Bannerman, 4th N.I., commanding the Cabul Gate, and Colonel Mainwaring,

30th N.I., commanding the Durrance Gate.

Length of Front 1,700 yards.

Herat Gate Front, 500 men under command of Colonel Edwardes, 2nd N.I.,

with Major Marshall, 4th N.I., commanding the Herat Gate, and

Lieutenant-Colonel Griffith, 1st N.I., commanding the Topkhana Gate.

After 16th August, Brigadier-General Daubeny commanded this Front and

Major Ready, 66th, the Gate.

Length of Front 1,987 yards.

Shikarpoor Gate Front, 400 men under Brigadier-General Brooke, with

Major Trench, 19th N.I., in command of Shikapoor Gate. After 16th

August, Colonel Heathcote, 19th N.I. commanded this front, and Major

Marshall, 4th N.I., the Gate.

Length of Front 1,300 yards.

Transcriber’s note:

The captions for the fold-out maps and sketches have been moved to fall

on the nearest paragraph break. Notes for those at p. 512 and p. 532 are

found below.

Footnotes have been moved to follow the paragraphs in which they are

referenced.

Minor errors, attributable to the printer, have been corrected.

Compound words (e.g., ‘loophole’) may be hyphenated inconsistently. When

the hyphen appears on a line or page break, the hyphen is retained or

removed based on the preponderance of other instances.

Variant spellings of place names or tribal names are retained if there

are more than one instance of each.

The abbreviation ‘lbs.’ appears multiple times with and without a

preceding space, as ‘300 lbs.’ or ‘300lbs’, and is given here as

printed.

Errors deemed most likely to be the printer’s have been corrected, and

are noted here. The references are to the page and line in the original.

The following issues should be noted, along with the resolutions.

29.32 the village of Charasia about eleven Inserted.

o[’]clock

46.32 General Massy ordered his v[e/i]dettes Replaced.

59.36 against the wooden framewor[d/k] of the Replaced.

pavilion

77.35 the large earthe[r]n jars and dubbers Removed.

79.8 It was by [no ]mean safe walking Added.

90.8 to submit to ou[t]side interference Inserted.

112.10 a guide to some troops marching up the Replaced.

Bala Hissar [B/R]idge

112.26 has sunk very low of [l]ate Added.

113.28 of w[h]ich 9½ will appear in the Inserted.

accounts

114.4 Arrival of Stores from the Replaced.

Shutargard[e/a]n

125.7 upon the safety of the Shutargard[e/a]n Replaced.

152.18 and v[a/o]lleys> from the Martinis and Replaced.

Sniders

156.14 and his inter[w/v]iew with Cavagnari Replaced.

171.2 can scar[c]ely admit of a doubt Inserted.

186.35 on the Ghazni [B/R]oad. Replaced.

257.32 To[-]night we are resting on our arms Restored.

268.26 We had not suffic[i]ent ammunition Inserted.

288.16 to live on [peacable] terms with the _sic_

people

291.13 Ataullah Khan, Anitoollah Khan[,] Added.

Habibulla Khan (the Mustaufi)

324.14 the gro[o]ves were filled with lead Inserted.

337.7 and the tough shaft [as it] had been of as if? as though?

tinder

354.9 Daoud Shah accompa[in/ni]ed Yakub Khan Inverted.

to Cabul

362.20 an important mission to fu[l]fil in Inserted.

Central Asian politics

363.25 _vi[a/â]_ Maizena and Peshbolak Replaced.

379.30 with the advanced party [a/o]f the Replaced.

Candahar column

400.9 without fear of an _[e/é]meute_ Replaced.

424.19 has been gained in a short intercou[r]se Inserted.

427.11 The Battle[ ]field of Ahmed Khel Removed.

441.2 Sirdars and servants mingled in Inserted.

famil[i]ar groups

454.5 It now rema[i]ns for Abdur Rahman to Inserted.

show

471.3 That would indeed be a Inverted.

disappointme[u/n]t too grievous to be

borne.

499.7 When, howev[ev]er, we reached Removed.

Khel-i-Akhund

503.20 Sir Frederick Robert[s]’s Plan of Attack Inserted.

521.25 and to examine th[o/e] contents of Replaced.

Ayub’s tents

538.36 The contin[u]ous firing showed the Inserted.

village

545.7 Reti[o/r]ement of the Brigade upon Replaced

Khusk[l]-i-Nakhud Removed.

551.11 to clear G[e/a]rmao of the Naib and his Replaced.

advanced cavalry

561.18 in their slack disc[lip/ipl]ine Transposed.

567.3 the [fi]rst> quarter’s payment Restored.