Further Details of the Maiwand Disaster—A Force ordered to march from
Cabul to Candahar—Aid given by the Amir—Farewell Dinner to Sir F.
Roberts—Details of the Force destined for Peshawar—Closing Scenes of
the Occupation of Cabul—Interview between the Amir and Sir Donald
Stewart—A Friendly Leave-Taking—The Evacuation of Sherpur on August
11th—Peaceful March to India—The Arrangements made with the
Amir—Grant of £190,500 and Thirty Guns—The Forts left intact about
Cabul—Weakness of such a Policy.
_6th August, 1880._
On the 4th of August orders were received from the Government of India
for a force 10,000 strong under Lieutenant-General Sir F. Roberts to
march from Cabul to the relief of Candahar; but it was not until last
evening that the full meaning of the sinister news from Candahar was
generally recognized in camp. So much secrecy had been kept regarding
the earlier despatches, no doubt in the hope that later news would show
the disaster to have been exaggerated, that until Colonel St. John’s
long telegram giving details of the losses was issued in the Club, we
could not accept the defeat at Khusk-i-Nakhud as a reality. In a large
camp like this wild rumours obtain ready circulation; they are believed
for a day, or a week, until some new theory is broached and a new turn
given to the current of men’s thoughts. First we believed that General
Burrows’ Brigade had indeed been annihilated; then the affair sank into
a reconnaissance in which two companies of the 66th had been cut up to a
man, and two guns lost; and at last, when it became known that General
Roberts was to form a division to march southward, the belief became
general that our army in Candahar had been roughly handled, and that
Ayub Khan’s success was growing with alarming strides. When Colonel St.
John’s telegram was read outside the Club-house to an audience of twenty
or thirty officers, we could scarcely realize that 1,200 of our men had
been killed in open fight, and that the remainder of the ill-fated
brigade had made the best of their way back to Candahar over an almost
waterless country. But there was no mistaking the hard facts set forth;
the list of officers killed and wounded; and the ominous closing
paragraph that the British garrison was preparing for a siege. Our past
experience in December had taught us one salutary lesson; the Afghans
respond to the call of a successful leader with a readiness which defies
all ordinary calculations; and we saw that there might indeed be good
cause for marching even such war-worn regiments as those about Cabul
right down to distant Candahar. Our hearts were light a fortnight ago at
the prospect of an early return to India, for the campaign has been a
trying one, and officers and men have grown very weary of the endless
see-saw in the political world wherein Mr. Griffin and Abdur Rahman are
the chief figures. All hopes were dashed when the order went forth for a
new and arduous march, with the prospect of guerilla fighting half the
way; and it must be confessed that at first there were hearty curses
bestowed upon the heads of those responsible for the change in the
programme. But when the details of the disaster were made known, the
duty of relieving Candahar was accepted quietly and with a certain
pride, all sense of personal discomfort and danger being sunk in the
feeling that the credit of our army must be vindicated without useless
delay. To form one of a picked force such as General Roberts has now
under his orders is no common fortune, for certainly not in the whole of
India could be a better lot of fighting men be got together than that
now waiting the final order to march. We are self-conscious of our own
strength, and are just a little impatient that it cannot be put forth at
once, while our enemies are still in the flush of success. To meet
10,000 British, Sikh, and Ghoorka soldiers—for Sir Frederick Roberts’s
force is made up almost entirely of these races—would try the mettle of
a better armed and disciplined army than the Afghans can ever hope to
put in the field; and if this force cannot do the work marked out for
it, then our military supremacy in the East must indeed be coming to an
end. I do not care to play the part of a trumpeter to the Cabul army,
but the merits of the regiments now brigaded are too great to be lightly
passed by. The trust which is placed in the infantry and their
breech-loaders appears at once from the fact that no field artillery is
to be taken. General Roberts will have only three mule batteries
(7-pounders), although one of these is of course the screw-gun battery,
which has a reputation for accuracy and range that cannot be equalled by
our 9-pounders. With these three batteries (in all eighteen guns), we
have to meet Ayub Khan’s thirty or forty guns, and we are going out upon
our errand without any fear of results: our screw-guns can silence one
or two of the batteries which were turned upon our little force at
Khusk-i-Nakhud, and our infantry can deal with the rest. We shall meet
Ayub Khan, presumably, either within sight of Candahar, or on the Ghazni
Road, and then his army of regulars and ghazis will have a fair
opportunity of measuring itself against a British force worthy of the
name. We shall not make the fatal mistake of scattering our brigades
over the country side, each liable at any moment to be taken in detail
and broken up by overwhelming numbers. Our march has not yet begun, and
there are soothsayers in our midst who foretell a journey to Ghazni
only, and then a backward movement towards the Shutargardan—Candahar
having been relieved in the meantime by General Phayre; but if it should
be our lot to cut ourselves off for three weeks from the outer world,
there need be no anxiety as to our fate; we are well able to take care
of ourselves.
The behaviour of the Amir, since he has learnt that a strong force will
march to Candahar, has been all that could be wished. He is sage enough
to see that Ayub Khan is the only dangerous rival he now has in
Afghanistan, and if we break up the Herat army, Cabul will be made quite
safe. The Amir has also sent several men of importance to travel a day’s
march ahead of our army, and arrange with the _maliks_ for the provision
of supplies. If these officials of Abdur Rahman really do their work
properly, our Commissariat officers will find their task of feeding
15,000 fighting men and followers greatly lightened. South of Ghazni we
shall have to trust mostly to our own foraging parties, and we shall
doubtless be on half-rations before Khelat-i-Ghilzai is reached. Sir
Donald Stewart on the march to Cabul had at times difficulty in
collecting supplies, as the villages on the road were deserted, and if
the peasants have not since returned to look after their crops the
country will not furnish much food. However, our own resources will
carry us over half the distance at least, and a few double marches will
make Khelat-i-Ghilzai seem not so far off after all. Mushk-i-Alam has
accepted the new order of things in such a thorough-going spirit that he
now talks of coming in with Mahomed Jan and accompanying Sir Donald
Stewart’s army to India. Both our late foes are anxious to make a
pilgrimage to Mecca.
Last night the Political Officers gave a farewell dinner in honour of
General Roberts, at which Sir Donald Stewart and the chief officers of
the force were present. In responding to the toast of his health Sir
Frederick Roberts made the following characteristic speech:—
“MR. GRIFFIN, SIR DONALD STEWART, AND GENTLEMEN,
“I scarcely know how to thank you all for the kind way in which
you have drunk my health, and that of the Column under orders for
Candahar. To the very flattering terms in which Mr. Griffin has spoken
of me I should have considerable difficulty in replying, were it not
that I can honestly say that any successes which I may have attained
hitherto have been due entirely to the experienced commanders I have
had with me, the most capable Staff that ever accompanied a General
Officer in the field, and the gallantry and discipline of the troops
under me. I do not think there ever have been, and I doubt if there
ever will be, more efficient troops sent from India than those which
General Stewart and I have had the honour to command for the last two
years. With such troops success is a certainty. Without wishing to
underrate the dangers and difficulties of the task before us, I feel
quite confident that the efficient force which Sir Donald Stewart has
placed at my disposal will succeed in reaching Candahar as quickly as
possible, and in effectually disposing of any Afghan army that may be
brought against us. As Mr. Griffin has said, we must all deplore the
cause which requires Cabul troops to be now sent to Candahar. A few
days ago we were all congratulating ourselves upon the prospect of a
speedy return to India. Some of us had laid in a store of Nipal pepper
for use at home; others, I have heard, had actually named an early
date for leaving Bombay for England. Well, Sir Donald Stewart is
willing to guarantee—and were it not an indecorous thing for an
officer so high in rank—would even bet—that we shall reach India
again, _viâ_ Candahar, in November next. Gentlemen, this is a country
of great uncertainties. We have been living in a state of uncertainty
for many months; but, thanks to the political skill of our kind host,
affairs have during the last few weeks, progressed so rapidly and
favourably that we have reason to hope the country may now have
comparative rest and quiet, and that some settled form of government
will be established. However, we must not be too sanguine: and I trust
that our fellow-countrymen, who have not had the same opportunity that
we have had of knowing Afghanistan and the Afghans, will not be
disappointed if matters do not go altogether smoothly after the
British troops leave Cabul. No Amir has ever yet occupied the throne
for any time until he has proved himself capable of governing the
country, and it is not likely that Amir Abdur Rahman will be an
exception. We all know what difficulties Mr. Griffin has had to
contend with, and we all rejoice at the great success which has
attended his efforts—efforts so ably assisted by the Political
Officers now with him. It now remains for Abdur Rahman to show that he
is capable of filling the great position in which he has been placed.
From the commencement of this campaign, the Political Officers have
borne as important, if not as active, work as the soldier. First and
foremost the gallant Cavagnari, known to and mourned by us all, and
more than liked by many of us: with him many brave men fell, and it
was to avenge their base and treacherous murder that this force came
to Cabul. It is a great satisfaction to me to think that at present,
at any rate, no officers will be required to remain at Cabul, and that
all the Political Officers I see around me will return to India with
the troops. But I feel quite sure if the decision had been otherwise,
officers would have been found to accept the dangerous post, either
officers of the civil service, or amongst those military politicals
who have gained for themselves a reputation on the frontier and other
parts of India.”
The foregoing was the last of my letters from Sherpur, as on the 8th of
August I joined the force destined for Candahar. Accordingly, I will
here briefly summarize the events which occurred at Cabul after the
march upon Candahar had been begun. The force left in Sherpur and in the
fortifications about Cabul were the 2nd Division under the Command of
Major-General Hills. They were brigaded as follows:—
1st Brigade.—General C. Gough—9th Foot, 28th Punjab Native Infantry,
45th Sikhs.
2nd Brigade.—General Hughes—59th Foot, 3rd Ghoorkas, 19th Punjab Native
Infantry.
3rd Brigade.—General Daunt—67th Foot, 5th Punjab Infantry, 27th Punjab
Native Infantry.
Cavalry Brigade.—General Palliser—1st Punjab Cavalry, 2nd Punjab
Cavalry.
Artillery.—11-11 R.A., and G-4 R.A.
With camp-followers and servants there were about 20,000 men in the
Division. Sir Donald Stewart waited until Sir Frederick Roberts had
entered the Upper Logar Valley and heliographic communication had ceased
before giving the order to evacuate Sherpur. The troops were all under
canvas ready to file out at a moment’s notice. The following extract
from a letter written by a trustworthy correspondent will give an exact
idea of the actual evacuation:—
“BUTKHAK, _11th August_.
“Late in the evening of the 10th instant arrangements were finally
concluded for an interview between His Highness the Amir Abdur Rahman
Khan and the British representatives in Cabul. Whether a meeting could
be arranged was doubtful, I understand, up to nearly nine o’clock; and
if it had not taken place, Sir Donald Stewart would have had to forego
the pleasure of seeing the Amir whom his efforts have done so much
towards placing on the throne of Cabul. But good fortune favoured Sir
Donald. The camp of the Amir had been moved during the morning of the
10th to Deh Gopak, a small secluded village about three miles from,
and within easy sight of, the Sherpur cantonments. Prior to this, the
camp had been at Kila Murad Beg, six miles from Cabul, and on the
other side of the first low range of hills beyond the lake. His
Highness did not, however, arrive at Deh Gopak till eight o’clock in
the evening; and here he was agreeably surprised to find Sirdar
Mahomed Afzul Khan waiting for him. This distinguished gentleman, who,
it will be remembered, was the leading member of the Mission to
Turkistan at the beginning of negotiations with Abdur Rahman, had been
fitly selected as the bearer of the Government presents to the Amir.
They consisted of a handsome grey English horse, a rifle, a pair of
pistols and a gold watch. The Sirdar arrived at Deh Gopak about six
o’clock, and had to wait two hours before the Amir arrived. He was
greatly pleased with the presents; insisted on the Sirdar’s dining
with him; presented him with a Kashmir shawl and a few other articles
of dress; and on dismissing him sent a message to the effect that he
would be glad to meet the British officers at seven o’clock the
following morning. It will thus be seen that the Amir has got the
better of the absurd suspicions which not only made him backward in
dealing with us, but actually led him to throw away the food near
which a stranger had merely passed, from fear of being poisoned.
“Before the return of Mahomed Afzul Khan, a tent had been pitched
within a couple of hundred yards of the cantonment walls, in
anticipation of the Amir’s consent to come in; so that though the
interview was not decided upon till so late, there was no bustle or
confusion. Sir Donald Stewart and the Chief Political Officer had
moved under canvas in the centre of the cantonments, and as all tents
and baggage had to be ready to start by 5 A.M.;, there was a weary
period of waiting in the open air, under a sun sufficiently warm even
at six o’clock. At a few minutes before seven the escort of Guides’
Cavalry rode up; the General mounted, and followed by a string of some
thirty or forty officers approached the tent, which was in a field
about twenty paces from the roadside. As soon as the British party got
outside the Head-quarters’ Gate, the Amir and his followers were seen
coming from the opposite direction. Half a mile in his rear on the
side of a hill were a large number of his troops, both cavalry and
infantry; but the number of followers with His Highness was hardly
more than sixty; and only two of his sepoys were on sentry at the tent
itself. The two parties met exactly in front of the path leading to
the tent. Abdur Rahman had with him Sirdar Yusuf Khan. Sir Donald
Stewart was accompanied by Mr. Lepel Griffin, all the rest standing at
some few yards’ distance. The Chief Political Officer introduced the
Amir to the Lieutenant-General as they met; and then walked towards
the tent, followed by all the British officers present. There were not
more than five chairs. His Highness occupied the centre seat: on his
right were Sir Donald Stewart and General Hills; on his left Mr.
Griffin. The conversation was conducted in Persian by Mr. Griffin on
behalf of the Lieutenant-General, His Highness having little or no
command of Hindustani. After the usual formalities were concluded
several officers were introduced to the Amir; amongst others were the
three Brigadiers under Major-General Hills; Colonel Lockart (Chief of
the Staff), Dr. Smith (Chief Medical Officer), Colonel Fryer, Major
Morgan, Major Lance, and others. His Highness was dressed in a drab
suit of striped cloth, with his ‘continuations’ tucked into long black
boots; a black Astrakan cap, in which a diamond star glittered,
covered his head; his arms consisted of a revolver only, which he
carried in an ordinary waist-belt. Though still nervous, I thought he
was less so than on the former occasions when I saw him; and all who
observed him were greatly pleased at his appearance. In the course of
conversation he said that his whole heart was full of gratitude to the
British, and he begged that his best thanks might be conveyed to His
Excellency the Viceroy. The interview was public throughout; no
business was entered into (indeed it is said that all matters of
business were concluded at Mr. Griffin’s last meeting with the Amir);
and we took our leave in less than a quarter of an hour, His Highness
shaking hands with all who cared to wish him good-bye and good-luck.
“The Amir deputed his right-hand man, Sirdar Yusuf Khan, to accompany
the General out of Cabul, himself returning almost at once to Deh
Gopak. The British officials did not return to the cantonment, but
went by the road along the outer wall, out by Siah Sung, and thence by
the main road to Butkhak. As we rode along we could see the forts on
Bemaru already occupied by small parties of the Amir’s infantry. The
Asmai fort had been occupied the night before as soon as our own
picquets left it; the big fort on Siah Sung was occupied during the
day, as were the Sherderwaza and other forts. The Bala Hissar was
taken over by General Gholam Hyder Khan, with one regiment of infantry
and about a hundred cavalry. Sherpur itself was garrisoned by the Haz
Danari, a celebrated Turkistan cavalry regiment, and 500 khasidars, a
force scarcely strong enough to defend any single corner of the huge
cantonment. The Amir on his way back to his camp at Deh Gopak was
preceded by a band of music, and on his arrival there received a
salute of thirty-one guns. Considerable enthusiasm was evinced among
his followers; for, incredible as it may appear, there were many of
them who believed that the Amir would be made a prisoner by us, even
up to the last moment of the interview. Had anything happened to him,
they knew well what would be their fate with any new-comer who might
be chosen, and they feared any mishap to the man with whom they had
thrown in their lot.
“Up to the present the Amir has not made his entry into Cabul. His
nine years’ residence in Russian territory has in no way removed or
lessened his Oriental superstition; and he left the choice of an
auspicious hour and day to the astrologers, of whom he has several
attached to his court. The chief of these has named eleven o’clock on
Sunday next for the public entry, and has decreed that no luck can
attend the occasion unless His Highness wears an emerald ring. One is
accordingly being prepared, and the words ‘Amir Abdur Rahman, 1297,’
are to be engraved on it. Meantime Sirdar Yusuf Khan is still carrying
on his duties as the Governor of Cabul. He has established picquets on
all the approaches to the city, and the passport system is again in
full swing. All went perfectly well the first day of our absence, and
if His Highness prove wise and conciliatory, his reign at Cabul may,
with the support already given him, possibly be longer than that of
either of the last two Amirs. This letter, however, purports to be an
account of our evacuation of Cabul, and I must keep to my subject, and
not concern myself with either the present, past, or future politics
of Afghanistan.
“The three brigades arrived at Butkhak to-day, after a dusty march,
before noon. The first march has been got over without a single
accident of any description, and too great praise cannot be bestowed
on Sir Donald Stewart, on the Chief Political Officer, and on the
officers and troops themselves for the excellent result of their
exertions. The country is perfectly quiet, though there are plenty of
marauders ready to drop on any unfortunate straggler. Accompanying us
to India are a few of the Cabul Sirdars, including Wali Mahomed Khan
and Tahir Khan. Several Hindu merchants from the city have also
grasped the opportunity of our march to proceed unmolested to India,
as well as two Khokandi pilgrims travelling to Mecca.”
---------------------
The march thus begun was carried out without the slightest opposition on
the part of the tribesmen between Cabul and Peshawur; and it may be said
that not a shot was fired after Cabul had been left. The heat was very
trying in the Jellalabad Valley and the Khyber, but the men bore up
bravely, and they had not this time to fight against cholera. It was
believed that Gundamak or Jellalabad would be held until General Roberts
reported that Candahar had been relieved, but the Indian Government were
anxious to get the troops over the frontier, as the garrisons of
Northern India were very weak. Lundi Kotal, therefore, once more became
our outpost in North-Eastern Afghanistan, and the regiments composing
General Hills’ division were sent to various stations in India, except
such as were required to hold the Khyber posts.
Regarding the arrangements with the Amir: he received thirty guns
(chiefly of small calibre), which we left behind us in Sherpur, and 19½
lakhs of rupees (£190,500). Of this sum ten lakhs (£100,000) were given
as an earnest of British friendship, and 9½ were “restored” as merely
belonging to the State. This was the sum seized in Yahiya Khan’s house
in October 1879, upon our first arrival at Cabul. It was spent in
purchasing supplies for the army, as our treasury was nearly empty at
that time. The Prize Committee had regarded it as prize-money, but this
view was not countenanced by the Government.
A concession was made which I strongly condemned in one of my former
letters; the fortifications we had built about Cabul were not destroyed.
The rather sophistical reason given for this course of action was that
the Amir made many requests to us, all of which were at first refused
with the exception of one respecting money. One request which he urged
with singular pertinacity was that the forts, &c., we had built might
not be destroyed. Again and again he was told his wish could not be
granted, but he returned to the charge, pleading that his prestige would
be lowered in the eyes of the people if we showed such open distrust of
him at the commencement. The Government at last yielded to his
insistance, and we left the chain of forts about the city intact: they
will give our soldiers, perhaps, some amusement when we return in three
or four years to annex the country. We refused to make any treaty with
Abdur Rahman, and also to promise him gifts of arms and ammunition in
the future, but with our rupees he should be able to equip an army
pretty rapidly, and to consolidate his power.
------------------------------------------------------------------------
PART II
-------
THE MARCH UPON CANDAHAR AND DEFEAT
OF SIRDAR AYUB KHAN.
INTRODUCTION.
The following is a bare summary of the facts connected with General
Burrows’ advance upon Girishk, and the defeat of his brigade at Maiwand.
I have gone more into the details of the defeat in letters written after
my arrival at Candahar, my informants being officers engaged in the
action.
At the end of June 1880, reports, which were thought trustworthy,
reached Candahar that Ayub Khan had left Herat early in the month with
all his troops, amounting to eleven regiments of infantry, thirty-six
guns, and a very large number of cavalry, regular and irregular. He was
said to have told the troops that the English had spent millions of
rupees in Candahar, which, with all other property and the women of the
people would be at their disposal after they had driven out the English.
A strong body of cavalry under the Luinab, formerly Governor of
Turkistan, was supposed to form Ayub’s advance-guard. On July 11th it
was officially reported by the Government that Ayub Khan’s army had
actually reached Farrah, half-way to Candahar, on June 30th. In the
meantime the following force under Brigadier-General Burrows had moved
out westwards on the Herat Road:—
Three hundred sabres, 3rd Bombay Light Cavalry, under Major Currie, 200
sabres, 3rd Scind Horse, under Colonel Malcolmson, six guns E-B, Royal
Horse Artillery, under Major Blackwood, two companies of the 1st Bombay
Grenadiers, and forty Sappers; the whole under the command of
Brigadier-General Nuttal, with Major Hogg as Brigade Major. The infantry
were:—six companies of the 66th Regiment under Colonel Galbraith,
remainder of the 1st Grenadiers under Colonel Anderson, Jacob’s Rifles
under Colonel Mainwaring; the whole under Brigadier-General Burrows,
with Captain McMath as Brigade Major and Captain T. Harris, Deputy
Assistant Quartermaster-General. Surgeon-Major Edge and Surgeon Earle
were in charge of the Field Hospital; Captain Dobbs had charge of the
Commissariat; and Lieutenants G. S. Jones and E. E. M. Lawford of the
Transport. Major Leach, R.E., V.C., had charge of a Survey party. The
force was accompanied by Colonel St. John, Chief Political Officer, and
the Nawab Hasan Ali Khan. The Wali Shere Ali Khan, Governor of Candahar,
with a battery of six-pounders and a force of cavalry and infantry, was
at Girishk, on the Helmund, collecting supplies and watching the road to
Farrah. General Burrows reached Khusk-i-Nakhud on July 7th, and Girishk
on July 11th. We found the Helmund River fordable everywhere. On July
15th Shere Ali’s infantry mutinied. His cavalry had reported Ayub’s
scouts to be within 20 miles, and this fact caused great excitement
among his men. They were encamped at Kadanak, on the bank of the
Helmund, General Burrows’ camp being on the eastern side. On Shere Ali
ordering his force to retire from Camp Kadanak towards Girishk, the
infantry deserted in a body, taking guns, arms, and ammunition, and went
off towards Zamindawar. A British force crossed the river in pursuit,
overtook them at Shoraki, and completely dispersed them, killing 200,
and recovering guns and baggage. Shere Ali’s cavalry did not share in
the mutiny. On July 16th, General Burrows made a night march to
Khusk-i-Nakhud, some 25 miles nearer Candahar, where he awaited Ayub’s
advance. By the 23rd, the main body of the Herat army had crossed the
Helmund, and encamped at Hyderabad, above Girishk, and Afghan cavalry
were seen pretty frequently by our reconnoitring parties. On the 27th,
General Burrows marched to Maiwand, to intercept Ayub’s army, and the
same day the disastrous action which resulted in the siege of Candahar,
was fought. The British loss was upwards of 1,000 fighting men _killed_,
alone. The published despatches have already given full details of our
losses on this occasion, therefore I will not enumerate. It was to
relieve Candahar and scatter Ayub Khan’s army that General Roberts was
ordered to march southwards from Cabul.
CHAPTER I.
Composition of the Cabul-Candahar Force—The Scale of Equipment—Food
Supplies—Reasons for choosing the Logar Route to Ghazni—The March
from Beni Hissar to Zahidabad—Arrival at Zerghun Shahr—Communication
cut off with Sir Donald Stewart—The Transport of the Force—The
Success of the March dependent upon our Baggage Animals—The March
through Logar and the Shiniz Valley—Plentiful Supplies—Arrived at
Shashgao—Reconnaissance over the Sher-i-Dahan Kotal—The State of
Ghazni and the District—An Obituary Notice.
CAMP NEAR ZAHIDABAD, _9th August, 1880_.
Yesterday the force destined to march to Candahar, under the command of
Sir Frederick Roberts, left Sherpur Cantonments, equipped for rapid
marching and sharp fighting. Sir F. Roberts holds the supreme command;
Major-General John Ross commands the whole of the infantry battalions;
Brigadier-General Hugh Gough the cavalry; and Colonel C. A. Johnson the
Artillery. Colonel Perkins is commanding the Royal Engineers; Colonel
Chapman is Chief of the Staff; Deputy Surgeon-General Hanbury, Chief
Medical Officer; Colonel Low, 13th Royal Bengal Lancers, Chief Director
of Transport; and Major Badcock, Chief Commissariat Officer. Major
Gorham, R.A., is Judge Advocate, and Captain Straton, 22nd Foot,
Superintendent of Signalling. The Political Staff consists of Major
Hastings, Chief Political Officer; Major Euan Smith, Political
Secretary; Major Protheroe, and Captain Ridgeway. Of these, Major Euan
Smith accompanied Sir Donald Stewart in his march from Candahar, and his
knowledge of the route and the tribes about it will be invaluable. The
following are the troops now brigaded:—
1st Brigade.—General Macpherson, V.C., C.B.—92nd Highlanders, 2nd
Ghoorkas, 23rd Pioneers, 24th P.N.I., 6-8 R.A. (screw-guns).
2nd Brigade.—General Baker, C.B.—72nd Highlanders, 2nd Sikhs, 3rd Sikhs,
5th Ghoorkas, No. 2 Mountain Battery.
3rd Brigade.—General Macgregor, V.C., C.B., &c.—60th Rifles, 15th Sikhs,
4th Ghoorkas, 25th P.N.I., 11-9 R.A.
Cavalry Brigade.—General H. Gough, V.C.—9th Lancers, 3rd Bengal Cavalry,
3rd Punjab Cavalry, Central India Horse.
The detailed strength of the force is as follows:—
──────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────
Europeans. Natives.
──────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────
Officers. Men.
──────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────
6-8 Royal <spa 6 95 139
Artillery
11-9 Royal Artillery 6 95 139
No. 2 Mountain Battery 5 - 140
9th Lancers 19 318 -
3rd Bengal Cavalry 7 - 394
3rd Punjab Cavalry 9 - 408
Central India Horse 11 - 495
⎛ 92nd Highlanders 19 651 -
1st ⎜ 23rd Pioneers 8 - 701
Brigade. ⎜ 24th Punjab Infantry 7 - 575
⎝ 2nd Ghoorkas 7 - 501
⎛ 72nd Highlanders 23 787 -
2nd ⎜ 2nd Sikhs 7 - 612
Brigade. ⎜ 3rd Sikhs 7 - 570
⎝ 5th Ghoorkas 8 - 561
⎛ 2-60th Rifles 21 616 -
3rd ⎜ 15th Sikhs 10 - 650
Brigade. ⎜ 25th Punjab Infantry 7 - 637
⎝ 4th Ghoorkas 8 - 629
Staff Officers 79 - -
──────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────
Total 274 2,562 7,151
──────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────
This gives a total of 9,987 fighting men, or for all practical purposes
say 10,000. There are about 8,000 followers. We have thus to feed 18,000
men for three or four weeks, while 1,977 chargers, 750 artillery mules,
and 7,235 transport animals have also to be provided for. The Amir sent
in 700 baggage animals (_yaboos_),—a most acceptable gift,—and has
despatched his agents into Logar to prepare the people for our coming.
He has particularly asked that foraging parties may not be sent out
between Cabul and Ghazni, as he believes that his power over the
_maliks_ is great enough to secure all supplies without trouble. Once
well on the march, we shall be able to test the extent of his power by
the willingness of such unruly clans as the Wardaks to bring in corn and
sheep without coercion of any kind. The Commissariat Department are
carrying for the British troops tea, sugar, and rum for thirty days,
preserved meat for two days, bread stuffs for five days, 500 lbs. of
army food, 200 gallons of lime-juice, and all available preserved
vegetables are also being carried. Sheep for ten days are being driven
with the force. The scale of baggage is very low, of necessity. Each
British officer is allowed one mule, on which his tent and his kit have
to be packed; but as arrangements have generally been made to “double
up”—_i.e._ two officers to sleep in one tent—the allowance is quite
enough. The allowance for each British soldier, as kit and equipage, is
30lbs., and for each native 20lbs.
Prior to our moving out all was hurry and confusion in Sherpur—not a
confusion resulting from indecision and conflicting orders, but rather
that exciting rush of work which follows sudden orders to reduce an
army’s equipment. If Sir F. Roberts is to reach Candahar in time to be
of any service to the garrison his division must really be a flying
column, able to make forced marches, and so mobile that the fighting of
an action in the morning shall not necessarily detain the whole line
twenty-four hours. In order that the troops may be in the lightest
marching order, their greatcoats are being carried for them, and the
relief thus afforded is greater than at first sight appears. Six pounds
is not in itself a heavy weight for a soldier to carry, but the rolled
greatcoat presses upon a man’s chest, impedes his breathing, and makes
him hot and uncomfortable on a long march. The 92nd Highlanders have
sold all their greatcoats except a few for men on picquet duty; the
Highlanders are of such physique that they do not dread the change of
temperature which we are sure to experience when once Ghazni is reached.
Our route, it will be seen, is _viâ_ the Logar Valley, and not by way of
Argandeh and Maidan (the shortest route). The reason of the Logar Road
being chosen is that supplies are plentiful in the villages on the
route. The late sojourn in Logar of General Hills’ force showed the
great capabilities of the valley in the matter of corn and sheep, and
the people are only too anxious to deal with us.
The order of march yesterday morning was:—Cavalry Brigade under General
Hugh Gough to Charasia; 1st and 3rd Brigades under Generals Macpherson
and Macgregor to Beni Hissar; and 2nd Brigade under General Baker to
Indikee by way of the Dehmazung Gorge. Accordingly the cantonment was
full of warlike pomp and circumstance—chiefly the latter—from 5 o’clock
in the morning. All the troops told off for the Division were under
canvas, with their kit ready at hand, and there remained nothing but to
strike tents, load up baggage animals, and march away to a merry
quick-step. Everything had been carefully prepared, all the men’s kits
weighed and tested to a pound; and with little confusion, but much
soldier-like energy, the line of march was formed in two columns, and
the evacuation of Cabul began. Ten thousand men of the present garrison
moved out, and their comrades, who filed in from Siah Sung to take their
places, will probably start on the 11th for India. We are going so
roundabout a road that civilization seems a long way off: our friends
are within twenty days of Peshawur, where the untold luxuries of
dak-bungalows and gharries begin. Sir Donald Stewart’s march will, it is
expected, be a very peaceful one, for the chief Ghilzai leaders are with
the Amir, who has been quietly warned to keep them with him and out of
mischief until the troops have got to the east of Gundamak. What may
happen to Sir Frederick Roberts between Cabul and Candahar no prophet,
Kafir or Mahomedan, can venture to say. There may be a most resolute
opposition at Shahjui or nearer Candahar, or the fanatical enthusiasm of
the ghazis who beat back General Burrows at Khusk-i-Nakhud may have
cooled somewhat, and our army may have only a few scattered bands to
pursue. How far our pursuit will extend, also, cannot be foreseen. If
Ayub shows the white feather, shall we tamely allow him to retain the
1,200 Snider and Martini rifles, and the two Horse Artillery guns he has
captured? If so, his wisest course would be to retire upon Herat, raise
and drill three or four regiments, whom he could arm with
breech-loaders, and in a year try his fortune again, avoiding Candahar
altogether, but striking for Cabul by way of Turkistan and Balkh. There
are many questions involved in this march to Candahar, and whispers of
“Herat!” are already being heard in camp. Every step we move threatens
Abdur Rahman’s position in Cabul, so far; but unless we completely break
Ayub’s power our nominal Amir will have a hard fight for his kingdom
hereafter.
But I have wandered off from our march out. General Baker, with the 72nd
Highlanders, 2nd and 3rd Sikhs, 4th Ghoorkas, and a Mountain Battery,
reached Indikee during the morning, while the other two Brigades pitched
camp in the fields beyond Beni Hissar. The tail-end of a thunderstorm
laid the dust in the afternoon, and when Sir F. Roberts rode out in the
evening to assume command of his division it was delightfully cool and
fresh. Sir Donald Stewart, General Hills, and some of the Staff of the
new 2nd Division, accompanied General Roberts, and much had to be said
during the short ride. Some of our friends, who were bound for Peshawur,
also came out to camp, and hand-shakings and cries of “good-bye and
good-luck” were all the order of the evening. There were certain little
signs of seriousness in some cases, which showed our errand was looked
upon as spiced with danger; but in the majority of instances the
farewells were as loud and merry as soldiers’ partings should be.
Sherpur looked the ghost of its former self when we left it in the
evening. The barracks of the south-western end were nearly all empty;
there were no figures visible beyond those of Cabuli _chiffonniers_,
intent upon looting everything, from old tin cans to _charpoys_ and
newspapers; and, saddest of all, our well-beloved Club was no more. The
walls were still standing in skeleton bareness, but the large tent which
had seen many a genial rubber played, and heard many a quip and
crank—“bar-made jokes” we call them—over good wholesome liquor, was a
prey to the Afghan. It had been bought for a song, equally with the
“fittings” and spare stores, and was being carried off to the city. How
we have hated our sojourn in Afghanistan of late, when the hot weather
found matters not yet settled, only the record of our curses, an’ it be
kept, can never reveal. The bare, brown hills of Bemaru and the higher
ranges about had grown so wearisome in our sight that we bore with
philosophy the dust-storms which visited us daily: they hid the hated
landscape for a time, and made us forget everything but the dust in our
eyes and the dryness of our throats. Sherpur is not a “desirable place
of residence,” although it has had its pleasures and fortunes, which I
have faithfully chronicled; and can we be blamed for shaking its dust
from our feet with unholy joy, even though we know that many a weary
mile lies between Cabul and the Sibi Railway? Last night General Roberts
issued an order to the troops which stirred our blood a little, for if
Candahar and Khelat-i-Ghilzai have really to be _relieved_, there may be
some pretty work cut out for us. The order was as follows:—
“It has been decided by the Government of India that a force shall
proceed with all possible despatch from Cabul towards Khelat-i-Ghilzai
and Candahar for the relief of the British garrison in those places, now
threatened by a large Afghan army under the leadership of Sirdar Mahomed
Ayub Khan. Sir Frederick Roberts feels sure that the troops placed under
his command for this important duty will cheerfully respond to the call
made upon them, notwithstanding the privations and hardships inseparable
from a long march through a hostile country. The Lieutenant-General
wishes to impress on both officers and men the necessity of preserving
the same strict discipline which has been so successfully and uniformly
maintained since the commencement of the war, and to treat all the
people who may be well disposed towards the British with justice and
forbearance. Sir Frederick Roberts looks confidently forward to the
successful accomplishment of the object of the expedition, convinced as
he is that all ranks are animated with the proud feeling that to them is
entrusted the duty and privilege of relieving their fellow-soldiers and
restoring the prestige of the British army.”
We are not letting the grass grow under our feet, for we have only mule
and pony carriage, and our progress is not delayed by camels or bullocks
persistently casting their loads. To-day we have marched (that is the
1st and 3rd Brigades, and Divisional Head-Quarters) about 14 miles,
while General Baker, who is encamped higher up the Logar, must have done
16 or 17. To-morrow the whole force crosses the river, and then we shall
push on for Ghazni, which we hope to reach in four or five days. This
will, in all likelihood, be the last letter which I can hope to get
through, though runners may try to reach Sir Donald Stewart as he
retires upon Gundamak. The troops are all very fit, and march
splendidly; the mornings are cold and bracing; while during the day a
cool wind prevents the sun from making itself felt. We shall have a most
enjoyable march for the next few days so far as climate is concerned,
and we hope for the best in the matter of supplies. To-day they are
coming in very fairly. The _moollah_, Ahdurrahim, the eldest son of
Mushk-i-Alam, who is accompanying the force, has been created
Khan-ul-Alam, or chief _moollah_, by the Amir. This appointment has had
a good effect, and Mushk-i-Alam with his party is reported to be
proceeding to join the Amir.[47]
-----
Footnote 47:
The old _moollah_ kept his word and took a prominent part in the
ceremonies attending Abdur Rahman’s coronation.
-----
ZERGHUN SHAHR, _10th August_.
To-day we look upon as the last we shall be in communication with Cabul,
and consequently with India; but we are not in the least depressed
thereby, as we have our work before us and have made up our minds to do
it thoroughly. The diary of our march should be of interest, as it is of
a kind not often undertaken. We have cut ourselves off completely from
any supports; we are self-supporting in every sense of the word; and we
have as our objective point a town nominally held by our own troops, but
which may, before our arrival, be surrounded by an army far surpassing
our own in numbers and guns. The effect of the disastrous action at
Khusk-i-Nakhud will have raised the whole country about Candahar against
us, and Afghans never show so bold a front as when living on the fruits
of a victory. If Candahar were held in force by an unbeaten army of
British soldiers, we should have little to do beyond making the best of
our way to the place and joining hands with the garrison; there would be
little danger and less glory in such an undertaking; but as it is we are
a body of 10,000 men, making forced marches and not knowing from day to
day what may be before us. So long as we are north of Ghazni we shall
have no anxiety regarding supplies, but once we have passed that
fortress our very food will have to be sought for at every
halting-place, and the prospect of deserted villages and crops secretly
stored is not a very encouraging one. But it will be time enough to deal
with our difficulties when they occur, and as we are now in the rich
Logar Valley, where corn and forage are plentiful, I will not speculate
further as to what the marches to Khelat-i-Ghilzai may bring forth. Our
chief source of anxiety is that the Herat army and its ghazi allies may
not give us a fair chance of what the soldiers call “getting at them.”
That would indeed be a disappointment too grievous to be borne.
The march from Beni Hissar to Zahidabad was as trying as any we are
likely to have between Cabul and Ghazni. The rear-guard of General
Macpherson’s Brigade did not reach camp until after seven o’clock,
having been under arms for fourteen hours, and the 92nd Highlanders and
23rd Pioneers were so tired and worn out that many threw themselves down
in their tents without energy enough to take more than a mouthful of
food. It was not the actual distance (16 miles) which told upon them so
much as the long halts in the sun while the baggage was being pushed
forward; while a dust-storm the whole afternoon added greatly to their
discomfort. The sun is stronger than was expected, and the men, not
being yet in thorough marching order, felt its effects rather severely.
The camp was pitched in the open fields near where we encamped in
October last, when our mission was to punish Cabul. Our force now is
nearly as strong again as the old Cabul Field Force, “the avenging army”
as it was termed; but the brigades are not yet united, the cavalry and
General Baker’s Brigade being a few miles in advance. This is to enable
us to march with greater rapidity. That rapidity naturally depends upon
our transport, the marching power of our men not being a doubtful factor
in our calculations. We are provided with mule and pony carriage, camels
being unsuitable for forced marching, and I am glad to say we have an
unusually strong staff of transport officers, with Colonel Low at their
head, who are equal to all the demands made upon their knowledge and
endurance. Upon the efforts of this staff much will depend, as if
carelessness were once to creep into the management and care of the
animals a dead-lock would follow. In the first campaign the stupid
experiment of trying to work camels without food was tried, and the
result, as Government found to its cost, was terrible failure. Now, Sir
Frederick Roberts is determined to try what can be done when the animals
are given grain and forage with a liberal hand, and when we have reached
Candahar I will note the result in _this_ case also. The Transport
Staff, to which I, in common with the whole force, look with great
confidence, is as follows:—
Lieutenant-Colonel Low, Chief Director.
Lieutenant Booth, Staff Officer.
Captain Wynter, 33rd Foot, General Transport Officer.
Lieutenant Fisher, 10th Hussars, Cavalry Brigade.
Lieutenant Wilson, 10th Hussars, 1st Brigade.
Captain Elliot, 3rd Bengal Cavalry, 2nd Brigade.
Captain Macgregor, 44th Native Infantry, 3rd Brigade.
Lieutenant Robertson, 8th Foot, Ordnance Park.
Lieutenant Elverson, 2nd Queen’s, also attached to 3rd Brigade.
But even this staff cannot ensure the service being kept up to its
present state of efficiency unless regimental commanders and other
responsible persons see that orders are strictly carried out. The
Lieutenant-General issued an order at Zahidabad reminding commanding
officers of the necessity for exercising the closest supervision over
the transport animals. In this General Roberts says:—“The performance of
long and continuous marches such as those which will be undertaken by
the force can only be successfully accomplished if the animals are
regularly fed and the adjustment of loads attended to. Recognizing that
the success of the undertaking in hand must depend upon the rapidity
with which Candahar is reached, the Lieutenant-General relies
confidently on the exertions of all ranks to aid in maintaining the
transport animals in efficient condition.”
To-day the cavalry under General Hugh Gough joined the 2nd Brigade (72nd
Highlanders, 2nd and 3rd Sikhs, 5th Ghoorkas, and Swinley’s Mountain
Battery) on their camping-ground over the Logar above Zahidabad, and
skirted the right bank of the river past Deh-i-Nao to the ground near
Paza and Wazir Kila, from which villages they drew their supplies. The
1st and 3rd Brigades, with General Roberts’s and General Ross’s
head-quarters, struck camp at three o’clock, and General Macpherson’s
Brigade moved off first. The only difficulty was at the bridge over the
Logar; but as the stream was fordable, the baggage animals had no
trouble in wading across. General Roberts watched the brigade cross, and
it was pleasant to notice that the men seemed in the best of spirits,
doubling up the bank and hurrying along as if Candahar were only 10
miles away. One company of the 23rd Pioneers recognized the General, and
raised the Sikh war-cry of “_Guru! Guru! Futteh Guru!_” Once the river
had been left behind open ground was reached, and after a march of 14
miles camp was pitched a short distance beyond Zerghun Shahr. Here
supplies and forage were obtained in abundance, the villagers being
quite willing to give all that was required. The agents of the Amir
accompanying the force did good work in aiding the Political Officers in
making all smooth for the Commissariat.
CAMP SHASHGAO, _14th August_.
We are now within an easy march of Ghazni, and our cavalry have already
reconnoitred over the Sher-i-Dahan Pass without meeting an enemy. Ayub
Khan’s influence does not seem to extend so far north, while Hashim Khan
and his followers have fled southwards, declaring they have no wish to
fight the British, but will return when we have passed and make
preparations for a struggle with Abdur Rahman. Since my last letter we
have made four marches, the halting-places of General Roberts’s
head-quarters having been Padkhao Barak in Logar, Amir Kila at the mouth
of the Tang-i-Wardak, Takia in the Shiniz Valley, and Shashgao. There
has not been a shot fired, and all our efforts have been concentrated in
keeping our baggage animals up to their work, and in drawing supplies
from the country passed through.
On August 11th, the 1st and 3rd Brigades with head-quarters turned out
at 2.45 A.M., and moved off at four o’clock towards the Baraki group of
villages which cluster about the Logar River, where it turns to the
north. The brigades moved in parallel columns of route across an open
stony plain, and the first 10 miles were made in grand style, there
being nothing to impede the troops. Cultivation was then reached, and as
the crops of Indian-corn, lucerne, &c., were still on the ground, much
delay occurred in getting the baggage along. The water was cut off from
two or three of the deepest canals, and the road improved; but there was
a “nasty bit” just outside Baraki Rajan, where the bed of a tributary of
the Logar had to be crossed. The camping-ground was on a ridge, with
water close at hand, and fields of half-grown Indian-corn, which were
bought up at Rs. 50 a _bigah_ and used as forage. The 2nd Brigade and
the cavalry were encamped 3 miles away at Baraki Barak, having crossed
the river at Hisarak. The Logar Valley presented a picture of fertility
perhaps unequalled in Afghanistan. It is well-wooded, and the irrigation
from the river is admirably carried out. On either hand the cultivation
extends for several miles, and the villages are surrounded by orchards
and plantations of willow and other trees for firewood. The number of
the people visible all along the line of march showed the valley to be
thickly populated. To the south the valley is bounded by the barren
Altimour Range, shutting out Zurmut, while to the north-east are the
Shutargardan and the mass of mountains about it. Our faces were turned
westwards towards the Tang-i-Wardak, the barrier of hills through which
that Pass leads being overtopped by the more distant Pughman Range.
On the 12th the cavalry and General Baker’s Brigade had a long and
trying march from Baraki Barak, past Amir Kila, over the Samburak Kotal
to Sydabad in the Shiniz Valley. This placed them on the direct
Cabul-Ghazni Road, the Shiniz Valley extending from the Sher-i-Dahan
Kotal to Sheikhabad. The Lieutenant-General watched the Cavalry Brigade
pass Amir Kila, and a gallant show it made. The horses looked in grand
condition, the Central India Horse seeming none the worse for their
hurried march from Jellalabad. The road was so narrow that the baggage
animals had in many places to go in Indian file, and, although the
advance-guard started at four o’clock, only part of the cavalry baggage
reached Sydabad. The remainder was halted for the night, just above the
Amir Kila, near the camp of the 1st and 3rd Brigades, which had marched
only nine miles from Padkhao Barak. The Samburak Kotal is to the north
of the Tang-i-Wardak, and is comparatively easy; but there was only one
road over it—that made by the Candahar Force in April for the Horse
Artillery and Field guns. A few hundred yards of this road near the
crest were so steep that some of the cavalry ponies cast their loads;
but on the transport officers going up early on the morning of the 13th,
the baggage was found to have been left untouched by the villagers, and
only one pony was lying exhausted on the road. General Macgregor moved
off by way of the Tang-i-Wardak to Hyder Khel, which had been fixed as
the halting-place of the 1st and 3rd Brigades; and then Colonel Low,
Director of Transport, saw to the clearing away of the baggage of
General Baker’s Brigade. Fatigue parties were told off to carry the
loads lying on the road, to the top of the Kotal, and then the stream of
mules and ponies was set in motion. Working parties also improved and
widened the road, and two “diversions” were made which allowed of three
lines of animals moving upwards at the same time. By three o’clock in
the afternoon the whole of the baggage was clear of the Kotal; only
_three_ animals having had to be abandoned. This will show in what good
condition our transport now is: not a load was left behind and the
regiments with General Baker had once more the pleasure of seeing their
tents and kit. The men had bivouacked at Sydabad, and the cold air of
the early morning had been too keen to be comfortable. General Roberts
with head-quarters joined the 2nd Brigade which encamped at Takia, two
miles beyond Hyder Khel, the distance from Sydabad being about 12 miles.
To-day (August 14th) the whole force is concentrated about Shashgao,
within three miles of the Sher-i-Dahan Kotal, the cavalry and General
Baker’s brigade having marched fourteen miles from Takia, while the
troops commanded by Generals Macpherson and Macgregor have covered
between sixteen and seventeen. The Shiniz Valley is from six to ten
miles across, and runs almost due north and south. High rolling hills
rise gradually on either side, and there is a gentle rise from about
7,000 feet above sea level at Sydabad to 8,000 feet at Shashgao, where
we are now encamped. There is only a narrow strip of cultivation about
the river, and scarcely any trees after Takia is left. The villages are
all strongly fortified, each consisting of a number of walled enclosures
with flanking buttresses. These miniature forts are usually built in
echelon, and against anything but artillery could make a stout
resistance. The Shiniz is a very small stream at this season of the
year, but there are numerous springs which give an excellent supply of
water. Shashgao is almost surrounded by a barren stony plain, the
cultivation extending but a mile or so from the village. On this plain
the whole of our force is now encamped, this being the first time the
Lieutenant-General has had the four brigades concentrated. It is a huge
encampment, and if Sirdar Hashim Khan has caught a glimpse of it he may
well be pardoned for hastening away to Zurmut. Supplies have not come in
so abundantly as in Logar, the country being much poorer; but still good
green forage has been got for the cavalry and transport, and enough food
for the troops. It should be remembered that for the last three days we
have been in the Wardak country, and that the Wardaks are no great
friends of the new Amir, whose agents therefore we expected to do little
for us. But the people have shown no hostility, and Major Hastings and
the Political Officers have had no difficulty in dealing with the
_maliks_. This is a good sign, and proves that Hashim Khan has really no
party worthy of the name in this district. To have reached within one
march of Ghazni without a sign of opposition of any kind must convince
even the greatest alarmist that the effect upon the Afghan mind of
Ayub’s victory has been purely local. The whole country about Candahar
may be up in arms, but there is no corresponding movement among the
warlike population between Cabul and Ghazni.
The troops are improving in health daily, and in spite of long and
trying marching there is the best spirit among all ranks. Men falling
out on the march are mounted on spare ponies, but their lot is not a
cheerful one, as they are unmercifully “chaffed” by their comrades, who
go swinging along with many a cheery allusion to what is to be done at
Candahar. The greatest anxiety is for plenty of wholesome fighting to
reward them for their weary tramp, and nothing would please them more
than to see the Sher-i-Dahan Kotal covered with Afghans to-morrow
morning.
In the midst of our new excitement relative to Candahar a little
incident carries many of us back to the old days of December, when the
Cabul Field Force was fighting against great odds about Sherpur.
To-night in the Field Force orders appears the following _in memoriam_:—
“Lieutenant-General Sir F. Roberts is sure that all ranks of the late
Cabul Field Force will share the regret he feels at the death of
Lieutenant-Colonel Cleland, 9th (Queen’s Royal) Lancers. On the 11th
December last, in the Chardeh Valley, this officer was dangerously
wounded whilst gallantly leading his distinguished regiment against the
enemy. From the effects of that wound Lieutenant-Colonel Cleland died at
Murree on the 7th instant, after many months of severe suffering. By the
death of Lieutenant-Colonel Cleland, Sir F. Roberts, in common with a
large number of officers and soldiers, has lost a valued friend, whilst
Her Majesty’s Army has been deprived of the services of a most promising
and gallant officer. The Lieutenant-General desires to express the deep
sympathy he feels with the officers and men of the 9th Lancers in the
personal loss they have sustained.”
------------------------------------
CHAPTER II.
The Advance through the Sher-i-Dahan Pass—The Tomb of Mahmood at
Roza—Arrival at Ghazni—State of the Citadel—A Miserable-looking
City—Condition of the Camp-Followers—Splendid Marching—Losses by the
Road—Cavalry Scouts—The field of Ahmed Khel—A Raid on Powindah
Traders at Chardeh—News from Khelat-i-Ghilzai and Candahar—Mukur to
Panjak: a Trying March—Sir F. Roberts and the Troops—The Candahar
Province entered at Shahjui—Heliographic Communication with
Khelat-i-Ghilzai—Relief of Colonel Tanner’s Troops—Disastrous Sortie
at Candahar—Ayub Khan Raises the Siege—Cavalry March to
Robat—Heliographing with General Primrose—General H. Gough meets
Colonel St. John—“In Touch” of Ayub Khan—Diary of the March from
Cabul.
GHAZNI, _15th August_, 1880.
Nothing occurred to disturb us last night in our camping-ground at
Shashgao, and we turned out as usual at three o’clock and loaded up for
the day’s march. It was well known yesterday that no armed gathering was
at Ghazni; but in this country no one can say what a night may bring
forth, and orders were accordingly issued for the advance through the
Sher-i-Dahan Pass to be made as if an enemy were actually at hand. With
between 8,000 and 9,000 baggage animals to be guarded, great precautions
had to be taken to make the line of march as compact as possible, and
this object was gained by the following disposition:—
⎛ 1 Regiment of Cavalry.
1.— ⎜ 1 Company 23rd Pioneers.
⎜ 2 Guns No. 2 Mountain Battery.
⎝ 1 Regiment Infantry from 1st Brigade.
2.— Remainder of 1st Brigade with 4 guns No. 2 Mountain Battery
preceding 6-8 Royal Artillery in order of march.
3.— 2nd Infantry Brigade.
4.— Cavalry Brigade, with the exception of one troop attached to
3rd Brigade.
5.— Baggage Column, marshalled by Lieutenant-Colonel Low.
6.— Rear-guard, consisting of the whole of 3rd Brigade with a
troop of Cavalry.
Owing to the darkness of the morning and the nature of the road it was
found necessary to modify this disposition; the 92nd Highlanders went
first, with the Cavalry Brigade following, until the southern end of the
Pass was reached, when a squadron of cavalry trotted forward to
reconnoitre the country towards Ghazni.
The Sher-i-Dahan Pass might, from its name (the lion’s mouth) be
expected to be very formidable, whereas it is one of the easiest in
Afghanistan. The rise from the Shashgao plain to the Kotal is only 400
feet, and is so gradual that it is scarcely noticeable. The road is not
at all shut in for the first 2 miles, the hills rolling away on either
hand in easy undulations. The Kotal is marked on our maps as 9,000 feet
high, but it was found by aneroid measurements to be only 8,300. The
road is sufficiently broad to allow of four horsemen riding abreast, and
is in very good order. For about a mile after the Kotal is crossed there
is a gradual descent and the hills close in; but they soon recede, and
one enters upon an open plain, basin-shaped, in which is a line of
_karez_ furnishing water for a few score acres of cultivation. The road
crosses the plain, and goes in nearly a straight line up a second low
Kotal, from the top of which the Ghazni plain is overlooked. The
villages of Kila Hindu and Khodobad are seen on the left; Roza is
directly in front; while in the distance, over a mass of vegetation,
rises the Ghazni citadel, the town itself not being visible. The
Sher-i-Dahan could scarcely be held against any large force, as it can
be turned on either hand, all the hills being accessible to infantry and
mountain guns. There are no positions such as can be held by a few
hundred men, as in the Khyber, Shutargardan, and Jugdulluck Passes; only
sloping sides of hills, many of which horsemen can ride up. These hills
are as bare and barren as Afghan hills generally are, not a tree being
seen for miles.
It was, therefore, a great relief to enter upon the fertile country
about Ghazni itself. At this season of the year the crops of Indian-corn
and lucerne grass cover the fields with greenness, while the walled
orchards surround the villages with belts of foliage, promising shade
and coolness most grateful to wearied men. Vineyards also abound, the
ground being rich and water plentiful, and delicious grapes are retailed
at prices lower than in Cabul itself. A donkey load made up of two large
baskets, each weighing 40lbs. or 50lbs., cost us only three rupees when
our advanced guard was at Roza, though prices rose enormously as the day
wore on. The troops passed by a narrow lane through Roza, the outskirts
of which are a mass of vineyards, while the village itself boasts of
several high, well-built houses as well as of the tomb of Mahmood of
Ghazni. A running stream of pure water pours through the village and
crosses the road near the gate, and about this some hundred men were
gathered to watch our army file past. Some of us turned into Roza, and
made our way to Mahmood’s tomb, to which we were directed with every
show of eagerness. It stands in a walled garden, and there is a rude
building about it which probably serves as a mosque. In the garden are
richly-carved stone gargoyles and images resembling the Assyrian bull,
probably the spoil brought by Mahmood to his capital when returning from
some of his successful expeditions. The tomb itself is still well
preserved, the marble being beautifully polished and kept clear of even
a speck of dirt or dust. In place of the gates of Somnath, which Nott
carried back to India nearly forty years ago, are richly-carved doors of
a wood made to resemble sandal wood, while hundreds of horseshoes and
other tokens are nailed on the lintel. The tiger-skin mentioned by Vigne
as being the largest he had ever seen, still hangs on the wall just
outside the gate. Bits of rich carving and elaborate inscriptions can
still be traced on the walls of the room built about the tomb; but there
is an air of decay about everything except the marble slabs of the tomb
itself. These are about 8 feet long by 2 in breadth, and are raised some
2 feet above the cracked stone flooring. The Kufic inscriptions are
still very well preserved. Particoloured banners are stretched across
the roof to prevent dust falling from above, and a janitor sits stolidly
at the entrance to see that the tomb is not desecrated. The remains of
the King who invaded India eleven times rest peacefully enough in the
picturesque village overlooked by the Ghazni citadel, but glory has
departed from the neighbouring city, once the capital of a most powerful
kingdom.
Ghazni is situated at the foot of a long undulating spur which runs down
from the west of the Sher-i-Dahan Pass and gradually loses itself in the
plain. Two minars—high tapering pillars, said to have been built ages
ago by Mahmood—mark the road leading from Roza to the Cabul Gate, with
which Durand’s name is inseparably connected; and in the shade of these
pillars Sir Frederick Roberts and his Staff halted, while Major
Hastings, Chief Political Officer, rode to the citadel to bring in Abdul
Reschid, who is nominally acting as Governor of the city in these
troublous times. That worthy presently appeared with a score of mounted
retainers, all more or less ragged and disreputable, and the General
rode on to visit the Bala Hissar and the city itself. From a military
point of view the citadel is badly placed, as a knoll on the spur of the
hill commands the building at a distance of only 800 yards. Artillery on
this knoll could make the fortress quite untenable, while guns could
scarcely be worked on the walls in the face of rifle-fire from
breech-loaders. But the walls are by no means in the state of ruin
reported by Sir Donald Stewart’s force. There are certainly two breaches
on the south-western side, but they could be easily repaired, and the
walls are so thick and high that to send a storming party against them
would involve heavy loss of life, and success would be very
problematical if the garrison were at all resolute in defence. The moat
is nearly dry, but an irrigation channel runs alongside, from which the
water could be diverted. A low wall, 2 feet high, pierced for musketry,
and with small flanking bastions on the escarp 8 or 10 yards above the
moat, is in utter ruin; but of the main walls above, the parapet only is
fallen away, the roadway along the top being still practicable for men
lining it. An engineer officer gave it as his opinion that the Cabul
Bala Hissar was really in very little better repair, when we entered it
last October, than is that of Ghazni now. The approach to the Cabul Gate
is by a road over the moat, but the gateway itself is hidden from view,
as two flanking walls, 38 feet high and 20 yards in length, stretch out
in nearly semicircular shape. Between these one can only see a few yards
in advance, until a sharp turn shows the gateway right in front. There
is nothing distinctive in its appearance; it is of the pattern common in
all Afghan forts: two high wooden doors opening inwards, of great
thickness and studded with iron bolts. The masonry on either side and
above it is blotched and scarred by time, but is still fairly
substantial. A drinking fountain is on the left, the water being carried
into the city by a channel from the hill above. The immediate approach
from outside is rather steep, but is broad enough to admit a regiment
marching up in fours. A crowd of curious citizens blocked the gateway,
but they readily gave place as we rode in. Immediately within the gate
is an open space some 50 yards square, and rising in front on a mound
100 feet high is the citadel. Two well-worn roads lead up to it at an
angle sufficient to make riding up rather difficult. It was down these
that a swarm of swordsmen rushed and cut up our leading companies when
Nott stormed the place. Two old field-guns, 6-pounders, were standing on
the left, mounted on carriages of very recent make, while a mud building
with barricaded doors was said to be the “magazine,” and to contain two
more guns and some ammunition. The interior approaches to the walls were
in bad repair; but there were pathways along them, and plenty of
materials in the shape of sun-dried mud and debris to build a new
parapet.
Conducted by Abdul Reschid, who, by the way, is fonder of strong liquor
than a true Mahomedan should be, Sir F. Roberts and some twenty officers
rode up to the citadel, which was found quite deserted. It is
rectangular in shape, and has only one gateway facing towards Roza, the
mound on which it stands falling down on the other sides almost
perpendicularly. The walls are thirty feet high, and are built of brick
and mud, each of the four corners boasting of embattled towers, which at
a distance seem very imposing. The eastern half overlooking the city has
been built within the last few years, and has some pretension to
architecture, but the western section is just as it stood in 1840-41. An
open courtyard is entered after the narrow gateway has been passed, and
two tiers of rooms look down upon the blank space below, which shows no
signs of being the keep of a citadel. Abdul Reschid explained that in
the old rooms on the right the English prisoners were confined, while
the Governor always lived in the new quarters commanding the city. Into
these we accordingly went, and from the upper rooms a grand view was
obtained of the surrounding country, thickly dotted over with villages
embowered in orchards and vineyards. One could appreciate the fertility
of the Ghazni province at once, and our hopes of plentiful supplies
being forthcoming for the troops mounted high. At our feet lay Ghazni
itself, with its encircling walls, and a more miserable-looking city
could scarcely be imagined. The “houses” are low mud huts, nearly all of
one story, and streets there appeared to be none. The 24th P.N.I. had
marched in through the Cabul Gate directly in our wake, and their band
woke the echoes of the place right cheerily as we listened to Abdul
Reschid’s chatter concerning Hashim Khan and young Mahomed Ali Jan, who
had fled four days before—not in fear, but because they had no wish to
fight the British, their quarrel being with Abdur Rahman alone.
Presently we rode down into the town, and found it as miserable as it
looked from above. There was an attempt at a covered bazaar, the
covering being twigs and branches of trees to afford shelter from the
sun; but the street was so narrow that we had to go in single file, and
in places one could step from shop to shop across the roadway without
effort. I have called them shops out of courtesy, for Ghazni was once a
great city, but they are really wretched stalls, in which grapes, fruit,
corn, and _attar_ are retailed. A few blacksmiths’ and shoemakers’ shops
were alone worthy of the name, and after ten minutes’ inspection we rode
out of Ghazni by a second gate, some 200 yards distant from the one by
which we had entered. This gate was also in fairly good order, and a
storming party entering by it would get entangled in the narrow streets,
all commanded by the citadel above. Ghazni, while not so ruinous as it
has been painted, is certainly rapidly decaying, and another generation
will probably see it at its lowest ebb.
Our camp was pitched on a large sandy plain almost due east of the city,
and to-morrow we begin our march to Khelat-i-Ghilzai, which we hope to
reach on the 28th or 29th of the month, the rapidity of our movements
depending now upon the capacity of the country to furnish forage for our
cavalry and our transport animals. The excitement known to exist about
Candahar has not extended northwards yet, and there seems more interest
in Cabul affairs consequent upon the accession of Abdur Rahman than in
the movements of Ayub Khan. Supplies of grain, flour and forage have
been got in abundance to-day, and if we could only be sure that the
crops of Indian-corn have been sown about the villages on the route our
prospects would be very bright. We have hitherto got along wonderfully
well; our troops are getting in better marching order daily, and our
transport animals having been well rationed are as fit for heavy and
continuous work as can ever be expected. The disappearance of Hashim
Khan and Mahomed Ali Jan proves that the people have no stomach for
fighting, for if the Sirdars could have raised an army in this district
they would undoubtedly have tried to harry us on the march. Our force
numbers in all over 18,000 men, soldiers and followers, and our line
must straggle a little in spite of all precautions. The weakest link in
our chain is the state of the dhoolie-bearers and followers, who lack
the stamina of the sepoys, and are left more to their own resources than
men under strict regimental discipline. Dr. Hanbury, Chief Medical
Officer, is doing all he can to keep the _kahars_ in health, and as
_ghee_ is not obtainable he has procured the issue of a small meat
ration to all followers. The quantity will be increased if sheep can be
got at the villages, and under this system break-downs are likely to be
reduced to a minimum. To avoid placing in dhoolies men who are only
foot-sore, Colonel Low is buying up all the donkeys he can find, and on
these such men will be carried until they are again able to walk. There
is really no sickness in the force, except mild forms of fever and
diarrhœa, from which men are detained in hospital only a few days. No
messengers have as yet arrived from Khelat-i-Ghilzai, but we expect to
receive letters in a few days.
CAMP KHELAT-I-GHILZAI, _23rd August_.
To-day is the fifteenth from Cabul, and the eighth from Ghazni, and so
far Sir F. Roberts’s march has been most successful. We have come
through an enemy’s country without any show of opposition being made,
and the merit of the march is therefore its unequalled rapidity. From
Ghazni we have covered 136 miles in eight days, giving an average of 17
miles per day, continuous marching; while, taking Beni Hissar as our
starting point, we have done 286 miles in fifteen days, or on an average
15·7 miles per day. For a regiment alone to do this would not be
extraordinary, but for a force numbering 18,000 souls, with between
8,000 and 9,000 baggage animals, to cover this distance without a day’s
halt, is a feat in marching which is perhaps unrivalled. Sir F.
Roberts’s march upon Cabul last year proved what can be done by a
determined General in the face of enormous difficulties, but our present
work is a more remarkable achievement; and even if there should be no
second Charasia at the end both officers and men will have deserved well
of their country. When there is no butcher’s bill there is a tendency to
underrate the importance of military movements; but it is to be hoped
there will be little detraction in regard to the relief of Candahar.
Only those who have shared in the march can form an idea of the
discomfort and hardship involved; and I, as a non-combatant, with no one
but myself to take care of, have had many opportunities of seeing how
splendidly the men have behaved, and how officers have not spared
themselves in carrying out the orders of the General directing the
movement. The regiments forming the fighting line have, after marching
for eight hours, often through sandy soil or over rough ground, to
furnish on arrival at camp parties for all kinds of duty; one party for
wood, another for _bhoosa_ and green forage, a third for guards, while
sentry-go and picquet duty at night have allowed what is technically
known as only “three nights in bed.” Then the rear-guard work has been
terribly heavy: regiments on this duty reach camp sometimes as late as
nine o’clock, having been under arms since four o’clock in the early
morning. The next day’s march begins at 4 A.M., and the men have had to
turn out at reveillé (2.45 A.M.), load up their baggage animals, and
fall in as if they had enjoyed a long night’s rest. The nights have
luckily been deliciously cool, and the early mornings even bitterly
cold; but two hours after sunrise the heat makes itself felt, and from
eight o’clock until four the sun beats down upon the open treeless
country with great fierceness. Marching, one does not feel it so much,
but in the trying pauses when cast loads have to be replaced upon
broken-down mules, and when waiting in camp for the tents to come up,
the heat punishes the men fearfully. Blistered hands and faces were
common enough during the first days of the march, and although these
have come to be little regarded, there remain that bodily exhaustion and
lassitude resulting from long exposure in the sun and a short allowance
of sleep at night. The extremes of temperature may be appreciated when I
state that the thermometer at 4 A.M. registers 45° in the open, and at 4
P.M. 105° in a double-fly tent. For the last two marches we have turned
out at 1 A.M. and marched at 2.30, in order to get the main body into
camp early in the day, and as we have had a bright moon to light up the
road, the marching has been excellent. The rear-guard gets in by about
three o’clock in the afternoon, and the troops have ample time to
prepare their food before “turning in” at half-past seven.
It is well for us that food has been plentiful along the route, for
without liberal rations no men could stand the constant call upon their
powers; and we have been lucky also in getting plenty of green forage
for our animals. The villages which were deserted when Sir Donald
Stewart marched to Cabul, we have found all fairly well peopled; the
villagers had sown their crops of Indian-corn, which we have been able
to purchase for transport requirements. We expected to find a howling
desert, whereas we have found a strip of cultivation, narrow enough, but
still sufficient for our needs. We could not possibly have maintained
our rate of rapid marching if this had not been so, for continuous work
will break down the best mule ever bred if the animal be not properly
fed. General Hugh Gough’s cavalry brigade has also been kept up to its
efficient state, and the horses look nearly as fit as when they left
Cabul.
I have already alluded to our followers as being the greatest drag upon
us, and the _kahars_ have undoubtedly had a struggle to keep up. They
are such fatalists that they believe it is part of their _kismut_ to
wander off the road into obscure _nullahs_, there to fall asleep, and
take the risk of being cut up by Afghans. Of late the troops of cavalry
forming the rear-guard have quartered the country like beaters at a
tiger hunt, and the sleeping _kahars_ have been rudely wakened and
brought along. Baggage animals with sore backs have been utilized for
carrying the poor wretches into camp, a mule gone in the withers being
quite equal to bearing a man astride his back. Wonderful to say, men
straggle into camp long after midnight, unharmed and perfectly
self-satisfied. They have enjoyed their sleep in obscure ravines, and
have then resumed their march as if in a friendly country. Some of them
tell strange stories of having been stripped by Afghans and then allowed
to escape; but these are Mahomedans who have claimed fellowship in
religion with the tribesmen. Our actual loss in dead and missing since
we left Cabul is, I believe, as follows:—Died—Europeans, one; sepoys,
four; _kahars_, five; followers, five; missing—forty-three. Of the men
who have died, one private of the 72nd and one sepoy of the 23rd
Pioneers committed suicide: three sepoys died from obstruction of the
bowels caused by eating unripe Indian-corn, and then drinking large
quantities of water. Of the missing many are known to have been _kahars_
trying to get to the Khyber line, and Hazara syces who have gone to
their own country. There were 494 soldiers in hospital on the 24th
August.
Regarding our transport, we have at work now 2,664 _yaboos_ and ponies,
as against 2,919 when we left Cabul; 4,426 mules as against 4,509; 934
donkeys as against 929; and 150 camels. Many of the donkeys and all the
camels have been obtained on the road. Our total transport now consists
of 8,174 animals of all kinds, while the Khelat-i-Ghilzai garrison will
furnish 301 camels, 132 mules, ten ponies, and 265 donkeys. The garrison
is made up of two companies of the 66th (141 men), the 2nd Beluchis
(675), squadron 3rd Scind Horse (107 sabres), with two guns of C-2 R.A.
(forty-seven men), two medical officers, one commissariat officer, and
various details, amounting in all to a total of 1,005 men. They have
stored in the fort a large quantity of tinned meat and soups, _attar_,
corn, and _bhoosa_, which will be a most welcome addition to our stores.
To-day, also, a wing of the Beluchis have moved out to Jaldak, our next
stage, where they will collect supplies for the force. We are to halt
here to-morrow to give men and animals a short rest.
Having summarized some of our difficulties and drawn attention to the
merits of the march, considered apart from its ultimate ending, I will
now give in detail the stages marched from day to day and the actual
distances covered. On August 12th we left Ghazni and marched to
Yergatta, just past the battlefield of Ahmed Khel—20 good miles. The
brigades got into motion at 4 A.M., and the cavalry began the work which
they have since performed daily, and which I will now allude to once for
all. They were spread out all across the valley, and worked steadily
along, examining every yard of ground and feeling for an enemy who has
never yet shown himself. A bright moon favoured their movements, and
when one got a little ahead of the infantry it was a weird sight to see
a chain of phantom-like men and horses stretching away on either hand,
until lost in the early morning mist. Too high praise cannot be given to
General Hugh Gough and his fine cavalry brigade for the way in which
this covering movement was done. The infantry could march along in
perfect security with the knowledge that some 1,500 troops were in front
and on the flanks, that the “eyes of our army,” as the Germans have it,
were wide open. Sowars, when properly handled, make excellent Uhlans, as
they are all light-weights and their horses seldom tire. Our more
heavily accoutred English cavalry are of course handicapped at such
cross-country work, but the 9th Lancers are so eager to reach Candahar
and capture a few of Ayub’s guns that they make light of the burning sun
and bitter fatigue; their want of knowledge of the language and habits
of the people is more than compensated by extra vigilance and care in
scouting. The cavalry marches were always several miles longer than
those made by the infantry, by reason of their constant scouting; while
before camp was pitched patrols were sent out five miles in advance on
reconnoitring duty. A troop was detailed daily to act with our infantry
rear-guard, and they were always last in, as they had to sweep all stray
animals and followers before them. But for this arrangement many lives
would have been lost, as the apathy of a tired _kahar_ or other follower
is extraordinary.
This first march out at Ghazni was very trying. After passing through
the walled gardens about the town, and turning to take a farewell look
at the Bala Hissar, most imposing when viewed from the south, we got
into the open country, and before us was the plain stretching right away
to Khelat-i-Ghilzai, with no break in its continuity. The hills which
bound it may send out minor spurs, and the lower ranges on the east
between the Ghazni River and the high Khonak mountains may seem at times
about to close in upon the road; but there is not a kotal to be crossed,
and the valley is always broad enough to allow of three columns of
route.
The characteristics of the country north of Khelat-i-Ghilzai are very
accurately detailed in official route books: the villages, with their
orchards and patches of cultivation, are numerous enough for the first
few miles. They then grow fewer and fewer, and the plain becomes a waste
covered with the camel-thorn scrub and intersected by deep ravines
running from the foot of the hills on either side down to the river bed.
These are formed by the streams resulting from the melting snows, and
their banks are so steep that they are at times formidable obstacles to
baggage animals. Streams of water, chiefly from _karez_ sources, cross
the road at right-angles from time to time, and near these are generally
a few fields of Indian-corn, lucerne and melon beds. In this first
march, for example, we crossed a broad river bed three miles south of
Ghazni, and then got upon a sandy plain which lasted almost as far as
Nani, where a number of small streams furnish water for the crops. Here
an hour’s halt was called (which only served to stiffen the men), and
then we moved towards Ahmed Khel over an arid plain which led to the
rolling hills on which Sir Donald Stewart fought his action. Nothing
could be more desolate than the country of Ahmed Khel and the
battlefield itself, but we got water at Yergatta, and a few fields of
Indian-corn for our worn-out animals. The scarcity of wood all down the
line of march was also a source of constant trouble—at Yergatta
camel-thorn scrub having to be collected and burned. The order of march
from Ghazni was: 2nd and 3rd Brigades leading, and 1st Brigade (with
troop of cavalry) acting as rear-guard. The leading brigades marched in
parallel columns of route and reached Yergatta about 3 P.M. A terrific
dust-storm was blowing, and the task of getting in the baggage was
unusually hard. The 1st Brigade lost its way in the storm, and the
rear-guard did not arrive in camp until long after dark. Men and animals
were alike exhausted by this long march, the longest save one made on
the route.
Such officers of General Stewart’s force as were with us explained the
positions in the Ahmed Khel action, and our surprise was indeed great
that even ghazis could “rush” infantry armed with breech-loaders over
ground on which there was not a bit of cover. There were between 400 or
500 graves on the battlefield showing where the enemy’s dead had been
buried: in place of headstones there were, in a few cases, the scabbard
of a sword or knife sticking up, transfixing a bloody cap or a pair of
old shoes belonging to the dead ghazi. I am sorry to say the graves in
which our dead were buried had been torn open and dishonoured. On one of
the largest graves had been found a small piece of paper tied to a
stick. On being unrolled an inscription was seen, stating that the spot
was sacred to the memory of the “martyrs” who had fallen in fight
against the English army—the date given was 1297 A.H. But for the
interest attaching to Ahmed Khel our camp at Yergatta would have seemed
doubly dreary. Fortunately our animals had been fed at the halting-place
at Nani, which somewhat lessened the soldier’s work when camp was
pitched.
On August 17th a comparatively short march of twelve miles was made to
Chardeh by way of Mushaki. The previous day’s march had sorely tried our
transport, but we got in after much straggling of animals on the road.
Sandy stretches also tried the men’s feet a good deal, numbers of sepoys
falling out of the ranks from foot-soreness. The Chardeh group of
villages covers a wide stretch of country, but many of the walled
enclosures were deserted, and forage was difficult to get. Numbers of
Powindah traders were seen, and there was a little excitement in the
evening, thanks to these men. We were anxious to hire or purchase a
number of camels to aid our transport, and the Powindahs at one large
encampment promised to provide 500 of their beasts. They afterwards
refused to send in even 100, and Colonel Low, with 300 men drawn from
Macpherson’s brigade, surrounded their camp at dusk. The Powindahs had
hidden the camel-saddles, and they turned the camels loose, while the
women and children rushed among the soldiers, abusing them heartily and
making a terrific din. Some shots were fired at the Ghoorkas, who
returned the fire, but our officers prevented any serious fight.
Lieutenant Gordon, of the 4th Ghoorkas, had a narrow escape from being
hamstrung; as he was passing one of the tents, a man struck at his leg
with a knife, thrusting it out from below. Gordon’s sword saved him, the
knife cutting through the scabbard to the steel. Eventually 150 camels
were captured and brought into our camp. On this day we received our
first news from Khelat-i-Ghilzai, a messenger arriving with a letter
from Colonel Tanner, 2nd Beluchis, commanding the garrison. He set our
minds at rest on several points, for the Powindahs had alarmed us by
stating that Candahar had fallen, and the Khelat-i-Ghilzai garrison were
hard pressed. In place of this we learned that all was well at the
latter place, the country not having risen. A letter from Colonel St.
John, dated August 8th, was also enclosed, its purport being that
Candahar was completely invested, but that the garrison had supplies for
two months and _bhoosa_ for fifteen days; 15,000 Afghans had been turned
out of the city, which was held by our troops. At Chardeh most of the
Hazaras who had marched with us from Cabul left camp for their own
country, which lay beyond the range of hills on our right. Our cavalry
found about a thousand Hazaras with their horses and cattle in a fort
near our camping ground. Their story was that they had been shut up
since April by the Afghans, who had sworn to kill them for aiding Sir
Donald Stewart. They regarded us as their deliverers, and made a hurried
exit over the hills, glad to escape while our army was holding Chardeh.
On August 18th we marched 16 miles to Oba Karez, our way being lighted
for a mile by the blazing ruins of the fort lately occupied by the
Hazaras, which the Afghan villagers had fired. We could see villages
dotted about for the first five or six miles, and running streams gave
ample water for the troops; but the last eight or nine miles was barren
plain, with nothing growing but camel-thorn; not even a stagnant pool to
relieve the men’s thirst. There is no village at Oba Karez, which is
merely a halting-place, where a delicious stream of water from a _karez_
bursts out at the foot of a mound 150 feet high. A number of villagers
from a distance had brought a few supplies to this mound, and also
donkey-loads of water-melons, which our men fell upon most ravenously.
The want of water told most of all upon the followers, whose state at
times was pitiable. We camped about a mile beyond the _karez_, near the
stream flowing from it. To-day we received another letter from
Khelat-i-Ghilzai, under date 13th August. It was from Captain Yate,
Political Officer with Colonel Tanner. Captain Yate wrote:—
“I send you a copy of Colonel St. John’s letter of 8th August, received
yesterday, our only communication with the outer world since July 26th.
That letter will give you all the information we possess. I shall be
glad if you will kindly send me by the return messenger a copy of your
route to Candahar, to enable me to make what arrangements I can for
supplies along the road. Everything is quiet about here and down the
road, I believe, as far as Shahr-i-Safa or Khel-i-Akhund, and I hope to
he able to have _bhoosa_ and flour stored ready at the different stages.
The Shahjui district has been very unsettled of late owing to the
continued presence of Mahomed Aslam, the Tokhi Chief, but he, I fancy,
will move off as soon as he hears of the approach of your force.
Directly I know where you are for certain I will send out Mahomed Sadik,
a friendly Tokhi Chief, who will help to get in supplies for your
force.... Yesterday we received letters from Sir R. Sandeman and Wyllie
at Quetta, who were anxious concerning our safety.”
I quote this letter, as the news that the country was quiet north of
Candahar was very satisfactory to us in camp.
KHELAT-I-GHILZAI, _23rd August_.
On August 19th our eleventh march from Beni Hissar was made to Mukur,
about 15 miles. When we were at Ghazni we were warned that a great
tribal gathering would bar our road at Mukur; but the people have not
yet forgotten the action of Ahmed Khel, and not an armed man presents
himself at any village we visit. For the first 6 miles out of Oba Karez,
not a drop of water was found on the camel-thorn desert. Our route took
us gradually nearer to the range of hills on the west, which rise almost
perpendicularly out of the plain. The order of march was changed, the
three brigades advancing abreast with their respective baggage in rear,
and a regiment of cavalry arrayed on either flank. The country was so
flat that our line extended for 2 miles, at times; and a brave show was
thus made of our fighting strength. At about the seventh mile we were
cheered by a line of trees in the far distance, showing where the Mukur
villages were scattered on the headwaters of the Turnak River. Without
any perceptible rise or fall we crossed the watershed of the valley, and
by noon our advanced guard of infantry was resting under the shade of
the trees about a village at the foot of a hill 700 feet high, rising
sheer above the springs from which the Turnak takes its rise. The
camping-ground was on a rolling plain in rear of the village, and was
the best on which we had yet encamped. Supplies were abundant, and we
got such luxuries as fowls, eggs, and milk at reasonable rates. The
villagers turned out in great numbers, and were generally fine, handsome
fellows, good-natured, but very independent. We had to pull down a few
of their houses for firewood; but as the owners were paid handsomely
both for the wood and the “ruins,” they did not lose their good temper,
and we believed in the end that similar terms would have induced them to
pull down the whole village.
August 20th will always be remembered, by those who survive the
operations now being carried out, as a day full of privation, and
calling for much endurance by officers and men. We marched from Mukur to
Panjak, covering 21 miles by the direct road. Water was so scarce that
followers fell exhausted on the roadside, and we had to send back
_bhistees_ with _mussuks_ of water to save the _kahars_ and others from
dying of thirst. The heat was greater than ever in the day, although in
the early morning the air had been bitterly cold. One company of a
native regiment lay down in an irrigation channel, the water of which
was too muddy to drink. Not a tree gave shade in any direction, and the
arid plain with its scrub-growth seemed to grow red hot. I do not wish
to exaggerate the sufferings of the army; but it should be counted in
our favour hereafter that we are marching day after day through a
half-desolate land, with no supports to fall back upon in case of
disaster, and uncertain of what lay before us; with nothing but thin
tents to shield us from a sun which laughed to scorn 100° in the shade,
and with a water-supply so uncertain that we never knew in the morning
where our camping-ground in the evening might be. At Panjak itself were
good villages belonging to Aslam Khan, the Tokhi Chief, and we had water
and supplies more than enough for our force; but the struggle to reach
this oasis broke down many a man and beast. The troops were rewarded by
the issue of an extra ration of rum, non-drinkers receiving an extra
meat ration; and as the heat had been so trying, it was debated whether,
in future, reveillé should not sound at 1 A.M., and the march begin at
2.30 A.M., a bright moon favouring this arrangement.