Arrival of Abdur Rahman at Tutandarra in Kohistan—Preparations for the
Evacuation of Cabul—A Deputation sent from Cabul to the Sirdar—The
Friends and Enemies of the future Amir—Attitude of the Kohistanis,
Ghilzais, and Wardaks—Mahomed Jan and Mushk-i-Alam’s Acceptance of
Abdur Rahman—Durbar at Sherpur on July 22nd—Formal Acknowledgment of
Abdur Rahman as Amir by the British Government—Mr. Lepel Griffin’s
Address to the Chiefs—Sir Donald Stewart’s Appeal to their
Patriotism—Abdur Rahman’s Departure from Charikar—Resignation of
Wali Mahomed, Governor of Cabul—News of the Maiwand
Disaster—Probable Movement of 10,000 Troops to Candahar—Interview
between Mr. Lepel Griffin and the Amir—Discussion of Terms—The
Amir’s Demeanour—Second Interview—A Satisfactory Settlement arrived
at.
Early in July Sir Donald Stewart sent a final message to Sirdar Abdur
Rahman Khan, requesting him to come to Cabul to discuss the terms of a
settlement, and on the 15th of July the Sirdar reached Tutandarra, near
Charikar, in Kohistan. His passage over the Hindu Kush had been a very
trying one. On the 9th of July we had sent a deputation of Cabul
gentlemen to Kohistan to pay their respects to the future Amir. Among
these men were Abdul Kadir, the head Kazi of the city, who was the
bearer of a letter to Abdur from the chief Political Officer; the
Ghilzai Chief of Tezin, and Sirdar Yusuf Khan, Barakzai. The
negotiations seemed to be progressing so well that all preparations were
made for evacuating Cabul by the 16th of August, and large convoys
started daily from the Bala Hissar with stores and surplus ammunition
for India.[44] The following letters describe the close of the
negotiations:—
-----
Footnote 44:
It will be seen from this that the evacuation of Cabul was decided
upon long before the Maiwand disaster was made known.
-----
_19th July, 1880._
There now seems every prospect of a satisfactory settlement being made
with Abdur Rahman, who will shortly leave Tutandarra for Charikar,
thence coming to any place which the British representatives at Cabul
may name. He raises no objection to this; expresses his strong wish to
make a firm and friendly arrangement with the British, and is more
anxious for personal interviews than even we could be. Since his arrival
in Kohistan the tone of his messages, and his reception of the
deputation of Cabul gentlemen sent to him at Tutandarra, have been more
than cordial; and there can be no reasonable doubt that he has finally
determined to unreservedly accept the English conditions, and find his
strength in an English alliance. This being the case, it is of some
importance to know what the strength and party of Abdur Rahman in
Northern Afghanistan are; and on this subject we have a good deal to
guide us. It may be presumed that the Government did not blindly pin its
faith to Abdur Rahman before it had ascertained that there was a
sufficiently large party in Afghanistan to ensure some promise of
stability if the Sirdar himself was capable and considerate to his
political opponents. It is understood that Mr. Lepel Griffin came to
Cabul with instructions from the late viceroy (Lord Lytton) to enter
into communication with Abdur Rahman, and ascertain if he were a chief
suited to the Government purposes, and that communications were
accordingly opened with the Sirdar within a few days of the arrival of
the Chief Political Officer in Cabul. These have been continued without
interruption since, until Abdur Rahman has now felt himself strong
enough to respond to the Government invitation; and unless unforeseen
accidents occur within the next month, it would seem certain that he
will be Amir of Cabul.
Some critics have assumed that, as in the first Durbar held after Mr.
Griffin’s arrival at Cabul the only candidates for the Amirship actually
named were Wali Mahomed Khan, Hashim, Musa Jan, and Ayub Khan, the
question of the possibility of Abdur Rahman had then not been considered
by the Government. But a comparison of dates shows that this must be
incorrect, and it is consequently probable that, looking at the
formidable character of the armed opposition at that time, and the
ignorance of the Sirdar’s character and intentions, his name was
expressly excluded, not because negotiations with him had not commenced,
but that Yakub Khan’s faction—who were then assembling in immense
numbers, and would have become far more formidable but for their defeat
at Ahmed Khel and Charasia—might not be rendered desperate and be
strengthened by the knowledge that the person to whom they were most
opposed had been selected by Government, while it was uncertain whether
he would, after all, prove suitable. The delay which had taken place in
coming to an understanding with Abdur Rahman is indeed small when the
magnitude of the interests at stake is considered, and the distance at
which the Sirdar was residing on the other side of the Hindu Kush. It
will have been no more than four months from the arrival of Mr. Griffin
at Cabul, and the opening of negotiations with Abdur Rahman, before
these are virtually completed, and the army can then be withdrawn as
quickly as military exigencies or regard for the life and health of the
troops will permit.
It is very difficult to say what strength Abdur Rahman possesses in
Afghanistan, as it was difficult to know what really constituted the
party of Yakub Khan or Musa Jan. One thing certain is that a very large
number of undecided persons of all tribes will accept any Amir who may
be chosen by the Government, and formally notified according to the
Mahomedan religion. Constant efforts have been directed by the Political
Department at Cabul to break up all the strong opposition parties; to
enlist on the side of the Government nominee the religious feeling of
the country, and especially the assistance of the great religious
leaders (which has been successfully done); and to break up those great
tribes which are under the control of chiefs of more or less importance,
so that no formidable organized resistance might be offered to the new
Amir. The most important tribe in Afghanistan is undoubtedly the
Ghilzais. The Andaris, one of the most important of the southern
sections of the tribe, are entirely in favour of Abdur Rahman, as are a
great majority of the Tarakis. The northern Ghilzais are very much under
the control of their chiefs, the most important of whom is Asmatullah
Khan, of Hisarak and Lughman. He, it has just been announced, has
addressed Mr. Griffin, and expressed his entire willingness to accept
the Amir chosen by the English, even if this should be Abdur Rahman.
Another important Ghilzai chief, Khan Mahomed Khan, of Tezin, is with
the deputation sent to Charikar to welcome Abdur Rahman. Padshah Khan
will be opposed to the Sirdar; Maizullah Khan will probably join him;
Faiz Mahomed Khan has openly declared that he will be in opposition. On
the whole, it may be said that about half of the important Ghilzai tribe
will be in favour of the new Amir. Others, should his conduct be
conciliatory, would be doubtless won over later. The Kohistanis, who are
almost entirely Tajiks, and between whom and the Afghans there is not
much love lost, can also be counted upon.
There is, however, a strong party in favour of Shere Ali’s family; but,
roughly speaking, two-thirds of Kohistan and Koh-Daman may be estimated
on the side of the Sirdar. It is worth noting, in spite of the reports
to the contrary, that General Mir Said Khan, of Istalif, and Mir Butcha
Khan have not yet visited Abdur Rahman. They are doubtful of their
reception, and with excellent reason, as they have been illegitimately
collecting Government revenue, which they know any organized Government
at Cabul would compel them to disgorge. The Wardaks, between Logar and
Ghazni, are unfriendly, but may be won over by good treatment. They will
very much follow the example of Mahomed Jan and Mushk-i-Alam. The latter
has for some time past been working honestly in the interests of peace,
and has written that he, together with all the important chiefs
assembled in Maidan, are ready to accept the choice of the British
Government. The Sirdars of the ruling house are naturally unfriendly, as
the adherents of the party of Azim Khan and Afzul Khan have long been
banished or reduced by Shere Ali to impotence. A good many of the
smaller sirdars belong to this party, and are on Abdur Rahman’s side;
but the men who have money—like Hashim Khan, Wali Mahomed, Ibrahim Khan,
Karim Khan—are, as a matter of course, in opposition.
The future depends very much on the Sirdar’s own conduct. If he chooses
to take a conciliatory course, he may help his own against the strong
opposition against him. If he becomes as unpopular in Cabul as he is in
Turkistan, by oppressing the people and exacting money from the traders,
he will not last very long. Already the news of his exactions has caused
the wholesale flight from the city of the Indian merchants of Cabul—two
_kafilas_ of whom have already marched to India with their families;
while trade is almost entirely stopped between Cabul, Turkistan, and
Bokhara. The necessities of the Sirdar’s position, and his almost
absolute want of funds, are, to a certain extent, an excuse for this;
but unless he desires to alienate the trading classes, which will be a
very great blow to the prosperity of his kingdom, he will have to
entirely change his policy with them.
_22nd July._
To-day the first step in the settlement of Afghanistan has been taken,
and a new page turned in the history of our relations with Cabul. We
have formally acknowledged the Sirdar Abdur Rahman Khan, son of Mir
Afzul Khan, eldest son of Dost Mahomed, as Amir of Cabul, and have
promised him our support so long as he remains friendly to the British
Government. Events have marched so rapidly within the last few days that
many of us can scarcely realize the importance of to-day’s proceedings.
Mahomed Jan and the chiefs assembled in Maidan, sent in a friendly
deputation, and this was a piece of good fortune which we scarcely
anticipated. The old _moollah_, Mushk-i-Alam, had, it is true, written
to say he would accept the ruler whom we favoured, but it was not
expected that secessions from the Jacobin party would follow so rapidly.
The deputation sent by Mahomed Jan to Sherpur offered to make
unconditional submission to the British authorities, but this was a
proceeding deemed impolitic by Sir Donald Stewart and Mr. Lepel Griffin.
Our object is to strengthen Abdur Rahman’s hands as much as possible,
not to gather a party about ourselves, and the proffered submission was
diverted to the Sirdar. This gives the latter the appearance of being
chosen of the people rather than forced upon them by our dictation, and
our anxiety is to ally ourselves openly with no party, though we are
quite willing to acknowledge the strongest man. Two sons of Mushk-i-Alam
and seven Wardak chiefs are now at Charikar, where they will be far more
useful than in Sherpur, and the effect upon the popular mind is
proportionately great. If the champion of Yakub and Musa Khan’s claims
considers the chances of a restoration to power of Shere Ali’s family at
an end, it is not likely the lesser lights will continue in factious
opposition. My last letter explained at length the then strength of
Abdur Rahman’s party, and it will be seen that he is now quite powerful
enough, with his new allies from Maidan, to hold his own in Cabul. His
promise to the traders not to raise forced loans and to repay at once
the money he has extorted from merchants in Turkistan has soothed the
feelings of the Cabul people, who have hitherto looked with dismay upon
the prospect of his coming to rule over them. It would have been a fatal
piece of folly if, as Amir, he renewed his tyranny, and there are
already signs on the part of the rich citizens here of readiness to
advance him money on the security of future revenue. Once he has funds
wherewith to raise and equip an army, the Amir elect may reasonably hope
to scatter the remnants of the Jacobin faction and to disperse Ayub
Khan’s army if it turns away from Candahar and reaches Ghazni. Abdur
Rahman will inevitably have to fight some of the malcontents remaining
after our armies have withdrawn over the Shutargardan and beyond
Jugdulluck, and our belief is that he will be strong enough to crush all
other pretenders, though he himself may exhaust his means in the
struggle. He must then turn to the British for countenance and support,
as there is a strong feeling against Russian interference with the
country, and we shall probably revert to the old policy of a liberal
annual subsidy. What conditions will be imposed if the subsidy is
granted only the Home Government perhaps at present knows; but unless
the war is to be fruitless, they must be somewhat on the lines laid down
in the Gundamak Treaty—the presence of a British Envoy in Cabul being
waived for the present.
The Durbar was held at five o’clock this evening, three large tents
having been pitched in the Cantonment, about 150 yards from the
Head-quarters’ Gate. All the afternoon, sirdars and persons of lesser
note came streaming through the 72nd Gateway, with their wild-looking
retainers on horseback and on foot. The order against the carrying of
arms, so wisely enacted by Sir Frederick Roberts in October, is still in
force; but privileged persons, such as Sirdar Wali Mahomed Khan and the
three representatives sent by Abdur Rahman from Charikar, were to-day
allowed small escorts of armed men. With carbines, or Enfield rifles,
slung at their back, a sword dangling from their waist-belt, pistols and
knives stuck in their _kummerbunds_, these horsemen trotted about full
of their own importance, evidently looking upon the Durbar as held for
the special honour of their masters. The said masters were, as usual,
gorgeous in crimson, purple, and gold; but I have so often described the
greasy Cabul Sirdar in all his glory that I am loth to trot him out
again, even on such an historic occasion as the present. We missed the
handsome Arab Hashim Khan used to ride, and that mountain of flesh,
Abdulla Khan, awed us no more; the two Sirdars are brooding over their
wrongs in Kharwar or Zurmut, and their hearts will be full of bitterness
when they learn of the success Abdur Rahman has scored. Wali Mahomed, as
Governor of Cabul, was a person of some importance in his own eyes,
though his tenure of power is now a very weak one, for he will be
scarcely rash enough to court death by remaining at his post when our
army files out of Sherpur. Sirdars and servants were the chief living
features in cantonments, between the Club and the Head-quarters, all the
afternoon, for in his anxiety to secure a “good place” each petty member
of the Barakzai family took time by the forelock, and hastened to the
Durbar tents an hour or two before the hour fixed for the solemn
proceedings. The guard of honour of 100 men, furnished by the 72nd
Highlanders, under the command of Captain Garnett, fell in about
half-past four o’clock, and to the cheery quick-step of “Scotland yet,”
marched off to where the gathering crowd of British officers and Afghan
notabilities had begun to arrange itself. We have not the means
wherewith to arrange a grand spectacle, and nothing could have been more
commonplace than the three tents in which the Durbar was to be held.
Facing Bemaru Heights was the largest of all, towering above its near
neighbour, which again dwarfed the Durbar tent proper, an old
weather-beaten canvas affair, dull red in colour, once the property of
the Amir. The guard of honour formed up at the entrance to the
northernmost tent, the lines of bayonets shining out in the sunshine,
and duly impressing certain weak-kneed sirdars, who shuffled along to
their places in very undignified fashion. There had been an effort made
to give some picturesque colouring to the interior of the small tent
wherein sirdars knelt on one side while British officers sat comfortably
on their own particular chairs and camp-stools on the other. Persian
carpets covered the dusty floor, shawls were thrown over the chairs of
state reserved for the representatives of the British Government, while
the very shabby tent-poles were swathed in _kinkob_ work. The dusky
faces of the sirdars showed no more sensibility, after once the crowd
had settled or wriggled itself into something like order, than would so
many masks on lay figures: our policy is so inscrutable to men like Wali
Mahomed that any new declaration is placidly awaited with almost
benevolent indifference. The rows of turbans, many-coloured and full of
strange peculiarities in shape and folding, covered the shaven scalps of
men whose thoughts turned, doubtless, upon what new phase the affairs of
Afghanistan were about to take. Sirdar Wali Mahomed looked anxious and
dispirited, as must a man whose power is slipping rapidly away; the
stuttering Shahbaz Khan, our whilom Governor of Kohistan; Ibrahim Khan,
who has worked all along heartily in our cause; Sher Mahomed Khan, a man
who has studied Western politics and knows which of our Generals hails
from Ireland, which from Scotland, and which from England; Yusuf Khan,
who has unreservedly thrown in his lot with Abdur Rahman Khan; Sarwar
Khan, who fought against us in December; all these princes of the
Barakzai dynasty were hiding whatever curiosity they felt with a kind of
listless dignity which deceived no one but themselves. Three strangers
were in the first row of the sirdars: these were General Katol Khan,
Mahomed Amin Khan, and “the Saiad Sahib,” sent by Abdur Rahman to
represent him at the Durbar. They were rather sorrily arrayed for such
an occasion, their long residence in Tashkend having perhaps made them
indifferent to the beauties of oriental attire, but as the
representatives of the future Amir they had to be treated with every
consideration. Contrasting with the flowing white robes or
richly-coloured coats of the Afghan portion of the assembly were the
quieter uniforms of the officers of the garrison, lighted up here and
there by the gold and glitter of the Staff, always the “show-men” on
occasions of this kind, A few of our friends from Logar and “down the
line” had come in on leave, so that the force in Northern Afghanistan
was well represented. With military punctuality, Sir Donald Stewart,
accompanied by Sir Frederick Roberts, Mr. Lepel Griffin, and the members
of the Head-quarters’ Staff in Sherpur, reached the Durbar tents; the
usual formalities of presenting arms, &c., were gone through, and then
the three men with whose names the present settlement will henceforth be
most closely associated took their seats in solemn Durbar. The
representatives of Abdur Rahman were presented, hand-shakings exchanged
in Western fashion, and the proceedings began.
Sir Donald Stewart, with a soldier’s brevity, said he wished to explain
to the Sirdars, Chiefs, and people assembled, the reason for holding the
Durbar and requesting their presence and that of the English officers
stationed in Cabul. It was that the public recognition by the Government
of England of Sirdar Abdur Rahman Khan as Amir of Cabul should be made
known with as much honour as possible. Mr. Lepel Griffin would explain
more in detail the views and wishes of the Government on this important
subject. Major Euan Smith, Political Officer with General Hills’
Division, translated this short preamble into Persian, after which Mr.
Griffin read the following speech in the same language:—
“SIRDARS, CHIEFS, AND GENTLEMEN,
“It is little more than three months ago that, by command of His
Excellency the Viceroy of India, I explained to you in Durbar the
intentions of the British Government with regard to the future of
Afghanistan. I then told you it was not intended to annex the country;
but that the armies of Her Majesty the Queen-Empress would be
withdrawn so soon as the prospect of a settled administration had been
assured, and a chief acknowledged as Amir who should not only be
animated by friendly sentiments towards the English Government, but
have the cordial support of his own countrymen. Since that time
General Sir Donald Stewart, General Sir Frederick Roberts, and myself,
have endeavoured to carry into effect the wishes of the Government,
and you are summoned here to-day to hear that our efforts have been
successful. The course of events having placed Sirdar Abdur Rahman
Khan in a position which fulfils the wishes and expectations of the
Government, the Viceroy of India and the Government of Her Most
Gracious Majesty the Queen-Empress are pleased to announce that they
publicly recognize Sirdar Abdur Rahman Khan, grandson of the
illustrious Amir Dost Mahomed Khan, as Amir of Cabul.
“It is to the Government a source of satisfaction that the tribes and
chiefs have preferred a distinguished member of the Barakzai family,
who is a renowned soldier, wise, and experienced. His sentiments
towards the British Government are most friendly; and so long as his
rule shows that he is animated by these sentiments, he cannot fail to
receive the support of the British Government. He will best show his
friendship for the Government by treating those of his subjects who
have done us service as _his_ friends.
“CHIEFS AND GENTLEMEN,—In accordance with assurances already conveyed
to you, the armies of the Queen-Empress will shortly withdraw within
those frontiers which were decided by treaty with the ex-Amir, Mahomed
Yakub Khan. We trust and firmly believe that your remembrance of the
English will not be unkindly. We have fought you in the field whenever
you opposed us; but your religion has in no way been interfered with;
the honour of your women has been respected, and every one has been
secure in possession of his property. Whatever has been necessary for
the support of the army has been liberally paid for. Since I came to
Cabul, I have been in daily intercourse with you; but I have never
heard an Afghan make a complaint of the conduct of any soldier,
English or Native, belonging to Her Majesty’s army.
“The British Government has always been well-disposed towards
Afghanistan. You all know how it supported and assisted the former
rulers of the country. It has no other wish than your happiness and
prosperity; and it is with this object alone that to-day it recognizes
Sirdar Abdur Rahman Khan as Amir of Cabul.”
Mr. Griffin then read the speech in English for the benefit of the
officers of the garrison, and a Pushtu translation was read by Mr.
Cunningham, Mr. Griffin’s Secretary. Not a sign of intelligence, nor an
expression of approbation or dissent, was made in the assembly. From the
Sikh and Ghoorka sentries standing in rear of the tent to the fringe of
tatterdemalion retainers peering in over the sirdars’ heads, all were
quiet as if cogitating upon the new policy enunciated. Our late envoys
to the Sirdar, Afzul Khan and Ibrahim Khan, standing behind Sir Donald
Stewart, stroked their beards silently and proudly; this was the outcome
of their dangerous journey to Khanabad. Those of us who had marched with
Sir Frederick Roberts over the Shutargardan, and borne the heat and
burden of the day when the cry of “retribution” was raised after
Cavagnari’s death, were delighted that our General’s name had been
linked with those of Sir Donald Stewart and Mr. Griffin in regard to
that work of settlement which the Government view with such
satisfaction. There is a tendency to forget, in the present political
turmoil, the work done last autumn—work for which no reward has been
given; and this is more ungenerous in the case of a soldier, such as
General Roberts proved himself, than it would be with a diplomat who can
always look with confidence to future chances of distinction.
The Durbar was brought to an end by an earnest appeal on Sir Donald
Stewart’s part to all the Sirdars and Chiefs, who were asked to sink
their private quarrels and unite in supporting the new Amir. Major Euan
Smith rendered this appeal in Persian so earnestly and with such
emphasis that its effect was to stir a little ripple of animation in the
dead sea of faces that had made no sign hitherto. Sirdar Yusuf Khan
promised on his own part so to act for the good of his country; and with
his spontaneous little outburst the Durbar closed. In a few minutes
Generals and subalterns jostled each other, Sirdars and servants mingled
in familiar groups, the tents were clear, the guard marching off, and
thus our acknowledgment of Sirdar Abdur Rahman Khan as Amir was publicly
made. To-day is the 22nd of July; it was on the 24th of July last year
that Cavagnari made his entry into Cabul under the auspices of Yakub
Khan. Then all seemed plain-sailing; now the outlook is nearly as
placid; but all who have soldiered over the Indus since November 1878
pray that the present “satisfactory settlement” may not prove as
deceptive and rotten as that consummated at Gundamak.
The Sirdars present in Durbar were as follow:—
Wali Mahomed Khan. │Mahomed Asaf Khan.
Yusuf Khan. │Gholam Khan.
Sher Mahomed Khan. │Mahomed Karim Khan.
Nur Mahomed Khan. │Shahd Mahomed Khan.
Mahomed Sarwar Khan, │Mahomed Ali Jan.
Shahbaz Khan. │Abdul Kaium Khan.
Amin-ud-dowla Khan. │Mahomed Samir Khan.
_27th July._
There has been a lull since the sudden outburst of political activity
shown in the Durbar on the 22nd of July, but there is nothing to
indicate that the wheels of the Indo-Afghan mill which is grinding out a
new Government for Cabul are at all clogged. The new Amir has just left
Charikar, but he has little if any armed gathering about him, and if he
is to take over Sherpur and the Bala Hissar when we leave he ought to
have at least 5,000 men at his back. Our acknowledgment of his claims
has of course given him new prestige in the eyes of many of the chiefs;
and as, at our advice, he is wisely adopting a conciliatory tone both
towards the Cabul citizens and people hitherto devoted to Shere Ali’s
family, there is great hope that his power will steadily expand. Being a
man suspicious and reticent in the extreme, he does not take us much
into his confidence; but his anxiety to have personal interviews with
Sir Donald Stewart and Mr. Lepel Griffin is not all concealed. It is
well known here that there are many points of detail to be discussed and
settled before we leave, and such settlement can be far more easily
brought about by personal interviews than by continuous letter-writing.
Mr. Lepel Griffin is about to go out to General Gough’s camp at Kila
Dushman,[45] and it is understood that the Amir will pitch his camp at
Ak Serai, five or six miles further north on the Istalif Road. It would
be unwise for our representative to go out before the Amir has actually
left Charikar, as a loss of dignity would surely result from any
appearance of “waiting upon His Majesty’s pleasure.” On Friday Mr.
Griffin leaves for Kila Dushman, and upon his report Sir Donald Stewart
will time his own visit to Koh-Daman. Then we shall be able, at last, to
take an exact estimate of the new Amir’s strength, and form some
judgment of his feelings towards the British Government. An exile for so
many years from Afghanistan, he may push his inquisitiveness as to our
intentions to an awkward extent. We are not prepared to promise too much
either in the way of subsidy or moral support, and before any conditions
are made we may have to probe his relations with his friends at Tashkend
pretty deeply. The fate of Shere Ali should serve as a warning to Abdur
Rahman; but prompted by Kaufmann and others, he may look upon England
under a Liberal Government as a friend and ally of Russia. But, if I
mistake not, he will be given clearly to understand that while the
Courts of St. James’s and St. Petersburg may be on the best terms with
each other, it is not part of the British policy at least that minor
kingdoms such as Afghanistan should conduct their foreign relations
independently. There are too many interests involved for us to tolerate
intrigues by any foreign power in a country bordering on India; and if
in our generosity we sink our claim to station an English officer at
Cabul, we shall demand that no other European State shall be represented
there. “Perish India!” is not yet the cry of the Radical party in
England, and until that watchword has been accepted by the English
people, our best efforts will be directed to warding off danger from our
Indian possessions. In our late acknowledgment, while advising the Amir
to remain friendly with us, we made no mention of the conditions under
which that friendship could be best maintained. That task still remains.
Whatever the Indian Government may have decided, there must be some line
laid down to guide the Amir in his course of action when he has made his
power supreme over all rivals. If he be left to his own devices he may
invite all his friends from Russian Turkistan to visit him in the Bala
Hissar, and India may again be startled by news of the honour done in
Cabul to the representatives of the Czar. The stories told of two
Russian agents being in the camp at Khanabad have never really been
discredited, but it is unlikely the Amir will allow them publicly to
accompany him when he leaves Ak Serai for Zimma on Saturday. The next
few days will see the final details of the settlement of Cabul discussed
and formulated, and when we turn our backs upon the city next month we
shall be content in our knowledge that we have left the most powerful
prince to succeed us, and that the difficulties he will have to face are
sufficiently great to prevent him meddling with foreign politics for
some time to come.
-----
Footnote 45:
General Gough’s brigade had moved into Koh-Daman in consequence of the
turbulence of the Safis.
-----
We have withdrawn our guard of sepoys from the Kotwali in the city, and
Sirdar Wali Mahomed has so little confidence in any but British bayonets
that he has promptly resigned his Governorship of Cabul. Sirdar Yusuf
Khan, who has done much to aid us in re-establishing a settled
Government, has been made Governor, and holds the city now as the
representative of the Amir. As a consequence of this, the citizens have
begun to swagger again in all their turbulent boastfulness, and our
soldiers are warned against entering the bazaars. Armed men are now
constantly seen, and many of us think it is perhaps a little premature
to repeal the law forbidding the carrying of arms. It is not an uncommon
sight now, even in Sherpur, to meet men on horseback or on foot with
Enfield rifles at their backs, and knives in their girdles. To-day I saw
one of the military police “showing the door” to three Afghan sepoys.
These men had cross-belts, pouches, and bayonets, but carried their
rifles slung over their shoulders in a very unsoldier-like way. How they
had crept into cantonments no one could find out, but they were quite
self-possessed, and were very observant of all that was going on. They
are probably sepoys, who being sent from Charikar to recruit men for the
Amir’s army, had taken advantage of some Pathan being on sentry at one
of the gates to walk into Sherpur and criticize our arrangements.
_2nd August._
Interest has been divided, during the past week, between the startling
news from Candahar[46] and the near approach of the new Amir to Cabul.
The Candahar news is serious enough, but we are still in the dark as to
the exact extent of our defeat on the Girishk Road, and consequently can
only speculate vaguely upon the results of the action. Already a strong
division has been told off to march southwards, if the Government of
India should consider the necessity sufficiently urgent. Sir Frederick
Roberts will have command, and his old troops will be quite equal to
dealing with Ayub Khan, if the latter tries to follow up his first
success. It may be disappointing to regiments just on the eve of
returning to the civilization of the plains to find themselves marching
away to Candahar; but the work has to be done, and our soldiers sink
their feelings, or calculate that “after all it is only reaching the
railway at Sibi instead of Rawal Pindi.” The plan is to take a division
made up of British, Ghoorka, and Sikh infantry, with a fair allowance of
cavalry and two or three mountain batteries (including the screw-guns),
and march steadily upon Candahar, doing our fighting on the way, but
never halting or going off the route to meet the enemy. Of course the
flower of the force about Cabul having been taken away (say 10,000 men),
it would be imperative that the army left in Sherpur should retire upon
the Khyber line, letting in the new Amir to assume power in Cabul
without further delay. To remain in occupation of Cabul would be false
policy, as not only would the people be irritated at our presence and
tempted to harass our weakened force, but the Amir would grow unpopular,
as he would seem to be allying himself too intimately with the Kafir
intruders. The diversion of troops to Candahar must not be looked upon
as settled, for there are many considerations yet to be thought of
before such a step could be taken. The defeat of the brigade at
Khusk-i-Nakhud may have been exaggerated, or Ayub’s success not pushed
to its full extent, in which case the force under General Phayre at
Peshin might suffice to re-establish our power in Southern Afghanistan.
Again, Ayub may not choose to waste his strength against Candahar
itself, but may turn northwards and march leisurely to Ghazni, gathering
strength day by day. In this case, we certainly should not send a force
from Candahar to follow him, and if we did not occupy Ghazni in
strength, the tenure of Abdur Rahman’s power in Cabul would be very
short indeed. All the Jacobin faction would be united at Ghazni, and the
prestige attaching to Ayub Khan would make him a leader whom the new
Amir might well dread.
-----
Footnote 46:
The news of the Maiwand disaster reached Sir Donald Stewart on July
29th, the first telegram speaking of the “annihilation” of General
Burrows’ brigade. Later telegrams showed that the defeat, while
serious enough, was not so terrible as at first reported. The news was
kept as secret as possible, as it was feared that the negotiations
with Abdur Rahman might be delayed if the new complications in
Southern Afghanistan were made known.
-----
But, as in a few days our course of action will probably be made clear,
the Candahar matter can be left where it stands, while local politics
are dealt with. Our representatives have at last met Abdur Rahman Khan
face to face, and although part of their programme—a public Durbar—has
not been carried out, still it is believed such satisfactory
arrangements have been made that Cabul can be evacuated during the
current month. On Friday, Mr. Lepel Griffin, Chief Political Officer,
and his Staff went out to Brigadier-General Charles Gough’s Camp at Kila
Hajee, about nine miles due north of Sherpur, on the Charikar Road. Mr.
Griffin was to meet the Amir, who had come down from Charikar to
Ak-Serai, and was to smooth away such difficulties as might crop up
prior to the holding of the Durbar on Monday. Sirdar Yusuf Khan,
Governor of Cabul, and Captain Ridgeway, Assistant Political Officer,
made arrangements for the interview, which was supposed to take place
about midway between Kila Hajee and Ak-Serai. A vineyard near Zimma was
first proposed by Yusuf Khan, but this was objected to, possibly because
the temper of the Amir’s followers was known to be very uncertain, and
it is always well to be on guard against Afghan fanaticism. Finally, a
hill was chosen a little off the road, and on this a large tent, sent
out from Sherpur, was pitched. The hill was five miles from Kila Hajee,
and only two from the Amir’s camp at Ak-Serai, but of this little
account was made. At half-past seven, on Saturday morning, a squadron of
the 9th Lancers, the 3rd Bengal Cavalry, and the 3rd Punjab Cavalry,—the
whole under the command of Colonel Mackenzie, of the 3rd Bengal
Cavalry,—formed up at Kila Hajee as escort to Mr. Griffin, who was
accompanied by Major Hastings and his political staff, and a few
officers whom curiosity prompted to turn out. A few Ghoorkas held the
Kotal a mile from camp, but beyond this no display of infantry was made.
The Lancers and the 3rd Bengal Cavalry trotted on ahead, and the road to
Zimma was followed, up hill and down ravine, until the Durbar tent was
sighted on the crest. The country about was very fertile, vineyards and
orchards abounding, while northwards towards Istalif a mass of
vegetation was seen. On arrival at the Durbar tent a halt was called,
the 9th Lancers forming up near the entrance, while the native cavalry
drew off to some distance below. About 200 yards to the north the Amir’s
private tent had been pitched, and about this some 100 of his retainers
were seen to be gathered. Mr. Griffin sent Captain Ridgeway, Mr.
Cunningham, Rajah Jehandad Khan, and Afzul Khan to escort the Amir up
the hill, and with the remainder of the British officers, about twenty
in number, waited near the Durbar tent. The Amir met the party of four,
as it appeared, at the entrance of his tent, and after the usual formal
salutation, a move was made up the slope. One of the Amir’s attendants
unfurled a large red umbrella, his white charger with gorgeous trappings
was led in rear; and with a small mob of armed retainers following, his
Highness walked slowly along. Mr. Griffin, as in courtesy bound, met him
halfway, hands were cordially shaken, and then everyone made for the
large square tent which offered grateful shelter from the sun.
The troopers of the 9th Lancers formed a striking contrast to the 100
men of the Amir’s body-guard, none of whom were clad alike, and whose
“uniform” deserved its name on one ground—it was of uniform
irregularity. The arms of these men of motley were equally curious:
Martinis, Sniders, Chassepots, Miniés, such were some of the rifles;
while double-barrelled shot-guns, match-locks, and _jhezails_ were also
conspicuous. The guard had been chosen probably from among men whom the
Amir could thoroughly trust, as he could from his Turkistan regiments
easily have taken two companies armed with rifles of the same pattern.
Within the tent a semicircle of chairs had been placed at the head of
three long narrow tables, on which were some English sweetmeats and
Cabuli confectionery. The Amir, with whom was Sirdar Afzul Khan, the
Khan of Kulab, and half a dozen personal attendants, including a
favourite slave-boy, went through the ordeal of receiving all the
officers introduced to him with quiet self-possession and good-humour.
Behind him, in the verandah of the tent, were clustered his wild-looking
body-guard, with their weapons carried in every picturesque style of
carelessness; each man looking upon the ceremonious introductions with
more of contempt than curiosity. The Amir’s demeanour was a surprise to
every one, from Mr. Griffin downwards. From the photograph brought by
Afzul Khan from Khanabad, one was led to expect a gross, sensual-looking
man on the usual stereotyped pattern of Barakzai Sirdars. The reality
was quite different: a man of middle-age, broadly-built but not obese,
with features marked and worn by care and anxiety, but lighted up by a
smile which gave character and pleasantness to the whole face. His dress
was quiet and unostentatious; a blue coat, half uniform, with gold
epaulettes; a pair of cloth breeches, short riding boots, a handsome
sword and belt, and a cap of Astrakan fur, with the ribbon of an order
(perhaps Turkish) let in deeply in front. So winning a manner had the
Amir that men who came quite prepared to revile him, went away most
favourably impressed. He is not the “brute” an Afghan Sirdar usually is,
and his after-conversation with our political officers showed him to be
familiar with Western ideas, and to have made good use of the time he
has spent in Tashkend.
After the introductions had been got through, the tent was cleared of
all but those who were to take part in the “discussion.” I am not sure
if the word should be used; but as there is a great objection to the use
of the term “negotiations,” I will let it stand. With Mr. Griffin
remained Major Hastings, Mr. Cunningham, C.S. (Secretary), and Mr.
Christie (the officer in charge of the Political Intelligence
Department); with the Amir, Yusuf Khan, and a Moonshee, who took notes
of what was said. Out of ear-shot in the tent sat, also, the Khan of
Kulab, who dozed during the interview in happy unconsciousness of what
was going on. Outside, in the verandahs, the sweetmeats were served
round to all who chose to partake of them, and the Amir’s servants also
handed round cups of tea, which Afghan and Britisher alike sipped while
the three hours of the interview slipped away. The tents of the Afghan
army could be seen amid the vineyards, a couple of miles away; but no
sign of the 5,000 or 6,000 armed men known to be in rear of the near
hill could be detected. Our cavalry were the chief figures in the
landscape, which was as peaceful as could be wished. The interview with
the Amir lasted from 9 o’clock till noon, and no doubt many state
secrets were aired, and much mutual cross-questioning gone through. The
following may be taken as the purport of the conversation:—The Amir
expressed himself most anxious to do everything to secure the throne for
himself, and to remain on friendly terms with us; but he confessed his
present weakness, and asked what we were prepared to do for him. Quoting
our generous conduct towards Shere Ali, and the gifts of guns,
ammunition, and money we had made to that monarch, he let it be inferred
that he also should expect the same kind of treatment. What answer he
got I am not prepared to say; but if it were that he would receive money
but no arms, I should not be surprised. He was told that necessity might
arise for marching troops from Cabul to Candahar, as Ayub Khan had shown
unexpected strength in the south; and in answer to the question whether
there would be objections raised to such a march, he said he should like
to consult the people with him. No doubt the three hours were profitably
filled, and our representative at least learned that the 2,000 Turkistan
troops with the Amir were exceedingly suspicious of all his dealings
with the British, and particularly objected to his visiting General
Gough’s camp. They had an idea that treachery was contemplated, and that
Abdur Rahman might be spirited off to India to keep Yakub Khan company.
At noon the Amir appeared with Mr. Griffin at the door of the tent, the
Lancers saluted, farewells were exchanged, and in a few minutes our
representative and escort were cantering back to Kila Hajee, while the
Amir was thoughtfully returning to his excited followers at Ak-Serai.
It was still believed on Saturday that a Durbar at Kila Hajee could be
arranged, and Sir Donald Stewart, Sir Frederick Roberts and their Staffs
rode out to General Gough’s camp. The Guides’ cavalry and four guns of
G-3, R.A., with blank cartridges for saluting purposes, also moved out
to Kila Hajee. On Saturday night the Amir’s troops occupied the Kotal, a
mile from our camp, evidently fearing a surprise, and only withdrew at
daylight on Sunday. General Gough equally mistrusted them, and a company
of each regiment slept fully accoutred in their respective
quarter-guards. A second interview between Mr. Griffin and the Amir took
place yesterday (Sunday) morning, but in view of the uneasiness among
the Turkistani troops, the precaution was taken of sending four
companies of our Infantry to within a mile of the Durbar tents, and the
Kotal in rear was also held in force. The conversation of the previous
day was renewed, and I understand the Amir said the tribes might object
to a force marching to Candahar, but that if no long halts were made on
the way, there could be no objection on his part. Finally, the Amir
asked that all English and native officials might withdraw, and for an
hour he remained in conversation with Mr. Griffin. As we have since
heard that everything has been satisfactorily settled, it is to be
supposed that the “bargain”—if a rude mercantile term may be imported
into high politics—was closed, and that the Amir Abdur Rahman Khan has
declared his readiness to occupy Cabul, as we march out in a week or
more, and will thereafter abide in his friendly sentiments towards the
British. No Durbar, therefore, was held this morning, and now our
Generals and Politicals are once more safe within the walls of Sherpur,
and we are all discussing the chances of 10,000 men having to return to
India by way of Candahar and Quetta.
A little incident occurred at Zimma on Sunday, which shows that the
pestilent _moollah_ is always taking occasion to arouse the people’s
passions against us. While the Amir and Mr. Griffin were closeted
together, a ragged-looking man (a _fakir_) approached the tent and began
shrieking out, whereupon old Nakshband Khan, an ex-Ressaldar of Native
Cavalry, called out to the Amir’s sentries to drive him off. There was a
sentry at each corner of the tent, and one of these men promptly stoned
the _moollah_, Nakshband explaining, with much energetic abuse, that
such beasts did all the mischief in the country. The _moollahs_ have
been very quiet of late, but with Ayub’s success as a text, they may
again begin preaching war to the knife against all Kafirs.