Deportation of the Mustaufi to India—His Sympathy with the Family of
Shere Ali—Progress of Negotiations with Abdur Rahman—Arrival of the
British Mission at Khanabad—Probable Popularity of the Sirdar’s
Cause—Reception of the Mission—The Amirship formally offered to
Abdur Rahman—Return of Ibrahim Khan to Sherpur—His Report—A Russian
Agent in the Khanabad Camp—Treatment of our Envoys as
Prisoners—Photograph of the Sirdar sent to Cabul—His Vacillation and
Intrigues with the Tribes—Flight of Sirdars Hashim Khan and Abdulla
Khan—Arrival of Afzul Khan—His favourable Estimate of Abdur
Rahman—Hasan Khan’s Movements in Logar—Cavalry Action at Padkhao
Shana on July 1st—General Palliser’s Success—Two Hundred Tribesmen
Killed—Dispersion of Hasan Khan’s Force.
The following letters, written in May, June, and July, will explain the
progress of our negotiations with Sirdar Abdur Rahman which eventually
led to his assumption of the Amirship:—
_26th May, 1880._
Yet another minister of Yakub Khan’s has been deported to India. The
Mustaufi, Habibulla Khan, has broken down in his professions of
faithfulness to the British, and on the morning of May 20th he left
Cabul in a _dhoolie_, under an escort furnished by the 9th Lancers,
which accompanied him as far as Butkhak. Here two companies of the 67th
Foot were in readiness to escort him to Luttabund. They had been sent
out on the previous afternoon, their sudden march giving rise to rumours
of an impending attack upon our communications, a rumour strengthened by
the 9th Lancers standing to their horses the whole afternoon, as if
ready for a gallop out. What may have been the Mustaufi’s crime I can
only conjecture: officially we are told that “he was summoned to
Sherpur, and after a long investigation was found guilty of conspiring
against the British, and was at once put under arrest.” Camp gossip runs
that letters were intercepted, bearing his sign manual, inciting the
chiefs to rise again, and that these were produced before Wali Mahomed
and other sirdars, who swore to the genuineness of the signature. The
old man when found out took the matter quite calmly, and when told that
he would be sent at once to India rather welcomed the idea, saying he
would go on a pilgrimage to Mecca and afterwards visit England. The
Mustaufi seems to have recognized the simple fact that we are bent upon
making Abdur Rahman Amir, and this he regards as a breach of faith, as
nothing was said of our intention when he was striving so hard to bring
the Ghazni malcontents to Sherpur. He knew that he could not hope for
power under Abdur Rahman—his partisanship for Shere Ali’s family was too
notorious—and hence in his extremity he resorted to fresh intrigues to
delay or put altogether out of the question Abdur Rahman’s visit to the
British camp. He has been detected, and as Abdur Rahman’s path must be
cleared of every obstacle, Habibulla Khan has been summarily sent to
India.
Contrary opinions as to the final result of our mission to Abdur Rahman
are still afloat both in our camp and in the Cabul bazaars; but so far
everything that the most sanguine could have hoped for in the direction
of an _entente cordiale_ being established between the Pretender and the
British Government has happily come to pass. Our Mission has reached its
destination in safety, has been honourably and even effusively received,
and we are on the eve of receiving an answer from the Sirdar himself
regarding the proposals we have made to him. And yet there is a large
party in the city who still persist in prophesying that Abdur Rahman
will never visit Cabul so long as the British force occupies the city.
Their reasons are disjointed and somewhat irrational, but they are
repeated with such persistent head-shaking and beard-wagging that, in
spite of one’s own better belief, it is difficult at times to avoid
thinking as these birds of ill-omen think. Not that they deny either the
Sirdar’s anxiety or determination to be Amir (this they admit most
unequivocally), but they argue that he is too wise to ruin himself in
the eye of the nation by accepting the Amirship from the hands of a
British General. When they are reminded that the British are just as
determined that the new Amir shall be simply and solely their nominee,
as their work would be incomplete if they left the throne to be filled
by any candidate who might get a party together, they cry back on their
lines of argument, and insist that Abdur Rahman _will_ be Amir, but by
virtue of his own popularity and prowess, and not as a man accepting a
boon from a conquering army. When it comes to the finer details of ways
and means, the prophets can only take refuge in vague hints and inane
mumblings which would have shamed even the vilest impostor in the old
days, when prophecy had some points to recommend it to the credulous.
Perhaps the explanation is that Abdur Rahman has not in Cabul itself a
faction worthy of the name. His prestige lies not so much in the
sympathy of the citizens as in the support the hardier tribesmen are
willing to give him as a soldier and a ruler. There is something in his
success in Eastern Turkistan which has drawn the independent and
reckless spirits of Kohistan, Koh-Daman, and Logar to him: it may be the
boldness with which he has declared himself claimant to the throne, or
that his old fame as a successful general still lives in the hearts of
the people. Every man born in Afghanistan is born to a soldier’s life,
not the life of camps and campaigns so much as the constant struggle of
intertribal warfare, or time-honoured family feuds. Every man’s hand is
familiar with the use of _jhezail_ or rifle, _tulwar_ or knife, and a
successful leader is far more honoured and more faithfully followed than
a chief who lives by intrigue and begs his way to power by lavish
bribery. Abdur Rahman ruled in Cabul, after Dost Mahomed’s death and
Shere Ali’s usurpation, by mere force of success in arms. He placed his
father upon the throne in defiance of Shere Ali, who was never a match
for him in the field, even though backed by the support of the Indian
Government. Shere Ali won Cabul finally in the absence of his young
rival in Turkistan. In an instant his success was magnified, he became
the successful warrior, and his power was assured. Abdur Rahman sank out
of sight. Later, Yakub Khan blazed into power, a bold leader of armies,
full of vigorous life. How success bred success in his case until Herat
and Turkistan were practically lost to his father, contemporary history
shows; and only when he sank the soldier in the son, and trusted in his
father’s rotten honour, did his career come to an end. Yakub, free and
holding his own proudly in Herat, was a figure to draw men’s admiration
and support: Yakub, a prisoner in the Bala Hissar, was a fallen star
which could no longer dazzle men’s eyes. So it has been with Abdur
Rahman Khan. In January 1869 he crossed the Oxus a fugitive, and since
that eventful year he has been nothing but a lay figure in Afghan
politics. Now he is once more clearly outlined before the people, who
have been bitterly humiliated by our armies since the murder of our
Envoy in the Bala Hissar.
They may at first have looked to the grandson of the Dost to avenge
their humiliations by force of arms; but the fall of Ghazni and the
appearance of another 7,000 men to swell our numbers in Cabul and the
Logar Valley have dashed their hopes once and for all. Now they turn
their eyes northward, mayhap their feet also, and await the sign that
will free them from the presence of the Kafir armies. So it is that
Abdur Rahman seems to them a hero, a deliverer; they are lifted beyond
the petty intrigues of the Barakzai sirdars in Cabul, the deep plotting
of the Mustaufi, or the empty bombast of Mahomed Jan. Even Mushk-i-Alam,
the arch-priest of discontent, is silent for a while: there are no new
appeals to their fanaticism, and not 1,000 men are under arms in
districts which have been seething with revolt for months. Logar,
Kohistan, Wardak, are no longer names to conjure with. Mahomed Jan even
has drifted into Kharwar and Zurmut, whose widely-armed tribes are held
in contempt by the better trained forces of the provinces about Cabul,
the male population of which has been leavened with sepoys carrying
firearms equal in part to our own. The Northern Ghilzais are for a
moment sobered by the reflection that Afghanistan is likely to be rid of
a foreign army sooner by the advent of the Sirdar now in Khanabad than
by listening to suggestions of renewed outbreaks and ceaseless harrying
of our posts in the Passes. True, factious _moolahs_, like Khalil and
Fakir, are stirring up disaffection about Jellalabad; but that district
is somewhat removed from the direct effect of the influences at work
about Cabul, and we can afford to disregard such petty outbreaks, which
only give us a better chance of showing our power to strike in all
directions. The little actions which have lately been fought in Beshud
and the Shinwari country will bear their own fruit; every additional
tower destroyed is another mark of our current supremacy, another
warning that our forbearance has limits—wide though they be. Even the
towers of Padshah Khan—ally, enemy, friend, traitor, alternately—are at
last in ruins, and his crops may yet be reaped by our soldiers. On the
one hand, we proffer honest negotiation leading to a stable settlement;
on the other, we are firm to punish the restless animosity which seeks
to force us out of the country by incessant annoyance and harassing
intrigue.
Perhaps the reasoning which I have mentioned as being in vogue in Cabul
as to the probable failure of any negotiations with Sirdar Abdur Rahman
may be due to the efforts of the Cabul sirdars, who dread the coming of
our nominee more than they loathe our own domination over the city.
Ambition is not a passion easily foregone, and both Wali Mahomed and
Hashim Khan know that the dreams once indulged in of power and
pre-eminence in Afghanistan are now at an end. The offer of the Amirship
has been formally made to their rival: his claims have thus been
declared pre-eminent, and minor pretenders are cast out into the utter
darkness of neglect and contempt. The sirdars know they have nothing to
expect at the hands of Mahomed Afzul’s son except contumely or even
worse; his years of exile have hung heavily upon him; and Shere Ali’s
family and partisans are in his black list. Petrovsky, the Russian
writer, who saw so much of the Sirdar and professed to know him very
intimately, wrote, “To get square some day with the English and Shere
Ali was Abdur Rahman’s most cherished thought, his dominant,
never-failing passion.” No doubt Petrovsky believed the hatred towards
the English was equal to that against Shere Ali; but time and events
have modified the former, particularly as the English are masters of the
situation, while it is probable the feeling of revenge against Shere
Ali’s family is still as lively as ever. It therefore behoves Hashim
Khan, who, by his marriage with Abdulla Jan’s sister, became one of the
family, to exert himself to prevent the Sirdar becoming Amir; and this
he is doing by intrigues which have, luckily, as yet borne but little
fruit. Knowing his own chance has disappeared, he thinks to make Ayub
Khan a powerful claimant through the latter’s position in Herat. Hashim,
it is believed, has also made attempts to seduce the Kohistanis from
Abdur Rahman’s cause, and how much further his intrigues may go we
cannot at all estimate. Probably he has sown distrust, by means of
agents, in the mind of Abdur Rahman himself, warning him that the
British only wish to get possession of his person with a view to sending
him a prisoner to India.
From whatever cause it may be, the fact is clear that Abdur Rahman is
somewhat distrustful of our overtures, though welcoming them warmly as
becomes a pretender who suddenly finds himself first in the running for
a throne. The news which has reached Cabul of the progress of our
Mission is highly important; and although official reticence is great,
the messengers and others who have arrived from Khanabad a few days ago
have spread pretty trustworthy reports of what has really occurred. The
little party which left Sherpur on May 3rd passed through Kohistan
unmolested, and after trying a journey through the Sir-i-Lang Pass, in
parts of which the snow was still lying, they found themselves beyond
the Hindu Kush and well on their way to Kunduz. For a day they were
delayed by stress of weather, but afterwards their journey was unbroken,
Ghori being reached, and finally Kunduz, about the 14th or 15th of May.
They had been joined by numbers of men from Kohistan anxious to pay
their respects to the Sirdar, and they seem never to have been in any
danger from marauding bands which are known to infest the country. Abdur
Rahman sent a troop of cavalry to escort them to Khanabad, and on their
arrival every honour due to the Ambassadors of the British Government
was paid to them. A tent near the Sirdar’s own was placed at their
service, and they were treated throughout with great courtesy, though
always strictly guarded. Then began their real work, the usual public
and private interviews, so much in vogue in the East, taking place
daily. Finally, in a great Durbar, the letter from the British was
presented to the Sirdar, and the contents were read out. My information
goes so far in regard to the letter that I am justified in stating its
purport to have been an unfettered offer of the Amirship to Abdur Rahman
Khan. Whether Herat and Candahar were specified as being detached from
the Durani kingdom, I cannot say; but most probably they were, perhaps
with the after-idea of gracefully yielding Herat to the Amir, and so
giving the appearance of concession on our part. But for official
secrecy, this point could be at once cleared up; but the Government of
India are the best judges of what should be made known on their part,
and until they contradict the belief here that Herat is to be
independent, we must go on believing that the proposal to the Sirdar is
that he may become Amir of Eastern and Northern Afghanistan, Turkistan
and Badakshan, leaving Candahar in our possession, while Herat is to be
“independent,”—though in whose charge is not very clear. The effect upon
Abdur Rahman of Mr. Lepel Griffin’s letter is described as one of great
satisfaction and even joy; he caused alms to be distributed among the
poor, and generally rejoiced at the new prospect opened out to him. But
he is a cautious and sagacious man, and after eleven years’ waiting is
not foolish enough to mar his chance by unseemly haste. For himself he
declares that the offer is most tempting and highly pleasing; but, that
his power as Amir may be unquestioned, he desires to have the opinion of
all the chiefs of the country who shall share with him the
responsibility of forming a new Government. Thus he does not hasten to
leave Khanabad, to rush to Sherpur, assume power, and trust to his own
personal energy to retain it; he methodically takes the best course to
secure popular election; and until he has gained the ear of the people,
he will not leave the Kattagan country, where his camp is now pitched.
That distrust, which is so essentially a part of the Afghan character,
is also at work in his mind, as his good fortune seems almost too sudden
and too unqualified not to have hidden beneath it some sinister meaning;
and until he is convinced of the contrary, and thoroughly reassured, he
is not likely to cross the Hindu Kush. He is sending his formal answer
by one of the members of the Mission; and upon its arrival we shall, of
course, have to take steps to sweep all distrust from the Sirdar’s mind
and convince him of the honesty of our intentions. This will not be
difficult, and then the negotiations will crystallize into tangible
shape, and we may, at last, see our way to unravel the Afghan tangle
which has so long irritated and perplexed us. The first signs of the new
order of things is that a loan of a lakh of rupees has been advanced to
the Sirdar by the Hindus and ryots of Kohistan, who are astute enough to
see that the British are the real sureties for repayment, as Abdur
Rahman must receive their support if he is to hold his own, in the
future, in Cabul.
_4th June._
Sirdar Ibrahim Khan, one of the members of our Mission to Abdur Rahman
Khan, has returned to Cabul, and has proved the possibility of
communicating direct with the Pretender. But still we seem no nearer a
settlement than before the Mission started; for the Sirdar, acting,
perhaps, at the instigation of the native Russian agent, said to be in
his camp, is serenely independent in his attitude, and has given no
promise whatever on any specific points connected with the Amirship. He
seems to be fully aware of our awkward position in the country, and is
not at all anxious to aid us in extricating ourselves. Our military
supremacy he does not doubt, but the political dead-lock, he knows, has
nonplussed us; and secure in his retreat beyond the Hindu Kush, he is
working rather to make the British, and not himself, the grateful party
in the current negotiations. What the status of the native representing
Russia at Khanabad may be, I have but limited means of knowing; but if
native report is to be trusted,—and it is all I have to rely upon,—Abdur
Rahman is being guided entirely by this man’s advice. The result is that
any speedy settlement is out of the question, for the crooked ways of
Russian diplomacy are difficult to follow; and what the Sirdar may be
egged on yet to demand, even the greatest diplomat in Sherpur or Simla
cannot conjecture. Ibrahim Khan, it is true, brought with him a letter
from Abdur Rahman, which was couched in cordial terms. But beyond
cordiality, which costs nothing among Eastern nations, the letter
contains little of value. The Sirdar, like a precocious child, “wants to
know too much.” There is no spontaneous outburst of gratitude, no eager
acceptance of our offer of the Amirship: but, on the contrary, a cool,
self-possessed tone of inquiry, as if the writer felt himself master of
the situation, and meant to dictate his own terms. This is the more
unfortunate, because there is no longer a strong power to back our
efforts to settle the question with the high hand of conquerors. The
change of front in English politics has reacted upon us here with
tremendous effect, and we are appearing in the eyes of the people rather
as suppliants than dictators to Abdur Rahman. Perhaps the Sirdar himself
is of much the same opinion, but he may find himself wofully mistaken in
a few weeks. We shall _not_ yield on every point he raises; simply
because we have other cards to play. This he will soon be made to
understand; and he must then choose once for all. He is trying our
patience a good deal now; but there are limits to our forbearance, and
these limits are not far distant.
Cabul has, indeed, proved a white elephant which we cannot afford to
feed. We are so anxious to get rid of the beast at any price, that we
are thrusting it as a gift upon a man who looks upon it as his lawful
property, which we have seriously injured while holding it tethered in
our midst. The independent spirit shown by the Sirdar, whether real or
affected, cannot but have a bad effect upon the tribal chiefs; and if we
allow the negotiations to “drag” much longer, serious mischief may
follow. The natural restlessness of the Afghans will not permit them to
watch and wait for months; and already there are signs of a turbulent
spirit manifesting itself. A large body of fanatical Safis have passed
from Tagao into Kohistan, and our only means of counteracting the
_jehad_ they are said to be raising has been to dismiss the Ghilzai and
Kohistani deputations hitherto waiting in Cabul. The _maliks_ have
accordingly been sent to their homes, and it is hoped their efforts to
maintain peace will be successful. To send a division now into Kohistan
would be to cause greater distrust in Turkistan than already exists, and
if our negotiations are to come to any satisfactory point, this distrust
must not be excited. I have learnt from Sirdar Ibrahim Khan, that while
our Mission was honourably received at Khanabad, Sirdar Abdur Rahman was
so mistrustful, either of his own power, or of his followers’
fanaticism, that he had practically to treat our representatives as
prisoners. Sirdar Wazirzada Afzul Khan, Ibrahim Khan, and Sher Mahomed
Khan were lodged in a large tent adjoining the Sirdar’s, as I mentioned
in a previous letter, and a strong guard surrounded both. The members of
the Mission were unable to move about of their own free-will, and they
had but little, if any, opportunity of consulting together. Abdur Rahman
can scarcely be blamed for these precautions, as, in case of insult or
violence being offered to the Sirdars, he would have been held
personally responsible for the breach of hospitality. He does not seem
to have had any very large body of troops with him, the want of money,
of course, hindering him in his efforts to collect the army of
Turkistan, about him. Sirdar Ibrahim Khan describes him as by far the
most civilized, intelligent, and able Afghan he has ever met; and though
the knowledge has been gained in a short intercourse, it is valuable as
bearing out the opinions of Schuyler, Petrovsky, and other writers, who
saw the man under the unfavourable conditions of exile and despondency.
During his residence in Tashkend Abdur Rahman has kept himself well
informed on general Asiatic politics; and this knowledge he is now
applying, to the best of his ability, in his negotiations with the
British.
Ibrahim Khan saw a number of photographs of the Sirdar on his tent, and
one of these was presented to him on his expressing a desire to carry
back a copy with him. The portrait is by a photographer of Tashkend, and
shows a man of about forty years of age, broad-shouldered and stoutly
built, with a face expressing rather stolid self-possession than
striking intelligence. A huge black beard covers the lower half of the
face, but cannot hide the thick sensual lips, which contrast greatly
with the broad forehead and stubborn eyes. The Sirdar is in uniform of
Western cut, and wears a curved sword of the kind affected by Afghan
nobles. The face shows no marks of trouble or anxiety, and has not that
harassed look which was so characteristic of Shere Ali and Yakub Khan.
Abdur Rahman is a “well-preserved” man, and, if report speaks truly, has
still left to him the energy and ambition which made him so dangerous an
enemy of Shere Ali twelve years ago.
Sirdar Ibrahim Khan will return to Khanabad in a few days, carrying back
with him full explanations of our policy; and these once given, Abdur
Rahman will be practically in the position of having received an
ultimatum. The local sirdars persist in saying that he will never come
in; but the last news from the North is that the Sirdar is establishing
posts between Khanabad and Charikar, thus securing rapid and safe
communication with Kohistan and Cabul. As he has no army worthy of the
name, this step can be scarcely a preparation for a hostile advance, but
looks more as if he were making his own passage to Sherpur secure when
the time comes for his journey to our camp.
_2nd July._
One might well apply the words of the Jewish proverb-monger to Sirdar
Abdur Rahman Khan: “The prince that wanteth understanding is a great
oppressor.” The people of Afghanistan are now oppressed with the burden
of a Kafir occupation, because the prince to whom we have appealed to
take the government of the country off our hands lacks understanding. He
is cunning and cautious to a fault, but he is in close danger of
over-reaching himself. We have so far lowered our pride as to treat with
Abdur Rahman in order to secure peace for Afghanistan, and now we are in
the awkward position of finding our words twisted, their meaning
perverted, and the Pretender posing before the nation as a patriot of
the first water. During the past three months Mr. Lepel Griffin, acting
under the orders of the Government of India, has been striving to place
himself thoroughly _en rapport_ with the Sirdar, who seemed at last to
be quite earnest in his expressed wish to become and remain on friendly
terms with us. There was, however, such hesitation in all his actions,
and so strong a current of vacillation in his replies, that in sheer
self-defence we had to pin him down to certain definite conditions,
which he could either accept or reject as his inclination dictated. An
ultimatum, really, was sent to him, though we have avoided using the
term under the peculiar circumstances in which we were placed—viz., that
of being in possession of a kingdom which our armies could easily
retain, but which we were most anxious to leave at the earliest moment.
In this state document the Indian Government stated clearly and
distinctly that the Sirdar would be welcomed as Amir of Afghanistan, and
could rely upon our future countenance and support so long as he
remained faithful to his engagements with us, _but_ that Candahar and
the Kurram Valley could not be surrendered to him, as their fate had
once for all been settled. So distinctly was the latter part of the
proposed settlement laid down, that it was added “No discussion is
possible on this subject.” Nothing could have been more simple than
this: Abdur Rahman could by a word become Amir of Afghanistan less
Candahar and Kurram; he had but to say “I accept,” and the matter was at
an end. But his perversity is so great, that he has chosen to construe
our terms into an offer of a united Afghanistan, such as his grandfather
the Dost ruled over, and with calm assurance to say that he accepts such
offer. This dishonesty of purpose has been pushed to such extremes that
he has sent circulars to all the tribes, proclaiming with more or less
insolent triumph that the British have given him the Amirship of the
whole country, and that he will shortly arrive among them to take up the
reins of power. What sinister motive may have prompted such a course we
cannot imagine, unless it be that the Sirdar wishes to assume the _rôle_
of a great patriotic leader, to accuse us of treachery in our
negotiations, and thus to unite all parties in a supreme effort to force
us out of the country. It may be urged with equal consistency that he
wishes the people to believe he is no friend of the British, and that he
only accepted our real terms after holding out for the restitution of
territory acquired by us during the campaign. The effect of his
extraordinary action upon the people has been a very unhealthy one: they
cannot believe, in the face of our protestations, that we have included
Candahar and Kurram in the terms of the settlement, and, on the other
hand, they are in a feverish state of expectancy as to whether the
Pretender will insist upon such districts being surrendered to him—which
would mean a revival of the war—or whether he will, under protest, take
Afghanistan shorn of two of its provinces. Take Hashim Khan’s case: he
was about to leave for Candahar, which place, under our protection,
would have proved a safe asylum for him, even if his sworn enemy, Abdur
Rahman, were ruler of Cabul. But no sooner did he see the Pretender’s
circular stating that Candahar was to revert to the new Amir, than he
hastened to prepare for flight, suspecting us of having treacherously
deceived him regarding the southern province. The circular was received
in Cabul fifteen hours before Abdur Rahman’s answer reached Mr. Lepel
Griffin, and Hashim Khan made an effort to see the Chief Political
Officer to gain knowledge, once for all, of the truth of the Pretender’s
assertions. Unluckily, Hashim Khan could not see Mr. Griffin at once,
and refusing to wait, he rode off to Cabul, and in company with Abdulla
Khan fled in the night to Chakri, in the Ghilzai country beyond Khurd
Cabul. The two Sirdars gave out that they were ghazis, probably to blind
the tribesmen, and we have since heard that Hashim Khan is trying to
gather about him the disbanded sepoys of Yakub Khan’s army. He has two
lakhs and a half of treasure with him, and by offering regular payment,
both to armed and unarmed men, he has already a little army under his
control. As he has so far taken no action against us, a friendly letter
was sent by order of General Stewart, inviting him to return, and
assuring him that the statement about Candahar was a falsehood. His
answer was that he was no enemy of the British, but that under existing
circumstances he had been “advised” to leave Cabul and watch events from
a safe distance. Abdulla Khan, it is believed, is the “adviser” referred
to; that over-fed Sirdar having, like Jeshurun, waxed fat and kicked out
savagely. He was apparently tired of playing the part of a nobody in
Cabul, and has now incited Hashim Khan to commit himself to a very
foolish course of action.
Since penning the above strictures upon Sirdar Abdur Rahman, our envoy,
Sirdar Afzul Khan, ressaldar 10th Bengal Lancers, has arrived after a
trying journey from Khanabad. Strangely enough, he brings letters of
most friendly import from Abdur Rahman, whom he reports to be already on
his way southwards. The Pretender marched with 2,000 men and twelve guns
from Khanabad on the 28th of June, the day on which he had promised to
leave, and on the 29th he was encamped at Chasma, on the Ishkamish Road.
By this time he is probably at Khinjan, where no doubt he will wait the
arrival of our messenger, who left Sherpur three days ago. This time, it
is hoped, the negotiations will really end, as Abdur Rahman will learn
that his fast-and-loose mode of dealing has exasperated the British
Government, which will not give him another chance. The arrival of Afzul
Khan is most opportune, as he can explain fully, and without the caution
he had to use in his letters, what the Sirdar’s intentions are, and why
it is that he has dishonestly perverted the meaning of the terms so
generously offered to him. I believe I am right in stating that both
General Stewart and Mr. Lepel Griffin incline to the opinion that the
Sirdar will shortly cross the Hindu Kush into Kohistan, and will accept
the Amirship at our hands. Of course, his circular came upon us as a
great surprise, and it was impossible to reconcile it with his previous
avowals of friendship and a desire to come to terms, but Afzul Khan has
cleared away some of the mistiness hanging about the affair, and what is
facetiously called in camp “the political horizon” is once more looking
clearer. There are still, however, many conflicting interests to be
reconciled, and the news from Logar shows that the supports of Yakub’s
Khan’s family—whom, to adopt Cavagnari’s term, I will call
“Jacobins”—are actively engaged in stirring up the tribesmen against the
British.
Yesterday (July 1st) the tribesmen grew so bold that they advanced to
within a few miles of General Hills’ force, and gave our cavalry an
opportunity of punishing them, which was not neglected. The Ghazni Field
Force had been ordered to march to Charasia, and Mahomed Hasan Khan, the
stanchest supporter of Yakub Khan (whose imprisonment in the time of
Shere Ali he shared), took advantage of General Hills’ march to Charasia
to occupy the Logar Valley with a mixed force of men from Zurmut,
Kharwar, Maidan, and Wardak; but the gatherings dispersed upon the
Ghazni Field Force again marching southwards. Finding General Hills did
not move beyond Zerghun Shahr, Hasan Khan took heart again, and induced
1,000 or 2,000 men to occupy the large village of Padkhao Shana, on the
Kushi side of the Logar, only twelve miles from the British camp. Here
they remained till yesterday morning, when Palliser’s cavalry brigade,
550 strong, came down upon them and scattered them in all directions.
The particulars of the action are as follows:—General Hills heard on
June 30th that the village had been occupied in force, and he ordered
the cavalry brigade to move out at 3.30 A.M. yesterday.
Brigadier-General Palliser’s instructions were to reconnoitre their
position, and if an opportunity occurred, to attack them in the open.
His force was made up of 231 sabres of the 1st Punjab Cavalry, 158 of
the 2nd Punjab Cavalry, and 188 lances of the 19th Bengal Lancers. Upon
nearing the spur which runs down from Kushi towards the Logar River,
small parties of the enemy were seen, and the advanced cavalry scouts,
on gaining some rising ground from which Padkhao Shana could be seen,
reported the main body to be in full retreat in the direction of the
Altimour Hills, which separate the Logar district from Zurmut. Their
strength appeared to be about 1,500 footmen and a few cavalry. General
Palliser detached a troop of the 2nd Punjab Cavalry to watch the
village, and with 502 sabres and lance went in pursuit of the enemy. The
latter, seeing the cavalry bearing down upon them, broke into detached
knots, and took advantage of the difficult ground to make good their
flight. The cavalry, however, followed them up very quickly, in spite of
the stony nature of the ground and the difficulties presented by
_nullahs_ and ravines, and the two squadrons of the 1st Punjab Cavalry
and the 19th Lancers in the front line were soon hotly engaged. The
enemy fought with desperation, and tried to reform their line, but
without success. They sheered off to right and left, and were cut down
by the supporting squadrons of the 1st and 2nd Punjab Cavalry. The
pursuit continued for two hours, until the mouth of the Altimour Pass
had been reached. Here the cavalry were halted. They were then about
eight miles from Padkhao Shana, whither they quickly returned. Two
hundred bodies are said to have been counted on the ground. Our
casualties are now reported as four sowars killed, twenty-three wounded,
and one British officer, Captain Barrow, wounded. The ground was such as
to give many opportunities for severe hand-to-hand fighting, in which
Major Atkinson, 1st Punjab Cavalry, and Captain Leslie Bishop, 2nd
Punjab Cavalry, are specially mentioned by those present as having
displayed determined bravery. There were many hairbreadth escapes among
the officers and men, notably in the case of Colonel Yorke, 19th Bengal
Lancers, who received a bullet through his helmet, a second ball grazing
his forehead. His orderly was shot dead at his side. This man, Jewand
Sing, had distinguished himself earlier in the day, when Captain Barrow
was wounded. Captain Barrow, who was acting as orderly officer to
General Palliser, engaged single-handed with an Afghan _malik_, who
fought with great coolness and bravery. He was armed with rifle, shield,
_tulwar_, and the usual long knife. As Captain Barrow rode at him he
fired his rifle, wounding the officer’s horse in the neck. He then
betook himself to his sword, and warded off all blows with his shield.
Captain Barrow received two severe cuts, the first disabling his
bridle-hand, and the second cutting deep into his right fore-arm. Just
at this moment Jewand Sing and Sowar Gholam Khan, of the 1st Punjab
Cavalry, rode up, and the Afghan, who had already been badly wounded,
was killed out of hand. In the ranks of the enemy was one of the
deserters from the Sappers and Miners, who would not fight, but begged
for mercy. He was shot in the _mêlée_, and his Snider rifle recovered.
Hasan Khan deserted the tribesmen at the commencement of the action,
riding away to a place of safety as soon as our cavalry appeared. The
cavalry did not reach camp at Zerghun Shahr until half-past six at
night, having been fifteen hours uninterruptedly in the saddle, and
having ridden over forty miles since morning. As they rode into camp,
all the regiments turned out and cheered them heartily. The results of
this brilliant little action cannot fail to be most beneficial for a
time at least, as Logar is once more cleared of malcontent tribesmen.
It is said that Hashim Khan intended sending a contingent from Chakri
over the Ghilzai Hills, but the prompt action taken by General Hills
stopped this, and Hashim Khan has again written in to say he is “no
enemy of the British.” He may well be afraid of putting himself at the
head of men in the field when he sees how easily our troops scatter the
forces opposed to them. Our cavalry have never done so well as at
Padkhao Shana during the present campaign; no English cavalry regiment
was present, the honours of the fight resting with the 1st and 2nd
Punjab Cavalry and the 19th Bengal Lancers.
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