The Defences of Sherpur Strengthened—Continued Inactivity of the
Enemy—State of the Walls and Trenches—Mounting of Captured Guns—The
Reserve—The State of Cabul—Attacks upon the Hindu and Kizilbash
Quarters—Threat to assemble 100,000 Afghans—Reflections upon Past
Events—Neglect of Military Precautions—Non-destruction of Forts and
Villages—Review of the Fighting—City Rumours—Musa Jan proclaimed
Amir—Seizure of Treasure by Mahomed Jan—Demonstration by the Enemy
on December 17th—The Distribution of Commands in Sherpur—Immunity
from Night Attacks—Steadiness of the Troops—The Attack of December
18th—Heliograms exchanged with Luttabund—The First Fall of Snow at
Cabul.
SHERPUR, _15th December, night_.
To-day’s respite from fighting has been of the greatest value to us. The
shelter trenches thrown up in the darkness have, in many instances, been
found to be defective, accordingly Colonel Perkins and the engineers
with the force have laid out new lines, and the northern and eastern
defences are now quite strong enough to assure our safety in those
directions. The northern end of the western wall was partly blown down
when the mutineers fired their magazine the day after Charasia; the
breach in it has been closed with earth and rubbish; and the corner
bastion, looking towards the lake, has been made thoroughly defensible.
From this bastion to the foot of the Bemaru Heights is an open space,
about 100 yards across. The trees beyond it, which shaded our cemetery,
have been cut down, and a strong entrenchment thrown across, with wire
entanglements, 20 yards in front. Here, again, Afghan ammunition waggons
have been of great use. They are placed sideways, one wheel facing
outwards, and the other forming the inner side, over which the defenders
can fire. A deep trench has been dug along the outer face, and the earth
thrown up between the wheels, so as to give stability to the barrier.
This has made a formidable obstacle, which could not be readily taken
when defended by breech-loaders. From the end abutting on the steep
slope of the heights a trench and parapet run up to the block-house on
the crest. An _abattis_ has been made of the branches of trees 30 yards
in front of this, faced again by wire entanglements, and two 18-pounders
from among the captured guns are placed on a platform cut in the slope
and commanding the ground in front of the lower barrier of ammunition
waggons. The fire from the block-house and the trench on the hillside
would take in enfilade any force making a front attack. Along the crest
of the Bemaru Heights is a line of earthen breastworks extending to the
break in the hills above the Ghoorka quarters on the foundations of
Shere Ali’s intended palace. It was in this “gorge,” as it is now
called, that our troops in 1841-42 had much severe fighting, their old
“Brown Besses” being unequal to carrying from slope to slope. From the
camp, paths lead up a gentle slope through the gap. The northern side,
facing Kohistan, is much steeper, and the centre is cut up by deep
nullahs formed by the streams which rush down when the snow melts.
Immediately below, at the foot of the hills, cultivation begins and
reaches out half a mile to the open _maidan_, where we held our review
on the 8th instant. On either side of the gorge are flanking trenches
with _abattis_, while wire entanglements have been laid across the paths
below. Two block-houses look down upon the nullahs from either side of
the gap; while right in the mouth is a third, built very strongly, and
loop-holed for musketry. A Gatling gun is placed near this defence, and
guns could also move up in case of attack. The eastern Bemaru hill is
also entrenched, and has a block-house in the centre, and another at the
northern point, which was, at first, very weak. The village of Bemaru,
with strong towers and walls, lies at the bottom of the hill; and the
ground is so rugged and steep, that men could creep up almost without
being seen. Flanking trenches, wire entanglements, and _abattis_ have
here, again, given strength to the defences. Bemaru village itself is
now occupied by the Guides; the quarters of the 23rd Pioneers, and the
mule and _yaboo_ lines being just below. There now remains the eastern
line of defence; which, even now, is not completed, and has given us
much anxiety. I have already mentioned that the huts of the 28th Punjab
Infantry have been built between the end of the cantonment wall and
Bemaru; and I may add that every means of rapidly strengthening the
place has been taken. Shelter-trenches and positions for guns have been
made, and the orchards outside have been cut down wherever they gave
shelter. The bit of country outside cantonments in this direction is
very fertile, being irrigated from a wide canal, and some dozen villages
and forts are clustered together on its banks. The walls bounding the
orchards and gardens as well as the near forts would, if time permitted,
be razed to the ground; and until this is done, there will be a chance
of strong bodies of the enemy annoying us thence. Until we know Mahomed
Jan’s tactics, and whether he really means to attempt an assault, we
cannot do more than strengthen the actual lines of defence, leaving the
walls and towers in the fields to be destroyed hereafter. Regarding the
walls of Sherpur itself, they are in a thorough state of defence; such
openings as had been cut in them for the convenience of soldiers and
followers having been blocked up with arm chests filled with stones and
rubbish. The outer wall is about twenty feet high, with numerous
flanking bastions, and is pierced for musketry at every six feet. The
actual parapet is six feet high, giving perfect shelter to soldiers
manning the walls; and our men, preferring to fire over the top, have
cut resting-places with their bayonets for their rifles. No bullet can
penetrate more than a few inches into the sun-dried mud, which is really
so hard that 9-pounders could not breach it. The blocks of mud solidify
so thoroughly after a time, that they will turn the edge of a pick, as
we have found in improving our quarters in the long line of barracks. A
dry ditch, twenty feet in width, follows the line of walls, which, in an
early letter, I described as three sides of a parallelogram. The
barracks form the inner line of defence, a low parapet on the roof
overlooking the dry ditch below.
There are four high gateways in the walls; one facing westwards, known
as the “Head-quarters’ Gate,” and three in the southern wall facing
Cabul. The middle one of these is the “Commissariat Gate,” and abuts on
the road leading through the old cantonment over the Cabul river to the
Bala Hissar. All the Commissariat godowns are in the barracks and
verandah to right and left of this gate. A line drawn at right angles
from these across the cantonment would strike the gap in the Bemaru
hills; and in anticipation of our having to draw in our defences, the
engineers are preparing an inner line of entrenchments stretching
between these two parts. Our food supply, firewood, and _bhoosa_, would
be enclosed within it, and our men would be far less harassed. We should
probably continue to hold the north-eastern Bemaru hill as an outwork;
but to do this we should have to destroy very thoroughly Bemaru village,
the huts of the 28th Punjab Infantry, and the barracks and wall at the
eastern part of Sherpur. There seems but little probability of our
having to do this, as the reinforcements will lighten our work, give an
ample garrison, and also permit of a brigade moving out to meet the
enemy. We are mounting one of the 8-inch howitzers, captured here, in a
bastion of the western wall, whence we can shell Deh-i-Afghan and the
road leading from the Cabul gorge. We have plenty of loose powder for
this howitzer, and any number of empty shells left behind by the
mutineers. Some of Shere Ali’s mountain guns are also being got ready
for use. Our own batteries are kept free to move from point to point as
required, special stations being told off for them at night. Morgan’s
mountain battery is the artillery reserve: the infantry and cavalry
reserve is made up of the whole of the 92nd Highlanders, a wing of the
67th, a wing of the 72nd, and six squadrons chosen from among the 9th
Lancers, 5th Punjab Cavalry, Guides’ Cavalry, 12th Bengal Cavalry, and
the 14th Bengal Lancers. The remainder of the troopers and sowars are
dismounted, and used as infantry to man the defences. The reserve, in
case of a night attack, is to form up in the open ground in the middle
of cantonments below the Bemaru gorge. We have thus made all our
preparations, and shall probably pursue a waiting policy, leaving
Mahomed Jan to his occupation of Cabul city and the Bala Hissar until
General Charles Gough arrives. What that occupation is likely to be, we
are already learning: the houses of all known friends of the British are
being looted and destroyed, and the Hindu and Kizilbash quarters are
also being attacked. Constant firing is heard from the city, and the
Kizilbashes are resisting the attacks to the best of their ability.
Against such numbers, however, they cannot make a stand, however bravely
they may fight. Several of them have sought refuge with us, and we have
also, as our guests, Sirdar Wali Mahomed Khan, young Ahmed Ali, and
their personal retainers. Daoud Shah has been put under arrest “as a
matter of precaution,” and the Mustaufi is also again in confinement, as
well as other Afghan sirdars, whose honesty is a doubtful quality.
Hazara coolies and city people, employed hitherto as labourers, masons,
and carpenters, have also been turned out of Sherpur, as they are now
only a drag upon us, and might also be bearers of information to the
enemy.
This evening large bodies of men with standards appeared on the road
above Deh-i-Afghan until the slope of the hill was completely covered.
Beyond waving their knives and _tulwars_, and shouting defiance, they
did nothing to annoy or irritate us. General Roberts at first ordered
some guns out to shell them, but changed his mind, and declined to waste
ammunition upon them. In the evening they returned to the city, but kept
two large signal fires burning on the heights. They are said to expect
reinforcements from Kohistan, Turkistan, and the Shutargardan district;
but we have no news of these being on the move. They boast of being able
to get 100,000 men together in a week, and have sent to Ghazni for guns.
At present they have not been able to rig up the two mountain guns they
captured, or to use two others taken in Wali Mahomed’s camp above
Dehmazung. If they were to shell Sherpur they might cause us some loss,
as our cavalry are picqueted in the open.
While I am writing (on the evening of the 15th) we are expecting a night
attack; but we are quite ready for it, every post being fully manned.
The Mohurrum has now begun, and fanaticism is sure to run high among the
Ghazis and followers of Mushk-i-Alam, but it will scarcely prompt them
to attack so strong a position as we have now made. Orders have been
issued that, in the event of any of the enemy getting within cantonment
walls, they are to be bayoneted. Shooting is forbidden, as in camp our
bullets would probably be more dangerous to our own troops than to
scattered parties of Afghans. Every man is resting on his arms ready for
an emergency.
_16th December._
The second night has passed without any demonstration by Mahomed Jan
against Sherpur; and while the fire-eaters in our force are longing for
an attack, in order that the Afghans may learn how mud walls and
entrenchments can be defended by men with breech-loaders in their hands,
most of us are glad that our soldiers have had time to rest, and have
not been obliged to stand out all night in the bitter cold. Four
blankets per man have been served out; and, wrapped in these, the
soldiers have been able to keep themselves fairly comfortable, while
sleeping in the trenches and bastions. The sentries are on the alert,
and have, of course, had to endure cold and discomfort; but the great
body of men have rested quietly. To-day also, no attack has been
attempted; and while we are settling down to the new conditions imposed
upon us—for we are now practically in a state of siege—our spirits are
as high as ever. We chafe under the delay which must necessarily ensue
before we can once more disperse the enemy; but we hope that the troops
from Jugdulluck and Gundamak will soon put us in a position both to hold
Sherpur and to have a few thousand men outside, dealing with the Ghazis.
There can be no doubt we have been lulled during the past two months
into false security. Our only anxiety hitherto has been to find an enemy
to fight; and the opinions I have expressed in former letters as to the
Afghan weakness for running away have been simply those held by every
one here. When we sent our brigades out to fight, they found no one to
face them; and we were unaware that such a powerful combination as that
now against us was possible. After the dispersion of the remnants of
Yakub Khan’s mutinous army, there was such an appearance of peace, at
least for many months, that the ordinary military precautions were not
taken. Our hands were full with laying in supplies for the winter and
getting the troops into barracks. Sherpur, with its three sides already
fortified, and ample accommodation in its long lines of rooms, was ready
to our hand, and we occupied it at once, although the strength of our
army was scarcely adequate to defending it[35] and keeping our
communications open. The original plan of placing two or three regiments
in the Bala Hissar was certainly a good one; but the explosions in the
fortress, and the dread that it might still contain mines unknown to us,
deterred General Roberts from carrying out his first intention.
-----
Footnote 35:
This was the view taken by Colonel Macgregor, Chief of the Staff.
-----
Further, when Sherpur was occupied, the sense of security then
prevailing led us to spare the forts and villages in its vicinity. Even
the old walls and isolated towers in the fields about were left
untouched. We make war so humanely that, even in a country like
Afghanistan, we are loth to let military exigencies override all other
considerations. That we shall suffer for it now in loss of life is
beyond question; for, at several points about the walls, cover is given
to an attacking party, who can get within 400 or 500 yards of our
bastions. On the eastern and southern sides this is particularly the
case. Outside Bemaru, as I have said, are forts, villages, and orchards;
while, between the three gates facing towards Cabul, the ground is
similarly occupied. Fort Mahomed Sharif, so well known in the dreary
days of 1841-42, still stands intact within 700 yards of the “72nd
Gateway,” and about it are high walls and walled enclosures, which are
sure to be occupied by sharp-shooters. Outside Deh-i-Afghan also are
orchards and gardens, each with its strong open walls, and in the fields
are ruinous walls, with an occasional tower, which we could easily have
destroyed if we had foreseen that an investment was hanging over us. It
is easy to be wise after the event; but there can now be but one view as
to the defects of Sherpur. To defend it, simply, is now comparatively
easy, even with the 6,000 men we have within its walls; but beyond
defence, we can do nothing. It covers such an enormous area of ground,
that when all our picquets and sentries have been placed, we have no one
to spare; and though we have dismounted nearly the whole of our cavalry,
there are not even 1,000 men available for outside work. If it were half
the size, we should be as comfortable as in an Indian cantonment; or if
we had 10,000 men here, and three or four more batteries of artillery,
we could break up Mahomed Jan’s army without difficulty. But neither of
these conditions exists, and we are quietly accepting the humiliation of
investment, and witnessing the looting of Cabul and the Bala Hissar
without being able to strike a blow against the enemy. The suddenness of
the whole business is the most remarkable feature, and we now see to
what imminent danger Sherpur was exposed when Generals Macpherson and
Baker were sent out to force the fighting in Maidan. In the first week
of December native rumours of 40,000 or 50,000 men gathering together to
attack Cabul were freely circulated in the city, but little attention
was paid to them. Later, there was the plain evidence of our cavalry
scouts that 4,000 or 5,000 men were between Maidan and Argandeh, and to
cut them off was the object of General Macpherson’s march into the
Chardeh Valley, and of the _détour_ made by General Baker from Charasia
to Maidan. General Macpherson, in carrying out his flank march to get
between Mahomed Jan and Bamian, came unexpectedly upon Mir Butcha and
his Kohistanis; and he had first to deal with them before turning his
attention to the Ardal Pultan and their friends from Wardak and Ghazni.
His defeat of Mir Butcha, on December 10th, was of great value, as
preventing the Kohistanis from joining the other force; but on the 11th
there followed the defeat of our cavalry and the temporary loss of two
guns. That afternoon was really most pregnant with danger to the
cantonment. Two brigades were miles away from the walls, and between the
nearest men of General Macpherson’s brigade and Sherpur were 10,000 of
the enemy. If they had streamed over the Nanuchi Kotal, near where the
action of the 14th was fought, and had shown the same determination in
assaulting our lines as they had done in resisting the cavalry and guns,
we must have lost Sherpur long before help could have come from the two
Brigadiers. That the enemy streamed off to the Cabul gorge, with the
intention of seizing the Bala Hissar and the city, was the saving of our
cantonments. Two hundred rifles of the 72nd checked them at Dehmazung,
and they contented themselves with occupying the hills to the south of
the Bala Hissar Heights, and waiting for reinforcements. We kept them in
play, on the 12th, with 600 men, who partly captured their position; and
by that time General Baker had reached Sherpur. On the 13th our success
was unqualified; we stormed and occupied the enemy’s position, and our
cavalry in the Cabul plain cut to pieces such fugitives as left the
hills. That evening we believed we had seen the enemy’s full strength
and had broken it; but after the action on the Asmai Heights, and the
retreat of our troops to cantonments, we were undeceived. It became
apparent that there were between 30,000 and 40,000 men, quite sufficient
to keep us within our walls, as with such numbers many points could be
threatened at the same time. It came to this: that we must he content to
let them occupy Cabul, the Bala Hissar, and whatever other points they
chose, while we watched them carefully from Sherpur, ready to repel
attack, or to clear them out of forts and villages dangerously near our
walls. _They_ have liberty to roam whithersoever they will; while _we_
are so numerically weak, except for cavalry reconnaissances, that we
must accept the usual conditions of a beleaguered garrison. We have
accepted it, cheerfully enough, I venture to say; and when we again go
out to clear Cabul and the Bala Hissar, we shall do it with all the more
zest after being penned up in Sherpur by sheer weight of numbers.
To-day there has not been much done beyond hard work at the
entrenchments, at which the men labour heartily, as they know the
importance of having continuous lines of defence. Our curiosity is fed
by rumours from the city, from which we gain a certain amount of
trustworthy news; though our spies, as a rule, are the most
treacherous-looking ruffians we have seen for a long time. Our
intelligence department has such bad tools to work with, that scarcely
any information proves correct; for an Afghan is a greater adept at
fabrication than any other Asiatic. We cannot _trust_ them: they go and
come, and bring strange tales, and fill our minds with the idea that
40,000 Ghazis mean to fight to the death, so as to capture Sherpur; and
then nothing comes of it. We hear to-day of scaling-ladders being made,
and of an assault to be delivered simultaneously at seven points; but
when or how it will be made not even the most pronounced liar among the
spies ventures to say. Two or three bankers from the city have been in
Sherpur to-day, and from them we have learnt that Mahomed Jan and his
followers are bursting with pride at finding themselves in possession of
Cabul, and holding the British army in check. There is so much
confidence among them, that, no doubt at the instigation of Yakub Khan’s
mother, they have proclaimed young Musa Jan, Yakub’s son, Amir. This is
to give a semblance of order and patriotism to their movements, we
suppose; and, perhaps, their leaders hereafter may be bold enough to
proffer negotiation. They will be the mouthpiece of their new Amir, and
Sir F. Roberts will be nothing more than the representative of the
British, who will be told, as in olden times, that they are not wanted
in the country. Further, they have found that no Governor of Cabul now
exists, General Hills, our nominee, having, of course, left the
_kotwali_ for the safer quarters of Sherpur. The fanatics have therefore
nominated Mushk-i-Alam, the old _moollah_, to be Governor, and, with all
his ninety years heavy upon him, he sits dispensing justice and
encouraging the _moollahs_ to work upon the religious feelings of
soldiers. Whether he expects long to enjoy his dignity does not appear;
but, apart from his great age, there is the contingency of Cabul once
more falling into our hands. His _jehad_ has certainly been a wonderful
success, and it is long since so large a number of armed men have been
assembled in and about Cabul. They are likely to experience the same
difficulty we have always felt—supplies. Each villager carries with him
_chupaties_ and dried mulberries sufficient for three or four days’
consumption; but their food-bags now want replenishing. With her usual
energy, Yakub’s mother is said to have given her jewels and money to the
“troops”—if they deserve the name—and they have now ample funds to carry
them on for a short time. The citizens also have been called upon to
show their patriotism. By beat of _tom-tom_ it has been proclaimed that
all surplus grain and other food must be given up, each family only
retaining enough for its own consumption. The _bunniahs_ and others will
be heavy losers by this enactment; but as death is threatened in case of
disobedience, there is no option but to obey. They will find Mahomed
Jan’s short rule far different from ours, under which they amassed
rupees by thousands, and fleeced the strangers handsomely. The wholesale
looting that has gone on during the last two days has given the enemy
vast stores of treasure; and one report states that Yahiya Khan’s house,
which we only partially cleared out, has proved a mine of wealth to
them. The usual result has followed: they have begun to quarrel among
themselves. Every Afghan is not a Ghazi; and to the mind of the village
tribesman, far away from his home, it seems folly to risk farther
fighting, while such plunder has been already obtained. The Ghazis would
at all costs try to storm Sherpur, and repeat the victory of 1841-2, but
their fanaticism has not extended far, and it will have to rise to
fever-heat before it will face an assault. We have not much to fear in
that direction; but still with our small stock of ammunition, it would
be better, perhaps, if it did not take place. If made at night, our men
would probably blaze away 70 or 100 rounds; and if our reinforcements
were checked, we might seriously feel the want of ammunition.
To-day the sky has been overcast and the hills obscured with mist, so we
have been unable to communicate by heliograph with Luttabund. We believe
the garrison there to be quite safe, as news of any attack in that
quarter would reach us very soon. Colonel Hudson knows that we are
invested, and he will have taken every precaution to ensure his own
safety. There seems no disturbance among the Tezin Ghilzais as yet, and
the Safis of Tagao have not yet returned to their friends in Cabul.
Their losses must have been heavy on the 13th and 14th. The Kohistanis
who got away from the cavalry on the 13th did not all escape to their
homes. While the fight was going on near Cabul, the 12th Bengal Cavalry
at Butkhak were ordered to patrol the plain between that post and the
Logar river. Towards evening they came across eight men who were at once
made prisoners. They were all armed and well mounted, and, upon being
questioned, said they were friends of Wali Mahomed, on their way to
Tezin, to bring the Ghilzais down to aid the British. This statement was
telegraphed to Sherpur, but Wali Mahomed knew nothing of the men; and as
they had the accoutrements of a Guide sowar on one horse, and three new
Snider rifles, with 400 rounds of ammunition, they were ordered to be
shot. When told they were to die, they half-admitted that they were not
friends of Wali Mahomed. Their leader was a young Kohistani, who met his
death bravely enough: the second was a petty sirdar, who, in fear and
trembling, begged for his life; and the third was a village priest, who
tried to induce the Mahomedan sowar told off to execute him to let him
go. “You are a Mahomedan,” he said, “and I am one of your holy men. You
cannot shoot me! Let me get past the sentry, and I can escape.” The
sowar’s answer was characteristic of our men: “You have been fighting
against the _Sircar_, and it is your _kismut_ now to be shot. You must
fulfil your _kismut_.” The _moollah_ saw that his prayers were of no
avail, and as he was walking out, he added half-apologetically:—“I tried
to persuade these others not to fight, but they would come down to
Cabul, and they brought me with them.” This was admission enough, even
if it were not the whole truth. It is the _moollah_ usually who
persuades the tribes to turn out, not the tribesmen who have to persuade
the priest to come with them. The four other prisoners were servants of
the three men named: as they were all bearing arms they also were shot.
_17th December._
To-day the enemy seem to have awakened to a sense of their
responsibility as an investing force. Having made their permanent (?)
political arrangements for the good government of Cabul and Afghanistan,
they have begun to turn their attention to the stranger within their
gates. They fondly imagine that a parade of their strength may overawe
us, and strike terror to our souls: quite forgetting that it can only be
for a short time that we shall be the attacked, and not the attackers.
About ten o’clock this morning they poured out of the eastern and
western gates of Cabul, with banners flying and _tom-toms_ beating, and
drew up in dense masses upon the Siah Sung Heights on the one side and
the slopes of the Asmai hill above Deh-i-Afghan on the other. Horsemen
were seen galloping about in their midst, and trying to keep them
together in military order; but their efforts were, as a rule, of no
avail, only the men of the Ardal Pultun marching at all like soldiers.
The men in that regiment (Guards) still carry their Sniders, and dress
in a soldierlike manner, their cross-belts and pouches giving them the
appearance of regular sepoys. At eleven o’clock the Afghans assembled
must have numbered fully 20,000, and it was believed that they meditated
an attack on the eastern and western walls of Sherpur. The alarm was
accordingly sounded in cantonments, all work at the trenches was
stopped, the Reserve formed up at its appointed place below the Bemaru
gorge, and every man went to his post. It was a bleak December day; the
sun was obscured, a cold wind sweeping down from the Pughman hills, and
heavy clouds louring as if threatening snow. Our men in the trenches and
on the walls were all clad in their over-coats, and dreary work they
found it waiting for an enemy who never came. The hundreds of
scaling-ladders we had heard so much about were not visible, and the
thousands of men who crowded upon Siah Sung were only valorous enough to
wave their knives and scream out curses which never reached our ears.
After several hours of this unsatisfactory waiting, the order was given
to shell the enemy, most of whom were out of rifle-range. G-3 and two
guns of F-A opened upon Siah Sung, and their practice was excellent. G-3
got the range exactly, and two or three shells burst right in the thick
of the masses upon the ridge. The effect was instantly seen: “they jist
ran like skelpit bairns,” as a Highlander remarked. The dead and wounded
were dragged away by the heels, and in an hour the heights were clear,
except of such small parties as disdained to run away. A few marksmen of
the 67th, with their Martinis, knocked over one or two of these at 1,700
yards, and this long range shooting caused the Afghans to disperse, some
going to the Bala Hissar, and others running down to the villages below
Siah Sung. On our eastern wall the 8-inch howitzer, placed in position
on one of the bastions, was fired for the first time, and its huge
shells, dropping into and over Deh-i-Afghan, scattered the crowds there
assembled. The terrific report of the howitzer, and the bursting of its
heavy shells, did much to alarm the enemy, who have hitherto only had
7-pounders and 9-pounders fired against them. There was some difficulty
at first in getting the range and fixing fuses in the shells, which are
of Afghan make; but our gunners soon overcame this, and the howitzer is
now in perfect working order. It will be very useful in shelling such
villages near Deh-i-Afghan as may be occupied by sharpshooters.
The only attempt to open fire upon the cantonment walls was made by a
small body of the enemy, who took possession of the small walled garden,
where the 5th Punjab Cavalry was quartered before the investment. This
garden lies to the right of the road leading to the city, and is about
700 yards from the “72nd Gateway.” It is all that remains of the old
“King’s Garden” of 1839-42. The walls are about ten feet high, and
within them are numerous large trees, up which some of the more daring
Afghans climbed. Their best shots aimed at our men lining the walls; but
although their bullets struck the parapet from time to time, or dropped
far over into the open space where our tents used to stand, no harm was
done. Two mountain guns of Swinley’s battery were placed in the bastion,
fifty yards to the west of the “72nd Gateway,” and these shelled the
garden, while a few marksmen fired at such Afghans as exposed
themselves. In the afternoon two companies of the 5th Punjab Infantry
were ordered out to clear the garden. Colonel Brownlow, of the 72nd, who
has charge of the wall from the gateway to the south-western bastion,
rode out with them. They doubled across the open, covered by the fire
from the gate and bastions, and got well round to the westward of the
garden. The enemy fired a few shots, and then rushed out at the opposite
side, making for Mahomed Sharif’s fort on the other side of the road.
One was shot and bayoneted; and on our side a sepoy of the 5th was
slightly wounded by a bullet in the leg. The garden was thoroughly
searched, but none of the enemy could be found, so our men returned to
Sherpur, two companies of the 72nd being ready inside to cover their
retirement if they had been followed up. Beyond one or two dropping
shots, they were allowed to march back unmolested. While this was going
on, the Bala Hissar was seen to be crowded with armed men, and word was
brought in that the _moollahs_ were haranguing them, and urging them to
attack in earnest. Their exhortations had some effect, as several
thousand men took the road which would have brought them across the
Cabul river and well within range of our rifles; but their courage or
fanaticism was not equal to the demand made upon it, and they eventually
turned off and went into the city. A few are reported to have gone to
some villages outside Bemaru and the eastern wall of Sherpur; but
whether they will remain there all night is doubtful. There is no
organized plan of attack among them; and unless more determination is
shown than that displayed to-day, our investment is likely to be of a
very mild kind. The numerical strength opposed against us seems also to
have decreased, and our spies report that many villagers have returned
home with their dead and wounded, taking also with them such loot as
they can carry. The boasted reinforcements to swell their ranks to
100,000 men are not forthcoming; and beyond the annoyance of being
confined within cantonments, we do not suffer much from Mahomed Jan’s
successes. The wells we have sunk since our water-supply was cut off
give us good water; and except the cavalry, whose lines are in the open,
we are all snug under cover in our barracks, so that stray bullets
cannot do us harm. For the better purposes of defence the cantonment has
been divided into sections, and each of these is in charge of an
officer. From the head-quarters’ gate northwards to the end of the wall,
and thence along the heights to the Bemaru gorge, Major-General Hills
has charge; Brigadier-General Hugh Gough takes from the gorge and along
the line of entrenchments to Bemaru village; Colonel Jenkins, of the
Guides, has the eastern wall, from Bemaru to the corner bastion looking
towards Butkhak; Brigadier-General Macpherson the southern wall, from
that bastion to the 72nd Gate; Colonel Brownlow from the gate to the
corner bastion on the south-west, facing Deh-i-Afghan; and Colonel Hogg
from that bastion to the head-quarters. Major Hanna is Brigadier-General
Gough’s orderly officer. The Reserve is under Brigadier-General Baker,
and at night all the men belonging to it sleep on the hillside below
Bemaru gorge. During the day the position of the infantry is as
follows:—From the head-quarters’ gate to the western foot of the
heights, the 5th Punjab Infantry; below the heights to the west of the
gorge, the 3rd Sikhs and 5th Ghoorkas; east of the gorge, the wing of
the 23rd Pioneers; in Bemaru village, the Guides’ Cavalry and Infantry;
near the eastern wall, 100 men of the 28th Punjab Infantry and part of
the 67th Foot; in the barracks, on the south, the remainder of the 67th,
the 92nd, and the 72nd; and in the western wall the Sappers and Miners.
Dismounted cavalry are also employed at a few of the bastions and near
the gorge. The guns are moved from point to point as their fire is
wanted. To-day parties of cavalry were out, reconnoitring towards
Kohistan, in the direction of the Surkh Kotal; but beyond seeing a few
score men moving about, they reported nothing unusual. They did not come
under fire of the enemy. Our cavalry videttes take up a position on two
low hills, a mile beyond the north-western bastion, whence they can
watch the Aliabad and Nanuchi Kotals leading from Chardeh Valley, and
also warn us of the movements of the enemy along the road at the foot of
the Asmai hill from Deh-i-Afghan. No large bodies of Afghans could move
from this direction without the garrison having timely warning of their
approach.
[Illustration: Sherpur Cantonment]
Again to-day we had no heliographic communication with Luttabund, and
the position of General Charles Gough’s brigade is quite unknown to us.
We are calculating that he will be here by the 20th; but this is a
sanguine estimate, as the troops on the Khyber side are still weak in
their transport arrangements. He may be unable for a few days to
concentrate his troops at Jugdulluck preparatory to starting for Cabul;
but the exigency is so great, that we may reasonably hope great energy
will be shown in pushing on when once a start is made. He is to bring
with him the 9th Foot, the 2nd and 4th Ghoorkas, and a mountain battery;
and if the baggage is limited to the merest necessaries, the march
should be a rapid one. It is a heavy blow to our prestige to be forced
into Sherpur after having ruled Cabul for two months; and the sooner the
present humiliating state of affairs is changed, the better will it be
for our future control of the country. Our men are equal to bearing the
exposure of night work well enough under the influence of excitement;
but when the reaction comes, there will be a long list of hospital
cases, for, even with four blankets and an overcoat, a soldier cannot
but feel the effects of sleeping out in the open air. To-day has been
the coldest we have yet experienced, and the wind is very trying to the
sentries, who have to stand motionless at their posts, watching for the
enemy. If snow falls, the discomfort will be increased, and the men in
the trenches and bastions will have to bear great hardships.
_18th December._
Night attacks, which would cause us much trouble and seriously harass
our troops, do not seem to be advisable in the eyes of the Afghans. Not
even the Ghazis, who showed such courage on the 14th, can persuade their
friends to venture forth at night; and as the moon nightly gives more
and more light, we feel less anxious as we “turn in,” fully dressed, at
ten o’clock. Not that we relax our vigilance in the least: there is too
much at stake for this; but that we sleep sounder, now that for three
nights we have been left undisturbed. A sentry occasionally fires a
shot; but no sooner does the report ring out, than an officer visits the
post and personally sees if there are signs of danger. In the Reserve
below the gorge the officers of each regiment watch for an hour in turn;
and thus, in addition to the sentries, there are always eyes and ears
ready to detect anything unusual. Tents have been pitched for some of
the men to sleep in; but the majority roll themselves up in their
blankets and waterproof sheets, and rest as cheerfully as if within four
walls. The officers on duty on the walls sleep among their men, and are
called whenever suspicion is excited by moving objects outside, so that
a night surprise is impossible. The officers in charge of sections visit
their walls and trenches nightly, to see that all arrangements are
properly carried out; and General Roberts and his Staff sometimes make
the entire round of cantonments. If an enemy were besieging us in a
civilized manner, and pushing forward parallels and entrenchments, we
could not be more vigilant; and it is satisfactory in the extreme to see
the soldierlike bearing of all the troops engaged in the weary work of
keeping watch and ward over nearly five miles of defences. British and
native are fully alive to the serious duties they have to fulfil; and
down even to the dismounted Lancer, with his carbine ready for use,
doing the unwonted task of sentry-go in the trenches, there is not a man
who has not accepted cheerfully the hardships imposed upon him.
It was understood that to-day an attack would be made in earnest. The
_moollahs_ had been at their prayers in the early morning, and had
blessed innumerable flimsy standards which were to be planted on our
walls when their victorious followers had driven us from our defences.
There certainly was more appearance of resolution in the movements of
the enemy than has hitherto been the case. The small party in the
villages beyond the eastern wall had cleared out during the night, and a
demonstration in force was made from the south-western direction. Our
cavalry videttes on Siah Sung and the hills near the north-west bastion
gave us warning of the approach of several thousand men, who moved out
with their standards from the Jellalabad gate and Deh-i-Afghan, and took
up positions in the gardens and enclosures which cover the plain to the
north of the city. I have said that good cover for an attacking force
still remains in front of the southern wall and the south-west bastions,
and this was made use of by Mahomed Jan, to push his men well towards
Sherpur. The alarm was sounded in cantonments at eleven o’clock, as on
the previous day, and in a quarter of an hour we were ready for the
attack. A hot fire was begun from behind walls, watercourses, and
towers, upon the soldiers lining the walls of Sherpur, and we answered
it with our guns. Shells were dropped into the gardens where the enemy
were in most force, six guns of G-3 and F-A being taken out at the
north-west corner of the cantonment, and making good practice at 1,500
and 2,000 yards. Orders were given for no small-arm ammunition to be
wasted, and small volleys only were fired upon the men fully exposing
themselves. A few Ghazis worked from wall to wall, until within 400
yards of the corner bastion nearest Deh-i-Afghan, but they could do
nothing beyond planting their standards, for at that distance our
marksmen, with their Martinis, could scarcely fail to hit even so small
an object as a man’s head. Afghans are good skirmishers, and in the art
of taking cover they are almost unequalled; but there was an open space
between their advanced standards and the walls, which even a Ghazi would
not venture to cross. All that we could see were the flashes from their
rifles and _jhezails_ from loopholes in the enclosures and towers, or
from behind trees, ditches, and stones. Our shells were so effective,
that two or three bursting in a garden were enough to drive its
defenders to seek other protection; and as they passed from wall to
wall, they were shot down by our rifle-fire, which never grew wild or
irregular. Eight picked men out of the 72nd Highlanders firing a volley
at a signal from their officer accounted for six men out of ten who were
trying to reach a small isolated tower only 400 yards from the
south-west bastion; and their comrades near were so disheartened that
they left their standards, and crawled back several hundred yards.
Solitary Ghazis, walking in sheer bravado out of cover, were killed at
longer ranges, and all heart seemed to die out of the attacking party,
who could make no headway against such a deadly fire. For the greater
part of the day the enemy’s fire from the villages continued, and
bullets came singing over the walls into cantonments, making it
dangerous for any one to venture beyond the shelter of the barracks.
Spent bullets dropped a few yards over the roofs, and Lieutenant
Sunderland, of the 72nd, was struck on the foot and slightly wounded by
one of these. A _bhistee_ near head-quarters was hit in the chest, and
General Vaughan’s horse was wounded while standing picqueted near the
same spot. Every tree and every yard of wall outside Deh-i-Afghan and
Murad Khana, the northern part of Cabul, seemed to hide skirmishers; and
the rattle of musketry for several hours told of the continuous fire
they were keeping up. Not a man on Sherpur walls was hit, though narrow
escapes were numerous. General Roberts, with several members of his
Staff, was watching the movements of the enemy from the roof of the
head-quarters’ gate when a bullet passed just over the parapet and
struck the wall behind. The heliograph instrument on the same roof was
also hit. The Union Jack was flying just below, and it was believed that
this was taken as a target, as the shooting was so accurate. A score of
Mahomed Jan’s nondescript cavalry galloped along the road below the
Asmai hill, as if to cut off our videttes, but a few shells checked
them; while a small body of infantry, which tried to work round in the
same direction, were kept back by a few shots from the sowars’ carbines,
aided by a cross fire from twelve picked shots of the 5th Punjab
Infantry, snugly ensconced in the fields, behind a little _sungar_ 600
yards from the guns. These twelve men—six Afridis and six Dogras—also
prevented any stragglers from firing at the guns; and the coolness with
which they kept their post and fired upon 200 or 300 Afghans who tried
to dislodge them was admirable. In the afternoon the 67th Foot moved out
along the fields in front of the southern walls, and skirmished along
the enemy’s right flank, so as to draw their fire, and make them show
their real strength. They were also to examine the ground, and see if it
were possible for cavalry to work across. They lined such walls as gave
cover and drew a smart fire upon themselves, which they returned rather
too freely considering that ammunition is so valuable. There was not
time for them to clear the gardens and forts, so at sunset they returned
to their quarters, their withdrawal being the signal for the enemy to
follow their old tactics of creeping forward again to the positions they
had evacuated. The fire from the bastions was again effective in
covering the retirement, and the regiment reached cantonments without
any casualties. The King’s Garden had been occupied since the morning by
two companies of the 5th Punjab Infantry, Colonel Williams (commanding
5th Punjab Cavalry) having reported that it was easily defensible by
infantry. The Punjabees were withdrawn at the same time as the 67th
retired; two companies of the 3rd Sikhs, who had gone out to strengthen
the right flank of the 67th, keeping the enemy back while the garden was
evacuated. No sooner had the sepoys withdrawn than the garden was filled
with Afghans, who fired the quarters of the sowars, and amused
themselves by shrieking and howling about the place, as if they had
gained a great success. The 5th Punjab Cavalry have had all their
trouble for nothing: they had made themselves comfortable for the
winter, and had got in _bhoosa_ and firewood; and this is now either
burnt or carried away. In a village near Mahomed Sharif’s Fort are large
stores of forage, and this, also, will probably be looted.
To-day the sun shone out for a short time, and we were able to
heliograph to Luttabund, although the mist over the hills beyond Butkhak
was very dense. A message was received from Colonel Hudson, commanding
at Luttabund, reporting all well; he had not been attacked; Gough’s
brigade had not been seen, and it was supposed he was still at
Jugdulluck. General Roberts signalled back, ordering the brigade to
advance instantly, even if they had to leave their tents behind for want
of transport; but whether the signallers at Luttabund could read our
message, is not certain, as no answering flashes came back, heavy clouds
obscuring the sun over the distant _kotal_. It was signalled twice, so
that it might be understood, and we have but little doubt that it was
“read” correctly. It is now plain that our reinforcements will not be
here by the 20th, and we must wait patiently for another five or six
days.
Snow began to fall at seven o’clock this evening, and it is still
steadily snowing now (midnight). At ten o’clock I visited the bastions
held by the 72nd Highlanders, and gained some idea of the work our men
are called upon to do. The sentries in their greatcoats were simply
white figures standing rigidly up like ghosts, the snow-flakes softly
covering them from head to foot, and freezing as they fell. Men on guard
in the bastions were walking briskly to and fro in their limited space
to keep themselves warm, and at their feet were their sleeping comrades,
covered with their waterproof sheets. A cold wind had been blowing in
the early part of the evening, and this had driven the flakes into every
crevice, and had caused several inches of snow to drift about the feet
of the sentries in the parapet. In the ditch below our horses were
tethered, and our syces and followers sleeping, the snow covering all
alike, and whitening the ground as far as the eye could reach. Inside
cantonments was one wide sheet of snowy brightness, the Bemaru Heights
rising up in the background and looming through the snowflakes like a
snowy barrier blocking us from the outer world. It was bitterly cold on
these heights, over which a cold wind nearly always blows; and we knew
that, hidden from our view, were 2,000 or 3,000 men sleeping at their
posts, with snow about them, every man ready to answer the first call of
his officer, stalking about among the sentries. Picquet duty under such
conditions is a real hardship; but with Balaclava caps and warm gloves
frost-bite is guarded against, and with the early morning comes hot soup
and cocoa, which cheers the men, and gives them heart to face the cold.
By order of the General, the Commissariat serve out, night and morning,
tinned soups and cocoa to all European soldiers; and it is fortunate
that a large supply of these stimulants—for such, indeed, they are in a
climate like this—reached us a few weeks ago. The small tins are easily
carried by the men, and all that is wanted is a cup of hot water to give
a “drink” with which rum cannot hope to compete. The sepoys and sowars
of the native regiments are not forgotten, additional comforts being
served out to them; and they are cheery as their English comrades,
though the snow is far more trying to men from a tropical climate.
Our wounded generally are doing well, though one trooper of the 9th
Lancers, who was injured by his horse being killed in a charge, has
died. Colonel Cleland, the Colonel of the same regiment, who was wounded
in the disastrous affair of the 11th, is pronounced out of danger; while
Lieutenant Egerton, shot through the neck on the 14th, is walking about
again, though still on the sick list. I am sorry to say that Major Cook,
V.C., 5th Ghoorkas, is dying, mortification having set in from the wound
he received below the knee on the Bala Hissar Heights. His brother,
Lieutenant Cook, of the 3rd Sikhs, who was wounded in Chardeh, is
rapidly recovering.
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