Attempt to storm the Takht-i-Shah Peak—Natural Strength of the
Position—Heliograms exchanged with General Baker—Failure to take the
Peak—Casualties—The New Plan of Attack—The Action of the 13th of
December—Storming of the Beni Hissar Ridge by the 92 Highlanders and
the Guides—The Cavalry Charges in the Plain—Death of Captain
Butson—The Position of Affairs at Nightfall—Reinforcements from
Kohistan—The Action of December 14th—Storming of the Asmai
Heights—Retreat of the Safis—Captain Vousden’s Charge—Counter-Attack
by the Enemy from Indikee—Death of Captain Spens, and Retirement
from the Cuncal Hill—Loss of Two Mountain Guns—Withdrawal of all
Troops from the Asmai and Sherderwaza Heights—The State of the
Sherpur Defences—Total Casualties.
SHERPUR, _12th December, midnight_.
I left Mahomed Jan and his followers in possession of the hills to the
south of the Sherderwaza Heights, with a part of General Macpherson’s
brigade on the latter, ready to attack him. To-day a party of 560 men,
made up in nearly equal proportions from the 67th Foot, 72nd
Highlanders, 3rd Sikhs, and 5th Ghoorkas, aided by two guns of Morgan’s
mountain battery, have made that attack, and have established themselves
on a lower hill between the Sherderwaza Heights and the high conical
peak of Takht-i-Shah, whereon the enemy muster in great force and have
sixteen standards flying. This peak is the highest of the clump of
mountains south of Cabul and lying between the city and Charasia, and
was the point whence Captain Straton tried to heliograph to the
Shutargardan in the early days of our occupation. It is cone-shaped,
looked at from Sherpur, and on its southern side joins a ridge running
southwards above the village of Indikee. The sides facing Cabul are very
steep, and covered with huge boulders polished by wind and rain, and of
a kind to check any storming party. Perfect cover is afforded to men
holding it, and on the summit is a well-built _sungar_ of great
thickness, covering a natural cavity in the rocks which has been made
bomb-proof by some Afghan engineer, who understood the strength of the
point. Fifty men could lie in perfect security behind the _sungar_ or in
the hole below it, and could choose their own time for firing at an
advancing enemy. Outside the _sungar_, and a little lower down, is a
cave, wherein another strong body of men could hide themselves and act
in a similar way, while their flank to the left would be guarded by a
broken line of rocks extending down to the _kotal_, where the Bala
Hissar Ridge meets them. Just between the two ranges is a low,
dome-shaped hill, blocking up the otherwise open _kotal_; and round this
a footpath winds, leading to the _sungar_, but so narrow as only to
admit of men going up in Indian file. The enemy occupied this morning
the Takht-i-Shah Peak and the line of rocks I have mentioned, and had
also a few score of men on the lower hill in the _kotal_. Away on the
south, hidden from our view, were some 5,000 or 6,000 men, waiting for
an attack to develop, in order to reinforce the peak. At eight o’clock
our guns opened fire from the picquet on the ridge. There were then only
seven standards on the peak, but during the day nine others were brought
up; and the long ridge, stretching downwards to Beni Hissar, was lined
with men. These were, by the contour of the ground, safe from our
shells, and they quietly watched the guns all day. From eight o’clock
until evening Captain Morgan fired shell after shell into the _sungar_
and the rocks below. The enemy were of quite a different order to those
we have hitherto had to deal with. They stood up boldly to their flags,
and waved their rifles and knives in derision at each shot. We could not
spare more infantry for the attack, as we had to protect Sherpur, which,
we learnt, was to be attacked by Kohistanis from over the Paen Minar
Kotal, north of the lake. The city, too, was known to be in a ferment,
and a demonstration might at any time be made from it against our
cantonment. General Baker with his flying column was still absent, and
our object was rather to hold the main body of Mahomed Jan’s force in
check, than try to disperse them with 560 men. At nine o’clock
heliographic communication was opened with General Baker, then on the
Argandeh Kotal. He reported that his rear-guard had been harassed for
the last two days, and that the hills in all directions were lined with
tribesmen. He was ordered to march without delay to Sherpur, and it was
hoped at first that he would arrive in time to assist General Macpherson
in attacking the enemy’s position. As he had to march fourteen miles
with his rear-guard engaged from time to time, he did not reach Sherpur
until evening, so his troops, footsore and tired, were not available.
[Illustration:
ROUGH PLAN OF THE COUNTRY ROUND KABUL.
TO ILLUSTRATE THE
OPERATIONS OF THE 13TH AND 14TH DECEMBER, 1879.]
After several hours’ shelling of the Takht-i-Shah Peak, the 67th, the
Highlanders, Sikhs, and Ghoorkas made their attack; and, in spite of the
stubbornness with which the Afghans fought, established themselves on
the low hill on the _kotal_. They tried to work upwards to the _sungar_;
but the fire of the Afghans was so true and sustained, that the attempt
had to be given up. Our men also ran short of ammunition, and they
contented themselves finally with holding the position captured, so as
to be able to co-operate on the morrow with any force sent out from
Sherpur to attack by way of Beni Hissar on the enemy’s flank. Our
casualties included Major Cook, V.C., 5th Ghoorkas, shot below the knee;
Lieutenant Fasken, 3rd Sikhs, bullet wound in both thighs; and
Lieutenant Fergusson, 72nd Highlanders, seriously wounded in the face.
The enemy this evening still hold the Takht-i-Shah Peak in strength, and
large reinforcements are said to have joined them from Logar, the
Ghilzais from that district being up in arms. It has been decided
to-night to send a brigade, under General Baker, to attack the peak from
Beni Hissar village to-morrow at the same time that Colonel Money, of
the 3rd Sikhs, moves up another force from the hill on the kotal.
_13th December, evening._
To-day the Takht-i-Shah Peak has been carried, and a strong picquet now
holds it. The action has been a great success, but there are still large
bodies of the enemy above Indikee; and as they may try to regain the
position, General Macpherson has abandoned Dehmazung altogether, and
posted his brigade on the Sherderwaza Heights. At eight o’clock this
morning General Baker left cantonments with the following troops:—
G-3, Royal Artillery, four guns;
No. 2 Mountain Battery, four guns;
92nd Highlanders (six companies);
Guides’ Infantry (seven companies);
3rd Sikhs (wing of 300 men);
5th Punjab Cavalry.
General Baker took the road past the Bala Hissar, and, upon debouching
into the plain north of Beni Hissar, found the enemy posted in force all
along the ridge in front, leading down from the Takht-i-Shah Peak. Beni
Hissar was also full of Afghans, and in the fields about it were
detached parties. These, seeing our force advancing, began to stream
towards the ridge, and the original plan of attack was so far modified
that, instead of working round through Beni Hissar village, the
Highlanders and Guides were sent straight across some marshy ground at
the ridge. The object in view was to cut the enemy’s line in two, and it
was attained most successfully. Our eight guns opened fire at 1,400
yards upon the masses of Afghans on the ridge, and the shells kept under
the musketry fire opened upon our infantry. The 3rd Sikhs protected
General Baker’s left flank, while the cavalry aided in keeping the
scattered parties about Beni Hissar in check. Nothing could be finer
than the advance of the 92nd and the Guides; they reached the slope of
the hill, and opened fire upon the enemy, one continued roll of musketry
being heard as they pushed upwards. They gained the crest, and the
Afghan line was severed, about 2,000 being left about Beni Hissar while
the assault was made upon the peak. The rapid fire from our
breech-loaders swept away such of the enemy as stood firm, while the
bayonet made short work of the ghazis who defended the standards. At
some points twenty and thirty bodies were found lying piled together,
shot through and through by Martini and Snider bullets, showing how well
the volleys had told. In a very short time the majority opposed to the
storming party had broken and fled. A few ghazis fought desperately, but
upwards went the Highlanders in the same gallant style they had shown at
Charasia, and under the same leader, Major White. The Guides, under
Colonel Jenkins, were equally eager, this being their first chance in
the campaign, and they shared with the 92nd the honour of scattering the
defenders of the ridge. One young Highland officer fell a victim to that
uncalculating courage which becomes rashness when pushed to extremes.
Lieutenant Forbes, with only a few men, scaled the ridge, and got
detached from the regiment which was toiling up as fast as the men with
their heavy load of rifles and ammunition could climb. He was left at
last with only Colour-Sergeant Drummond, an old twenty-one years’ man,
and a band of ghazis turned back and attacked him. The Sergeant was shot
down, and Lieutenant Forbes rushed forward to save his body from
mutilation. After cutting down a ghazi he was overpowered and killed
before the Highlanders could save him. Not a man of the ghazis who had
turned back escaped: they were shot and bayoneted on the rocks. As the
attacking party neared the Takht-i-Shah Peak the Afghans deserted it;
and when a party of the 72nd Highlanders and 5th Ghoorkas from the Bala
Hissar side reached the _sungar_, they found the flags still flying, but
no one guarding them. The position had been captured in about two hours,
and as the mid-day gun was fired in Sherpur, the heliograph flashed from
the _sungar_, and the peak was known to be ours. Some of the enemy
ventured too near the Chardeh plain in their retreat, and a squadron of
the 14th Bengal Lancers charged among them, killing between twenty and
thirty.
While the Highlanders and Guides were storming the ridge, an attack had
been attempted from Beni Hissar upon General Baker’s left flank, but the
3rd Sikhs drove back the enemy, who began to move round towards Siah
Sung, and eventually collected in force upon these hills. They were
shelled by our guns, and the 5th Punjab Cavalry were reinforced by two
squadrons of the 9th Lancers, a squadron of the 14th Bengal Lancers, and
the Guides’ Cavalry. Wherever the ground was good, our sowars and
Lancers charged and did great execution. The Afghans fought bravely,
forming up to receive the cavalry with a steadiness that trained
infantry would not have surpassed, and reserving their fire until the
horses were close upon them. One brilliant charge by the 9th Lancers
cost that regiment one officer killed and two wounded, besides the loss
of several troopers. Captain Butson and Captain Chisholme, at the head
of their respective squadrons, swept down upon 500 or 600 men, taking
them on the right and left flank. Captain Butson turned in his saddle as
he faced the enemy, and cried out:—“Now, men, at them for the honour of
the old 9th,” and the next moment he fell dead, shot through the heart.
He was in command of the regiment, the affair of the 11th having sadly
thinned the ranks of the officers, and his death is universally
regretted. Captain Chisholme was shot through the leg, the flash of the
rifle burning his clothes, so steadily had the Afghan in front of him
waited before discharging his piece. Lieutenant Trower was also slightly
wounded, while the Sergeant-Major and three troopers were killed and
seven wounded. The Lancers rode through and through the Afghans opposed
to them, and scattered them all over the plain. The 5th Punjab Cavalry
also made a successful charge, and the Guides twice got well among the
fugitives. Their second charge was upon a body of Kohistanis, who had
crossed the plain east of Bemaru and made for Siah Sung with the
intention of joining Mahomed Jan. They were shelled from the eastern end
of the Bemaru Heights; and, upon seeing General Baker’s force engaged,
halted irresolutely near Siah Sung. They tried to retrace their steps,
but were suddenly charged down upon by the Guides, who had waited for
them behind the northern slopes of Siah Sung. Sixty are said to have
been killed in this charge alone, the Guides chasing them as far as the
Logar river, where the swampy ground checked the cavalry. Altogether the
day’s fighting has been a wonderful success; and though our casualties
are eleven killed and forty-three wounded, the enemy’s loss in killed
alone must have been between 200 and 300. 150 of the 5th Punjab
Infantry, sent out to reinforce General Baker, came upon a large party
of Afghans marching down the Bala Hissar Road. They were at first
mistaken for Highlanders; but when they fired a volley at the officer
who rode up to speak to them, the mistake was soon apparent. The
Punjabees at once extended themselves in skirmishing order among the
willow plantations on each side of the road, and opened a rapid fire.
The Afghans faced about and made for the Bala Hissar, but a company of
the 5th cut off half their number, and in a hand-to-hand fight killed
forty. These men, who are believed to have been from the city, were
really run to earth, and were so exhausted that they could scarcely use
their knives.
One feature of the day’s fighting has been the attitude of the villagers
about Cabul. A straggler from the 92nd Highlanders was found cut up
between Sherpur and the Cabul river; officers riding alone have been
fired at, and pelted with stones; and two villages on either side of the
road to Beni Hissar opened a heavy fire upon our troops. General Baker
halted on his way back to cantonments to burn these villages as a reward
for their treachery. The lives of the men in one were spared on
condition that they fired the other, the gates of which could not be
forced open by our guns. The defenders were shot as they tried to escape
from the ruins. From the Bala Hissar and near the city shots were fired,
and the flanking parties of the 92nd, in their homeward march, came upon
200 or 300 men in the willow plantations, who fled towards the city
walls. A convoy of wounded sent from the Sherderwaza Heights to Sherpur
had also a narrow escape, the bravery of the non-commissioned officer in
charge of the escort alone preventing a catastrophe on a small scale.
After General Baker had captured the Takht-i-Shah Peak, a number of
_dhoolies_, containing officers and men wounded on the 11th and 12th on
the Sherderwaza Heights, were sent down the hill to Sherpur. Sergeant
Cox, with twenty men of the 72nd, was in charge of the _dhoolies_, and
among the wounded were Major Cook, V.C., 5th Ghoorkas; Lieutenant
Fergusson, 72nd Highlanders; and Lieutenant Fasken, 3rd Sikhs. Upon
arriving at the foot of the hill, the road leading under the southern
wall of the Bala Hissar was followed, and it was soon seen that parties
of armed men were lining the parapets. Sergeant Cox, fearing to draw the
fire by striking across the fields towards Beni Hissar, where General
Baker was shelling some villages, put on a bold face, and marched on
steadily. This had the best effect, as not a shot was fired from the
walls. Ten Highlanders were at the head of the _dhoolies_, and ten in
rear. Just as the little party got near the Bala Hissar gate a large
body of Afghans sprang out from among the willows lining either side of
the road, and, drawing their knives, came straight upon the
advance-guard. The road from Beni Hissar joins the road to Sherpur just
at this point, and seeing that it would be impossible to cut through the
enemy, or to retreat the way he had come (as in the latter case the men
on the walls would probably open fire), Sergeant Cox pushed on, ordering
his men to reserve their fire. His object was to get the _dhoolies_
fairly on the Beni Hissar Road on his right, and then to fall back until
help should come from that quarter. The manœuvre succeeded admirably.
Waiting until he was within twenty yards of the Afghans, he ordered the
ten men with him to fire a volley. This was too much for the enemy, who
broke and took cover in the trees. The _dhoolie_-bearers thought all was
over, and those carrying Major Cook dropped their _dhoolie_ in the
middle of the road. They were about to run, when Sergeant Cox threatened
to shoot them down unless they did their duty. They soon recovered
courage, and while rapid volleys from the advance-guard kept the Afghans
in check, all the _dhoolies_ were got safely upon the Beni Hissar Road,
and finally reached General Baker’s force in safety. Sergeant Cox
managed the whole business splendidly, and under such leadership the men
were cool and collected, skirmishing and retiring without being touched
by the scattered fire directed at them. After waiting an hour, the
escort was strengthened by some cavalry, and the little convoy of
wounded reached cantonments in safety. The position in which Sergeant
Cox was placed was a most dangerous one, as the least hesitation or want
of decision would have been fatal: the Afghans were, indeed, so sure of
success, that they did not fire at first, but trusted to cutting up the
guard at close quarters with their knives. The three officers, whose
lives were saved by Sergeant Cox’s steadiness, reported the incident to
Colonel Money, who had sent the _dhoolies_ down the hill. Sergeant Cox
was one of the men decorated with the distinguished service medal on
December 8th for gallantry at the Peiwar Kotal. General Baker’s force is
now safely in quarters again. General Macpherson has sent back to
Sherpur the 72nd Highlanders and the 3rd Sikhs, and, with the 67th Foot
and the 5th Ghoorkas, holds the Bala Hissar Heights and the Takht-i-Shah
Peak. The enemy are still in force above Indikee and at Dehmazung, which
commands the Cabul gorge, and the road into the city has been abandoned.
They may try to work round in that direction—that is, if to-day’s defeat
has not disheartened them. This evening a party of Kohistanis have come
over the Surkh Kotal, and are bivouacking on a hill a mile and a half
west of Sherpur. These are the reinforcements sent by Mir Butcha, who
has no doubt heard of the success of Mahomed Jan on the 11th. The
casualties to-day were eleven killed (two officers) and forty-three
wounded. Of these the 92nd lost one officer and two men killed and
nineteen wounded. The Guides had three killed and eight wounded.
_15th December._
Yesterday the severest fighting we have yet gone through took place on
the Asmai Heights above Deh-i-Afghan, and a lower conical hill adjoining
them on the north. The enemy have been so largely reinforced, that their
numbers are estimated at 40,000, and they have shown a recklessness in
sacrificing life which has hitherto been considered quite foreign to the
Afghan character. There must be many ghazis in their ranks from what we
have seen to-day, and these fanatics always show a contempt for danger
which makes them formidable enemies. They sacrifice their lives,
satisfied if, before death, they have killed a Kafir, and so secured a
future reward. Our own losses have been heavy, and for the first time
our men have had to retire before the enemy, who are wonderfully elated
at their success. It is true it was but an isolated case of a handful of
men having to meet 5,000; but with the evacuation of the position our
men were holding, we lost two mountain guns, which Mahomed Jan is sure
to make the most of as trophies, if he does not turn them against us. To
give in detail the incidents of yesterday:—Between seven and eight
o’clock in the morning some thousands of men were seen gathering on the
slopes above Deh-i-Afghan, a suburb of Cabul lying northwest of the city
upon a low eminence, which overlooks Timour’s tomb. The evacuation of
Dehmazung had, of course, given free passage to such of the enemy as
wished to pass into Cabul and the Bala Hissar, and these now poured out
by way of Deh-i-Afghan and manned the heights. The usual standards were
carried, and in a very short time the sky-line was alive with men, until
there must have been 8,000 or 10,000 looking down upon Sherpur and
within range of our guns. The array extended upwards from the suburbs,
along the crest of the Asmai Ridge, down the dip to the north, and over
the conical hill I have mentioned; while, again, further to the north,
was a higher lumpy hill, on which were a number of Kohistanis, who had
bivouacked there the previous night. General Baker was ordered to clear
the hills, and for this purpose he took out the following troops:—
Four guns G-3, Royal Artillery;
Four guns No. 2 Mountain Battery;
14th Bengal Lancers;
72nd Highlanders (225 men);
92nd Highlanders (45 men under Captain Gordon, who fell in with the
72nd, as the six companies of the latter were so weak);
Guides’ Infantry (460 sepoys);
5th Punjab Infantry (470 sepoys).
This gave a total of 1,200 bayonets and eight guns. The cavalry were
employed in the open to keep in check, or cut up, stray bodies of the
enemy. General Baker left cantonments by the head-quarters’ gate in the
western wall, and made straight towards a mound near Kila Buland, a mile
and a half away, facing the conical hill, on either side of which were
roads leading into the Chardeh Valley beyond. He got his guns into
action at once, in order to clear the way for the infantry attack, and
sent his cavalry round on his right flank towards the Chardeh Valley to
reconnoitre in that direction. The Guides’ Cavalry were ordered out to
reinforce the 14th Bengal Lancers, and were fired at several times from
walled enclosures just over the Nanuchi Kotal. The mountain guns drew
off to a low ridge on which stood the ruins of a fort, Kila Buland, and
shelled such bodies of men as were visible in the direction the cavalry
had taken. The party told off to take the heights were the Highlanders,
under Colonel Brownlow, and Guides’ Infantry, the 5th Punjabees being
held in reserve near the guns. The low, conical hill was captured
without much trouble, but there then remained for Colonel Jenkins,
commanding the attack, the difficult task of taking the Asmai Heights,
every foot of the crest bearing an Afghan firing from behind the
excellent cover given by rocks and boulders. Rising up from the captured
conical hill was a steep hillside, with here and there shelving rocks
hiding men from the view of those above, and up this rugged ground our
soldiers went steadily and rapidly, utilizing every bit of cover, and
answering from time to time the heavy fire they were met with. The guns
shelled two strong _sungars_ which had been built on the northern and
southern points of the crest; and made such practice, that the enemy
began to move downwards towards Cabul. They clustered in masses above
Deh-i-Afghan, where the shells of G-3 could not reach them, and afforded
so tempting a mark, that Sir F. Roberts, who was watching the attack
from the signalling station on the roof of the officers’ quarters in the
western gate, ordered two Horse Artillery guns out to open fire from
under the cantonment walls. A wing of the 3rd Sikhs and some cavalry
went out as escort, and extended themselves into the fields beyond. The
shrapnel fired from these two guns made the hillside almost untenable;
but still in the _sungars_ on the crest a few determined ghazis resisted
the advance of the Highlanders and Guides. Our men fought up, however,
and the _sungar_ on the northern point was taken with a rush. The
banners waving above it were obstinately defended by ghazis, who were
killed to a man. Colonel Jenkins then worked his way under a heavy fire
along the crest, which has a total length of a quarter of a mile; and
there only remained the southern _sungar_, built on the peak of the
hill, to be taken. In this _sungar_, which was unusually strong, were
forty or fifty men who, by their fire, checked the advance for some
time. Major Stockwell, with a few Highlanders, passed through a gap in
the wall which runs down the ridge, and galled the Ghazis by a cross
fire. Private Gillon, of the 72nd, climbed up the wall, and, creeping
along the top, pulled out a standard from among the stones of the
_sungar_. There was an open bit of ground between our front attacking
party and the _sungar_ walls, and this was swept by such a fire that
even the bravest might have hesitated to cross it. Such of us who were
watching the fight saw that the stubborn defence would cost us some
valuable lives; but presently, when the Drummer was seen on the walls,
there was a rush of Highlanders and Guides—one plucky Highlander,
Lance-Corporal Seller, 72nd, leading full 20 yards in front, with a
Guide quite close behind him. As the _sungar_ was neared, most of its
defenders cleared out on the opposite side, but a few Ghazis stood to
their post; one fanatic jumping, knife in hand, on the low stone walls.
The bayonet made short work of such of his companions as had remained.
Lance-Corporal Seller had a tough fight for the last standard on the
_sungar_. As he got up to the wall he pulled the flag out and, at the
same moment, a Ghazi cut down at his head with a long knife. Seller
parried the blow with the standard, and then the Ghazi jumped over and
closed with him. They rolled over together, and another Highlander
bayoneted the Afghan. Seller was cut over the arm, and is now in
hospital. He certainly deserves the highest reward for his gallant
conduct: the “V.C.” has been given for much less. The _sungar_ was
filled with dead men, fifteen bodies being counted in a heap as if a
shell had burst among them. Our loss had been heavy, as much
hand-to-hand fighting at difficult points had taken place; many of the
Guides were cut and slashed by the knives and _tulwars_ of the Ghazis;
while the ranks of the 72nd Highlanders were thinned by numerous
casualties, mostly of a dangerous kind. Lieutenant Egerton, who only
joined the regiment a few weeks ago, was shot through the neck on the
crest of the hill. He showed courage that even an old soldier might have
envied, being always well to the front in the attack. Lieutenant
Frederick Battye, of the Guides, was also shot through the neck at about
the same time.
Colonel Jenkins was now holding the whole crest of the Asmai Heights;
but on the slope towards the city were many thousands of the enemy. The
two guns of F-A Battery shelled them at 1,700 yards, and the mountain
guns, with General Macpherson, were also turned upon them. A wing of the
3rd Sikhs were extended in skirmishing order across the fields towards
Deh-i-Afghan, and with their Sniders were easily able to reach the men
pouring down into Cabul. Deh-i-Afghan, however, held many of the enemy;
and from the house-tops, walls, and orchards about, the 3rd Sikhs were
fired upon. The watercourse gave our sepoys good cover, but still there
were one or two casualties; and General Roberts resolved to sack and
burn Deh-i-Afghan. The two guns of F-A began to shell it vigorously, and
two more guns of the same battery were brought out and joined in the
work. Shell after shell was pitched among the houses, and the defenders
of them drew off before such a fire. Some 1,500, supposed to be Safis
from Tagao, went through the city and made for the Cabul plain so as to
reach Deh-i-Sabz, to the north of Butkhak. Some of them ventured too
near the King’s Garden, outside Sherpur, where the 5th Punjab Cavalry
are quartered, and Captain Vousden charged out upon them and killed
thirty. He had only twelve sowars with him, and of these two were killed
and four wounded; Captain Vousden killed five Afghans with his own
hand.[32] The main body got well away beneath Siah Sung; and although
some Lancers were sent in pursuit, and two Horse Artillery guns went out
under escort of a party of the 92nd Highlanders, the Safis could not be
overtaken. They ran at a sling-trot for miles, just like wolves in a
pack, and had plainly had enough of fighting for the day. We had thus,
apparently, disposed of the body of the enemy (those who had manned the
heights from the city); but there were many more to take their place,
and General Baker, with his 1,200 bayonets, had yet to learn the full
strength that was against him.
-----
Footnote 32:
For this he was strongly recommended for the Victoria Cross.
-----
About midday the signallers with General Macpherson heliographed down
that a vast body with many standards were streaming out from Indikee
into the Chardeh Valley, and were taking a northerly direction, which
would bring them under the hill occupied by Colonel Jenkins. The
movement was well made, and eventually developed into an attack upon the
conical hill which the Guides and Highlanders first stormed. This hill
was held by thirty-three men of the 72nd Highlanders, a small party of
Guides under a Subadar, the whole being under the command of
Lieutenant-Colonel Clark, 72nd. While the upper hill was being taken,
parties of the enemy’s infantry and cavalry were seen coming across
Chardeh from the direction of Kila Kazi, as if to take Colonel Jenkins
in flank, and the conical hill was strengthened by Swinley’s Mountain
Battery, with an escort of 100 men of the 5th Punjabees, under command
of Lieutenant Wilson, of the 10th Hussars, serving for the day as a
volunteer. This gave Colonel Clark about 200 rifles, with which to hold
the hill. The mountain guns opened fire upon the body of Afghans in the
plain, who broke up and dispersed out of range. In the meantime the
enemy from Indikee—to the number of fully 15,000 or 20,000; they covered
the plain for miles—had marched out as if going to Kila Kazi, or
Argandeh. Their array was orderly enough; and when they had all reached
the plain, they suddenly faced about and came down in the shape of a
crescent upon the heights we were holding. Their right flank had for its
object the scaling of a ridge extending down from the southern _sungar_
on the Deh-i-Afghan hill; their centre, the assault of the low conical
hill, which was General Baker’s weakest point; and their left flank
swept round upon the lumpy hill to the north of Colonel Clark’s
position, and commanding it. They seemed to our handful of men to be
myriads as they came steadily on; and although volleys were fired from
the conical hill, and the mountain guns shelled them at short ranges,
they never faltered. They were literally mowed down; but as one Ghazi
fell, another sprang to the front, and their standards were at last
placed on a little mound within 150 yards of our bayonets. Their left
flank had gained the lumpy hill which we had left alone, not having men
enough to occupy it, and a cross fire was opened upon Colonel Clark’s
party. There was a bit of open ground between the mound on which their
standards were placed and the rocks in rear, under which their main body
had clustered in face of our fire; but across this small space numbers
rushed with reckless audacity until, behind their advanced standards,
several hundred men were hidden. Colonel Clark thought that at all risks
they must be driven from this mound, as they might make a rush in
overwhelming numbers: and Captain Spens volunteered to make the attempt.
Taking with him five of the 72nd Highlanders and a few Guides, he made
for a bit of rising ground below the mound and reached it safely. His
fire could not dislodge the Ghazis, who suddenly rushed out upon the
little party. Captain Spens was attacked by four or five men: he cut
down one, but in a second he was overpowered and hacked almost to
pieces. There followed in rear of the Ghazis, who had sprung out, a
dense mass of Afghans, who swarmed up to the thin line of defenders, who
could scarcely hope to stop them. The mountain guns were on Colonel
Clark’s left, and their guard of 5th Punjabees had been, perhaps too
sanguinely, sent forward to repel the attack. Our men lost heart as they
saw four or five thousand men nearly upon them; and when Captain Hall,
with a reinforcement of 150 more of the 5th Punjab Infantry, got near
the crest of the hill, he found such of its defenders as had not been
shot down retiring in disorder. To rally them was impossible at that
point, and they fell back down the hillside. The fire of the enemy at
such close quarters cost us a score of wounded, and the mules of one
mountain gun being shot, it had to be abandoned where it stood. A second
gun was being carried safely downwards when the mule carrying it was
also knocked over. The handspike in the muzzle used for lifting it was
broken, but the gunners rolled it for some yards down the hill until the
Afghans were close upon them, when it also had to be left. Two guns were
thus lost, but fortunately there was but little ammunition left behind.
At the foot of the hill our men rallied, and re-opened fire, which
checked the rush of the enemy. The 3rd Sikhs doubled across the fields
from near Deh-i-Afghan and reinforced General Baker, driving back such
Afghans as had ventured down the slope towards the village where the
guns of G-3 were placed. These guns were withdrawn to a safe distance;
but, although the enemy in half an hour had 10,000 men on and about the
conical hill, they did not venture down to attack. Our cavalry were
ready in the plain to charge down upon them if they gained the fields;
but they had quite a different intention. As I have said, their right
flank were scaling a spur running down from the southern _sungar_ to the
Chardeh plain, and they hoped to cut off Colonel Jenkins and his party.
This soon became evident, as a long string of standard bearers began to
climb up towards the northern _sungar_, following exactly the path taken
by our storming party in the morning. From over the crest of the hill
came the rattle of musketry; and estimating the difficulty of holding
the crest all night, and so weakening the defences of Sherpur, General
Roberts sent word to Colonel Jenkins to evacuate the position.
The enemy has shown such unexpected strength—40,000 men in all are
believed to have been present in Chardeh Valley and in the hills above
Deh-i-Afghan—that it was running considerable risk to keep our garrison
in cantonments short of a man; accordingly at the same time that Colonel
Jenkins was ordered to retire, a message was sent by heliograph to
General Macpherson to hasten back to Sherpur with all his force. He was
to take the road above the Deh-i-Afghan suburb. General Baker was
ordered to hold on to the village he had occupied since the morning
until all the troops from the heights were within the walls. Meanwhile
Colonel Jenkins had met the attack up the spur from Chardeh. Major
Stockwell, 72nd, was sent down a few score yards with a small escort,
who kept up a hot fire upon the advancing masses. A few Ghazis, with
their standards, got from point to point; but they were still at a
respectable distance when the order to evacuate the hill was received.
Major Stockwell withdrew his men from the little _sungar_ they had
built, and retired leisurely, so as to give the Afghans no idea that the
crest also was to be evacuated. Captain Gordon, of the 92nd, was shot
through the right shoulder while this movement was being made. Five
minutes after our men had left their _sungar_ a banner was planted upon
it, showing how rapidly the Ghazis rushed up the hill. Major Stockwell’s
party having been safely withdrawn, the retirement down the hill facing
Sherpur was begun. The enemy, who were nearly at the northern _sungar_,
led by a Ghazi with a green flag, were kept in check by volleys fired by
covering parties thrown out on Colonel Jenkins’s left flank. There was
not the least appearance of undue haste, the Highlanders forming up
quietly to cover the Guides scrambling down, and the Guides then doing
the same in their turn for the Highlanders. The hillside was so exposed
that our casualties were rather severe, among the killed being
Lieutenant Gaisford of the 72nd. Not a man was left behind, however, all
the wounded and dead being brought in. All anxiety about Colonel
Jenkins’s force being now at an end, there only remained General
Macpherson’s brigade to come in. Two companies of the 92nd Highlanders
were marched out to cover them across the plain, and to help General
Baker’s rear-guard in its final retirement; but they were not wanted.
Presently shots were heard in Deh-i-Afghan, and then the baggage of the
brigade was seen entering the fields under a strong guard. The 67th
Foot, 5th Ghoorkas, and 3rd Sikhs followed with the mountain battery,
and, before long, entered the head-quarters’ gate. In coming through the
Cabul gorge, General Macpherson had been able to help the Highlanders
and Guides by his fire. He sent two companies of the 67th, under Colonel
Knowles, to hold a knoll half-way up the slope from Deh-i-Afghan to the
southern _sungar_. Bodies of the enemy tried to rush down the hill to
overtake Colonel Jenkins and even to harass the brigade under General
Macpherson; but the steady shooting of the 67th could not be faced, and
the most adventurous Ghazis being shot down, the rest withdrew to the
crest. Colonel Knowles handled his men with a coolness that could not
have been excelled. General Baker then retired slowly, his rear-guard,
under Major Pratt, 5th Punjab Infantry, by a brisk fusillade for about
ten minutes, stopping the few Ghazis who came down from the conical
peak. By dusk everyone was in cantonments, and we could count our
casualties. They were unusually heavy for Afghan fighting, but have
given us valuable experience, as we no longer despise our enemy. That
Afghans when in overwhelming numbers will fight and rush blindly on,
regardless of loss of life, has been fully exemplified, and we shall no
longer send flying columns over the hills and break up our army into
three weak parts. With Generals Baker and Macpherson both out of
Sherpur, an attack upon cantonments might have resulted in a disaster.
Now that our force is once more concentrated, Sherpur may be looked upon
as safe.
When all our troops were once more in quarters, we had to think about
our defences, though it was highly improbable that Mahomed Jan would try
a night attack. Our men were quite fagged out with all the hill-climbing
they had done to so little purpose; but the majority of them had to turn
out to do picquet duty, and keep a sharp look-out on the walls. Shelter
trenches were hastily thrown up at our weakest points on the Bemaru
Heights; the gates in the walls were barricaded with gun carriages
belonging to the guns captured on October 8th; and we waited patiently
and a little anxiously, it must be confessed, for a night alarm. Every
regiment was told off to particular points, and a reserve—made up of a
wing of the 67th, a wing of the 72nd, and the whole of the 92nd—were
ready to fall in below the gap in the Bemaru Hills in the centre of the
cantonments. We did not fear any attempt to scale the walls; but at
either end of the heights which shut us in on the north were open gaps;
Shere Ali’s line of wall, intended to include the Bemaru Hills within
the fortified square, never having been completed. At the eastern end of
Sherpur, the 28th Punjab Infantry have built a line of huts extending
from near the corner bastion towards Bemaru village; and as the ground
beyond it is covered with walled enclosures, towers, and orchards,
excellent cover would be given to an attacking force which might gather
under cover of darkness, and make a rush to get in. On the 14th,
_abattis_ had been laid, the orchards near giving plenty of wood, and
above Bemaru village were strong picquet posts and trenches which
commanded the road leading from Kohistan. Two guns of G-3 were at this
point, but they were withdrawn, as to remove them in face of a
determined attack would have been nearly impossible, the ground towards
camp being very steep and much broken up. Wire entanglements, made with
telegraph wire and tent-pegs, were laid down, wherever there was open
ground over the walls, and extra vigilance was shown by sentries. The
block-houses on the crest of the Bemaru Heights were also filled with
our men, ready to reinforce any points assailed. But the night passed
quietly, the soldiers being undisturbed even by stray shots. The enemy
were, perhaps, as tired as ourselves, and were holding high revel in the
city and the Bala Hissar, where no doubt they found many friends to
welcome them. Our garrison at Butkhak, consisting of some fifty rifles,
and the whole of the 12th Bengal Cavalry, arrived safely at Sherpur
during the night, it being deemed unwise to leave them so far away from
cantonments. As they also had to be supplied with food from our godowns,
and we could not spare a force to escort convoys across the Cabul plain,
it was necessary they should be brought in. This withdrawal has cut us
off from Luttabund.
To-day (the 15th) has been one of almost absolute quiet. Beyond cavalry
parties patrolling outside Sherpur, our men have not been sent out,
although the Afghans crowded out upon the slopes above Deh-i-Afghan,
inviting us to come out and attack them. There can be no good object
attained, however, in again storming the heights, as we cannot weaken
the garrison by telling off a couple of regiments and a mountain battery
to hold the hills when captured. We had not, either, ammunition to throw
away; there are only about 300 rounds per rifle of Snider and
Martini-Henri, and we are as yet uncertain when reinforcements from
Gundamak, bringing a further supply, will reach us. Luckily the
telegraph remained open until five o’clock this morning, so full
particulars of our condition were sent down the line. General Charles
Gough has been ordered to bring in his brigade as quickly as possible;
and he is now concentrating them at Jugdulluck. Colonel Hudson,
commanding at Luttabund, has been ordered to hold on with the 300
Pioneers and the 28th Punjab Infantry, until General Gough reaches him.
He will then come on to Sherpur. With the arrival of the brigade we
shall be able, not merely to hold Sherpur in comfort, but also to send
out 2,000 or 3,000 men to attack Mahomed Jan in whatever position he may
take up. With more ammunition for our batteries, we can shell
Deh-i-Afghan, the Bala Hissar, and even Cabul itself if occasion
requires. At present we cannot afford to waste shells; as in the case of
any check to General Gough’s brigade, we should have to rely upon our
own strength until more troops could be sent forward from Jellalabad,
and further down the Khyber line. We must make our calculations on this
basis until we hear of the brigade from Jugdulluck being at Luttabund or
Butkhak, which they should reach by the 19th or 20th at the latest.
Asmatullah Khan, of Lughman, with his powerful section of Ghilzais, is
reported to be anxious to join Mahomed Jan with 10,000 or 15,000 men,
and he may try to intercept the force moving from Gundamak. As he would
leave his villages west of the Darunta cliff at the mercy of a flying
column from Jellalabad, he may, perhaps, hesitate before taking such a
step. The Safis of Tagao, who returned to their homes yesterday
afternoon, before our reverse, will soon learn that Cabul is still in
the possession of Mahomed Jan, and they also may try to block the
Luttabund Road.
Our losses in yesterday’s action were very severe, and among our wounded
are many dangerous cases. The proportion, usually, of severe wounds is
one-third out of the total wounded, but nearly every case now in
hospital is “severe.” The list of casualties from the 10th to the 13th
and on the 14th is as follows:—
CASUALTIES FROM 10TH TO 13TH DECEMBER.
─────────────────────────┬───────────────────────────┬──────────────┬──────
Regiment. │ British. │ Natives. │Total.
─────────────────────────┼─────────────┬─────────────┼───────┬──────┼──────
│ Officers.│ Men. │ │ │
─────────────────────────┼──────┬──────┼──────┬──────┼───────┼──────┼──────
│ K.│ W.│ K.│ W.│ K.│ W.│
F-A, Royal Horse │ 1│ —│ —│ 1│ —│ —│ 2
Artillery │ │ │ │ │ │ │
No. 2 Mountain Battery │ —│ —│ —│ —│ —│ 2│ 2
9th Lancers │ 3│ 4│ 21│ 16│ —│ —│ 44
5th Punjab Cavalry │ —│ —│ —│ —│ 3│ —│ 3
14th Bengal Lancers │ 1│ —│ —│ —│ 7│ 4│ 12
67th Foot │ —│ —│ —│ 2│ —│ —│ 2
72nd Highlanders │ —│ 1│ —│ 5│ —│ —│ 6
92nd Highlanders │ 1│ —│ 2│ 21│ —│ —│ 24
3rd Sikhs │ —│ 2│ —│ —│ 4│ 10│ 16
Corps of Guides │ —│ —│ —│ —│ 3[33]│ 9│ 12
5th Punjab Infantry │ —│ —│ —│ —│ 1│ 10│ 11
5th Ghoorkas │ —│ 2│ —│ —│ 1│ 10│ 13
─────────────────────────┼──────┼──────┼──────┼──────┼───────┼──────┼──────
Total │ 6│ 9│ 23│ 45│ 19│ 45│ 147
─────────────────────────┴──────┴──────┴──────┴──────┴───────┴──────┴──────
CASUALTIES ON 14TH DECEMBER.
─────────────────────────┬──────┬──────┬──────┬──────┬───────┬──────┬──────
│ K.│ W.│ K.│ W.│ K.│ W.│
No. 2 Mountain Battery │ —│ —│ —│ —│ 1│ 6│ 7
5th Punjab Cavalry │ —│ —│ —│ —│ —│ 8│ 8
14th Bengal Lancers │ —│ —│ —│ —│ —│ 5│ 5
67th Foot │ —│ —│ —│ 5│ —│ —│ 5
72nd Highlanders │ 2│ 1│15[34]│ 16│ —│ —│ 34
92nd Highlanders │ —│ 1│ —│ 3│ —│ —│ 4
3rd Sikhs │ —│ —│ —│ —│ —│ 5│ 5
Guides’ Infantry │ —│ 1│ —│ —│ 13│ 27│ 41
5th Punjab Infantry │ —│ —│ —│ —│ 1│ 13│ 14
5th Ghoorkas │ —│ —│ —│ —│ 3│ 2│ 5
─────────────────────────┼──────┼──────┼──────┼──────┼───────┼──────┼──────
Total │ 2│ 3│ 15│ 24│ 18│ 66│ 128
─────────────────────────┴──────┴──────┴──────┴──────┴───────┴──────┴──────
-----
Footnote 33:
Missing.
Footnote 34:
One missing.
-----
The total loss in the five days’ fighting is, therefore, eight British
officers killed and 12 wounded; 38 British soldiers killed and 69
wounded; 37 Native soldiers killed and 111 wounded; or a total of 275
casualties, viz., 83 killed and 192 wounded.
The officers killed on the 14th were Captain Spens and Lieutenant
Gaisford, 72nd Highlanders: those wounded were Captain Gordon, 92nd
Highlanders; Lieutenant Egerton, 72nd; and Lieutenant Frederick Battye,
Guides’ Infantry.
----------------------------