The Siege of Sherpur continued—General Baker’s Attack upon Kila Mir
Akhor—Destruction of the Fort—Telegraphic and Heliographic
Arrangements in Sherpur—News from Luttabund—Despatch of a Convoy to
Colonel Hudson—Movements of the Enemy at the Butkhak Road—Want of
Military Knowledge among the Afghans—Dissensions in their
Ranks—Mahomed Jan offers Terms—Heavy Guns got into Position in
Sherpur—Bombardment of Kila Mahomed Sharif—Failure to dislodge the
Enemy—Arrival of General Charles Gough’s Brigade at Sei Baba—Night
March of the 12th Bengal Cavalry to Luttabund—Occupation of Villages
East of Sherpur by the Enemy—Trustworthy News of a contemplated
Attack—The Preparations to resist an Assault—The Attack of December
23rd—Repulse of the First Attack on the Eastern Trenches—The Attack
renewed—Dispersion of the Enemy—Cavalry Pursuit—Deaths of Captain
Dundas, V.C., and Lieutenant Nugent, R.E.—General Charles Gough at
the Logar Bridge—Return of Casualties.
SHERPUR, _19th December_.
The enemy during the night occupied two strong forts a few hundred yards
beyond the eastern wall, and were in such numbers that their fire
annoyed us in that direction. Near the 28th N.I. lines is a high walled
enclosure, in which sick and wounded sepoys are placed; and in front of
this again, outside the lines, is a small fort in which fifty men, of
the 67th Foot, under Captain Smith, had been stationed during the night
as an advanced post. The fort nearest to them in possession of the enemy
is known as Kila Mir Akhor, named after the Afghan Master of the Horse,
and to-day General Baker was ordered to destroy this. He took with him
400 of the 67th, under Major Kingsley, 400 of the 3rd Sikhs under
Colonel Money, the 5th Punjab Cavalry, two mountain guns of Swinley’s
Battery, and a party of Sappers and Miners. These moved out about eight
o’clock; but the morning was so misty after last night’s fall of snow,
that nothing could be seen twenty yards away. A wall of mist shut out
the view on every side, and it was difficult to feel the enemy and to
test their strength. Just as the guns were being got into action, a
terrific fire from the two forts held by the Afghans was opened upon
General Baker, and several men fell wounded. Lieutenant Montenaro, of
the Mountain Battery, was laying a gun when a bullet struck him in the
chest and lodged in the spine, inflicting a mortal wound. General Baker
moved back the 67th in rear of the fort occupied by Captain Smith, to
act as a reserve, and extended the 3rd Sikhs in skirmishing order
through the orchards to open fire upon Kila Mir Akhor. The guns tried to
get round on the left, but found no position to suit them in the
orchards, and it was then reported that the fort was commanded from the
south-eastern bastion. They were moved into this bastion, and, aided by
two guns of F-A, shelled the place for some time. Covered by this fire,
the 67th advanced to see if the fort were still held, as the fire from
it had slackened. As they were not fired upon, the Sappers, under
Lieutenants Nugent and Murdoch, pushed on with powder bags and got
within the walls, which were surrounded by Major Kingsley and his men.
The towers were mined and blown up, and the buildings set on fire. The
enemy still held the further fort, which was of great strength, with
walls 30 feet high, and beyond some skirmishers of the 67th checking the
fire from its towers, it was left untouched. The enemy were crowded
within it, and were reinforced by men from the Siah Sung Heights. Our
cavalry and a company of the 67th kept a sharp look-out on General
Baker’s left flank in the Kohistan direction, while the towers and
bastions were being blown up, and Kila Mir Akhor having been destroyed,
the force returned to cantonments. This kind of work is full of danger,
as the Afghans make good shooting from loop-holes and behind orchard
walls; and in this skirmish we had six of the 67th and six of the 3rd
Sikhs wounded, besides Lieutenant Montenaro fatally hit.
There was again to-day constant firing at the walls by detached parties
of the enemy, and several casualties occurred—horses, ponies, and
camp-followers being hit. Our men do not answer the fire, except when
certain of their aim, as one rifle discharged from the walls is the
signal for twenty answering shots. The bullets go wide of their mark and
drop into cantonments, doing, as I have said, some damage. A trooper of
the 9th Lancers, while in the open, was badly hit in the chest; and one
of the 3rd Sikhs, while on the Bemaru Heights, was also struck. The
bullet was from a Snider rifle, and must have travelled 1,500 or 1,700
yards. The Ardal Pultun was running short of Snider ammunition, and the
irregulars with them are equally short of lead. Slugs made of telegraph
wire, revolver bullets, and, in some cases, even cartridges have been
picked up within the walls. They were probably fired from Enfields,
smooth-bores, or _jhezails_. They would make an ugly wound at short
ranges, but they are mostly spent by the time they reach us.
Though we are cut off entirely from the outer world, our internal means
of communication are perfect. The heliograph works from the
head-quarters’ gateway to the eastern end of Bemaru, and telegraph
offices have been opened about cantonments by Mr. Luke and Mr. Kirk in
charge of the line. There is plenty of wire left even after so many
hundreds yards have been used for entanglements, and branch lines have
been laid from the chief office to the more distant quarters. General
Roberts is thus kept informed of all that is going on, and much orderly
work is saved by these means. Orders can he transmitted to General
Macpherson and Colonel Jenkins in a few seconds, and troops warned for
duty without the least delay. At night, lamps are used for heliographic
signalling from the gateways and the heights whereon there are no
telegraph offices; and though the light draws fire occasionally, the
signallers have not yet been hit. Such of the cavalry as were picqueted
in the open have been moved nearer to the line of barracks, so as to be
out of fire, and there is now an open _maidan_ where, a month ago, our
tents covered the ground. The ordnance stores have also been moved to a
safer spot than that formerly occupied, in rear of General Baker’s
garden, and the office tents and post-office near head-quarters have
been repitched on safer ground. There have been so many bullets singing
about that away from the shelter of the walls there was positive danger
in walking from point to point. On the northern line, the Bemaru
Heights, no shots have been fired, as the enemy cannot get within range
without laying themselves open to being cut off in the plain beyond by
our cavalry.
We have heard from Luttabund to-day that none of the special messengers,
conveying letters and telegrams, has reached there since the 15th. We
are afraid after this to entrust important letters to the messengers,
who may have taken them to the enemy, or been captured on the road to
Luttabund. Beyond keeping a diary of events, such as I am now writing,
nothing can be done; and it is hardly likely that beyond the mere fact
of being invested and of stray shooting at the walls there will be
anything left to chronicle for a few days.
Major Cook, V.C., as good a soldier as ever served, and a universal
favourite in the force, died this evening. Lieutenant Montenaro still
lives, but paralysis has declared itself, and his death must be a matter
of a few hours. Our loss of officers is painfully great, and the total
casualties of all ranks since December 10th must now be nearly 300. The
9th Lancers have been the worst sufferers: they have lost three officers
killed and four wounded, and twenty-one men killed and seventeen
wounded, or forty-eight casualties in their ranks. The 5th Punjab
Cavalry is the only regiment whose officers have escaped scot-free
during the five days’ fighting, from the 10th to the 14th.
_20th December._
Waiting for the attack has grown so terribly monotonous, that we daily
curse the tactics pursued by Mahomed Jan, who only sends out 200 or 300
sharp-shooters to blaze away their ammunition at our sentries. It has
become so apparent that no real assault is likely soon to take place,
that we are half-inclined to go out and deal with the enemy. But,
fortunately for them, they are in Cabul, and street fighting with our
small force would be almost a useless sacrifice of life. We could burn
the city down certainly; but there are political considerations which
tie our hands, as to destroy Cabul means much more than burning so many
thousand houses. We have still no news of General Gough’s brigade,
although the 20th has come and gone, and now even the most sanguine
among us do not expect the investment to be at an end till Christmas
Day. Our little garrison at Luttabund has had a small fight of its own,
but has come well out of the scrimmage, having killed fifty of the
assailants. Mahomed Jan is afraid to split up his force, or he would
before this have detached 5,000 or 6,000 men to hold Butkhak, and
advance thence to carry the Luttabund Kotal. It is the presence of our
troops at Luttabund and Jugdulluck which has no doubt kept the Tezin
Ghilzais in check; and as Asmatullah Khan seems to be quietly waiting in
the Lughman Valley for further news of Afghan successes, the march of
our reinforcements should be made without a shot being fired—at least as
far as Luttabund. A small convoy of _yaboos_, in charge of their Hazara
drivers, carrying food to Colonel Hudson, was sent from Sherpur last
night, and reached Luttabund safely. Another will be sent to night; but
as parties of the enemy have been seen taking the road to Butkhak, it is
not unlikely that it will be intercepted. The Hazaras are very plucky;
they go out willingly for a small reward, and we are now using a few of
them to carry letters and despatches. They pass out of the north-west
corner, make for the border of the lake, and thence work along the
northern edge of the plain between Sherpur and Butkhak, avoiding the
latter place as much as possible. We are anxious as to the safety of the
bridge over the Logar river, halfway to Butkhak. It is believed at
present to be intact; and unless it is very thoroughly blown up, its
strong masonry piers and arches can be easily repaired. Luckily, we are
not fighting an enemy with many resources. There is no one from Mahomed
Jan downwards who understands, in the first place, how to make an
investment really worthy of the name. To deal with walls such as we have
to defend, the only mode to harass the garrison successfully is to
concentrate an enfilading fire so as to sweep the parapet. We have not
had time to make traverses of sand-bags on the bastions or walls; and
our men would suffer greatly if the bullets, instead of passing
harmlessly over the parapet at right-angles, were directed so as to rake
it from gate to gate. If the enemy threw up earthworks during the night
at some distance from the corner bastions, and fired in a line parallel
to the ditch, they could not fail to do some mischief. As it is, not a
man on the walls has yet been wounded, and our answering volleys, when
fired, have always been effective. Four men out in the open were shot
down by one volley from the marksmen at the south-west bastion, the
range being 450 yards. A Martini rifle, resting in a neatly-cut channel
on the parapet, is, in the hands of cool, collected soldiers, a most
deadly weapon at these short ranges; and as no one is allowed to fire
without an officer’s permission, the shooting is nearly always good. One
of the many rumours from the city was that powder-bags were to be
brought to blow in the gates. In only one case, at head-quarters, has an
attempt been made by us to permanently close the gateways. There is a
strong guard at each, and the open space is usually blockaded with
Afghan ammunition waggons, strong _abattis_ outside being so arranged as
to check a rush. On either side of the waggons, which can be easily
drawn away when troops are sent out, are low walls built up of
flour-bags, from behind which ten or twelve men can command the entrance
if it comes to close fighting. At the head-quarters’ gate strong doors
have been placed on hinges let into the wooden supports to the mud wall
on either side, and gun carriages are closely jammed against these.
Twelve picked men are on duty day and night on the wall commanding the
entrance, and their orders are to reserve their fire until the enemy
with their powder-bags are within twenty yards of the gateway. A strong
wooden platform, with a parapet of sand-bags, stretches from wall to
wall six feet above the gun-carriages, and this post is entrusted to the
care of the thirty Ghoorkas who came up with Sir Michael Kennedy as
escort. Even if the door were blown in, the ghazis at the head of a
storming party would have to face a heavy fire from above, which they
could not return while clambering over the barricade. This gateway would
probably be the one first assailed, as the Afghans know quite well that
General Roberts and his Staff have their quarters within it.
Some of our spies state that the men now holding Cabul have seriously
contemplated an assault; but that their ranks are split up by quarrels
as to the right of tribal sections to appoint a new Amir. Old
Mushk-i-Alam still continues to prophesy that a repetition of the
victory of 1841-42 is sure to come to pass; and, as a first step towards
this, Mahomed Jan has had the coolness to “open negotiations.” One would
be inclined to look upon his self-assurance as ludicrous, were it not
that he has the gratification of seeing us shut up in Sherpur, as if at
his mercy. The propositions offered are of such a “mixed” order that
they seem, at first sight, scarcely serious. One is that we should at
once retire to India, after having entered into an agreement to send
Yakub Khan back to Cabul in the state befitting an Amir; and we are to
leave two British officers of distinction as hostages for the faithful
carrying out of our contract. Another is made on behalf of the
Kohistanis, who offer to accept Wali Mahomed as Amir, if we will march
away without concerning ourselves further with Afghan matters. The
leaders, who have been bold enough to make these proposals, think,
perhaps, that we are as weak as our unfortunate army thirty-eight years
ago, and that by frightening us into concessions they will be able to
cut us up in detail as we toil back to Peshawar. As all the advantages
of arms, equipment, and ample supplies are now on our side, we only
laugh at the terms so considerately offered. “We have a lakh of men:
they are like dogs eager to rush on their prey! We cannot much longer
control them!” is said to have been one of the messages sent to shake
our faith in our own strength; but such absurd vapouring is taken at its
real value, and contemptuously passed over. Yet a few days, and we shall
have 6,000 men hammering at the gates of Cabul; and unless our soldiers
belie themselves, there will be a great revenge taken for the
humiliation our army has had to endure. The idea of creating a new Amir
has turned the heads of our foes to an extent that is absurd when it is
remembered that they are merely in Cabul on sufferance for a few days
until our reinforcements come up. The Kohistanis, who have nominated
Wali Mahomed, are at loggerheads with the Ghilzais from Logar and
Wardak, who wish to put Yakub Khan’s son, young Musa Jan, on the throne.
They are politicians enough to know that Yakub himself will never he
sent back as ruler of Afghanistan, and nothing would suit them better
than to have an infant as Amir, and their own chiefs as a Council of
Regency. Such a government would be on lines which would give full scope
to ambitious men, and the country would be plundered for the benefit of
the Ghilzais and their friends. In this wrangling about the Amirship,
the more warlike work, ready at hand, is forgotten, though the more
fanatical have held councils of war and told off leaders to various
sections which are to assault Sherpur at a given signal. There is,
however, but little attention paid by the rank and file to the commands
of their leaders; and though when a ghazi rushes upon his death, a
handful of desperate men will follow him, the great majority hang back
when they see the task before them.
The firing into cantonments to-day was of the usual desultory kind, and
our mountain guns pitched a few shells into such gardens as contained
fairly large bodies of men. Two Highlanders were wounded while on
picquet duty at the line of entrenchment from the commissariat godowns
to the Bemaru gorge. Kila Mahomed Sharif, so well known during the
disastrous winter of 1841, still stands near the site of our old
cantonments between Sherpur and the Cabul river, overlooking the road
from the Bala Hissar. From this fort, which is only 700 yards from the
72nd Gateway, men fired at the southern wall all day, while others could
be seen, with rifles slung across their backs, superintending the
carrying away of the _bhoosa_ stored by the 5th Punjab Cavalry in a
village near for winter consumption. Hazara coolies were made to do this
work, and also to dismantle the cavalry quarters in the “King’s Garden,”
which, as before stated, we have abandoned. This morning three
18-pounders and an 8-inch howitzer, part of the siege train given to
Shere Ali by the Indian Government, were got into position on the
bastions east and west of the 72nd Gateway, and to-morrow these will
open upon Kila Mahomed Sharif and the villages in rear. We want
40-pounders at least to batter down the thick walls of the fort; but
still the heavy guns now ready to be fired will probably have a good
effect upon the enemy. Round shot will be used for these 18-pounders,
and bits of iron, bullets, &c., have been sewn up in canvas to serve as
canister if the enemy make any demonstration in force. There was no
difficulty in getting the guns and howitzer up the bastions, twenty or
thirty men at the drag-ropes moving them easily into position. It is
strange that guns which were given to Shere Ali as a reward for his
fidelity to the British should now be turned against the Afghans, who
have shown themselves unable to appreciate the value of an alliance with
India. Now that the siege train has returned to our possession we shall,
perhaps, be less confiding in handing over munitions of war to a nation
which has treated us so treacherously.
Beyond throwing out our usual cavalry videttes, we have done nothing
to-day to show the enemy we are on the alert. The cavalry have been
terribly hard worked since the 10th, and horses and men have suffered in
consequence. At one period the saddles were never taken off the horses
of the 5th Punjab Cavalry for sixty hours, and the other regiments have
been nearly in the same condition. Lieutenant Montenaro died this
evening from the effect of the wound received yesterday. This makes the
tenth officer we have lost in as many days, and there are still eleven
others under treatment for wounds.
_21st December._
The three 18-pounders and the howitzer opened fire about ten o’clock
this morning upon Kila Mahomed Sharif, and fired round-shot and shell at
its walls and the village in rear, where the enemy mustered in strength.
The bombardment was so far successful that the fire from the fort at our
walls ceased; but the thick walls were too strong to be battered down by
anything under a 40-pounder; unless, indeed, our guns had been kept
playing upon it for two or three days. After three or four hours’
incessant firing, a party of the 5th Punjabees went out, accompanied by
Major Hanna, of the Quartermaster-General’s Department, to examine the
place, and see if the enemy had really withdrawn. It was soon found that
they were only hiding themselves from the shot and shell; and when the
Punjabees got in the open, the Afghans rushed back to their positions
and re-opened fire. They used the holes made in the walls by the
round-shot as loop-holes, and it must be confessed they were admirably
adapted for the purpose. All day long bullets have been dropping over
the walls, and five soldiers and several camp-followers have been
wounded. The tactics of the enemy are annoying, as they withdraw at the
first sign of our men moving out, and return again as soon as we retire.
Two or three of their marksmen are daily posted to the same points, and
blaze away steadily at any one incautiously peeping over the parapet.
Our men quietly sit down inside, smoke their pipes, and laugh at the
bullets. A few watch the movements of the sharp-shooters; and as soon as
they show in the open, a volley from four or five Martinis is fired,
generally killing one or two men. One of the Afghan modes of skirmishing
is for a few men to get in rear of a wall, cut holes through the bottom
a few inches above the ground, dig another grave-like hole in which to
lie down flat, and then to fire their pieces from their loop-hole. The
effect is very singular: the flashes seem to leap out of the ground
itself, and when a score of men are firing, the bottom of the wall
bristles with flame. This manner of firing gives greater steadiness of
aim, and is far safer than resting the rifle on the wall-top, or
thrusting it through a slit cut half-way up. This afternoon the enemy
showed in large numbers in the orchards about Deh-i-Afghan, and were
plainly trying to skirmish round towards the north-west gap between the
walls and the Bemaru Heights. General Hills commanding at that corner
sent out a party of the 5th Punjab Infantry and 3rd Sikhs to occupy some
low hills half a mile from the north-west bastion; and these were enough
to intimidate the enemy, although we never fired a shot from our rifles.
The guns shelled the orchards, and, at dusk, the usual retirement of the
Afghans to the city followed. The Sikhs and the Punjabees were then
withdrawn to their lines, and all made snug for the night. We have
materially lessened the number of men on the walls and bastions to-day,
as the duties are so severe, but everything is held in readiness to
repulse an assault at a few minutes’ notice. As the Martini ammunition
is rather short, Sniders are served out to the Europeans behind the
parapets at night. We have plenty of Snider cartridges, as a large
quantity was captured in the Bala Hissar.
To-day heliograms were exchanged with Luttabund, and news was received
from General Hugh Gough, who is at Sei Baba with 1,400 men and four
mountain guns. He will reach here on the 24th at the latest, and then we
shall be able to turn the tables on Mahomed Jan and his 30,000 or 40,000
men. Our second convoy of _yaboos_ to Luttabund was cut off, only four
ponies out of fifty reaching Colonel Hudson safely. The villagers _en
route_ are believed to have killed the Hazara men in charge. The 12th
Bengal Cavalry start to-night for Butkhak, whence they will join General
Gough’s force. This is the first sign of the approaching termination of
the siege.
The Lieutenant-General commanding has published the following Divisional
Order, expressing regret at the death of Major Cook, V.C., 5th
Ghoorkas:—“It is with deep regret the Lieutenant-General announces to
the Cabul Field Force the death, from a wound received on the 12th of
December, of Major John Cook, V.C., 5th Ghoorkas. While yet a young
officer, Major Cook served at Umbeyla in 1868, where he distinguished
himself; and in the Black Mountain campaign in 1868. Joining the Kurram
Field Force on its formation, Major Cook was present at the capture of
the Peiwar Kotal: his conduct on that occasion earning for him the
admiration of the whole force, and the Victoria Cross. In the return in
the Monghyr Pass, he again brought himself prominently to notice by his
cool and gallant bearing. In the capture of the heights at
Sang-i-Nawishta, Major Cook again distinguished himself; and in the
attack on the Takht-i-Shah Peak, on the 12th December, he ended a noble
career in a manner worthy even of his great name for bravery. By Major
Cook’s death Her Majesty has lost the services of an officer who would,
had he been spared, have risen to the highest honours of his profession,
and Sir F. Roberts feels sure the whole Cabul Field Force will share in
the pain his loss has occasioned him.”
_22nd December._
We have been left almost undisturbed to-day, and it has been hard to
believe we are really in a state of siege. Scarcely a shot was fired at
the walls until the evening; but our spies bring in news that Mahomed
Jan is reserving his strength for an attack, which shall be final. He
has heard, no doubt, of General Gough’s approach, and is wise enough to
know that his opportunity is fast slipping away. The advance-guard of
our reinforcements is now at Luttabund; and the fact of the 12th Bengal
Cavalry going out from Sherpur last night must have shown him that we
are once more equal to sending troops down our old line of
communication. The 12th Bengal Cavalry had a fearful journey outwards.
On passing Kila Mahomed Sharif, on their way to the Cabul bridge, they
were fired upon by a picquet, and, the alarm being given, the enemy
turned out and blocked the way. The cavalry turned off from the road,
and struck the river lower down. The water was not very deep, but the
banks were steep and slippery, and men and horses fell backwards as they
tried to climb up the further bank. It cost two hours to ford the river,
the last squadron having to dismount in the stream, crawl up the bank,
and drag their horses after them. The sowars were wet through, and two
or three horses were drowned. Once over, the road to Butkhak was taken,
and from every village on the road turned out a few men, who fired upon
the horsemen. They, perhaps, mistook them for another convoy of
_yaboos_. The dismounted men had to be left to return to Sherpur, under
cover of the darkness. Upon nearing Butkhak, a patrol was sent out; and
as it was then near daybreak, they could see men moving about the
village. The place was occupied by several hundred Afghans, who opened
fire upon the cavalry. The latter could not stay to fight; and Major
Green, in command, knowing how impossible it was to return to
cantonments, resolved to push on to Luttabund. One sowar was shot dead
and three others wounded; and the enemy followed so closely that a
squadron was dismounted and ordered to skirmish out with their carbines.
This gave time for all stragglers to be got together again, and in a
short time the skirmishers were recalled and the whole regiment trotted
off to Luttabund. Twelve men were missing, but ten have since reported
themselves at Sherpur. They disguised themselves by altering their
uniform, and then hid away in nullahs until evening, when they crept out
and made a wide _détour_ to the north until they reached the open plain
between the Wazirabad Lake and the Bemaru Hills. Their horses and
accoutrements were lost. The enemy have occupied the village of Khoja
Durwesh, about three miles to the east of Sherpur, and are reported to
be collecting in force in the forts between Bemaru and this village.
They are probably Kohistanis, who have taken the precaution of securing
their line of retreat in case of defeat.
Sunjub, a trustworthy retainer of Ibrahim Khan, a ressaldar of native
cavalry in our service, has come in from Cabul and reported that Mahomed
Jan and the other chiefs have at last made up their minds to assault
Sherpur. The fighting men in Cabul have been told off to various
sections of attack, and the signal for the assault is to be the kindling
of a beacon fire of damp gunpowder, oil, &c., on the Asmai hill.
Forty-five scaling-ladders have been given to 2,000 men stationed in the
King’s Garden, and Kila Mahomed Sharif, and a demonstration with these
is to be made against the southern wall near its western end. This is to
be a false attack. The real assault is to be delivered upon the Bemaru
village and the eastern trenches; but in case of this assault
succeeding, an attempt, in earnest, is to be made to scale the wall near
the 72nd Gateway. We have made our dispositions accordingly, and the
Reserve will assemble below the Bemaru gorge, at four o’clock to-morrow
morning. The Asmai hill will be watched by many eyes, and when the
beacon light is seen we shall all be ready at our posts. A message has
been sent to General Charles Gough, ordering him to march to Sherpur
to-morrow instead of halting at Butkhak.
_23rd December._
After eight days’ investment Mahomed Jan has at last made his attack
upon Sherpur, and has been beaten off with ridiculous ease, though
nearly 20,000 men must have been sent to take part in the assault. Our
casualties have been very small, and but for an unfortunate accident, by
which two engineer officers were killed by the premature explosion of a
mine, the day has been one of perfect success. The tribal combination
may be looked upon as broken up, for Kohistanis, Logaris, and Wardaks
are reported on their way, in haste, homewards, and our reinforcements
are encamped within five miles of Sherpur. The news brought in last
evening turned out correct to the letter. From four o’clock this morning
nearly all eyes were turned upon the Asmai Peak, and even before the
signal light appeared, sharp firing was heard near the King’s Garden and
the Fort of Mahomed Sharif. Our sentries on the walls in that direction
had been strengthened, but they did not answer the fire, as it was
desirable to get the enemy well within range by encouraging them in the
belief that we were not on the alert. Our men fell silently into their
places; two mountain guns had been placed below the block-house on the
eastern end of the Bemaru Heights, the reserves were standing to their
arms, and the officers in charge of the sections of defence were all at
their posts. At half-past five there was seen on the Asmai Height a
little flash of fire, which in a moment grew to a bright glare, and
streamed up into the air until it must have been seen by all the country
round. For a few moments it burned brightly, as if fed with oil or
inflammable matter, and then died away. As it flashed out, a continuous
fire was opened below the bastions on either side of the 72nd Gateway,
the flashes from the rifles and matchlocks showing that a large body of
men had crept up within 200 yards. The bullets whistled harmlessly over
the walls and barracks, our men still remaining quiet; as, in the
semi-darkness and with the mist still hanging over the fields, nothing
could be seen distinctly 100 yards away. We were waiting for the
development of the real attack, and shortly before six o’clock it came.
From beyond Bemaru and the eastern trenches and walls came a roar of
voices so loud and menacing that it seemed as if an army 50,000 strong
were charging down upon our thin line of men. Led by their ghazis, the
main body of Afghans hidden in the villages and orchards on the eastern
side of Sherpur, had rushed out in one dense mob and filled the air with
their cry of “_Allah-il-Allah!_” The roar surged forward as their line
advanced, but it was answered by such a roll of musketry that it was
drowned for an instant, and then merged into the general din, which told
us that our men with Martinis and Sniders were holding their own against
the attacking force. For ten minutes the roar was continuous, and then
the musketry fire dwindled down to occasional volleys and scattered
shots from the south-eastern bastion to the Bemaru Heights, where the
mountain guns were waiting for daylight before opening fire. The eastern
defences were in charge of Brigadier-General Hugh Gough at the eastern
end of the heights, and Colonel Jenkins of the Guides from the trenches
on the slopes of the hill to the corner bastion facing Siah Sung. The
troops defending the position were the Guides’ Infantry in the trenches
about Bemaru, 100 men of the 28th P.I. in the native hospital, and 67th
Foot. The latter were reinforced by two companies of the 92nd
Highlanders from the Reserve. When the attack was made, it was still so
dark and misty that little could be seen in front of the trenches, and
the orders were to reserve fire until the advancing masses of Afghans
could be clearly made out. Then the men of the 28th were the first to
open fire, and they fired volley after volley at such long ranges that
they effectually scared away even the ghazis from their neighbourhood.
That the fire was not otherwise effective was proved by only one dead
body being found afterwards in front of their lines. General Hugh Gough
from the hillside, hearing such a tremendous fusillade below, fired
star-shells, which burst in the air and showed the attacking force in
the fields and orchards nearly 1,000 yards away. The Afghans opened fire
in turn, but their shooting was wild and ineffective, though the bullets
dropped dangerously about cantonments. The native hospital seemed the
point towards which the enemy worked, taking it perhaps as a landmark to
guide them; but their right flank was directed towards Bemaru and the
trenches on the slopes of the hill. The Guides joined in the fusillade,
and the attack was broken while yet the advanced ghazis were 500 or 600
yards away. Sniders at that distance told with precision, and to make
headway against them was impossible. The bullets searched every yard of
open ground, and made even the orchards almost untenable. To the right
of the sepoys of the 28th were the 67th and the 92nd Highlanders,
waiting with characteristic discipline the order to fire. Through the
mist at last appeared a dense mass of men waving swords and knives,
shouting their war-cry, and firing incessantly as they advanced. The
order came at last for our soldiers to open fire, and the Afghans were
then so close that the volleys told with murderous effect. Some of the
ghazis were shot within 80 yards of our rifles, so patiently was the
attack awaited; while thirty bodies were counted afterwards well within
200 yards’ range. The attack collapsed as suddenly as it had begun, the
Afghans saw what execution men in trenches and behind parapets can do
with breech-loaders in their hands, and they took cover behind walls and
trees, from whence they expended thousands of cartridges, doing us but
little damage. Our ammunition was too precious to be needlessly wasted,
and only when clusters of men got within range were volleys fired to
scatter them. As day broke the two mountain guns, with an 18-pounder and
two of F-A Battery in the corner bastion, shelled the villages and
orchards, and it was believed that the ghazis were too disheartened to
try a second assault. About eleven o’clock, however, after five hours’
skirmishing, they succeeded in getting a few thousand of their more
desperate followers together, and tried again to assault our lines. They
were driven back more quickly than on the first occasion; and could,
indeed, scarcely be said to have advanced 100 yards in their rude
formation of attack. Shortly after this they began to waver and to
slacken their fire, and when their scouts reported, as no doubt was the
case, that a new force was crossing the Logar river, they became a
demoralised mob bent upon seeking safety at the earliest opportunity.
General Charles Gough had left Luttabund in the early morning, and upon
arriving at Butkhak had been able to communicate by heliograph with
General Roberts. The heliograph flashing away to the east in the Cabul
plain must have warned Mahomed Jan of the near approach of our
reinforcements, and the clouds of dust rising between Butkhak and the
Logar river showed him that troops were moving onwards, and would
perhaps take him in rear. In any case the villages east of Sherpur were,
in two or three hours, nearly empty of men; the plain beyond was covered
with Afghans streaming towards Siah Sung and Cabul. The Kohistani
section, to the number of fully 5,000, went away to the north,
homewards, taking their women, whom they had brought down, to witness
their triumph, with them. It was now our turn to attack instead of being
attacked. The guns shelled the fields wherever parties of men were
within range; two guns of F-A and an 18-pounder making grand practice at
so close a range as 300 yards; and the cavalry were sent out by way of
the Bemaru gorge to cut up the fugitives. First of all went the 5th P.C.
with four guns of G-3, R.A., which shelled the villages near Bemaru. By
one o’clock the enemy were completely broken. The 5th P.C. were
fortunate to get among a detached body on the north side of the lake.
When their first charge was over, thirty Afghans were lying dead on the
plain. The 9th Lancers joined them, and soon our horsemen were charging
over the Siah Sung slopes. The main body of the enemy had got well away
to the city, but all stragglers were hunted down in the nullahs in which
they took shelter, and then despatched. Two or three lancers or sowars
were told off to each straggler, and the men, dismounting, used their
carbines when the unlucky Afghan had been hemmed in. Following in the
wake of the 9th Lancers and the 5th Punjab Cavalry came the Sappers,
with every engineer officer in camp, their orders being to blow up and
burn all the villages and forts lately occupied by the enemy. The
cavalry had cleared the fields and open ground of all Afghans, but in
the villages some fanatics remained, and these, fastening themselves up
securely in houses or towers, were blown up by the mines laid by the
engineers. Lieutenant Murdoch had a very narrow escape. Entering a
fortified village he kicked open the door of a house, and was greeted
with a volley from three or four men inside. He was wounded in the neck,
but not dangerously, and as the Afghans refused to surrender, the
blasting charge was laid near the house, and they were killed when the
mine was fired. A sad accident occurred in another fort. Captain Dundas,
V.C., and Lieutenant Nugent, Royal Engineers, had constructed three
mines which were to destroy the walls and towers; and all being ready
they went back to light the fuses. The sappers were drawn up outside
under their European non-commissioned officer, and noticed that two of
the mines exploded almost instantly. Their officers were still within
the walls, and when the dust and smoke cleared away, they were still
missing. Search was made, and the bodies of Captain Dundas and
Lieutenant Nugent were found lying under the _débris_. Both officers
were dead. It is conjectured that the time-fuses, instead of burning
slowly, flared up like a train of powder, and that the mines exploded a
few seconds after the fuses were lighted. We have thus lost two good
officers by an accident which might have been prevented if the equipment
of the Sappers had not been cut down by the parsimony of the Government.
So few fuses were sent up from India when the force advanced upon Cabul
that the engineers had to make others, and these were of course
defective. It was two of these which were being used when the explosion
occurred. While the cavalry were covering the operations of the Sappers,
several thousand men marched from the Bala Hissar and opened fire upon
the 9th Lancers and the 5th Punjab Cavalry on Siah Sung. Several men
were hit, and Captain Gambier, of the 5th Punjab Cavalry, was wounded by
a bullet passing through his thigh. The Cavalry withdrew under the heavy
fire directed against them, and for a few hours the Afghans remained on
the heights with banners planted. They retired to the city at nightfall,
and all the villages between Sherpur and Cabul are now quite deserted.
While the attack was being made on the eastern defences, three or four
thousand men had kept up an incessant fire at the southern wall, and
such a rain of bullets fell about the Commissariat and 72nd Gates that
many of our camp-followers in cantonments were wounded. Kila Mahomed
Sharif and the King’s Garden were full of Afghans, and two 18-pounders
and two mountain guns shelled them until late in the afternoon, while
the marksmen behind the walls shot down such men as retreated across the
open. Dead bodies were seen lying in the fields, and two or three
scaling-ladders, so heavy that six men would have been needed to carry
them, were scattered about on the ground less than a thousand yards
away. When the Afghans on the southern side saw our cavalry sweeping
over Siah Sung, they began to retire hastily to the city, and as they
crossed the road 1,000 yards away from our bastions, they were fired at
from the 72nd Gateway, and many were seen to fall even at that distance.
The men who stopped to carry off the dead behaved in the coolest way,
one Afghan returning again and again to drag off the bodies of his
comrades. Earlier in the day four men were killed by a volley at 600
yards, and two or three who escaped tried to face the bullets which
swept the ground about their dead. Finding it was certain death to
appear in the open, they crawled behind a wall, and with a long crooked
stick dragged their dead away. Several of the best marksmen of Mahomed
Jan, who had come daily to the same posts and fired persistently at the
ramparts, were shot to-day, our men having at last got the exact ranges.
The waste of ammunition on the part of the enemy was enormous; they knew
perhaps that it was their last chance, and they fired round after round
all day long.
From the ladders found in the fields there can be no doubt the feint on
the southern side of Sherpur would have become a real attack if the
eastern line of defences had been forced; but the scaling ladders were
only high enough to reach half-way up the wall, and the assaulting party
could never have gained the parapet. We should have been well satisfied
if they had come on, as their punishment would have been fearfully
severe. On the south-west and west no attack was made: a few hundred men
from Deh-i-Afghan occupied our vidette-hill towards the lake, and
planted a white standard on the crest, but they never fired a shot, and
a few shells in the evening warned them to retire, which they did about
five o’clock. A few standards were also placed in the fields to the
west, but the ghazis with them hid themselves behind little _sungars_
they had thrown up, and did not annoy us at all. The northern line of
trenches along Bemaru Heights were never assailed, the steep hillside
facing Kohistan being clear of cover; and though, once, it was expected
that the gorge would be attacked, and guns were ordered up to the
trenches there, the appearance of the 5th P.C. on the _maidan_ below
checked such of the enemy as were working round from the village north
of Bemaru. In fact, after the first unsuccessful attack, the enemy did
not know what to do, and though their leaders on horseback galloped
about and harangued them, they could never be got together in a cohesive
body. Several of the horsemen were shot, and we are hoping that Mir
Butcha, the Kohistani Chief, is among the number. At any rate, a
horseman who was most energetic was struck by a volley, and immediately
he fell from his horse 200 or 300 men rushed from a village near, placed
him on a _charpoy_, and went straight away across the _maidan_ over the
Paen Minar Kotal, which is on the southern road to Kohistan. The man
must have been a chief of distinction to be thus guarded, for his escort
never looked back upon Sherpur, but hurried their chief away as fast as
the bearers of the _charpoy_ could walk.
To-night we are resting on our arms, but all is quiet in the fields
about Sherpur, and we look upon the investment as at an end. The brigade
under General Charles Gough is halted tonight on the Jellalabad Road at
the Logar river, and is holding the bridge, which after all was never
destroyed by Mahomed Jan. Our reinforcements will march in to-morrow,
but it is scarcely likely there will be any more fighting, as spies from
the city report that the tribesmen are in full retreat. Very glad,
indeed, are we to be once more free after nine days’ close confinement
at Sherpur. As a soldier remarked on the walls when the
Lieutenant-General was making his rounds:—“Well, I should think this is
the first time in his life that General Roberts has been confined to
barracks!” The confinement has harassed men and officers so much that we
dread the re-action: the excitement is over now, and the exposure night
after night in snow and slush must have broken down the health of many.
The worst cases in hospital even now are men suffering from pneumonia:
the wounded are doing well, though some of the wounds are very severe.
Snow has begun to fall again, and winter has now set in thoroughly.
The casualties to-day, including followers, are thirty-two in number.
General Hugh Gough was knocked over by a Snider bullet, which must have
been nearly spent. It cut through his poshteen in the right breast, but
was caught in the folds of a woollen vest, and fell at his feet as he
shook himself together again. The returns for to-day are as follows:—
CASUALTIES ON 23RD DECEMBER.
─────────────────────────┬───────────────────────┬─────────────────
│ British. │
─────────────────────────┼───────────┬───────────┼───────────┬─────
Regiments │ Officers. │ Men. │ Native. │Total.
─────────────────────────┼─────┬─────┼─────┬─────┼─────┬─────┼─────
│ K.│ W.│ K.│ W.│ K.│ W.│
Royal Engineers │ 1│ 1│ —│ —│ —│ —│ 2
F-A, Royal Horse │ —│ —│ —│ 1│ —│ —│ 1
Artillery │ │ │ │ │ │ │
G-3, Royal Artillery │ —│ —│ —│ 1│ —│ —│ 1
No. 1 Mountain Battery │ —│ —│ —│ —│ —│ 1│ 1
No. 2 Mountain Battery │ —│ —│ —│ —│ 1│ —│ 1
9th Lancers │ —│ —│ —│ 1│ —│ —│ 1
5th Punjab Cavalry │ —│ 1│ —│ —│ —│ 7│ 8
67th Foot │ —│ —│ —│ 1│ —│ —│ 1
92nd Highlanders │ —│ —│ 1│ 5│ —│ —│ 6
23rd Pioneers │ —│ —│ —│ —│ 1│ —│ 1
Guides’ Infantry │ —│ —│ —│ —│ —│ 3│ 3
Sappers and Miners │ 1│ —│ —│ —│ —│ —│ 1
3rd Sikhs │ —│ —│ —│ —│ —│ 2│ 2
5th Punjab Infantry │ —│ —│ —│ —│ —│ 2│ 2
28th Punjab Infantry │ —│ —│ —│ —│ —│ 1│ 1
─────────────────────────┼─────┼─────┼─────┼─────┼─────┼─────┼─────
Total │ 2│ 2│ 1│ 9│ 2│ 16│ 32
─────────────────────────┴─────┴─────┴─────┴─────┴─────┴─────┴─────
Of our followers one was killed and six wounded. The total casualties
during the siege and on the day of the final attack were eighteen killed
and sixty-eight wounded (including seven followers killed and twenty-two
wounded).
------------------------------------