Parade of all Troops in Sherpur—Strength of the Garrison—The
Commencement of the December Operations—General Macpherson’s Brigade
at Aoshahr—General Baker’s Flank March upon Maidan—The _Jehad_
preached by Mushk-i-Alam—Strength of Mahomed Jan’s Force—The Plan of
Operations—Defeat of the Kohistanis at Kila Karez—General Macpherson
starts for Argandeh—General Massy’s March up the Chardeh Valley with
the Guns and Cavalry—First Sight of Mahomed Jan’s Army—Unexpected
Strength of the Afghans—The Action of December 11th in Chardeh—Loss
of Four Guns and Repulse of the Cavalry—Defence of the Dehmazung
Gorge by 200 of the 72nd Highlanders—Recovery of the Guns by Colonel
Macgregor—Macpherson’s Arrival at Dehmazung—Attack on the
Sherderwaza Picquet.
SHERPUR, _9th December_.
General Baker’s Brigade returned to Sherpur a few days ago, and the
result of his visit to Maidan is now visible in the large stacks of
_bhoosa_ and the bags of grain near the Commissariat Gate. Sir Michael
Kennedy, Director-General of Transport, with a small party of officers
has arrived from India on inspection duty and is now a guest of Sir
Frederick Roberts. The ex-Amir is now well on his way to India, and the
troops sent to strengthen the posts between Cabul and Jugdulluck have
returned to quarters. So far no attempt has been made by the tribes on
the Peshawur Road to rescue Yakub Khan, but there is much latent
fanaticism about Cabul, and the _moollahs_, who always gave us so much
trouble, may seize upon the deportation of the sovereign as a
rallying-cry.
Yesterday a parade of all the available troops in garrison was held on
the large _maidan_ which lies to the north of the Bemaru hills, and
extends to the borders of the narrow Wazirabad Lake at the foot of the
southern Kohistan hills. No better place for a review of even 20,000 men
could be desired, as the ground is very level, and is covered with short
grass, which prevents dust accumulating. The nominal object of the
parade was to present four men of the 72nd Highlanders with medals for
distinguished service at the storming of the Peiwar Kotal last
December.[30] There were 4,710 men and twenty guns on the ground. The
guns were twelve 9-pounders, belonging to F-A and G-3, and eight
7-pounders of the Mountain Batteries. The following table shows only the
troops paraded; it was necessary, for the safety of the cantonment and
the valuable stores now collected within its walls, that a strong guard
should remain in Sherpur, and 100 men were detached from each infantry
regiment for this work. In-lying picquets were posted, signallers with
heliographic apparatus placed on the Bemaru Heights and over the
Commissariat Gate (that nearest the city), and, to prevent any
incendiarism being attempted, orders were given to refuse admission to
all the Hazara coolies employed on the quarters until the parade was
over. Our _bhoosa_ stacks and wood-piles are so nearly completed now,
that we cannot afford to let them be burnt down.
The following is the full strength of the troops drawn up for the
Lieutenant-General’s inspection:—
KURRAM DIVISION, CABUL FIELD FORCE.
──────────────────────────┬─────────┬─────────┬─────────────────┬─────┐
│ │ │ Non-commissioned│ │
│ │ Native │Officers and Men.│ │
Troops. │Officers.│Officers.│ ————│ ————│Total│
│ │ │British.│ Native.│ │
──────────────────────────┼─────────┼─────────┼────────┼────────┼─────┤
F-A, Royal Horse Artillery│ 5│ —│ 106│ —│ 111│
G-3, Royal Artillery │ 6│ —│ 107│ —│ 113│
No. 1 Mountain Battery │ 2│ 1│ 4│ 80│ 87│
No. 2 Mountain Battery │ 4│ —│ 4│ 74│ 82│
9th Lancers │ 16│ —│ 265│ —│ 281│
5th Punjab Cavalry │ 8│ 11│ —│ 342│ 361│
14th Bengal Lancers │ 7│ 10│ —│ 213│ 230│
67th Foot │ 15│ —│ 439│ —│ 454│
72nd Highlanders │ 18│ —│ 553│ —│ 571│
92nd Highlanders │ 15│ —│ 561│ —│ 576│
23rd Pioneers │ 4│ 6│ —│ 295│ 305│
3rd Sikhs │ 8│ 10│ —│ 525│ 543│
5th Punjab Infantry │ 4│ 11│ —│ 503│ 518│
5th Ghoorkas │ 5│ 8│ —│ 389│ 402│
7th Company Sappers │ 3│ —│ 4│ 69│ 76│
──────────────────────────┼─────────┼─────────┼────────┼────────┼─────┤
Total │ 120│ 57│ 2,043│ 2,490│4,710│
──────────────────────────┴─────────┴─────────┴────────┴────────┴─────┘
-----
Footnote 30:
These were Sergeant-Instructor of Musketry Salmond, Sergeant Cox,
Private McIveen and Private Bonar.
-----
To these have to be added the Staff, which was made up as follows:—
Commanding Cavalry Brigade—Brigadier-General Massy;
Brigade-Major—Lieutenant Brabazon; Orderly Officer—Lieutenant Hearsey.
Commanding 1st Infantry Brigade—Brigadier-General Macpherson;
Brigade-Major—Captain Guinness; Orderly Officer—Captain Macgregor.
Commanding 2nd Infantry Brigade—Brigadier-General Baker;
Brigade-Major—Captain Farwell; Orderly Officer—Lieutenant Kane.
Commanding Royal Artillery—Lieutenant-Colonel Gordon; Officiating
Adjutant—Lieutenant Allsopp.
The parade went off very successfully, and seemed to impress Sirdar Wali
Mahomed Khan, Daoud Shah (the late Commander-in-Chief of the Afghan
army), and other persons of importance who were present.
We mix work and play a good deal at Cabul: for scarcely had the parade
ended than the more serious business of sending out a brigade into the
Chardeh Valley was begun. In the afternoon the following troops, under
the command of Brigadier-General Macpherson, left the cantonment and
marched to Aoshahr, five miles due west of Sherpur:—
6 companies 67th Foot;
7 companies 5th Ghoorkas;
550 of the 3rd Sikhs;
4 guns F-A, Royal Horse
Artillery;
4 guns No. 1 Mountain Battery;
1 squadron 9th Lancers;
2 squadrons 14th Bengal Lancers.
This movement is due to the gatherings in Koh-Daman and Maidan. The
efforts of old Mushk-i-Alam, the Ghazni _moollah_, to raise a _jehad_
have been so far successful, that Mahomed Jan has 5,000 men with him
between Argandeh and Beni-Badam, on the Ghazni Road. This would not have
been of much consequence were it not that pressure had been brought to
bear upon the local villagers, who were bringing in grain and _bhoosa_.
In the Logar Valley our Governor has been defied and the supplies which
were pouring in from that district have almost entirely ceased. We still
want about 15,000 maunds of wheat and 50,000 maunds of _bhoosa_, and as
we are anxious to get it all in before the snow falls, it has been
determined to attack the tribal bands and once more open the road. If
our supplies were collected, we should probably have left Mahomed Jan
alone until he had got a large force together, and then have gone out to
meet him. General Macpherson has halted to-day at Aoshahr, as a plan has
been carefully prepared by which it is hoped Mahomed Jan’s “army” will
be forced to fight. In the carrying out of this plan, two separate
forces will be employed—the second brigade, under General Baker, being
now at Charasia with secret orders. This force is made up as follows,
and is a “flying column” in the true sense of the word:—
450 of the 92nd Highlanders;
450 of the 5th Punjab Infantry;
5 troops of the 5th Punjab
Cavalry;
4 guns of No. 2 Mountain
Battery;
7th company Sappers and Miners
(detachment with gun-cotton).
General Macpherson will to-morrow march up the Chardeh Valley and
endeavour to get between the enemy and the road leading to the Unai
Pass, so as to cut off their retreat towards Bamian. General Baker,
moving in sympathy with the Chardeh Force, will leave Charasia and make
a feint of going up the Logar Valley. This intention will be openly
proclaimed; but, after leaving Charasia a few miles in rear, he will
turn sharply to the south-west and throw himself across the Ghazni Road
below Beni-Badam, cutting off Mahomed Jan’s retreat to Ghazni. The 5,000
men said to have assembled would then be practically encompassed about,
and, being unable to run away, they would probably make a stout
resistance. If General Macpherson can only keep them in play and get
well above them in the Bamian direction, blinding them to the movements
of the other column, we shall at last be able to punish the Ardal Pultan
right smartly. Our information leads us to expect that Mahomed Jan will
fight. He certainly held on to the heights above Cabul, even after we
had reached Beni Hissar on October 7th; and, perhaps, his courage may be
equal to again resisting us. The detachment of so many men has, of
course, weakened the garrison of Sherpur, and the Guides, Cavalry, and
Infantry have been ordered up from Jugdulluck in consequence. They will
probably arrive in a day or two. The Kohistanis have not ventured to
display further hostility to us, but Mir Butcha still keeps about him a
gathering of discontented men, and may try to join Mahomed Jan at
Maidan. Amid all this tribal disturbance it is satisfactory to know that
the Ghilzais, Lughmanis, Shinwaris, and Afridis on our line of
communications with India are still quiet: whether suspiciously so, I
cannot say. Beyond the cutting of the telegraph wire between Dakka and
Jellalabad occasionally, they seem to be on their best behaviour.
[Illustration: Map to Illustrate the Actions of December 11th to 14th.]
_11th December._
The strategical move of two columns out of our cantonment here, to
disperse Mahomed Jan’s force, has had a most unexpected result. The
enemy have beaten us at our own game—has outmanœuvred us—and, instead
of Mahomed Jan being a fugitive, he is calmly occupying the peaks to the
south of the Bala Hissar Ridge, and his standards are flying in sight of
Cabul and all the country round. We have been complaining of want of
excitement here lately, but to-day has given us more than our fill. I
explained in my last letter that Brigadier Macpherson moved out, on
Monday, to Kila Aoshahr, just through the Cabul gorge and at the eastern
end of the Chardeh Valley; while Brigadier Baker, on the following day,
marched to Charasia, and intended cutting off Mahomed Jan’s retreat, on
the Ghazni Road, at Maidan. Yesterday the force under General Macpherson
left Kila Aoshahr at dawn; four guns of F-A, Royal Horse Artillery, with
an escort of two squadrons of cavalry, drawn from the 9th Lancers and
the 14th Bengal Lancers, remaining on the camping-ground, with orders to
check the retreat of the enemy if they turned towards Cabul. The
infantry, with four mountain guns and a squadron of the 14th Bengal
Lancers, under Colonel Ross, took the Kohistan Road, and finally gained
the Surkh Kotal—a ridge running down from the Pughman Range, and
dividing Chardeh from the Koh-Daman, the celebrated “fruit country” of
Kohistan. The chief object of General Macpherson was to head back
Mahomed Jan, who was reported to be making for Kohistan, in order to
unite his force with the bands gathered by Mir Butcha at Khoja Serai.
The 14th Bengal Lancers were sent forward to reconnoitre on the Pughman
plain to the north of the _kotal_, and they soon found themselves in the
face of several thousand men near Kila Karez. The whole country seemed
covered with masses of armed tribesmen, and on every low hill banners
were flying. The infantry halted on the Surkh Kotal while the baggage
came up, and preparations were made for dispersing the Kohistanis, who
were plainly on the way to swell Mahomed Jan’s gathering. As
Macpherson’s force formed up on the _kotal_, the enemy advanced very
confidently, and our cavalry were obliged to fall back. Two mountain
guns were got into action, and a few shells broke up the most advanced
bodies. A sufficient guard was left over the baggage, and General
Macpherson then attacked with the following infantry: four companies
67th Foot; six companies 5th Ghoorkas; three companies 3rd Sikhs—two
mountain guns moving with them. The enemy broke and fled in confusion as
soon as our rifles began to make good practice. There was one hill,
defended by _sungars_, at which a few Ghazis tried to make a stand; but
the 67th were not to be denied, and they raced up it in fine form,
driving out its defenders very smartly. The 5th Ghoorkas took by a rush
a hill on the extreme left, and the 3rd Sikhs, in assailing another
hill, were equally successful; but two fanatics jumped over the
_sungars_ and charged upon the men nearest to them, sword in hand. They
wounded two sepoys, and then rushed back to their comrades. The guns
shelled the Kohistanis as they streamed away up the valley, and the
cavalry, dismounted, also fired at a few hundred yards into them. The
watercourses and enclosures prevented the Lancers charging. The
Kohistanis, who were commanded by Mir Butcha in person, lost heavily;
many bodies were found on the ground by our men, and many of the dead
were seen to be carried off. Our casualties were—one man 67th, two
Ghoorkas, and four of the 3rd Sikhs, all wounded. Major Fitz-Hugh,
commanding the Ghoorkas, received a slight flesh-wound from a bullet in
the right leg. He was not so badly hurt as to be incapacitated from
duty, though, at the Lieutenant-General’s request, he has since remained
in cantonments. Having thrashed Mir Butcha, General Macpherson encamped
for the night at Mahomed Surwar Khan’s Kila, close to Kila Karez, ready
to deal with Mahomed Jan on the following day. The presence of a large
force of sepoys and tribesmen at and near Argandeh, on the Ghazni Road,
14 miles from Sherpur, was known beyond doubt: and General Macpherson’s
aim was to get between them and the Unai Pass leading to Bamian, so as
to drive them down towards Maidan, where General Baker was waiting with
950 infantry, five troops of the 5th Punjab Cavalry, and four mountain
guns. There was a chance that Mahomed Jan would break back into the
Chardeh Valley, towards Cabul, but it was not believed that he had with
him a sufficient number of men to do any mischief in that direction. He
had, however, double the force reported (5,000), and was sufficiently
confident to take the bold step of entering the valley. Whether he
contemplated an attack upon Sherpur, knowing there was nothing between
him and the cantonments, except a small party of cavalry and four guns,
is not known; but if he had learnt the weakness of the place, such an
attempt was highly probable. In any case, while General Macpherson
marched from his camp at the fort, where he had passed the night, and
took the path to Argandeh behind a range of hills running right across
the Chardeh Valley from the Surkh Kotal, the enemy, to the number of at
least 10,000, debouched into the villages on the Cabul side of the
range, and waited there the movements of our troops. They were rewarded
for their manœuvre by the appearance of the Horse Artillery guns and
their small escort of cavalry, making their way to join the infantry at
Argandeh. This movement of our guns and the after-events, which have
been extremely serious, can best be explained by following the action of
the cavalry from the evening of yesterday.
The four Horse Artillery guns, under Major Smith Windham, were, as I
have said, left at Kila Aoshahr with an escort of cavalry. They were
ordered to move this morning along the Argandeh Road to rejoin the
infantry, and they started, with this object in view, under the command
of Colonel Gordon, R.A. Brigadier Massy, with another squadron of the
9th Lancers, from Sherpur, overtook them soon after starting, and took
command of the whole. He had then as escort to the four guns of F-A, 170
troopers of the 9th Lancers (under Lieutenant-Colonel Cleland) and 44
sowars of the 14th Bengal Lancers (under Captain Neville), or a total
strength of 214 lances. A troop of the 9th Lancers (43 strong), under
Captain Butson, had been sent off by General Massy to open
communication, if possible, with General Macpherson. General Massy made
Kila Kazi on the Ghazni Road his objective point, that being about 4
miles distant; and he reached this without incident. Just after it had
been passed, however, his advance-guard, which consisted of a troop of
the 9th Lancers under Captain Gough, reported the enemy in sight on the
hills in front. It soon became apparent that the Afghans had thrown
themselves across the Argandeh Road, but as only 2,000 or 3,000 appeared
in sight, it was thought they were fugitives flying either from General
Macpherson or General Baker. As they began streaming down from the hills
General Massy got his guns into action at 2,900 yards, which range, at
Colonel Gordon’s suggestion, was changed to 2,500, and 2,000 yards, the
guns advancing towards the left to make their fire more effective. After
a few shells had been fired, the enemy showed themselves in full force
and advanced in skirmishing order upon the guns and cavalry. Their line
of advance was fully two miles in extent, and was of good formation.
There were about 4,000 men thus extended in the shape of a crescent, and
in rear of them was an irregular body, numbering 6,000 more. Thus
Mahomed Jan’s force was found to be 10,000 strong, instead of 5,000. It
was admirably led, and boasted thirty or forty standards, mostly common
red, white, or green cloth floating at the end of a rude staff 12 or 13
feet long. Though the shells from the four guns were pitched into the
thick of the enemy, no effect was produced in the way of breaking the
line of advance. It never wavered, but came steadily on; and as General
Massy had no infantry with him, he was obliged to retire. The guns
changed position “right back,” and re-opened fire at 1,700 yards.
Bullets from Snider and Enfield rifles began dropping among the cavalry
and the gunners, but no casualties of any moment occurred. Thirty of the
9th Lancers dismounted and opened fire with their Martini carbines, but
the enemy were too numerous to be checked by so small a body of men—a
regiment of infantry was what was required. While the artillery was thus
in action, Sir F. Roberts and Staff, with Sir Michael Kennedy and party,
joined General Massy, having ridden out from Sherpur to watch the
movements of the brigade. The fire from the steadily-advancing line of
the enemy was well sustained, and to check their forward movement and
cover the retirement of the guns the cavalry were ordered to charge.
When General Roberts sent instructions to General Massy to order the
Lancers to charge, as the enemy were approaching dangerously near to the
guns, Colonel Cleland, with one squadron of the 9th Lancers (126
lances), was directly in face of the Afghan line, with the 44 sowars of
the 14th Bengal Lancers in rear, some distance nearer the guns. The
other troops of the 9th (44 lances) under Captain Gough, which had been
acting as the advance-guard, were away on General Massy’s right flank,
watching the Afghans in that direction. When the charge was sounded
Colonel Cleland led his squadron straight at the advancing masses, the
14th Bengal Lancers following in his wake, but not close up, as the
order to charge had not reached them so quickly. Captain Gough, with his
troop of the 9th, seeing his Colonel charging, also took his men into
action on the enemy’s left flank. Some 220 men against 10,000 were odds
that could scarcely be expected to turn in our favour; but the Lancers
had to risk a heavy loss in the hope of saving the guns. The three
bodies of men disappeared in a cloud of dust as they headed for the
masses of the enemy, and nothing could be seen for a few moments of the
fight. Then riderless horses came galloping back, followed by scattered
parties of troopers, evidently quite out of hand. They had been received
with a terrific fire, which had killed many horses and men, and, upon
trying to force their way through the enemy, had been surrounded and
their progress blocked by sheer weight of numbers. Men and horses went
down in the _mêlée_, and, once down, there was but a faint chance of
being rescued. In one or two instances, however, men were dragged from
under their dead horses, mounted on others, and got well away out of the
ruck.[31] Even among Sir F. Roberts’s party watching the fight, bullets
fell thickly, killing three or four horses under their riders and
wounding others. When the dust cleared away, it was seen that the
cavalry charge had made no impression upon the enemy, who were still
advancing steadily across the fields, waving their knives and _tulwars_,
and carrying their banners more proudly than ever. Mounted men were
galloping about from end to end of their line, directing their movements
and keeping them well together. The fire from their Sniders and Enfields
was deliberate and well-directed; and though any of our English
regiments would with their Martinis have checked them in a few minutes,
the broken ranks of the cavalry could not hope to stand against them.
The 9th Lancers had suffered terribly in the charge: sixteen of their
troopers, with two officers (Lieutenants Hearsey and Ricardo), had been
left on the ground, dead; their colonel had come out badly wounded by a
sword-cut, and a shot through the side; Lieutenant Stewart Mackenzie had
been disabled by his horse rolling over him; and seven troopers had
received wounds more or less severe. It was Colonel Cleland’s squadron
which was so shattered in this charge. This squadron having lost its
officers, and being broken up by the bad ground, got out of hand; but
Captain Gough’s troop, being more fortunate, served as a rallying point;
while the 14th Bengal Lancers, not getting well into the enemy, as a
nullah checked them, were kept compactly together. The rally was
sounded, and Colonel Macgregor and other officers of the General’s party
collected the Lancers together, while the guns advanced 400 or 500
yards, and re-opened fire. The squadron of the 14th Bengal Lancers had
lost but one officer, Lieutenant Forbes (whose body is still missing),
and with Captain Gough’s troop of the 9th were able still to keep
between the guns and the enemy, now only 1,000 yards off. A second
charge of these two troops, together with all the troopers who had been
collected, was ordered, but it was made in a half-hearted way, the
country being of extraordinary difficulty for horses, and the enemy
swarming behind every tree and the banks of the higher water-channels.
-----
Footnote 31:
The Chaplain of the Force, the Rev. —— Adams, was recommended for the
Victoria Cross for extricating one man, under a heavy fire.
-----
As Major Smith-Windham was retiring with his two guns, which had been
advanced after the first charge, he found one of the other two guns
stuck firmly in a watercourse, Lieutenant Hardy trying vainly to drag it
out with such horses as had got over. This was found to be beyond the
strength of the horses, already worn out by the severe work of the
morning; and as the enemy were closing around on both sides the gun was
spiked and abandoned. Lieutenant Hardy was killed by a shot through the
head while near this gun. The other three guns had been got 400 or 500
yards further on to the village of Baghwana, but were stopped by a
channel deeper and steeper than any yet crossed. Guns, men, and horses
floundered into this, and the guns at least would not come out again;
they, also, were spiked and left in the water and mud, and drivers and
gunners moved off with the cavalry, the villagers firing rapidly upon
them. The long line of the enemy came straight on, passed through the
village, shrieking and waving their knives, and put their faces towards
the Nanuchi Kotal, which leads from the Chardeh Valley to the Western
gate of our cantonments. Sir F. Roberts, with a small escort, had gone
across country towards the village of Dehmazung, commanding the western
entrance to the Cabul gorge. He had sent urgent messages to General
Macpherson to hasten down the valley, and the Brigadier was soon engaged
with 2,000 men, left behind by Mahomed Jan to keep him in play. The
cavalry fight had been watched through telescopes by several officers
with General Macpherson, who had heard the artillery fire. Sending his
baggage under a strong guard of infantry, and a squadron of the 14th
Bengal Lancers, under Colonel Ross, by way of the upper road nearest
Kohistan, General Macpherson marched through a break in the hills and
debouched into the Chardeh Valley. The appearance of his troops away in
their rear seems to have influenced the movements of the enemy, who
turned off from the road to Sherpur, and, swinging their left flank
round, made direct for Dehmazung, with the evident intention of getting
into the city, and occupying the Bala Hissar Heights above it. General
Roberts, upon seeing the new movement, sent off a message by his
aide-de-camp, Captain Pole-Carew, to Brigadier Hugh Gough, commanding at
Sherpur, ordering 200 men of the 72nd Highlanders to double out to the
gorge.
After the second charge, in which the 9th Lancers lost several men shot
down, Captain Gough’s troop did rear-guard work, dismounting and firing,
so as to hold the enemy a little in cheek. Only such Lancers as were
wounded, or had their horses disabled, were sent back to Sherpur, by way
of the Nanuchi Kotal, the rest escorting General Roberts to Dehmazung.
Once the broken squadron of the 9th were got together, they settled down
resolutely to their work of keeping the enemy in play, and their
carbines were used with good effect until Dehmazung was reached. Here
they got cover, and, with the sowars of the 14th, opened a smart fire
upon Mahomed Jan’s force as it streamed up towards Cabul. Alone and
unaided they could not have hoped to stem the rush, and matters were at
a crisis when Colonel Brownlow, with the 200 rifles of the 72nd
Highlanders, arrived. The Highlanders were in the nick of time: Colonel
Brownlow doubled out a company to occupy Dehmazung, the 9th cheering
them lustily as they saw the welcome relief, and soon from the roofs and
walls of the village rapid volleys were being poured into the Afghan
ranks. The enemy streamed down upon the village “like ants on a hill,”
as a Highlander described it, but Colonel Brownlow’s admirable
disposition of his handful of Highlanders soon checked the rush. The men
were told not to throw away a shot; the Martinis soon blazed out in one
persistent line of fire—and such a fire, that even Ghazis shrank from
encountering it. In less than half an hour the enemy were forced back,
and they then split up into two parts—one going on to the south, to
Indikee village, and thence scaling the Takht-i-Shah Peak and the
heights to the south of the Bala Hissar fortified ridge, the other
facing round to the west, as if to get upon the hills south of Kila
Kazi. Their entrance into Cabul had been frustrated, and all that was
left to them was to raise their standards on the hills they had occupied
and flourish their knives in defiance at distant Sherpur. This they did,
as we could see plainly enough through our binoculars.
In the meantime General Macpherson had fallen upon a large body of
Afghans higher up the valley, and with the 67th Regiment and the 3rd
Sikhs had completely broken their ranks and pursued them towards
Argandeh. General Macpherson did not then know of the loss of the guns,
but in facing round towards Cabul he came upon the scene of the charge,
and was then able to recover the bodies of Lieutenants Hearsey and
Ricardo and of the troopers killed in action. His own loss was not
heavy, Lieutenant Cook of the 3rd Sikhs being the only officer wounded.
Sir F. Roberts remained at Dehmazung until Macpherson’s force reached
it, about nightfall; and then, leaving the Brigadier with his men
encamped below the gorge, where Wali Mahomed had a camp with some
mountain guns (he was preparing to start for Turkistan), the
Lieutenant-General returned to Sherpur. He had before received the news
that the guns had been pulled out of the watercourses into which they
had fallen, and were on their way to cantonments. How they were
recovered, well deserves telling.
When Sir F. Roberts trotted across to the Cabul gorge, there were
Lancers, gunners, and drivers, making their way towards Sherpur, and
most of them were out of hand, their officers having been either put out
of action or being missing. At the Nanuchi Kotal, facing the western end
of Sherpur, most of these rallied about Colonel Macgregor, Captain Dean
also having gathered some stragglers together. When the enemy veered off
towards Dehmazung, Colonel Macgregor saw that the village of Baghwana,
near where the guns were lying, was not guarded by any of Mahomed Jan’s
rear guard, and he thought there might be a chance of recovering the
guns without waiting for General Macpherson’s advance. With a scratch
lot of Lancers and Artillerymen, he accordingly followed the upper
Argandeh Road; and, beyond stray shots from villagers (who, as on
October 8th, blazed at us whenever we were within range), the party met
with no opposition. The baggage of Macpherson’s brigade was met making
its way to Sherpur; and as the enemy were then well on their way to
Indikee, Colonel Macgregor took thirty men of the 67th, and about the
same number of Sikhs and Ghoorkas—sixty in all—and, extending them in
skirmishing older, made for the abandoned guns. On arriving at the
village he placed his men in an enclosure well adapted for defence
against any numbers; and such artillerymen as were with him set to work
to get out the guns. This was done after a long struggle, and then it
was found that teams sufficient only to give four horses per gun were
present. The rest had galloped into Sherpur with their officer, Major
Smith-Windham. With no artillery officer, but with the Chief of the
Staff, rests the credit of recapturing the guns. Colonel Ross was told
to bring them safely into camp with the baggage escort and the scratch
gathering of mounted men, and this he did.
Our losses in the day’s action, so far as the R.H.A. and the cavalry are
concerned, are four officers killed, two wounded, and twenty-three men
killed and ten wounded. The officers killed and wounded were well to the
front in the desperate charge their squadrons made upon the unbroken
masses of infantry, and most of them were hit by the volley which the
enemy poured into them as they got to close quarters. Colonel Cleland,
in spite of his two wounds, was helped into the saddle and rode eight
miles to Sherpur, fainting as he was lifted from his horse into a
_dhoolie_ at the gate. The bodies of those killed were brought in, and,
I am sorry to say, they had been fearfully mutilated. The passions of
our men are likely to be dangerously aroused in future fighting by the
remembrance of these mutilations, which will not bear description.
In Sherpur, an anxious afternoon was passed. When stragglers from the
9th Lancers and F-A battery rode in, wounded, mud-splashed, and many
without lances or swords, it was known that a serious action had taken
place, and all troops in the cantonment were ordered to stand to their
arms. Major Smith-Windham, with half a dozen drivers of F-A battery, was
the first officer to arrive; and when no guns followed him, and he
reported them “spiked and abandoned,” and the enemy advancing towards
Sherpur in overwhelming force, the anxiety of Brigadier Hugh Gough was
greatly increased. No gunner would leave his guns if there were a chance
of recovering them, and they were given up for lost. The western wall of
the cantonments was manned by 150 of the 3rd Sikhs. At its northern end,
where there is a gap between it and the Bemaru hills defended by a
shelter trench, wire entanglements were laid down from the foot of the
hill to the end of the wall. All the gates were occupied by small
detachments of infantry, and the two remaining Horse Artillery guns were
placed upon the Bemaru Heights facing towards the Nanuchi Kotal leading
to Chardeh. If an attack were really about to be made, it would be sharp
work defending the three miles of walls enclosing the cantonments, as
less than 1,000 men were available for the duty; but the news that
Mahomed Jan with his 10,000 followers had turned off towards the Cabul
gorge dissipated the anxiety felt; and when, later, the fire of the 72nd
Highlanders was heard at Dehmazung and then died away, everyone knew
Sherpur was safe. It was ticklish work for the time being; but Brigadier
Gough made his arrangements quietly, and without listening to any absurd
suggestions. As a precautionary measure, a heliogram was sent to Colonel
Jenkins, commanding the Guides, who had reached Luttabund from Sei Baba
in the morning: he was ordered to come in with his cavalry and infantry,
without baggage. At seven o’clock we heard he was at Butkhak, and as I
am writing (at midnight) his corps is marching in over 700 strong—200
more will arrive to-morrow with the baggage. Sir F. Roberts, after
sending up 200 of the 72nd Highlanders to reinforce the picquet on the
Bala Hissar Heights, rode into cantonments, within the walls of which
all is made snug for the night. The reinforcement to the picquet was
caused by the belief that Mahomed Jan would attempt to occupy the
heights commanding the Bala Hissar and Cabul, and there is no doubt this
was his intention. Since seven o’clock the picquet has been assailed on
all sides, and even now the circle of fire shows where the 250 British
soldiers are holding their own.