Effect of the Action of Charasia—Advance to Beni Hissar—Cavalry
Reconnaissance—The Bala Hissar Deserted—The Sherpur Magazine Blown
up—Attitude of the Amir—Operations of the 8th and 9th of
October—Capture of Sherpur Cantonments—The Affair of the Asmai
Heights—Cavalry Pursuit towards Ghazni—The Force moves to Siah
Sung—Leaders of the Mutinous Regiments.
CAMP BENI HISSAR, _8th October_.
There can be little doubt that the action at Charasia has broken up the
combinations against us, and that Cabul is now at our mercy. It cannot
be too fully borne in mind that, but for the promptness with which
General Roberts decided to attack, instead of allowing the enemy to
gather strength by our own inaction, serious consequences might have
ensued to our compact little army now within three or four miles of the
Bala Hissar. Not that defeat was to be feared in any sense of the term,
but that the slightest hesitation or check in our advance would have
raised against us crowds of enemies whom we should have had to deal with
in, perhaps, as difficult a country as could be fought over. It was a
bold bid for all doubtful and wavering hearts to join them—this move of
the mutinous regiments seven or eight miles out of Cabul right across
our path; and if they had been allowed to hold the hills even for
twenty-four hours, there can scarcely be a doubt that their numbers
would have been doubled, and our loss in dislodging them proportionately
greater than that which even now we have suffered.
I have described the position of our camp at Charasia in my last letter,
and from this it would be seen that our best route to Cabul was by way
of the Sang-i-Nawishta defile on our right front. At daybreak yesterday
we moved out of Charasia camp, and at the mouth of the defile Sir F.
Roberts was met by Major White, who explained the positions occupied by
the enemy, and the action he had taken in dislodging them. The General
congratulated him heartily on his success, and then passed on to where
General Baker had bivouacked at the northern end of the defile. High
hills shut in the road on either hand, the Logar River, here a deep
stream, also running to the right of the path, which at times is very
rough. Two or three men had hidden themselves behind rocks on the steep
hillsides to the east, and they now fired down as the troops filed
along. Their shots were wide of the mark, and our men firing freely back
soon silenced them. Rounding the corner of the hill on our left, we came
upon General Baker’s bivouacking ground, and here followed more
congratulations; Sir F. Roberts hearing in detail from his Brigadier an
account of the action upon the success of which so much had depended.
General Baker with his brigade was left to keep open the Pass while the
baggage and stores were passing through, and he remained there until
this morning, by which time the ground at Charasia had been cleared.
In the next three miles to Beni Hissar the road runs among rich
corn-fields, irrigated by the diversion of the stream, and the route to
the Bala Hissar was followed by our troops until the ground fixed upon
for the camp was reached. This was just under the walls of some gardens
belonging to the Amir and his Mustaufi (Minister of Finance), where
water was plentiful and trees afforded shade. While the Infantry were
marching in, General Massy went forward with the cavalry through Beni
Hissar village and into the fields beyond. The hills to the left shut
out for a mile a view of Cabul, but after ten minutes’ riding the Cabul
plain was reached, and before us was the Bala Hissar and the fortified
ridge running upwards and commanding it. The heights were crowned by a
wall fifteen or twenty feet high, and the line of fortification could be
seen following the sky-line, until the hill dipped down to the bed of
the Cabul River to the north of the city. Again, the ridge rising on the
left bank of the river presented a similar sight, the zig-zag wall being
apparently endless. Our videttes rode out well towards the Bala Hissar,
and, accompanying them, I had a good view of the fortifications, but
could not see a single soldier lining the walls. All was deserted, and
we knew that the mutineers, if they meant fighting, were not foolish
enough to allow themselves to be caught in a trap such as the Bala
Hissar would have proved. The small portion of the city that could be
seen also lay as if abandoned by the inhabitants, and we made up our
minds that the fortified camp at Sherpur, lying over the low Siah Sung
hills which blocked our view to the north-east, was the position taken
up by the enemy for a final struggle with our force. The plain on which
our cavalry reconnoitred was all under cultivation, rich fields of
clover and lucerne relieving the general brownness of the land, the
crops of which had been lately reaped. Cultivation extended as far as
the eye could reach on the right, while on all other sides high hills
blocked the view, the gigantic Hindu Kush lying away in the distance to
the north, keeping sentinel over Afghanistan as impassively as the
Himalayas look down upon Hindustan.
We returned to camp to speculate upon the chances of further fighting,
and in the afternoon we had to listen to the many stories brought in by
local friends of the Amir and merchants from Cabul, who came to pay
their respects to Sir Frederick Roberts. In the evening the firing of
heavy guns was heard in the direction of Sherpur, and it was surmised
that the rebels were marking out ranges; but when a tremendous explosion
succeeded it soon became known that the magazine at their fortified camp
had been blown up, and it was then concluded that they were discharging
guns before abandoning them. Accordingly this morning we are not
astonished to hear that Sherpur Camp is deserted, and a force of cavalry
is now going out under General Massy in search of the enemy. This force
I am accompanying, as it is most probable some of the fugitives—if the
regiments have really decamped—will be overtaken. To-morrow we move camp
to the Siah Sung ridge directly overlooking Cabul.
The attitude of the Amir is not altogether satisfactory, and he is
plainly afraid that the soldiery will make a stand in the city, and that
Cabul will be stormed and destroyed by our army. He assured us that we
should not meet with any resistance at Charasia, and yet it is now
believed that Nek Mahomed visited him in our camp, told him of the force
ready to fight, and appealed to him to desert the British and head a
national rising. All Yakub Khan vouchsafed to tell the General was that
the Bala Hissar was no longer in the possession of people whom he could
trust, and that his own family had been moved into the city. He now
confidently explains that the mutinous regiments have dispersed, and
that we have nothing more to expect in the way of opposition.
CAMP SIAH SUNG, _10th October_.
The force of cavalry sent under General Massy on the 8th instant, to cut
off the retreat of the enemy, who was said to have abandoned Sherpur
entrenched camp after blowing up the magazine on the previous evening,
was made up as follows:—102 men of the 9th Lancers, 140 of the 5th
Punjab Cavalry, 260 of the 12th Bengal Cavalry, and 220 of the 14th
Bengal Lancers,—in all 722 lances and sabres. I accompanied this force,
which left Beni-Hissar camp at eleven o’clock in the morning, passed
through the village adjoining, and then took its way across the Cabul
plain (leaving the Bala Hissar and the city on the left) to the Siah
Sung ridge, on which we are now encamped. This was easy going for the
horses, who were pushed on rapidly until the ridge was crested on the
extreme right, and a gradual descent led us towards Sherpur. Soon the
level plain lying north of Cabul was reached, and rich cultivation was
passed through, the ground being everywhere intersected by watercourses
and irrigation channels. The Cabul river, at this season a shallow
streamlet only a few yards broad, was crossed, and on our right, at a
few hundred yards’ distance, was the long line of wall, with bastions
for heavy guns at regular intervals, which marked the fortified camp of
which we had heard so much. Our scouts found it quite deserted, and
their first prize was a heavy gun which had been dragged some distance
across the fields, no doubt with the intention of using it in another
position. There were no guns at the embrasures in the bastions; but
General Massy had the good luck to find seventy-five pieces of various
calibre parked within the walls. These guns were in very good order, but
little damage having been done to them. There was not much ammunition
left with them, the Afghan troops having carried off a large quantity;
while the magazine itself had been blown up to prevent the remainder
falling into our hands. The guns included four English 18-pounders, one
English 8-inch howitzer, and two Afghan imitations of this weapon; and
forty-two bronze mountain guns (3-pounders) with part of their
equipment.
This fortified camp of Sherpur is built at the base of the low, stony
Bemaru hills, running for about two miles at a slight angle to the
general direction of the plain itself. It has only three sides
fortified, the hill in rear being quite sufficient to shield it from
attack in that quarter, as an open plain stretches away to the hills of
the Koh-Daman and Kohistan. The main wall is about a mile and a half
long, with three strongly-guarded entrance-gates, and from each
extremity the fortification is carried at right angles till it reaches
the ridge in the rear. There is a fourth gateway on the western flank.
The plan followed throughout is a thick mud wall (25 feet in height)
built with bastions for guns, and a low parapet to shield troops manning
the outer wall. The entrance-gates are lofty structures, with
comfortable quarters on either side for officers, and are so wide that
four or five men could ride through them abreast. They are each defended
by a curtain built in the same way as the outer wall. Inside the
cantonment is an open space quite clear of buildings, exactly answering
to an English barrack-square, and on this 20,000 men might be paraded
with room to spare. To the right, on the hillside, is the small village
of Bemaru, with the usual flat-roofed houses, burnt brown by the sun,
and with but little sign of life in it. The novel feature in this
cantonment is the arrangement of the barrack-rooms. At about 20 feet
from the outer wall, and parallel to it, is built a range of rooms,
extending along the three sides of the place. Each room would hold at a
pinch twenty men, and there are some hundreds of these dormitories,
which are snug enough even for a variable climate such as this. Along
their front is a narrow verandah-like space, pucca brick pillars and
arches supporting the flat mud roof, which rests on strong beams and
unhewn poles. This arrangement has a very pleasing effect when viewed
from within the cantonment, the regularity of the arches and their
supports grouped in threes before each room, with a wider span then
following, giving the appearance of a long colonnade. Broad staircases
lead at certain intervals to the roof of the barracks, which would give
a second line of musketry fire in resisting any attempt to storm. Open
spaces are left at rare intervals between the rooms to admit of the
passage of men and guns to the outer wall. Altogether this fortified
camp could, if properly victualled and garrisoned, be defended for an
indefinite period against any force without artillery. The water supply
is from streams diverted from the fields and carried by low culverts
underneath the walls; but if this were cut off, wells, no doubt, could
be sunk to supply the deficiency. From the absence of trees and the
utter barrenness of the space enclosed by the walls, with the stony
hills in the rear, the place must be insufferably hot in summer, though
at this time of the year it would be much better than tents. When our
cavalry rode through the gates into the middle of the cantonment there
was no sign of an enemy, and it must have been deserted many hours
before. A few cartridge papers were lying about, and the rude fireplaces
of the men were still black with smoke; but beyond this nothing could be
seen. In one or two places an attempt had been made to burn the barracks
down, but the fire had not obtained sufficient power over the timbers
for this to be accomplished. Doors and loose woodwork had been looted by
the villagers, who claimed to have put the fire out; but their story was
a very questionable one. People were passing freely through the place as
we entered, but they did not show much interest in our proceedings. In
the north-west corner the wall had been partly blown down, and the ruins
of the magazine were strewn in every direction.
It was upon arriving opposite Sherpur Cantonment that we sighted the
enemy; the Asmai Heights to the left, overlooking the old Afghan quarter
of Cabul, being crowded with men. We were 3,000 or 4,000 yards away, and
at that distance they did not consider us worth a shot, though their
guns could be distinctly seen. A halt was called, the cavalry forming up
at the farther end of the cantonment; while General Massy heliographed
back to Sir F. Roberts the news of the enemy having been found occupying
a position of strength. We were told, in reply, that General Baker was
leaving Beni Hissar with infantry to attack the heights, and we
accordingly hurried on, skirting the hills and passing through
grain-fields and meadows, with here and there a country villa in its
fertile garden surrounded by huge walls. Our object was to reach a break
in the hills and to pass over into the Chardeh Valley, so as to cut off
the enemy from taking the road which leads to Ghazni, Bamian, and
Turkistan. We worked round almost on the arc of a circle, of which Cabul
might be the centre, keeping the ridge occupied by the enemy at first on
our left rear, then on our left, and, finally, on our left front, when
we galloped through the break we had been making for, near the village
of Aoshahr, and faced round towards Cabul itself. The rich Chardeh
Valley was all before us, and we passed down into it, and could then see
the disposition of the men General Baker was to attack. We had learned
that they numbered three regiments and had eleven guns in position, and
this information was fairly accurate. They had 2,000 regulars, besides
700 or 800 untrained men who had joined them, and had twelve guns.
Videttes were thrown out right across the plain, and a rapid
reconnaissance made. An old ressaldar of Fane’s Horse, who was
accompanying us as guide, stated that three roads led from the valley
and united to form the chief road to Bamian. The 5th P.C. were
accordingly sent well on to the right to block the road there; two
squadrons were sent back into Sherpur plain to watch a path leading down
from the hills in that direction; another squadron returned a mile and a
half to Aoshahr, so as to prevent the fugitives escaping along the crest
of the hills down the dip we had passed through; while the General and
Staff remained in the open with the rest of the cavalry, including the
9th Lancers. We had mounted signallers with us, and heliographic
communication was opened with the high Takht-i-Shah Peak overlooking the
Bala Hissar Ridge. Captain Straton thence signalled down that the
enemy’s working parties had been strengthening their _sungar_ on the
Asmai Hill, and that some of General Baker’s troops were on the same
side of the ridge as ourselves. We could see the enemy distinctly on the
hillside, and at its foot was their camp, made up of forty or fifty
tents. These were close to the village of Dehmazung, half-hidden by
orchards, and a gun was slued round and pointed at us as soon as we
appeared. The 9th Lancers withdrew 1,000 yards just as the enemy fired a
few shells at our videttes. The shells buried themselves in the soft
ground and never exploded. We could not push farther forward, as deep
watercourses cut up the fields at every few score yards, and the rows of
closely planted willow-trees along these would have broken any cavalry
formation. In the various villages, too, large bodies of the enemy were
gathered, who could have shot our horsemen down from the towers and
walls without at all exposing themselves. A narrow road to the left led
along the foot of the hills to the enemy’s camp, but only three men
could have gone abreast, and it was commanded on the left and front by
the guns, and on the right by the troops in Dehmazung, underneath the
walls of which it passed. At a quarter to four we heard the first gun
fired, and from that time to dark we watched for the infantry attack to
develop. Some of the 92nd Highlanders were seen to our right centre
among the trees of a village a mile from Dehmazung, and a small party of
the 9th Lancers was sent by General Massy to open communication with
them. These found the enemy swarming in the orchards they had to pass
through, and after being fired upon from several walls they had to
return. The mountain guns with General Baker, posted upon the high ridge
commanding the Bala Hissar, were shelling the Asmai Heights lined by the
enemy, whose guns returned the fire shot for shot. Having twelve guns to
General Baker’s two mountain guns, they had much the best of it, though
the range was so long that little real damage was done on either side.
The ridges upon which this shell practice was going on form the defences
of Cabul from attack from the Bamian direction. Running up from the Bala
Hissar, and following every dip and rise of the hillside, is a strong
wall ten or twelve feet high, pierced for musketry. This wall is
continued at right angles along the crest of the Sherderwaza Ridge and
down the precipitous hillside of the gorge through which the Cabul River
runs. It ends a few yards from the broken arches of a bridge spanning
the stream—at this time reduced to very small dimensions, by being
largely drawn upon for irrigation purposes in the Chardeh Valley—but
begins at once on the opposite side of the river. A strong tower, with a
base of stones fifteen feet high, raised on the solid rock, is the
starting point on this, the northern side of the river, and the wall
zig-zags up just in the same way as that in continuation of the upper
Bala Hissar. The line of fortification extends along the hill top, and
then turns down for some distance along a spur facing towards Sherpur.
On the crest of this ridge (the Asmai Heights), three white standards
were flying near the guns of the enemy, who had one heavy piece on the
summit, the report of which made the bark of the mountain guns sound
quite contemptible. The line of fire on both sides was at right angles
to the bed of the Cabul River, the shells flying over the gorge and
bursting on the opposing heights. From our position in the plain below
we could watch the artillery and judge pretty accurately as to the fall
of the shells, and it was annoying to see that as it was “end-on”
firing, the enemy were receiving but little injury. Their policy was
plainly to hold on till nightfall and to attempt to escape under cover
of darkness; and as the sun sank slowly behind us, it became obvious
that unless the infantry attack was soon delivered, they would succeed
only too well. Our chagrin was great that there were not guns with our
cavalry, as we could see men in little clusters of 50 or 100 lying under
the lee of the rocks on our side of the ridge, perfectly sheltered from
General Baker’s shells. General Massy had applied for horse artillery
before leaving Beni Hissar; but it was reported that the country he
would have to pass over was cut up by deep irrigation channels which
would hinder the guns from keeping up with the cavalry. It was decided
therefore not to send out artillery. With a couple of R.H.A. guns we
could have made the enemy’s camp and the hillside quite untenable, and
the 2,800 men gathered there would either have had to come down into the
plain, where our cavalry would have chosen their own ground to charge
them, or to take refuge in Cabul city, which they could easily have
reached. An old native officer, a Cabuli, who saw service in the Mutiny,
was much struck with our plan of cutting off the retreat; and when he
saw the cavalry debouch into the Chardeh plain, he said in his fervent
thankfulness:—“God has delivered these _budmashes_ into your hands even
as the Embassy was delivered into theirs.” And it certainly did seem as
if these three regiments, which were said to have been chief in the
attack upon the handful of men under Sir Louis Cavagnari in the Bala
Hissar, were about to be exterminated. But night fell, and still our
infantry attack was not delivered. General Massy ordered his videttes
and the chain of cavalry to be maintained until it was quite dark, so as
to induce the enemy to believe the cordon would be maintained during the
night; but he would not run the risk, in such an awkward country, of his
men being shot down in detail. He therefore withdrew them eventually
within two or three of the rude forts in the plain and waited for
daylight. It seemed almost hopeless to intercept in the darkness men who
had a valley six or seven miles across, with hills on either side, to
escape by. That they did escape is now a cause of much heartburning in
the force. If, like Joshua, we could have made the sun stand still, say,
for only two hours, the day would have been as grand a success as the
6th at Charasia; as it was, it can only be looked upon as one of great
disappointment to all concerned.
The only troops available for despatch with General Baker were 320 of
the 92nd Highlanders, two companies of the 72nd Highlanders, and seven
companies of the 23rd Pioneers. With these were two mountain guns and
one Gatling. The road up to the ridge commanding the Bala Hissar and
the passage over the Kotal down into the Chardeh Valley were so
difficult, that although this force moved out of Beni Hissar at noon,
it was a quarter to four before the mountain guns got into action, and
it was some time later before the 92nd Highlanders reached the village
to the west of Dehmazung. The enemy were in greater force than was
expected, and as the 92nd men were unsupported, they were ordered to
wait for reinforcements before making any attack. They were directed
to take up a position on a spur of the Sherderwaza Heights, parallel
to the Cabul River, and this they did without loss, although the enemy
opened fire from two breech-loading field-pieces in their camp. The
shells and round shot were pitched too high, and greatly amused our
men. Marksmen were posted at sheltered points, and their aim was so
good that the Afghans soon retired from these two guns, leaving them
in the open. The two companies of the 72nd were at this time on the
hillside nearest to Beni Hissar, and the 23rd was in reserve. A gun in
the tower I have mentioned fired occasionally, and the Gatling was
tried at this; but the drum hitched after a few rounds, and the gun
had to cease firing. General Baker had made up his mind to attack the
instant his reinforcements—consisting of a wing of the 67th, two
companies of the 5th Ghoorkas, and four more mountain guns—arrived.
These, however, did not reach him until half-past five, and it was
then quite hopeless to think of storming the heights in the dusk. The
troops accordingly bivouacked where they stood, and a very cold night
they had of it. General Macpherson arrived at 6.30 A.M. with the
remainder of the 67th, the 28th P.N.I, and four horse artillery guns
on elephants. He started with some infantry and guns to follow General
Massy.
There is no doubt the enemy began evacuating their position as soon as
it was dark; and when a strong patrol crept into their camp at midnight
they found all had fled. Guns, tents, camp equipage, &c., fell into our
hands. Seven bodies were found buried on the heights, and three others
were lying on the rocks. Whether the fugitives carried off others, we
have no means of telling. There were no casualties on our side. General
Baker sent information to General Massy of the flight of the enemy, and
the cavalry started off on the Bamian Road at 5.30 A.M., but only one
small party of twenty-one was overtaken on the Kotal-i-Takht. These took
refuge on a low hill and fought desperately, the good luck of
surrounding and shooting them down falling to the 5th P.C. The single
combat between Rahmat Ali, a native officer, and the leader of the
party, was a pretty piece of business. The Afghan tried to escape on a
fast pony, but was overtaken by Rahmat Ali, who, after warding off two
blows from his opponent’s _tulwar_, got well down upon the man’s head.
Unluckily his sword snapped at the hilt, but the blow had knocked the
fugitive off his horse, and he was pistolled before he could recover
himself. It was the hardest day’s work the cavalry have had for a long
time, over thirty-six miles being covered in the day. The men were
without food both days they were out, but they behaved splendidly, not a
grumble being heard. For instance, the 9th Lancers started on the
morning of the 8th, after having received one loaf to every three men.
They carried no food, as only a reconnaissance was intended, and at
night some sheep were killed for them, and they tried to eat the flesh
after roasting the animals whole. They had nothing but their swords to
use in cutting up the carcases, and they found it quite impossible to
eat the flesh; so on the 8th they went supperless to bed. On the 9th
they were in the saddle from 5 A.M. to 9 P.M. (when they reached this
camp), and the pursuit and return were made in such quick time that
again there was no chance of their getting food. Horses and men of all
the regiments out with General Massy were quite exhausted when they at
last reached their quarters here. Some score of horses were lost on the
road, having literally died in harness. There was no slackness in the
pursuit when once it began, but the enemy had too great a start to be
overtaken, and it now seems probable they dispersed to the hills and
made for their homes, many doubtless taking refuge in the city. One
piece of experience was certainly gained, and that was that the
villagers about Cabul are hostile to us almost to a man. Five of them
belonging to Aoshahr were made an example of by Colonel Ross, of the
14th Bengal Lancers. They treacherously fired into the Lancers, after
having salaamed to them as they passed. The ruffians were captured with
their guns still in their hands, and were shot without further parley.
It is only by such severity, and by taking no prisoners in action, than
any impression can be made upon the Afghan mind. Such prisoners as are
brought in are tried by a military commission, and the great majority
are shot. There is just a fear that too much leniency may be shown, as
the work is rather distasteful to British officers; but as we are an
“avenging army,” scruples must be cast aside.
The army moved into this camp yesterday afternoon. It was only about a
four miles’ march from Beni Hissar, and the 72nd were left in charge of
all stores that could not be got off by the transport animals in the
day. On the night of the 8th there was some lively firing by small
bodies of _budmashes_, who tried to shoot down men on picquet and sentry
duty; but, as is usual, the bullets did no mischief. Last night there
was news of what threatened to be a better organized attack by local
villagers and tribesmen. Mounted sowars, it seems, were sent round to
the tribes in this neighbourhood asking them to gather in force and to
attack the camp, as much loot could be got, and only a few men had been
left in camp. The exemplary severity we have shown in shooting all the
men caught in arms against us, deterred the villagers from combining
together, and no attack was made. The 72nd had drawn in their camp well
under the walls of a garden overlooking the ground, and had formed a
kind of laager with flour bags, &c., but not a shot was fired all night.
The 72nd were ready for any number of assailants, and from behind their
barricades of flour bags they would have read the Afghans as sharp a
lesson as the Zulus received when trying to storm the mealie redoubt at
Rorke’s Drift. The whole of the stores were brought in here to-day. The
5th Ghoorkas hold the ridge overlooking the Bala Hissar, and the 5th
Punjab Cavalry are in the Sherpur Cantonment, to prevent the barracks
there being destroyed by the local peasants for the sake of the woodwork
and other material. In two or three days we shall probably move into the
Bala Hissar, in which five months’ provisions are to be stored. The city
is quiet, and the camp is quite thronged with petty traders, who bring
in food, clothing, &c., for sale, and move freely among our troops. Sir
Frederick Roberts inspected the Sherpur Camp and the captured guns
to-day, but no movement of troops took place. In a short time a small
force under General Gough will march back to the Shutargardan to re-open
communications in that direction, pending further news of the Khyber
Force, whose advance seems to be very slow owing to transport
difficulties.
Cabul itself is quite open to us now, and we can enter it whenever we
choose. The guns captured on the Asmai ridge were six field-pieces and
six mountain guns. Two field-pieces were also found in camp, and an
immense store of ammunition. Thirty camels, four elephants, and several
mules and ponies also fell into our hands.
It is now well established that the leaders of the mutineers are the
Amir’s most trusted friends. Kushdil Khan, who was sent specially by him
to meet Cavagnari at Shutargardan, was a prominent leader both at
Charasia and on the heights yesterday. Mahomed Jan, a general in Yakub’s
army, and of some importance among the powerful Wardak section of the
Southern Ghilzais, is also mentioned. There is no doubt of concealed
action among the Amir’s officers, and unluckily none of the leaders have
been taken. Sirdar Nek Mahomed Khan is really the head of all. It now
appears that only one quarter of the magazine in the Bala Hissah was
looted, and there are now in that fortress about twenty-six guns in
perfect order and several rockets, old presents of the Indian
Government. Nawab Khan, colonel of artillery, came in yesterday to know
what orders General Roberts had to give about them, and was told they
were to remain there for the present. No one can suppose any captured
guns will be given to the Amir, who is still with us.
It was rumoured that 800 sepoys had kept together in a body, but this
story is now said to be false, all having dispersed except 100 who
escorted their leader, Mahomed Jan, towards Turkistan. The three
regiments at Ghazni are reported to be only five miles out of that
place, while four days ago our force from Candahar was at Makr, four
long marches from Ghazni. The enemy has been extremely well informed of
all our movements, though their source of information cannot be
absolutely fixed upon. Regular news was probably given by some of the
Amir’s retainers, who see all that goes on in our camp.
The political situation shows no development; the Amir coinciding in all
that is done, now that the flight of the mutineers has removed his
apprehension of Cabul being sacked. If the attack on the 8th had been
made earlier in the day, the only outlet for Mahomed Jan and his 2,000
troops would have been to Cabul itself.[14] The city would then of
course have been taken by storm, and, as Sir Frederick Roberts said in
his proclamation, we could not have been held responsible for the
consequences. At present the strictest orders prevail against any one
entering the city, which perhaps even now may harbour many mutineers.
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Footnote 14:
General Massy’s withdrawal of his patrols was severely criticized, and
capital was afterwards made out of it by the military authorities in
India. As showing how utterly helpless the troopers would have been in
the darkness to check an enemy, I may quote my own experience. On the
morning of the 9th I rode from General Massy’s force to join General
Baker, taking an Afghan guide and two sowars as escort. Innumerable
watercourses had to be jumped, and both sowars were left behind in the
ditches. My horse had nearly to swim one stream, and the strain and
toil of climbing up the banks were such that I lost even the felt
_numdah_ from under my saddle. The willow-trees lining the stream were
also great obstacles to horses and men, even in daylight.
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