The March to Zerghun Shahr—Proclamation to the People of Cabul—The
Composition of the “Avenging Army”—March to Sufed Sang—Transport
Difficulties—Hostility of Villagers—March to Charasia—Cavalry
Reconnaissance—The Battle of Charasia—Defeat of the Afghans.
ZERGHUN SHAHR, _2nd October_.
The camp at Kushi was all astir early this morning, for it was our first
day’s march, and the capacity of our baggage animals had yet to be
tested. It is true we had only to march eight miles to Zerghun Shahr,
where General Massy had been in camp for some days; but still there were
large quantities of stores and ammunition to be moved. General Baker’s
Brigade was the first to move, and at eight o’clock they followed in the
wake of the 5th Punjab Cavalry, which was ordered to cover their front
and flanks. The greatest anxiety was regarding the baggage, but the
arrangements were well made by the transport officers, and as the
animals had an easy road to follow the march was a very satisfactory
one.
With one or two exceptions the line was well kept, and the baggage
reached its destination pretty rapidly. The 5th P.C. advanced as if in a
country swarming with enemies, the advance guard being thrown out a mile
in front, and flankers working on either hand over the stony hills which
traversed the plain. Following the cavalry were F-A, R.H.A., a small
party of signallers, the 23rd Pioneers, the 72nd Highlanders, No. 2
Mountain Battery, 5th P.I., one company Sappers and Miners, Baggage,
Field Hospital, Engineer Park, 5th Ghoorkas (as rear-guard), and a few
troopers of the 5th P.C. All the troops looked very fit, and they
marched with an _élan_ that could not be mistaken. The road taken was
over the stony plain which extends for two or three miles on either
hand, and the march was absolutely without incident. Zerghun Shahr was
reached before noon, the troops halting for half an hour about four
miles out, and the regiments filed off to their camping grounds on the
open plain. The village lies a few hundred yards to the west of the
road, and is of very small dimensions. A running stream supplies the
camp with water, the principle of the _karez_ (the sinking of a
continuous line of wells, connected by an underground channel, carrying
the water to a lower level) having been largely applied. With the
exception of the fruit trees in the village there is no vegetation
anywhere to be seen, and the country is nearly a repetition of that
previously passed over; bare hills looking down upon stony plains which
do nothing but reflect the sun’s rays upon unlucky travellers. The
desolate aspect of everything is most distressing, but we are hoping for
better things after another march.
To return to the march from Kushi: General Macpherson’s Brigade left at
ten o’clock, Sir Frederick Roberts and staff starting about an hour
later. With them was the Amir and his Sirdars, who could not fail to be
impressed with the compactness and fitness for any kind of work of the
soldiers before him. Every effort was made, too, to keep the baggage
animals well together under strong escorts, so as to show His Highness
that our army was not careless on the march, and would not lay itself
open to surprise. When such grand regiments as the 67th, 72nd, and 92nd
are on the move, it is not likely there will be any slackness, for the
men are of the old stamp, and know what discipline and smartness mean.
The Amir upon arriving here was shown to his encamping ground, which is
well away from that of Wali Mahomed, meeting between the two at the
present juncture being studiously avoided. The camp is overrun with
wild-looking Afghans, generally galloping at headlong speed without any
special object in view, and but for the sturdiness of our sentries these
mangy horsemen would invade the privacy of even head-quarters and
brigade camps. Our soldiers bear them no goodwill, and usually return
their look of insolent braggadocio with a frown which expresses a good
deal. Tommy Atkins is on the whole a very honest sort of fellow, and his
ire is now roused against these swaggering cowards, who were in Cabul
when our Embassy was attacked, and would not raise a finger to aid the
handful of men who perished. Poor old Daoud Shah is perhaps entitled to
some little respect; but for the others contempt is almost too good. The
Amir is our guest—a guest perhaps upon whom a friendly watch is kept as
a matter of precaution—and we cannot therefore give expression to our
feelings very frankly, but if the Camp were canvassed the general
opinion would be one of rather a strong kind as regards his vacillation
and cowardice on the 3rd of September. However, he is now in the midst
of an army which will soon be at the gates of his capital, and then he
will have to sit down quietly until our policy is duly shaped—this time
simply in accordance with our own aims, and utterly regardless of his
protestations. He is now profuse in his thanks for the proclamation
which is to go before us to Cabul; at the same time he is doubtful of
its effect upon the mutineers. His tone might change, perhaps, if he
could see any way out of his present difficulties other than that to be
made by our bayonets.
The proclamation alluded to was dated October 2nd, and was sent off
to-day to Cabul. It is as follows:—
“PROCLAMATION TO THE PEOPLE OF CABUL.
“Be it known to all that the British army is advancing on Cabul to
take possession of the city. If it be allowed to do so peacefully,
well and good; if not, the city will be seized by force. Therefore all
well-disposed persons who have taken no part in the dastardly murder
of the British Embassy or in the plunder of the Residency are warned,
that if they are unable to prevent resistance being offered to the
entrance of the British army and to the authority of His Highness the
Amir, they should make immediate arrangements for their own safety,
either by coming into the British Camp or by such other measures as
may seem fit to them. And as the British Government does not make war
on women and children, warning is given that all women and children
should be removed from the city beyond the reach of harm. The British
Government desires to treat all classes with justice, and to respect
their religion, feelings, and customs, while exacting full retribution
from offenders. Every effort will therefore be made to prevent the
innocent suffering with the guilty. But it is necessary that the
utmost precaution should be taken against useless opposition.
Therefore, after the receipt of this proclamation, all persons found
armed in or about Cabul will be treated as the enemies of the British
Government; and further, it must be clearly understood that if the
entry of the British force is resisted, I cannot hold myself
responsible for any accidental mischief which may be done to persons
and property, even of well-disposed people who may have neglected this
warning.
“Signed, &c., F. ROBERTS.”
Two sowars belonging to the 12th Bengal Cavalry, who were spending their
furlough at Cabul, arrived here to-day, and report that the mutineers
mean to fight. We have just heard of an unsuccessful attack upon the
Shutargardan by Mangals and Ghilzais.[8]
-----
Footnote 8:
The Shutargardan was held by the 3rd Sikhs and 21st Punjab Infantry
with four guns of No. 1 Mountain Battery. Colonel Money of the 3rd
Sikhs was in command.
-----
The force is now concentrated, for the first time, for the march onward
to Cabul. It is made up as follows:—
CABUL FIELD FORCE, OCTOBER 1879.
──────────────────────────────┬──────────┬─────────────────────┐
│ British │ Other Ranks. │
│Officers. │ │
──────────────────────────────┼──────────┼──────────┬──────────┤
│ │ British.│ Native.│
──────────────────────────────┼──────────┼──────────┼──────────┤
Divisional and Brigade Staff │ 60│ - │ -│
F-A, R.H.A. │ 7│ 118│ -│
G-3, R.A. │ 7│ 137│ -│
No. 2 Mountain Battery │ 3│ - │ 223│
9th Lancers │ 4│ 118│ -│
5th Punjab Cavalry │ 7│ - │ 325│
12th Bengal Cavalry │ 6│ - │ 328│
14th Bengal Lancers │ 7│ - │ 407│
67th Regiment │ 18│ 686│ -│
72nd Highlanders │ 23│ 746│ -│
92nd Highlanders │ 17│ 717│ -│
5th Punjab Infantry │ 8│ - │ 610│
23rd Pioneers │ 6│ - │ 671│
28th Punjab Infantry │ 8│ - │ 636│
5th Ghoorkas │ 7│ - │ 574│
7th Company Sappers and Miners│ 3│ 2│ 93│
Two Gatling guns │ 1│ 34│ -│
──────────────────────────────┼──────────┼──────────┼──────────┤
Total │ 192│ 2,558│ 3,867│
──────────────────────────────┴──────────┴──────────┴──────────┘
There are about 6,000 “followers” and some 3,500 baggage animals.
Fourteen days’ supplies are being carried, with tea and sugar for two
months. Lieutenant-Colonel B. L. Gordon, R.H.A., commands the artillery
(twelve 9-pounder and six 7-pounder guns, with two Gatlings); and
Lieutenant-Colonel Æ. Perkins, R.E., is in command of the Engineers. The
Cavalry Brigade is of course commanded by General Massy; while the
Infantry are brigaded as follows:—1st Brigade (General Macpherson),
67th, 92nd Highlanders, and 28th P.I.; 2nd Brigade (General Baker), 72nd
Highlanders, 5th Ghoorkas, and 5th P.I. The 23rd Pioneers are not
attached to any particular brigade.
SUFED SANG, ZAHIDABAD, _4th October_.
Yesterday the march was continued, and Macpherson’s Brigade with the
cavalry reached Sufed Sang in the evening, after a march of nearly
fifteen miles. The same open plain was traversed, but there were more
signs of cultivation as the Logar River, which was hidden from sight at
Zerghun Shahr by a range of hills, was neared. Along its banks are
villages scattered at short intervals, and the orchards of these form a
very pleasant relief to the bare barrenness of the Ghilzai Hills on our
right. The Logar River is spanned by a narrow bridge near Zahidabad
village, but it was found impossible to get wheeled guns across it, and
the ford adjacent to the bridge was not so shallow as it should have
been, the villagers having turned a large volume of water into the
stream from a neighbouring irrigation channel. This was the first sign
of the latent hostility of the people in the Logar Valley, but as the
_maliks_ (headmen) of Zahidabad and the near village of Sufed Sang came
in and paid their respects, we could do nothing in the way of
punishment. The troops forded the river, the baggage being sent by way
of the bridge. Some of the men were swept off their feet by the force of
the current, but as the stream was only fifty or sixty yards in width,
no lives were lost. The Prince of Bokhara, who is a refugee at the
Amir’s Court, met General Roberts at Zahidabad. He had followed Yakub
Khan’s example, and had fled from Cabul in the night. He reported that
the troops were being incited to fight by certain disloyal Sirdars, but
that no general rising of the people had taken place: the flight of the
Amir had prevented any great tribal combination so far.
Our camping ground is in the midst of cultivation, and we are halted
here to-day awaiting the arrival of General Baker’s Brigade. Yesterday
it was found that the carriage of the force was quite inadequate to
carry all the stores and ammunition, now that the whole army had been
concentrated, and accordingly General Baker was ordered to halt his
brigade at Zerghun Shahr for the night and guard the Commissariat
supplies and the Ordnance park. This he did by forming a rude sort of
laager, within which the transport animals were placed. He was not
molested during the night. The call upon the Transport of the Force to
do double work was answered with great alacrity by Lieutenant-Colonel
Mark Heathcote and the officers working under him. After the heavy march
of fifteen miles the beasts were well fed and given a few hours’ rest;
but at one o’clock in the morning all the strongest camels were paraded
and marched off to Zerghun Shahr. There they were loaded up, and with as
little delay as possible began the return journey to Sufed
Sang—forty-five miles in thirty-six hours.[9] On the previous evening
some shots had been fired near the Logar Bridge, but no mischief was
done; and we took but little notice of this expression of enmity, except
to station strong picquets and warn the sentries to show extra
vigilance. This evening, however, a determined attack was made upon the
rear-guard, the villagers of Kuti Kheyl and other hamlets creeping up,
under cover of darkness, and hiding themselves in _nullahs_ and behind
orchard walls. Fortunately they were badly armed, and although they kept
up a desultory fire at close quarters, Major Stockwell of the 72nd
Highlanders drove them off by firing volleys and by throwing skirmishers
out to protect his left flank. As the rear-guard crossed the river the
villagers grew bolder and followed them up pretty closely, but no
baggage was lost; and a few companies being sent from camp to hold the
bridge the firing died away, and now (10 P.M.) all is again quiet. The
halt to-day has been of service in enabling us to get in a few supplies,
but the transport difficulty is a serious one, as it is now clear only
one infantry brigade can march daily, and the baggage animals must he
sent back day by day to bring up the stores and reserve ammunition.
To-morrow General Baker’s brigade will move on to Charasia, and the 92nd
Highlanders will probably be added to the regiments composing it. There
is news to-day from Cabul to the effect that the mutinous regiments have
not yet left, but are busy looting the arsenal in the Bala Hissar,
wherein are stored many hundred rifles, and an enormous quantity of
small-arm ammunition.
-----
Footnote 9:
This will show the difficulties General Roberts had to contend with,
even in the few marches from Kushi to Cabul. The transport train was,
as usual, the weakest link in the chain, and everything had to be made
subservient to it.
-----
CAMP CHARASIA, _5th October_.
The village of Kuti Kheyl was chiefly responsible for the attack upon
General Baker’s rear-guard last night, and we have now a number of
prisoners in our hands who were captured in that neighbourhood, and who
are said to have been concerned in the skirmish. This morning (Sunday),
before striking camp, a small force was sent out with two mountain guns.
A squadron of cavalry surrounded Kuti Kheyl, and upon the 9th Lancers
finally going in, several men showed fight. Three were run through, one
just as he was levelling his piece at an officer, and five were
captured; two of whom were wounded on the head with lance-butts. The
_maliks_ of the village were also brought in, but were released after
receiving a warning as to their future behaviour. The five prisoners
were sent on with the advanced guard here, and were tried this afternoon
by drum-head court-martial. One of them was a sepoy of the Amir’s, and
he, with two others, was sentenced to death for being in unlawful
rebellion against his sovereign. The other two were released, no doubt
much to their astonishment.
As the march to Charasia was only a short one of six miles from Sufed
Sang, we did not start until ten o’clock. Early in the afternoon the
encamping ground was reached, and tents were pitched on the fallow
fields which stretch to the foot of the hills on either side. The road
followed a due northerly direction, through a cultivated tract of
country, for about three miles, to some very low hills which traverse it
at right angles, and near which is the village of Childukhteran.[10] On
crossing these hills, a long valley lay stretched before us in the shape
of a parallelogram; and at the farther extremity could be seen the
village of Charasia, with its orchards stretching in front of it, with
clumps of trees dotted farther to the west. Beyond was the mass of hills
which shut in Cabul, and hinder any view of the city from the valley.
The hills to east and west also close in; and the valley cannot be much
more than two miles across. It is all under cultivation by means of
irrigation channels. The hills overlooking Charasia are, first, a low
range of a light-coloured slaty character, then a higher series of rocky
heights, and in the immediate rear, forming the sky-line, is a
precipitous range with four or five peaks standing out in bold relief.
This range runs sharply down, on the east, to the road which leads
direct to the old Cabul camping ground and the Bala Hissar, and, with
another high range sloping similarly down on the other side of the road,
forms the Sang-i-Nawishta defile, which, if held in strength, would be
very difficult to force. Through this defile the Logar River passes into
the Cabul Valley. Our encamping ground is south of the village, the
head-quarters of Sir F. Roberts being a mile or more from the orchards.
The ranges of hills east and west of us are very high and steep; but
directly to our left front is only a gradual slope, over which lies the
beautiful Chardeh Valley, filled with orchards, and apparently rich in
cultivation. A road skirting the hills leads through the valley into
Cabul. There is a third road among the hills immediately in rear of
Charasia.
-----
Footnote 10:
Forty daughters.
-----
A cavalry reconnaissance to-day did not cause any of the enemy to show
themselves; but perhaps to-morrow, when more ground is covered, there
may be a different result. Emissaries from Cabul are said to have been
in the Charasia village yesterday, and the difficulty we have had in
getting supplies this afternoon is a proof of their efforts to influence
the villagers against us. However, only a few shots have been fired at
our cavalry, and we are resting in camp, which is protected by strong
outlying picquets. To-morrow morning 1,500 baggage animals go back to
Sufed Sang to bring up the rest of the stores, and this delay will cause
us to halt here a day. General Macpherson, with the 67th Foot, 28th
N.I., three guns, and a squadron of cavalry, has been left behind to
take charge of to-morrow’s convoy. He will draw in his camp as much as
possible, as the affair at Kuti Kheyl has shown how badly disposed the
villagers are towards us.
The Amir and Wali Mahomed have come in with us, but the former does not
seem to have—or will not exercise—control over the villagers we have to
deal with. There is plainly much trimming of sails among them as to
their immediate attitude, but we are wide-awake enough not to trust them
in any way. In case of any check, there cannot be the least doubt that
the groups which now watch us marching past would shoulder their
_jhezails_ and turn out to harass us on all sides. The men with us who
know the local character best are strong in their assertion that until
we have occupied Cabul we shall be annoyed by these tribesmen, who are
loth to let long strings of baggage animals pass through their midst
without trying to loot some of the riches they carry. Even to-day a
kahar in charge of a mule-load of baggage was cut up. He had wandered
from the road, and had made no sign when the rear-guard passed. Half a
dozen men watched their opportunity, and when the coast was clear they
killed the kahar and walked off with the mule and its burden.
The news that the regiments in Cabul looted the arsenal yesterday would
seem to indicate that they mean fighting, and this intelligence is the
best that we have had for a long time. The only way in which they can be
punished lies in resistance when we advance; for, if they run away, it
will be difficult to chase them all over Afghanistan, even if we were
disposed to do so. The health of the troops is excellent, although the
sun has laid up a number of men with fever. It is of the mildest kind
and soon passes off.
CAMP BENI HISSAR, _7th October_.
We are now encamped within a few miles of the Bala Hissar and the city
of Cabul, the mutinous troops having yesterday been defeated and driven
from the heights above Charasia, which they had occupied with the idea
of barring our further advance. The details of the action are as
follows:—At daybreak yesterday morning (October 6th) a strong working
party was sent out to improve the road through the Sang-i-Nawishta
defile, but before they had gone two miles from camp the cavalry patrol
in advance reported that the enemy were in great strength on the hills,
and had guns in position commanding the road. The working party
consisted of the 23rd Pioneers, under escort of a wing of the 92nd
Highlanders and two guns of No. 2 (Swinley’s) Mountain Battery; and upon
the cavalry patrols being fired at and falling back, this party received
orders to halt and act on the defensive. As the morning advanced it was
seen that not only was the Sang-i-Nawishta held in force, but the hills
beyond Charasia, from the Chardeh Valley to the Logar River, were
crowned with armed men. It was plain that our farther progress towards
Cabul was barred, and as there was only one brigade available for the
attack the position was not an encouraging one. Fortunately the 92nd
Highlanders had been detached from General Macpherson’s brigade for the
time being, and this gave us another British regiment to fall back upon.
Sir Frederick Roberts deemed it wise to attack without delay, as to
remain inactive before the mutinous regiments now facing him would
probably encourage a general tribal rising, and instead of 10,000 we
should have 50,000 men to deal with. Already the hills to right and left
of the camp had a few white-clad men upon them, plainly sentinels sent
from the near village to watch the progress of the fight and aid in the
pursuit if our army were driven back. General Macpherson had to make his
way from Sufed Sang to Charasia, and as his baggage train was seen
stretching along the valley, the tribesmen grew bolder and opened a
desultory fire upon the escort. This was the signal for many men to join
the sentinels I have spoken of, on the hills, and so numerous did the
gathering become that a squadron of cavalry was sent back to reinforce
General Macpherson, who was further ordered to make all possible haste
to Charasia.
In the meantime the camp was astir with preparations for the attack upon
the enemy in front, and the men were full of enthusiasm at the prospect
of meeting face to face the regiments which had brought about
Cavagnari’s murder. The following troops, under the command of
Brigadier-General Baker, marched out of camp towards the village of
Charasia about eleven o’clock:—
Four guns of No. 2 Mountain Battery, under Captain G. Swinley, R.A.
Two Gatling guns, under Captain A. Broadfoot.
7th Company of Sappers and Miners, under Lieutenant C. Nugent, R.A.
72nd Highlanders, under Lieutenant-Colonel W. H. J. Clarke.
Six companies of the 5th Ghoorkas, under Major A. Fitz-Hugh.
200 of the 5th Punjab Infantry, under Captain C. McK. Hall.
This force was strengthened by 450 of the 23rd Pioneers, withdrawn from
the road leading to the Sang-i-Nawishta defile;[11] while at the same
time our right attack was also modified. Major White, of the 92nd
Highlanders, assumed command in this direction, the troops entrusted to
his charge being:—
Three guns, G-3, R.A., under Major S. Parry, R.A.
Two squadrons of cavalry, made up of detachments of the 9th Lancers, 5th
Punjab Cavalry, and 12th Bengal Cavalry, commanded by Major Hammond, 5th
P.C.
A wing of the 92nd Highlanders, under Major Hay.
100 men of the 23rd Pioneers, under Captain H. Paterson.
-----
Footnote 11:
It should be noted that no cavalry accompanied General Baker. A
similar mistake was made on several other occasions later on. Our
infantry lacked the _immediate_ support of cavalry to make defeats
decisive.
-----
This force was to keep the enemy in play at the Sang-i-Nawishta by rapid
artillery fire, and so to distract their attention that they would give
time for our main attack to be delivered on their right, where they had
no guns in position, and had not a narrow gorge to defend. The old
tactics of turning their flank and taking their main line in reverse
were to be followed; and knowing the Afghan inability, as a rule, to
make a counter-attack, General Roberts weakened his right, so as to
concentrate a strong infantry force for the outflanking movement over
the hills overlooking the Chardeh Valley. Sirdar Nek Mahomed Khan (son
of Dost Mahomed), who was in command of the Afghan troops, seemed to
think we should make a determined effort to force the Sang-i-Nawishta
Pass, and he had accordingly posted on the heights overlooking the road
twelve guns, while three or four Armstrong-pattern breech-loaders were
on the plain below. The enemy’s disposition seemed to indicate that if
we tried to force the Pass their guns would have held us in check, while
their right was swung round to take us in flank, the series of ridges
which they covered offering a good manœuvring ground for such a
movement, while the undulating plain below, with its belt of trees round
about Charasia, would have given excellent cover. The accompanying map
will show the relative positions, and also make clear the strength of
the defending force which was able to cover so much ground.
[Illustration: Plan of Engagement on Heights near Kabul, 6th October,
1879.]
After leaving the camp, General Baker made for the village of Charasia,
which consisted of a number of detached walled enclosures such as are
common all over the country. There were numerous orchards and gardens
adjoining these, so that his first movements were well concealed from
the enemy, whose attention up to this point was directed chiefly to
Major White’s movements on the Cabul Road. Seeing how greatly he was
outnumbered, General Baker took the precaution of occupying a strong
walled enclosure on the outskirts of Charasia, and here he placed his
reserve ammunition and his field hospital. The temper of the villagers
was so uncertain that he telegraphed to General Roberts for another
regiment of infantry to strengthen his reserves, and 100 men of the 5th
Punjab Infantry hurried out at once and joined the hospital and reserve
ammunition guard. The remainder of the regiment were sent out soon
after, although this left the camp very weakly guarded, only 1,000
cavalry and infantry with six 9-pounder guns being left at
head-quarters. However, as General Macpherson was coming up with his
brigade, the risk was well worth running, as failure on General Baker’s
part might have meant disaster to the whole army. The 72nd Highlanders
led the way out of Charasia, and bullets soon began to drop among their
ranks while the enemy’s picquets were seen to be retiring up the ridges.
As the brigade pushed forward with the intention of outflanking the main
line of hills lying between Chardeh and the Sang-i-Nawishta, their
progress was checked by a strong position on their left front on which
the Afghans had raised _sungars_, and from which they began to open a
heavy musketry fire. Two mountain guns replied to this, and the 72nd
extended in skirmishing order, one company under Captain Brooke-Hunt
turning off to the left, while the main body of the regiment worked away
to the front, the ground affording but slight cover. Captain Hunt’s
company scaled a hill 500 or 600 feet high, climbing over difficult
rocks, which hindered their rapid advance. The enemy were exceedingly
numerous on their extreme right, another and steeper hill enabling them
to pour a heavy fire upon the company. Two more mountain guns and the
Gatlings were ordered to open fire upon this hill, and upon such bodies
of men as were visible on the near ridges; but the Gatlings were in such
bad order, owing to their defective make, that after a few rounds the
drum “jammed” and they had to be taken out of action. Our true attack
had now been recognized by Nek Mahomed and he hastened to reinforce his
right; a stream of men was seen pouring along the rearmost ridges from
the direction of the Sang-i-Nawishta, and standards borne by Ghazis
began to thicken on our left. General Baker lost no time in pushing
forward part of his reserves, in order to force their first position
before it could be strongly reinforced. The 5th Ghoorkas, and 200 men of
the 5th Punjab Infantry, doubled forward, while the enemy’s fire
increased in intensity. Captain Hunt’s company was strengthened by two
companies of the 5th Ghoorkas, under Captain John Cook, V.C.; while two
more companies of Ghoorkas and 200 of the 5th P.I. joined the advanced
skirmishers of the 72nd in the main attack. The skirmishing line was
thus extended so as to outflank the left of the ridge, which the Afghans
still clung to with great obstinacy, as it was the key of the position
on their right flank. This was at 1.30 P.M., when our troops had been
engaged for an hour and a half without having made much impression upon
the enemy. With the strengthening of our advance success was soon
declared: the hill on the extreme left, from which a flanking fire had
been directed on our skirmishers, was carried in splendid style by the
company of the 72nd and the two companies of the 5th Ghoorkas, while the
other companies of the two regiments, by a series of gallant rushes,
turned the enemy’s left. At two o’clock our advanced line was enabled to
direct a cross fire upon the 2,000 men who held the ridge, and who now
showed symptoms of wavering. A general advance was ordered, and the
72nd, 5th Ghoorkas, and 5th P.I. were in a few minutes in possession of
the Afghan’s first line. But not without loss, for the enemy were
chiefly armed with Snider and Enfield rifles, and their fire was rapid
and continuous. Fortunately they had so little knowledge of the
principles of musketry that their bullets mostly passed over our men’s
heads as the rush uphill was made. The 72nd Highlanders bore the brunt
of the fighting, and their casualties amounted to thirty-six. They had
on several occasions to cross open ground, and in spite of the exposure
they rushed forward with an _élan_ that could not have been surpassed.
Private MacMahon, one of their number, particularly distinguished
himself on the left. Almost single-handed he scaled a hill on the crest
of which was a _sungar_ filled with men: loading and firing as he went,
his coolness incited four or five Ghoorkas to follow him; and when he
finally leaped into the _sungar_ its defenders took to flight and were
shot down as they ran. MacMahon is to be recommended by General Baker
for the Victoria Cross, his gallantry having been observed by the
General and his Staff as well as by the officers engaged in the attack.
It was such incidents as these which caused General Baker to express his
great satisfaction with the behaviour of the troops under his command.
After their first position had fallen into our hands, the enemy rallied
on some low hills 600 yards in rear and re-opened fire, to which our
mountain guns replied, while our men were resting on their arms. A
company of the 23rd Pioneers, under Lieutenant Chesney, was thrown
forward on the right, while two companies of the 92nd, under Captain
Oxley, which Major White had detached to hold in check any flanking
movement the enemy might attempt on General Baker’s right, also came
into action. The enemy’s second position was attacked by the 72nd
Highlanders and the 5th Ghoorkas, aided by the three companies just
mentioned, and at three o’clock the Afghan right had been broken up, and
their regiments were flying towards the village of Indikee. The mountain
guns fired shrapnel into their midst, and the Gatling guns, for the few
moments they were able to work, also did some execution, while volleys
from the 72nd at long ranges caused the fugitives to hasten their
flight. Major Stockwell, with a wing of the 72nd, followed them rapidly
until he reached the open ground leading down into the Chardeh Valley,
when his further advance was stopped by General Baker, as the turning
movement along the ridge towards the Sang-i-Nawishta had to be made. The
want of cavalry was here painfully apparent, as the retreating masses of
the Afghans could easily have been overtaken, the sloping ground between
Indikee and the hills being admirably suited for a pursuit. While Major
Stockwell had thus been completing the defeat of the enemy’s right, two
companies of the 23rd Pioneers had gained a footing on the main ridge
itself, whence the enemy were rapidly retiring as they recognized that
their line would in a few minutes be taken in reverse. General Baker
swung round his left, ordered a general advance, and at 3.45 P.M. the
ridge was in our hands without any serious opposition having been met
with. Not that they had not shown great determination before, for bands
of ghazis had made good their footing behind the _sungars_ until our
bayonets had forced them down. The 5th Ghoorkas were charged by a number
of these madmen, but they met the rush by a counter bayonet charge and
cleared all before them.
Leaving General Baker with the main body of his force sweeping over the
high ridge in the direction of the Sang-i-Nawishta Gorge, I must now
turn to Major White’s movements on our right, where had been done one of
the most gallant feats of the day. The feint in this direction had been
turned into a successful attack, resulting in the capture of twenty
guns, although our infantry numbered only a few hundreds, and our
cavalry were unable to act. Skirting the east of Charasia, Major White
found the enemy scattered about among the trees, and also holding the
hills to right and left of the defile. The three guns of G-3 were soon
in action, and a few shells well placed, with the fire of skirmishers
thrown out among the trees and gardens, drove back the more venturesome
of the enemy to the shelter of the _sungars_ in the hills, and behind
some boulders in the bed of the Pass. Our guns were then moved forward
and made beautiful practice, the answering fire from the enemy’s
artillery being quite harmless. One of our shells struck an Afghan
field-piece, dismounted it, and killed two of the horses standing near,
while another struck a standard in a cluster of men. In fact, the 103
rounds fired by G-3 were of the greatest value in preparing the way for
the infantry attack. This attack was led personally by Major White, who
at the head of only fifty Highlanders charged the first hill on the
right, where several hundred Afghans were posted. Our men went up with a
rush under a severe musketry fire, and the enemy waited as if to receive
them at the point of the bayonet. With such odds in their favour, and a
_sungar_ to aid them, European troops would have swept back the handful
of men attacking with scarcely an effort; but Afghan courage and
steadiness are very limited. When the Highlanders were within five or
six yards of the _sungar_ the enemy turned and fled, and were shot in
the back as they made for the next hill. The success thus gained was
mainly due to Major White’s personal gallantry, one striking instance of
which may be quoted. Not caring to expose his men in a particularly
steep bit of ground, which was enfiladed by a few Afghans well placed in
rear of some rocks, he took a loaded rifle from one of the Highlanders
and “stalked” the enemy single-handed. By cautious climbing he reached
the rocks behind which they were concealed, and as he showed himself
they jumped up and ran, no doubt in the full belief that the single
figure they saw was only the leader of a number of others. One man
stayed to fire, but missed his aim, and as he turned Major White shot
him through the head. Unfortunately, he had no more cartridges with him,
or some of the others would have fallen. This hill is to be called
“White’s Hill” in memory of his gallantry. The capture of this point
enabled the guns to be advanced still further towards the entrance of
the Pass, but Major White was not content. Having given his men
breathing time, and being reinforced by another fifty men from below, he
again went forward and captured two lower hills on the right, in the
same grand style, and with only trifling loss. It was by these movements
that he was able to send Captain Oxley with two companies well to the
left, to co-operate with General Baker’s Brigade. Six Armstrong guns
fell into Major White’s hands on the open ground below the hills; and
when our turning movement in the Chardeh direction had been completed,
and the enemy began to evacuate the main ridge, the cavalry were sent
forward, and the infantry occupied the hills commanding the
Sang-i-Nawishta Pass on the left. Here twelve more guns were captured in
position, while the cavalry found two more abandoned on the road. The
twenty guns brought out from Sherpur, therefore, to fortify the Pass
have all fallen into our hands. Upon Major White gaining the ridge to
the left he could see no further sign of the enemy, who had stampeded to
the Bala Hissar. The cavalry could not follow as the Pass narrows, and
the narrow paths beyond are not adapted for a body of horse charging.
Our information was to the contrary, it being stated that the road
opened into a plain, and our cavalry being accordingly sent to the right
to cut off the retreat of the enemy when driven towards Cabul by General
Baker. As events occurred, the two squadrons would have been invaluable
if they had accompanied the General. The progress of the brigade along
the main ridge was very slow, as the ground was rugged and difficult;
and it was not until nightfall that a junction was effected with Major
White. The 23rd Pioneers and the 5th P.I. moved down into an open bit of
ground beyond the Pass, while the 72nd Highlanders, the Ghoorkas, and
mountain guns remained above, throwing out strong picquets over the
range of hills. Major White’s force bivouacked on the ground they had
occupied when their last movement was made.
It is worth mentioning that two elephants, three camels, and 200 mules
carrying stores, &c., were safely piloted over the precipitous hills
which were taken, and the men were thus able to bivouac in comfort. Not
the least important arrangement of the day was that of signalling.
Captain Straton had parties of men with General Baker and Major White,
and a third batch of signallers was sent to a high hill to watch the
Chardeh Valley, and the movements of large bodies of tribesmen, who
lined the crests of the range overlooking the camp from the west.
Heliograms were exchanged between these points and the head-quarters
camp, and General Roberts was kept fully informed of all that was
happening in these directions. This focussing of all information upon a
common centre enabled the General to make his dispositions with accuracy
and effect: without the signallers dangerous delays might have occurred.
The heliographing was so thoroughly well done that Sir F. Roberts
complimented Captain Straton personally on the success of his
arrangements. The only drawback was a succession of small sand storms,
which swept across the camp and blotted out everything for the time
being.
The attitude of the tribesmen in our immediate neighbourhood, _i.e._, on
the ranges of hills east and west of the camp, was one of expectancy
modified by an earnest desire to harass our picquets by spasmodic
firing. Their ill-will was first shown by firing upon the signallers on
the hill, and the party had eventually to be withdrawn. Two guns were
sent down and a few shells pitched upwards, which caused these guerillas
to withdraw to a safe distance. The convoy from our last camp at Sufed
Sang, Zahidabad, was also fired upon, and General Macpherson had to
throw out skirmishers to protect his baggage animals. At least some
hundred men appeared on a high peak to the east of the camp, and fired
upon a picquet of the 92nd who were on a lower level. A brisk fire was
kept up for some time, and the enemy driven off to higher ground.[12] As
they re-opened fire the R.H.A. were ordered to try a shot at the peak.
The first shell dropped a little short, but the second burst on the
point occupied, and the next instant it was quite clear, its late
occupants running in disorder into the valley beyond. There were several
of the Amir’s soldiers among them, still wearing his uniform. The camp
after this was left undisturbed: tents were struck at sunset in
readiness for the early morning march which it had been decided to make
to Beni-Hissar, just beyond the Sang-i-Nawishta Pass.
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Footnote 12:
As I have, perhaps, scarcely done justice to this incident in my
letter, I now quote the General’s despatch on the subject:—“One party,
bolder than the rest, caused so much annoyance to a picquet of the
92nd Highlanders, that it became necessary to dislodge them, and this
difficult service was performed in a most gallant manner by a small
party of the 92nd under Lieutenant R. A. Grant. Colour-Sergeant Hector
Macdonald, a non-commissioned officer, whose excellent and skilful
management of a small detachment when opposed to immensely superior
numbers in the Hazara-Darukht defile, was mentioned in my despatch of
the 15th instant, here again distinguished himself.” Colour-Serjeant
Macdonald afterwards received a commission in the 92nd.
-----
The enemy are believed, in this action, to have had 9,000 or 10,000 men
on the ridges, including thirteen regiments of regulars. They left 300
dead on the field, but their total loss in killed and wounded must have
been much greater. Our loss was twenty killed and sixty-seven[13]
wounded, among the latter being Lieutenant Fergusson, 72nd Highlanders,
bullet contusion, left leg, slight; Dr. Duncan, 23rd Pioneers, bullet
wound in the chest, severe; and Captain Young, 5th Punjab Infantry,
bullet wound in the left thigh, severe. Of the British Infantry
regiments the 72nd lost three killed and thirty-four wounded; and the
92nd three killed and six wounded. Among our camp followers five
dhoolie-bearers were killed and four wounded, returns which show that
the _kahars_ were well under fire in carrying off the injured.
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Footnote 13:
Seven of the wounded men afterwards died.
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