It would not be desirable to prohibit production of heavy water and
deuterium in quantity since heavy water is the best moderator of
neutrons in the large-scale production of atomic power for industrial
uses. Furthermore, such a prohibition could never be enforced, since, as
stated, the manufacture of heavy water and the separation of deuterium
are relatively simple processes that “may be carried out in small plants
which can exist in a variety of locales.” What makes it even more
difficult, if not impossible, to detect any violation of such a
prohibition is the fact that the raw material for heavy water or
deuterium is just plain water.
7. SHOULD THE PROVISIONS OF THE PRESENT UN PLAN RELATING TO INSPECTION,
SURVEYS, AND EXPLORATIONS BE MODIFIED TO CONTROL HEAVY WATER AND
DEUTERIUM PRODUCTION?
The United Nations plan assumes that the production of fissionable
material cannot be regulated without strict supervision over the mining
of source materials such as uranium and thorium:
Without the control of raw materials, any other controls that might be
applied in the various processes of atomic energy production would be
inadequate because of the uncertainty as to whether or not the
international agency has knowledge of the disposition of _all_ raw
material. (_Second Report_, p. 30.)
Whereas uranium and thorium are needed to produce U-235, [U-233] and
plutonium, the production of deuterium is not subject to such limitation
of source materials. Only water, the existence of power, and
comparatively simple plants are needed for the manufacture of heavy
water and deuterium. In view of these facts, can the existing United
Nations plan cope with the problem of regulating deuterium production?
In commenting upon spot aerial surveys, for example, the _Second Report_
recommends that “the [international] agency shall conduct spot aerial
surveys in each period of 2 years over areas not exceeding 5 percent of
the territory under the control of each nation or areas not to exceed
2,000 square miles, whichever is the larger. (These area limitations
apply to spot aerial surveys only)” (p. 68). If aerial surveys were to
be used not only in controlling raw materials but also to help in
spotting deuterium and heavy water plants, must they be carried out more
frequently than is provided in the existing plan?
The _Second Report_ also indicates that a UN inspectorate should be
compelled to secure permission, through a warrant procedure, before
inspecting “private and restricted property not open to visitation by
the population in the locality, and in the case of certain ground
surveys and aerial surveys which are additional to others which the
agency may conduct without warrant or other special authorization” (p.
60). Do the technical facts surrounding heavy water and deuterium
production suggest that such a restriction on an international agency’s
authority would have to be modified?