Since H-bombs require either U-235 or plutonium, as well as deuterium
and tritium, and since absolute or near-absolute control of U-235 or
plutonium is not possible, it becomes obvious that H-bomb controls must
relate to both deuterium and tritium as well as to fissionable material.
Since the UN plan does not mention them by name, added safeguards are
necessary to regulate deuterium and tritium. No safeguards, however,
could be devised even in this respect to provide absolute or
near-absolute protection.
6. IS IT TECHNICALLY POSSIBLE TO DETECT THE MANUFACTURE OF HEAVY WATER
AND DEUTERIUM THROUGH INTERNATIONAL INSPECTION? WOULD AN INTERNATIONAL
AGREEMENT FLATLY PROHIBITING PRODUCTION IN QUANTITY BE DESIRABLE?
The manufacture of heavy water and the separation of deuterium are
relatively simple processes. They may be carried out in small plants
which can exist in a variety of locales.
The _Second Report_ of the UN Commission comments as follows:
The international agency shall have the authority to require periodic
reports from nations regarding the production, shipment, location, and
use of specialized equipment and supplies directly related to the
production and use of atomic energy, such as mass spectrometers,
diffusion barriers, gas centrifuges, electromagnetic isotope
separation units, very pure graphite in large amounts, heavy water,
and beryllium or beryllium compounds in large amounts. In addition,
the agency shall have authority to require reports as specified of
certain distinctive facilities and construction projects having
features of size and design, or construction or operation, which, in
combination with their location and/or production or consumption of
heat or electricity, are peculiarly comparable to those of known
atomic facilities of dangerous character (p. 54).
Would inspectors possessing freedom of movement be able to locate
deuterium and heavy water plants? Would aerial surveys and aerial
photographs of industrial areas help detect processes which produce
hydrogen as a byproduct and which might therefore be concerned with the
manufacture of heavy water or deuterium? Should quantity production of
deuterium be prohibited even though it is used in certain types of
peacetime reactors such as the Canadian reactor at Chalk River, the
French reactor at Chatillon, Swedish reactors under construction, and a
research reactor at the Argonne National Laboratory? Is it possible on
technical grounds to enforce such a prohibition?