It can be stated unequivocally that, in the absence of complete mutual
faith and goodwill on the part of all concerned, neither the existing UN
plan nor any other technical plan that can be devised will provide
absolute or near-absolute protection. No plan could be devised that
would provide assurance against the diversion of enough material in any
one year to make at least one atomic bomb. In five years this would mean
the secret production of five hydrogen bombs.
5. MUST H-BOMB CONTROLS RELATE TO DEUTERIUM AND TRITIUM AS WELL AS TO
FISSIONABLE MATERIAL? IF THEY MUST, CAN THE PRESENT UN PLAN FULLY
PROVIDE FOR THESE CONTROLS OR DOES IT REQUIRE REVISION OR CHANGES IN
EMPHASIS?
Should control over both fissionable material and deuterium and tritium
call for the same emphasis and consideration which the United Nations
Atomic Energy Commission has already given to control of U-235 and
plutonium? Would surveillance of deuterium and tritium manufacture
furnish better insurance against illicit H-bomb construction than
surveillance of U-235 and plutonium, or is the reverse more apt to be
true? Are added safeguards necessary to regulate deuterium and tritium?
Or is the UN plan, as now constituted, sufficiently flexible and
comprehensive to take care of light-element control?