The language makes it obvious that the United Nations plan “foresees and
carefully takes into account the possibility of an H-bomb.” In view of
Russia’s attitude, however, and to leave no room for future quibbling,
the present plan should be explicitly elaborated to include hydrogen
weapons. On the other hand, since Russia will have none of the plan,
such elaboration would at best be purely academic.
As for protecting informants, certainly no plan could contemplate that
citizens would act as spies against their own country, even if they find
that their country is violating an international agreement. The plan is
designed so that such violations could be detected by the official
employees of the international control agency. Obviously, such official
employees stationed in any country should not be nationals of that
country and should be protected by diplomatic immunity. Each country, in
selecting its representatives to the control agency, would naturally
subject them to a most careful screening as to their character and
loyalty, and would use all necessary checks to make certain that they
are faithful and loyal to the objectives of the agency.
4. IS CONTROL OVER FISSIONABLE MATERIALS SUFFICIENT TO PREVENT THE
PRODUCTION OF HYDROGEN BOMBS? IF SO, IS THE EXISTING UN PLAN ADEQUATE TO
THIS TASK?
The technical facts suggest that H-bombs may be regulated in at least
two ways: (1) Control over the fissionable material usable as a
“trigger” and (2) control over deuterium and tritium.
Perhaps control over _all_ fissionable material would give effective
control over hydrogen weapons. However, by way of specific example, the
introduction to volume VI of the Scientific Information Transmitted to
the United Nations Atomic Energy Commission, June 14, 1946-October 14,
1946 (see State Department Publication 2661, pp. 151–152), comments as
follows:
It is difficult to define the amount of activity in the illicit
production of atomic weapons which is significant. The illicit
construction of a single atomic bomb by means of a decade of
successful evasion would not provide an overwhelming advantage, if it
can be assumed that it would take another decade to produce a second
bomb. But the secret production of one bomb per year would create a
definite danger, and the secret production of five or more per year
would be disastrous. This report assumes arbitrarily that the minimum
unit of noncompliance is the secret production of one atomic bomb per
year or a total of five bombs over any period of time. [This example
is chosen because UN documents published later omit concrete
illustrations, although the stress which these documents place upon
international ownership, operation, and management clearly reflects a
determination to reduce to the rock-bottom minimum any illicit mining
or production.]
Considering that five illicit A-bombs might, under certain
circumstances, lead to five illicit H-bombs, what margin of
inefficiency—if any—in controlling source and fissionable material is
permissible? Is absolute protection against illegal diversion of source
and fissionable material technically possible? Does the existing UN plan
provide absolute or near-absolute protection? Can greater technical
protection be secured than under the present UN plan?