Since the H-bomb requires the A-bomb as a trigger, it becomes obvious
that the two problems are inseparable.
3. IS THE EXISTING UNITED NATIONS PLAN TECHNICALLY ADEQUATE TO CONTROL
H-BOMBS?
The United Nations plan has been couched in such a manner that an
international agency would possess discretionary authority in defining
and controlling materials and processes that may be employed to
manufacture nuclear weapons of mass destruction.
For instance, the _Second Report_ of the United Nations Atomic Energy
Commission defines “atomic energy” as including “all forms of energy
released in the course of, or as a result of, nuclear fission _or of
other nuclear transformation_.” “Source material” is taken to mean “any
material containing one or more key substances in such concentration as
the international agency may by regulation determine.” “Key substance”
is defined to mean “uranium, thorium _and any other element from which
nuclear fuel can be produced, as may be determined by the international
agency_.” (p. 71). Similarly, the report defines “nuclear fuel” as
“plutonium, U-233, U-235, uranium enriched in U-235, material containing
the foregoing, _and any other material which the international agency
determines to be capable of releasing substantial quantities of atomic
energy through nuclear chain reaction of the material_.” (p. 71.) The
_report_ likewise observes that: “Dangerous activities or facilities are
those which are of _military significance_ in the production of atomic
weapons. The word “dangerous” is used in the sense of _potentially
dangerous to world security_.” (p. 70). [Italics supplied throughout.]
Does such breadth of phraseology mean that manufacturing processes and
source materials needed in the production of H-bombs could be properly
controlled, through the existing UN plan?
Since nearly 2 years of work were required to formulate the UN plan, can
this plan be regarded as adequate for hydrogen weapons so long as the
control measures for the atomic energy industry are not explicitly
elaborated with the same detail as the arrangements evolved for
controlling U-235 and plutonium?
It may also be pointed out that the existing UN plan contains no
provision for physically protecting informants who advise the
international agency of violations. Might potential informants keep
silent for fear of being punished by their national governments? Is this
factor important if the existing UN plan were subjected to the added
strain of controlling hydrogen weapons as well as atomic weapons?
What safeguards would assure that the employees of an international
control agency would be faithful and loyal to the objectives of the
agency and that they would not work purely in the interests of some
national government—perhaps a national government other than that of
their own country?